Geography of the Arab Spring
An analysis of the Syrian revolutionary process from a spatial point of view
By Teun van de Ven
Bachel or thesi s Geogr af i e, pl anol ogi e en milieu (GPM) School of Management Radboud University Nijmegen June 2013 Geography of the Arab Spring
An analysis of the Syrian revolutionary process from a spatial point of view
By Teun van de Ven
Bachelorthesis Geografi e, planologie en milieu (GPM) School of Management Radboud University Nijmegen June 2013 Thesis supervisor: Olivier T. Kramsch Studentnumber: 4065751 Table of contents
Su m m ar y ……………………………………………………………………………….II
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………1
Met hod…………………………………………………………………………………4
Chapter One - Theor et i cal f r amew or k………………………………………………….6
1.1. Revolution………………………………………………………………………………….…...6
1.1.1. Definition………………………………………………………………………………………6 1.1.2. Preconditions and causalities…………………………………………………………………...8 1.1.3. The revolutionary process…………………………………………………………………….10
1.2. Uprising……………………………………………………………………………………….12
1.3. Revolutionary wave……………………………………………………………………………12
1.4. Geography and revolutions……………………………………………………………………13
1.4.1.Demography, Urbanisation and Economy…………………………………………………….13 1.4. 2. Ur bani sat i on…………………………………………………………………………………...14 1.4.3.Economy……………………………………………………………………………………....15 1.4.4.Food shortage……………………………………………………………………………….....15 1.4.5.Culture……………………………………………………………………………………...... 16 1.4.6.Focus…………………………………………………………………………………………..16
Chapter Two - The Syrian revolutionary process……………………………………..17
2.1. Foundation…………………………………………………………………………………….17 2.2. Institutionalisation……………………………………………………………………………..19 2.3. Launch…………………………………………………………………………………………21 2.4. Fluctuation…………………………………………………………………………………….25 2.5. Interception……………………………………………………………………………………26
Chapt er Thr ee – Anal ysi s……………………………………………………………...27
3.1. Definition……………………………………………………………………………………...27 3.2. Relative deprivation and social mobility……………………………………………………….28 3.3. Culture………………………………………………………………………………………...29 3.4. Demographical, Economic and Urban aspects…………………………………………………30
Chapter Four – Conclusion…………………………………………………………37
Ref er ences…………………………………………………………………………….40
I
Summary
The ai m of t hi s thesi s i s t o r educe t he gap t hat exi sts betw een t he t heor et i cal and empi r i cal know l edge about revolutionary processes, the Arab Spring in particular. The research consists of a case study of the r evolution in Syria. The country is suffering from a civil war which is the result of the violent approach the Syrian regime used to quell the popular uprisings of early 2011. The case is approached from a geographical point of view. The reason for this choi ce i s t hat st udi es regarding the Arab Spring or revolutions in general are highly politically oriented. The spatial orientation as used in this thesis results in both interesting and useful insights in the Syrian casestudy, but also in the Arab Sp r i n g as a whole and of revolutions in general. The study has been a desk research, as field research in Syria at this point in time is dangerous and al so r equi r es mor e t i me and money t han w as avai l abl e f or t hi s par t i cul ar r esear ch. The dat a used t o anal yze t he case has been col l ect ed f r om a sel ect i on of the t housands of scientific papers and books, newspaper- and background articles and policy documents t hat ar e w i del y avai l abl e. I n or der t o pr esent an i mage as objective as possible, data from various sour ces i s used. The method used in order to analyze the Syrian revolutionary process is loosely based on several methods of qualitative research, such as grounded theory and cr i t i cal di scour se anal ysi s.
The theoretical framework that is used in this thesis i n or der to understand the empirical findings in a better way is based on scientific literature from various disciplines, such as geography, poli ti cal sci ences, sociology and history. The understanding of the concept “ revolution” is mainly based on two works of Krejci (1983 and 1994), which are both studies of the theoretical background of revolutionary pr ocesses i n gener al . Based on hi s theor y t he r esear ched case has been cl assi f i ed as bei ng a ver ti cal r evol ut i on f r om below, meaning that it is a revolution that originated from the lower parts of society and was directed agai nst t he nat i onal r egi me. The revolutionary process can be divided up into several phases. Krejci (1994) designed such a model. A slightly altered version of this model is used in order t o st udy t he case chosen for this thesis. The phases range from the “ foundation” to the “ consolidation overthrow” . How ever , f or t he anal ysi s onl y t he f i r st f i ve phases of t he model ( w hi ch consi st s of ei ght phases i n t ot al ) have been used, as t he r esear ched revolutionary process still finds i tsel f i n phase f i ve. In the search for universal geographical causes of revolutions again writings about revolutions in gener al have been used, but al so t heor i es r egar di ng space and urbanity. Thi s collecti on of li t er at ur e w as completed with literature about the Arab Spring. Based on earlier studies a web of geographical causes of the Syrian revolutionary process has been designed. The main focus lies on the interconnected spheres of demography, economy and the urban sphere. This trinity is complemented with the factors “ culture” and “ food shortage” . For a better understanding of the urban sphere in particular theories of Henri Lefebvre (1996) are used. Accor di ng t o Lef ebvr e t he “ ur ban soci et y” i s the end phase of a developing society, which all societies should strive for as all people hold a “ right to the city” . That means the right to make use of
II
“ the city” to fulfil ones need for qualitative growth of his personal life, by “ enabling the full and complete usage of these moments and places” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 179). In order to reach the phase of “ urban soci et y” t he hel p of t he gover nment i s necessar y, because i t i s consi der ed essent i al that t he spat i al pl anni ng of society is “ oriented towards social needs” (Lefebvre, 1991, 178). When the road to the “ urban society” is blocked by an unwilling government the only way to reach it is by revolution, which Lefebvre called an urban revolution.
In order to analyze the Syrian revolutionary process properly the empirical findings have to be compared to the theoretical framework. To do this the second chapter consists of a “ story” of the course of the revolution in Syria, based on the data collected from various sources. The story is built up according to the ei ght phase model as descr i bed i n the t heor et i cal f r amew or k. Feelings of dissatisfaction increased among the Syrian population as a result of the i nt er connect ed spheres of demography, economy and urban life. The high fertility of Arab women has left the entire r egion stuck with a youth bulge of people between the ages of 15 and 24 (Mirkin, 2013, p. 7). There was not enough work to provide every job seeker with a job. This shortage was caused by an already poor economy that r ecent l y w or sened because of t he gl obal economic crisis. The country simply had to deal with a surplus of young people looking for work. This resulted in high youth unemployment, which caused a wave of urbanisation as the jobless youngsters moved to the cities in the hope of a better future. The si t uat i on w as w or sened by i ncr easi ng br ead pr i ces, as a r esul t of a gl obal w heat scar ci t y. How ever , at t hi s poi nt t he f eel i ngs of i nj ust i ce had not yet gr ow n l ar ge enough to make the peopl e f ace t hei r r epr essi ve gover nment . That moment came w hen t he peopl e of other countries in the region opposed their regimes and cl ai med t hei r f r eedom, the process that has been named the Arab Spring. The situation of those people i ncr eased as di ct at or s w er e expel l ed. The peopl e of Syr i a now f el t r el at i ve depr i vat i on, t hey w er e w or se of than the people in neighbouring countries. These gener al f eel i ngs of i nj ust i ce w er e expr essed by the peopl e through mass demonstrations in various Syrian cities. In a short time institutions were formed, such as the Local Coordination Committees. By institutionalizing the revolutionary process the organisation and t her eby the ef f ect i veness i ncr eased. Security forces originally responded with non-lethal riot control. After a short time they turned to lethal riot control, after which they t ur ned to t he besi egi ng of ent i r e ci t i es and t ow ns. During this process unar med pr ot ests t ur ned i nto ar med r ebel l i on. Sever al or gani zat i ons such as the Fr ee Syr i an Ar my w er e founded to battle government troops. When t he r ebel s i ncr eased i n number s, more battles were fought in t he ci t i es of Sy r i a. Ther rebels grew stronger. At a cer t ai n poi nt Assad appar ant l y decided to commit “ urbicide” as a weapon of last resort against the rebels. Entire city districts were shelled, which resulted in t he compl et e destr uction of neighbourhoods and the death of hundreds of people, both rebels and civilians.
III
When this overview of events during the Syrian revolutionary process is placed against the background of the t heor et i cal f r amew or k, the geogr aphi cal f act or s of the pr ocess become vi si bl e. Demogr aphi cal aspect s of the Syrian society were for a great amount responsible for the poor economical situation of the country. Because of t hat par t i cul ar si t uat i on many peopl e moved f r om t he Syr i an per i pher y to t he cent r es, the ci t i es. The populations of large cities such as Damascus and Aleppo strongly increased and it was this growth of the urban population that eventually caused a r évol ut i on ur bai ne in Syria. The revolution began with a striking revolutionary class. In contrary to the classic Lefebvrian vision it was not the working class that stood up against its government, it was the exact opposite. In the Syrian revolutionary process it was the growing majority of unemployed youngsters that took the lead in an uprising against a crusted regime, making it a revolution of the non-working class. Demography influenced economy. Economy influenced the cities. Finally the urban revolution caused by these centres of urban life originated from the huge amount of youngsters that populated them. Geography did not only play a role in the reasons the revolutionary process was initiated. Also the course of the revolution was for a large part spatial. As the revolution in Syria coul d be char act er i zed as an urban revolution, the cities have played an important role in the initial stages of the process. The city was used as a space of mobilization wherein Local Coordination Committees organized mass protests against the r egi me thr ough an i nf r ast r uct ur e of peopl e. The city as mobilizing space has played a large role in the growth of the revolution. The ci t y al so pl ayed an i mpor t ant r ol e as t he space w her ei n bat t l es w er e f ought dur i ng l at er phases of the revolutionary process, when the vertical revolution from below had already turned into a civil war. The urban infrastructure provided the rebels with opportunities to succesfully oppose a numerically and technologically superior opponent. The tactics used by rebel forces was finally countered by the Syrian army with the strategy of urbicide, the deliberate destruction of entire urban areas. By doing so the “ playground of revolution” and the advantages it held for the rebels was deducted to ruins, which i mpr oved t he chances of t he Syr i an ar my consi der abl y.
IV
Introduction
At the end of 2010 the world became a w i t ness of a concatenation of revolutions, of political cataclysm, in t he Middle-East and Nor t her n Af r i ca ( M EN A -r egi on) . After an eruption of anti-gover nment pr ot ests i n Tunisia more followed quickly in Egypt , Bahr ai n, Yemen, Li bya, Oman, Jor dan and Syr i a among others (Mirkin, 2013). I n some cases r egi mes r esi gned, i n other s t hey w er e over t hr ow n, some uprisings faded aw ay and in the case of Syria the outcome of t he events i s yet unsur e. Revolutions an si ch ar e not new nor uni que. The di f f er ence bet w een t he Ar ab Spr i ng and “ t he aver age r evol ut i on” and w hat makes t hi s ser i es of events a r ar e phenomenon is that it is not one revolution but a w hol e ser i es of such occurrences. It is not often seen throughout the course of history that a revolutionary wave crosses multiple borders and engulfs an entire region. It has happened before though, between 1810 and 1825 in Latin America, in 1848-1849 in Europe and the last more or less si mi l ar case w as t hat of t he col l apse of most Communist states in Central- and Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991 (Anderson, 2011).
The af f ai r s i n t h e M EN A-r egi on could be of great importance not only for the states themsel ves, but al so f or t he r est of the world. The phenomenon of changing regimes all over the region will not only affect the Arab World, but also the world as a whole (Rubin, 2006, p. 6). In the post-World War II period the West has managed to keep a strong grip on the Islamic world, but as a r esul t of t he cur r ent changes i n t he distribution of pow er thi s influence might st r ongl y decr ease. The i nt er connect edness betw een t he Mi ddl e East (and Northern Africa) and the West might now openl y pr esent i tsel f as t her e i s a st r ong possi bi l i t y that event s i n one r egi on have thei r ef f ects i n anot her . The r easons behind Western influence in t he r egi on ar e par t l y expl ai nabl e from ideological motives, accompanied with a certain sense of guilt in the case of Israel. The protection of this Jewish state t hat i s sur r ounded by ( t o a gr eat er of l esser ext ent ) unf r i endl y mi nded Musl i m st ates has al w ays been a priority of the West since WWII and they managed to do so by holding a certai n gr asp on t hose neighbouring states. Ther e ar e al so t he anci ent economi c concer ns. West er n economi es t hr i ve on oi l and a l ar ge per cent age of t he gl obal oi l r eser ves ar e l ocat ed i n countr i es such as I r an, Saudi -Ar abi a, Li bya and I r aq. For a long time the West f avor ed a st abl e (and in most cases authoritarian) l eader i n an oi l possessi ng country above a democrati c r egi me. A democrati c country will shift its policies and changes throughout the years and is therefore harder to influence (Anderson, 2011).
The future of the world for a large part depends on the outcomes of the battle between Arab nationalist r egi mes, I sl ami st r evol ut i onar i es and l i ber al r ef or mer s ( Rubi n, 2006) . A battle that is t aki ng pl ace right now. Although the importance of what happens in the Arab world is w i del y r ecogni zed, knowledge of
1
Western politicians and scholars on what is exact l y happeni ng “ over t her e” seems to f al l behi nd. Ther ef or e t hi s t hesi s tr i es to r educe t he gap t hat exists in theories regarding change in the Arab world.
As can be seen it is of great importance to learn more about both the underlying causes and the outcomes of the Arab Spring, as it will def i ni t el y have consequences f or t he gl obal bal ance of pow er . As said above the ai m of t hi s bachelor thesis is to contribute to the theory regarding the Arab Spring in order to do so. Because we are looking at a phenomenon of considerable size and importance that is quite rare in its existence, it is of great significance t hat mor e r esear ch on t he subj ect i s done. To ensur e a bett er understanding of the Arab Spring this thesis seeks to complement the theoretical view on the subject.
In order to learn more about the concatenation of revolutions we must start with the beginning: w h at ar e the causes of this sudden revolutionary wave? Some of the dictators that resigned were in power for more than thirty years. Why are they expel l ed at t hi s pr eci se moment ? A par t of t he answ er s to these questions may lay in history. In this paper a comparison will be made at some poi nt s w i t h Europe’s Revolutionary Year 1848 t hat shares certain similarities with the Arab Spring. How ever , the cour se of event s cannot be fully explained by only looking back. I n t he l i t er at ur e t her e has been w r i tt en quite a lot about the actual event s. How ever , forming a theoretical framework on which those events find a firm foundation seems t o fall behind. Most theory that has been constructed in order to understand the Arab Spring in a better way is very politically oriented. However, to reduce the analysis of this phenomenon to just political aspects would result in an ut t er i ncompl et e i mage. Although the processes cannot be understood properly without some sort of political perspective, a geographical view will definitely shine a di f f er ent but useful light on t he af f ai r s i n t he MENA-r egi on. Ther ef or e t hi s t hesi s attempts to broaden the theoretical knowledge about the Arab Spring by focusing primarily on the geographical backgrounds of the revolutionary processes during the Arab Spring. The backgrounds of the causes for revolution and the revolutionary process itself w i l l be anal yzed f r om a geographical point of view. Herein we will mainly focus on the urban f act or that pl ayed a r ol e i n t he pr ocess, because this, as w e w i l l see, i s the most i mpor t ant spat i al aspect in a revolutionary process. Fr om a sci ent i f i c per spect i ve the Arab Spring offers us an interesting and rare phenomenon as a research object. Comparable cases are not often found in history and therefore the opportunity should be sei zed t o r esear ch t he event w hi l e i t i s st i l l “ f r esh” . The Ar ab Spr i ng has obvi ousl y not seen its end, but it is already clear that this is something “ for in the books” .
Thi s t hesi s w i l l consi st of a case st udy of the ongoing revolutionary process in Sy r i a, a country that is affected by the Arab Spring and as a r esul t of t hat i s now deal ing with a high-intensity conflict, a civil war. The r esul t s of t he anal ysi s mi ght be of use i n or der t o r educe t he gap that exi sts i n l i t er at ur e w hen i t com es to theoretical backgrounds regarding the Arab Spring. On one hand it is valuable to describe the situation and to focus on the empirical side of the Arab Spring, to simply describe the events. On the other hand,
2 w i t h a pr oper t heor et i cal backi ng this data could become far more interesting and useful. The aim of this thesis will therefore be to create such a theoretical background in order to support existing and future r esear ch. The case study of Syria is chosen for multiple reasons. A complete overview of the geographical backgrounds of the Arab Spring as a whole would be too bulky to make in the relatively small timeframe in which this t hesi s f i nds i t sel f . Ther ef or e thi s one case w i l l be hi ghl i ght ed and t he f i ndi ngs w i l l be anal yzed in order to sort out w het her t hey ar e ( t o some ext ent ) gener al i zabl e to other cases of the Arab Spring in the concluding chapter of this paper. The particular case of Syria is chosen because it is an ongoing process at the moment of writing and because of the role Syria plays in the region and all aspects that come with that r ol e. The ai ms of t hi s r esear ch l ead us t o the following central question:
T o what ex t ent can t he r evol ut i onar y pr ocess i n Sy r i a be expl ai ned f r om a geogr aphi cal per spect i ve?
