Ecological Feminism and Ecosystem Ecology1

Ecological Feminism and Ecosystem Ecology Author(s): Karen J. Warren and Jim Cheney Source: Hypatia, Vol. 6, No. 1, Ecological Feminism (Spring, 1991), pp. 179-197 Published by: Wiley on behalf of Hypatia, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810040 Accessed: 30-09-2015 22:24 UTC

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This content downloaded from 131.156.157.78 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 22:24:03 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions EcologicalFeminism and EcosystemEcology1

KARENJ. WARRENand JIMCHENEY

Ecologicalfeminism is a feminismwhich attempts to unite the demandsof the women'smovement with those of theecological movement. Ecofeminists often appeal to "ecology"in supportof theirclaims, particularly claims about the importanceof feminismto environmentalism.What is missingfrom the literature is any sustained attemptto showrespects in whichecological feminism and thescience of ecologyare engagedin complementary,mutually supportive projects. In thispaper we attempt to do that by showingten importantsimilarities which establish the needfor and benefitsof on-goingdialogue between ecofeminists and ecosystemecologists.

Ecologicalfeminism is a feminismwhich attemptsto unite the demandsof the women's movement with those of the ecological movement in order to bring about a world and worldviewthat are not based on socioeconomic and conceptualstructures of domination.Many ecological feministshave claimed that what is needed is a feminism that is ecological and an ecology that is feminist (see King 1983, 1989). They have shown ways in which ecology, understoodin its broadestsense as environmentalism,is a feministissue.2 What has yet to be shown is that ecology, understoodin its narrowersense as "the science of ecology" (or, scientific ecology) also is or might be a feminist issue. Establishingthat claim involves showingthat ecological feminismmakes good scientific ecological sense.3 In this paper we discuss ten noteworthy similaritiesbetween themes in ecological feminism and ecosystem ecology-similarities that show the two are engaged in complementary,mutually supportive projects. Our goal is modest and suggestive.We are not arguingfor the strongerclaims that ecosystem (or, more generally,scientific) ecology must be feminist, that feminists must be ecologists, or that these similaritiesestablish that ecosystemecology is feminist. To establish these claims, much more would be needed than is providedin this paper.4Rather, we are identifyingtheoretical points of inter- Hypatiavol. 6, no. 1 (Spring1991) ? byKaren J. Warren and Jim Cheney

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section between ecofeminismand ecosystemecology in the interestof further- ing discussionon the nature and direction of futurebridge-building between the two.5

ECOLOGICALFEMINISM AND ECOFEMINISTETHICS

We take ecological feminism to refer "to a sensibility,an intimation, that feministconcerns run parallelto, are boundup with, or, perhaps,are one with concern for a naturalworld which has been subjectedto much the same abuse and ambivalent behavior as have women" (Cheney 1987, 115). Although there area varietyofecofeminist positions (Warren1987), the common thread that runs through ecofeminist scholarshipis that the domination of women and the domination of nature are "intimately connected and mutually reinforcing"(King 1989, 18). All ecofeminists endorse the view that an adequateunderstanding of the nature of the connections between the twin dominations of women and nature requiresa feminist theory and practice informedby an ecological perspectiveand an environmentalisminformed by a feminist perspective(Warren 1987, 4-5). Much of ecofeminist scholarshipconcerns the ethical nature of human relationshipsto the nonhuman naturalworld. Like feminist ethics generally, "ecofeministethics" includes a varietyof positions. What makes ecofeminist ethics feminist is a twofoldcommitment to critiquemale bias in ethics and to develop analyseswhich are not male-biased(see Jaggar1990, 23). However, ecofeministethics extends feministethical critiquesof sexismand other social "ismsof domination"to include critiquesof "naturism,"i.e., the unjustified dominationof nonhumananimals and nature by humans.As such, ecofeminist ethics critiquesnot only androcentricbut also anthrocentricand naturistbias in ethics. Ecofeministethics is groundedin the assumptionthat the dominations of women and of natureare morallywrong and ought to be eliminated. Likefeminist ethics (seeJaggar 1990, 24-5), the practicalimport of ecofeminist ethics is as a guide to action on issuesin the pre-feminist,patriarchal present. This guidance is aimed at assistingpersons in resisting sexist, naturist, and interconnectedracist, classist,heterosexist practices, and in envisioning and creating morally desirable alternatives. The women-initiated non-violent Chipko movement begun in 1974 in Reni, Indiais one such alternativeaction (see Shiva 1988 and Warren1988). One wayto imageecofeminist ethics is as a quilt-in-the-making(see Warren 1988, 1990). Like the AIDS Names Project Quilt, ecofeminist ethics is a quilt-in-process,constructed from "patches" contributed by personslocated in different socioeconomic, cultural, historical circumstances. Since these patches will reflect the historiesof the variousquilters, no two patches will be just the same. Nonetheless, the quilts-in-processwill each have bordersthat not only delimit the spatiotemporaldimensions of the quilt, but also put some

