Survival of the Ministers on Ministerial Durability in Post-War Norway
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Survival of the ministers On ministerial durability in post-war Norway Martin G. Søyland Department of Political Science Faculty of Social Sciences University of Oslo May, 2015 Survival of the ministers: On ministerial durability in post-war Norway c Martin G. Søyland 2015 Survival of the ministers: On ministerial durability in post-war Norway Martin G. Søyland http://www.duo.uio.no/ Print: Reprosentralen, University of Oslo Word count: 24 647 Abstract Over the last decade, the field of ministerial durability – exploring why some cabinet ministers are replaced and others not – has taken an empirical turn. Among others, Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding(2012) scrutinize the relationship between cabinet ministers and Prime Ministers in Britain, while Bucur(2013) analyze how ministers in semi-presidential systems are held accountable by presidents, parties, and prime ministers. However, ministers in multi-party parliamentary democracies have received little attention. In this thesis, I explore what determines ministerial durability in post-war Norway. By using an unmatched data set combination of Norwegian ministers and the resignation calls they received during their tenure, this thesis provides three main contributions. Firstly, I find that Norwegian ministers are held accountable by party leaders based on their performance, merits, and ambitions – not personal characteristics. Secondly, I uncover that newspapers have an alarming influence on the ministerial deselection process. Finally, I find that resignation calls – a measure for ministerial performance – bares with it both endogeneity and validity problems that should be taken into consideration by further studies on ministerial durability. v Acknowledgments There are so many people to whom I am grateful for contributing to my academic and personal development throughout my five years of studying political science. Your support is greatly appreciated, but I can only name some. I give biggest of thanks my supervisors, Bjørn Høyland and Cristina Bucur. Bjørn will always be a great inspiration for me with his hard work ethic and knowledge, but also for listening and taking my opinions seriously. Cristina, one of the academic stars within the field of ministerial durability, has given me invaluable supervision and been encouragement from day one. So many fellow students have given me the honor of sharing their company and infinite pool of humor. Ole Røgeberg, Malin Østevik, Anne Høyer, Maren Henriksen, and Marie Harbo Dahle have all contributed greatly to getting me where I am. The "matprat.no" gang – Einar Tornes, Magnus Jacobsen, and Magnus Gabrielsen Aase – have provided me with a cascade of happy memories. A huge thanks to Lars Sutterud and Ingebjørg Finnbakk for standing by me in my annoying moods, keeping me down to earth, and correcting me when I am wrong. Haakon Gjerløw and Peter Egge Langsæther: words can not describe the impact the two of you have had on my academic development. I thank you for reading and commenting on all my papers, always answering my questions, and for being the invaluable friends you are. Finally, I would never have gotten this far without the support of my wonderful wife. You are my biggest idol for having unlimited compassion towards everyone you know, ability to always see the best in people you meet, and for believing in me. Thank you. Any remaining mistakes within this text are fully my own. vii Contents Abstract iv Acknowledgments vi 1 Introduction1 1.1 The case of Norway...............................4 1.2 The road ahead.................................5 2 Building blocks9 2.1 Principal-agent theory.............................9 2.1.1 A single chain of command....................... 11 2.1.2 Who fires ministers in Norway?.................... 14 2.1.3 Agency loss between ministers and party leaders........... 15 2.2 Ministerial durability.............................. 16 2.2.1 Performance............................... 16 2.2.2 Experience................................ 20 2.2.3 Cabinet................................. 22 2.2.4 Personal characteristics......................... 23 2.2.5 Reshuffles................................ 24 3 Norwegian cabinet anatomy 25 3.1 Norwegian cabinet history........................... 25 3.2 Cabinet as a collective............................. 27 3.3 Cabinet leaders................................. 28 3.4 Cabinet members................................ 30 ix 3.5 Political parties................................. 30 4 Methods and data 33 4.1 Event history analysis............................. 33 4.2 Data collection................................. 35 4.2.1 Ministers................................ 35 4.2.2 Resignation calls............................ 