Thi s t hesi s can basically be divided into four phases: the theoretical explication of key concepts in the theoretical framework, an empirical study of the Syrian revolutionary process, comparing the theory and t he empi r i ci sm in the analysis and finally a concluding phase. More about the structure of this thesis will be discussed in the Method section.
3
Method
In this chapter we will briefly discuss the methods and data used to conduct this research. Firstly, t her e w i l l be an explanation about the design of this research paper. We will explain the structure of this thesis and discuss the choice for the chapters and paragraphs that together will form this thesis.
This thesis can basically be divided into four phases: t he t heor et i cal expl i cat i on of key concept s i n t he theoretical framework, an empirical study of the Syrian revolutionary process, a compar i son of t he t heor y and the empiricism and finally a concluding phase. The t heor et i cal f r amew or k w i l l consist of a description of the key concepts that form a theoretical foundation for the rest of the thesis when put together. The concepts “ Arab Spring” , “ revolution” , “ r evol ut i onar y w ave” , “ upr i si ng” and “ geogr aphi cal causes of r evol ut i on” w i l l be ext ensi vel y discussed in order to form a clear theory. This part of the thesis is completely based on scientific literature from different disciplines, such as geography, political sciences, sociology and history.
The l ast t hr ee chapt er s f or m t he case study of t he Syr i an conf l i ct . A case st udy i s a cl assi c en w i del y used r esear ch desi gn w i t hi n t he f i el d of qual i t at i ve r esear ch. I t i s a r esear ch on a pr esent-day phenomenon with ambiguous borders and wherein multiple sources are used in order to come to a conclusion (Vennix, 2010). According to Peters (in Vennix, 2010, p. 103) a case study is the opposite of a survey-r esear ch, as a large amount of characteristics (and their interconnectedness) of a limited amount of research-uni t s i s r esear ched. A sur vey-r esear ch i s t he other way around as in such a case a limited amount of characteristics of a l ar ge amount of cases i s r esear ched. A bulky phenomenon as the Arab Spring is difficult to research as a whole. The complexity and size of t he case ar e j ust t oo l ar ge t o r esear ch i n a thorough w ay, especi al l y i n t he r el at i vel y smal l amount of t i me that stands for this research. Instead of the complete phenomenon “ Arab Spring” this thesis will focus on one part (revolution within one state) of the total. A precondition is t hat the chosen case i s r epr esent at i ve with respect to other cases within the same phenomenon (Vennix, 2010). It can never be a hundred per cent cl ear w hether the chosen case i s act ual l y r epr esent at i ve, but as t her e ar e qui t e a f ew si mi l ar i t i es bet w een t he Syrian revolution and other cases of revolution during the Arab Spring, especially in the initial phases, i t is considered t o be at l east r epr esent at i ve enough. Thi s r esear ch w i l l not be conducted as a study “ in the field” . The main reason for that choice is a lack of time and money to do so and the fact that field r esear ch i n Syr i a mi ght not be t he saf est w ay t o get a bachel or ’ s degr ee. Ther ef or e t hi s st udy w i l l mai nl y consi st of desk r esear ch. Over the past f ew year s thousands of scientific papers and books, newspaper- and background articles and policy documents have been w r i tt en about t he event s i n t he MENA-r egi on. A sel ect i on of t hese w r i ti ngs w i l l be used t o col l ect t he dat a t hat i s necessar y f or t hi s r esear ch. I t w i l l bui l d upon t he empi r i cal data collected by others. From this w i l l be seen w hat the exact cour se of events w as i n Syr i a. Thi s dat a coul d be anal yzed i n di f f er ent w ays. I n
4 this thesis is chosen for a mixture of research methods as elements of both grounded theory and cri ti cal discourse anal ysi s coul d be recognized in the followed approach. The “ rules” of these approaches are how ever not st r i ct l y f ol l ow ed, but sever al aspect s ar e used i n or der t o cr eat e an anal ysi s of t he Syr i an revolutionary process in the most complete way possible. I n t he theor et i cal f r amew or k some aspect s ar e par ti al l y based on ear l i er sci ent i f i c r esear ch or important theories and partially derived from the empirical findings of revolutionary processes. This is to a level coherent with the grounded theory approach, which is about finding a theory in the empirical data avai l abl e. Furthermore, much of the data is analyzed by searching for similarities or differences. This approach could be compared to the critical discourse analysis, although it is some sort of stripped version w i t hout ext ensi ve codi ng. I n or der t o w r i t e chapt er t w o and t hr ee t her e has ext ensi ve r eadi ng of hundr eds of articles from various sources t aken pl ace i n or der t o see t he compl et e st or y and “ to get t he f ul l i mage” .
Thus, the second chapter consists of a comprehensive description of the revolutionary process in Syria so far. The aim is to be as complete as possible and in that way discover the causes behind this particular chapter of the Arab Spring. The focus will be on the geographical aspects of the causes for revolution, although it will be necessary to describe non-geogr aphi cal “ seeds of r evol ut i on” as w el l . These f act or s w i l l however be somewhat more briefly described. They are included in order to form a complete picture and not for later analysis, as we will concentrate on geography. The third chapter will consist of a comparison of the theory and the empirical findings. The factors that caused the revolution in Syria which we found in the second chapter will be placed against the theoretical background that was formed in the first chapter. By doing so we this chapter will result in an overview of the geographical factors that caused a revolution in Syria. This will ultimately result in a concluding chapter in which we will creat e a br i ef over vi ew of geographical causes that altogether resulted in the start of the revolutionary process in Syria. The geographical causes will also be related to each other and the interconnectedness will be discussed. In order to answer the central question of this thesis there also will be a comparison made in which we will find out to what extent the geographical causes also apply to other countries in the MENA-r egi on.
5
Chapter One - Theoreti cal framework
In order to understand the events in the MEN A-r egi on, “ the Arab World” , bet w een Januar y 2011 and today, it is important to explicate what has been going on using some sort of theoretical framework. In this section a theoretical foundation will be l ai d out , whereupon the empirical findings can be built. The most important concepts found in literature regarding the Arab Spring will be made clear, such as the t er m “ Ar ab Sp r i n g ” i t se l f , revolution and revolutionar y w ave. Fi r st of al l , a t heor et i cal vi ew on the central concepts “ revolution” and the related term “ uprising” will be given, to put forward what the greater phenomenon is wherein the research fits. Secondly, a smal l section will be dedicated to the concept “ revolutionary wave” , an overarching phenomenon w her e the Ar ab Spr i ng i s par t of . Fi nal l y, a theoretical background will be set out about the geography of revolutions.
The explanation of key concepts will be followed by the explication of the geographical factors that possibly contribute to revolutionary processes and that of the Arab Spring in particular. This part will be based on earlier literature that connects geography to revolution, geographical basic literature and writings about other revolutionary waves.
The key concept of t he Ar ab Spring is revolution. The uprising of the people has caused sever al r egi mes i n t he M EN A -r egi on to resign, others were overthrown and in the case of Syria the outcome is yet unknown. The revolutionary wave started in Tunisia and other countries followed one af t er t he ot her . To have a bett er understanding of this, we have to find out what is said in the literature about revolutions and if there are possible comparisons that could be drawn with earlier (waves of) revolution(s).
1.1.1. Revolution - Definition
It is not easy to catch all facets of the term “ revolution” into one definition. Definitions found in literature slightly alter from each other. The most broad description of what a revolution is, is found in the introduction of Kr ej ci ’ s “ Gr eat r evol ut i ons compared: The outline of a theory” (1994). In that work Kr ej ci st at es that the core of the concept could be described in only three words: sweeping dramatic change (p. 6) . Thi s st at ement seems fully logical, how ever i t i s a t erm to broad to use for a decent operationalisation. Other authors use different, more specific definitions. For instance, David Robertson describes a revolution as: “ … a violent and total change in a political system which not only vastly alters the distribution of power, but results i n maj or changes i n t he whol e soci al st r uct ur e” (In Kr ej ci , 1994, p. 7). Kr ej ci l at er put s emphasi s on t he vi ol ent aspect s of revolution and on the fact that it is a process. In that aspect the definition differs from for instance the Cambridge British English Dictionary, which tells us that revolution is: “ a change in the way a country is governed, usually to a different political system and often using violence or war” . Scientists rather drop “ revolution” as an event and use the t er m r evol ut i onar y process. The main reason for this is that a “ revolution” (or revolutionary process) does not consist only of the violent episode that causes regime
6 change. A revolution does not begin, nor end at that point. The end of a revolution(ary process) is only reached w hen the seat of pow er i s t aken by the r evol ut i onar i es and a st abl e si tuat i on i s r eached. Thi s usually takes some time as most revolutions contain a considerable deal of chaos.
“ For ce i s bei ng used on bot h si des and not necessari l y onl y wi t hi n t he count r y i nvol ved. T he compl et e over t hr ow of a gover nment and a change of t he pol i t i cal r egi me, however , may occur sever al t i mes. Revol ut i on t hen appear s t o be not a si ngl e event but a pr ot r act ed per i od of t ur bul ent , dr amat i c event s, whi ch, as pr evi ousl y st at ed, may be bet t er st yl ed as a ‘ r evol ut i onar y pr ocess’ ” (Krejci, 1994, p. 7).
In his book (1994) Krejci distinguishes four different kinds of r evol ut i onar y pr ocesses, as shown in figure 1. Accor di ng to hi s t heor y ther e ar e t hr ee di f f er ent f or ms of r evol ut i onar y pr ocesses:
- Revolution from above - Revolution from below - Revolution from the side
Figure 1 – Different kinds of revolutionary processes The first kind of revolution mentioned by Krejci (1994, p. 9) is the revolution from above. This is a revolution that does not find i t s or i gi ns i n t he peopl e but i n ( a par t of ) the gover nment or t he mi l i t ar y el i t e. These kinds of revolutions (as far as they can be considered revolutions in the proper sense of the word) are mostly called coupe d’ et at . The power shifts from a particular section of societies elite to another. Secondly, t her e i s t he r evolution from below whi ch can be described as the “ classic revolution” , an uprising of a large part of society against its rulers. This form of revolution can be split up in two sub forms: horizontal and vertical revolution. Horizontal revolutions are revolutions from below wherein the people of one country stand up against the government of another. This is a possibility when a country has some kind of dominant position over the other. Such cases are al so know n as “ secessi oni st w ar s” or “ w ar s of liberation” . Revolutions from the peopl e agai nst t hei r ow n sover ei gn gover nment ar e cal l ed ver t i cal revolutions. A possible outcome of this kind of revolution is civil war. The turn of a vertical revolution
7 from below into civil war lays not at a specific point, the term is often used when the revolutionaries are (becoming) equal to the government in terms of social status and/ or (military) power position. Kr ej ci al so di st i ngui shes a so-called hybrid revolution, which is a mix of the first and second kinds of revolution. In a hybrid revolution a sect i on of t he el i te t ake over t he gover nment , but they ar e suppor t ed by a l ar ge par t of t he peopl e. The r egi me i s f or ced t o r esi gn by pr essur e f r om bel ow as w el l as above. Thi s subcategory is not considered one of three basic forms of revolution, because of its mixed origin. The last kind of revolution that Krejci (1994, p. 9) distinguishes is the revolution from the side. This is an exported revolution from one state to the other, via military conquest or infiltration. The adoption of ideas and st r at egi es f r om a revolution by people of another country is not included in Krejci’s definition. A revolution from the side is the transfer of a revolutionary process from one country to the other through deliberate acts to do so by the initial revolutionaries.
1.1.2. Revolution - Preconditions and causalities
Char l es Ti l l y r evi ew ed al l Eur opean r evol ut i ons bet w een 1492 and 1992 and came with a working definition that gives us an idea of the basic elements needed for a revolution to unfold. His definition reads as f ol l ow s:
“ A f or ci bl e t r ansf er of power over a st at e i n t he cour se of whi ch at l east t wo di st i nct i ve bl ocs of cont ender s mak e i ncompat i bl e cl ai ms t o cont r ol t he st at e, and some si gni f i cant por t i on of t he popul at i on subj ect t o t he st at e’ s j ur i sdi ct i on acqui esces i n t he cl ai m of each bl oc” (Tilly, 1993 in Krejci, 1994, p. 19).
The underlying cause of every revolutionary process is found in the discrepancy between the vision of the state and that of the group or groups of people who try to overthrow the government. Of cour se ever y situation is different and each individual case has to be placed in its own context. Kr ej ci states this in his critique on Pitirim Sorokin, who reviewed “individual disturbances in isolation” and paid no attention to the parti cular soci o-historical and cultural context (Krejci, 1994). Krejci agrees with the political scientist Pet er Cal ver t ( i n Krejci, 1994, p. 17) that exactly that particular context is of the greatest importance to take into account, because that helps us understand the phenomenon of revolutionary process.
Krejci puts emphasis on the fact that there is no single cause of revolution.
“ T heor i es t hat ex pl ai n r evol ut i on i n t er ms of one cause or one i ssue bei ng at st ak e ar e mi sl eadi ng. I t i s t he st r uct ur e of causat i on r at her t han one par t i cul ar cause or one par t i cul ar aspect of devel opment whi ch hel ps us t o underst and t he phenomenon of r evol ut i on” ( p. 37) .
There is always a structure of causation. A web of causes, one leading to another and altogether those causes, pr er equi si t es and r equi r ement s, f or m t he gr ound from which the revolutionary process arises. A revolution is never caused by for instance a financial crisis or a food shortage. Multiple events and discourses eventually lead to revolution, not one spark.
8
I n l i t er atur e some under l yi ng causes ar e ment i oned t hat seem t o hold for the grand majority of r evol ut i onar y pr ocesses throughout history. Maybe the most important requirement that a revolutionary process needs before it can unfold is that an extraordinary large number of people, who usually prefer to maintain a passive attitude towards politics (Krejci, 1983, p. 213), ar e ready and willing to go onto the streets and demand the resignation of t he gover nment . Ci t i zens have t o be pr epar ed to t ake up ar ms and r i sk thei r l i ves i n t he w or st scenar i o. Thi s required mindset is not caused by affairs such as poverty and hunger, but by a general feeling of injustice that is ei t her caused by the government or that it is unable to improve. As Moore stated in Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy:
“ Massi ve pover t y and expl oi t at i on i n and by t hemsel ves ar e not enough t o pr ovi de a r evol ut i onar y si t uat i on. Ther e must al so be f el t injustice built into the social structure, that is, either new demands on the victims or some reason for the victims to feel t hat ol d demands ar e no l onger j ust i f i abl e” (1967, p. 220).
Another quite w el l -known aut hor and st at esman suggests t hat t he maj or i t y of the peopl e can be pr eceded by “ t hose w ho have t he capabi l i t y and cour age t o t ake t he i ni t i at i ve and pr ocl ai m t he w i l l of soci et y” (Qaddafi, 1975, p.10). How ever , w het her t he ci t i zens en masse gather in front of the presidential palace, or that they are infected with the revolutionary virus by a smaller group of courageous revolutionaries, the f act i s that t her e needs t o be a w i del y f el t i nj ust i ce and the bel i ef t hat t hi s can be i mpr oved. If that par t i cul ar feeling is absent, people simply will not consider to take part in a revolutionary process. Thi s i s consi st ent with the concepts “ r el at i ve depr i vat i on” and ( a l ack of ) ver t i cal soci al mobi l i t y, more gener al causes of revolution mentioned in t he l i t er at ur e. Rel at i ve depr i vat i on i s about t he r el at i ve situation of one opposed to that of others. When used in a revolutionary context it is often about a middle class with growing economic means, but with a lack of political opportunities. This middle class f eel s a discrepancy between their expectations (becoming politically influential because of their improved social status) and the satisfaction of those expectations. This discrepancy is caused by the lack of possible vertical social mobility, a foundation for a healthy society (Pareto, 1965 in Krejci, 1994). People need the opportunity to move upwards in a society. If they are denied that opportunity that means they are stuck in their current situation. This hopelessness will in the end cause the people to stand up against their government. This goes up for all classes but the elite, as the desire for vertical social mobility goes for ever yone, t he poor , t he mi ddl e cl ass and t he l ow er el i t e. The si t uat i on i n a pr e-revolutionary society can be descr ibed as follows: Although people in different cl asses have the same rights and possibilities as they have always had, t he i mpr ovement of t hei r pr osper i t y causes t hem t o w ant mor e. Such feelings can turn into feelings of hopel essness and i nj ust i ce and l ay t he foundation for a revolution.