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necessaryconditions, "boundaryconditions," on what can become partof the quilt. What these boundaryconditions do not do is delimit the interiorof the quilt, what the design or actual pattern of the quilt will be. That design will emerge out of the life experiences, ethical concerns, and specific socioeconomic historicalcontexts of the quilters(see Warren1990). What are some of the boundaryconditions of ecofeministethics? Just what does, and what does not, belong on the quilt?Since ecofeminismis a critique of interrelatedsocial systems of domination, no "isms of domination" (for example,sexism, racism, classism, heterosexism, naturism) belong on the quilt (Warren 1990). This means that any conceptual framework(or, set of basic beliefs, values, attitudes,and assumptionswhich growout of and reflect one's view of oneself and one'sworld) which sanctions,justifies, or perpetuatesthese "ismsof domination"- oppressiveand patriarchalconceptual frameworks- does not belong on the quilt. What does belong on the quilt are those descriptionsand presciptionsof social realitythat do not maintain,perpetuate, or attemptto justifysocial "ismsof domination"and the power-overrelationships used to keep them intact. These will include patches that make visible and challenge local and global formsof environmentalabuse, the dispropor- tional effects of environmental pollution on women, children, the poor, dislocated indigenous persons, and peoples in so-called less developed countries; patches that provide present-dayalternatives to environmental exploitation; patches that document and celebrate the morally respectful dimensions of women'sexperiences with the nonhuman world;and patches that include the experiencesof indigenouspeople, when those experiencesare neither sexist nor naturist.Taken together, the patches on the quilt provide the ethical theorist with concrete, pictoralways of understandingthe nature of a morality which treats both women's moral experiences and human interactionswith the nonhumannatural world respectfully.

ECOSYSTEMECOLOGY

Many controversies in modern ecosystem ecology about the nature of ecosystemscan be understoodas argumentsbetween two approachesto the studyof ecosystems:the "population-community"approach and the "process- functional"approach.6 The population-communityapproach focuses on the growth of populations, the structure and composition of communities of organisms,and the interactionsamong individual organisms. It is groundedin Darwiniantheory of naturalselection. It "tendsto view ecosystemsas networks of interacting populations whereby the biota are the ecosystem and abiotic components such as soil or sedimentsare external influences"(O'Neill et al. 1986, 8). The population-communityapproach typically is identifiedwith the workof such ecologists as Clemens, Lotka,Gauss, and Whittaker.

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In contrast, the process-functionalapproach is based on a quantitative, mathematical,thermodynamic, biophysical model which emphasizesenergy flowsand nutrientcycling. It assumesthat the fundamentalunits of ecosystems include both organismsand physical components, biotic and abiotic components. The process-functionalapproach was developed duringthis century by such ecologists as Tansley,Lindeman, and Odum. Although discussionsof ecosystemsecology often present "the ecological perspective"as if there were only one perspective,debates arisingfrom differences between the population-community and process-functional approachesto ecosystemsecology reveal that there currentlyis no singlemodel of ecosystems.7Furthermore, there is a third alternativeway to conceive ecosystems. That alternative is "hierarchytheory" or what, for importantfeminist reasons, we prefer to refer to as "observationset theory."8We understand hierarchytheory to be the most viable attempt to date by scientific ecologists to provide an inclusive theoretical frameworkfor the variety of ecosystem analyses.Ecologists such as O'Neill, DeAngelis, Waide and Allen are among its main advocates (O'Neill et al. 1986). Central to hierarchy(observation set) theoryis the notion of an observation set. O'Neill et al. describean observationset as "a particularway of viewing the naturalworld. It includesthe phenomenaof interest,the specificmeasure- ments taken, and the techniquesused to analyzethe data"(1986, 7). Although specific problems always call for particularobservation sets, theory making calls for considerationof multiple observationsets: Each of these points of view emphasizesdifferent phenomena and quite differentmeasurements. But since neither encompas- ses all possible observations,neither can be considered to be more fundamental. When studying a specific problem, the scientists must alwaysfocus on a single observationset. How- ever, when developing theory,many observationsets must be considered(O'Neill et al. 1986, 7).

Accordingto hierarchytheory, both an adequateconception of the complexity of ecosystemsand meaningfulecosystem comparisons require that one consider multiple observationsets. Spatiotemporalscale is an importantcharacteristic of an observationset both because it changes as the ecological problem changes and because "ecologicalprinciples often do not translatewell acrossthese scales"(O'Neill et al. 1986, 20). The meaningsof such basic ecological concepts as "stability," "equilibrium,""temporary," "enduring," "local," and "global,"are relative to some particularscale. Dependingon the spatiotemporalscale usedin any given observationset, "ecosystemshave been seen as static or dynamic, as steady- state or as fluctuating,as integratedsystems or as collections of individuals" (O'Neill et al. 1986, 20). Forexample, a foreststand can be looked at froman

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organismicstandpoint (e.g., as enduring,stable individualtrees or populations of trees) or froman energyflow and nutrientcycling standpoint(e.g., as fluxes and flowsof carbonand oxygenrecycled through photosynthesis). Because the forest stand may accuratelybe viewed in either way, it is incorrect, in fact impossible,"to designatethe components of theecosystem"-the designation depends on the spatiotemporalscale and changes as that scale changes (O'- Neill et al. 1986, 83). The basic contribution of hierarchy (observation set) theory is to call attention to the importanceof observationsets and spatiotemporalscales to ecosystem ecology. The complexity of natural systems is overlooked or dis- counted when one focuseson a single observationset. An exclusivist "either- or" approach to describing or studying ecosystems (e.g., an exclusivist population-communityor functional process approach)is thereby viewed as basedon a falsedichotomy which resultsin an inadequate,because incomplete, theoryof ecosystems(O'Neill et al. 209).9

