LEADERSHIP, MORALITY AND ETHICS:

DEVELOPING A PRACTICAL MODEL FOR MORAL DECISION-MAKING

Alfred W. Kaszniak 1,3, Cynda H. Rushton 2, & Joan Halifax 3

1 University of Arizona

Tucson, Arizona

2 Johns Hopkins University

Baltimore, Maryland

3 Upaya Institute

Santa Fe, New Mexico

Kaszniak, A.W., Rushton, C.H., & Halifax, J. (2018). Leadership, morality and ethics: Developing a practical model for moral decision-making. MindRxiv. April 17. mindrxiv.org/8qby6. DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/8QBY6

Introduction:

Principled and authentic leadership in all sectors of society, including health, education, business, and finance, requires fundamental shifts in understanding how moral discernment operates. Cultivating leaders who exemplify integrity necessitates grounding in pro-social values, character formation, ethical principles, and contemplative practices that enhance moral decision-making and engaged moral action. The present paper is the product of collaboration between a neuroscientist, an ethicist, and a contemplative exploring issues around leadership, morality, and ethics. It is an exploration on how people in roles of responsibility can better understand how to engage in discernment processes with more awareness and a deeper sense of responsibility for others and themselves. It has been written in a global climate where a practical understanding of how moral decision-making works is essential in this time when there can seem to be an increasing moral vacuum in leadership.

The meanings of the words morals and ethics overlap in common usage, though sometimes conflicting distinctions are drawn by philosophers and other scholars.

One simple way of understanding the distinction is that, “Broadly speaking, morals are individual principles of right and wrong, and a system of ethics deals with sets of those principles.”

The term ethics is often used in reference to the philosophical study of morality. A system of ethics, by such usage, has overlap with Haidt’s (2012) definition of moral systems:

“Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities,

institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that

work together to suppress or regulate self-interest and make cooperative societies

possible.” (p. 314)

Here we use morals when we are referring to individual principles or discernment of right and wrong, ethics when we are referring to sets (particularly codified sets) of these principles, and moral/ethical when we are referring to both. Further, when examining mental processes that we see as involved in moral decision-making and action, we will draw distinctions between moral resonance, moral discernment

(including, though not limited to moral reasoning), and moral action. We will refer to moral resonance in reference to an expanded perspective on moral sensitivity, which has been described as the ‘‘ability to recognize the presence of moral issues in real-world situations’’ (Navaez & Rest, 1995). One meaning of the word resonance is a quality that makes something personally meaningful or important. Moral resonance, as we are defining this term, involves a set of processes that detect whether initial reactions to an event are aligned with personally important values – with the leader’s character. These processes begin with attention to subtle and initially pre-conscious bodily cues reflecting emotional biases and empathic resonance with others. These cues can alert one to the possibility of a moral issue, and can interact with conscience and altruistic disposition (reflecting values and character).

We will use the term moral discernment to refer to those mental processes that are primed by moral resonance to engage executive control processes. These executive processes, informed by intentions as well as social and emotional contexts, allow for pause, situational reappraisal, and arousal regulation. The emotional regulation and balance afforded by executive processes allows for a modulation of potential biases in moral reasoning (involving inductive and deductive logic, and the application of systematic ethical principles). Moral reasoning then informs moral decisions that support various courses of principled moral action (see Rushton, Kaszniak, &

Halifax, 2013a). Moral discernment thus also appears to involve several distinguishable mental processes, most of these operating within conscious awareness.

In what follows, we articulate a conceptual and practical moral/ethical model, motivated by recent scientific investigation, to support leaders in working skillfully and compassionately with the complexities that inevitably arise as they engage with their organizations, others, and themselves.

The focus of this model is on how people process moral/ethical decisions, and how this processing can be done with greater fidelity to moral resonance, moral discernment, claims of conscience, ethical principles, and inductive/deductive approaches to moral/ethical reasoning. These modes of processing, which include cognitive, somatic, emotional, and spiritual dimensions, use different capacities, all of which are important in reaching morally/ethically grounded decisions and engaging in moral action.

Unlike some early models of moral and ethical cognition, this model for an applied approach to morals/ethics focuses not only on logical conceptual reasoning, but also takes into account emotional determinants of moral behavior. These emotional determinants are often operating outside of, and prior to a leader’s conscious logical reasoning processes. The model also examines the leader’s ability to access values, view these values on both deep and synoptic levels, and align them within a systems perspective. An assumption of this model is that both conceptual and experiential appreciation of the interconnected domains we propose are essential when dealing with the critical and complex issues that leaders face today.

It is intended that the proposed model will be applicable to leaders at all levels in health care, government, education, law, business, and many other areas that are both affected by and contribute to the global conditions that are associated with so much suffering in the world today. This model, and its implications for a new approach to moral/ethical education, is grounded in recent relevant scientific research and scholarship, as well as that concerning the consequences and biological correlates of contemplative practices that can enhance principled moral action. The following summary of scientific research and scholarship is not intended to be an exhaustive review, but rather endeavors to highlight representative published work that the authors view as most relevant for moral/ethical leadership.

Scientific Research and Scholarship on Moral Resonance, Moral Discernment and Moral Action:

Until the last decade of the 20th century, the predominant approach to a scientific understanding of morality examined developmental theories that placed their emphasis on conscious reasoning processes in adult moral decision-making and action (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969). From this perspective, individuals use logic as a means to resolve conflicts between competing possible actions and moral/ethical claims.

Using both inductive and deductive inferences, individuals evaluate certain premises to reach conclusions about proper moral action.

Although social processes are embedded in such cognitive approaches to moral discernment, the interpersonal and social elements are not clearly differentiated. In her groundbreaking critique of Kohlberg’s reasoned justice orientation as the foundation of ethics, Carol Gilligan introduced the interpersonal, emotional, and social aspects of ethics in what is now known as an ethic of care (Gilligan, 1982,

1988). Care ethics assert that moral inquiry begins with one’s own experience rather than first appealing to a priori principles, external norms, or standards. It emphasizes subjective experiential phenomena such as empathy and felt relational bonds as having compelling moral meaning and consequent moral claims and duties. Without diminishing the role of moral reasoning, an ethic of care emphasizes the affective, relational, and contextual elements of morality as practices of responsibility, from the immediate and personal to the larger domains of citizenship and public policy. (Hamington, 2010; Held, 2005; Held & City University of New

York, 2014; Mohammed & Peter, 2009; Walker, 2008). This is an interesting and important perspective to bring to bear on the issue of moral leadership.

A major premise of an ethic of care is a worldview that recognizes the interconnection and interdependence of all beings and things, and with it a responsibility to appreciate the impact of action on others, particularly disenfranchised and voiceless stakeholders, or even environmental dimensions.

Walker (2008) identifies four essential elements of an ethic of care: 1)

Responsiveness to human needs, 2) Responsible competence in attending to human needs, 3) Valuing human connection and relationship, and 4) Valuing the work and responsibilities of care. The present authors would add to these four elements a fifth: Valuing human interconnections with the environment and responsible competence in stewarding our environment. Taken together these elements create a broader foundation for appreciating the complexity, moral trade-offs, and contours of integrity-preserving action.

Related to this is an increasing recognition in the cognitive sciences and neurosciences of the important roles of emotion and non-conscious processes in all decision making (e.g., Damasio, 1994; 1999), including moral discernment

(Liljenquist, Zhong, & Galinsky, 2010; Narvaez, 2014; Zhong, Bohns, & Gino, 2010).

Moral resonance and moral discernment are strongly influenced by typically pre- conscious emotional influences that are often more powerful than rational reasoning (for review, see Haidt, 2012). These emotional influences include feedback to the brain from bodily processes that are rapidly activated in emotion

(Haidt, 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002). These bodily processes, such as changes in heart-rate and respiration, prepare the body for taking action, and several may be subjectively perceivable (termed interoception) and made available to other conscious cognitive processes, when brought into awareness (for review of relevant research and scholarship, see Farb et al., 2015). Research in cognitive science has made it clear that activity of the body plays an integral role in cognitive processes

(Barsalou, 2008).

Our bodies thus appear capable of providing what can be thought of as early warning systems that alert us to threats, challenges, biases, or violations of integrity, inform conscience and principled moral action, and inform the experience of moral congruence - a felt sense of disposition toward altruism, and moral elevation.

Greater attention to the bodily cues associated with such morally-relevant issues as pre-conscious biases and violations of integrity thus appear to have the potential of countering what has been termed “ethical fading,” (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004), where decision makers allow moral/ethical issues to fade into the background, cease to be felt as relevant, and no longer perceive them.

There is correlational evidence that persons who self-report greater mindfulness

(open, non-judgmental attention to and awareness of whatever is occurring in the present moment) in their daily lives also report that they are more likely to act ethically, uphold ethical standards, and use a principled approach to ethical decision making (Ruedy & Schweitzer, 2010). Self-reported degree of mindfulness in daily life was also correlated with less cheating on a behavioral measure of unethical behavior (Ruedy & Schweitzer, 2010). In addition, there appears to be a kind of upward moral spiral in organizations when leaders serve as examples of moral excellence. As reviewed below in the discussion of moral intentions, there is evidence that leaders who manifest moral excellence in their fairness with others and their self-sacrifice engender moral elevation and greater commitment among their followers (Vianello, Galliani, & Haidt, 2010).

The neural architecture of moral cognition appears to involve a convergence of both pre-conscious and conscious emotional, physical, social, and cognitive processing networks evolved to support humans in navigating the intellectual, social, material, and moral landscape of their lives (Bzdok, Gross, & Eickhoff, 2014; Helion, 2014;

Mathews & Bok, 2014; Tangney et al., 2007). A growing body of research on the neural correlates of morality has suggested that our moral sense is the result of an integration of conscious cognitive processes with several primarily pre-conscious processes involved in emotional responses to social situations and empathic attunement to the behavior and intentions of others (for review, see Marazziti,

Baroni, Landi, Ceresoli, & Dell’Osso, 2013).

The Evolutionary Roles of Disgust, Fear, and Social Cooperation in Moral

Resonance:

Moral resonance and moral discernment appear to have some of their evolutionary origins and biological correlates in the emotions of disgust and fear (Wicker, et al.,

2003). Humans and other animals show quick aversion to anything that poses a threat of harm. Disgust is particularly elicited by sights, smells, and sounds that signal the threat of disease, such as excrement, indicators of infection, dead bodies, spoiled foods, and particular animals (Curtis & Biran, 2001; Oaten, Stevenson, &

Case, 2009). A region of the brain’s cerebral cortex enfolded deep within the fissure separating the temporal and frontal lobes, called the anterior insula, has been shown to be activated when a person is experiencing disgust, and when seeing others’ facial expressions of disgust (Phillips et al., 1997). Stroke-related brain damage involving the insula has been shown to result in both decreased responses to disgust-inducing sensory stimuli, and difficulty discriminating disgust facial expressions from those of other emotions such as anger (Calder et al., 2000).

