A Perspective from the Region Ashraf Mohammed Kishk 4

Volume XVIII Highlights

Our Publications

NDC Policy Brief Series NDC Research Paper Series

December 2018 NDC Policy Brief 6-18 – Will Artificial Intelligence December 2018 challenge NATO interoperability? NDC Research Paper 1 – Projecting Stability: Elixir Martin DUFOUR or Snake Oil? Ian HOPE

NDC Policy Brief 5-18 – European defence: what impact for NATO? Russian Studies Series Thierry TARDY

November 2018 November 2018 Russian Studies 04/18 – Russia’s Arctic Papers: The RP 146 - Modernized Deterrence and Revitalized evolution of Strategic Thinking on the High North Dialogue - Adapting the Harmel Report to post-2014 Nazrin MEHDIYEVA Europe Ian HOPE Russian Studies 03/18 – Preparation and Conduct of Military Actions in Local Wars and Armed Conflicts NDC Policy Brief 3-18 – Challenges and potential Charles K. BARTLES for NATO-Egypt partnership Adel EL-ADAWY

October 2018 NDC Policy Brief 2-18 – Projecting stability in practice? NATO’s new training mission in Iraq Kevin KOEHLER

NDC Policy Brief 1-18 – The internal nature of the Alliance’s cohesion Thierry TARDY CONTENTS

Editorial 2

Commandant’s Corner 3

A Deep Insight:

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and Gulf Security: A perspective from the region Ashraf Mohammed Kishk 4

The Ukrainian Question: Genesis, Structural Problems and Possible Solutions Gregorio Baggiani 8

The July NATO Summit in Brussels Giovanni Parigi 12

Russia’s Su-57 compared to US/EU Military Aircraft: A threat to Europe and NATO? Michael Eric Lambert 17

Highlights:

Our Courses 22

World News 27

Our Publications 29

Editor: Photography: Ilaria Latorre (ITA C) NATO and Allied Forces website Wikipedia (with attribution) Assistant Editors: NDC Reproduction and Graphic Section Serena Fattacciu (ITA C) Francisco J. Marin-Barrena (ESP C) Graphic Design & Printing: Grafich Communication S.r.l. (Fondi -LT-) Proof-reading: Caroline Curta (FRA C) Peter G. Mead (GBR C) Editorial Vox Collegii

region. This year will mark the fifteenth a chaotic international system. anniversary of the launch of this important partnership for cooperation in numerous The Public Affairs team hopes you will areas with the Gulf States and other enjoy the reading and find, once more, partners from the Middle East and North some good food for thought. Africa. In this in-depth analysis, the author describes its benefits and how it could improve further.

The second article, by Dr Gregorio Baggiani, addresses another area of crucial Ilaria Latorre relevance for NATO, giving some valuable Public Affairs Office insights into the structural problems and possible solutions to the Ukrainian crisis.

Relations between NATO and Ukraine date back to the early 1990s and have since developed into one of NATO’s important partnerships. In the wake of the Russia- Dear Reader, Ukraine conflict in 2014, cooperation has intensified and NATO has adopted a firm position in full support of Ukraine’s It is with great pleasure that I present you sovereignty and territorial integrity, within with the latest edition of Vox Collegii, the its internationally recognized borders. half-yearly publishing fixture from the NATO Defense College. Moving on, Dr Giovanni Parigi offers us an assessment of the real outcomes of the During the past six months, we have been NATO Summit held in Brussels last July. running our flagship Senior Course 133, Many initiatives were discussed: from the comprising 66 high-level officials from 32 improvement in the Alliance’s deterrence NATO and partner countries from all over and the enhanced mobility of NATO the world. forces, to the setting up of a Cyberspace Operations Centre and Counter Hybrid Together with all our other courses and Support teams, and the establishment of the numerous outreach activities of two new Headquarters. the College, we have spent yet another intensive academic year, in striving always Last but not least, Dr Eric Lambert shares to fulfill our mission of Education, Research specific information on Russia’s military air and Outreach. capabilities and how these could threaten NATO and Europe. His policy paper pools After nine years of activity, Vox Collegii together Chinese, US and Russian data has reached its eighteenth edition. Year to explain the limits of the Russian fifth- after year, it continues to be a valuable generation aircraft - the Su-57- when it “showcase” for the NDC’s activities, comes to “ground” applications in three offering significant perspectives ondifferent regions: the post-Soviet space, different NATO-related topics, for both the Middle-East, and North Korea. internal and external audiences. A new year has just begun, and 2019 will In the next few pages, you will find four mark a significant moment for NATO, as it thought-provoking articles. enters the 7th decade since its creation. We all look forward to the celebrations Dr Ashraf Kishk provides the first of the Alliance’s 70th Anniversary, as it contribution on the Istanbul Cooperation remains an essential provider of security Initiative (ICI) and security in the Gulf for all its citizens and a pillar of stability in

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from 12-21 November and was again a MC 123 review and the future of the resounding success: 47 Course Members NDC. Our most sincere thanks to all those representing 31 countries participated, involved. and further benefitted from a 4-day Field Study in Brussels. Integrated Partner Finally, I take this opportunity to thank Orientation Course (IPOC) 2018-2 was also some of our key departing members and a resounding success, as were the Modular wish them all the best in their future en- Short Courses (MSC) held during the last deavours, may that be further employ- Senior Course. ment or a well-deserved retirement.

Our Research Division, re-energized by Their contribution to the NDC has not many new arrivals since the last edition, gone unnoticed, and was instrumental has continued to organize and sponsor in making the College a better place. multiple conferences and events. The RD Most notably, I want to acknowledge the also furthered their publication catalogue, recent departure of our Dean, BGEN (ret) publishing seven NDC Policy Briefs, one František Mičánek, our DoM, BGEN Mario NDC Research Paper, and three Russian Ramponi, and our DAPP, BGEN Heinz Josef Studies since May 2018, while hosting Feldmann. multiple Visiting Scholars and Research Dear Reader, Fellows. In spring 2019, under the auspices I would also like to formally welcome the of NATO’s 70th Anniversary, the Research new additions to the NDC family, with a Division will coordinate a major event, particularly warm welcome to Dr Stephen Mariano, our new Dean, and to the new The NDC’s accomplishments since our with the theme “NATO at 70: No Time to DAPP, BGEN Rolf Wagner. previous issue of Vox Collegii cannot Retire”, which will be part of a series of be overstated. The College was again events celebrating the 70th anniversary of fully successful in delivering top quality the Alliance. education, research and outreach, while also making important strides providing The NDC also pursued its outreach clear direction to better prepare for future activities, including making significant Lieutenant-General Chris Whitecross challenges. progress in interactions with other defence Royal Canadian Air Force education institutions from around NDC Commandant Senior Course 133 has brought together the world, in such locations as Kuwait, more than 60 Course Members Colombia, Taiwan and the Baltics, to name representing 32 NATO and partner just a few. nations, while 36 Course Members from 15 countries graduated from NRCC-20 On 19 October 2018, the NDC held the last November. Their concluding journey 65th edition of the Anciens’ Seminar, with should provide members of both these Anciens from all over the world. This event Courses with enhanced tools, insight, was considered a major success, and the critical thinking and perspective, not only Keynote Address by His Royal Highness on NATO, but on the world as a whole. Rashid bin El Hassan was most appreciated. Furthermore, experience and networks Dr Tardy (DRD) also moderated an excellent acquired while at the College should also panel discussion, which was supported benefit them in their future endeavours, by our newest Honorary Ancien, Gen Petr whether within NATO or in other Pavel. international settings. Of note, NRCC-20 was the first iteration of this Course under Another major endeavour of the College the approved 365 days’ Trial Structure and, that has progressed since the last edition with the same starting date as the Senior is the first ever NDC Strategic Plan. This Course, the synergy between our two draft was completed and shared, and major courses again proved very valuable. formal contacts have since then also been established with NATO HQ to help us Generals, Flag Officers and Ambassadors’ toward the completion of that cornerstone Course (GFOAC) 2018-2, entitled ‘NATO: document, which will in turn shape the Beyond the Brussels Summit’, was held Strategic Communication Plan, the next