SIMILARITESBETWEEN ECOFEMINISM AND ECOSYSTEMSECOLOGY

We are now in a position to show some of the similiarities between ecofeminism (particularlyecofeminist ethics) and ecosystem ecology seen through the lens of hierarchy (observation set) theory. These similarities suggestvarious ways in which ecofeminismand ecosystemecology informand supportone another.10 First, central to hierarchytheory is the view that space-time dependent observationsets provide differentvantage points or frameworksfrom which one makesecological observationsand engagesin ecological theory building. It is throughthe notion of multipleobservation sets that the idea of one single model of ecosystemsis rejected.In this respect,hierarchy theory rulesout any notion of an observationset free or decontextualizedscience: how one views ecosystemswill depend on the observationsets one employs. One is immediatelystruck by the similaritybetween the hierarchytheorist's emphasison observationsets, "windowsthrough which one views the world," and the ecofeminist's emphasis on "waysof thinking," "world-views,"and "conceptual frameworks,"especially oppressive and patriarchalones (see Warren 1987, 1990). The notion of a patriarchaland oppressiveconceptual frameworkis as central to ecofeminismand ecofeminist ethics as the notion of an observationset is to hierarchytheory in ecosystem ecology: one could not generate the observationsand conclusions of each without them. An attention to observationsets is also an acknowledgmentof the importanceof the contexts in and through which one observes, measures,and theorizes. One's observation set, like one's conceptual framework,will quite literally shape and affect what one sees; both providea contextfor theorizing.

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There are at least three interrelatedreasons why attention to context is of importance to ecofeminist ethics. First, what a thing (person, community, population, species, animal, river) is, is in part a function of whereit is, a functionof the relationshipsin which it standsto other thingsand to its history, including (where applicable) its evolutionaryhistory. It is this attention to placethat fuels bioregionalistecofeminism (see Plant, 1990) and the importance many ecofeministsgive to narratives,myth, and ritual in the construc- tion of ecofeminist ethics (see Cheney 1987, 1989a;Diamond and Orenstein 1990; Warren 1990). Second, an understandingof context is important in assessingthe putatively universal claims of reason and ethical deliberation. Feministworries about ahistorical and allegedlygender-neutral conceptions of reasonand rationalityin the Westernphilosophical tradition provide one way of understandingthe importanceof context-historical location and gender identity in theory building in the pre-feministpresent."1 Ecofeminist theory buildingseeks to ridprevailing conceptions of reason,rationality, and morality of whatevermale and naturistbias they have. More than this, however,and this is our thirdpoint, an attention to context permitsone to stressthe idiographicdimension of ourethical journeysthrough this world and of ethics itself. Holmes Rolston has been a strong advocatefor recognizingthis aspect of ethical thought in environmentalethics, and this advocacy derives from his understandingthat a thing is what it is in part becauseof where it is. As Rolston puts it: An ethics should be rational,but rationalityinhabits a historical system.The place that is to be countedmorally has a history; the ethics that befits such a place will take on historicalform; the ethics will itself have a history.The place to be mapped... will have twin foci. One focus will be nomothetic, recurrent; the other will be idiographic,uniquely particular... The rationality of the ethic, as well as the area to be mapped, will be historical.That is, logic will be mixed with story.The move fromis to ought... is transformedinto movement along a storyline (Rolston 1988, 341-42). An attention to context does not split off the idiographicas what ethics permits,provided that the universaldemands of moralityare met. Instead,the ethically idiographicis the very center of each individual'sethical life; it is the place from which we not only test the claims of the "universal"and the "rational,"but fromwhich we constructthe "universal"claims of "rationality." In this way, the "universal"and the "rational"are alwaysin some manneror other inflected with historicity.The "universal"and "rational"are themselves moments in a story,reflecting some observationset. The ecological dimension of ethical reflectionstems in largepart fromthe fact that ecology is context (or observationset) dependent. We agree with Brennanthat:

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what ecology shows is not simply that the context makes a differenceto the kind of action we engage in. It shows, rather, that what kindsof thingswe are,what sortof thing an individual person is, and what sort of options for fulfillment and self- realisation are open, are themselves very much context-dependent (Brennan 1988, 162).

One way ecofeminist ethics centralizes this context-dependent feature of ethical discourseis by conceiving of ethics as growing out of what Cheney (1987, 144) calls definingrelationships, that is, relationshipsunderstood as in some sense defining who one is. These relationshipsinclude those of moral agents with the nonhuman naturalworld, including animals. Second, hierarchytheory provides a methodologicalmeans of investigating ecological problems. According to hierarchy theory, the "ontology" that emergesfrom any particularinvestigation is relativeto the observationset that producesit. This does not make that ontology "subjective"in any pernicious sense;but it does mean that to accept a solution to a particularproblem is not therebyto make any ontological commitmentsin any absolute (i.e., non-observation set dependent) sense. Thus, the methodology of hierarchytheory makes it imperative that the epistemological requirements of particular problems,given in termsof observer-affectedobservation sets, dictate to ontology (ratherthan the converse);ecology does not determinethat an ecologicalproblem must be pressedinto the shape of a preferredontology. According to hierarchy theory,it wouldbe quixoticto think in termsof strivingfor an articulationof the structure(even thehierarchical structure) of an ecosystem. As a methodologicalstance, hierarchytheory rejects the view that there is only one way to describe ecological phenomena. Which description is appropriate will depend upon the observation set and on what it is one is attempting to describe,explain, or predict. In this respect, hierarchytheory privilegesmethodological and epistemologicalconsiderations over ontology, the attempt to specify what is "really"in the world.The ontology embedded in both explanation and phenomena being explained is alwaysa function of the appropriate observation set. Any grand attempt to provide one metaphysicsof moralsseems doomed because misguided: it puts the metaphysical/ontologicalcart before the epistemological/methodological horse. Like hierarchytheory, ecofeminism makes no attempt to provide the point of view, one single model, an "objective"(i.e., value-neutral,unbiased) point of view-none, that is, beyondthe very"boundary conditions" of ecofeminism itself.Ecofeminists criticize up-down, value-hierarchical, value dualisticthink- ing which they say characterizesWestern philosophical thinking aboutwomen and nature as being both patriarchaland insular-as if what is observed, prescribed,and theorizedare independentof any conceptualframework (Gray 1981; Griffin 1978; King 1983b, 1989; Ruether 1975; Warren 1987, 1988,