9
In order for a revolutionary process to start there has to be a foundation of several levels of dissatisfaction among the people. However, this foundation alone is not enough to spark a revolution. The f oundation is of t en pr esent f or many year s bef or e r evol ut i on br eaks out at a cer t ai n moment i n t i me. The accel er at or f or almost every revolution is some kind of trigger, known as the spark. I t i s an instant event such as an execution or murder by the government, a violent quenching of a demonstration by police forces or the death of an important person (Krejci, 1983). Although economical and demographical factors for instance are of far greater importance for causing a revolutionary process, the spark is the event that directly sets off the revolution. When the underlying causes are considered a pile of wood drenched in petrol, the spark is just the match that sets it all on fire.
1.1.3. Revolution – The r evol uti onar y pr ocess
The name “ revolutionary process” indicates that the phenomenon consists of multiple consecutive phases. The pr ocess has a starting point and then goes through different phases until it reaches an end st age w hi ch marks the end of the revolutionary process when a “new, non-revolutionary equilibrium set s i n” ( Kr ej ci , 1994, p. 38). At that point the revolution is over. In the following paragraph a summary of the different st ages of t he r evol uti onar y pr ocess w i l l be gi ven. These phases ar e based on Kr ej ci ’ s ( 1994) model , how ever t hey ar e sl i ght l y al ter ed. The most important reason for this is that this paper exclusively f ocuses on vertical revolutions from below combined with some aspects of revolutions from the side. The model t hat Kr ej ci pr esent ed has a ver y br oad char act er and i s too bulky to use in a correct way in this particular r esear ch. For t hi s r eason i t i s sl i ght l y nar r ow ed dow n i n a w ay t hat i t i s mor e usef ul i n t he speci f i c case of Sy r i a. We w i l l make use of a mor e t ai l or -made model consisting of eight phases in order to r esear ch the chosen revolutionary process. To gi ve a cor r ect i mpr essi on of w hat i s al t er ed i n t he model that w i l l be used i n t hi s paper , Kr ej ci ’ s “ mi ssi ng” par ts w i l l be pr esent ed bet w een br acket s.
1. Foundation (Onset ) Thi s i s a pr e-revolutionary phase. It descr i bes a per i od of r ef or mi st moves w i t hi n t he soci et y’ s el i t es. These reforms are a result of the preconditions discussed in the previous paragraph. New ideas will spread from the elites to the upper, middle and lower classes and the political activation of large parts of society. 2. Institutionalisation The foundation will lead to institutionalisation of the reformist ideas, as new institutions are created (or existing ones are taken over) to function as a bases for the opposition. At this point the opposition is still r ef or m i st -oriented rather than revolutionary. 3. Launch The government tries to stop the hazardous development. At this point there are two possibilities: either t he gover nment succeeds i nt o endi ng t he r evol ut i on pr emat ur el y or the r ef or mi st s become r evol ut i onar i es and turn to violence themselves and thereby start the revolution.
10
( Compr essi on) (“ The government tries to temporise but eventually finds this development dangerous and attempts to clamp down on it. This phase can be described as t he compr essi on of w hat i s st i l l a r ef or mi st r at her t han a r evol ut i onar y movement.” ) (Explosion) (“ As t hi s att empt ei t her comes t oo l at e or i s not car r i ed t hr ough r esol ut el y enough ( ei t her because of a l ack of resources or a lack of fighting spirit, or both), but has immediate effects that are highly irritating, the compression is answered by a violent outburst; this, an expl osi on, is the starting point of the revolution proper.” ) 4. Fluctuation (Oscillation) The l aunch w i l l act i vat e di f f er ent soci et al groups that all have their own revolutionary plans. The revolutionary class consists of a variety of groups. It does not only consist out of people from the working cl ass, but al so f or i nst ance of mer chant s, ar t i sans, peasant s, l aw yer s and t eacher s. These i nt er nal di f f er ences make the revolutionaries an unstable coalition that will ultimately come into conflict with each other (Walzer, 1998). Also the plans for the future or the reason for revolution may differ between the revolutionary groups and this will also contribute to the infighting that will eventually take place at a certain point in the revolutionary process (Krejci, 1994). However, during the fluctuation-phase fighting will not take place yet. The different revolutionary groups reveal their plans and become each ot her ’ s r i val s in their struggle for power. During this phase the power tends to fluctuate between the different groups. 5. Interception The struggle for power among the revolutionaries is decided in this phase. In this phase armed conflict between revolutionary groups is not impossible. The largest or superiorly armed group will succeed in t aki ng over t he pow er . 6. Consolidation (Tightening) The group that is in power tries to stay in that position by consolidating its power through the maki ng of a “ revolutionary dictatorship” (Krejci, 1994, p. 40). At this point they have to fight both the counter- revolutionaries (the former regime) and the other revolutionary groups. Elements with more radical plans t han t he l eadi ng r evol ut i onar i es ar e el i minated in this phase. (Expansion) (“ A contingent foreign intervention is a challenge that tends to be answered by terror against the potential supporters of the intervention, and eventually, by a counter-attack, which often issues and expansi on of the r evolutionary rule into some neighbouring countries.” ) 7. Rever sal A large part of the population sees their revolutionary plans not implemented. This mutual disappointment among the opponents of the revolutionary dictatorship makes collaboration possible. Even cooperation with counter-revolutionaries is possible. This phase of the revolutionary process could be considered a step
11
back, as t he post -revolutionary government is either replaced by the pre-r evol ut i onar y r egi me or some of i t s el ement s. (Restoration compromise) (“ At t hat poi nt t he r evol ut i onar y pr ocess t akes a di f f er ent cour se. Wher e t her e w as a f or mal r est or ati on, there is a prolonged period of uneasy compromise between the revolutionary right and supporters of the anci ent r egi me.” ) ( Rest or ati on pr essur e) (“ Gr adual l y t he anci ent regi me at t empts t o t i l t t he bal ance mor e and mor e t o t hei r si de. Thi s pr essur e upset s the existing alliances. The revolutionary right refrains from giving further support to the counter- revolutionaries and eventually makes an alliance with the other remaining groups which, in one way or another, supported the revolution.” ) 8. Consolidation overthrow Because t he or i gi nal r easons t hat l ead t o r evol ut i on st i l l exi st and t he anci ent regi me is actually still in place af t er al l , t he remaining revolutionary groups together stage a final coup against the regime. This is called the “ consolidation overthrow” or “ glorious revolution” (Krejci, 1994, p. 41).
1.2. U pr i si n g
Although the terms “insurrection” , “ rebellion” , “ revolt” , “ struggle” and “ uprising” are often used as synonyms for “ revolution” , it is of notable importance to make a clear differentiation between those terms in order to compare them to each other. Revolution should be seen as a different process then uprising etc., al t hough t her e i s a st r ong connect i on bet w een those concept s. “ I nsur r ect i on” , “ r ebel l i on” , “ r evol t ” , “ struggle” and “ uprising” could be used as synonyms for each other, but to prevent confusion the term “ uprising” will be consequently used in this paper.
A r evol utionary process that is ended in an early phase (probably in one of the first four phases) and because of that untimely termination does not reach its goals will be referred to as an uprising. This abortion of the process could have several causes, for inst ance a smal l er r evol ut i onar y gr oup, a st r onger government or a quick response of the government on growing unrest. In fact an uprising is nothing more than an uncompleted revolutionary process. “ A failed attempt at revolution” , as Krejci calls it (1994). In this respect an uprising could be seen as being more of an event, rather than a process.
1.3. Revolutionary wave
The Ar ab Spr i ng i s of t en r ef er r ed to as a “ r evol ut i onar y w ave” . When t he t er m i s sear ched f or w i th Googl e more than 17.5 million hits come up and t he ar t i cl es on t he f i r st f ew pages ar e al l about the r ecent events in t h e M EN A-r egi on. Mor eover , t he use of t he w or d “ w ave” t o descr i be cer t ai n event s i s not a new phenomenon. Huntington (1991, in Geddes 1999) described three “ waves of democratization”
12 throughout history. The name stuck. Some researchers claim that the Arab Spring is the fourth wave of democratization; others say it is a continuation of the third wave.
The revolutionary year that struck Europe in 1848 is also often called a revolutionar y w ave, because al so i n t hat case i t seemed as i f one r evol ut i on spar ked the ot her and gover nment s i n di f f er ent countr i es w er e forced to resign.
The use of the met aphor “ w ave” i mpl i es t hat one par ti cul ar phenomenon spr ead acr oss al l t he countr i es involved. Of cour se t hi s i s par t i al l y t r ue as ant i -government protests occurred in many countries and the same techniques of mobilization and sometimes even the same symbols were used (Gelvin, 2012). However, this generalization ignores the fact that each uprising or revolution had its own particular causes, goals and ways of protesting. Similarities can easily be found and therefore it is easy to see the phenomenon as a “ w ave” that “ engul f s” an ent i r e r egi on, but di f f er ences bet w een t he event s i n di f f er ent countries al so exi st and should not be ignored.
1.4. Geography and revolutions
Ear l i er r esear ch suggests that ever y r evol ut i onar y pr ocess has cer t ai n geogr aphi cal , soci o-hi st or i cal and cul t ur al causes ( Cal ver t , 1970 in Krejci, 1994). Thi s t hesi s i s an attempt to find out what those particular causes w er e i n t he case of Syr i a. In order to do so, the logical first step is to look at the geogr aphi cal aspect s of the causes of revolutionary processes in general, bef or e w e move t ow ar ds a mor e speci f i c and t horough analysis of the geography behind the Syrian uprising i n t he third chapt er . Some of the following geographical factors that are believed to have some kind of causal link to revolutionary processes are found in literature regarding a specific revolution in history. Others are found in literature that looks towards “ r evol ut i on” f r om a mor e theor et i cal poi nt of vi ew . Fr om t hi s l i t er at ur e r evi ew t he t hr ee most important geogr aphi cal f act or s have been der i ved. The first and most important factor is the combination of demography, ur bani sat i on and economy, seen as an individable trinity of factors that mutually influence each other. The other factors that will be used in the analysis of the Syrian revolutionary process are food shor t age and culture. At the end of this paragraph a model is constructed out of these f act or s. The Syr i an r evol ut i onar y pr ocess w i l l be r evi ew ed on t he basi s of thi s model i n t he next chapter .
1.4.1. Geography and revolutions – Demogr aphy, Urbanisation and Economy
In the historical analysis of the 1848 Revolutions in Europe (Jones, 1981) quite some emphasis is put on the demographical factors that were believed to have lead to the revolutions in different European countries. The most important of these demographic under l yi ng causes ar e t he l ar ge per cent age of t he population living in an urban environment, rapid further urbanisation and the composition of the urban population. This focus on urban aspects of revolution is fully in line with what Henri Lefebvre referred to as the “ urban revolution” or “ révol ut i on ur bai ne. According to the French urbanist the city as an entity holds
13 revolution as an intrinsic feature. Revolution is therefore inextricably connected to “ the city” ( Lef ebvr e, 1996). These aspect s w i l l be f ur t her el abor at ed on under “ Urbanisation” . The second most important factor that Jones mentions in his book (1981) is the division of labour and the overall economic position of the population, which could both be linked to “ urbanisation” . Around 1848 t he r i se of t he mi ddl e cl ass and t he r el at i ve depr i vat i on t hat t hi s cl ass encount er ed w as a f act or t hat f ed the need peopl e f el t f or a change and w hat event ual l y made them f ace t he gover nment. A comparable situation can be seen in the MENA-r egi on i n t he years prior to the Arab Spring. This and other aspects of the economical side of demography will be further discussed under “ Economy” .
1.4.2. Geography and revolutions – Ur bani sat i on
According to Lefebvre the “ urban society” is the end phase of a developing society, which al l soci et i es should st r i ve f or as all people hold a “ right to the city” . That means t he r i ght t o make use of “ the city” to fulfil ones need for qualitative growth of his personal life, by “ enabling the full and complete usage of these moments and places” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 179). To a cer t ai n degr ee this i s an utopian situation w her e t he soci al needs of peopl e are to the utmost supported by the economical and political sphere. I n many cases t her e i s a notabl e di scr epancy bet w een w hat t he ci t i zens of a soci et y st r i ve f or ( to make use of their right to the city) and the support of their pursuit by the government, the political sphere. I n or der to r each the phase of “ ur ban soci et y” t he hel p of t he gover nment i s necessar y, because it is consi der ed essent i al that t he spatial planning of society is “ oriented towards social needs” (Lefebvre, 1991, 178). When the road to the “ urban society” is blocked by an unwilling government the only way to reach it is by revolution, or as Lefebvre puts it (1991, p. 179): “ Only the taking in charge by the working class of planning and its political agenda can profoundly modify social life and open another era...” In order to cr eat e a soci et y t hat gi ves peopl e t he r i ght t o the ci t y t he col l ect i ve is forced to make use of its future right to begin with, as that is the only way t o al t er soci et y. Because ur ban- and societal reform in themsel ves hold a r evol ut i onar y cor e, the ever devel opi ng soci et y and t her ef or e soci et y i t sel f i s i nt r i nsi cally revolutionary.
Building up to the 1848 Revolutions t her e w as a l ar ge w ave of ur bani sat i on t o t he l ar ger Eur opean ci t i es. Eventually t he ci t i es became “ t he st age of r evol ut i on” , as people left the rural areas to en masse come t o t he ci ty. This group consisted mainly of young men from the working class. The working class life was noted for its brutality at that time and the large group of young men w as an i deal “ r evol ut i onar y ar my” ( Jones, 1981).This supports Lefebvres theory that a revolution needs the city to take place and the city itself is also par t l y causi ng t hat same r evol ut i on. According to various sources the same process, or at l east a qui t e similar process, lead to the outbreak of revolutions throughout the MENA-r egi on.
A city as the motor or catalyser behind a revolutionary process could be measured on different scales, on both mi cro- and macr o l evel . When we look at the urban aspects of a revolution on the micro level this
14 means we look at the actual revolutionary events taking place in the city streets and on the squares. The city functions as the “ playground” wherein the revolution takes place. The urban aspects of revolution on macro level are based on the city as an entity, a phenomenon that in itself holds the preconditions for revolution. Lefebvre (1970, in Boudreau, 2007) calls this “ the urban society” , the network of social, political and economic relations t hat make t he ci t y. These two interpretations of the concept “ city” fit in t he geogr aphi cal di st i nct i on bet w een space and pl ace. We can categorize the city as the playground of revolution as space, t he “ obj ect i ve” collection of buildings, streets and squares. When we look at the city as an urban society with all its interconnected aspects (and the subj ect i ve meani ngs they hold towards t he ci ti zens), that are rooted in that specific part of space (Agnew, 2011), it should be referred to as pl ace. I t i s “ the terrain where basi c soci al pr act i ces – consumption enjoyment, tradition, self- identification, solidarity, social support and social reproduction, etc. - ar e l i ved out . As a moment of space, w her e ever yday l i f e i s situated” (Merrifield, 1993).
1.4.3. Geography and revolutions – Eco n o m y
A modern urban society is a network wherein social, political and economical aspects constantly interact w i t h each other and t hus al l t hr ee of t hese el ements deter mi ne the l i ves of ci t i zens to some l evel . I n a globalising world with the market economy as the norm “ the economy” plays an increasingly important soci et al r ol e. Especi al l y w hen t he economy i s w eak t he negat i ve ef f ect s i t has on soci et y can be deci si ve. This can for instance be seen in Europe the past five years. A worldwide poor economical situation def i ni t el y has i ts ef f ect on count r i es i n t he MENA-region (Mirkin, 2013). The negative effects produced in t he economi cal spher e w i l l have t hei r out comes i n t he soci al , ur ban and pol i t i cal spher e as w el l . Ther ef or e it is of great importance that we also consider “ the economy” as a momentous factor and insert it into the anal ysi s.
1.4.4. Geography and revolutions – Food shortage
I t i s ar guabl e t hat this factor should be considered as a par t of t he demogr aphi cal , ur ban or economical f act or , as it definitely has economi cal and ur ban consequences. I n t hi s r esear ch how ever f ood shor t age i s seen as an external factor that influenced the geogr aphi cal trinity (demography, urbanisation and economy). Ther ef or e t he choi ce i s made to implement the factor food shortage as a separ at e f act or t hat influenced the geographical trinity. An often mentioned cause for the Revolutionary Year is the food shortage that hit Europe in 1848 and the years before. Because potato crops had been destroyed by a disease and potatoes w er e t he most important source of calorie intake for Europeans at that time, Europe encountered a serious food shortage (Jones, 1981). This eventually led to an increase in urbanisation, as people escaped the poor countryside in a pursuit for a better life i n t he ci t y, w hi ch as can be seen above al so i ncr eased t he chance of a r evol ut i onary process to break out.