The anterior insular cortex (AIC) receives visceral (from the internal organs) and visual input and is involved in autonomic nervous system responses that affect visceral activity (Wicker et al., 2003). The AIC has been found to be involved in a number of mental/behavioral phenomena, from visceral and sexual feelings, to maternal love, craving, decision-making and sudden experiences of insight. Such observations have led to theorizing about the importance of “embodiment”

(conscious and non-conscious effects of visceral and other bodily feedback to the brain) in mental processes (e.g., Farb et al., 2015), and it has been proposed that the

AIC makes a fundamental contribution in all conscious awareness (Craig, 2009).

Given these observations regarding the AIC, it is not surprising that disgust often produces changes in the bodily reflections of autonomic nervous system (ANS) responses, including decreased heart-rate, blood pressure, and skin conductance, altered stomach activity, and changes in respiration (Meissner, Muth, & Herbert,

2011; Ritz, Thons, Fahrenkrug, & Dahme, 2005). There is also a characteristic facial expression of disgust, which appears to manifest across cultures (Ekman, Friesen, &

Ellsworth, 1972). Further, seeing another’s facial expression of disgust, elicits activity in those same brain regions (including the AIC) that are activated when one experiences disgust oneself (Wicker, et al., 2003).

A second emotion is relevant to consider in regard to moral resonance. The physiological, experiential, and behavioral components of the fear response are initiated when an event is appraised (consciously or non-consciously) as a potential threat. The amygdala, an almond-shaped brain structure deep in the forward part of the temporal lobes, and connected brain structures play an important role in the rapid detection of what is salient to the individual (Cunningham & Brosch, 2012;

Santos, Mier, Kirsch, & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2011), often prior to conscious awareness of the event. Salient events can be potential threats, potential affordances/opportunities, or some degree of a combination of these valences (i.e., ambivalent). The detection of salience, and determination of the salient event’s valence are influenced by the individual’s motivations or needs (e.g., hunger, thirst, social affiliation, etc.). Absent a relevant need, an event might not be detected as salient, and hence ignored (i.e., responded to with indifference).

As a consequence of salience detection, attention is focused on the event and various biological processes are set in motion that prepare for aversion (to threat), approach (to affordance/opportunity), or confusion (to ambivalence). For example, if the salient event is appraised as potentially threatening, the amygdala initiates multiple components of the fear response, which include autonomic arousal and neuroendocrine release (see Adolphs, 2013). Fear also narrows and biases attention to the potential threats (Harrison, Hurlemann, & Adolphs, 2015; Todd, Talmi,

Schmitz, Susskind, & Anderson, 2012), and may interfere with empathic concern and pro-social emotions and behavior (Cikara & Bavel, 2014; Harrison, Hurlemann

& Adolphs, 2015). For example, a leader encountering a colleague or employee of a different racial, cultural, religious, or political group might automatically and pre- consciously appraise this other as posing a potential threat, based on prior cultural or familial conditioning. The resultant biological processes of fear arousal would narrow and bias the leader’s attention to only those actions of the other person that seem to confirm the potential for threat. As a result of this biasing of attention, the leader might not register facial or other indicators of the other’s distress, and hence not experience the empathic resonance that would give rise to concern and compassionate action.

It has been argued that disgust and fear may have an important role in certain aspects of morality and ethics. For example, Tybur, Lieberman, and Griskevicium

(2009) describe three functional domains of disgust: pathogen disgust, leading to avoidance of infectious organisms; sexual disgust, leading to avoidance of potentially dangerous sexual partners and behaviors; and moral disgust, leading to avoidance of the violation of social norms. Reminders of physical cleanliness can influence moral and political attitudes (Helzer & Pizarro, 2011), and persons who are more likely to experience physical disgust are also more likely to experience moral disgust (Jones & Fitness, 2008), consistent with these different kinds of disgust sharing common biological processes. Although moral disgust may lead to principled moral action, disgust can also lead to horrifically immoral actions. When in wars or ethnic conflicts, persons of a particular group are dehumanized and likened to vermin, cockroaches, or other animals that elicit pathogen disgust, then atrocities such as “ethnic cleansing” or genocide are often the outcome (see Semelin,

2007). Dehumanization of persons in particular groups may also result in reactions of disgust that manifest in less dramatic, but equally harmful systemic violence, such as racial discrimination and sexism.

Moral discernment has traditionally been considered to be shaped by social norms and standards motivated by non-selfish conscious considerations such as respect for others, concern for their well-being, and fairness/impartiality in intentions. There is research supporting this perspective (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). However, preconscious mental processes, involving, for example, disgust and fear, can occur before and influence conscious moral discernment (David & Olatunji, 2011). This is particularly relevant for pre-conscious processes that can operate in the sphere of the leadership experience. For the leader who is interacting with others of different gender, race, culture, or background, prior conditioning can initiate pre-conscious, and therefore unrecognized biases related to disgust and fear.

The value of fear and anxiety as evolutionary survival mechanisms is well understood, but the adaptive utility of these emotions is primarily in managing short term threats. In the long term, when repeatedly or persistently activated, they can be destructive. For example, the correlation observed between degree of air pollution in U.S. cities and increases in criminal and unethical behavior appears to be mediated by anxiety (Lu, Lee, Gino, & Galinsky, 2018). Fear and anxiety can also overwhelm other emotions, depriving leaders of their full emotional capabilities, though the impact is not exclusively emotional. Fear and anxiety can incur long- lasting, sometimes disabling and even life-threatening impairments that may markedly limit the ability of a leader to develop and exercise other capabilities.

(Armony & Vuilleumier, 2013; Deppermann et al., 2014; Kalin, Shelton, & Davidson,

2004; Maren & Phan, 2013; Pittenger & Duman, 2007). For example, the leader who works in an environment that is driven primarily by efficiency can chronically engage fear-based, anxiety-riddled responses to Board imprimaturs, in order to demonstrate return on investment calculations that may fail to account for the context of the organization’s mission. In such circumstances, burnout can occur, numbing the leader’s ability to notice, respond to, and take action to uphold the broader organizational values. Cases of moral injury and distress suggest, for example, that although there is high variability in individual sensitivity, biological and environmental moral stressors can induce a loss of moral functionality

(Boudreau, 2011; Brock & Lettini, 2012; Glannon, 2011; Hunt, 2011; Litz et al., 2009;

Maguen & Litz, 2012; C. Shay, 2009).

In addition to the contributions of disgust and fear, there is evidence supporting the conclusion that human morality also has evolutionary group-level naturally selected origins in motives and skills for cooperating with others, influenced by sociocultural contexts and interactions (Haidt, 2012; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013; Warneken &

Tomasello, 2009). As observations of human evolutionary cousins such as the great apes have suggested, our evolutionary ancestors likely lived in social groups with empathy, various emotions, gratitude, and a sense of fairness influencing social behavior (de Waal, 1996), even though such ancestors did not seem to show processes we would identify as conscious moral reasoning.

A growing body of research supports the conclusion that evolution has shaped our present biology and psychology not only by survival of the fittest, but also by group- level “survival of the kindest” (see Haidt, 2012; Keltner, 2009), resulting in an innate capacity for cooperation and altruism (see also Ricard, 2015). Accumulating research demonstrates that greater happiness and satisfaction is produced by altruistic actions than by those that are egocentric (see Diener & Seligman, 2002).

Our evolved altruistic disposition, a kind of basic goodness, is thus both an important aspect of conscience, and perhaps the most significant contributor to personal happiness.

The moral relevance of our evolved capacities for disgust, fear, and social cooperation can be appreciated by reflecting on how these relate to the most common dimensions of morality. Haidt (2012), based on surveys conducted by himself and collaborators, describes dimensions of the moral spectrum as including:

1) harm/care, 2) fairness/reciprocity, 3) ingroup/loyalty, 4) authority/respect, and

5) purity/sanctity. The first three (Harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, and ingroup/loyalty) would appear to be most strongly related to social cooperation, while authority/respect might also relate to fear, and purity/sanctity to disgust. As

Haidt and colleagues also have found, these dimensions of the moral spectrum differentially relate to individual differences in worldview that are associated with political identification (i.e., liberal versus conservative). There is evidence linking such differences to fear and disgust reactivity. For example, conservatives have been found to be more easily disgusted than liberals (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom,

2009), and show higher threat sensitivity (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Salloway,

2003). These differences can be observed early in life. For example, Block and Block

(2006) found that women who identified as liberals when adults had been earlier rated by nursery school teachers as showing traits consistent with novelty-seeking and threat insensitivity.

It should be noted that the practical applications of the model we have developed here will not likely resolve intergroup differences in worldview, political orientation, and associated differences in those moral dimensions that are most salient and are most likely to elicit moral reactivity. However, practical implications of the model may facilitate greater clarity and a decrease in unrecognized biases in moral decision-making. In addition, having a framework in which to understand the moral decision-making of another may foster less reactivity in face-to-face interactions with another who initially seems threatening or unfamiliar.

Emotion and Rational Cognition in Moral Resonance and Moral Discernment:

Mind-brain processes involved in moral resonance and moral discernment have been inferred from the results of studies employing moral dilemma scenarios while simultaneously recording brain activity via functional magnetic resonance imaging

(fMRI). Common moral dilemma scenarios pose situations in which the participant must decide whether it is morally acceptable to sacrifice one individual’s life to save the lives of several others. Such research has suggested that individuals are influenced by both emotional and cognitive/rational factors in making moral discernments. Brain areas associated with emotional/social processes (e.g., medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulate/precuneus, superior temporal sulcus/temperoparietal junction) and with conscious abstract reasoning (e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and cognitive executive control (e.g., anterior cingulate cortex, ACC) are activated when persons make judgments of moral acceptability in response to these kinds of moral dilemma scenarios (Greene &

Haidt, 2002).

The contributions of emotional processes appear to be predominant when a moral dilemma is experienced as “personal” (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen,

2004). Green et al. (2001) identify personal moral dilemmas as those that meet three criteria: (1) the moral violation must be likely to cause serious harm; (2) the harm must be to a particular person or group of persons; and (3) the harm must not result from deflection of an existing threat onto a different party. Leaders, for example, may confront such “personal” moral dilemmas when they must make decisions regarding trade-offs necessary to balance the organization’s budget.

Executives need to take the perspective of those without authority influence or stature to understand the impact of budget decisions on others. If the leader identifies with others in executive roles, the leader may fail to appreciate the significance of the impact of budget cuts on those who do not enjoy the same authority or influence within the organization. Discernment in response to moral dilemmas that do not meet the criteria described by Green, et al. (2001) appears to be more strongly influenced by processes of conscious abstract reasoning and cognitive control (Greene et al., 2004). Examples here would include the application of systematized ethical principles, values, and norms to organizational policy development or budget allocations.

