Village Social Network Structures and Electoral Competition* Cesi Cruz†1, Julien Labonne‡2, and Pablo Querubin§3 1University of British Columbia 2University of Oxford 3New York University September 13, 2017 Abstract. In this paper, we test whether the structure of village social networks affects political competition in local elections. We use data on 20 million individuals in 15,000 villages of the Philippines. We take advantage of naming conventions to assess intermarriage links between families and reconstruct the family networks in all of those villages. Using data from the 2010 local elections we show that there is less political competition in villages with dense social networks, a result that is robust to controlling for a large number of village and candidate characteristics and to alternative estimation techniques. We then explore the mechanisms behind this effect and present evidence, from a detailed dataset collected in 284 villages after the 2013 local elections, that political influence is more concentrated in denser villages and that this is associated with higher turnout and higher vote margins for the winning candidate. *We thank Nick Eubank, James Fowler, Yana Gorokhovskaia, Steph Haggard, Alex Hughes, Franziska Keller, and Sarah Shair-Rosenfeld for helpful suggestions. We are also grateful to partici- pants at the UCSD Human Nature Group Workshop and UBC Comparative-Canadian Workshop for feedback. All remaining errors are ours. †
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[email protected] 1 Introduction Social network analysis has contributed to the literature on electoral competition by linking political outcomes to the ties between politicians and their core bases of elec- toral support.