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1990). Ecofeministsacknowledge up front their basic feminist value commitments:the twin dominationsof women and natureexist, arewrong, and ought to be eliminated. Ecofeministssee these twin dominationsas social problems rooted in very concrete, historical, socioeconomic conditions, as well as in oppressive,patriarchal conceptual frameworksthat maintain and sanction these conditions. As a methodologicaland epistemologicalstance, all ecofeministscentralize, in one way or another, the "voices"and experiences of women (and others) with regardto an understandingof the nonhumannatural world. Like hierarchy theory,this is not to say that an ecofeminist "ontology"does not include materialobjects-real trees, rivers,and animals.It does! But it acknowledges that these objects are in importantsenses both materiallygiven and socially constructed:what counts as a tree, river,or animal,how natural"objects" are conceived, described, and treated, must be understood in the context of broader social and institutional practices. Centralizing women's voices is importantmethodologically and epistemologicallyto the overall critiqueand revisioningof the concept of natureand the moraldimensions of human-nature relationships. Third, hierarchytheory is antireductionist.Population-community based observationsets cannot be reduced to process-functionalbased observation sets (or vice versa). Consequently, a functional-processunderstanding of organismsdoes not renderan "objectontology" of discrete organisms(trees, rivers,animals) obsolete, or renderorganisms mere conduits or configurations of energy, as environmental ethicist J. Baird Callicott has claimed (1986). There is no ontologically prior or privileged or fundamentaldescription of nature.Hierarchy theory rules out a view of individualentities (e.g., animals) as ontologically parasiticon something more fundamental(e.g., energy flows or nutrient cycles), a point we returnto shortly.If hierarchytheory is correct, then in contemporaryscientific ecology, there is no place for a notion of degreesof reality.Both individuals and energyflows are real. Becauseit is antireductionist,hierarchy theory centralizes diversity; it takes differenceor diversityto be a fundamentalfeature ofphenomena, not reducible to talk of the "sameness"of organismsor the "oneness"of energyflows. That would be the case only if one approachhad epistemological,metaphysical, or ontological priorityover the other. In fact, one of the most interestingfeatures of hierarchytheory is that it privileges the notion of diversity or difference when studyinginteractions between differentsubsystems ("holons") of ecosystems,and the notion of commonalitiesamong members of the same subsystem. Hierarchytheory is thereforea frameworkwhich providesfor both an ecology of differencesand an ecology of commonalities,depending on the context and observationset.12 Ecofeminist ethics is also antireductionist.It is a structurallypluralistic frameworkthat centralizesboth diversityor difference (e.g., among women,

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amongpeople of color, between humansand nonhumans)and commonalities (e.g., among women, among people of color, between humans and nonhumans). A nonreductionist ecofeminist stance acknowledges differences between humansand membersor elements of nonhumannature, while nonetheless affirming that humans are animals and members of an ecological community.An ecology of differencesand commonalities fits well with an ecofeministpolitics and ethics of differencesand commonalities. Fourth,hierarchy theory is an inclusivisttheory that offersa frameworkfor mediating between historically opposed approachesto ecosystem ecology, makinga central place for the insightsof each without inheriting the defects of either when viewed exclusively as the right or correctway to studyecosys- tems. Hierarchytheory suggeststhat the futureof at least ecosystem ecoogy maywell lie in successfullyintegrating these two approachesinto a model that centralizes the importance of observation sets and locates any particular ecosystemanalyis in or relative to a particularobservation set. Similarly,ecofeminst ethics is an inclusivist ethic (see Warren 1990) that offersa frameworkfor mediatingbetween two historicallyopposed approaches in environmental ethics: deontological rights-, virtues-, or holistic-based ethics and consequentialist-basedethics. Warrenhas arguedthat ecofeminism "involves a shift from a conception of ethics as primarilya matter of rights, rules,or principles[whether deontological or consequentialist]determined and applied in specific cases to entities viewed as competitorsin the contest of moral standing," to one which "makesa central places for values . . . that presupposethat our relationshipsto othersare central to our understandingof who we are" (Warren 1990, 143). An ecofeminist ethic may involve a commitment to rights in certain contexts and for certain purposes(for example, in the protection of individual animals against unnecessarypain or suffering);it mayuse consequentialistconsiderations in other contexts and for other purposes(for example,when consideringbehavior toward ecosystems). Like hierarchy theory, ecofeminist ethics is one possible frameworkfor developingsuch an inclusivistalternative.13 As a fifth and related point, hierarchy theory provides a frameworkfor viewing historically opposed approachesas complementary.Dualisms fade into the complexity of multiple vantage points and find complementarity where once there was only oppositionality (e.g., stability or instability, diversity or sameness, energy flow or discrete organism). This rejection of oppositional polarities is accomplished not by reducing population-community to process-functional accounts, or vice versa, or by reducing both to a still more basic or primitive ontological framework;it is accomplished by providing a unifying frameworkfor studying and relating to one another various analyses, each with their own epistemology and context-dependent ontology. As a "unified theory," it is a unity which does not erase difference.

