The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality and What to Do About It, Doctoral Dissertation of Joshua D

9/03 Note to readers of The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth about Morality and What to Do About it, Doctoral Dissertation of Joshua D. Greene in the Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, June 2002. You are welcome to read this work, pass it on to others, and cite it. I only ask that if you pass on this work to someone else that it be passed on (1) in its entirety, (2) without modification, and (3) along with this note. I consider this a work in progress. It is currently under review in its present form at an academic press. I intend to revise and expand it substantially before publishing it as a book, so much so that the book and the dissertation will probably best be considered separate works. Comments are welcome. You can contact me by email ([email protected]) or by regular mail: Joshua Greene Department of Psychology Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544 jdg THE TERRIBLE, HORRIBLE, NO GOOD, VERY BAD TRUTH ABOUT MORALITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT Joshua David Greene A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY NOVEMBER 2002 © Copyright by Joshua David Greene, 2002. All rights reserved. ii Abstract In this essay I argue that ordinary moral thought and language is, while very natural, highly counterproductive and that as a result we would be wise to change the way we think and talk about moral matters. First, I argue on metaphysical grounds against moral realism, the view according to which there are first order moral truths. Second, I draw on principles of moral psychology, cognitive science, and evolutionary theory to explain why moral realism appears to be true even though it is not. I then argue, based on the picture of moral psychology developed herein, that realist moral language and thought promotes misunderstanding and exacerbates conflict. I consider a number of standard views concerning the practical implications of moral anti-realism and reject them. I then sketch and defend a set of alternative revisionist proposals for improving moral discourse, chief among them the elimination of realist moral language, especially deontological language, and the promotion of an anti-realist utilitarian framework for discussing moral issues of public concern. I emphasize the importance of revising our moral practices, suggesting that our entrenched modes of moral thought may be responsible for our failure to solve a number of global social problems. iii in fond memory of David Lewis 1941-2001 a philosopher without counterpart in this world or any other iv Acknowledgements My philosophical interests are rather pedestrian as philosophical interests go. If your man or woman on the street takes no interest in a certain issue, chances are I don't either. One consequence of my distaste for esoterica is that my friends and family outside of philosophy are, to me, as valuable a professional resource as my colleagues in the field. As my ideas have developed I've tried to make them accessible and compelling to intelligent lay people. What this means in practice is that my non-philosopher friends and family have endured years of my ranting, and I thank them for their trouble—for listening, for keeping me grounded with their feedback (sometimes in the form of glazed expressions), and for providing me with what is loosely called “moral support.” I thank my housemates Giulio Boccaletti and Antoinette Handley; my old friends Koichi Kurisu, Jon Bresman, and Darin McKeever; and my old old friends Brett Halsey and Emily Sobel. Thanks to Jessica Freireich for her open mind and heart. Thanks to Andrea Heberlein for a lifetime of affection in less than a year, with the best yet to come. Thanks to my inspiring siblings, Danny and Elizabeth, and to my parents, Laurie and Jonathan Greene, who taught me from the start to think for myself. As an undergraduate, I was fortunate to have had three talented and generous mentors who nurtured me by taking my fledgling ideas seriously when others would have laughed at them. I am forever grateful to Jonathan Baron, Amartya Sen, and Derek Parfit for sending me on my way. v Much of my work in recent years has been outside of philosophy in the emerging field of social cognitive neuroscience, and I am very grateful for my second home in Princeton’s psychology department. The influence of my work in psychology on my philosophical work is obvious, and my sincerest thanks go to Jonathan Cohen, John Darley, and Leigh Nystrom for taking me in and for providing me with unprecedented opportunities. I would also like to acknowledge Judith Viorst, whose charming tale of pre- adolescent angst inspired the title of this work.1 Over the last five years I've had