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The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and Gulf Security: A perspective from the region

Ashraf Mohammed Kishk

The fifteenth anniversary of the launch of NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), for cooperation with the Gulf states and other partners in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), falls in June 2019. Four of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Qatar – have joined the ICI, while Saudi Arabia and Oman have not. The ICI involves cooperation in six areas: defence advice, military cooperation, fighting terrorism by means of intelligence sharing, maritime cooperation, contributing to NATO’s efforts to counter threats of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and cooperation in civil emergency planning.1 The ICI has raised a great deal of controversy at the level of public opinion in the Gulf countries. This controversy has nothing to do with ICI content, as it includes important areas for security and defence cooperation between NATO and the Gulf countries. Instead, the controversy raises the question of what added value the ICI can bring to the Gulf countries in the areas of security and defence, as they already have defence partnerships with the major NATO member states. Addressing this question requires analysing three points. The first is the extent to which the ICI meets the security needs of the Gulf countries. The second is the extent to which NATO is responsive to addressing regional security threats in the Ashraf Kishk is Director of the Program Gulf countries to enhance their security. The third point raises developments in for Strategic International Studies at the security environment in the Gulf, and requirements for upgrading of the ICI. Bahrain Center for Strategic, International, and Energy Studies (DERASAT), since April 2012. He has published widely on issues such as strategic requirements for Gulf Union 1. Meeting the security needs of the Gulf countries status, Gulf-Iranian relations, Gulf regional security, and the implications of the Iranian NATO has been keen to establish several partnerships in various regions of the nuclear deal on regional security and the world, especially after the end of the Cold War era. The Gulf region has received a strategic choices of the GCC. He received a great deal of the Alliance’s interest in this respect. During a visit to the United Arab four month scholarship to the NATO Defense Emirates in March 2016, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said, “The UAE College in Rome and wrote a paper entitled: and the other GCC countries are highly valued NATO partners.”2 This NATO interest “Istanbul Initiative for cooperation between is met with a similar interest from the Gulf countries that have joined the ICI. This Gulf Cooperation Council and NATO: Challenges and Solutions”. He also lectured has been clear in the conferences held by NATO and these countries between at the NDC from 2009 to 2011 on gulf 2004 and 2018, to discuss ways to strengthen the initiative. Such interest has been security, relations in the Middle East and obvious also in official statements by officials of these countries. For example, NATO policy towards the Middle East region. participating in the meeting of the NATO Council and the ICI member states, held The opinions expressed in this article are his in Kuwait on 24 January 2017, the Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin own and must not be attributed to the NATO Ahmed Al Khalifa said, “The meeting is evidence of the continued achievements Defense College or to the North Atlantic by the ICI since its launch in 2004.”3 Treaty Organization. Apart from these statements, there are developments that show that the Gulf countries have benefited from the ICI. For example, the average number of activities and events hosted by Kuwait on enhancing cooperation with NATO has been three events a year. These have included conferences, courses and meetings. Meanwhile, the concerned Kuwait bodies have participated in 60 activities and events held by NATO, including field courses and training workshops.

In addition, NATO’s inauguration of the regional centre of the Alliance and the ICI

1 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). November 18, 2011. https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_58787.htm? (accessed on November 6, 2018). 2 NATO: Cooperation with the UAE and the region enhances stability, https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2016-03-04-, March 4, 2016 (accessed on November 6, 2018). 3 The Foreign Minister participates in the meeting of the NATO Council and the ICI member states in Kuwait. January 24, 2017. http://www.alayam.com/online/local/627887/News.html (accessed on November 6, 2018).

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Foreign Ministers from ICI member states attending the NATO Wales Summit. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_108674.htm in Kuwait in January 2017 reflected the development in NATO’s 2. NATO’s responsiveness in addressing Gulf regional work.4 security threats

The Alliance has become an organization concerned not only The security of the Gulf is an integral part of regional security, with hard security, but also with soft security, given the centre's and both influence each other. The Gulf countries are located training courses in electronic security, crisis management, within a turbulent region that includes direct threats to their energy security and civil emergency planning. Meanwhile, national security. Such threats include the emergence of failing setting up a regional centre for the NATO partnerships means states sharing borders with the Gulf countries and the challenge continuous discussion for the joint security challenges on the of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which sought to ground, in terms of the role of the Alliance regarding security destroy the unified national states. Other threats include Iran’s support to partners, and their perspectives on this support. attempts to develop advanced generations of missiles, and Setting up this centre also addresses questions raised in relation the Iran nuclear programme crisis, following the decision of to NATO’s role regarding the security of the Gulf ICI member US President Donald Trump to withdraw from the deal. The states.5 Gulf states have had to deal with these threats simultaneously. This has required strengthening international partnerships, Some ICI member states have also set up permanent diplomatic including that with NATO. missions at NATO headquarters. This has shown the desire of these countries to have a more detailed understanding of how Meanwhile, questions have been raised by large sectors of NATO works. Another goal of this move is to strengthen the public opinion in the Gulf region and the Arab world in general state-to-state partnerships and programmes approved by these on why NATO intervened in the Libyan crisis in 2011 and not countries. Undoubtedly, the mechanisms of the ICI have had an in the Syrian crisis. In response to this question, then NATO important impact on the benefits gained by the Gulf countries Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen pointed out: “The as partners of NATO. ICI partnerships and shared activities take intervention of NATO in Libya was with a clear mandate from into account the specificities of each country, including Saudi the UN Security Council and obvious support from countries of Arabia and Oman, which have not joined the ICI. Both these the region, a rare combination that we have not seen in other countries have been seeking to know more about the changes situations.” This means that the issue of NATO intervention in in the work of the Alliance since the Cold War era. Therefore, crises is not easy. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, and the personnel from the armed forces and ministry of foreign affairs extent of the threat posed by crises to the fundamental interests of the two countries have participated in courses at the NATO of the Alliance’s member states, regulate the intervention. Other Defense College in Rome on an annual basis. requirements for a NATO intervention include UN resolutions, in addition to regional support by partners.6 Non-intervention by the NATO military in regional security crises does not mean that the Alliance was completely detached from them. The Alliance 4 Al-Mubarak inaugurates the NATO-ICI Regional Centre, January 25, 2017. http://www. alraimedia.com/Home/Details?Id=48235d6c-4713-40cc-9354-d24d3d5deb6c has conducted military exercises in the Mediterranean Sea, 5 Ashraf Mohammed Kishk. Institutionalizing regional partnerships, January 28, 2017. http:// www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/576291.aspx 6 RASMUSSEN, ANDERS FOGH. NATO and the Arab Spring. May 31, 2011. ttps://www.nytimes. com/2011/06/01/opinion/01iht-edrasmussen01.html