15
1.4.5. Geography and revolutions – Culture
Gelvin (2012) stated that the shared culture and history in the MENA-r egi on al so w as a f act or t hat i n some way contributed to the unfolding of the Arab Spring. The history of the region that, especially in the last decades, i s f i l l ed w i t h revolutions, violence, w ar , oppr essi on and foreign intervention has in a way formed t he peopl e. Accor di ng t o Gel vi n (2012) the fact that many people in the MENA-r egi on ar e mor e or l ess accust omed t o vi ol ence, i s a key el ement f or the devel opment of t he r evol ut i onar y w ave i n the region.
1.4.6. Geography and revolutions - Focu s
As can be seen al l of t hese geogr aphi cal causes cannot be seen apar t f r om each other . They f or m t he “ w eb of causes” that was mentioned earlier. This interconnected geographical factors form the foundation on which a revolutionary process is built, the ground from which it arises.
Figure 2 – Geographical factors of the Syrian revolutionary process One set of f act or s seems to hold the most importance and could be considered essential for a revolution to unfold itself. These f act or s ar e t he tr i angl e of ur bani sat i on, demography and economy. These f act or s ar e i nt er t w i ned with each other and externally influenced by both “ culture” and the accidental factor “ food shor t age” as w e w i l l see in f i gur e 2 and will l ear n i n the next chapter. The “ stages of revolution” , cities w er e t he pl aces w her e t he act ual r evol ut i ons, t he f i ght i ng and dying, took place. In order to understand a revolution it is essential to understand their spatial context, in other words to understand the role of the entity “ city” in the revolutionary process. As can be r ead i n t he paragraphs about demography, economy and urbanisation these three factors are st r ongl y connect ed. For t hat r eason w e see t hese thr ee aspect s as one i ndi vi si bl e t r i ni t y.
16
Chapter Two - The Syrian revolutionary process
In this chapter the recent revolutionary process in Syria will be laid out. This is done so we can analyze it and determine its geographical aspects in the next chapter. In order to structure this chapter and to describe t he pr ocess i n t he cl ear est possi bl e w ay i t w i l l be divided into the different phases of a revolutionary process as shown on pages 13-15. The events that took place in Syria in each of these phases will then be described. Because some phases over l ap, the description of the revolutionary process will not be ent i r el y chronological.
Figure 3 – Location Syria. Source: Figure 4 – Map of Syria. Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html factbook/geos/sy.html
2.1. Foundation
A combination of political, economical and demographical factors paved the road for a revolutionary process in Syria. The Syrian people have lived under the authoritarian Assad regime for more than forty year s and have not been abl e t o speak themsel ves out agai nst i t (Manf r eda, n.d.) . Although the Ba’ath party originated out of ideas of anti-imperialism and social reform and was popular among the people of Syria in the 1950’s and 1960’s it now only holds the same name as the original party. The i deal s t hat f or med Ba’ at h
17 f i f t y year s ago ar e vani shed and i t i s now mer el y a f acade as i t i s not hi ng mor e t han a di ct at or i al r egi me. Pr esi dent Assad uses t he l egacy of hi s f at her t o l egi t i mi ze his authoritarian regime. The r esult of fifty years of Ba’athism is a very uneven division in the Syrian economy. Cronyism and corruption more and more caused dissatisfaction under the population and thus contributed to the feelings of injustice.
The poor economic situation of Syria is only made worse by the huge growth of the Syrian population in t he l ast decades. The annual gr ow t h r at e i n Syr i a i s al most t w i ce as f ast as t he aver age w or l d r at e ( 2.8% vs. 1.5%) (Mirkin, 2013, p. 12). The Arab World as a w hol e is now dealing with a growing “class” of the youth because of this population boom. “ A history of high fertility in the Arab r egi on, si x chi l dr en per woman dur i ng t h e 1980s, has produced a youth bulge aged 15 to 24 years” (Mirkin, 2013, p. 7). The enormous youth unemployment (three times as high as the total unemployment) is the result of (inter)national economical problems and a surplus of young people on the labour market. The entire region is affected by the global economic crisis. Economic problems in other parts of the world affect the export of products from the MENA-r egi on. As a result of a poor economical situation and a huge amount of young citizens simply too f ew j obs exi st t o provide all people aged 15-24 with a job. About a third of the Arab youth cannot find a job; there is no real di f f er ence bet w een hi gh- and low educated youngsters. The poor economi c st at e of t he r egi on i s a ver y important underlying factor of the regional unrest. It is also believed that if the situation does not get better (which is a likely situation), this “generation in waiting” (Mirkin, 2013, p. 25) will continue to play a dest abi l i zi ng r ol e f or t he comi ng year s.
The r el at i ve depr i vat i on f el t by young peopl e as a result of that situation cannot be seen apart from the unrest that engulfed the region. The unemployment led to dissatisfaction with the entire situation among the youth. This resulted in a l ar ge mi gr at i on st r eam t o t he l ar ger ci t i es such as Damascus, Al eppo and Homs. Rural-ur ban mi gr at i on i s a common spat i al pr ogr ess i n t he MENA-region, or as Mirkin put it:
“ Many count r i es i n t he Ar ab Regi on ar e experi enci ng l ar ge popul at i on movement s f r om r ur al t o ur ban ar eas, as young men and women l eave t edi ous agr i cul t ur al empl oyment i n sear ch of “ br i ght ci t y l i ght s” and supposedl y mor e rel i abl e and bet t er pai d ur ban j obs. ” (Mirkin, 2013, p. 16)
Mainly because of this process, urbanization levels have grown over the past years. In Syria for instance, the urban population grew from 4,1 million in 1980 to 11,3 million in 2010, while the total population “only” doubled from 8,9 million to 20,4 million (Mirkin, 2013, pp. 12 and 16). Hi st or y show s t hat t he specific category of the Syrian population that took part in the migration process (young people and particularly young men) ar e t he i deal “ r evol ut i onar y ar my” . In combination with the already mentioned high unemployment these expanding cities did become a sort of time bombs that had to “ go off” at som e point. As large concentrations of poor and unsatisfied people lived together in the cities the provision of housing became insufficient, unrest grew and it was easier for this concentrated group to act together than
18 it was for people living in rural areas. Eventually those urban citizens did act together in many cities throughout the MENA-region and this resulted in the Arab Spring.
Another, to some extent coincidental, factor that contributed to both t he increasing urbanisation and negat i ve f eel i ngs t ow ar ds t he r egi me i s the persistent drought that forced people to move from rural to urban areas. Millions of peopl e have been af f ect ed by t he dr ought t hat caused cr op f ai l ur es and w at er shor t ages among other pr obl ems over t he l ast f i ve year s. Droughts caused poor wheat harvests and inflating bread prices (Sternberg, 2012). This led to anger and unrest among civilians. During the Revolutionary Year di scussed ear l i er , f ood shor t ages pr oved to be of gr eat i nf l uence t ow ar ds t he out br eak of t he var i ous European revolutions. It is believed that also in this modern time something as trite as food shortage can still (indir ect l y) l ead to r evol ut i on.
All of these factors can be found in multiple countries throughout the region. The dissatisfaction of the people was not unique for Sy r i a; in fact there was an overall sense of dissatisfaction with the government in most par t s of the Middle East and Northern Africa. These negat i ve f eel i ngs came t oget her at one moment when a frustrated young man set himself on fire on December 17 in Sidi Bouzid in Tunesia. That marked the eruption of already simmering dissatisfaction about the government and protest broke out throughout the whole country. This was noticed in other countries in the MENA-region and protests followed quickly i n Jor dan, Oman, Yemen and Egypt . The r evol ut i onar y w ave hi t Syr i a a f ew mont hs af t er i t al l began i n Tunesia.
2.2. Institutionalisation
When the political position of Bashar al-Assad seemed to weaken for a brief moment in 2005, after he had to r etr eat t h e Sy r i an ar my f r om Lebanon because of t he great amount of diplomatic pressure from the international community, the silent opposition groups of Syria came together in Damascus to unify themselves into a broad coalition of opposition. Fi ve groups with different backgrounds f or med t he Damascus Decl ar at i on. Those or gani zat i ons w er e t he Democr at i c Nat i onal Ral l y i n Syria, Kurdish Democratic Alliance in Syria, the Committees for the Revival of Civil Society, the Kurdish Democratic Front i n Syr i a and Al Must akbal ( Fut ur e) Par t y. The new coal i t i on cal l ed f or t he est abl i shment of a democr at i c Syr i an r egi me and emphasi zed t he equal i t y of al l component s of t he Syr i an peopl e and f r eedom f or t hei r various “religious, nati onal and soci al af f i l i at i ons” (Syrian Observer, 2012). The Damascus Declaration i t sel f ends w i t h the cal l “ … to work to end the stage of despotism. We declare our r eadi ness to of f er the necessar y sacr i f i ces f or t hat pur pose, and t o do al l w hat i s necessar y t o enabl e t he pr ocess of democr at i c change to take off, and to build a modern Syria, a free homeland for all of its citizens, safeguard the freedom of its people, and protect national independence” (Damascus Decl ar at i on, 2005). This call might have been the seed, planted in 2005 that grew into the anti-r egi me pr ot est s l ess t han si x year s l at er .
19
When the number of protests in Syria increased, it quickly became clear that the popular uprising was not to have a future unless the opposition, which was spread all over Syria, organized itself. The first institutions that emerged out of the uprising were the Local Coordination Committees. Those w er e m ost l y decentralized organizations that spread their messages through the Internet and staged huge protests via soci al net w or ks. Ther e w as some sor t of cent r al commi tt ee t hat hel d cont r ol over t he di f f er ent commi tt ees. The quick emersion of the LCC’s was enabled by their basis of networks of friends, families and colleagues and their thoughts of dissidence they shared for many years (Shadid, 2011). Especially during the early stages of the Syrian revolutionary process the LCC’s formed an important factor, “ the organi zat i onal backbone” , which helped spreading the revolutionary ideas throughout the whol e of Syr i a ( Lavender , 2012).
Although the importance of the LCC’s cannot be denied it mainly operates as some sort of underground movement . The opposi t i on par t i es i n Syria needed a coalition in the tradition of the Damascus Declaration, which had been severely weakened by the government since 2005. In September 2011 the Syrian National Council was formed as the future gover nance al t er nat i ve t o t he Assad r egi me and the official coalition of the various opposition groups that already existed before or were created during the uprising in Syria. The opposition coalition was formed out of the Damascus Declaration, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, members of Local Coordination Committees and smaller nationalist or ethnic based (Assyrian and Kurdish) groups (Lavender, 2012). This official political opposition began to fall apart from the day it was created. It contained such a variety of ideologies and ideas for the Syrian future t hat a l ar ge disunity actually was the only logical outcome from the start. The SNC exists for a large part of Sunni Muslim parties and cooperation with Christian, Alawite and the important opposition forces of the Kurds proved to be difficult ( Lavender , 2012). The SNC did not result in the unified alliance of opposition groups that was foreseen. The conflict in Syria evolved in a civil war and the opposition would certainly not succeed in defeating the regime when not unified. The various opposition groups again tried to form a solid coalition. In November 2012 the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF) was formed in Doha, Qatar. The SNC was integrated into the new organization. In order to create a more stable coal i t i on the l eader of t he or gani zat i on, Shei kh Ahmad Moaz al -Khatib, is a former Imam who has been active in the opposition since 2011 and has no ties to political or religious groups. The neutral position of the president of the Nat i onal Coal i t i on shoul d ensur e a st abl e cooper at i on bet w een t he di f f er ent et hni c, r el i gi ous and ideological groups (Al Arabiya, 2012). At the moment of writing the NCSROF is still the most important collection of opposition groups in Syria.
At a certain point the violence imposed on the protesters rose to such a level that the opposition had to super sede t hei r mass pr ot ests f or ar med vi ol ence, as w e w i l l r ead i n t he next par agr aph. This phase in the revolutionary process asked for different institutions, military instead of merely political. Due t o t he
20 increasingly horrifying nature of their orders soldiers of the Syrian Army deserted and formed an organized armed branch of the revolutionaries under the command of the deserted Colonel Riyad al Asaad, the Free Syr i an Ar my. As many other parts of the opposition the FSA is highly decentralized. It consists of more than a hundred semi-autonomous battalions which each organise their own guerrilla style attacks on the Syrian army. According to the CIA World Fact Book “ there are also hundreds of local groups that organize protests and st age ar med at t acks” ( 2013) . Some of t hese l ocal gr oups ar e l oosel y af f i l i at ed w i t h t he FSA. They sometimes fight under the flag of the FSA and sometimes under their own. Other groups fight Assad strictly for their own goal. Most of these particular groups are t he so-called Islamist brigades, who fight for their religious beliefs and to spread their radical ideologies (Lavender, 2012). In order to align the different operations and to prevent counterproductive actions among the various battalions the FSA has a hi gh command based in Turkey (Lavender, 2012). Ther e w i l l be f ur t her el abor at ed on the FSA in the next par agr aph. As the formation of the FSA obviously took place during the “ launch” phase of the r evol utionary process it might seem somewhat odd to put it in the “ institutionalisation” section. However, the way in which it was created can be seen as a part of the institutionalisation phase that continued into t he l aunch phase. Thi s exampl e cl ar i f i es t he f act that a revolutionary process is a continuous process and that the various phases contain some overlap.
2.3. Launch
On the 18th of March 2011 a group of young people was arrested and put in jail by Syr i an pol i ce af t er spr ay painting the “ Arab Spring-mant r a” ( Ash-sha’b yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām/ t he peopl e w ant t he r egi me to f al l ) on a w al l (Wilkinson & Thompson, 2012). This anti-gover nment chant w as f r equent l y hear d dur i ng ear l i er protests in Tunis, Egypt, Bahr ai n, Yemen and Li bya. The event f ol l ow ed ear l i er smal l er and peacef ul protests in the Syr i an capi t al of Damascus in the w ake of t he Ar ab Spr i ng (Williams, 2011). Syria had been ruled with an iron fist by the Ba’ath party for decades and the upheavals in other parts of the MENA-r egi on made t he Syrian people r eal i ze t hat t hey might be able to change this (Ghosh, 2011). Several demonstrations erupted in Damascus and other cities throughout the country as people called for political r ef or ms. The arrest of t he young ci t i zens of Dar a’ a, caused other r esi dent s of the town, whi ch i s l ocat ed south of Damascus, to stand up against their regime. At the third day of protest this local uprising turned violent and a st at ue of t he f or mer Syr i an pr esi dent w as destroyed and several official buildings were attacked and set on fire. As a result the army came down h ar d on t he pr ot est and sever al pr ot est er s w er e shot and killed (Abouzeid, 2011). In order to stop the protesters from communicating with each other and with the outside world the mobile phone connections were cut. The arrest of the group of teens was the spark that “ set fire to the Syrian revolution” , from that point on the chain of events proved to be unstoppable. The initial uprising in Dar a’ a in its turn caused anti-gover nment protest throughout t he w hol e of Syr i a. What made this protest different from earlier protests was the r eact i on of secur i t y f or ces. I n t he w eeks bef or e t hi s par ti cul ar pr ot est only less-lethal weapons such as
21 st i cks, teargas and water cannons were used against the protesting crowds. In this case the gover nment deci ded t o make use of f i r ear ms i n or der t o br eak t he r esi st ance. Thi s sudden aggr avat i on of vi ol ence made t he r ef or m mi nded peopl e i n Syr i a only mor e det er mi ned t hat t he aut hor i t ar i an government had to l eave. The i ncr ease of vi ol ence used by secur i t y f or ces also contributed to an escalation of the degree of violence of the protests, because from this moment on there have been an increasing number of reports of armed protesters that answ er ed the army’s gunfire (Kahn, 2011).
Each Fr i day t he Syr i an peopl e w er e cal l ed t o t ake par t i n mass pr ot ests af t er t he Fr i day pr ayer s. How ever t he government had already shown that they were willing to use lethal for ce, t ens of thousands of protesters went out on the streets on the 25th of March, the 1st , t he 8 th, the 15th and eventually on the 22nd of Apri l. This became the bloodiest day in the now five-w eek-old Syrian uprising so f ar as more than a hundred people were killed by security forces that day w hi l e pr ot est i ng i n Azr a, Dar a’ a, Douma, Homs, t he capi t al city of Damascus and many more towns and cities in Syria (Shadid, 2011).