the privilege of defending my ideas against some of the best minds in the philosophy business, both young and old. My debts to the members of Princeton's philosophy department are many, and I will not attempt to enumerate my creditors for fear of omissions. A few, however, deserve special mention. Thanks to Caspar Hare and Simon Keller for their constant companionship and insight. Thanks also to Anja Jauernig, Angelique Knapp, Josh Knobe, Brian Lee, Jonathan and Phillippa McKeown-Green, Jessica Moss, Casey O'Callaghan, Kieran Setiya, and Jeff Speaks. Many thanks to Mark Johnston, Paul Benacerraf, and my peers who participated in our departmental dissertation seminars during my post-generals years. I am also grateful to Gideon Rosen and the students in his meta-ethics seminar (Spring 2001) for allowing me to present to them an earlier version of my second chapter and for providing me with valuable feedback. Thanks to Ann Getson for being so much more than her title, "Graduate Assistant," could ever convey. 1Alexander and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Day (1987). vi I owe a great debt to my advisor and mentor Gilbert Harman whose encouragement has meant a lot to me and whose advice and criticism have been indispensable. I thank Gil not only for his contributions as my thesis advisor but for his unflagging support of my work outside of the department. Finally, I would like to thank my late advisor David Lewis, to whom this work is dedicated. David dazzled his audiences with his brilliance and won the hearts of those who knew him with his kindness. I came to Princeton hoping to work with David, even though he is known primarily for his work in metaphysics, and my primary interest has been in ethics. It was a good match while it lasted, although, as any Lewis student will attest, it was rarely easy. David held his students to the highest standard, and I am honored and enriched for having sneaked in as one of his last. I regret that he did not live to see this work completed. If the first three chapters are tighter and better argued than the last two, you can blame me and thank the incomparable David Lewis. vii Table of Contents Abstract iii Dedication iv Acknowledgements v Table of Contents viii Part I: The Terrible, Horrible Truth About Morality Chapter 1: Introduction 2 1.1 Projectivist Anti-Realism 5 1.2 Two Meanings of “Moral” 15 1.3 Some Further Clarifications 22 1.4 The Conservative Approach 24 1.4.1 The Non-Cognitivists 24 1.4.2 Mackie 25 1.4.3 Blackburn’s Quasi-Realism 29 1.4.4 Timmons’ Ethical Contextualism 30 1.4.5 Moral Fictionalism 32 1.4.6 Others 33 1.5 The Revisionist Approach 34 1.5.1 Hinckfuss’ Moral Nihilism 34 viii 1.5.2 John P. Burgess’ “Anethicism” 37 1.5.3. Garner’s “Compassionate Amoralism” 37 1.5.4 Radical Nihilism 38 1.5.5 John A. Burgess’ Framework for the Evaluation of Error Theories 45 1.6 In Defense of Revisionism 46 Chapter 2: Against Moral Realism 54 2.1 Some Preliminaries 55 2.1.1 Two Sources of Moral Skepticism 55 2.1.2 Metaphysical v. Epistemological Skepticism 57 2.1.3 Moral Intuitions and Moral Skepticism 60 2.2 Moral Realism and the Need for Fundamental Moral Principles 64 2.2.1 The Structure of Moral Principles 64 2.2.2 The Supervenience of Value and the Necessity of Moral Principles 71 2.2.3 Fundamental Moral Principles 78 2.3 The Nature of Fundamental Moral Principles 84 2.1.3 The Variety of Moral Principles: General and Specific, Direct and Indirect 84 2.3.2 Fundamental Moral Principles: General or Specific? 88 2.4 Analytic Naturalism 90 ix 2.4.1 Direct Analytic Moral Principles and Moore’s Open Question Argument 91 2.4.2 Michael Smith’s Analytic Rationalism 93 2.4.3 The Specter of Relativism: Jackson, Smith (Again), and Lewis 99 2.4.4 Realist Relativism 110 2.4.5 Other Forms of Analytic Naturalism 114 2.5 Synthetic Naturalism 120 2.5.1 The Synthetic Naturalist’s Strategy 120 2.5.2 Synthetic Naturalism and the Problem of Fundamental Moral Principles 123 2.5.3 Mathematics and Consciousness: Synthetic Naturalism’s Partners in Innocence? 130 2.6 Non-Naturalism 134 2.7 Summary and Conclusion 135 Chapter 3: Moral Psychology and Projective Error 142 3.1 Projectivism 145 3.2 Moral Intuition and Moral Reasoning 149 3.3 Emotion and Moral Judgment 156 3.4 Projective Error 169 3.5 The Shaping of Morality 188 x 3.6 The Illusion of Rationalist Psychology 197 3.7 Conclusion 204 Part II: What to Do About It Chapter 4: Practical Anti-Realism 208 4.1 Some Preliminaries 209 4.1.1 Error Theories and Pessimism 209 4.1.2 The Baggage of Moral Realism 211 4.1.3 Objective and Subjective Evaluation 220 4.1.4 Analytic Naturalism Revisited 221 4.2 Assessing our Moral Practices 225 4.3 Moral Psychology and the Scale Problem 228 4.4 Moral Realism and the Revisionist Proposal 233 4.5 The Analogy

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