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Bilateral meeting between NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Prime Minister of the State of Qatar, Sheikh Abdullah Bin Naser Bin Khalifa Al-Thani https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_58787.htm including Trident Juncture 2015, Operation Sea Guardian in With the increasing threats to maritime security, especially in 2017 and Blue Whale in 2018. Although these drills were not the Bab al-Mandab Strait, NATO launched Operation Ocean directed at specific parties, they were a message to partners in Shield against piracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa in 2009. the ICI and the Mediterranean Dialogue on NATO’s ability and This reflects the Alliance’s desire and ability to ensure maritime readiness to address risks caused by regional crises. navigation, which is a challenge facing the Gulf countries. NATO has the assets to do this, given its maritime capabilities and In addition, NATO formally announced its participation in the its new facilities, including the Strategic Command Centre in International Coalition against ISIS by deploying AWACS early Naples. This centre is concerned with NATO operations in the warning aircraft, as well as providing assistance in ensuring Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. air, sea and ground radio communications.7 NATO has also NATO has also decided to set up a new command concerned provided Gulf regional security actors with support. This is an with safeguarding sea routes across the Atlantic Ocean.9 important indicator of the Alliance’s commitment to regional security. In this respect, the July 2018 NATO Summit Declaration 3. Developments in the Gulf security environment and referred to the launch of a training programme for Iraqi security requirements for an upgrade of the ICI forces. Such programmes support the Iraqi security forces in combating terrorism in the short term, and support the security All the issues reviewed above confirm that the NATO-Gulf of Iraq and the region in the long term.8 partnership is still important for both sides. However, the security developments facing the Gulf countries at present 7 NATO: We agreed to deploy AWACS early warning aircraft to Syria. February 11, 2016. https:// arabic.rt.com/news/810771/ (accessed November 6, 2018). 9 Ashraf Mohammed Kishk. Three determinants for NATO’s interference in conflicts, and security 8 Koehler, Kevin. Projecting stability in practice? NATO’s new training mission in Iraq. October 24, of waterways is a priority. February 15, 2018. http://araa.sa/index.php?option=com_content&view 2018. http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1216 (accessed November 6, 2018). =article&id=4380:2018-02-15-12-25-18&catid=3679&Itemid=172 (accessed November 6, 2018).

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Family photo of North Atlantic Council with ICI countries https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_140257.htm are different from the environment in which the Istanbul The second course of action is related to the role of NATO in Cooperation Initiative was launched in 2004. The Gulf countries, addressing one of the dilemmas faced by the Gulf countries, which are small countries, must deal with all regional fronts namely the imbalance in regional power. NATO can support the simultaneously. This puts pressure on the security and defence defence capabilities of the Gulf countries and conduct military capabilities of these countries. Iran also remains a threat to the drills from time to time with the countries of the region, as a Gulf countries, given its support to non-state armed groups message to parties seeking to change the regional balance of in neighbouring countries. In addition, Iran is upgrading its power. In addition, supporting efforts of the Gulf countries to conventional military capabilities and there is continuous modernize the “81” naval force is a key need for the Gulf states, ambiguity regarding its nuclear programmes. Moreover, and NATO members have important experience in this regard. Russian intervention in the Syrian crisis also reinforced Iran’s The force played an important role in securing the oil supplies regional policies and brought about further imbalance in the to Western countries via the Arabian Gulf during the 1980-1988 regional balance of powers. Furthermore, terrorist groups have Iran-Iraq War and the Kuwait Liberation War in 1991.11 been increasingly tending to threaten maritime security. These threats require that the Gulf states not only maintain their The third course of action is concerned with threats to regional partnership with NATO, but also seek to upgrade it.10 security. NATO can support the security and defence capabilities of the neighbours of the Gulf states, just as it has provided the This upgrading can be achieved through three simultaneous Iraqi security forces with support. NATO can also provide the actions. The first is upgrading the ICI itself, in terms of content, Yemeni security forces with support. The Alliance should also for it to address security developments, especially energy have a mechanism to address the strategic changes that might security, which is important for both NATO and the Gulf happen in the region. One possibility in this respect is the countries. This upgrading can also come about in terms of the idea of setting up a strategic coalition that comprises the Gulf mechanism of cooperation itself, for it to include a strategic states, Egypt and Jordan, which would obviously affect NATO’s dialogue in the form of an annual meeting between NATO and regional partnerships. the Gulf countries, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman – in parallel to the ICI – so as to further develop NATO-Gulf cooperation.

10 Ashraf Mohammed Kishk, NATO and the security of the Arabian Gulf: the regional balance and requirements of international competition. December 3, 2018. http://araa.sa/index. 11 Ashraf Mohammed Kishk,: Will the NATO safeguard Bab al-Mandab Strait? January 24, 2018. php?view=article&id=4400:2018-03-12-09-53-55&Itemid=172&option=com_content http://akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1106767

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The Ukrainian Question: Genesis, Structural Problems and Possible Solutions

Gregorio Baggiani

1.1 The Structural Causes of the Ukrainian Crisis

The conflict in Ukraine is probably the biggest political disorder since the end of the Cold War in 1991, which saw the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. This allowed NATO and the European Union to expand and draw nearer to Russian borders, creating, from the Russian point of view, a problem of asymmetry or non-inclusiveness in terms of the Russian Federation’s economic interests and security. Of course, every state is perfectly legally - though not geopolitically - entitled to join any economic or security organization it considers useful or necessary; it is absolutely legitimate in law, even when it effectively creates an imbalance in security and power relations between states that do not belong to the same economic, political and security organizations. The feelings of insecurity perceived by some former Soviet states, like the Baltic States, with regard to the Russian Federation, and the anti-Russian instincts of a good part of the US establishment, have also contributed to this. After the Ukrainian crisis, the world order will no longer be the same.

The crisis proper began in November 2013, with the refusal by then President I am a researcher specialized in the analysis Viktor Yanukovych to ratify the agreement with Europe, for reasons of personal of the former Soviet Union, with particular advantage, but also because it contained clauses that were too onerous for attention to the foreign policies of Ukraine Ukraine, and because the Russian offer was better. In February 2014, this led to and contemporary Russia. spontaneous protests, not only against the Yanukovych government’s decision I worked as an election observer for OSCE not to sign the agreement with the European Union, but above all against the in areas of the former Soviet Union and the extreme corruption of his government. Making the situation worse for the Balkans between 2002 and 2015. In 2005, Ukrainian authorities was the hostility from some of the most important countries I worked on a research project on energy in the area, such as Poland and, in particular, Germany. The latter, a fundamental resources in the Caspian Sea in cooperation economic partner for Russia, not only took on an important role as mediator, but with Emanuela C. Del Re. From 2008, I entered into conflict with the leaders of the Kremlin, despite the SPD’s traditional worked as a researcher, with a contract from attitude of compromise towards Russia, and the strong economic ties between Rome University, on an article on the causes the two countries, traditionally represented by the German manufacturing of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a project that involved a period of work at industry (Ostausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft). the Russian Archives in Moscow. Another crucial factor was the role of the United States, whose main geopolitical Between 2009 and 2011, I was a columnist aim has always been to prevent Russian hegemony at the continental level, for the "Lettere Internazionali" section of the especially if combined with Russian technology and the potential creation of a online journal "Il Mulino". continental economic space in synergy with China. Also significant is the latent dispute between Germany and the United States regarding the building of gas The opinions expressed in this article are the pipelines between Germany and Russia, in particular the now well-known “Nord author's own and must not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or to the North Stream.” Therefore, obstructing a potential economic and energy space is one of Atlantic Treaty Organization. the main strategic aims of the United States, which looks unfavourably at Europe’s energy dependence on Russia, with the political risks it inevitably implies.