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The earliest ecofeminist literaturewas groundedin a rejection of oppositional value dualisms(see Gray 1981;Griffin 1978). Ecofeministethics needs to follow suit14by emphasizingdifference in a way that does not reduce differenceto the termsof some (reductionist)privileged discourse. Sixth, because it centralizesdiversity, hierarchy theory complexifiesrather than simplifiesthe varietyof waysnatural phenomena can be described.It does this by emphasizingthe sortsof interrelationshipsthat exist among organisms and the relevance of scalarand other dimensionsto the observationsmade. It rejects exclusivist models of ecosystems (i.e., population-community or process-functionalmodels) that simplifyrather than complexifythe natureof ecosystems,typically by an imposednaive reductionismthat focuseson sameness, similarity,or shared traits. Interrelationshipsamong biotic and abiotic nature that are based on a single, unitarymodel of ecosystemsare viewed as misrepresentationsof the varietyof relationshipsin nature. Similarly,as a context-dependent, inclusivist frameworkthat centralizes difference, ecofeminism complexifies the variety of ways in which ethics is conceived and practiced,in which humansmay be in relationshipwith others (includingthe nonhumannatural environment), and in which human-nature, women-natureconnections may be described.As we have arguedelsewhere (Warren 1988, 1990; Cheney 1987, 1989a, 1990), ecofeminist ethics complexifies the moral arena by making a central place for values often lost or overlookedin mainstreamethics (e.g., values of care, love, friendship,diversity, appropriatereciprocity) in the context of human-nonhumanrelation- ships. This includes taking seriously the sort of "indigenous technical knowledge"that women and otherswho workclosely with the land have (see Warren1988). Seventh, and perhapsmost importantlyfor ethics, hierarchytheory permits meaningfulecological talk of "individual"and "other"without the caveat that these are nonprimitivenotions, ultimatelyreducible to notions of energyflow and pattern. At the same time, it also permits meaningful talk of "whole- system" behavior in both population-community and process-functional terms,neither of which is reducibleto the other.Hierarchy theory thus permits meaningful discussion of discrete (and, in varying degrees and modes, autonomous)individual objects as well as of whole systems.Hierarchy theory shows that "objecttheory" is not obsolete; it is an acceptableand alternative way to describe organisms-appropriatefor some observation sets and not others. This alternativeway of describingecosystems is accomplishedin hierarchy theory in part by an eighth characteristic,one shared by ecofeminism and ecofeminist ethics: it encouragesa network or relational view of organisms, whether conceived as "knots in a biosphericalweb of relationships"or as separate(although not isolated or solitary),discrete individuals,members of species, populations,or communities.In both cases, ecosystemsare networks,

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either networksof interactingindividuals, populations, and communitiesor of interactingenergy and nutrient flows and cycles. This dual acknowledgmentof the autonomous existence of individuals (characteristicseven) and the relational existence of individualsin webs of relationships(characteristic eight) fits nicely with those feminist ethics which insist that it is of primaryimportance to acknowledgeand foster individual autonomy (after all, oppressedpersons are still tryingto have their autonomy recognized)and to recognizethat people exist in webs of relationshipsthat are to some extent constitutive of who they are. Much work in feminist ethics (often stronglyinfluenced by the work of Gilligan 1982) has emphasizedthe centralityof relationshipsin women'sethical thinking.Others (e.g., Friedman 1989 and Young 1986) have critiquedcommunitarian ideals and stressedthe importancefor women of autonomyand a politics of differencein a world in which the penchant for defining oneself relationallycan easily be turnedinto sacrificeof the self. Many feministshave been concerned to develop conceptions of self and society that avoid the problemsof what Alison Jaggarcalls abstractindividualism, that is, the position that it is possible to identify a human essence or human nature that exists independentlyof any particular historicalcontext (Jaggar1980, 29). This concern carriesover into ecofeministethical reflection on nature.An ecofeminist ethic that emphasizesthe nature of individuals or "others"as beings-in-relationshipspermits meaningful ecological discussionof both"self" and "other," of "individuals" (populations, communities) and "webs of relationships."For ecofeminists the contexts and relationships that help construct "the self" include ecological contexts and relationshipswith nonhuman nature. For an ecofeminist one cannot give an adequateaccount of what it is to be human in termsthat do not acknowledgehumans as members of ecological communities. That hierarchy theory provides for meaningful discussion of "self" and "other"suggests one reasonecofeminists are and ought to be suspiciousof some of the claims about scientific ecology made by other, allegedly "minority position"environmental ethics. For example, in "The MetaphysicalImplica- tions of Ecology,"Callicott arguesthat scientific ecology "underminesthe concept of a separableego and thus rendersobsolete any ethics which involves the concepts of'self' and 'other' as primitive terms"(1986, 301). Callicott's overarchingconclusion is that scientific ecology ontologically subordinates matter and living naturalobjects (e.g., humans, deer, trees) to energy flows, makingan "objectontology" inappropriate as an ecological descriptionof the naturalenvironment. Views such as Callicott's are not borne out by state-of-the-arthierarchy theoryin ecosystemecology. Hierarchy theory shows that even if at some level of inquiry it is plausible to hold that the universe and everything in it are constitutedof energy,that everythingis a perturbationin an all-encompassing