The Role of Intentions in Moral Discernment:

Intention reflects a goal, purpose, or aim an individual is committed to bringing about- an aim or standard that guides action. There is controversy regarding the relationship between intentions and beliefs and whether intention is sufficient to guide action (see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intention/). Prior or normative intentions that are aligned with values and beliefs, such as bringing about the greatest good for those affected by a decision or action, can offer a useful cognitive tool in appraising ethically complex situations. However, it is important to distinguish one’s intentions from what one actually does. For example, a leader may intend to bring about good outcomes for the company, but may or may not act in accordance with those intentions. One potentially fruitful application of intention in leadership involves pausing to reconnect to one’s beliefs and values (such as reducing harms and benefitting others) and examining the coherence and consistency in one’s intentions and actions.

It has been found that participants in studies involving moral dilemma scenarios place a strong emphasis on the inferred intention of an actor when discerning whether an action is morally acceptable (Greene et al. ,2009). The discernment of a leader about whether or not the actions of colleagues and employees are morally acceptable is thus influenced by how the leader construes these others’ intentions.

Similarly, as already noted, the leader’s engagement in principled moral action may be influenced by the leader’s own intentions. The leader’s intentions, and inferences about the intentions of others, are thus important components of moral discernment. Intention is strongly influenced by cultural conditioning and messages affecting the leader’s worldview, values, and character, all of which are integral aspects of conscience. As described below, the leader’s view of reality, including views related to self and other, permanence/impermanence, interconnectedness/interdependence, causality and consequentiality, and so on all contribute to a sense of responsibility and an ethic of care.

In social psychological experiments within natural work settings, it has been found that leaders’ interpersonal fairness and unselfishness, reflecting their altruistic disposition and intention, powerfully elicit a sense of moral elevation in their followers. Further, this sense of moral elevation was found to fully account for followers’ organizational citizenship and emotional commitment to the organization

(Vianello, Galliani, & Haidt, 2010).

Conscience in Moral Resonance:

Conscience is an inner feeling or intuition that can be viewed as a “… barometer for appraising intentions, acts or behaviors as morally praiseworthy or morally culpable in relation to a moral ideal or standard” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013). It involves a self-reflective process to discern, for example, what is obligatory or prohibited, the degree to which various actions are aligned with an altruistic disposition, and with what one believes to be virtuous, honorable or malicious/hurtful, and one’s moral standing and character. The initiation of this process probably begins pre-consciously, from subtle bodily cues accompanying empathic resonance with another’s emotional experience, conditioned by the leader’s worldview and experience of self (see Dambrun & Ricard, 2011). Included in initiation of conscience is also detection and interpretation of the feelings and somatic/physiologic cues associated with alignment (e.g. balanced, at peace, resolute) or violation of integrity (e.g. shame, guilt, remorse). This process of appraisal informs the leader’s choices about what is required in response—either action or inaction.

There is growing evidence that conscience is far more social and emotional than would be expected from perspectives that assume highly individuated, autonomous, self-contained rational actors. A uniquely human project is “the moral making of the world,” exploring the moral categories by which we apprehend the world, the moral communities we construct, the moral signification of action, the moral labor of agents, the production of moral subjects and the moral values, issues, debates, and vocabularies that constitute moral thought and discourse at the individual and collective levels (Fassin, 2012).

Conflicts of conscience, that is, detecting dissonance or incongruence of one’s values, commitments or character, thereby imperiling integrity, can be associated with a broad range of moral harms. These can range from temporary feelings of frustration, anxiety, anger or sadness to more intense, sustained feelings of guilt, remorse, loss of self-respect, loss of identity, self-betrayal or moral distress

(Rushton, in press, b). A failure to adjudicate the dissonance or incongruence can erode integrity and produce a variety of detrimental physical, emotional, behavioral and spiritual consequences, particularly if this is sustained and repeated (Carse &

Rushton, 2017). Conceivably, habitually overriding the signals of conscience can lead to dampening their strength when occasions that threaten integrity arise.

Embracing the call of conscience is vital for leaders who are committed to preserving or restoring their integrity when challenged or threatened. Attention to, and inquiring into the meaning and significance of the somatic and emotional cues of conscience engages other mental processes to help clarify pathways for principled moral action.

The Social, Emotional, Relational and Organizational Contexts of Moral

Resonance and Moral Discernment:

Moral/ethical decisions and behavior occur within social contexts, whether family, informal groups, or organizations. These contexts influence moral resonance and moral discernment. Humans appear to possess innate moral capabilities and are socialized in culturally differentiated ways. An element of the moral development of individuals involves participation in moral communities. Dominguez (2015) describes the neural correlates of moral agency as “. . . found beyond the confines of a single brain: in the coming together and interacting of a community of brains, in the shaping of the moral brain by the social field and culture, and in the workings of a neurocognitive system that evolved to absorb, reproduce, and contribute to shared worlds of meaning” (Dominguez, 2015, p. 289). Such collective morality can produce greater coherence with shared moral values, or can lead to a collective

”moral blindness” to issues that violate widely recognized moral values such as compassion, dignity and fairness.

Social ecological frameworks have been widely adapted with the recognition that no single factor can explain or predict a particular phenomenon (Baron et al. 2014;

Fleury & Lee 2006). Given the complexity of the environments where leaders serve, an understanding of the dynamic interplay among the dimensions that influence the culture, work environments, and intimate relationships where moral/ethical issues arise is necessary. Achieving a moral/ethical culture is about achieving a shared purpose and perspective as well as organizational structures that drive decisions that are considerate and respectful of individuals and a range of perspectives.

When issues, such as vertical and horizontal violence, undermine congruence between individual and collective values and behaviors, and organizational processes and structures, individual and organizational integrity can be undermined. These organizational elements are situated within a broader “culture” that reflects the rings of influence outside the organizational context and encompasses larger aspects of society including economic, social policy, and other mega-influencers. These aspects affect individual leaders, for example, when structural inequalities create differences in access to certain goods and services— that is, involving issues of social and distributive justice. These larger influences, if they support ethical behaviors and decision-making at the individual level, are vital for supporting individual moral agency and collective moral responsibility (Rushton

& Sharma, in press, a).

Social and organizational contexts in which a leader is situated can also affect the leader’s emotional experience and mood, in both positive (e.g., happiness, serenity) and negative (e.g., anger, fear, despondency) directions. Such emotional/mood consequences of social and organizational contexts affect the scope of what a leader will likely perceive to be possible choices for moral action. When positive emotion/mood is present, individuals perceive a wider range of possibilities for action (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). Positive emotion/mood also sets into motion upward spirals toward enhancing emotional well-being of the leader and others in the social group or organization (Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002).

However, social and organizational contexts can also work against individual and collective moral agency and responsibility. As noted in a New York Times Op-Ed column by David Brooks (2016), “When we build academic disciplines and social institutions upon suppositions of selfishness we’re missing the motivations that drive people much of the time. Worse, if you expect people to be selfish, you can actually crush their tendency to be good.”

Brooks draws several examples in support of these assertions from those that are provided by Samuel Bowles (2016) in his book, The Moral Economy. Bowles’ scholarship reveals that ethical and altruistic motives can be “crowded out” by messages from the larger culture, its institutions, and workplaces, conveyed by various tangible (often monetary) rewards and punishments. These messages communicate that limited self-interest is to be expected, or that the individual cannot be trusted to act in ways that consider prosocial values and the greater good for both self and others. In addition, as noted above, social and organizational contexts that engender negative emotional experience also narrow the range of what are perceived possibilities for action (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). This narrowing of perceived possibilities potentially blinds the leader to available moral actions and ways of resolving moral conflicts. Without conscious attention to the pervasive narrative that is conveyed verbally and behaviorally, leaders may inadvertently reinforce messages that serve to undermine the integrity of individuals and the organization. (Rushton & Sharma, in press, b)

The Impact of High Emotional Arousal on Moral Resonance and Moral

Discernment – The Roles of Empathic and Moral Distress:

For those leaders within organizations that serve persons who are suffering, including healthcare, social service, legal, educational, and some business/financial organizations, empathic distress (feeling distress in seeing another’s suffering) and empathic over-arousal (unpleasant high physical arousal in seeing another’s suffering) are a significant risk. Empathic distress/over-arousal can result in behaving in ways that are self-focused (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997), primarily concerned with reducing one’s own unpleasant over-arousal, including ways that ignore the other person’s needs and thus potentially interfere with moral resonance and moral discernment. A particular type of moral suffering, moral distress, has been defined as “anguish or anxiety tied to a sense of imperiled integrity, experienced under conditions of constraint or duress” (Carse & Rushton, 2017).

Moral distress can occur in all types of organizations, in situations where the moral discernments of different parties are in conflict, or where an individual’s moral discernment is in conflict with institutional policies, resource constraints, or management decisions (Rushton, Kaszniak, & Halifax, 2013a; 2013b; Rushton,

Caldwell, Kurtz, 2016). Particularly when accompanied by emotional over-arousal, moral distress can inhibit clarity of moral discernment through emotional effects on the biasing of attention (see Yiend, 2009). Moral distress in work settings has been associated with long-term psychological consequences and burnout (Allen et al.,

2013). For these reasons, it is helpful to examine the processes by which empathic and moral distress occur.

Humans are attuned to and automatically/spontaneously mimic the emotional arousal and distress of others, beginning as young as six months of age. This spontaneous mimicry is reflected by such indices as responding to pupil size observed in other people with corresponding changes in the child’s own pupil size

(Fawcett, Wesevich, & Gredeback, 2016). Adults show spontaneous and involuntary mimicry of the facial emotional expression of another, even when that facial expression is shown very quickly, and immediately masked by a subsequent neutral face, so that the other’s facial emotional expression is not consciously registered/reported (Dimerg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000). This spontaneous mimicry appears to involve brain systems, referred to as “mirror neurons”

(Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008), in which the same neuronal processes activated when we engage in a particular intentional action are activated when observing a similar action shown by another. When we see another in pain and distress, this

“mirroring” also involves brain systems that reflect the emotional distress that accompanies our own pain experience, including its manifestations in the body

(Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007). These brain processes are considered by several contemporary social neuroscientists to be foundational to human empathy (e.g.,

Decety, 2007).

For both humans and several other animals, empathic “resonance” with another’s distress often leads to what has been termed “empathic concern,” or compassion, understood as empathy accompanied by intent to decrease the other’s suffering (De

Waal, 2008). Empathic concern has been shown to be a significant predictor of helpful behavior in social interaction (Winczewski, Bowen, & Collins, 2016).

Empathic concern is thus an important contributor to moral resonance in situations involving the suffering or distress of others.