On April the 25th and the days that followed t he vi ol ence cl i maxed w hen the gover nment deci ded t o cut t he water, power, and phone lines to Dara’a and to send in tanks, hel i copt er s, a f ew hundred to a few thousand soldiers (according to which source is used) and rooftop snipers in order to break the revolutionary spirit in the cradle of the uprising (Shadid, 2011). Again the reaction of the government was more violent and l et hal t hen i t w as bef or e. Thi s w as t he f i r st t i me t hat ar mour ed vehi cl es and heavy w eapons w er e used t o end local rebellions. Duri ng this operation the first messages reached the outside world about military commanders who refused to carry out this kind of operations and the defection of a reasonable number of sol di er s of t he Syr i an ar my. From this point on the military was not longer used just to prevent or quell popular protests, instead the army was deployed to besiege entire towns and cities. Assad per si st ed i n t he use of heavy mi l i t ar y equi pment in his attempts to stop the ongoing r evol ut i onar y pr ocess and i n ear l y May t anks w er e send into Homs, which is the third largest city of Syria and the smaller towns of Baniyas and Saqba. Later that month Al-Rast an and Tal bi seh w er e besi eged. Despi t e t he i ncr eased cr ackdow n and the enor mous pr esence of pol i ce- and ar my f or ces i n al l maj or ci t i es in Syria, the protests only gr ew larger and stronger (Daragahi, 2011). Thi s i s also indicated by the fact that large protests also broke out in Syrias’ largest city, Aleppo, at the end of May as a reaction on the brutal actions which were carried out by the army over the last month.
During June the repression of the protests only grew further as people were reportedly killed by helicopter gunships, tanks, artillery and shot on sight by Syrian soldiers. Violent events took place in Hama, Rastan, Ji sr al -Shugur, Aleppo, Damascus and other cities. Not only the violence against the protesters increased, t he pr ot est er s themsel ves al so mor e of t en t ur ned to viol ent measur es as a r eact i on on t he mi l i t ar y act i ons. I n Ji sr al -Shugur 120 security forces were killed in an ambush carried out by “ unknown gunmen” , whom could be armed protesters or defected soldiers (Muir, 2011).
22
The 17th of June w as cal l ed t he “ Fr i day of Sal eh al -Al i " af t er the commander of the Syr i an r ebel l i on agai nst the French Mandate in the 1920’s. It was the largest day of protesting as tens of thousands of people pr ot est ed i n Dar a’ a, Dei r al -Zor , Homs, Hama and ot her ci t i es. A w eek l at er on Fr i day t he 24 th the largest protest so far occurred in Hama when 200,000 people went out to demonstrate against the regime. From this point on the revolutionary spirit seemed like it could only grow larger. A week later mass protest s broke out in the thus far relatively peaceful Aleppo and the protest in Hama grew to an astonishing 500,000. Dur i ng the mont h of Jul y t he vi ol ence i ncr eased even f ur t her and ever y vi ol ent day w as r et al i at ed w i t h even l ar ger protests by the opposition. The ar my’ s br ut al i ti es seemed to t ake on even harsher f or ms when Syrian tanks opened f i r e on densely populated parts of the city of Homs and killed at least forty citizens (Al Jazeera, 2011). No longer were the military operations of tactical nat ure, t he regi me appar ent l y deci ded t o reign down terror on its nationals. However , t he w i l l of t he peopl e had proven to be too strong to break, not even by force. The government proved to be incapable of terminating the revolutionary process that unf ol ded i tsel f . As the r egi me w as becomi ng mor e and mor e uncer t ai n of t hei r f ut ur e, desper at e measur es ar e bei ng t aken in order to end the revolutionary process. Military commanders for instance have more than once ordered their soldiers to shoot (unarmed) civilians on sight (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Several military commanders and a reasonable number of soldiers defect ed f r om t he Syr i an ar my as they disagreed with the increasing amount of violence inflicted to the protesters. On the 29th o f Ju l y a group of sever al hundr eds of t hese def ect or s decl ar ed t hemsel ves to be the Fr ee Syr i an Ar my and at t hi s point an organized mi l i t ar y opposition against Assad was born. A month later an organized political opposition, the Syrian National Council, was formed out of a large number of smaller opposition cells. They want to “ unite its [the opposition] efforts in creating an all-i nclusi ve r epr esentat i ve body f or the nation. The goal of this body is to support the Syrian people's Revolution and their struggle for f r eedom, dignity, and democracy” (Syrian National Council, n.d.). The organization consists of reform minded democrats, Muslim organizations and Kurds (BBC New s, 2011).
In the remaining months of 2011 Assad’s regime continued to react violently on every protest raised agai nst it. However, as the months passed by the opposition’s military branch, the Free Syrian Army, grew larger. At last the opposition was able to answer on the violent acts committed by the Syrian military (I ssachar of f & Har el , 2011) . Bet w een August and December ther e have been r epor t s of ambushes on mili t ar y convoys, assassi nat i ons of mi l i t ar y commander s, t he conquer i ng of cer t ai n ci t y di st r i ct s and at t acks on military strongholds carried out by the FSA. They used urban guerilla tactics and put their minimal means to full use. FSA sol di er s w er e t r ai ned i n this type of warfare by Croatian, Serbian and Kosovar mercenaries (Tomas, 2012) and possibly others as well. As the conflict prolonged the foreign interference increased. During this stage of the revolutionary process the ci t y of Homs became t he cent er of t he
23 opposition and as a result of that formed the stage for dai l y cl ashes betw een t he FSA and secur i t y f or ces loyal to Assad.
The tendency first shifted from popular protests in cities around Syria to the siege of those cities and at this poi nt shi f t s t o a f or m of ur ban w ar f ar e. Al t hough t he FSA achi eves smal l successes, the r egi me pr oves t o be resilient and victory is still a dot on the horizon. Protesters have been killed by the thousands over the last months and the military still controls most of the countries cities.
Al so i n the f i r st si x months of 2012 t her e seems t o be a decr ease i n peacef ul mass pr ot est s and an i ncr ease i n ar med r ebel l i on agai nst the r egi me. The FSA r el i es on guer i l l a w ar f ar e and hi t-an d-run tactics and thus succeeds i n smal l vi ctories that are often quickly undone by the superiorly equipped Syrian Army. When t he FSA f or i nst ance t ook over an Ai r For ce mi ssi l e base, t he ar my w as abl e t o t ake i t back bef or e t he heavy weapons the FSA was after could be stolen. That is basically how the uprising evolves. The opposition seems to hold out and they surely har m t he r egi me t o a cer t ai n degr ee, but the general assumption is that t hey j ust do not achi eve l ar ge enough vi ct or i es t o make a r eal di f f er ence. Wi t h t he st ol en, homemade or bl ack mar ket bought w eapons t hat t hey possess t hey are not able to do something against the Airforce and heavy ar mor t hat Assad uses agai nst t he upr i si ng. Assad keeps usi ng ar mor ed vehi cl es and l ar ge amount s of soldiers to keep control of Syrian cities. In January 2012 hundreds of people had been ki l l ed i n ci t i es as Damascus, Homs and Hama when the Syrian army besieged (parts of) these cities and fought the FSA in what witnesses called “ urban warfare” (Oweis & Karouny, 2012). I n an at t empt to end the r evol ut i onar y pr ocess t he gover nment i ncr eased t he vi ol ence i n t he t act i cs they used. In February ther e w as t he Homs massacr e, w her e 400 people were ki l l ed w hen t he ar my launched an artillery bombardment on the city. Also the massacres in Houla and Al-Qubair show that the regime is taking desperate measures to stay in power. In those two cities hundreds of people (more the largest part women and childr en) w er e execut ed on the streets and in their houses by mi l i t i as l oyal t o Assad (Nebehay, 2012).
This violent approach possibly makes things only worse. Protesters do not longer call for a regi me change i n a peacef ul w ay and slogans about peace ar e maki ng place for the call for “a revolt with bullets and Kal ashni kovs” (Al Jazeera, 2012). During July the fighting between the FSA and government troops intensified further and heavy battles were fought in the two major cities of Syria, Damascus and Aleppo. On the 18th of July a number of high placed government officials were killed in a suicide attack on a government building (Al Jazeera, 2012). This event showed that as the fighting prolonged, t he r ebel s w er e t aki ng mor e desper at e measur es. However, not only the rebels had to rely more on unusual tactics, government forces also changed their tactics during this phase of the conflict. During the continuation of the confli ct the rebels improved their organization and acquired heavier and more sophisticated weaponry. The answer of the r egi me w as an i ncr ease in their use of fighter jets and gunships. These heavy weapons
24 w er e or i gi nal l y desi gned f or use i n a maj or conf l i ct w i t h a f or ei gn enemy ( I sr ael ) and t he sheer f act that t he Sy r i an r egi me ut i l i zes t hi s par t of i t s ar senal agai nst i t s ow n peopl e means the r egi me i s l osi ng absol ut e control on the revolution (Chivers, 2012).
Aleppo has seen almost a year of heavy fighting and at the moment of writing the FSA is in control of most par t s of the ci t y. Al l r out es i n- and out of the city are controlled by rebel fighters and according to experts it w i l l be onl y a mat t er of t i me bef or e al l gover nment f or ces ar e ei t her capt ur ed, ki l l ed or r et r eat ed f r om the ci ty (NDTV, 2013). The battle for Damascus was of shorter duration and its outcome was in favor of the government. Between July and September 2012 heavy fighting took place in the capital, but as the fighting prolonged the Syrian army was able to force the rebels out of most parts of the ci t y. The l ar ge mi l i t ar y pr esence i n Damascus, along with the use of heavy weapons such as tanks, attack helicopters, fighter jets and artillery concluded in a victory for the Syrian army. A rebel interviewed by a Western news agency said: “ Fi ght er j et s to us are now as common as birds in the sky” , pointing at the excessive use of heavy weaponry by the government. After the recapture of the capital city the rebels stated that they would now fall back on guer i l l a t act i cs and hi t -and-run operations against security forces (USA Today, 2012). Although the city is r ecapt ur ed by t he gover nment , f i r ef i ght s, heavy shel l i ng and ai r st r i kes st i l l t ake pl ace i n t he subur bs, resulting in dozens of deaths daily.
In the first five months of 2013 the uprising against the Syrian regi me has ent er ed i t s t hi r d year . Since i ts beginning more than 80,000 people have been killed, more than a million people fled to neighbouring countries and around four million people are internally displaced (United Nations, 2013). These numbers ar e bel i eved t o keep i ncr easi ng i n the comi ng mont hs. The f i ght i ng bet w een r ebel s and t he Syr i an ar my and t he “ col l at er al damage” w her ei n t hese bat t l es r esul t make up t he l ar gest par t of t he deat h t ol l . Sever al dozen to a few hundred people, mainly ci vi l i ans, di e ever y day as a r esul t of t he i naccur at e t act i cs t he Syr i an ar my now uses against rebel fighters. Rumors about the use of chemical weapons also increasingly come to light since the beginning of this year.
A small number of deaths ar e t he r esul t of f i ght i ng bet w een the various opposition groups. The number s ar e minuscule if compared to the amount of civilian deat hs that t he r egi me i s r esponsi bl e f or and the number of rebels and Syrian soldiers killed in action. However, the fact that infighting is taking place r eveal s t hat t he “ i nt er cept i on phase” has been r eached i n t he Syr i an r evol ut i onar y pr ocess.
2.4. Fl uctuati on
The Syrian opposition can be divided roughly into three groups: democrats, Islamists and ethnic groups (notably Kurds). Since t he NCSROF has been cr eat ed ther e seems t o be a str uggl e f or pow er i n t he pol i ti cal opposition. A part of the opposition st i l l wants a new and democratic Syria, but the voice of Islamist groups
25
(the Muslim Brotherhood as their main voice) became stronger over the past months. Ther e has al so been an increase in foreign fighters in Syria, who fight for the Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood faced increasing criticism as t he or gani zat i on const ant l y t r i ed to i ncr ease t hei r pow er i nsi de t he coal i t i on ( H assan, 2013). Their ideas also reach the various brigades of the FSA and there have been reports of commanders chanting r adi cal sl ogans (Ditz, 2013). As a growing part of the opposition now seems to fight for an Islamic state while another part fights for democracy, future infighting seems to be an increasing possibility. Besi des t he di f f er ent i deas bet w een t he secul ar i sts and the I sl ami sts t her e i s anot her gr oup t hat has a different view for the future. The Kurds are in power of large parts of the Kurdish regions that have al w ays been tightly controlled by Assad. The ethnic group has always wanted more autonomy in their regions and now see a possi bi l i t y. When Assad i s def eat ed they w ant t hei r ow n pi ece of Syr i a and t hat i s not t he f ut ur e that both the secularist and the Islamist movements have in mind (Lavender, 2012). As t he secul ar i st s and t he I sl ami st s ar e t he l ar gest opposi ng par t i es w i t hi n t he opposi t i on agai nst t he Syr i an r egi me i tsel f , these tw o si des w i l l pr obabl y become each ot her ’ s enemi es i n t he future. The Kurds are a relatively small group and, although they are a force that must be taken into account, the struggle for power during the revolution will probably take place between the other two groups. However, as the Kurds have their own plan with the future of their part of Syria it is a distinct possibility that they will come into conflict with one or both of the other parties after the current regime has fallen.
2.5. I ntercepti on
Among the varied groups of revolutionaries it is not yet decided who is in power. Small street battles bet w een r ebel gr oups have commenced, but t hose w er e smal l scal e and seemed t o originate more out of mat er i al i nt er est s than r eal “ st r uggl es f or pow er ” ( Ender s, 2013) .The st r uggl e f or pow er has yet t o commence. Although tensions are certainly rising between groups that fight for different outcomes of the r evol ut i on, thei r common enemy t he r egi me st i l l binds t hem som ew hat t ogether . Assad r emai ns t he undef eat ed enemy of t he Syr i an peopl e and in t hat r ol e he cr eat es a cer t ai n bal ance among t he revolutionaries. Tensions between radical Muslims who fight their Jihad against Assad and groups who strive for democracy and a free Syria are rising (Kouwenhoven, 2013). They how ever hold a mut ual goal and t hey can st i l l be of use to each ot her . In an interview of the Brown Moses blog with FSA Colonol Aqidi the latter stated: “ I have good relations with all of them [Islamist battalions] and I am communicating with them as long as they fight against the Assad r egi me.”
From this we can conclude that the revolutionary process in Syria still finds itself in the earliest stages of the Interception phase and will probably stay in that same phase as long as the Syria regime is not overthrown. For t hat r eason w e w i l l drop the last three phases of a revolution as described on pages 14 and 15 consolidation, reversal and consolidation overthr ow , as t hese phases ar e not yet r eached.
26
Chapter Three - Analysis
In this chapter w e will take t he over vi ew of the last chapter and look at the geographical aspects “ hidden inside it” once agai n, combining it with aspects of the concept “ revolutionary process” as discussed in the t heor et i cal f r amew or k. The previous chapters will be put together and in the end the revolution in Syrian shall be explained from a geographical point of view. Fi r st l y, t he t ype of r evol ut i on w i l l be def i ned, maki ng use of the def i ni t i ons pr esented i n t he theoretical framework. Then the factors that caused the revolutionary process will be highlighted, mainly focussing on the geographi cal aspect s of t hese f act or s. Fi nal l y, the geography of the course of the revolution will be discussed in this chapter.
3.1. Definition
In Syria the revolutionary process originated from the lower parts of society. It was not initiated by parts of the Syrian elite living abroad or by the political, military or economical top in the country. The peopl e of Sy r i a “ si mpl y” stood up against their regime in order to change things. That aut omat i cal l y makes cl ear t hat w e ar e deal i ng w i t h a “ r evol ut i on f r om bel ow ” . I n t he theor et i cal f r amew or k w as put f or w ar d t hat Kr ej ci spl i t s up a revolution from below into two sub forms: the horizontal and vertical revolution, the former bei ng “ secessi oni st w ar s” and t he l att er bei ng uprisings of the people against their own sovereign gover nment . Looking at Syria it is fairly obvious that the country is dealing with a vertical revolution. In that sense it is a “ classic revolution” , an uprisi ng of a l ar ge par t of soci et y agai nst i t s r ul er s. T h e Sy r i an revolutionary process should thus be categorized as a “ vertical revolution from below” . As put forward ear l i er , a possible outcome of this kind of revolution is civil war, when t he r evol ut i onar i es ar e ( becomi ng) equal to the government in terms of social status and/ or (military) power position. The Syrian revolution r eached t hat st age i n the l aunch phase. At a cer t ai n poi nt unar med pr ot est s decr eased, w hi l e ar med rebellion against the government increased. With cities conquered by the rebels and military operations initiated by the regime to take those cities back, there is no denial in the fact that Syria is encountering a civil war. The fact that the Syrian revolutionary pr ocess i s par t of the l ar ger r evol ut i onar y w ave know n as t he Arab Spring does not automatically imply that it should also be considered a “ revolution from the side” . As the description on page 9 makes clear such a revolution is only the case when the process of r evol ut i on i s del i ber at el y tr ansf er r ed f r om one count r y t o the ot her . During the Arab Spring this was not the case. Ideas, slogans and methods have spread throughout the region, but this happened because people in various countries throughout the MENA-region took over what they saw happening around them. As ideas spread and peopl e saw t hat t hei r ow n possi bi l i t i es w er e l ar ger t han t hey or i gi nal l y i magi ned, t he concatenation of revolutions in the MENA-r egi on took place.