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energyfield, this does not imply that entities revealedthrough other observation sets (e.g., as individualorganisms, populations, or communities) are not "primitive,"that they are reducibleto the ontology of some other observation set. Hierarchytheory not only permits but demands meaningful ecological discussion of "self" and "other" on the one hand and of "whole-system behavior"on the other. Certain ecological observationsets relevant to ethics yield an ontology of autonomousindividual organisms interacting with one another.Other observationsets paint a holistic pictureof ecosystemfunction. But there is no a priori or ecological reason (other than a misguidedreduc- tionism) to give (ethical or metaphysical)pride of place to the latter.15 What is crucial is our particularmode of access to the objects of our moral concern. We need to formulateour "ethical ontology"and ethical theory in light of an understandingof our epistemologicalrelationship to the objects of moral concern. In terms of actual practice, we certainly can say things, significantand importantthings, about individuals without drawingin the rest of the universe.We can gain at least certainkinds of knowledgeof individuals without an analysisof the relationsthat constitute or producethe individual as the individual it is; that is, we can come to know the individual without knowing anything much about the shapingfactors. Ninth, hierarchytheory makes a place for whatever "hard"scientific data scientific ecology producesregarding the natural environment, although it alwayscontextualizes that datarelative to a given observationset with specific scalar dimension. It is always scientifically relevant to ask about particular observationsets within which and from which the "hard"data are gathered. According to hierarchytheory, all scientific data and questions of ecology come with and have a context; properscientific theorizinginvolves making visible the observationsets (contexts) within which one conducts the observations and analyses.Hierarchy theory thereby leaves open the doorfor saying that whateverecologists learn about organismsor ecosystemsfrom computer modeling techniques, mathematicalor statisticalmodels, or data projections conductedwithin the closed systemof a laboratorymay not tell us all there is to know,or even the most relevant informationand materialwe need to know, aboutterrestrial organisms and ecosystems-i.e., natureoutside the laboratory. But we may need to know it, nonetheless, to solve pressingenvironmental problems.16 Ecofeminismwelcomes appropriateecological science and technology.En- vironmentalproblems demand scientific and technological responsesas part of the solution. These "data"represent a piece of the ecological pie. What ecofeministsinsist on is that the perspectivesof women and indigenouspeoples with regardto the naturalenvironment also be recognizedas relevant "data." As a feminism,ecofeminism insists that relevant "data"about the historical and interconnected twin exploitations of women (and other oppressed peoples) and naturebe includedin solutionsto environmentalproblems; as an

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ecologicalfeminism, ecofeminism insists upon the inclusion of appropriate insightsand "data"of scientific ecology.What ecological feminismopposes is the practice of one without the other. Lastly,hierarchy theory invites a reconceiving of ecosystemsresearch and methodolology,objectivity, and knowledge. In its rejection of the view that there is one ahistorical,context-free, neutral observation stance, in its incor- poration of multiple observationsets and its refusalto privilege the ontology of one over the ontology of any other, in its acceptance of multiple under- standings of ecosystems and the complexity of the relationships that exist within them, hierarchy theory exemplifies, to some extent, what Donna Haraway(1988) has called embodiedobjectivity. What is obviouslyabsent in hierarchy theory is an ethical and political dimension, however, which is present in Haraway'snotion. Objectivity,as Harawayputs it, is "aboutparticular and specificembodiment and definitely not about the false vision promisingtranscendence of all limits and responsibility" (Haraway 1988, 582-83). Because all knowledge is "situatedknowledge" (Haraway 1988, 581), no knowledge is innocent; all knowledgeinvolves risksand impliesresponsibility. As Harawayargues: admitted or not, politics and ethics ground struggles over knowledge projects in the exact, natural, social, and human sciences. Otherwise,rationality is simplyimpossible, an optical illusion projectedfrom nowhere comprehensively (1988, 587). The ethical and political dimensionsof knowledgeand objectivity suggest an importantcontribution that ecofeminismcan offer hierarchytheory. The "partialknowledges" that emerge from variousobservation sets do not constitute an innocent pluralityof bodies of knowledge.Both the positions taken (with their resultant situated knowledges) and the connections made are "power-sensitive"(Haraway 1988, 589). Situated knowledges are partial knowledges, not partialityfor its own sake but, rather,for the sake of the connections and unexpected openings situated knowledges makepossible. Situated knowledges are about communities, not about isolated individuals.The only way to find a largervision is to be somewherein particular.(Haraway 1988, 590) Since ecofeminismsees theorybuilding, objectivity, and knowledgeas historically situated, illuminated,and created, theory is not something static-it is both "situated"(in Haraway'ssense) and "in process,"emerging from people's different experiences and observations and changing over time. It is like quilting. Are there, then, any ethical implicationsof ecosystemecology? It depends. The ethical implicationsof ecosystemecology, like the hierarchytheory that

