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Explaining Military Responses During the Arab Uprisings Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 2016 Defect Or Defend? Explaining Military Responses During the Arab Uprisings Timothy Hazen Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Hazen, Timothy, "Defect Or Defend? Explaining Military Responses During the Arab Uprisings" (2016). Dissertations. 2284. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2284 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 2016 Timothy Hazen LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO DEFECT OR DEFEND? EXPLAINING MILITARY RESPONSES DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE BY TIMOTHY A. HAZEN CHICAGO, IL DECEMBER, 2016 Copyright by Timothy A. Hazen, 2016 All rights reserved. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Even though writing this dissertation was a solitary adventure it would not have been possible without the assistance and encouragement of numerous individuals. First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge my parents, Alan and Darlene, for their limitless support during my graduate studies. They have always encouraged me during this process and they have consistently been my strongest cheerleaders and advocates in all of my endeavors. Second, I would like to thank my dissertation director, Dr. Peter J. Schraeder, as it was his study abroad trip to Tunisia that introduced me to the country, reacquainted me to the region, and provided me with the curiosity to explore the puzzling role of Middle East and North African militaries during the Arab uprisings. Third, I would like to acknowledge my other dissertation committee members, Dr. John Allen Williams and Dr. Peter M. Sanchez. Dr. Williams introduced me to the subfield of civil-military relations and it was a pleasure working with him and serving as his teaching mentee and research assistant for several semesters. Dr. Sanchez’s expertise on military transitions in Latin America and familiarity with qualitative case-study analyses has been tremendously influential for this project and if it weren’t for a brief meeting I had with Dr. Sanchez in January 2008 while I was applying to master’s programs, I might have never applied to Loyola University Chicago. Fourth, I would like to thank the numerous institutions that provided me with financial assistance during the writing of my dissertation including: Loyola University Chicago Department of Political Science, Loyola University Chicago Graduate School, U.S. State iii Department, and the Centre d'études maghrébines à Tunis (CEMAT). Fifth, I would like to thank the numerous individuals and institutions for assisting me with my research and making my life a little easier while living in Tunisia: Dr. Mounir Khelifa, Ikram Dridi, AMIDEAST, the Faculté des Sciences Juridiques, Politiques et Sociales de Tunis, and the Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Politiques de Sousse. Sixth, I would like to thank all my friends and graduate student colleagues for sharing this experience with me: Jessica Mecellem, Christopher Nourdin Martinez, the other graduate students in the Political Science Department, the larger Loyola graduate students in GSAC, and the numerous graduate colleagues I met at conferences over the years. Seventh, I would like to thank all the readers, discussants, fellow panelists, and audience members at the 2012 Midwest Political Science Association Conference, the 2014 Southern Political Science Association Conference, the 2015 Midwest Political Science Association Conference, and the 2015 Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Conference for their insight, comments, and suggestions as this project has transformed over the last few years. Eighth, I would like to thank all my family and friends for their support, friendship, love, and patience during this process, and last, but certainly not least, I want to thank my wife, Megan, for always believing in me, for constantly encouraging me, for striving me to achieve greatness, and for providing me with a lifetime’s worth of inspiration. iv To my parents, Alan and Darlene Hazen, for their endless and constant support TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii LIST OF FIGURES viii LIST OF TABLES ix LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS x CHAPTER 1: UNDERSTANDING MILITARY RESPONSES DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS 1 Theoretical Questions, Empirical Puzzles, and Normative Issues 6 Classifications and Definitions 10 Exploring the Comparative Case Studies 17 Overview of the Project 19 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 22 Literature that Examines Single Variables 25 Levels of Military Professionalization and Military Autonomy 25 Factional Divisions within the Military and Society 29 Divisions within