1.2 Ukraine in NATO: Advantages, Perspectives and Problems for the West

The question of the real interests, especially US interests, involved in the strategic projection of NATO in Ukraine will, especially after the 2019 elections, represent one of the elements in the heated debate between the organization’s members (in particular between western and eastern states, the latter being more interested in Ukraine as a stable buffer state between Eastern Europe and Russia) when it

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Joint press point by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_161573.htm?selectedLocale=en comes to deciding about the country actually joining NATO. the EU’s democratic rules may have on the authoritarian Russian This is also because, should Ukraine become a NATO member, political model. There was a further hardening of its autocratic and the highly likely possibility of friction between Ukraine character after the Moscow demonstrations of December 2011 and Russia, NATO would be forced to intervene in accordance that followed the presidential elections. The main problem for with Article 5, which provides for collective defence when a Ukraine is the difficult, even irreconcilable membership of two member state suffers a military aggression, or an aggression economic and political entities like the European Union and that qualifies as a military attack. This is extremely important, the Eurasian Union, which because of its geographic position because “Hybrid War,” which implies a combined use of and size, the Kremlin considered crucial to the success of the military tools, information warfare, energy blackmail, and so Eurasian project. on, is currently being carried out by the Russian Federation and is aimed precisely at destabilizing the country to obtain The other important strategic project for Putin is one that is important political results without any formal declaration of war not necessarily easy to achieve, due to the obvious opposition or legally recognizable use of the military instrument, following from Ukraine and most of the international community: the the well-known “Gerasimov Doctrine” (from the name of the control of the Ukrainian coast from Sevastopol to Transnistria, current Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia). which would allow Russia to control the northern shores and Joining NATO, would also give an appearance of normality and hence all trade there, most importantly the energy trade. The democracy to a country on the verge of economic collapse, recent construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge allows Russia to with all the consequences on nearby countries who would connect to Crimea directly, and at the same time to seriously need to contain the collapse and preserve, at least in part, its damage the Ukrainian fishing sector and the extraction of social fabric. fossil fuels on the continental shelf and the Economic Exclusive Zone under Ukrainian jurisdiction, according to international law. It is evident, however, that the control of Ukrainian ports, 1.3 Russian Interests in Ukraine in particular Odessa, would allow NATO to control the energy routes from the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and the Middle East. What then are Moscow’s interests? First, Moscow is interested Controlling the port of Odessa would be particularly significant in Ukraine not moving towards NATO, an improbable scenario for NATO for the control of the Black Sea to contrast the numbers until a few months ago because the majority of the country of Russian strategic forces deployed in Crimea, even with the seemed against the idea (and NATO too seemed divided). restrictions to passage set by the 1936 Montreux Convention, Moscow is extremely hostile to any reference to this because, but above all to control Erdogan’s Turkey, which in recent years by definition, it considers NATO as a problematic antagonist. has shown reserve and even hostility towards NATO, and is One final worrying aspect from Moscow’s point of view is the no longer considered by the West as a totally reliable country, political and economic presence of the European Union in though it is still a full member of the organization. Though Ukraine, and the snowball effect that a gradual penetration of the Turkish military has always upheld the secular status of

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https://www.flickr.com/photos/ministryofdefenceua/34591996133 the state, the purges that took place after the coup may have It is also important to note the substantial differences between changed its ideological attitude towards Western institutions, the US and the Russian concepts of economy. The former including NATO. It is obvious, therefore, that Ukraine plays a is based essentially on the ability of the country’s private primary strategic role in the projection of NATO towards the companies to conquer markets without relying too much on Caspian Sea and the Middle East, and most importantly in the political institutions, whilst Russian state capitalism operates containment of the Russian Federation in an highly strategic in synergy with the state, to penetrate the markets of the area like the Black Sea. post-Soviet area. In other words, in the Russian perspective politics and economics work together, whilst the US sees private business interests as separate from the interests of 1.4 The Problem of Ukrainian Integration into the the government. An example of this is the construction by Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Blocs American companies of gas pipelines in the post-Soviet area not approved by the US government. Hence, Russia’s attempt One of the central issues in the Ukrainian conundrum pertains to create a marketplace and institutions which are independent to the Eurasian space, and whether or not Ukraine should from the West and from the Euro-Atlantic area. The aim of the place itself in a Euro-Atlantic context or within a Eurasian United States, and in part of the European Union, is therefore model of integration, exemplified by the SCO (Shanghai to preserve its own political and economic model and its Cooperation Organization), CSTO (the Collective Security Treaty international power against those models that may threaten it, Organization that oversees security-related issues between in particular the Chinese, who in perspective represent the most Russia and Central Asia, especially with regard to anti-terrorist fearsome antagonists of US supremacy and more generally of activities) and the Eurasian Union itself. Russia decided to build the Euro-Atlantic bloc. Consider, for example, the Chinese “Silk a Eurasian economic space in which to exercise its leadership, Road Initiative”, a project for economic integration linking the and also because of the existing technological compatibility Eurasian and African continents, led by the Chinese in direct between former Soviet states. In substance, for Russia the challenge to the US, which has military bases all over the world, Eurasian integration project is a way of safeguarding Russian advanced technology and strong financial institutions. Indeed, low-technology exports that wouldn’t find outlets in the more despite strong internal resistance, the IMF should, over the next technologically advanced markets of Western Europe and the few years, pilot through a reform of the political and economic United States. systems, making Ukraine more independent from international

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loans, which are granted less and less because of “Ukrainian Conclusions fatigue.” Many parts of the Ukrainian crisis seem to be quite difficult to solve. What is certain, however, is that Europe’s period of 1.5 Open Political and Strategic Problems and peace is over, as is the political model based on the mainly Possible Solutions Anglo-American idea that economic interdependence and international law can guarantee harmonious “post-national” With regard to a possible definitive settlement of the Ukrainian cohabitation between states. Instead, we are seeing a return question, some Russian concerns may be recognized by to a post-Westphalian age, one of violent confrontation and Western negotiators. These include Russia’s vital security conflict between differing visions of the world and contrasting interests or the legitimate economic concerns of Putin’s regime. geopolitical interests, as exemplified today by Russia-US The trade agreements between the EU and Ukraine, granting relations. Only strong political will on both sides could preferential commercial status to Ukraine, de facto penalize steer relations between the two countries back to greater economic relations between Russia and Ukraine. The presence constructiveness based on common objectives, such as, for of Russian military forces and infrastructure in the Black Sea and example, common rules on international trade, a common fight in territorial waters under Russian control represents, instead, - despite political divergences - against international terrorism, a serious strategic threat and can in no way be considered and so on. With regard to adapting the army to NATO standards, legitimate by the West, but is explicitly offensive in military Ukraine has undoubtedly improved its fighting capabilities, and strategic terms, aimed at acquiring a strategic advantage thanks also to the army’s experience in the field in eastern through the creation of a territorial corridor on the northern Ukraine, thus improving the country’s chances of joining the coasts of the Black Sea. Atlantic Alliance in 5 to 10 years.