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might be used to supportthem, only have axiological status within and from the vantage points of certain observationsets. As ecologist MarkDavis claims of any ecological model, "any set of ethical implicationsderived or inspired from the model must alwaysbe regardedas only one of many possible such sets" (Davis 1988, 4). The contextualist conception of objectivity at work in hierarchytheory is consistent with the notion of objectivity being developed in some feminist postmoderist theorizing. The problem faced by postmodern science, as Harawayputs it, is "howto have simultaneouslyan account of radicalhistorical contingency for all knowledgeclaims and knowing subjects... and a no-non- sense commitmentto faithfulaccounts of a 'real'world" (Haraway 1988, 579). But just as Haraway would insist upon an ethical and political basis for objectivity in the sciences, so she would add the idea of the "object" of knowledge as an active agent in the constructionof knowledge. She rightly points out that feministshave been suspiciousof scientific accounts of objectivity that portraythe "object"of knowledge as passive and inert. Haraway's view in responseto this passiveunderstanding of the objectof scientific inquiry is as follows:

Situated knowledgesrequire that the object of knowledge be picturedas an actor and agent, not as a screen or a groundor a resource,never finally as slave to the masterthat closes off the dialectic in his unique agencyand his authorshipof"objective" knowledge. The point is paradigmaticallyclear in critical approaches to the social and human sciences.... But the same point must applyto the other knowledgeprojects called sciences. (Haraway1988, 592-93).

If we understandthe objectsof scientific inquiryas actorsand agentsand insist upon an ethical and political basisfor objectivity,accounts of the worldbased "on a logic of 'discovery'" give way to "a power-chargedsocial relation of 'conversation.'The world neither speaks itself nor disappearsin favor of a masterdecoder" (Haraway1988, 593). In this regard,Haraway herself calls attention to the promiseof ecofeminism:

Ecofeministshave perhapsbeen most insistenton some version of the world as active subject .... Acknowledgingthe agency of the world in knowledge makes room for some unsettling possibilities,including a sense of the world'sindependent sense of humor.... There are ... richly evocative figuresto promote feministvisualizations of the worldas witty agent. We need not lapse into appealsto a primalmother resistingher translation into resource.The Coyote or Trickster... suggeststhe situation we are in when we give up mastery but keep searching for

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fidelity, knowing all the while that we will be hoodwinked.... We are not in charge of the world. We just live here and try to strike up noninnocent conversations (Haraway 1988, 593-94). We agree with Haraway's concluding words: "Perhaps our hopes for account- ability, for politics, for ecofeminism, turn on revisioning the world as coding trickster with whom we must lear to converse" (Haraway 1988, 596). The significance of the finding that ecofeminism and ecosystem ecology are in- volved in complementary, mutually reinforcing projects would then lie in what they can contribute together to our conversation with the world as "coding trickster."

NOTES

1. We gratefullyacknowledge the helpfulcomments received on an earlierdraft of this paperfrom Roxanne Gudeman, Donna Haraway,Sandra Harding, Alison M. Jaggar, Ruthanne Kurth-Schai,Toby McAdams, Michal McCall, Lindsay Powers, Truman Schwartz,Geoff Sutton, Nancy Tuana, Leslie Vaughn,Anthony Weston, and Cathy Zabinski. 2. See ecofeministcritiques of environmentalpractices cross-culturally in Caldecott and Leland (1983), Diamond and Orenstein (1990), Merchant (1980), Petersonand Merchant(1986), Plant (1989),Shiva (1988), and Warren(1988). 3. Showing that scientific ecology is a feminist issue is not as easy as one might expect. As scientific ecologistsare quick to point out, there is a differencebetween the ecology movement (or, popularenvironmentalism) and the science of ecology.Even if the women'smovement and the ecologymovement are inextricably connected, and even if understandingthe connectionsbetween the dominationof womenand the domination of nature is crucialto an adequatefeminism, environmentalism, or ethic, still, none of this showsany respectsin which the scienceof ecologymust be feminist.In this paper,we attemptto put into place some considerationswhich bearon thatissue. 4. In helpfulcomments on an earlierdraft of this paper,Sandra Harding pointed out that even if there are strikingsimilarities between ecological feminismand ecosystem ecology,there mightbe verygood reasonsfor feminists to rejectsome claimsof ecosystem ecology,and vice versa.One such reasonwould be the inattentionto issuesof powerin ecosystemtheory constructionand practice. Since an analysisof power is central to feministcritiques of sociallyconstructed "isms of domination,"one wouldneed verygood reasonsfor accepting as feminist any theoryor practicein scientificecology which did not includean analysisof powerand power-overrelationships. 5. Our discussion of ecological feminism is limited to emerging themes in ecofeminismand ecofeminist ethics which are not tied to any one feminism.This is becausethere is not one ecological feminismanymore than there is one feminism;the varietiesof ecofeminismswill reflectdiffering feminist commitments of liberal,marxist, radical, socialist feminismsas well as feminismsof women of color (nationally and internationally).Similarly, our discussionof scientific ecology is limited to ecosystem ecology,since it is ecosystemanalysis that is the focus of much of the currentliterature