the State Security Apparatus 32 Regime-Military Relations 35 Societal Variables 38 International Variables 41 Literature Examining Multi-Causal Explanations 46 Conclusion 50 CHAPTER 3: THE MENA MILITARY INDEX 51 Varying Military Responses During the Arab Uprisings 52 Operationalizing the Variables 55 MENA Military Index Questionnaire 60 Findings of the MENA Military Index 61 Conclusion 73 CHAPTER 4: THE TUNISIAN MILITARY DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS 76 Background of the Tunisian Military 77 The Uprising in Tunisia and the Role of the Military 85 The MENA Military Index & Tunisia 95 Institutional Variables 99 Regime Variables 105 Societal Variables 110 International Variables 116 vi Conclusion 120 CHAPTER 5: THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS 121 Background of the Egyptian Military 123 The Uprising in Egypt and the Role of the Military 131 The MENA Military Index & Egypt 140 Institutional Variables 144 Regime Variables 152 Societal Variables 156 International Variables 163 Conclusion 167 CHAPTER 6: THE BAHRAINI MILITARY DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS 169 Background of the Bahraini Military & Bahraini Politics 170 The Uprising in Bahrain and the Role of the Military 179 The MENA Military Index & Bahrain 185 Institutional Variables 190 Regime Variables 197 Societal Variables 200 International Variables 210 Conclusion 214 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 216 Central Findings 216 Addressing the Theoretical Questions, Empirical Puzzles, and Normative Issues 219 Re-examining the MENA Military Index 225 The MENA Military Index Moving Forward 232 APPENDIX A: THE MENA MILITARY INDEX QUESTIONNAIRE 236 APPENDIX B: NON-MAJORITY RESPONSES FROM THE MENA MILITARY INDEX 239 APPENDIX C: MENA MILITARY INDEX & UPDATED RESPONSES 249 REFERENCE LIST 254 vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Percentage of the Tunisian National Budget (1981 – 2011) 106 Figure 2. Tunisia & CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index (1981 – 2011) 114 Figure 3. Egypt & CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index (1981 – 2011) 162 Figure 4. Bahrain & CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index (1981 – 2011) 209 viii LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Countries/Territories of the MENA Military Index 12 Table 2. Barany's Variables for Measuring Army Responses to Revolution 48 Table 3. Five Types of Military Responses during the Arab Uprisings 53 Table 4. Converting the Variables to the MENA Military Index 58 Table 5. MENA Military Index: Number of Respondents for each Country 61 Table 6. MENA Military Index Scores 62 Table 7. Index Scores by Military Response Types 63 Table 8. MENA Military Index Variables Results (Numerical Order) 67 Table 9. MENA Military Index Variables Results (Most Frequent to Less Frequent) 68 Table 10. Percentage of Present Variable Conditions by Military Response Type 71 Table 11. Tunisia and the MENA Military Index Variables 98 Table 12. Egypt and the MENA Military Index Variables 142 Table 13. Bahrain and the MENA Military Index Variables 188 Table 14. MENA Polity IV Scores 221 Table 15. MENA Military Index Variables Results (Numerical Order) 224 Table 16. Number of Institutional Variables per MENA Country 227 Table 17. Number of Societal Variables per MENA Country 232 ix LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS BAT Brigade Anti-Terrorisme BDF Bahrain Defence Front BICI Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry BNIR Brigade nationale d'intervention rapide BOP Brigades de l'Ordre Publique CSF Central Security Forces EU European Union GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GID General Intelligence Directorate GIS General Intelligence Services IMET International Military Education and Training IMF International Monetary Fund MENA Middle East and North Africa NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NSA National Security Agency NSC National Security Council PSF Public Security Forces x RCC Revolutionary Command Council RCD Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique SCAF Supreme Council of Armed Forces SDC Supreme Defence Council SSI State Security Investigation TNFCC Tunisian National Fact Finding Commission TSCTP Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership UGGT Union générale tunisienne du travail UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNOC United Nations Operation in the Congo US United States USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics xi CHAPTER 1: UNDERSTANDING MILITARY RESPONSES DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS How should militaries respond to mass political protests that threaten the stability of the ruling regime? This was a central question several militaries across
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