In short, some Russian political and economic interests can be With regard to the progress on state reforms, Ukraine’s considered legitimate, whilst others have a purely offensive perspectives appear to be decisively less favourable to NATO valence. What then are the possible solutions to the conflict in membership, even in the medium term. In a few years’ time, Ukraine? The main problem is the difficult coexistence of the when the decision is taken, there will be a heated debate European Union and the Eurasian Union (with Russia) within between those in favour and those against. The former include the same state. This difficulty could, however, be overcome Sweden, Poland, Romania (which strongly fears Russian with a little political will from both sides. How? The degree of supremacy in the Black Sea), the Baltic States, the United States autonomy demanded and conceded by the Kiev government and Canada, which has a considerable Ukrainian community in the eastern regions from the diaspora of western Ukraine, and which in recent years of Donetsk and Lugansk has been visibly in favour of the Ukrainian cause. will be a central issue in the peace negotiations. Those who will presumably oppose Ukraine’s membership What role will President include Italy and Spain, and perhaps Germany, France and Poroshenko play in the some Eastern European states such as Bulgaria, Hungary peace process after the (currently very active in slowing down the process of Ukrainian 2019 elections? Obviously, NATO membership, and substantially helping Russia to delay as he will try to be reelected, much as possible Ukraine’s access to NATO), the Czech Republic

https://it.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_ because in Ukraine only and Slovakia, interested for historical and cultural reasons, as Ukraine.svg political power can well as for economic reasons in not excessively damaging their guarantee the revenue relations with Moscow. Because NATO decisions are taken by deriving from oligopolies and monopolies, whilst in more consensus, the question of Ukrainian membership will not be advanced countries economic power is generally detached easy to solve despite the weight of the United States within the from political power. Alliance and the strong political will of the more anti-Russian Eastern European states. Italy has important interests in the The solution to the whole range of political problems related extraction activities of Russian companies on the Crimean to the Ukrainian question may find a provisional solution after coast. US sanctions could interrupt or damage mining activities the 2019 elections, which are likely to result in a swerve of by Italian energy companies like Eni or Saipem. For this reason, the current regime towards more radical political positions. It Italy has a fundamental and evident interest in contributing, remains to be seen, however, whether an efficient authentically within the limits of its political and economic possibilities reformist political class will really be voted in. (Italy is not part of the “Normandy Format” or of the Minsk agreements), together with its European and US allies and Russia, to a definitive solution of the Ukrainian conflict.

11 A Deep Insight Vox Collegii

The July NATO Summit in Brussels

Giovanni Parigi

The media coverage of the NATO Summit in Brussels on 11 and 12 July was marked by tensions over political and financial issues. Now, after months have passed and the dust has settled, the time has come for an assessment of the real outcomes of the Summit.

The starting point was a short insightful comment: “As NATO nears 70, its ability to close capability gaps and create a more cohesive Alliance will be paramount for its longevity”1. In fact, one should distinguish between two different types of dynamics: capability gaps, and cohesion within the Alliance, respectively related to the operational and the political-strategic levels.

From an operational point of view, the Summit achieved very good results, establishing several effective measures to reinforce deterrence, project stability and cope with unconventional threats; and the invitation of Macedonia as a new member state reconfirmed NATO’s open door policy.

Giovanni Parigi is adjunct Professor of Arab THE ACHIEVEMENTS Culture at the Department of Cultural and Linguistic Mediation at the State University of Milan. He holds a Ph.D. in Political The Summit Declaration was itself a success, clearly identifying the directions for Science (Catholic University of Milan), with incisive improvements. In a nutshell, the main points of the Declaration are: a dissertation on the role of tribalism in the contemporary Middle East. »» The “Four Thirties” initiative: 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 combat vessels, ready for deployment within 30 days. This follow-on His areas of interest are politics, the state force will substantially improve the Alliance’s deterrence. and society in the Middle East, with a specific focus on security studies and civil-military relations. »» Enhanced mobility of NATO forces: improving the cross-boundary movement of air, land and naval forces; setting mobility goals in terms of timelines and As a reserve officer in the Italian Army, he fostering cross-border exercises. This also enhances cooperation with the EU was deployed in Iraq (2003-2010), Lebanon through a “military Schengen”-type improvement in mobility. (2007), and Iraqi Kurdistan (2018) as a Tribal Affairs Officer, and a Political and Cultural Adviser. »» Measures to counter unconventional threats from state and non-state actors, the setting up of a Cyberspace Operations Centre and Counter Hybrid As adviser to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Support teams. Affairs, he participated in the work of the Provincial Reconstruction team in Nassiriya (Iraq) (2006 and 2011), as Rule of Law and »» Establishment of two new Headquarters: the Joint Force Support and Governance Adviser. Enabling Command in Ulm - that is a hub for NATO force movements in Europe in the event of a crisis; and the Joint Force Command in Norfolk, to He regularly contributes policy briefs, protect communications across the Atlantic, enhancing NATO’s transatlantic research and articles, published by ISPI (the and intra-European reinforcement capabilities. Italian Institute for International Studies), Limes, Formiche and Fondazione Oasis. »» Renewed efforts against violent extremism: NATO has extended its funding The opinions expressed in this article are his to the Afghan National and Security Forces up to 2024; another commitment own and must not be attributed to the NATO was dedicated to defence and capacity-building in Tunisia. The Alliance Defense College or to the North Atlantic also agreed to establish a Canada-led non-combat training mission in Iraq, Treaty Organization. in counter-IED, civil-military planning, vehicle maintenance and for military medics.

1 S. Keil, S. Arts in German Marshall Fund Policy Brief n. 031 “NATO After the Brussels Summit: Bruised or Emboldened?”, 2018

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Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg after the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and Government https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_156719.htm

»» The Alliance also decided to enhance its deterrence and Several of these actions are ambitious and complex to defence capabilities in the Strategic Direction South, by implement, requiring much military planning and political establishing the Regional Hub for the South, in Naples. coordination between the members of the Alliance, the European Union and partners, such as Iraq and Tunisia. »» A revamping of the Mediterranean Dialogue partnership programme. But in spite of the promising “Four Thirties” initiative, the gap between requirements and capabilities remains wide, with »» Renewed commitment to the integration of security NATO’s greatest challenge probably located in the sphere of efforts with the European Union, strengthening a shared political-strategic dynamics. defence and deterrence posture, including in the critical sector of energy security. Additionally, the EU and NATO signed a joint declaration in which hybrid threats and THE CHALLENGES cyber security are highlighted as priorities. Before the beginning of the Summit, it was clear that the hottest topic was going to be the issue of defence spending. »» Following an agreement between Greece and Macedonia, * NATO invited the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia US President Trump has repeatedly stressed that NATO’s to join the Alliance. European members should increase their defence budgets, in order to reach the 2% of GDP threshold. Actually, US goals During the Summit, the 29 NATO members approved a long list were to push NATO Allies reaching the defence spending levels of actions and initiatives, aimed at facing the evolving and new agreed in the 2014 Wales summit 2, to take a more active role in threats to the Alliance. sharing the burden for the security and defence of Europe.

* Turkey recognizes the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name. 2 Point n. 14 of the Wales Summit Declaration. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ texts_112964.htm#def-exp

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13 A Deep Insight Vox Collegii

Arrival of Giuseppe Conte (Prime Minister of Italy), Elisabetta Trenta (Minister of Defence of Italy) and Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero (Italy’s Permanent Representative to NATO) https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_156711.htm

Some members of the Alliance asked for more flexible & development3 i.e. the “cash4, capabilities5 and contribution6” criteria, while Germany adopted a different point of view, criteria. In essence, contributions and defence spending are asking to consider not only the share of GDP allocated to two sides of the same coin, but while Washington is stressing the defence sector, but also capabilities and contributions the second, other NATO members highlight the importance of such as infrastructure, personnel, equipment, and research the first.

3 https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_252_Techau_NATO_Final.pdf 4 “Cash” is the 2% target on defence spending. 5 Basically, it is the budget allocated to the procurement of equipment. 6 Troops and assets deployed in NATO missions and exercises.