However, empathy can sometimes lead to empathic distress, particularly when the physiologic arousal of empathy is very high, termed empathic over-arousal

(Eisenberg, 2002). Empathic over-arousal often results in the person who is experiencing empathic distress not attending to or coming to the aid of a distressed other, focusing instead on strategies to reduce their own distress (Eisenberg, 2002).

In contrast, when emotional arousal is regulated through executive brain systems that direct attention, inhibit impulsive action, and plan alternative responses, then empathic concern is more likely than empathic distress (see Eisenberg & Eggum,

2009). Burnout in helping professionals and others may reflect “empathy fatigue”

(from repeated empathic distress) and not what is often referred to as “compassion fatigue” (e.g., Figley, 1995). Compassion, reflecting attentional stability, emotional balance, and loving determination to help those who suffer, is associated with positive emotion, and appears not to fatigue (see Ricard, 2015; Halifax, 2018).

Experiments have shown that empathic distress, rather than empathic concern and compassion, is more likely when someone is taking a self-focused perspective, and not taking the perspective of the distressed other (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997).

This often reflects difficulty in disengaging from one’s own self-focused perspective and shifting to the perspective of the other (Royzman, Cassidy, & Baron, 2003).

More generally, self-centered psychological functioning has been related to greater degrees of experienced unhappiness (for review, see Dambrun & Ricard, 2011). An important component of empathy that leads to concern and compassion, rather than distress, appears to be flexibility in shifting perspective (for review of relevant social psychological research, see Batson, 2013; for review of social neuroscience studies of factors affecting empathy, see Zaki & Ochsner, 2013).

As noted above, when persons faced with the distress of another experience empathic over-arousal and distress, they are likely to engage in various endeavors to reduce their own distress. In addition to shifting attention away from the distressed other, these ways may include attempts at suppressing their emotion.

Such suppression, referred to as a “consequent-focused” emotion regulation strategy (i.e., a strategy employed after the emotion has been aroused), tends to be ineffective and often actually results in an increase in physiological arousal (Gross &

Thompson, 2007). Alternatively, “antecedent-focused” regulation strategies (i.e., those focused on events that initiate emotional responses, and on interpretation of these events), particularly what is termed reappraisal (seeing a different meaning of the event), tend to be more effective in actually reducing emotional, including empathic, over-arousal.

For example, persons without specific training who view a patient undergoing a painful clinical procedure are likely to themselves experience distress, showing activation in those brain systems related to the emotional aspects of personal pain experience. However, clinicians trained in the particular painful procedure are able to shift perspective, appraising the situation differently (e.g., knowing that the outcome will actually reduce the patient’s suffering), and show activation of those brain systems associated with perspective shifting and the modulation of other brain systems that are involved in initiating emotional arousal (Cheng, et al., 2007).

Such antecedent-focused emotion regulation, reappraising the situation and especially incorporating awareness of the other’s perspective, is also arguably relevant in situations of moral distress (Rushton, Kaszniak, & Halifax, 2013a; Carse

& Rushton, 2017).

The Role Of “Selfing” In Compromising Attention And Moral Discernment:

Given the association of empathic over-arousal and distress with self-focused perspective taking, antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategies that actually reduce self-focus might be optimal. A number of neuroimaging studies have indicated that brain systems associated with the replaying of past memories and projection into various future scenarios are associated with self-focused cognition and experience (e.g., Buckner & Carrol, 2006; Legrand & Ruby, 2009; Northoff &

Bermpohl, 2004). This brain capacity for “selfing” (generating a constructed, narrative sense of self) is useful in future planning, and plays a role in how we understand the minds and experiences of others (Legrand & Ruby, 2009). However, various shaping factors (cultural, parental, educational, social role, professional) can lead to inflexible reification of this sense of self, fluctuating levels of happiness/unhappiness, and decreased compassion and altruism (Dambrun &

Ricard, 2011).

Recent research has indicated that the attention training of what has been termed mindfulness meditation (Hasenkamp & Barsalou, 2012; Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, &

Davidson, 2008; Malinowski, 2013; Quaglia, Braun, Freeman, McDaniel, & Brown,

2016) modulates self-specifying and narrative self-networks in the brain (Brewer, et al., 2011; Vago & Silbersweig, 2012). The leader who has developed greater stability of attention and pliancy of attention shifting through mindfulness practice is less likely to be caught in inflexibile self-focus, and more likely to be able to take the perspective of another, resulting in a greater capacity for empathic concern and compassion.

Activity in self-specifying and narrative self-networks in the brain has been found to be associated with mind-wandering, wherein attention drifts away from a given task at hand (Mason, et al., 2007). Recent evidence suggests that greater mind-wandering is associated with less caring toward oneself and others (Jazaieri et al., 2016).

Leaders must often deal with multiple distractions, and if these distractions trigger mind-wandering (with a focus on the self), this can result in being at high risk for decreased caring and compassion. It takes practice to notice mind-wandering and bring attention back to the present.

Long-term meditators show evidence that is consistent with rapid antecedent- focused emotion regulation (Nielsen & Kaszniak, 2006), perhaps due to modulation of brain self-networks. Even those trained for only a few weeks in mindfulness meditation show evidence of decreased activation of these brain self-networks, with increased activation of brain systems involved in present-centered awareness of bodily activity (Farb, et al., 2007). Such brief mindfulness meditation training appears to enhance the activity of brain emotion regulation systems (Desbordes, et al., 2012). Persons trained in mindfulness meditation for only seven weeks also show reduced interference of emotional arousal on the performance of a subsequent cognitive task (Ortner, Kilner, & Zelazo, 2007), as well as reduction in the immune system activation associated with chronic emotional distress (Creswell, et al., 2012).

Just six weeks of training in meditation focusing on cultivating altruistic love

(termed “loving-kindness meditation”) has been shown to reduce subtle bias against stigmatized out-groups such as the homeless or people of color (Kang, Gray, &

Dovidio, 2013). Even a single session of loving-kindness meditation practice has been found to significantly increase participants’ sense of social connectedness

(Hutcherson, Seppala, & Gross, 2008). Short-term meditation training (both mindfulness and loving-kindness) has been shown to increase altruistic responding to another’s distress (Condon, Desbordes, Miller, & DeSteno, 2013). And, there is evidence of enhanced activation of brain systems related to emotion regulation following meditation training, correlated with evidence of greater compassionate behavior (Klimecki, Ricard, & Singer, 2013; Weng, et al., 2013).

Moral Resilience: This evidence regarding meditation has motivated the recommendation of attention training, through mindfulness and related practices, as an approach to enhance compassion and reduce moral distress (Rushton, Kaszniak, & Halifax, 2013a,

2013b). Such training may also be an important contributor to the cultivation of moral resilience, which Rushton (2016; in press, b) has defined as “the capacity of an individual to sustain, restore integrity in response to moral adversity.” Moral resilience is posited as a vital antidote to the despair and moral distress that is provoked when individuals discern the morally desirable action and are unable to act on it because of internal or external constraints. The concept of moral resilience suggests that while negative arousal, activating moral resonance, including conscience, is associated with morally distressing events, such arousal is not necessarily evidence of moral insufficiency or failing (Rushton, in press, a). Rather, the distress experienced is a signal of moral conscientiousness—that one is aware of the tension or conflict between various courses of action, notices it, and is propelled into a process of inquiry to understand the nuances, context, boundaries of ethical permissibility, and consequences of possible courses of action, on self and others

(Carse & Rushton, 2017). Leaders who are morally resilient are better able to navigate the inevitable ethical conflicts they confront without detrimental or excessive lingering residue. Intentionally cultivating the capacities that build moral resilience can support leaders to preserve their integrity in the midst of complex and challenging circumstances (Rushton, Kaszniak, & Halifax, in press). Moreover, moral resilience is oriented toward integrity and can offer leaders an important anchor when they must make ethical choices that require trade-offs that will necessarily cause harm or suffering to specific people or groups of people they are leading.

Moral Reasoning and Ethical Systems:

When an individual leader becomes aware of a moral dilemma, dissonance, or incoherence, influenced by the various cognitive and emotional processes described above, the logical processes of moral reasoning come into play in determining the specifics of principled moral action. As described by Kathleen Dean Moore (2016),

“Moral reasoning is discourse in which people affirm what they think is true or good or right and then, the crucial step, back their claims with reasons.” (p. 19) Tools for moral reasoning such as traditional ethical principles and theories provide one lens for exploring moral conflicts, although reasoning alone is only weakly linked to moral behavior (Blasi, 1983; Thoma, 1994). The systematic codification of moral reasoning into ethical systems can provide useful general guidance to leaders who face frequent moral dilemmas in the course of their responsibilities. However, such frameworks, in the context of busy executive practice, may be reduced to minimalist standards or be confused with legal or compliance standards; thereby diminishing their effectiveness. Models of moral competency that go beyond an assemblage of discrete moral/ethical components may provide more nuanced guidance for what a leader can do in the immediacy of a moral challenge.

One of the most cited models of moral competency is the four- component model developed by James Rest and colleagues, synthesizing nearly a century of moral development science to theorize four essential processes for effective moral agency.

(Elm & Weber, 1994; Rest & Thoma, 1985; Rest, 1986a, 1986b; Rest, Bebeau,

Narvaez, & Thoma, 1999; Rest et al., 2000;) Since its initial development, the model has been expanded to include a fifth component. The expanded model includes: 1)

Moral Sensitivity, 2) Moral reasoning, 3) Moral commitment, 4) Moral character, and

5) Moral action.

Narvaez (2008a; 2008b; 2010), building on Rest’s foundation has developed more complex, integrated models of moral development and functioning that capture many of the emerging discoveries in neuroscience, philosophy, anthropology, and human development. In her cross-cultural moral development research and practice, Narvaez has introduced innovative theories, most notably, Triune Ethics

Theory (TET) and Integrative Ethical Education (IEE), in a holistic, empirically derived approach to morality and character development that incorporates elements of moral philosophy, neuroscience, anthropology, and psychology to blend cognitive, social, and intuitionist theories with a focus on ethical expertise. (Narvaez,

2008a, 2008b, 2010). The model we propose here draws upon and expands

Narvaez’ work.

Summary:

In summary, emotional processes (involving disgust and fear, as well as positive emotions), empathy (and empathic distress), altruistic disposition, worldview, sense of self and self-focus, intentions, attention, cognitive control processes, moral reasoning, moral distress, and moral resiliency all appear to make important enabling or inhibitory contributions to moral discernment and principled moral action. Research on the effects and correlates of the attention training inherent to mindfulness meditation practice suggests that such practices may be useful in reducing self-focused bias as well as empathic and moral distress. The following proposed model therefore emphasizes all of these processes in the service of providing practical guidance for enhancing moral discernment and principled moral action.