36 4.3 Variable operationalization........................... 37 4.3.1 Duration and event........................... 37 4.3.2 Performance............................... 39 4.3.3 Experience................................ 43 4.3.4 Cabinet characteristics......................... 47 4.3.5 Personal characteristics......................... 48 4.3.6 Reshuffles................................ 52 4.3.7 Jurisdiction............................... 53 5 Ministerial durability analysis 55 5.1 Pooled performance............................... 55 5.1.1 Resignation calls............................ 59 5.1.2 Experience................................ 60 5.2 Actor influence................................. 62 5.2.1 Opposition and own party....................... 63 5.2.2 Newspapers............................... 64 5.3 Summary.................................... 65 6 Model fit and robustness 67 6.1 Predictive fit and outliers........................... 67 6.2 Resignation calls................................ 71 6.2.1 Which ministers are asked to resign?................. 72 6.3 Alternative durability models......................... 75 6.3.1 Resignation calls per year....................... 75 6.3.2 Age as ambition measure?....................... 77 7 Implications and limitations 79 7.1 Performance................................... 79 7.2 Experience.................................... 81 7.3 Cabinet characteristics............................. 83 7.4 Personal characteristics............................. 84 7.5 Generalization.................................. 84 7.6 Further studies................................. 85 8 Conclusion 87 Bibliography 90 Appendices 99 A Key words for resignation call collection................... 99 B Jurisdiction categorization........................... 100 C Regression tables................................ 101 D Proportional hazards tests........................... 103 E Frailty terms.................................. 104 Acronyms Centre Party Senterpartiet. 26, 27, 30, 47 Christian People’s Party Kristelig folkeparti. 26, 27, 30, 46 Conservatives Høyre. 26, 27, 30, 84 Cox PH Cox Proportional Hazards. 6, 33–35, 42, 45, 55, 58, 67, 74, 76 Labor Party Arbeiderpartiet. 1, 14, 16, 18, 19, 25–27, 30, 45, 47, 80 Liberal Party Venstre. 26, 27, 30 MP member of parliament. 11, 14, 31, 46, 57 NRK Norwegian Brodcasting Corporation. 23, 28 PM prime minister. 11–15, 18, 24, 25, 28, 29, 34, 36, 52 Progress Party Fremskrittspartiet. 27, 30, 84 Socialist Left Party Sosialistisk Venstreparti. 1, 14, 26, 27, 29, 30, 46, 75 VG Verdens Gang. 19 xiii List of Figures 2.1.1 Chain of delegation and accountability.................... 11 2.1.2 Types of agency loss.............................. 13 3.1.1 Cabinet composition and parliamentary basis................. 26 4.3.1 Number of forced exits and censored ministers across cabinets....... 39 4.3.2 Mean number of resignation calls across cabinets and forced exits..... 41 4.3.3 Resignation calls from different actors..................... 43 4.3.4 Cabinet experience across cabinets and forced exits............. 44 4.3.5 Parliamentary experience for censored ministers and forced exits...... 45 4.3.6 Mean youth party experience across parties.................. 46 4.3.7 Cabinet type over number of forced exits and total ministers........ 48 4.3.8 Mean and loess smoothed age over cabinets.................. 49 4.3.9 Percentage of female cabinet ministers in each cabinet............ 50 4.3.10 Number of ministers with higher and lower education............ 51 4.3.11 Number of reshuffles across PMs and mean minister duration........ 52 5.1.1 Pooled resignation call model......................... 56 5.1.2 Effect of resignation calls............................ 59 5.1.3 Effect of previous cabinet experience..................... 60 5.1.4 Effect of parliamentary experience....................... 61 5.2.1 Actor-based and pooled resignation call models................ 62 5.2.2 Hazard ratio plots of opposition and own party influence.......... 64 5.2.3 Effect of resignation calls from paper over time................ 65 6.1.1 Predicted risk from actor-based and pooled resignation call models..... 68 xv 6.1.2 Influential case analysis – Pooled resignation call model........... 69 6.1.3 Influential case analysis – Actor-based resignation call model........ 70 6.1.4 Effect of resignation calls from paper after excluding influential cases... 71 6.2.1 Negative binomial regression of resignation calls............... 73 6.3.1 Effect of resignation calls per year....................... 76 6.3.2 Alternative age measures............................ 77 List of Tables 4.2.1 Descriptive statistics.............................. 36 4.3.1 Extract of the data............................... 38 A.1 Key words for resignation call collection.................... 99 B.1 Coding scheme for