14 Volume XVIII A Deep Insight

Family portrait https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_156720.htm

Indeed, several countries pledged to increase their budget over perceived threats. By virtue of its geopolitical position, Turkey, the next years, and by 2024, at least 15 members are expected for example, pointed to terrorism as the primary risk, thus to spend more than 2%. In any case, defence spending remains drawing attention to the Strategic Direction South, whereas a key issue, and has profound political implications in each Poland focused on the risks stemming from the Strategic Alliance member state, as well as in the relations amongst them. Direction East, and Germany highlighted the need to preserve internal Alliance cohesion. Washington also condemned the growing energy dependence of some European countries on Russian supplies: President Another area of political concern is the enlargement policy. Trump asked countries, such as Germany, to prefer gas imports Surely, inviting Macedonia to start membership talks was an from the US. But in spite of his criticism of European Allies, achievement also for NATO. However, the Open Door policy President Trump increased the US commitment to Europe, may stir up friction among current members, with regard to the by almost doubling funds for the US-led European Defence possible future accession of Georgia and Ukraine. Initiative. In any case, in spite of the political challenges facing NATO, the A second area of political wrangling is in the prioritization of Summit achieved valuable results, with the signing of several threats. strategic documents: - the Brussels Summit Declaration; During the Summit in Brussels, it became crystal clear that NATO - the Brussels Declaration on Transatlantic Security and Solidar- members had diverging visions of the Alliance’s purpose and ity;

continued overleaf...

15 A Deep Insight Vox Collegii

- the Joint Declaration on Cooperation between NATO and the intense cooperation between NATO and those EU members E.U.; that are not part of the Alliance, namely Sweden, Finland and - the NATO-Georgia Commission Declaration; Austria. - the Chairman’s Statement on NATO-Ukraine; and - the Joint Statement on the Resolute Support Mission to Af- From a conceptual point of view, but with relevant operational ghanistan. implications, the parties tried also to enlarge the concept of war and the grounds for the use of force, in order to face hybrid All these documents highlight and reaffirm the Alliance’s threats. strategic dimension, reaching out to a large network of partners and addressing relevant current crises. Taking into consideration the connection between the operational and the political-strategic levels of analysis, the uncertainties at strategic level (for example, a divergent prioritization of threats) were not replicated at the operational CONCLUSIONS level, where the Summit provided a clear way ahead for the Alliance, while its readiness and mobility were enhanced. Considering the complexity of NATO’s internal political environment, and the evolving and challenging external Besides that, the Summit highlighted the Alliance’s need to international context, the achievements of the Brussels Summit focus on its strategic cohesion, addressing high-level political are significant and substantial. issues. In this regard, there are basically two contradictory options, each of which has positive and negative aspects. With regard to the top issue on the agenda, NATO members were able to reach a shared position on Russia, balancing The first is a push for change7. A review of the Strategic Concept, deterrence and defence with dialogue. The “Four Thirties” for instance, may force members to question the future of initiative constitutes a significant improvement in the Alliance’s the Alliance; such a course could lead to political polarization military capabilities, even though it requires intensive efforts to among NATO members, thus damaging the core value of the be made at operational and political levels. Alliance: its cohesion.

Moreover, NATO strengthened its efforts in the Southern In contrast, the second option is to maintain the status quo, Strategic direction, implementing the “Hub for the South” in avoiding a discussion on thorny political issues and focusing Naples, and planning the NATO training mission in Iraq. on operational improvements; this would simply postpone decision-taking on pending issues, in the hope that in the The NATO-EU joint declaration is encouraging, consolidating meantime the Alliance’s cohesion would not be tested by a cooperation between the two institutions. NATO invited a new serious crisis. To conclude, whichever of the two options NATO member to join, while the final Declaration called also for more chooses, we should remember that “It is political solidarity, now and in the future, that is the true defense against any and all adversaries”8.

7 “Adapting the NATO alliance now and together”, John R. Allen, July 9, 2108 Brooking Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/07/09/adapting-the-nato-alliance-now-and- together/ 8 Ibidem

16 Volume XVIII A Deep Insight

Russia’s Su-57 compared to US/EU Military Aircraft: A threat to Europe and NATO?

Michael Eric Lambert

»» Fifth-generation aircraft are both expensive and difficult to produce, but the outcome is a masterpiece of engineering, capable of targeting and destroying all previous versions without being seen.

»» Until recently, the US Air Force was the only one to have such capabilities. The Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor is now about to be replaced by the Lockheed Martin F-35, while numerous competitors are appearing such as the Chinese Chengdu J-20 and the Russian Su-57. None of the three main European companies (Eurofighter, the Swedish Saab and the French Dassault) are currently able to reach the same low-level radar cross section (RCS) as the US, China, and Russia.

»» With a range of 5,500 km, the Su-57 will be able to reach major European capital cities to collect information or destroy specific targets. But experts in China have cast doubt on its real capabilities compared to their own J-20. French military analysts are also sceptical about its efficiency and combat capabilities in specific conditions. Michael Eric Lambert is a political analyst working on European Affairs/Strategy, Sino- Russian relations in Central and Eastern »» The following policy paper brings together Chinese, US, and Russian data to Europe, and emerging threats, corruption explain the limits of the Su-57 when it comes to “on the ground” applications and arms trafficking in Europe. He received in three different regions: the post-Soviet space, the Middle-East, and North his Ph.D. in International Studies from the Korea. Sorbonne (2016) and trained at INSEAD.

He also holds an M.Sc. in Economics and 1 - Russian technology based on Soviet philosophy Psychology from the Sorbonne-Descartes University (2014) and an M.A in History and Business from Sorbonne-HEC in Paris (2012). Work on developing the Russian fifth-generation Su-57 (Su57) fighter jet began in the 1990s after the break-up of the Soviet Union. At the time, most Russian Dr Lambert is Director of the Black Sea equipment was outdated, with large numbers of Su-24-25 and Su-27 fighters Institute, a new independent and unaligned unable to compete with modern US/EU aircraft, such as the French Rafale or the Policy Centre with a focus on contemporary Lookheed Martin F-22 Raptor. issues in the Black Sea region. Prior to that, he was Visiting Researcher at the Center In that context, the Russian Ministry of Defence asked the Sukhoi Design Bureau for International Policy Studies at the and the Gagarin Aviation Enterprise in Komsomolsk-on-Amur to design a new University of Ottawa (2015) and received the Visegrad Fellowship from the Institute prototype able to compete with the West. Contrary to the French Rafale, the of International Relations in Prague (2017). project was not to build an aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The Russian Federation already had large numbers of submarine-launched nuclear He is famous for his “on the ground” missiles, either deployed or in underground facilities, and constantly moving on methodology and has regularly travelled Russian railways, making them impossible to find. The future Su-57 was more of a to war-zones (Transnistria, Eastern Ukraine, way to outdo Soviet technology, and provide new horizons for Russian engineers Abkhazia, South-Ossetia, and Nagorno- tempted to go abroad to find more stimulating jobs in Europe and the US. Karabakh) to collect data. From a diplomatic perspective, it was an obvious attempt to present Russia as a The opinions expressed in this article are the superpower in a post-Soviet environment. author's own and must not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or to the North Following NATO’s enlargement to Poland, close to the Russian Federation, the Atlantic Treaty Organization. project started in 2001 when the Russian Air Force specified its first requirements. In 2002, the Sukhoi Design Bureau won the tender for the project using an original approach with the aim of producing a Russian-made equivalent to the F-22. Two years later, the Sukhoi team came up with the relevant design.

17 A Deep Insight Vox Collegii

T-50 aerodynamic condensation at MAKS-2015 RULEXIP - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:PAK_FA_Prandtl_Glauert_singularity.jpg

Development, however, remained quite slow and only two military might, just a few years after the war in Georgia. The prototypes, the Su-57-KPO and the Su-57-KNS, were ready for same happened at the MAKS-2013 Airshow, at Le Bourget tests and a first flight in January 2010. (France) in 2015, and the Army-2016 international military and technical forum in Kubinka. A possible explanation for the slow progress was the inability of Sukhoi partners to provide components in a difficult economic Overall, between 1998 and 2018, only a few Su-57 have been context. Moreover, the US remained the only power with a fifth- produced, and none were tested operationally in Ukraine or generation aircraft, as neither Saab, Dassault, or Eurofighter Syria between 2014 and 2017. We still don’t know what the managed to catch up with the US Air Force in the 2000s. aircraft’s capabilities are, but the recent interest in the Su-35 (a fourth generation aircraft) highlights the limits of Russia’s In that context, the fighter’s first public demonstration in ambitions. In brief, the Russian Ministry of Defence has decided August 2011 at the MAKS Airshow was a success in spite of instead not to focus on the Su-57, but to go for a more reliable not giving away much about the product itself. No weapons, and ready Su-35 able to fight against all foreign aircraft except no high-speed aerobatics, and a public show to convey Russia’s the US F-22 and F-35.