27
The core of each revolution is a r adi cal l y di f f er ent vi ew on t he f ut ur e of soci et y betw een t he peopl e and t he government. This comes forward in slightly different words in every book, paper and report regarding t he subj ect . Ther e ar e al w ays r easons why t he peopl e and the r egi me come t o have such di ver gent vi si ons. As expl ai ned i n the t heor et i cal f r amew or k al l r evol ut i ons ar e caused by a causal str uct ur e, a w eb of underlying causes. Thi s chapt er w i l l be an at t empt t o unr avel t he par t i cul ar causal w eb t hat hol ds Syr i a i n i t s cent r e. I n order to do so, some theoretical views on the revolutionary process will pass by one more time and the empirical findings from the last chapter ar e t hen connect ed t o the t heor i es. As announced ear l i er t he f ocus in this chapter will lay on the geographical factors that could be held responsible for the outbreak of a revolutionary process in Syria. As this is the pre-concluding chapter we strive for a clear structure and in that w ay pave t he r oad f or t he f i nal concluding chapter. To do so, the theories will be combined with the “ t r i ni t y” of geogr aphi cal f act or s (and the external f act or s menti oned i n t he t heor et i cal f r amew or k under “ Geography and revolutions” ) that influences this “triangle of causes” . As w e have seen roughly the same cluster of factors can be held responsible for the unfolding of each r evol ut i onar y pr ocess. Of course the direct stimuli are dependent on the context and “ attention should be paid to the particular socio-historical and cultural context” (Krejci, 1994, p.17) when looking at an individual uprising against the government. However, these contextual influences do not mean that the various revolutions throughout history originate out of a w i de var i et y of causes. When w e l ook at t heor i es about the subject and reviews of insurrections in history roughly t he same pat t er n mani f est s i t sel f ever y t i me. Ther ef or e, it shoul d not r eal l y st r i ke us as a sur pr i se t hat t his pattern is al so vi si bl e i n t he case of t he Syrian revolutionary process. In the next paragraph the pattern will be shown using the course of events in Syr i a as descr i bed i n t he second chapt er and the t heor eti cal vi ew s di scussed i n t he theor et i cal f r amew or k.
3.2. Relative deprivation and social mobility
The revolutionary process st ar t ed w i t h a sl ogan w r i t t en on a w al l i n gr af f i t i . Thi s one sent ence embodi ed t he essence of a revolution in general and of what was going to be one of the most brutal revolutionar y pr ocesses i n modern history: “ t he peopl e w ant t he r egi me t o f al l ” . The di r ect r eason for this public written attack on the Syrian government is easy imaginable. The Syrian people had a plan for the future of Syria and they knew that that vision was impossible to realize as l ong as the Assad r egi me w as i n pl ace. Ther e w as a di scr epancy bet w een t he w i l l of the r egi me and the w i l l of t he peopl e. The large amount of distrust in the regime has been caused by the hollowing out of the Ba’ath party during the past decades. Although it once st ar t ed as a r evol ut i onar y soci al i st and ant i -i mper i al people’s party, it turned into an authoritarian led r epr essi ng r egi me under Haf i z al -Assad and remained so under the rule of his son Bashar. The Ba’athism of the past fifty years caused the daily life in Syria to be suffering from corruption and cronyism. Important societal positions were impossible to reach through the normal route. Only family members, friends and acquaintances of the Assad were able to obtain high positions in business, politics or the military (Davidson, 2012).
28
The people of Syria lacked the possibility of social mobility. They w er e stuck in their situation without reasonable expectations of improvement. Without expectations of a better future a society wide feeling of hopel essness ar ose. The exper i ence of a hopel ess vi si on on t he f ut ur e evol ved over ti me i nto t he f eel i ng t hat somet hi ng had to change. I n t he end peopl e ar e f or ced to under t ake ext r eme measur es, to st and up agai nst the government, when they find themselves in a hopeless situation (Pareto, 1965 in Krejci, 1994). However, the situation in Syria did not drastically change in 2011 compar ed to ear l i er year s. Corruption has been widespread in the system for many years and mass uprisings against the regime have not taken place earlier, so hopelessness alone did not cause a revolution. There was more to it. An important factor that possibly explains the quite sudden r i se of r evol ut i onar y f eel i ngs l i es not in Syria, it or i gi nat ed el sew her e. Many countries in the MENA-r egi on exper i enced cor r upt gover nments, w eak economies and little possibility for vertical social mobility, but that changed in 2010. The people of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and other states in the region successfully expelled the authoritarian regimes that had r ul ed the countr i es f or many year s, i n some cases even decades. The peopl e of Syr i a f el t w hat coul d be descr i bed as relative deprivation. Their own situation did not worsen, but the situation of other people improved significantly. As the situations in various neighbouring states of Syria got better and the ci r cumst ances i n Syr i a st ayed t he same, t he peopl e w er e r el at i vel y w or se of f . The Syrian people knew that their situation might be hopeless while living under the rule of Assad, but saw that change w as possi bl e i f t hey only f ol l ow ed t he w ay t hat w as pr esent ed by the people of ot her st at es. We see t hat t he pr e- revolutionary society i n Sy r i a found itself in a somew hat si mi l ar situation as ear l i er described on page 11: “ ... peopl e i n di f f er ent cl asses have t he same r i ght s and possi bi l i ti es as t hey have al w ays had, [ but ] t he i mpr ovement of thei r pr osper i t y causes t hem to want more. Such feelings can turn into feelings of injustice and lay the foundation for a revolution.” However, in the Syrian case it was not the own improved prosperity that resulted in relative deprivation, it was the improved prosperity of the peopl e of nei ghbouring countries that eventually resulted in feelings of injustice.
3.3. Culture
A factor that most likely has contributed to the spreading of r evol ut i onar y f eel i ngs throughout the region i s the shared culture. As the Arab Spring unfolded in a r egi on w her e the dominant religion is Islam and the community that populates the MENA-r egi on has a sense of shar ed hi st or y and exper i ences, i t seems l ogi cal to consider those aspects as possible explanations for the revolutionary wave (Gelvin, 2012). The m ost striking of these are the common opposition to American activities in the region and the widespread support for the Palestinian cause. This feeling of unity might have played a role in the concatenation of r evol ut i onar y pr ocesses. Al so t he violent history of the region could have played a role. As inhabitants of many countries in t he r egi on w er e accust omed t o oppr essi on and vi ol ence, i t mi ght have been a smal l er st ep f or t hem t o t ake t he str eet s t hemsel ves.
29
Both these factors could explain t he hi gh l evel of espr i t de cor ps, a high mor al , w hi ch the protesters had and i s still shown by the outgunned forces of the FSA and other armed rebels who do not give up the fight. The high moral was an absolute necessity to turn the uprisings into revolutions. I f t he peopl e had been mor e r esi l i ent t o t ake up ar ms agai nst t he r egi me, the r evol ut i onar y pr ocess w oul d have been abor t ed ear l y on in the launch phase. The w i l l of peopl e to t ake t he str eet s and t o oppose t he pol i ce and t he ar my unar med i s what turned the Egyptian revolution f or exampl e into a success (purely looking at the revolutionary process). Also in Syria the mass protests did not fade out after the government had already proven that they w er e w i l l i ng t o use deadl y f or ce i n or der t o cal l the r evolutionary process to a halt while it found itself still i n an ear l y st age.
3.4. Demogr aphi cal , Economi c and Urban asp ect s
As discussed in the previous chapter Syria encountered a huge growth in the urban population during the l ast decades. The Ar ab r egi on has al w ays deal t with high fertility rates. Back in 1975 the previous leader of Syr i a, Haf ez al -Assad was under the assumption that "high population growth rate and internal migration" were responsible for stimulating "proper socio-economi c i mpr ovements" ( Al -Tamimi & Svadkovsky, 2012, p. 1). These f er ti l i t y r at es seem t o have been decr easi ng over t he l ast year s, but t he ear l i er hi gh nat ur al population growth has resulted in an “all time high in the numbers of children and young people in the Arab region” (Mirkin, 2013, p. 13). Although the fertility of women in the child bearing age i n Syr i a has decreased, the large size of this group will probably continue the large growth of the Syrian population for many year s t o come ( Al -Tamimi & Svadkovsky, 2012). A l ar ge par t of t he t ot al popul at i on i n Syr i a w as under the age of 25. An overall young population implies automatically that a large proportion of the population finds itself in the working class. When this goes hand in hand with a large supply of jobs it can cause economic growth, which has been the case in various Asian countries (Mirkin, 2013). However, if a country houses many jobseeker s and ther e i s t oo f ew paid labour to provide them all with a job it has sever al negat i ve consequences. I n Syr i a i t f or ced many youngst er s f r om r ur al ar eas to go sear ch f or a bet t er l i f e i n the city. The demographical factor fertility combined with the lack of jobs caused by the poor Syrian economy induced a huge growth of the urban population in the last decades. That pr ocess event ual l y l ed t o t he i nsuper abl e cl ash bet w een t he peopl e and t he r egi me. Syr i a evol ved f r om a r ur al soci et y w her ei n t he ci t y had a smaller r ol e as t he centr e of deci si on- maki ng, towards a society more based on cities. In line with Lefebvres’ theory a next step in the process of turning into an urban society would be for the regime to improve the facilities and institutions and orient itself towards the social needs of the people. Cities like Damascus and Aleppo should in time become cent r es of ur ban l i f e w her ei n t he ci t i zens coul d l i ve sat i sf act or y l i ves and develop themsel ves. To achi eve t hat , the State should have focussed the urban planning in a way that stimulated people t o make use of t hei r right to the city, “ to work, to training and education, to health, housing, leisure, to life” (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 179). In a Lefebvrian urban society the social needs of the people are to the utmost supported by both
30 the economical and the political sphere. Contrary to Lefebvres utopian ideas, the Sy r i an gover nment, as discussed in the previous paragraph, did not seem to lay i t s f ocus on t he qual i t at i ve i mpr ovement of i t s soci et y. As a result the urban Syrian no longer saw their cities offer them prospects of improving their livelihoods or modern ways of life. Cities w er e devel oped during t he past year s. They had to because of the constant influx from rural regions and the natural growth of their populations. This devel opment w as however purely quantitative as the government only focused on more housing, by whipping up new quar t er s at the edges of the ci t i es, and the improvement of infrastructure when necessary. Solely quantitative growth of a society is not enough to bring it to a higher level and in Syria the quantitative growth proved to be of an i nsuf f i ci ent l evel to even hol d soci et y at t he same l evel . I n t he Ar ab Human Devel opment Repor t i t i s st at ed t hat ther e ar e a number of chal l enges f or t he gover nment s i n t he MENA- region. Every single one of these challenges can be explained by the process of an evolution into urban society that takes too long. The evolutionary phase wherein Syria was situated was stretched out to far, it w as thwart by the government. Mirkin (2013) names unemployment, underemployment and problems in job creation. In the same paragraph he states that “ low labour participation, partial empowerment of women, environmental degradation, food and water shortages, rapid urbanization and the insufficient provision of housing, education and medical care” are complement ar y pr obl ems. The r egi me i s cul pabl e f or a gr eat deal of t hese pr obl ems. Some pr obl ems may not directly be the gover nment s f aul t , but in those cases t he r egi me is at l east unabl e or unwilling to solve them.
Important causes for these problems can be found in the badly functioning Syrian economy. The urban situation is directly connected to the Syrian demography and the economic situation, as shown ear l i er a number of t i mes. I n t hi s paragraph the economic factors will be laid out. Two things that have always formed the foundation of the Syrian economy collapsed in the years prior to 2011. Those ar e the production of oil and the agricultural sector. There has been a decline in the national oil production since 2005. Oil production counted for more than 50% of the government income in 2005 and decreased to 35% in 2010 (Global Edge, 2012). I n t he year s pr i or to 2011 severe droughts badly damaged t he agr i cul t ur al sect or . The pr oduction of wheat and barley significantly declined which, had its effects on both the income from export and the supply to the Syrian people. The decr ease of t he over al l economi c si t uat i on af f ect ed t he Sy r i an soci et y as a whole. The government simply did not have the money to provide its people with basic products and ser vi ces such as el ectr i ci t y, w at er and br ead, which had always been heavily subsidized by the government. Especi al l y a shor t age of br ead and t he resulting exploding prices for the most important product for calorie intake in the MENA-r egi on w er e an important factor that contributed to the discontent among the population (Sternberg, 2012). As the government proved to be unable to take care of a steady supply of the most basic products and even bread became hard to come by the unrest rose. Higher prices and shortages have been caused by cl i mat e f act or s t hat l ed t o a decr ease i n w heat pr oducti on i n some of the l ar gest w heat
31 producers worldwide in 2010. In Russia and Ukraine extreme heat had been the cause of r educed har vests and i n Canada and Aust r al i a t he w heat pr oduct i on w as af f ect ed i n a negat i ve w ay because of heavy r ai nf al l (Sternberg, 2012). As the global wheat production had been diminished with a high percentage, the prices aut omat i cal l y i ncr eased. Al so Syr i a w as af f ect ed by r ai sed w heat pr i ces w or l dw i de, w hi l e i t s nat i onal production had also been significantly decreased because of periods of extreme drought and heat. The shor t f al l of w heat dr ove even mor e peopl e t o t he ci t i es, t he r ur al -urban migration increased and the cities got even more crowded. This of course had a sel f -enforcing effect, because with a rising number of people in a city the demand for nourishment increases even more. The overall situation for the people of Syria deteriorated. The situation had been far from optimal because of demogr aphi cal f act or s, t hat caused a r ush to t he ci t y. The ci t i es t hemsel ves w er e not ai med at fulfilling the social needs of their populations. The urban areas which got more and more crowded with “ cl i mat e r ef ugees” ( Al -Tamimi & Svadkovsky, 2012, p. 2) as t he year s w ent by became a hotbed for f eel i ngs that somet hi ng had t o change. These f eel i ngs and t houghts got even mor e w i despr ead w hen al so a basi c human need, access to food, was getting harder to come by. The legitimacy of the Ba’ at hi st gover nment , which had ruled the country with an iron fist for decades, was questioned when it could not longer feed the Syrian population. The external, environmental factors that caused a food shortage were to a cer t ai n l evel coi nci dent al but t hey f unct i oned as a cat al ysat or to br i ng the r ef or mi st f eel i ngs even cl oser t o the boiling point.
The peopl e w er e deni ed t hei r r i ght to t he ci t y. The Assad r egi me “ bl ocked the r oad t hat l ed to an urban soci et y” . According to Lefebvre the phase of urban society is only feasible when the process towards it is supported by the State. In the case of Syria there was no governmental support w hatsoever and t hat meant the people had only one option left to modify social life and come closer to the desired urban society: urban revolution, r évol ut i on ur bai ne.
Because Lef ebvr e w r ot e hi s theor i es i n t he 1960’ s and -70’s and saw the world through Marxist glasses the revolutionary class in his works consi st of the working class, the proletariat. When we l ook at the case of t he ( ur bai ne) r evol ut i onar y pr ocess i n Syr i a w e see t hat the parti cular soci o-historical and cultural context provides the revolution with a different revolutionary “ class” . As Jones (1981) observed in his revi ew of the 1848 revolutions, the anger felt by the population found its way out through the younger people. In Syr i a l ar ge number s of men and w omen i n thei r t w ent i es and thi r ti es l i ved cl osel y toget her i n cr ow ded ci t i es. They f or med t he “ r evol ut i onar y ar my” that eventually took matters into their own hands. During the initial phases of protest and still, during the street battles, a major part of the people finally used their right to the city and stood up against the regime. It w er e especi al l y men and w omen under t he age of t hi r t y (Lavender, 2012). It was this group that began the revolutionary process; it was this group that had their reasons to do so. They wanted freedom and basic human rights. Syria encountered a high level of youth unemployment, as did de entire MENA region. It is the region with the highest youth unemployment
32 worldwide, peeking in 2012 when almost a third of the youth in Northern Africa and the Middle East found itself jobless. They f ound t hemsel ves “ di spossessed of t he ci t y” ( Lef ebvre, 1996, p. 179) with no chances t o make f ul l use of t he ci t y t o l i ve an ur ban l i f e. As t he gover nment w as know n f or i ts w i despr ead corruption it was just a small step for the youngest layer of the population to lay the blame with the Assad r egi me. The peopl e of the MENA-r egi on made a “ vi si bl e and audi bl e cl ai m t o gl obal j ust pol i t i cs” ( Agat hangel ou & Soguk, 2011, p. 552). As mentioned above, when a group of adolescents expr essed those f eel i ngs w i t h a writing on a w al l , that set off the revolutionary process in Syria. The group of protesters initially consisted mostly young people, but during the early stages of the revolutionary process when unarmed mass protests still was the weapon of choice other parts of society quickly joined. Low- and middle income classes quickly joined the protests. Somewhat later doctors, lawyers, clerics and other community leaders joined too and took the lead (Lavender, 2012). Thi s turned the revolution into a process with a wide societal support.