The Model:

Based on considerations of the evidence and scholarship reviewed above, as well as our own personal and contemplative practice experience, we propose the following model of how various pre-conscious and conscious processes contribute to moral resonance and moral discernment, and in turn, to principled moral action. This model over-simplifies what is a more complex system of iterative and recurrent influences in which the various processes that are described and graphically depicted interdependently co-condition each other. However, for the purpose of providing a heuristic model that can help guide leaders in understanding the processes by which moral/ethical decisions and actions occur, and developing feasible education derived from the model, we have decided upon the simplified proposal depicted in Figures 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d. It should also be noted that this model is intended to describe normative human processes. There is considerable variability between people in the functioning of each of the processes we depict. And, there are some for whom the model would likely be inaccurate. For example, those persons who are described as psychopaths may show no evidence of empathic resonance with others, and therefore are able to harm others without emotional reaction or remorse (Blair, Jones, Clark, & Smith, 1997; Hare, 1999). Although a common perception is that persons described as psychopaths are found primarily within prison populations, there are some “successful psychopaths” who can be found in business and other leadership positions (Babiak & Hare, 2007).

Figure 1a: Initial Perception-Reaction Processes Percep&on)Reac&on,

Bodily, Reac&on, , Indifference, , Aversion, , Confusion, , Empathy, Approach, Cues, Conscious, Perceptual, Sensory, , Pa7ern,, Event, , Recogni&on, Pre)conscious,, , Implicit, , Memory/ Not,Salient, Condi&oning, , Threat, , Ambivalence, , Affordance, , , Empathic, , Resonance, , ,

Figure 1b: Moral Resonance Processes

Moral&Resonance& Alignment&&&Integrity& Bodily&Reac4on&Cues&

Sensed&Misalignment&or&Conflict&

Conscience:& Alignment&or& Empathy&Cues& Conflict& With&One’s& Values&&& Character& Bodily& Empathic& Yes& Yes& Reac4on& Resonance& Conscious& A6ended& A6ended&To?& To?&

Altruis4c& No& Pre0conscious& No& Disposi4on& Altruis4c&Disposi4on&

Una6ended&Bodily&Reac4on&Cues&

Una6ended&Empathy&Cues&

Figure 1c: Moral Discernment Processes

Moral+Discernment+ Alignment+&+Integrity+

Conscience:+Sensed+Misalignment+or+Conflict++

Moral+Conflict+ Moral+Conflict+

Execu.ve+ Cogni.ve+ Control+ Processing/+ Pause,+ Distress+ Moral+ Reappraisal,+ Reasoning/+ Arousal+ Ethical+Systems+ Regula.on+ Lack+of+Execu.ve+Control+

Conscious+ Social+&+ Inten.ons+ Emo.onal+ Pre$conscious+ Contexts+ Altruis.c+Disposi.on+

UnaBended+Bodily+Reac.on+Cues+

UnaBended+Empathy,+Empathic+Distress,+or+Moral+Distress+Cues+

Figure 1d: Moral Action Processes

Moral)Ac&on) Alignment)&)Integrity)

Conscience:):)Sensed)Misalignment)or)Conflict)))

Cogni&ve) Appraisal)&) Cogni&ve)Processing) Principled)Moral) Conscience:) Ac&on) Sense)of)Moral) Alignment)&) Resolu&on?)

Return)to)Moral)Discernment) No)

Conscious)

Pre>conscious)

Una@ended)Bodily)Reac&on)Cues) Impulsive)Self> focused)Ac&on) ) ) Una@ended)Empathy,)Empathic)Distress)or) If)Any)Sense)Of)Moral)Misalignment)Exists,) ) Appraisal)&)Conscience)May)Ac&vate) Moral)Distress)Cues) Self>interested) Moral)Ac&on)

The processes shown in this model begin with a sensory event. Sensory events relevant to the moral/ethical domain could involve seeing or hearing someone harm another, observing someone who is in physical or emotional distress, observing someone in the leader’s organization being treated unjustly, observing someone speaking disrespectfully to a supervisor, learning of someone having betrayed organizational confidentialities, or any of a potentially endless number of other examples relevant to the leader’s moral foundations.

In the case where a moral and/or ethical dilemma or violation is perceived, the mind/brain quickly initiates a set of pre-conscious and conscious processes that eventually lead to the sensory event being recognized, conceptualized (i.e., made sense of), and able to affect moral resonance, moral discernment, and principled moral action.

The first of these processes involves perceptual pattern recognition, wherein various sensory elements (e.g., shape, color, movement) are “bound” together into what quickly becomes consciously recognizable as a meaningful percept or event. This perceptual pattern recognition process is affected by all of the leader’s prior conditioning and implicit memory (e.g., habit learning), operating outside of conscious awareness.

The results of this pattern recognition become simultaneously available to both a process that incorporates the leader’s momentary needs/motivations, and to a process that may give rise to empathic resonance, both initially operating outside of conscious awareness. Needs or motivations active in the moment may include hunger, thirst, safety, physical comfort, social affiliation/affection, sex, and “higher order” needs such as social inclusion and positive self-regard, among others.

Empathic resonance refers to the automatic simulation within the leader’s own brain and body of aspects of the experience of another, initiated by such cues as the other’s facial expression, bodily posture, tone of voice, etc. For example, perceiving the facial expression of another in pain can initiate those same brain and visceral activities in a leader that are part of the other’s unpleasant painful experience.

Although the mind/brain/body processes involved in initial empathic resonance operate outside conscious awareness, there may be consequent bodily/visceral activities (e.g., heart-rate increase, change in breathing, tightness in the chest, etc.) that are available to a leader’s conscious awareness, or that can be made available by practiced careful attention to the body, and hence affect processes we group as moral resonance.

A leader’s needs/motivations in any given moment are influenced not only by various biological and psychological conditions (e.g., blood sugar level, relative recent abundance or deprivation of social affiliation/affection), but also by a leader’s worldview and sense of self. Worldview and sense of self are not explicitly depicted in figures 1a – 1d because they affect multiple aspects of each group of processes, from what is detected as salient to the self, to whether another is experienced as having similarities to one’s self, and therefore eliciting empathic resonance, and also conditioning altruistic disposition, values, intentions, and moral reasoning.

Worldview refers to influences that affect what a leader pre-consciously determines to be salient, important or of value. These influences range from how a leader was treated and raised by parents, through cultural messages and practices, to institutional norms. This can determine how a leader prioritizes what Haidt (2012) describes as dimensions of the moral spectrum, including: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Worldview, though pre-consciously affecting what is felt to be important or valuable, may be consciously experienced as the narratives or stories that a leader lives and sees her/himself as participating within. Such stories typically incorporate sense of self in relation to others, and can have wide-ranging effects. As noted by

Macy and Johnstone (2012):

“Future generations will look back at the time we are living in now. The kind

of future they look from, and the story they tell about our period, will be

shaped by choices we make in our lifetimes. The most telling choice of all

may well be the story we live from and see ourselves participating in. It sets

the context of our lives in a way that influences all our other decisions.” (p.

33)

Sense of self refers to those automatic and pre-conscious ways of sensing the nature of self in relation to others, also influenced by parental, cultural, institutional, and other contexts. One leader could have a pre-conscious sense of self as fixed

(unchanging over time), in competition with others for scarce resources, and independent (neither much affected by the needs and actions of others, nor seeing one’s own needs and actions as much affecting others). Another leader might have a sense of self as context-specific (changing fluidly as conditioned by context and situation) and interdependent, with a leader’s needs and behavior continuously affecting and affected by those of others.

Consider a leader with a more context-specific and interdependent sense of self that includes the valuing of cooperation, common humanity (despite superficial differences), and mutual care. For this first leader, the perception of another’s suffering may activate or strengthen the momentary need/motivation to compassionately relieve that suffering. Conversely, consider the leader with a more fixed, competitive, and independent implicit sense of self. For this second leader, the same physiological and emotional arousal of empathic resonance may activate or strengthen the momentary needs/motivations for safety, for reducing unpleasant arousal to regain physical comfort, and for conserving scarce personal resources

(e.g., energy, time).

For the first leader, the perceived event, in interaction with that leader’s momentary needs/motivations, would influence the process of salience detection and valence determination in such a way that the event will be processed as both salient and as positively valenced (i.e., as an affordance or opportunity for compassionate concern). For the second leader, this same event would more likely be processed as either not salient, and therefore ignored, or as a potential threat. When, within the salience detection and valence determination process, both potential affordance/opportunity and threat are detected, there is ambivalence.

This salience- and valence-determining process, in turn, activates another process we have labeled as “bodily reaction.” These reactions involve the various ways in which a leader’s body is being prepared for different possible actions. If, as a result of all of the previously described processes, the person or event has been appraised as a potential affordance/opportunity, various physiological processes prepare a leader for approach. Here, for example, a leader might experience a sense of quickened positive arousal/energy in response to an alignment of the situation with altruistic intentions or empathic concern. If, alternatively, the appraisal is that of potential threat, then a leader’s physiology prepares for aversive action, either avoidance, withdrawal, escape, or aggression. Here, for example, a leader might sense the abdomen tightening in response to an appraised threat to her/his integrity or core values. When ambivalence is present, there is confusion, sensing the body preparing simultaneously for both approach and aversion. And, of course, if the person or event is appraised as not salient and ignored, there is neutrality or indifference and no particular preparation for action.

Each of these bodily reactions may thus give rise to subtle perceivable cues – a felt sense of bodily change – that may be brought into conscious awareness, particularly with practiced attention to these bodily cues. Such bodily cues of different reactions are helpful for a leader to recognize, because they are indicators of what might otherwise be unnoticed potential biases that can affect moral decisions and actions.

Attention to these bodily cues, with curiosity and an inquiry into their significance, thus forms an important process within moral resonance.

In addition to the perception-reaction stream of bodily changes that prepare the body for action or inaction, when the event is associated with a person or persons there is a parallel stream in which empathic resonance, initially occurring pre- consciously, initiates bodily cues that can be available to conscious awareness.

These bodily cues may be experienced as a sense of “feeling with” another person, which may involve positive or negative emotional experience, depending on the emotion being expressed by the person who is perceived.

Within the subsequent processes associated with moral resonance, the leader may focus attention on these empathic bodily cues, as well as bodily cues that accompany preparation for aversion, approach, or ambivalence/confusion. Being aware of bodily cues may, in the best of circumstances, prime unbiased inquiry. Bringing what would have been implicit biasing influences into conscious awareness, through attending to these bodily cues, allows other conscious considerations to help balance various influences affecting decisions and actions. In the context of an event presenting a potential moral issue, attention to felt experience can activate conscience, here seen as a conscious process that detects alignment or conflict between initial reactions to events and a leader’s values and character. Processes of conscience are sensitive to potential violations of personal integrity-understood as a state of felt wholeness and harmony. Conscience is pre-consciously conditioned by a leader’s worldview, core values, and experience of self, which combine to determine altruistic disposition – the inclination to provide help to others, even when at a cost to self.