18 Volume XVIII A Deep Insight

Dmitry Zherdin—https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukhoi_Su-57#/media/File:Sukhoi_T-50_in_2011_(4).jpg

2 - Criticism from Europe and China Another essential component is radar. The Su-57 is supposed to detect an aircraft at 400 kms, to track 60 opponents and The Russian Su-57 appears to be similar to the F-22 Raptor to target 16 of them simultaneously. All these characteristics and superior to the F-35, both “made in America.” Despite are impressive, but the Swedish Saab is doing even better similarities, to be considered as a “fifth-generation fighter” it and Gripen are acting as team members, increasing the area needs to have a low-level RCS, while the Russian News Agency covered. The Su-57’s radar makes it impossible to detect the TASS presented the Su-57 with a 0.4m2 RCS by comparison to F-22 and F-35, ending up in a blind fight. A potential fight the 10m2 reflexion surface for the Soviet-made Su-27. Some US between a fourth generation aircraft and the Su-57 would be and EU analysts assumed the Su-57’s RCS to be approximately the only relevant use of such technology. 0.1, but Chinese analysts estimate that any fifth-generation fighter’s RCS should be no more than 0.001m2. The reports from Positive remarks apply to the 9-А1-4071К 30 mm cannon, larger China indicate that the Russian aircraft is definitely of excellent than the F-22’s 20mm. The К-37М/RVV-BD long-range missile is quality, but not as good as US competitors. the most efficient, and can hit airborne targets more than 300 kms away. Some Kh-58UShKE can be used to destroy ground

continued overleaf...

19 A Deep Insight Vox Collegii

A T-50 prototype for the Su-57 flies at the MAKS 2011 air show Alex Beltyukov - http://www.airliners.net/photo/Russia---Air/Sukhoi-T-50/2002344/L/

radar. A lone Su-57 could easily destroy a ground radar and are presenting the two engines of the Su-57 as a strategic make it possible for previous generation aircraft to continue on advantage, compared to single engine fighters. The argument their way without being detected. remains weak and the only reason for the French to present this idea is because the current Rafale is also equipped with The most impressive feature is the capacity to target all kinds of two engines. The single engine technology has been mastered ground, air, and sea opponents, up to 200-300 kms away. The for decades, and two or one doesn’t make any real difference capacity of 10,000 lbs maximum combat load is also impressive, nowadays – otherwise the US wouldn’t have opted for a single if you consider it can be dropped while more than 20 kms from engine on the F-35. the enemy to increase the impact. Compared to the F-22, the Su-57 has similar capabilities, with The engine is similar to the Su-35S. It shows Russia’s capability a speed of 2,100 km/hour, maximum speed of 2,600 km/hour, to use the same quality engines on two different aircraft, but and operational chilling of 20 kms, and can go as far as 5,500 also the difficulties of developing something specific for the kms in approximately 5.5 hours. Su-57. Experts working at the Ministry of French Armed Forces

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3 - Strategic relevance Russian Ministry of Defence is adopting a more defensive approach than some US/EU experts seem to think. While the Su-57 is catching up with the US F-22, and shows better capabilities compared to the new F-35, this may still not A conflict between Russia and China is also unlikely, because be relevant in practical terms. Russia will probably have to fight both countries have nuclear weapons. In North Korea, Russia against enemies in the Middle East (Syria) or the post-Soviet may decide to use the Su-57 to conduct operations but Moscow space (Ukraine and the Caucasus), and they are usually not does not seem particularly worried about the current situation equipped with modern aircraft. The current situation in Eastern and prefers the US and China to deal with Kim Jung Un. Europe and the Middle East makes the Su-57 superfluous. This Policy Paper does not take long-term military prospects into The aircraft has been expensive to develop and will be relevant consideration, but manned aircraft are becoming expensive against the future Chinese J-20 and/or the US F-22 and F-35. and too dangerous compared to drones. The future of air The F-35 will be exported to the UK, Italy, Denmark, The superiority will depend on unmanned aircraft, as the physical Netherlands, and Australia, with a low probability of conflict welfare of pilots is becoming an issue at high speed. with Russia in a blind fight. We also have to bear in mind that investments to develop a The Su-57 might provide a strategic advantage against the fifth-generation aircraft are leading to even more expensive French Rafale (the Su-57 will detect the Rafale at more than 200 research to create a sixth generation, and an unaffordable arms kms, as compared to only 50/60 kms for the Rafale to detect the race. Su-57), but France is too far away from Russia and ultimately able to use nuclear power against it.

The Russian aircraft could also be used in the Baltic States, Poland, and Turkey, but all NATO member states could apply Article 5 if the Kremlin decided to do so.

Regarding all parameters, the Su-57 is more of a defensive project to catch up with the US and China. The geopolitical analysis clearly underlines the lack of relevance for such high- tech equipment against other aircraft in non-NATO states.

4 - What can we learn from such a project?

Finally, the likelihood of exporting the Su-57 is very low because the Kremlin doesn’t want such technology to end up in foreign hands. The recent sales of the Su-35 to China are a clear sign the Su-57 will probably not be a commercial success outside of the Russian Federation or very close allies such as Belarus.

If one follows the reasoning regarding a potential conflict in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, the new Russian fighter is not relevant. The Saab is a more affordable option; the military philosophy behind the Rafale, Eurofighter, and F-35 was strongly influenced by the Cold War and is too expensive nowadays. The Saab is also able to land and take off on almost any runway and is very useful in underdeveloped countries. We should also take into consideration the cost of using such aircraft. The F-22 costs 40,000-50,000€/per hour, as compared to 4,000€/per hour for the Saab, making the Swedish fighter far more affordable for small countries and a relevant option for small/medium states like the Czech Republic, the Benelux forces and the Baltic states.

In addition, Russia seems to be the only real opponent, and not willing to fight NATO member states at the moment. The

21 Highlights Vox Collegii

Our Courses Senior Course 133

AZERBAIJAN GERMANY MONGOLIA SPAIN

Mr K. ALIZADA COL M. BRINGMANN COL P. NAR LTC C. AGUADO VALLADARES Mr O. DAHMS LTC J.C. DEL CORRAL LARA CDR F. FELD LTC M.J. GÓMEZ REYES MOROCCO BELGIUM COL B. MEY LTC L.F. GONZALEZ ASENJO Mr N. SCHAFRANEK COL A. CHAMANE LTC J. GONZALVEZ VALLES LTC K. QUANTEN COL M. SCHLEIERMACHER COL J.C. ULLRICH NETHERLANDS SWITZERLAND BOSNIA AND

HERZEGOVINA GREECE Mr M. LEENAARTS Dr P. BRAUN

LTC J. PUJIC COL P. LYMPEREAS NORWAY TURKEY CANADA Y HUNGAR LTC J.O. FUGLEM Ms H.S. APAKAN Mr A.B. BULBUL COL J. LAMBERT LTC K. ØVLAND COL L. WÉBER Mr Ö. DEMIR COL J. ZUORRO COL M. DİRİK Mr M.O. GÜRER POLAND CZECH REPUBLIC ITALY COL S. OSTROWSKI UNITED ARAB