With this description of the class of revolutionaries the causes f or t he Syrian revolutionary pr ocess has come full circle, as shown in figure 5. Demogr aphi cal aspects of t he Syr i an soci et y w er e f or a gr eat amount responsible for the poor economical situation of the country. Because of that particular situation many peopl e moved f r om t he Syr i an per i pher y t o t he centr es, t he ci t i es. The populations of large cities such as Damascus and Al eppo strongly increased and it was this growth of the urban population that eventually caused a r évol ut i on ur bai ne in Syria. The revolution began with a st r i ki ng revolutionary class. In contrary to the classic Lef ebvr i an vision it was not the working class that stood up against its government, it was the exact
opposite. In the Syrian revolutionary process it was the Figure 5 – Causal loop of the onset of the Syrian revolutionary growing majority of unemployed youngsters that took process the lead in an uprising against a crusted regime, maki ng it a revolution of the non-w or ki ng cl ass. That i n i t sel f i s agai n a demogr aphi cal f act or , w hi ch causes the pattern of this particular revolution to come back where it started. Demography influenced economy. Economy influenced the cities. Finally the urban revolution caused by these centres of urban life originated from the huge amount of youngsters that populated t hem.
In the last paragraph the factors leading up to the revolution have been laid out and the geogr aphi cal aspect s t hat caused and pr eceded the r evol ut i on i n Syr i a ar e now cl ear . How ever , t he ai m of t hi s t hesi s i s t o find out to w hat ext ent the revolutionary process as a whole can be explained from a geographical point of vi ew . Ther ef or e the geogr aphi cal aspect s of t he r evol ut i onary process itsel f st ill need to be analyzed. An
33 i mpor t ant el ement that can and must be linked to geography in order to fully understand it is the use of space, par t i cul ar l y t he use of ur ban space, as a f aci l i t at i ng f act or . The most prominent spat i al aspect s of t he r evol ution were the use of the city as a space of mobilization and the use of the city as the playground of r evol ut i on. As these pr ocesses pr oved t o be of gr eat i mpor t ance f or t he sur vi val of the Syr i an r evol ut i onar y process, t hey will be di scussed in the following paragraph.
We learned that during the institutionalisation phase Local Coordination Committees w er e f or med t hat “ took responsibility for meeting, planning and organizing events on the ground within their own communities” (LCCSyria, n.d.). I t w er e t hese or gani zations that popped up in the cities and small towns of Syria during the early days of the revolutionary process, that have played an important role in the launch of t hat pr ocess. By or gani zi ng event s t he LCC’ s made sur e t hat t he new born revolution remained in progress. It is not coincidental that these committees came up in the Syrian cities. The potential of forming social movement s had al w ays been present in the cities in t he M EN A-region, although it had never played a role in social change (Castells, 1983 in Roy, 2013). The fact that the formation of social movements was put somewhat on the backburner in Syria is probably because of tight government control. As earlier mentioned on page 22 an organization such as the Damascus Declarat i on w as al so deal i ng w i t h ar r est s and prosecution once the regime found out about its existence. How ever , in the wake of the Arab Spring and with the knowledge that a large part of society would back them, i t seemed t i me f or soci al movement s t o t ake t hei r opportunity and make a change. LCC’s mushroomed in various cities and towns throughout Syria and formed the organizational backbone of the early revolutionary process. The cities themselves formed the spaces of social mobilization as networks of friends, f ami l i es and col l eagues qui ckl y set up t he revolutionar y commi t t ees. The ci t i es i nf r ast r uct ur e i n t hi s case did not consi st of hi ghw ays, pi pes, w i r es, or cables, it formed “ a platform providing for and reproducing life in the city” (Simone, 2004). The networ ks of people that f or med the LCC’s are a good example of what Simone (2004) calls peopl e as i nf r ast r uct ur e. With peopl e as i nf r ast r uct ur e Simone means the process of cooperation, capable of generating an unanimous front of people from a variety of various capacities and needs which attempts to derive maximal outcomes out of a minimal amount of options. The people behind the LCC’s consisted for a large part of young people, but were quickly joined by people from the middle- and hi gher cl asses of soci et y. With just the use of laptops and mobile phones the revolutionary committees organized protests of in some cases several hundreds of thousands of people, which surely is a maximal outcome from very limited means. When a group of people claimed their right to the city, others followed quickly. The forming of t h e LCC’ s helped expanding Sy r i as’ r évol ut i on ur bai ne. Once i t became cl ear t hat r el at i vel y si mpl e act i ons as mobilizing people through social media could have huge effects every town in Syria that joined the uprising against the regime got their own Local Coordination Committee. The people used their right to the city to use it as a space of mobilization and in that way give body to what were just thoughts and ideas about a different future. Those conceptions of what could and should happen to ensure a qualitative
34 growth in the personal lives of Syrias’ population turned into a tangible revolutionary process once the city was used to do so.
Dur i ng the Syr i an r evol ut i onar y pr ocess t he ci t y as space w as a cr uci al el ement f or the pr ocess t o sur vi ve and continue to exist. Cities throughout the whole country became “ playgrounds of revolution” . In the first months it were the city streets that were overflown with thousands of protesters openly questioning t he l egi t i macy of the Assad r egi me. As t he r evol ut i onar y pr ocess pr ol onged, t he ci ti es became the bat t l ef i el ds wher eupon t he Fr ee Syr i an Ar my w aged w ar agai nst t he Syr i an ar my. During the first three months of the revolutionary process the protesting crowds remained r el at i vel y peacef ul , al though t he gover nment r epr essed the pr ot est s i n i ncr easi ngl y vi ol ent manners. The people wanted change and claimed their right to the city by using that exact right to the city. The city was used as the stage of protests as people gathered in front of official buildings and other symbols of the r egi me the peopl e w ant ed gone. How ever , t he ci t y onl y became of essent i al for the revolutionaries once the non-vi ol ent pr ot est s made way for armed conflict bet w een them and t he gover nment . Ever y t i me Assad noticed that his army’s st r at egi es w er e i nsuf f i ci ent to end t he r evol uti onar y pr ocess, t he l evel of vi ol ence used t o quel l t he pr ot est s was increased. As will be shown in the next paragraph, security forces originally started with non-lethal riot control. After a short time they turned to lethal riot control, after which they turned to the besieging of ent i r e ci t i es and tow ns. When t he r ebel s i ncr eased i n number s, battles were fought on the urban battlefields of Syr i a. At a cer t ai n poi nt Assad appar ant l y decided to commit “ urbicide” as a weapon of last resort against t he r ebel s. Ent i r e ci t y di str i ct s w er e shel l ed, which resulted in the complete destruction of neighbourhoods and the death of hundreds of people, both rebels and civilians. Originally security forces (police and army) were depl oyed to control the mass protests in the city cent er s. To do this they used t ear gas, w at er cannons and dr essed i n riot gear. Later on this relatively har ml ess met hods w er e r epl aced w i t h mor e l et hal ones, w hen i t became cl ear t hat the pr ot est s w oul d not be broken easi l y. Non-violent protests kept occurring over the whole country and beating down every individual protest proved fruitless f or t he gover nment . Peopl e kept returning onto the streets, although the government at this point had already shown that they wer e w i l l i ng t o use deadl y f or ce agai nst their own citizens. Again, the r egi me changed t act i cs and t he new st r at egy used by t he ar my w as t o besi ege ent i r e cities and towns, using tanks, large amounts of soldiers and cutting off phone-, w at er - and el ectr i ci t y facilities. Cities such as Dar a’ a, Homs and Hama w er e occupi ed by t he Syr i an ar my w hen t he r egi me at t empt ed t o end t he r evol ut i on once and f or al l . How ever , at t hi s poi nt t he r evol uti onar i es al so began t o resort to firearms. The ar med r evol uti onar i es w er e strongly outmanned and outgunned by the Syrian army, which is the reason they used guerilla tactics (Spyer, 2012). In the early days of what had become a civil w ar ar med r ebel s mostly relied on roadside bombs or improvi sed expl osi ve devi ces ( I ED’ s) and sni per s capabl e of at t acki ng t he Syr i an ar my unseen. As the conflict prolonged and the FSA was formed, their tactics
35 did not change much. Of cour se t he scal e of t he at t acks i ncr eased, because t he FSA w as capabl e of organizing larger assaults than the smaller local groups. How ever , most operations were still based on hit- and-run tactics, ambushes and other “ cl assi c i nsur gent t act i cs” (Enders & Landay, 2012). It was the city that pr ovi ded t he r ebel s w i t h the possi bi l i t i es t o engage t he Syr i an ar my i n t hat w ay. Rel at i vel y nar r ow st r eets pr ovi ded excel l ent spot s for ambushes and planting explosives and buildings functioned as hiding spots agai nst hel i copt er s and ai r cr af t . Also t he l ar ge ( ar mor ed) vehi cl es used by t he gover nment w er e hi nder ed i n t hei r movement by the urban environment and vul ner abl e t o at t ack. The superiority of a more high-t ech army strongly decreases in an urban environment (Graham, 2002). The FSA mainly uses guerilla- and hit- and-run tactics in their assaults on targets of the Syrian army ( Br own Moses, 2013). They are forced to do so, because the advantages the army holds in both numbers and firepower would make classic warfare an unw i se choi ce f or t he FSA. Engaging the Syrian army in “ urban warfare” seemed like the smart thing to do for the rebel s. The urban space that functions as the battlefield has given the rebel fighters the chance to prolong their mili t ar y campai gn. The f act t hat r ebel s used t he ci t y as t he batt l ef i el d of t hei r choi ce intrinsical ly challenged and diminished the power of the Syr i an ar my ( Gr aham, 2002) . If the battles would have been f ought i n r ur al ar eas of Syr i a, t he Syr i an ar my would probably have pr evai l ed because t hey would have had an enormous advantage in open terrain with their tanks, aircraft and helicopters. The r egi me noti ced t hat the r ebel s w er e har der to def eat t han i ni t i al l y f or eseen. For a l ast t i me t he army used a different strategy. Neighbourhoods known for housing armed rebels were hit by artillery and r ocket bar r ages. The use of these powerful weapons resulted in the complete destruction of buildings and infrastructure. The urban battlefield, that only worked against the governments army, was systematically destroyed. The Syrian regime committed urbicide in their own cit i es. The destruction of the hostile (for gover nment f or ces) envi r onment at the same t i me meant t he cr eat i on of spaces t hat made Syr i an sol di er s l ess vul ner abl e t o r ebel att acks. I nst ead of gi vi ng space the chance t o det er mi ne t he w ar , t he w ar w as empl oyed to determine the space (Salmon, 2002 in Graham, 2002). Ur ban w ar f ar e conti nues i n Syr i a, even at t he moment of w r i t i ng. The concr et e bat t l ef i el ds of t he cities provide the rebels with possibilities to at t ack and r et r eat qui ckl y. The ci t y as t he “ playground of revolution” , as a f aci l i t at i ng space f or ur ban w ar f ar e has pr oven t o be a f act or of si gni f i cance f or t he prolongation of the revolutionary process. On the other contrary, the success that the urban environment meant f or r ebel f or ces r esul ted i n t he demol i t i on of ci t y cent r es, host i l e spaces t o the r egi me. I n or der t o remove rebel forces from their playgrounds of revolution, the regime decided to commit urbicide.
As pr esent ed i n t hi s anal ysi s geogr aphi cal f act or s have pl ayed an i mpor t ant r ol e i n both the onset and the course of the Syrian revolutionary process in Syria. A short overview of the geography of the revolution will be given in the next chapter, accompanied by a critical evaluation of this thesis and some r ecommendations for potential future research.
36
Chapter Four - Conclusion
At long last we can come back to the central question that was the origin of t hi s t hesi s:
To what ext ent can t he r evol ut i onar y pr ocess i n Syr i a be expl ai ned f r om a geogr aphi cal perspect i ve?
In order to formulate an answer to this central question the geography of the Syrian revolutionary process w i l l once agai n and f or t he l ast t i me be pr esent ed. The r esul t s of the anal ysi s w i l l be pr esent ed i n a cl ear and orderly manner. Fi r st l y, t he geogr aphi cal f act or s t hat caused the revolution to unfold and the i nt er connect edness bet w een t hem w i l l be di scussed. Secondl y, an over vi ew of t he geogr aphy of t he r evol ut i onar y pr ocess i tsel f w i l l be gi ven. These brief descriptions of the outcomes of the analysis combined will form the answer to the question which formed the beginning of this thesis. As indicated in the introduction, one of the aims of this thesis was to find out if the processes that both caused the onset and the continuation of the revolutionary process in Syria also apply to other countries in the region. In other words, i f t he pr ocesses uncovered in this thesis could be used t o expl ai n the Ar ab Spr i ng as a w hol e. Ther ef or e t hat mat t er w i l l be br i ef l y di scussed i n t hi s chapt er . Besides the formulation of an answer to the central question this concluding chapter will also cont ai n a critical evaluation of this thesis and some recommendations for potential future research.
The cause of t he Syr i an r evol ut i onar y pr ocess l i es i n t he i nt er connect ed spher es of demogr aphy, economy and urban life. The high fertility of Arab women has left the entire MENA-region stuck with a youth bulge of people between the ages of 15 and 24 (Mirkin, 2013, p. 7). There was not enough work to provide ever y job seeker with a job. This shortage was caused by an already poor economy that recently worsened because of the global economic crisis. The country simply had to deal with a surplus of young people looking for work. Thi s r esulted in high youth unemployment, which caused a wave of urbanisation as t he j obl ess youngst er s moved t o t he ci t i es i n the hope of a bet t er f ut ur e. The ci t i es onl y gr ew i n a quant i t ati ve way throughout the years, as the government did not invest in qualitative growth. The urban areas of Sy r i a became over cr ow ded and ther e w er e to l i t tl e f aci l i t i es. The situation was worsened by increasing bread pr i ces, as a r esul t of a gl obal w heat scar ci t y. Peopl e w er e deni ed t hei r r i ght t o the ci ty, t he r i ght t o use t he city as an instrument to li ve t heir life. The only way for the people of Syria to aquire this right was to alter social life, this could only be done by opposi ng t he gover nment . How ever , at this point the feelings of injustice had not yet grown large enough to make the people face t hei r r epr essi ve gover nment . That moment came when the people of other countries in the region opposed their r egi mes and cl ai med t hei r freedom. The situation of those people increased as dictators were expelled. The people of Syria now felt r el at i ve depr i vat i on, t hey w er e w or se of t han the peopl e i n nei ghbour i ng count r i es. At this point the causal st r uctur e that pr eceded the revolution came full circle. Demography influenced the economy and that combination led to urbanisation, which in the end caused the révol ut i on ur bai ne. However, if it was not for the
37 initial revolutionaries to organize protests and openly claim their rights, the revolution would not have set off at that point. In the end it were the young revolutionaries, originating from the large youth bulge, that di r ect l y st ar t ed t he r evol ut i onar y pr ocess. I n Syr i a t he r evol ut i on agai nst t he r egi me began as a r evolution of t he non-w or ki ng cl ass. The causal loop thus agai n t ouched demography af t er i t passed economy and the ur ban f act or . As a mat t er of f act mor e or l ess t he same pr ocess did al so t ake pl ace i n o t h er M EN A-countries that were affected by the Arab Spring. Practically the same could be said about the starting point of the Arab Spring, Tunisia, but also about Egypt, Libya and Yemen (Mirkin, 2013).