Activation of conscience may manifest in a felt sense that can indicate alignment and integrity, or alert the leader to a possible conflict and violation of integrity. For example, in the case of a leader observing a colleague who disrespecting an employee, there could be a felt sense of disgust at the mistreatment of another that is in conflict with positive feelings toward the colleague who may play a critical role in the organization’s structure and profitability.

Conflict may also occur between a leader’s own conscience and the social and institutional contexts in which a leader is situated. With relatively unbiased and stable attention, the process of conscience can include an open inquiry process that is attuned to: (1) awareness of any misalignment or moral conflict determined by conscience, (2) aspects of the situation, including the interests and values of others,

(3) a leader’s own worldview, most deeply held values, how self is experienced in relation to others, and how consideration of these reflects and shapes character, and

(4) an initial awareness of possible choices of action. It is important to note that conscience alone ought not be the final arbiter of moral action. Rather, it is an element in a complex process that requires inquiry and discernment to understand the meaning and significance of the signal and to use it to assist in discernment of ethically justified action or inaction.

Summarizing these first two parts of our proposed model, two streams of processes operate within the domains of initial perception-reaction and moral resonance. One is dominated by needs/motivations having their effects on salience/valence detection, and consequently determining bodily reactions that prepare for action.

The other stream is dominated by empathic resonance, involving an initially pre- conscious simulation of the other’s emotional experience within one’s own brain and body. This empathic resonance gives rise to subtle bodily cues that can be experienced as feeling with the other. When the bodily cues of these two streams are brought into conscious awareness, in combination with altruistic disposition, conscience is activated. If conscience detects alignment and integrity, then principled moral action can occur. Although not illustrated in the graphic depiction of the model, in some cases it may be that the initial cues indicate that alignment and further discernment is needed to verify or shift awareness toward the action that will best serve in the situation. Further, it may be the case that a leader can still be in integrity with her/his own values even when efforts to act are constrained

(Rushton, in press a). When conscience detects misalignment or conflict, initiation of the processes of moral discernment is necessary in order to prepare for moral decisions and actions.

In the processes associated with moral discernment, the previous processes of conscience, where moral misalignment or conflict is detected, can give rise to distress. When such distress results in high emotional arousal and is not given sufficient attention, it can motivate self-interested moral action. Similarly, when initial bodily reaction cues, or misalignments/conflicts of conscience are unattended, the result can be impulsive self-focused action. However, through awareness of bodily, affective and cognitive responses, distress can be modulated by conscious executive processes that initiate reappraisal (i.e., different sense-making) of the situation, with consequent emotion regulation that reduces arousal. The regulatory function of executive processes is likely to be most effective when a leader has practiced attending to subtle physical cues. Executive processes are also influenced by one’s altruistic disposition, activated by attention to the bodily cues of empathic resonance, in turn informing the leader’s pre-conscious and conscious intentions. These intentions are also influenced by social (including organizational) and emotional contexts. A leader’s prosocial intentions, such as acting kindly, fairly and justly with others, can be strengthened by executive processes that are themselves influenced by the previous processes of conscience.

The activation of conscience, along with the influences of perceived distress, intentions, and social/emotional context, as mediated by executive processes, can then be brought into the moral discernment process. Here, the cognitive activities of inductive and deductive moral reasoning and consideration of ethical principles prepare a leader for principled moral action.

In the suite of moral action processes, the result of moral discernment leads to either a conscious moral decision or principled moral action (or, in some cases, principled inaction). In a final recursive stage, a leader can observe the effects of her/his own moral decisions and actions, calling upon conscience and insight to determine whether moral alignment and resolution has been reached, or whether additional engagement of moral discernment is necessary. As also illustrated within the processes of moral action, when a leader has not attended to bodily reaction cues, or to misalignments/conflicts of conscience, then impulsive self-focused action is likely to occur. Examples of impulsive self-focused action include rage, angry accusation, resource hoarding, dishonesty, and other behaviors. Similarly, self- interested moral actions can occur when a leader has not attended to empathic resonance, empathic distress, or moral distress cues. Such self-interested actions may superficially appear to be moral, but serve the primary purpose of relieving the leader’s own distress.

Implications of the Model for Leadership Education:

The novel aspects of our proposed model have several implications for leadership education. First, they suggest that such education would benefit leaders by focusing on those primarily pre-conscious processes involved in initial perception and reaction to a potentially morally significant event. Precisely because these processes occur outside of conscious awareness, leaders need to understand their impact and acquire stable and pliant attentional skills to allow an open and curious observation of subtle bodily reactions potentially signaling both empathic resonance and bodily preparations for action that may bias moral decisions. Acquiring such attentional skills requires the kind of practice characteristic of mindfulness meditation training, wherein feelings, thoughts, and other mental formations are repeatedly noticed with alert openness, curiosity, and non-judgment.

A second implication, given the importance of worldview and sense of self in altruistic disposition as it informs conscience, is that leadership education should include intensive reflection and discussion of worldview and sense of self. What are a leader’s (typically unexamined) assumptions about their interdependent relationships with others? To what extent does competition versus cooperation dominate how others are approached? What are a leader’s most deeply held values?

These and many other related questions can help bring into awareness this important set of influences upon conscience.

Matthieu Ricard (2015), in his book Altruism, emphasizes the far-reaching importance of worldview:

“…men and women across the world must recognize that they are

interdependent on multiple levels – between continents, nations, and as

individuals – and to be aware of our common destiny. The interests of our

human community can only be safeguarded by measures that are common to

everyone, even if they run contrary to near-sighted national interests, local

selfishness, the hegemony of multinationals, and the machinations of

lobbyists who meddle with policy, often transforming the international scene

into a gathering-place where sordid haggling prevails.” (p. 676)

Ricard advocates for the important role of meditative practices that cultivate a stable and vivid attention, and those that reinforce our sense of deep interconnection with all beings and the entire planet itself. Some of the evidence regarding the morally-relevant effects of different meditative practices were reviewed above. Whether such practices are capable of allowing a transformation of those leaders who are most highly committed to a worldview and sense of self that is focused on individualism, egoism, and selfishness, remains an open question.

A third implication involves how moral alignment or misalignment and conflict is sensed. Again, because bodily cues of integrity versus discomfort or distress can provide the earliest warnings of alignment or misalignment, a cultivated and practiced open attention to bodily experience seems critical. When leaders are able to recognize and leverage these cues to deepen insight and discernment, it is possible that their relationship to the distress or conflict inherent in leadership could be shifted from guilt and shame to curiosity and possibility (Carse & Rushton,

2017).

A fourth implication is related to the important role of executive mental control process in creating sufficient time for reappraising events in ways that result in greater emotion regulation, reducing the risks of impulsive self-focused action or primarily self-interested moral action. Executive control processes, as with attention to bodily cues, are enhanced by mindfulness which helps cultivate the ability to stop and reappraise.

Our intention is that what we have proposed in the present model might motivate new practical approaches to leadership education to enhance the moral integrity and moral resilience of the leaders of today and tomorrow.

References:

Adolphs, R. (2013). The biology of fear. Current Biology, 23, R79-R93.

Doi:10.1016/j.cub.2012.11.055

Armony, J., & Vuilleumier, P. (Eds.). (2013). The Cambridge handbook of human

affective neuroscience. Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Babiak, P., & Hare, R.D. (2007). Snakes in suits: When psychopaths go to work. New

York: Harper Business.

Baron SL, Beard S, Davis LK, Delp L, Forst L, Kidd‐Taylor A, Liebman AK, Linnan L,

Punnett L & Welch LS (2014): Promoting integrated approaches to reducing health

inequities among low‐income workers: Applying a social ecological framework.

American Journal of Industrial Medicine, 57, 539-556.

Barsalou, L.W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 617-

645.

Batson, C.D. (2013). The empathy-altruism hypothesis: Issues and implications. In J.

Decety (Ed.), Empathy: From bench to bedside (pp. 41-54). Cambridge, MA: MIT

Press.

Batson, C.D., Early, S., & Salvarani, G. (1997). Perspective taking: Imagining how

another feels versus imagining how you would feel. Personality and Social

Psychology Bulletin, 23, 751-758. Beauchamp, T.L., & Childress, J.F. (2013) Principles of Biomedical Ethics. (7th Edition).

New York: Oxford University Press.

Blair, R.J.R., Jones, L., Clark, F., & Smith, M. (1997). The psychopathic individual: A

lack of responsiveness to distress cues? Psychophysiology, 34, 192-198.

Blasi, A. (1983). Moral cognition and moral action: A theoretical perspective.

Developmental Review, 3, 178-210.

Block, J., & Block, J.H. (2006). Nursery school personality and political orientation two

decades later. Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 734-749.

Boudreau, T. (2011). The morally injured. The Massachusetts Review, 52(3-4), 746-754.

Bowles, S. (2016). The moral economy: Why good incentives are no substitute for good

citizens. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Brewer, J.A., Worhunsky, P.D., Gray, J.R., Tang, Y.Y., Weber, J., & Kober, H. (2011).

Meditation experience is associated with differences in default mode network

activity and connectivity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A.

108, 20254-20259. Doi: 10.1073/pnas.112029108.

Brock, R. N., & Lettini, G. (2012). Soul repair: Recovering from moral injury after war.

Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Brooks, D. (2016). The power of altruism. New York Times, July 8, A27.

Buckner, R.L., & Carrol, D.C. (2006). Self-projection and the brain. Trends in Cognitive

Sciences, 11, 49-57.

Bzdok, D., Gross, D., & Eickhoff, S. (2014). The Neurobiology of moral cognition:

Relation to theory of mind, empathy, and mind-wandering. In J. Clausen & N. Levy (Eds.), Handbook of Neuroethics (pp. 127-148). Dordecht, Netherlands: Springer

Netherlands.

Calder, A. J., et al. (2000). Impaired recognition and experience of disgust following

brain injury. Nature Neuroscience 3, 1077–1088.

Carse, A, & Rushton, C. (2017). Harnessing the promise of moral distress: A call for

reorientation, Journal of Clinical Ethics, 38 (1), 15-29.

Cheng, Y., Lin, C.-P., Liu, H.-L., Hsu, Y.-Y., Lim, K.-E., Hung, D., & Decety, J. (2007).

Expertise modulates the perception of pain in others. Current Biology, 17, 1708-

1713.

Cikara, M., & Van Bavel, J.J. (2014. The neuroscience of intergroup relations: An

integrative review. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9, 245-274.

Doi:10.1177/1745691614527464

Condon, P., Desbordes, G., Miller, W.B., & DeSteno, D. (2013). Meditation increases

compassionate responses to suffering. Psychological Science, 24, 2125-2127. DOI:

10.1177/0956797613485603

Craig, A.D. (2009). How do you feel – now? The anterior insula and human

awareness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 10, 59-70.