LTC T. KRAMPERA CDR A. BALLESTRA EMIRATES LTC F. DE MICHELE MAJ A. MARTI ATAR Q COL B. AL MUKHAINI COL M. ORTENZI EGYPT BGEN A. ALRAUILI MAJ A. PAGLIAROLI UNITED KINGDOM Couns. A. YOSSEF CDR D. RUGGIERI REPUBLIC OF COL V. BUCK KOREA LTC M. PERERA AN JORD FRANCE COL M. KIM COL K.M.Y. ABUDALBOUH UNITED STATES COL E. CHASBOEUF ROMANIA CAPT S. DE CHARGÈRES DU BREUIL LTC I. FLETCHER KUWAIT COL X. DE TORQUAT DE LA COL M. BUSOI LTC C. JOHNSON COULERIE COL B. ALZAABI CAPT O. TARABUTA LTC D. MILLER CAPT G. DELAROCHE LTC A. MOORE GP CAPT X. FOISSEY LTC E. SHEA COL J. REMANJON MAURITANIA SLOVAKIA LTC D. TAYLOR CDR C. WAHLIN COL N. EL BAH COL I. BALOG GEORGIA REPUBLIC SLOVENIA Ms A. BAGBAIA OF MOLDOVA LTC T. IONEL LTC A. ŠIJANEC

22 Volume XVIII Highlights

Our Courses NATO Regional Cooperation Course 20

AFGHANISTAN ITALY ATAR Q

Mr Z. FARAHI CAPT M. BAGNI Third Secr. N.H.N. AL ENAZI Mr S. QADIRY LTC V.T. CARBONE COL A. ESPOSITO COL L. PAGANO LTC M. RUSSO

ROMANIA ALGERIA LTC S. SOANÃ COL T. BOUCHEMEL AN JORD LTC K. EL-ROBRINI Mr R. MOUHOUB COL N. ALSARHAN BGEN A. GHADAIREH First Secr. A.Y.A. HASAN SAUDI ARABIA

COL F.B.N.A. ALAJMI PT EGY LTC I.B.S. ALHASOON First Secr. H. FAROUK EL-TAHAN KUWAIT First Secr. S. ALKHALIFAH BGEN N. GAMAL YOUSSEF SOLIMAN AHMED Mr J.S. AL-SABAH Min. Plen. M. SAFWAT RAMADAN ATTA LTC M. AL-SARRAF

SPAIN

GERMANY MAURITANIA CDR F.D.A. AZNAR FERNANDEZ-MONTESINOS LTC J. ESTEVEZ PAYERAS COL A. HERTGENS COL Y. CHERVE COL E. ELY LAGHNA LTC F. MARQUEZ DE LA RUBIA LTC M. TAGHI

RAQ I MOROCCO TUNISIA Mr B.F.S. AL-KINANI Mr E.F.Q. AL-SAADI CDR A. BENHAMOU CAPT S. LARBI Director T.T.J. AL-TAMEEMI COL M.L. MHAMDI

23 Highlights Vox Collegii

Our Courses GFOAC 2018/2

The Generals, Flag Officers and Ambassadors' Course (GFOAC 2018-2), “NATO: Beyond the Brussels Summit”, took place from 12 to 16 November 2018 at the NATO Defense College in Rome, and from 19 to 21 November in Brussels. GFOAC 2018-2 brought together 47 high-level civilian and military participants from a total of 31 NATO and partner states, including Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and Global Partner countries. GFOAC is a high-level course aimed at one- to three-star officers and civilians of equivalent rank. The course seeks to promote shared understanding of contemporary security challenges and NATO’s interests and capabilities.

24 Volume XVIII Highlights

Our Courses IPOC 2018/2

The Integrated Partner Orientation Course (IPOC 2018/2) on “NATO Present and Future” was held at the College from 22 to 26 October 2018, in conjunction with Senior Course 133 and Modular Short Course 132/3. This edition brought together 12 participants from 10 partner countries. The Course is designed to analyse the nature of NATO as an organization, examining its activities and policies, as well as its contribution in the field of security. Within this framework, it was possible to focus on the changing nature of the security environment and the relevant steps and adaptations NATO must undertake over the next few years.

Modular Short Course 133-1 Modular Short Course 133-2

25 Highlights Vox Collegii

Our Courses

Modular Short Course 133-3 Modular Short Course 133-4

Modular Short Course 133-5

Modular Short Courses are part of the five-month Senior Course. Since the Senior Course is divided into several Study Periods on specific themes, these can in practice be attended by military officers and civilian officials who are not able to join the Senior Course for its entire duration. To make this possible, the NDC offers five Short Modular Courses during every Senior Course: each MSC is designed to provide participants with an opportunity to update and improve their knowledge of key political, military, defence-related, economic and socio- cultural questions with implications for the Alliance.

26 Volume XVIII Highlights

World News

11-12 July 2018

NATO Summit, Brussels The NATO Summit in Brussels wrapped up on Thursday (12 July 2018), following two days of decisions to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and defence, step up the fight against terrorism and ensure fairer burden-sharing among all Allies. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stressed that NATO embodies the vital bond between Europe and North America. “Our decisions at the Brussels Summit show that, as the world changes, Europe and North America stand together and act together in NATO,” he said.

(https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_156831.htm?selectedLocale=en)

09 August 2018

The Science for Peace and Security Programme celebrates its 60th anniversary The year 2018 marks the 60th anniversary of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, which has a strong track record of promoting scientific projects and collaboration among scientists from NATO countries, maximizing the return on research investments and strengthening the transatlantic bond.

(https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_157632.htm?selectedLocale=en)

20 September 2018

NATO international conference on Women, Peace and Security NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller is in Baku, Azerbaijan to meet with senior government officials and to address a major international conference on Women, Peace and Security.

(https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_158191.htm?selectedLocale=en)

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27 Highlights Vox Collegii

World News

3-4 October 2018

Meetings of NATO Defence Ministers - NATO Headquarters, Brussels Belgium Defence Ministers discuss the progress made in implementing decisions taken at the NATO Summit held in Brussels in July, to adapt and strengthen the Alliance, including achieving fairer burden-sharing.

(https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_158665.htm)

25 October 2018 - 07 November 2018

NATO exercise Trident Juncture NATO’s biggest exercise since the end of the Cold War, Trident Juncture will include around 65 ships, 250 aircraft, 10,000 vehicles and 50,000 personnel from across the Alliance. All 29 Allies are participating, as well as NATO partners Finland and Sweden. “This is a strong display of our capabilities and of our resolve to work together,” said the Secretary General.

(https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_158620.htm)

10 December 2018

NATO and the European Union work together to tackle growing cyber threats Senior officials from NATO met their counterparts from the European Union today (10 December) to take stock of recent activities and explore further areas for engagement on cyber defence. “We are pleased with the progress made to enhance our preparedness and resilience,” said Dr. Antonio Missiroli, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges. “Our focus will remain on strengthening the ways in which we share information, train, educate, and exercise together to ensure that we have the most robust tools possible for responding to growing cyber threats.”

(https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_161570.htm?selectedLocale=en)

28 Volume XVIII Highlights

Our Publications

NDC Policy Brief Series NDC Research Paper Series

NDC Policy Brief 5-18 – European defence: what impact for NATO? Russian Studies Series Thierry TARDY

October 2018 NDC Policy Brief 2-18 – Projecting stability in practice? NATO’s new training mission in Iraq Kevin KOEHLER

NDC Policy Brief 1-18 – The internal nature of the Alliance’s cohesion Thierry TARDY