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in environmentalethics on the ethical or metaphysicalimplications, if any, of ecology (see Brennan1988; Callicott 1986;Cheney 1991b;Golley 1987;Rolston 1988,1989). 6. We expressour gratitudeto MarkDavis, Departmentof Biologyand Directorof EnvironmentalStudies at MacalesterCollege, for the informationhe providedabout the population-communityand functional-processapproaches to ecosystem ecology and hierarchytheory. Much of that informationis presented in his unpublishedarticle "ShouldMoral Philosophers Be Listeningto Ecologists?"(1988). 7. There are also feminist reasonsto worryabout construing these two approaches as the only approachesto studyingecosystems, reasons having to do both with a general concernabout theoreticaldescriptions of materialreality in termsof mutuallyexclusive polarities.(See, e.g., Gray,1981.) 8. Insofaras so much feminist, including ecofeminist, theory has focused on a critique of value hierarchicalthinking and its function in creating, maintaining,and perpetuatingsocial systemsof domination,the name "hierarchytheory" is most unfor- tunate froma feminist point of view. In her commentson an earlierdraft of this paper, Alison Jaggarsuggested that the name is "toxic"and could well predisposefeminists to be antagonistictowards hierarchy theory from the outset. Since, as will be shown, the notion of an "observationset" is central to hierarchytheory and yet does not connote problematicvalue hierarchies,we have chosen to referto hierarchytheory frequently throughoutthis paperas "hierarchy(observation set) theory."(We do not discusshere that aspectof hierarchytheory which gives it its name, thoughwe do in ourforthcoming book EcologicalFeminism, Westview Press.) If it werenot for the establishedusage of the expression"hierarchy theory" within the scientificecological community, we wouldrefer to the theorysimply as "observationset theory." 9. O'Neill et al. stress that they have exaggeratedthe differencesbetween the population-communityand process-functionalapproaches and that "fewecologists would hold to either extreme of the spectrum"(1986, 10). The distinction between the two approachesis better viewed on a continuum, with the population-communityand process-functionalapproaches at each end and ecologists"drawn in one directionor the other by the specificproblems that interestthem" (1986, 10). 10. That the discussionformat moves from hierarchy(observation set) theory to ecofeminismis not intendedto privilegeeither perspective.Furthermore, more space is providedbelow to ecosystemecology when discussingsimilarities than to ecofeminism for two main reasons:first, there is a virtualabsence in the literatureof ecofeminismof any attemptto spell out the detailsof just how ecologicalfeminism might drawsupport for its positionfrom, or impartits own insightsto, ecologicalscience. To begin to remedy this omission,we deliberatelyhave chosen to focus on ecosystemecology (ratherthan on ecological feminism) and then show important similarities between the two- similaritiesthat are moredetailed and specificabout "ecology" than are generalappeals to the importanceof ecosystems,interconnectedness among life forms, or ecological well-beingto the survivalof the planet. Second, we have presentedelsewhere our views on ecologicalfeminism and ecofeministethics (Cheney1987,1989a, 1991a; Warren 1987, 1988,1990) and did not want to duplicatethose effortshere. 11. Foressays and a literatureoverview on this issue,see the AmericanPhilosophical AssociationNewsletter on Feminismand Philosophy Special Issueon "Reason,Rationality and Gender,"edited by Nancy Tuanaand KarenJ. Warren,vol 88, no. 2 (March1989). 12. We develop this argumentin more detail in our forthcomingbook Ecological Feminism.

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13. Warrenhas arguedthat ecofeministethics needsto evaluateethical claimspartly in terms of a condition of inclusiveness:Those claims are morallyand epistemologically favored(preferred, better, less partial, less biased) which are more inclusive of theperspectives andfelt, livedexperiences of themost amount of people,particularly including the perspectives andexperiences of oppressedpersons (Warren 1988, 1990). 14. We say "needsto" because some ecofeminists have been criticizedfor substituting a value-hierarchical"women are closer to naturethan men"ontology and ethics for an unacceptablepatriarchal value-hierarchical schema which putsnature and what is female gender-identifiedtogether as inferiorand opposed to that which is malegender-identified. The criticism is that the very oppositionaldualism which promptsthe question "Are women closer to nature than men?"is itself the problem. Switching the answer by elevatingwomen and nature(in oppositionto men) only perpetuatesthe problem.(See Griscom,1981; King, 1981;Ortner, 1974; Warren, 1987.) 15. The implication is clear: just as "it is quite feasible and even reasonableto maintainan individualistic(i.e., Gleasonian)concept of the communityand a holistic concept of ecosystemfunction" (O'Neill et al. 1986, 189) so too it is quite feasibleand reasonableto understandthe moral communityas consisting, in part, of autonomous agentswith propertiesin their own rightwhile at the sametime treatingthat community as in some respectsholistic. 16. A popularenvironmentalist slogan, sometimes endorsed by ecofeminists,is that everythingis connected:a tug on any partof the systemhas an effect on everyother part of the system.This imageof ecosystemsis one that O'Neill et al. takegreat pains to dispel (86). Criticalto the stabilityof an ecosystemis the relative insulationor disconnection of sub-systems("holons") from one another (with stronginteraction within holons and weak interactionbetween holons). Overconnectednessin a system,where tugs on any part of the system produceeffects on all parts of the system, are unstable (94). This perspectiverenders problematic the oft-repeatedremark that ecologydemonstrates that everything is connected with everything else- the interconnection is only within holons, not betweenholons. An adequateecofeminist ecology, then, mustacknowledge that the world,so to speak, "strives"to organizeitself into discreteand relativelyautonomous holons as a condition of its own stability.This is at least as importanta featureof ourworld as is its connected- ness.And, indeed,individuals still come into theirown with the samesterling ontological credentialsas the energyflow patternswhich emergefrom process-functional analyses. Everythingmay be tied to everythingelse in somesense, but hierarchy(observation set) theorysuggests that it is not in any metaphysicallyreductionist, holistic sense.

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