Creswell, J.D., et al. (2012). Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction training reduces

loneliness and pro-inflammatory gene expression in older adults: A small

randomized controlled trial. Brain, Behavior, and Immunity, 26, 1095-1101.

Cunningham, W.A., & Brosch, T. (2012). Motivational salience: Amygdala tuning

from traits, needs, values, and goals. Current Directions in Psychological Science,

21, 54-59. Doi:10.1177/0963d721411420832 Curtis, V. & Biran, A. (2001). Dirt, disgust, and disease: Is hygiene in our genes?

Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 44, 17–31.

Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New

York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons.

Damasio, A.R. (1999). The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making

of consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company.

Dambrun, M., & Ricard, M. (2011). Self-centeredness and selflessness: A theory of

self-based psychological functioning and its consequences for happiness. Review

of General Psychology, 15, 138-157.

David, B., & Olatunji, B.O. (2011). The effect of disgust conditioning and disgust

sensitivity on appraisals of moral transgressions. Personality & Individual

Differences 50, 1142–1146.

Decety, J. (2007). A social cognitive neuroscience model of human empathy. In E.

Harmon-Jones & P. Winkielman (Eds.). Social Neuroscience: Integrating biological

and psychological explanations of social behavior. (pp. 246-270). New York:

Guilford.

Deppermann, S., Storchak, H., Fallgatter, A., & Ehlis, A. (2014). Stress-induced

neuroplasticity: (Mal)adaptation to adverse life events in patients with PTSD – A

critical overview. Neuroscience, 283, 166–177. doi:

10.1016/j.neuroscience.2014.08.037

Desbordes, G., Negi, L.T., Pace, T.W.W., Wallace, B.A., Raison, C.L., & Schwartz, E.L.

(2012). Effects of mindful-attention and compassion meditation training on amygdala response to emotional stimuli in an ordinary non-meditative state.

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6, 1-15.

De Waal, F. (1996). Good natured – The origins of right and wrong in humans and

other animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

De Waal, F.B.M. (2008). Putting the altruism back in altruism: The evolution of

empathy. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 279-300.

Diener, E. & Seligman, M.E.P. (2002). Very happy people. Psychological Science, 13,

81-84.

Dimberg, U., Thunberg, M., & Elmehed, K. (2000). Unconscious facial reactions to

emotional facial expressions. Psychological Science, 11, 86-89.

Dominguez, J. F. (2015). Introduction: Toward a neuroanthropology of ethics. In J.

Clausen & N. Levy (Eds.), Handbook of neuroethics. Dordecht: Springer Science.

DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4704-4_21.

Eckman, P., Friesen, W. V., & Ellsworth, P. (1972). Emotion in the human face:

Guidelines for research and an integration of findings. New York: Pergamon.

Eisenberg, N. (2002). Empathy-related emotional responses, altruism, and their

socialization. In R.J. Davidson & A. Harrington (Eds.), Visions of compassion (pp.

131-164). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Eisenberg, N., & Eggum, N.D. (2009). Empathic responding: Sympathy and personal

distress. In J. Decety & W. Ickes (Eds.), The social psychology of empathy (pp. 71-

83). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Elm, D., & Weber, J. (1994). Measuring moral judgment: The Moral Judgment Interview

or the Defining. Journal of Business Ethics, 13(5), 341-355. doi:

10.1007/BF00871762

Farb, N, Daubenmier, J., Price, C.J., Gard, T., Kerr, C., Dunn, B.D., Klein, A.C., Paulus,

M.P., & Mehling, W.E. (2015). Interoception, contemplative practice, and health.

Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 763. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00763.

Farb, N.A.S., Segal, Z.V., Mayberg, H., Bean, J., McKeon, D., Fatima, Z, & Anderson, A.K.

(2007). Attending to the present: mindfulness meditation reveals distinct neural

modes of self-reference. SCAN, 2, 313-322.

Fassin, D. (2012) Introduction: Toward a critical moral anthropology, In D. Fassin

(Ed.), A companion to moral anthropology, Chichester, UK.: John Wiley & Sons,

Ltd, doi: 10.1002/9781118290620.ch

Fawcett, C., Wesevich, V., & Gredeback, G. (2016). Pupillary contagion in infancy:

Evidence for spontaneous transfer of arousal. Psychological Science, 27, 997-

1003. DOI: 10.1177/0956797616642934.

Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004). Social norms and human cooperation. Trends in

Cognitive Sciences, 8, 185-190.

Figley, C. R. (1995). Compassion fatigue: Toward a new understanding of the costs of

caring. In B. H. Stamm (Ed.), Secondary traumatic stress: Self-care issues for

clinicians, researchers, and educators (pp. 3-28). Baltimore, MD: The Sidran

Press.

Fleury J & Lee SM (2006): The social ecological model and physical activity in African

American women. American Journal of Community Psychology 37, 129-140.

Fredrickson, B.L. & Branigan, C. (2005). Positive emotions broaden the scope of

attention and thought-action repertoires. Cognition and Emotion, 19, 313-332.

Fredrickson, B.L. & Joiner, T. (2002). Positive emotions trigger upward spirals

toward emotional well-being. Psychological Science, 13, 172-175.

Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development.

Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gilligan, C. (1988). Mapping the moral domain: A contribution of women's thinking to

psychological theory and education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Glannon, W. (2011). Brain, body, and mind: Neuroethics with a human face. New York

NY: Oxford University Press.

Greene, J.D., Cushman, F.A., Stewart, L.E., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L.E., & Cohen, J.D.

(2009). Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and

intention in moral judgment. Cognition, 111, 364-371.

Greene, J.D., & Haidt, J. (2002). How (and where) does moral judgment work? Trends

in Cognitive Science, 6, 517-523.

Greene, J.D., Nystrom, L.E., Engell, A.D., Darley, J.M., & Cohen, J.D. (2004). The neural

bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron, 44, 389-400.

Greene, J.D., Sommerville, R.B., Nustrom, L.E., Darley, J.M., & Cohen, J.D. (2001). An

fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293,

2105-2108. Gross, J.J., & Thompson, R.A. (2007). Emotion regulation: conceptual foundations. In

J.J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 3-24). New York: Guilford

Press.

Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail – A social intuitionist

approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814-834.

Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and

religion. New York: Vintage Books.

Halifax, J. (2018). Standing at the edge: Finding freedom where fear and courage

meet. New York: Flatiron Books.

Hamington, M. (2010). The will to care: Performance, expectation, and imagination.

Hypatia, 25(3), 675-695. doi: 10.1111/j.1527-2001.2010.01110.x

Hare, R.D. (1999). Without conscience: The disturbing world of the psychopaths

among us. New York: Guilford Press.

Harrison, L.A., Hurlemann, R., & Adolphs, R. (2015). An enhanced default approach

bias following amygdala lesions in humans. Psychological Science, 26, 1543-1555.

Doi:10.1177/0956797615583804

Hasenkamp, W., & Barsalou, L.W. (2012). Effects of meditation experience on

functional connectivity of distributed brain networks. Frontiers in Human

Neuroscience, 6, 38. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00038

Held, V. (2005). The ethics of care: Personal, political, and global. New York: Oxford

University Press. Held, V., & City University of New York, G. S. (2014). The ethics of care as normative

guidance: Comment on Gilligan. Journal of Social Philosophy, 45(1), 107-115. doi:

10.1111/josp.12051

Helion, C. (2014). Beyond dual-processes: The interplay of reason and emotion in

moral judgment. In J. Clausen & N. Levy (Eds.), Handbook of Neuroethics (pp. 109-

125). Springer Netherlands.

Helzer, E.G., & Pizarro, D.A. (2011). Dirty liberals! Reminders of physical cleaniliness

influence moral and political attitudes. Psychological Science, 22, 517-522.

Hunt, A. (Producer). (2011). Moral Injury. Disability Ministry Toolkit. [Webinar: How

Can We Help? Parish Support for Veterans and Their Families.] Retrieved from

http://www.ncpd.org/sites/default/files/Moral%20Injury.pdf

Hutcherson, C.A., Seppala, E.M., & Gross, J.J. (2008). Loving-kindness meditation

increases social connectedness. Emotion, 8, 720-724.

Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D.A., & Bloom, P. (2009). Conservatives are more easily disgusted

than liberals. Cognition and Emotion, 23, 714-725.

Jazaieri, H., Lee, I.A., McGonigal, K., Jinpa, T., Doty, J.R., Gross, J.J., & Goldin, P.R.

(2015): A wandering mind is a less caring mind: Daily experience sampling

during compassion meditation training, The Journal of Positive Psychology:

Dedicated to furthering research and promoting good practice, DOI:

10.1080/17439760.2015.1025418.

Jones, A., & Fitness, J. (2008). Moral hypervigilance: The influence of disgust

sensitivity in the moral domain. Emotion 8, 613–27. Jost, J.T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A.W., & Sulloway, F.J. (2003). Political conservatism as

a motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 339-375.

Kalin, N., Shelton, S., & Davidson, R. (2004). The role of the central nucleus of the

amygdala in mediating fear and anxiety in the primate. Journal of Neuroscience,

24(24), 5506-5515. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0292-04.2004

Kang, Y., Gray, J.R., & Dovidio, J.F. (2013). The nondiscriminating heart:

Lovingkindness meditation training decreases implicit bias against stigmatized

outgroups. Journal of Experimental Psychology, General, 143, 1306-1313. doi:

10.1037/a0034150

Keltner, D. (2009). Born to be good: The science of a meaningful life. New York: W.W.

Norton and Company

Klimecki, O., Ricard, M., & Singer, T. (2013). Empathy versus compassion – Lessons

from 1st and 3rd person methods. In T. Singer & M. Bolz (Eds.), Compassion:

Bridging practice and science, a multimedia book [e-book]. Munich, Germany:

Max Planck Society.

Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence – The cognitive-developmental approach to

socialization. In D.A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research

(pp. 347-480). Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.

Lamm, C., Batson, C.D., & Decety, J. (2007). The neural substrate of human empathy:

Effects of perspective-taking and cognitive appraisal. Journal of Cognitive

Neuroscience, 19, 42-58.

Legrand, D., & Ruby, P. (2009). What is self-specific: Theoretical investigation and

critical review of neuroimaging results. Psychological Review, 116, 252-282. Liljenquist, K., Zhong, C.B., & Galinsky, A.D. (2010). The smell of virtue: Clean scents

promote reciprocity and charity. Psychological Science 21, 381–383.

Litz, B., Stein, N., Delaney, E., Lebowitz, L., Nash, W., Silva, C., & Maguen, S. (2009).

Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans: A preliminary model and

intervention strategy. Clinical Psychology Review, 29, 695-706.