Not only the factors that caused the revolution have been to a l ar ge ext ent geogr aphi cal , al so the revolutionary process itself was characterized by geographical aspects. As the revolution in Syria could be char act er i zed as an ur ban r evol ut i on, t he ci t i es have pl ayed an i mpor t ant r ol e i n t he i ni t i al st ages of t he process. The city was used as a space of mobilization wherein Local Coordination Committees organized mass pr ot est s agai nst t he r egi me t hr ough an i nf r ast r uct ur e of peopl e. The ci t y as mobi l i zi ng space has pl ayed a l ar ge r ol e in the growth of the revolution. The ci t y al so pl ayed an i mpor t ant r ol e as t he space w her ei n bat t l es w er e f ought dur i ng l at er phases of the revolutionary process, when the vertical revolution from below had already turned into a civil war. The urban infrastructure provided the rebels with opportunities to succesfully oppose a numerically and technologically superior opponent. The tactics used by rebel forces was finally countered by the Syrian ar my w i th t he str at egy of ur bi ci de, t he del i ber at e destr uct i on of ent i r e urban areas. By doing so the “ playground of revolution” and the advantages it held for the rebels was deducted to ruins, which improved the chances of the Syrian army considerably
Geography has played an important role in the Syrian revolutionary process. As shown both the phases prior to the launch and the course of the actual revolution can be pr oper l y anal yzed f r om a geogr aphi cal point of view. Many of the factors that are part of the revolutionary process t o some ext ent have a geogr aphi cal char act er . Looki ng at the Syrian revolutionary process from a spatial point of view has proven to be both an interesting and useful way to explain it. The geogr aphi cal aspect s of r evol ut i on t hat came forward in this thesis ar e cer t ai nl y gener al i zabl e t o some ext ent f or other r evol ut i ons, especi al l y ot her revolutions that were part of the Arab Spring. As menti oned ear l i er ever y si t uat i on i s how ever di f f er ent and each individual case has to be placed in its own context. It woul d ther ef or e be unf ai r t o st at e that t he causes of the Syrian revolutionary process are point for point applicable to al l ot her cases in the Arab Spring. The f act r emai ns t hat mi ght be qui t e some over l ap i n the causal str uct ur es of t he var i ous r evol ut i ons that occur r ed r ecent l y i n t he MENA-r egi on.
This research has been based on reports about events in Syria that the w r i t er s w i t nessed f i r st hand, or got di r ect l y f r om peopl e w ho have w i t nessed i t and sources that analyzed those firsthand stories. To ensure a
38 proper objective r esear ch mul t i pl e new spaper s f r om var i ous count r i es have been used. How ever , t he biggest weakness of this research remains that it is completely based on what other people (journalists, r esear cher s, r evol ut i onar i es, r egi me l oyal i sts) w r ote. It would considerably strengthen the claims made in this thesis if future research is actually held in Syria with a focus on field research.
Al so for instance political factors, both national and international, have not been included in the analysis in this thesis, as one of the main goals was to look at the situation from a purely geographical point of view. It is absolutely recognized that other aspects outside the geographical sphere also played a role in the Syrian revolutionary process, but in order to hold a clear focus on the spatial side of the story some aspects have not been given as much regard as they might have deserved. This could also be taken into account for future research projects. It might be very interesting to find out exactly which influence different political, ethnical or religious factors had on the Syrian revolutionary process.
39
References
Abouzeid, R. (March 22, 2011). Syria's Revolt: How Graffiti Stirred an Uprising. Ret r i eved Apr i l 16, 2013 from http:/ / www.time.com/ time/ world/ article/ 0,8599,2060788,00.html
Agathangelou, A.M. & Soguk, N. (2011). Rocking the Kasbah: Insurrectional Politics, the “ Arab Streets”, and Global Revolution in the 21st Century. Gl obal i zat i ons. 8:5: pp. 551-558
Agnew , J. (2011). Handbook of Geographical Knowledge. London: Sage
Al Arabiya (November 12, 2012). Syria’s opposition chooses president, formally signs coalition deal. Ret r i eved June 7, 2013 from http:/ / english.alarabiya.net/ articles/ 2012/ 11/ 12/ 249032.html
Al Jazeer a ( Ju l y 2 2 , 2011) . Repor t s: Syr i an secur i t y f or ces shel l i ng Homs. Ret r i eved May 7, 2013 from http:/ / www.aljazeera.com/ news/ middleeast/ 2011/ 07/ 201172110946880289.html
Al Jazeer a ( Ju n e 8, 2012) . Gun bat t l es r age i n st r eet s of Damascus. Ret r i eved May 14, 2013 from http:/ / www.aljazeera.com/ news/ middleeast/ 2012/ 06/ 20126817510357285.html
Al Jazeer a (June 19, 2012) . Damascus bl ast ' ki l l s' t op Assad of f i ci al s Retrieved May 27, 2013 from http:/ / www.aljazeera.com/ news/ middleeast/ 2012/ 07/ 20127189355415804.html
Al-Tamimi, A.J. & Svadkovsky, O. (2012). Demography is destiny in Syria. The American Spectator [ Electronic version] . Retrieved June 15, 2013 from http:/ / spectator.org/ archives/ 2012/ 02/ 06/ demography-is-dest i ny-in-syr i a
Anderson, P. (2011). On the concatenation in the Arab world. N ew L ef t Revi ew. Vol. 68: pp. 5 – 15
BBC News (October 2, 2011). Syrian opposition launches joint National Council. Retrieved May 7, 2013 on http:/ / www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-middle-east -15143293
Boudreau, J.A. (2007). Urban revolution or urban involution? Reflections on fear and political action. Publ i c Space. http://www.publicspace.org/en/text-library/ eng/ b031-ur ban-revolution-or-u r ban -involution- r ef l ect i ons-on-f ear -and-pol i t i cal -act i on
Brown Moses (n.d.a). Interview With Colonel Aqidi Of The FSA On Qusayr, Jihadists, And The Supreme Military Council. Retrieved June 18, 2013 from http:/ / brown-moses.blogspot.nl/
Brown Moses (n.d.b). Syrian IED videos. Retrieved June 18, 2013 from http:/ / brown-moses.blogspot.nl/
40
Cambridge British English Dictionary Online. (n.d.) Definition of “ revolution” . http:/ / dictionary.cambridge.org/ dictionary/ british/ revolution_1?q=revolution, Ret r i eved Febr uar y 28, 2013
CIA World Fact Book (2013). Syria: government. https:/ / www.cia.gov/ library/ publications/ the-world- factbook/ geos/ sy.html. Retrieved April 15, 2013
Chi ver s, C.J. (August 2, 2012). "Syrian Leader ’ s W eapons Under Str ai n" . Ret r i eved May 27, 2013 from http:/ / www.nytimes.com/ 2012/ 08/ 03/ world/ middleeast/ as-confli ct-continues-in-syr i a-assads-ar ms- f ace-strain.html?_r=0
Damascus Decl ar at i on ( 2005) . The Damascus Decl ar at i on f or Democr at i c Nat i onal Change. Ret r i eved June 4, 2013 from http:/ / faculty-staff.ou.edu/ L/ Joshua.M.Landi s-1/ syriablog/ 2005/ 11/ damascus-decl ar at i on- in-english.htm
Dar agahi , B. ( May 13, 2011). Syr i an pr ot ests, expect ed to w ane, gr ow st r onger . Retrieved May 6, 2013 from http:/ / articles.latimes.com/ 2011/ may/ 13/ world/ la-fg-syr i a-protests-20110514
Davidson, A. (2012). The Syria Paradox. Retrieved June 16, 2013 from http:/ / www.nytimes.com/ 2012/ 05/ 27/ magazine/ the-syr i a-par adox.ht ml ?_r = 2&r ef = magazi ne&
Di tz, J. (2013). Syrian Rebel Infighting: Islamists Clash With Secularists. Retrieved on June 7, 2013 from http:/ / news.antiwar.com/ 2013/ 03/ 26/ syrian-r ebel -infighting-i sl ami st s-cl ash-with-secul ar i st s/
Enders, D. & Landay, J.S. (March 15, 2012). One year in, will Syria become a guerrilla war? Retrieved on June 18, 2013 from http:/ / www.mcclatchydc.com/ 2012/ 03/ 15/ 142123/ one-year -in-will-syr i a- become.html
En d er s, D. (March 26, 2013) . I sl ami st s, secul ar r ebel s bat t l e i n Syr i a over Nusr a Fr ont ’ s cal l f or I sl ami c state. Retrieved on June 7, 2013 from http:/ / www.mcclatchydc.com/ 2013/ 03/ 26/ 186970/ islamists- secul ar -r ebel s-battle.html# .UbHBBedgde8
Geddes, B. (1999). W hat do w e know about democr at i zat i on af t er t w ent y year s? Annual Revi ew of Pol i t i cal Sci ence, Vol . 2, pp. 115–144
Gelvin, J.L. (2012). The Arab Upr i si ngs, w hat ever yone needs t o know . New Yor k: Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess
Ghosh, P. (March 18, 2011). Anti-government protests slowly erupting in Syria. Retrieved May 6, 2013 from http:/ / www.ibtimes.com/ anti-government-protests-slowly-erupting-syr i a-276251
Global EDGE (2012). Syria: Economy. Michigan State University. http:/ / globaledge.msu.edu/ countries/ syria/ economy
41
Graham, S.D.N. (2002). Bulldozers and bombs: The latest Palestinian-Israeli conflict as assymetric urbicide. Antipode, Vol. 34, pp. 642–649.
Hassan, H. (May 29, 2013). Syrian stalemate fuelled by opposition's bitter infighting. Ret r i eved on June 7, 2013 from http:/ / www.thenational.ae/ thenationalconversation/ comment/ syrian-st al emat e-f uel l ed-by- oppositions-bitter-infighting#
Human Rights Watch (2011). “ We’ ve Never Seen Such Hor r or ” Cr i mes agai nst Humani t y by Syr i an Securi ty Forces. New York: Human Rights Watch.
Issacharoff, A. & Harel, A. (December 21, 2011). Assad losing control as 10,000 soldiers desert Syrian mi l i t ar y. Retr i eved on June 20, 2013 from http:/ / www.haaretz.com/ print-edi t i on/ new s/ assad-l osi ng- control-as-10-000-soldiers-deser t-syr i an-military-1.402625
Jones, P. (1981). The 1848 Revolutions. Harlow: Longman House
Kahn, G. (March 21, 2011). Syr i a: Seven Pol i ce Ki l l ed, Bui l di ngs Tor ched i n Pr ot ests. Ret r i eved May 30, 2013 from http:/ / www.israelnationalnews.com/ News/ News.aspx/ 143026# .UacfDdJgde_
Kouwenhoven, A. (May 26, 2013). Vrije Syrische Leger heeft Nederlandse jihadisten 'niet nodig'. Ret r i eved May 26, 2013 from http:/ / www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/ 2013/ 05/ 26/ vrije-syr i sche-l eger -nederlandse- moslimjongeren-we-hebben-jullie-ni et-nodig/
Krejci, J. (1983). Gr eat Revol utions Compared: The search for a theory. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books LTD.
Krejci, J. (1994). Great Revolutions Compared: The outline of a theory. Hertfordshire: Harvester W heat sheaf .
Lavender, L. (2012). The Syrian Opposition. Civil-Mi l i t ar y Fusi on Cent r e. www.cimicweb.org
Lefebvre, H. (1996). Writings on Cities (Kofman, E. & Lebas, E. trans. and eds.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell (Original work published between 1968 and 1985).
LCCSyria (n.d.). About the LCCS. Retrieved June 17, 2013 from http://www.lccsyria.org/about
Manfreda, P. (n.d.) Syrian Uprising: top ten reasons for the uprising in Syria. About.com: Middle East I ssues. http:/ / middleeast.about.com/ od/ syria/ tp/ Syr i an-Uprising.htm Retrieved April 16, 2013
Mer r i f i el d, A. (1993). Place and Space: A Lefebvrian Reconciliation. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 18, pp. 516-531
Mirkin, B. (2013). Arab Spring, Demographics in a region in transition. United Nations Development Pr ogr amme, Regi onal Bur eau f or Ar ab Stat es, Ar ab Human Devel opment Repor t Resear ch Paper Seri es
42
Moore, B. (1967). Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world. London: Penguin Books.
Muir, J. (June 7, 2011). Syria vows 'decisive' response in Jisr al-Shughour. Retrieved May 6, 2013 from http:/ / www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-middle-east -13677200
NDTV (February 18, 2013). Syria rebels seize key checkpoint near Aleppo airport: NGO Ret r i eved May 27, 2013 from http:/ / www.ndtv.com/ article/ world/ syr i a-r ebel s-sei ze-key-checkpoi nt-near -al eppo-airport- ngo-332405
Nebehay, S. (May 29, 2012). Most Houla victims killed in summary executions: U.N. Ret r i eved May 14, 2013 from http:/ / www.reuters.com/ article/ 2012/ 05/ 29/ us-syr i a-un-idUSBRE84S10020120529
Ow ei s, K.Y. & Karouny, M. (January 29, 2012). Syria troops battle to retake Damascus suburbs. Retrieved May 14, 2013 from http:/ / www.reuters.com/ article/ 2012/ 01/ 29/ us-syr i a-idUSTRE80S08620120129
Qaddaf i , M. al , ( 1975) . The Green Book: Part 1 – The instrument of government
Roy, A. (2009). The 21st -Century Metropolis: New Geographies of Theor y. Regi onal St udi es, Vol. 43.6, pp. 819–830
Rubin, B. (2006). The long war for freedom. The Ar ab st r uggl e f or democr acy i n the Mi ddl e East . New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Sh ad i d , A. (June 30, 2011). Coal i t i on of Fact i ons Fr om t he Str eet s Fuel s a New Opposi t i on i n Syr i a. Retrieved June 4, 2013 from http:/ / www.nytimes.com/ 2011/ 07/ 01/ world/ middleeast/ 01syria.ht ml ?_r = 2&pagew ant ed= al l
Sh ad i d , A. (Apri l 22, 2011). Security Forces Kill Dozens in Uprisings Around Syria Retrieved May 30, 2013 from http:/ / www.nytimes.com/ 2011/ 04/ 23/ world/ middleeast/ 23syria.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0
Si m o n e , A . M. (2004). People as infrastructure: intersecting fragments in Johannesburg, Public Culture Vol. 16, pp. 407–429.
Spyer , J. ( 2012) . Def yi ng a Di ct at or : Meet t he Fr ee Syr i an Ar my. Wor l d Af f ai r s [ El ect r oni c ver si on] . Retrieved June 18, 2013 from http:/ / www.worldaffairsjournal.org/ article/ defying-dictator-meet -f r ee- syr i an-ar my
Sternberg, T. (2012). Chinese drought, bread and the Arab Spring. Appl i ed Geogr aphy. Vol 34: pp. 519 - 524
Sy r i an National Council (2011). About SNC. Retrieved May 7, 2013 from http:/ / www.syriancouncil.org/ en/ about.html
Syrian Observer, The (February 11, 2012). Who's who: Damascus Declaration (DD). Retrieved June 4, 2013 from http:/ / syrianobserver.com/ Who/ Opp_Who/ Damascus+Declaration+DD
43
Tomas, S.J. (August 16, 2012). Marinko Krešić, predsjednik udruge ‘Hrvatski generalski zbor’: Assada ruši i stotinu hrvatskih bojovnika. Retrieved May 7, 2013 from http:/ / www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/ Novosti/ Hrvatska/ tabid/ 66/ articleType/ ArticleView/ articleId/ 184341 / Def aul t .aspx
Uni t ed Nat i ons New s Cent er (May 15, 2013). ‘Outraged’ by rising death toll in Syria, General Assembly demands halt to all violence. Retrieved May 28, 2013 from http:/ / www.un.org/ apps/ news/ story.asp?NewsID=44916# .UaSpWkBSiAg
USA Today (August 5, 2012). Syrian forces vow 'decisive' showdown for Aleppo. Retrieved May 27, 2013 from http:/ / usatoday30.usatoday.com/ news/ world/ story/ 2012-08-05/ syria-f or ces-vow-decisive- battle/ 56809400/ 1
Vennix, J.A.M. (2010). Theorie en praktijk van empirisch onderzoek (vierde editie). Pear son: Essex
Walzer, M. (1998). Intellectuals, Social Classes, and Revolutions. In Skocpol, T. (red.) Democr acy, Revol ut i on, and Hi st or y. London: Cornell University Press Wilkinson, P. &
Williams, L. (February 24, 2011). Syria clamps down on dissent with beatings and arrests. Ret r i eved Apr i l 25, 2013 from http:/ / www.guardian.co.uk/ world/ 2011/ feb/ 24/ syria-crackdown-pr ot est -arrests- beat i ngs
Wilkinson, P. & Thompson, N. (2012). Syria: from uprising to civil war. Retrieved April 16, 2013 from http:/ / edition.cnn.com/ 2012/ 03/ 14/ world/ meast/ syria-t i mel i ne
44