Country of Origin Report Afghanistan

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Country of Origin Report Afghanistan Country of Origin Report Afghanistan March 2019 Page 1 of 124 Country of Origin Report Afghanistan| March 2019 Publication details The Hague Text by: Department for Country of Origin Information Reports (CAB) Disclaimer: The Dutch version of this report is leading. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands cannot be held accountable for misinterpretations based on the English version of the report. Page 2 of 124 Country of Origin Report Afghanistan| March 2019 Table of contents Publication details ............................................................................................2 Table of contents .............................................................................................3 Introduction ....................................................................................................5 1 Country information .................................................................................... 7 1.1 Political developments ......................................................................................7 1.1.1 Government of National Unity ...........................................................................7 1.1.2 Elections ........................................................................................................8 1.1.3 Corruption in government ............................................................................... 16 1.2 High Peace Council (HPC) ............................................................................... 17 1.2.1 Peace talks with the Taliban ............................................................................ 18 1.2.2 Truce during the Sugar Festival ....................................................................... 19 1.3 Power factors ................................................................................................ 20 1.3.1 Power of old (mujahideen) factions/political parties ........................................... 20 1.4 Military developments .................................................................................... 21 1.4.1 The Afghan security forces .............................................................................. 21 1.4.2 Insurgent groups ........................................................................................... 23 2 The security situation ................................................................................ 30 2.1 Developments in the security situation ............................................................. 30 2.2 Civilian casualties .......................................................................................... 34 2.3 Security situation in regions of Afghanistan....................................................... 39 2.3.1 The north (Badakhshan, Takhar, Baghlan, Kunduz, Samangan, Balkh, Sar-e Pul, Jawzjan, Faryab) ........................................................................................... 42 2.3.2 The south (Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Nimroz, Zabul) .................................. 43 2.3.3 The east (Nuristan, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Logar, Paktia, Khost, Paktika) ... 43 2.3.4 The west (Badghis, Herat, Ghor, Farah) ........................................................... 45 2.3.5 The central provinces (Bamyan, Daikundi, Panjshir, Ghazni, Parwan, Kapisa, (Maydan) Wardak, Kabul) ............................................................................... 45 3 Human rights ............................................................................................. 49 3.1 Legal context ................................................................................................ 49 3.1.1 The new Penal Code ....................................................................................... 49 3.1.2 Nationality legislation ..................................................................................... 53 3.2 Documents ................................................................................................... 54 3.3 Monitoring and legal protection ....................................................................... 57 3.3.1 The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) ............................. 57 3.3.2 Transitional justice ........................................................................................ 58 3.4 Compliance and violations .............................................................................. 59 3.4.1 Freedom of expression and press freedom. ....................................................... 60 3.4.2 Freedom of association ................................................................................... 62 3.4.3 Freedom of religion and belief ......................................................................... 62 3.4.4 Judicial process ............................................................................................. 63 3.4.5 Arrests, custody and detentions ...................................................................... 64 3.4.6 Torture, maltreatment and threats .................................................................. 66 3.4.7 Extrajudicial executions and disappearances ..................................................... 70 3.4.8 Blood feuds and honour killings ....................................................................... 71 3.4.9 The death penalty.......................................................................................... 73 3.5 Position of specific groups ............................................................................... 74 Page 3 of 124 3.5.1 Persons associated with or supporting the Afghan government ............................ 74 3.5.2 Human rights activists .................................................................................... 76 3.5.3 Journalists and media personnel ...................................................................... 77 3.5.4 Ethnic and/or religious minorities .................................................................... 78 3.5.5 Children ....................................................................................................... 82 3.5.6 Women ........................................................................................................ 87 3.5.7 LGBTI ........................................................................................................ 101 3.5.8 Ex-communists ........................................................................................... 103 4 Migration ................................................................................................. 104 4.1 Displaced persons ........................................................................................ 105 4.2 Refugees .................................................................................................... 106 4.2.1 Reception in the region ................................................................................ 107 4.3 Repatriation ................................................................................................ 107 4.4 Activities of international organisations .......................................................... 112 4.5 UNHCR’s position ......................................................................................... 113 5 Appendixes .............................................................................................. 114 5.1 Reports and publications .............................................................................. 114 5.2 Newsletters ................................................................................................ 119 5.3 Websites .................................................................................................... 120 5.4 Abbreviations .............................................................................................. 121 5.5 Glossary ..................................................................................................... 122 5.6 Map of Afghanistan ...................................................................................... 124 Page 4 of 124 Country of Origin Report Afghanistan| March 2019 Introduction This country of origin report describes the situation in Afghanistan insofar as it is relevant to the assessment of asylum applications from persons originating from Afghanistan and to decisions on the repatriation of rejected Afghan asylum-seekers. It is an update of previous official reports on the situation in Afghanistan, The report refers to the thematic official report of May 2018 on the security situation, and deals with developments since June 2018, in relation to the political and security situation and the migration issue in particular. The human rights situation is described for the period from November 2016 (the date of the previous country of origin report), up to and including December 2018. Information published since the beginning of 2019 for the whole of 2018 could only be taken into account partially and in general outline in the present report. The report is based on information from public and confidential sources. Use has been made of information from various agencies of the United Nations, non- governmental organisations and other experts, as well as from specialist literature and media reporting. An overview of the public sources consulted is included in the list of references. The report is also based on local observations and confidential reports of the Dutch mission in Afghanistan. A fact-finding mission to Afghanistan took place in October 2018,
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