Lu, J.G., Lee, J.J. Gino, F., & Galinsky, A.D. (2018). Polluted morality: Air pollution

predicts criminal activity and unethical behavior. Psychological Science, 29, 340-

355. doi: 10/1177/0956797617735807.

Lutz, A., Slagter, H.A., Dunne, J.D., & Davidson, R.J. (2008). Attention regulation and

monitoring in meditation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12, 163-169.

Macy, J., & Johnstone, C. (2012). Active hope: How to face the mess we’re in without

going crazy. Novato, CA: New World Library.

Malinowski, P. (2013). Neural mechanisms of attentional control in mindfulness

meditation. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 7, 8. doi:10.3389/fnins.2013.00008.

Maguen, S., & Litz, B. (2012). Moral injury in veterans of war. PTSD VA Research

Quarterly: Advancing science and promoting understanding of traumatic stress,

23(1), 1-3.

Marazziti, D., Baroni, S., Landi, P., Ceresoli, D., & Dell’Osso, L. (2013). The neural

biology of moral sense: Facts or hypotheses? Annals of General Psychiatry, 12, 6.

doi:10.1186/1744-859X-12-6.

Mason, M.F., Norton, M.I., Van Horn, J.D., Wegner, D.M., Grafton, S.T., & Macrae, C.N.

(2007). Wandering minds: The default network and stimulus-independent

thought. Science, 315, 393-395. Doi: 10.1126/science.1131295. Mathews, D., & Bok, H. (2014). Brain research on morality and cognition. In J.

Clausen & N. Levy (Eds.), Handbook of Neuroethics (pp. 1151-1166). Dordecht:

Springer Netherlands.

Meissner, K., Muth, E. R., & Herbert, B. M. (2011). Bradygastric activity of the

stomach predicts disgust sensitivity and perceived disgust intensity. Biological

Psychology, 86, 9–16.

Mohammed, S., & Peter, E. (2009). Rituals, death, and the practice of medical futility.

Nursing Ethics, 16(3), 292.

Moore, K.D. (2016). Great tide rising: Towards clarity and moral courage in a time of

planetary change. Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint.

Narvaez, D. (2014). Neurobiology and the development of human morality: Evolution,

culture, and wisdom. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Narvaez D. & Rest, J. (1995). The four components of acting morally. In W. Kurtines

& J. Gerwirtz (Eds.), Moral behavior and moral development: An introduction

(pp. 385-399). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Nielsen, L., & Kaszniak, A.W. (2006). Awareness of subtle emotional feelings: A

comparison of long-term meditators and non-meditators. Emotion, 6, 392-405.

Northoff, G., & Bermpohl, F. (2004). Cortical midline structures and the self. Trends

in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 102-107.

Oaten, M., Stevenson, R. J., & Case, T. I. (2009). Disgust as a disease-avoidance

mechanism. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 303–321. Ortner, C. N. M., Kilner, S. J., & Zelazo, P. D. (2007). Mindfulness meditation and

reduced emotional interference on a cognitive task. Motivation and Emotion, 31,

271–283.

Phillips, M.L., Young, A.W., Senior, C., Brammer, M., Andrew, C., Calder, A.J., Bullmore,

E.T., Perrett, D.I., Rowland, D., Williams, S.C., Gray, J.A., & David, A.S. (1997). A

specific neural substrate for perceiving facial expressions of disgust. Nature, 389

(6650), 495–498.

Pittenger, C., & Duman, R. S. (2007). Stress, depression, and neuroplasticity: A

convergence of mechanisms. Neuropsychopharmacology, 33(1), 88-109. doi:

doi:10.1038/sj.npp.1301574

Quaglia, J. T., Braun, S. E., Freeman, S. P., McDaniel, M. A., & Brown, K. W. (2016).

Meta-analytic evidence for effects of mindfulness training on dimensions of self-

reported dispositional mindfulness. Psychological Assessment 28, 803-818.

doi:10.1037/pas0000268

Rest, J. (1986a). Development in judging moral issues. Minneapolis MN: University of

Minnesota Press.

Rest, J. (1986b). Moral development: Advances in research and theory. New York:

Praeger.

Rest, J. R., Bebeau, M. J., Narvaez, D., & Thoma, S. (1999). Postconventional moral

thinking: A Neo-Kohlbergian approach. London, UK: Psychology Press.

Rest, J. R., Narvaez, D., Thoma, S. J., & Bebeau, M.J. (2010). A neo-Kohlbergian

approach to morality research. Journal of Moral Education, 29(4), 381-395. DOI:

10.1080/713679390. Rest, J. R., & Thoma, S. J. (1985). Relation of moral judgment development to formal

education. Developmental Psychology, 21(4), 709. doi: 10.1037/0012-

1649.21.4.709

Ricard, M. (2015). Altruism. New York: Little, Brown and Company.

Ritz, T., Thons, M., Fahrenkrug, S., & Dahme, B. (2005). Airways, respiration, and

respiratory sinus arrhythmia during picture viewing. Psychophysiology, 42, 568–

578.

Rizzolatti, G., & Sinigaglia, C. (2008). Mirrors in the brain: How our minds share

actions and emotions. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.

Royzman, E.B., Cassidy, K.W., & Baron, J. (2003). I know you know: Epistemic

egocentrism in children and adults. Review of General Psychology, 7, 38-65.

Ruedy, N.E., & Schweitzer, M.E. (2010). In the moment: The effects of mindfulness on

ethical decision making. Journal of Business Ethics, 95, 73-87. Doi

10.1007/s10551-011-0796-y

Rushton, C. H. (2016). Moral resilience: A capacity for navigating moral distress in

critical care. AACN Advances in Critical Care, 27(1), 111-119.

doi:10.4037/aacnacc2016275.

Rushton, C. (in press, a). Integrity: The anchor for moral resilience. In C. Rushton

(Ed.), Moral resilience: Transforming moral suffering in healt care. New York:

Oxford University Press. Rushton, C. (in press, b). Conceptualizing moral resilience. In C. Rushton (Ed.), Moral

resilience: Transforming moral suffering in healthcare. New York: Oxford

University Press.

Rushton, C.H., Caldwell, M., & Kurtz, M. (2016). Moral distress: empowering nurses

to restore integrity. American Journal of Nursing, 116(7), 40-49.

Rushton, C.H., Kaszniak, A.W. & Halifax, J.S., (2013a). A framework for understanding

moral distress among palliative care clinicians. Journal of Palliative Medicine, 16,

1074-1079.

Rushton, C.H., Kaszniak, A.W. & Halifax, J.S., (2013b). Addressing moral distress:

Application of a framework to palliative care practice. Journal of Palliative

Medicine. 16, 1080-1088.

Rushton, C. Kaszniak, A., Halifax, J. (in press). Cultivating essential capacities for

moral resilience. In C. Rushton (Ed.). Moral resilience: Transforming moral

suffering in healthcare. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rushton, C. & Sharma, M. (in press, a). Designing sustainable systems for ethical

practice, In C. Rushton (Ed.), Moral resilience: Transforming moral suffering in

healthcare. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rushton, C. & Sharma, M. (in press, b). Creating a culture of moral resilience and

ethical practice. In C. Rushton (Ed.), Moral resilience: Transforming moral

suffering in healthcare. New York: Oxford University Press.

Santos, A., Mier, D., Kirsch, P., & Meyer-Lindenberg, A. (2011). Evidence for a general

face salience signal in human amygdala. NeuroImage, 54, 3111-3116.

Doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.11.024 Semelin, J. (2007). Purify and destroy: The political uses of massacre and genocide.

New York: Columbia University Press.

Shay, J. (2009). The trials of homecoming: Odysseus returns from Iraq/Afghanistan.

Smith College Studies in Social Work, 79(3-4), 286-298.

Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. (2007). Moral Emotions and moral behavior.

Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 345-372.

Tenbrunsel, A. E. & Messick, D.M. (2004). Ethical fading: The role of self-deception in

unethical behavior. Social Justice Research, 17, 223–236.

Thoma, S. J. (1994). Moral judgment and moral action. In Res, J., and Narvaez, D.

(Eds.), Moral development in the professions: Psychology and applied ethics (pp.

199-211), Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Todd, R.M., Talmi, D., Schmitz, T.W., Susskind, J., & Anderson, A.K. (2012).

Psychophysical and neural evidence for emotion-enhanced perceptual vividness.

The Journal of Neuroscience, 32, 11201-11212. Doe:10.1523;JNEUROSCI.0155-

12.2012

Tomasello, M., & Vaish, A. (2013). Origins of human cooperation and morality.

Annual Review of Psychology, 64, 231-255.

Tyber, J. M., Lieberman, D., & Griskevicius, V. (2009). Microbes, mating, and

morality: Individual differences in three functional domains of disgust. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 103–122.

Vago, D. R., & Silbersweig, D. A. (2012). Self-awareness, self-regulation, and self-

transcendence (S-ART): A framework for understanding the neurobiological mechanisms of mindfulness. Frontiers In Human Neuroscience, 6, 296.

doi:10.3389/fnhum.2012.00296

Vianello, M., Galliani, E.M., & Haidt, J. (2010). Elevation at work: The effects of

leaders’ moral excellence. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 5, 390-411.

DOI:10.1080/17439760.2010.516764.

Walker, M. U. (2008). Moral understandings: A feminist study in ethics. Oxford, UK and

New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2009). The roots of human altruism. British Journal

of Psychology, 100, 455-471.

Weng, H., Fox, A.S., Shackman, A.J., Stodola, D.E., Caldwell, J.Z.K., Olson, M.C., Rogers,

G.M., & Davidson, R.J. (2013) Compassion training alters altruism and neural

responses to suffering. Psychological Science, 24, 1171-1180. DOI:

10.1177/0956797612469537.

Wicker, B., Keysers, C., Plailly, J., Royet, J. P., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (2003). Both

of us disgusted in my insula: the common neural basis of seeing and feeling

disgust. Neuron, 40, 655–664.

Winczewski, L.A., Bowen, J.D., & Collins, N.L. (2016). Is empathic accuracy enough to

facilitate responsive behavior in dyadic interaction? Distinguishing ability from

motivation. Psychological Science, 27, 394-404.

Doi:10.1177/0956797615624491.

Yiend, J (2009). The effects of emotion on attention: A review of attentional

processing of emotional information. Cognition and Emotion, 24, 3-47.

DOI:10.1080/02699930903205698. Zaki, J., & Ochsner, K. (2013). The cognitive neuroscience of sharing and

understanding others’ emotions. In J. Decety (Ed.), Empathy: From bench to

bedside. (pp. 207-226). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Zhong, C. B., Bohns, V.K., & Gino, F. (2010). A good lamp is the best police: Darkness

increases self- interested behavior and dishonesty. Psychological Science 21,

311–314.