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Country Reports on Terrorism 2015

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Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 June 2016 ________________________________ United States Department of State Publication Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Released June 2, 2016 Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act. 1 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2015 Table of Contents Chapter 1. Strategic Assessment Chapter 2. Country Reports Africa Overview Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership The Partnership for East African Regional Counterterrorism Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Chad Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Somalia South Africa Tanzania Uganda East Asia and the Pacific Overview Australia China (Hong Kong and Macau) Indonesia Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Europe Overview Albania Austria Azerbaijan Belgium Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Cyprus 2 Denmark France Georgia Germany Greece Ireland Italy Kosovo Macedonia The Netherlands Norway Russia Serbia Spain Sweden Turkey United Kingdom Middle East and North Africa Overview Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iraq Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and Jerusalem Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen South and Central Asia Overview Afghanistan Bangladesh India Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 3 Western Hemisphere Overview Argentina Brazil Canada Cuba Colombia Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Trinidad and Tobago Venezuela Chapter 3. State Sponsors of Terrorism Iran Sudan Syria Chapter 4. The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Chapter 5. Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report) Terrorist Safe Havens Countering Terrorism on the Economic Front Multilateral Efforts to Counter Terrorism; International Conventions and Protocols Long-Term Programs and Initiatives Designed to Counter Terrorist Safe Havens -Countering Violent Extremism -Capacity Building -Regional Strategic Initiative Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighters Support for Pakistan Counterterrorism Coordination with Saudi Arabia Chapter 6. Terrorist Organizations Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) Ansar al-Dine (AAD) Ansar al-Islam (AAI) Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi (AAS-B) Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah (AAS-D) Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T) Army of Islam (AOI) Asbat al-Ansar (AAA) Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) Boko Haram (BH) Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) 4 Hamas Haqqani Network (HQN) Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) Hizballah Indian Mujahedeen (IM) Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) ISIL Sinai Province (ISIL-SP) Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) Jaysh Rijal Al-Tariq Al-Naqshabandi (JRTN) Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Jundallah Kahane Chai Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Lashkar e-Tayyiba Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC) Al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB) National Liberation Army (ELN) Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) Palestine Islamic Jihad – Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ) Palestine Liberation Front – Abu Abbas Faction (PLF) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) Al-Qa’ida (AQ) Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Real IRA (RIRA) Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) Revolutionary Struggle (RS) Al-Shabaab (AS) Shining Path (SL) Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Chapter 7. Legislative Requirements and Key Terms 5 Chapter 1 Strategic Assessment The global terrorist threat continued to evolve rapidly in 2015, becoming increasingly decentralized and diffuse. Terrorist groups continued to exploit an absence of credible and effective state institutions, where avenues for free and peaceful expression of opinion were blocked, justice systems lacked credibility, and where security force abuses and government corruption went unchecked. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) remained the greatest threat globally, maintaining a formidable force in Iraq and Syria, including a large number of foreign terrorist fighters. ISIL’s capacity and territorial control in Iraq and Syria reached a high point in spring 2015, but began to erode over the second half of 2015. ISIL did not have a significant battlefield victory in Iraq and Syria after May. At the end of 2015, 40 percent of the territory ISIL controlled at the beginning of the year had been liberated. In Syria, local forces expelled ISIL fighters from several key cities along the routes connecting the two ISIL strongholds of Raqqa and Mosul, and reclaimed about 11 percent of the territory ISIL once controlled. These losses demonstrated the power of coordinated government action to mobilize against and confront terrorism. ISIL’s loss of territory it governs and controls in Iraq and Syria in 2015 also diminished funds available to it. ISIL relies heavily on extortion and the levying of “taxes” on local populations under its control, as well as a range of other sources, such as oil smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, looting, antiquities theft and smuggling, foreign donations, and human trafficking. Coalition airstrikes targeted ISIL’s energy infrastructure – modular refineries, petroleum storage tanks, and crude oil collection points – as well as bulk cash storage sites. These airstrikes have significantly degraded ISIL’s ability to generate revenue. The United States led the international effort, including through the UN, to confront ISIL’s oil smuggling and its antiquities dealing, delivering additional blows to its financial infrastructure. Toward the end of 2015, ISIL fighters conducted a series of external attacks in France, Lebanon, and Turkey, demonstrating the organization’s capabilities to carry out deadly plots beyond Iraq and Syria and also exposing weakness in international border security measures and systems. These attacks may also have been staged in an effort to assert a narrative of victory in the face of steady losses of territory in Iraq and Syria. Along withISIL, al-Qa’ida (AQ), and both groups’ branches increased their focus on staging mass-casualty attacks. This included attacks on international hotel chains in Burkina Faso,Mali, and Tunisia; other popular public locations; and the bombing of a Russian passenger plane. These plots were designed to undermine economic security, damage fragile economies, diminish confidence in governments, and foment further discord along religious and sectarian fault lines. In 2015, ISIL abducted, systematically raped, and abused thousands of women and children, some as young as eight years of age. Women and children were sold and enslaved, distributed to ISIL fighters as spoils of war, forced into marriage and domestic servitude, or subjected to physical and sexual abuse. ISIL established “markets” where women and children were sold with price tags attached and has published a list of rules on how to treat female slaves once 6 captured. Boko Haram has also abducted women and girls in the northern region of Nigeria, some of whom it later subjected to domestic servitude, other forms of forced labor, and sexual servitude through forced marriages to its members. (For further information, refer to the Trafficking in Persons Report 2015,http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2015/index.htm.) Although ISIL did not claim responsibility, it was likely responsible for several attacks involving chemical-filled munitions in Iraq and Syria, including a sulfur mustard attack in Marea on August 21, 2015. The United Statesworkedwith the counter-ISIL coalition to dismantle this chemical weapons capability, as well as deny ISIL and other non-state actors access to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)-useable materials and expertise through interdictions and strengthening the ability of regional governments to detect, disrupt, and respond effectively to suspected CBRN activity. While ISIL lost significant territory in Iraq and Syria during the second half of 2015, the group made gains in Libya amidst the instability there. According to open-source reporting, ISIL’s branch in Libya was estimated to have up to 5,000 terrorist fighters. The group expanded its territorial control in Sirte and its surrounding coastline. It also conducted attacks in Libya’s oil crescent and in Sabratha, near the border with Tunisia. However, ISIL also suffered losses in Libya in confrontations with militia groups, in particular in the eastern Libyan city of Darnah. ISIL’s branch in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula (ISIL Sinai Province or ISIL-SP) increased its attacks against Egyptian security forces and become more sophisticated, exemplified by ISIL-SP’s multi-pronged attack in the North Sinai town of Sheikh Zuweid in July. The group also claimed responsibility for an operation
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