Revolution Beyond Our Borders Sandinista Intervention Sep 1985.P65

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Revolution Beyond Our Borders Sandinista Intervention Sep 1985.P65 Special Report No. 132 United States Department of State September 1983 Revolution Beyond Our Borders Sandinista Intervention in Central America This revolution goes beyond our borders. Tomas Borge July 19, 1981 Revolution Beyond Our Borders Sandinista Intervention in Central America CONTENTS Page I. What the Controversy Is About..................................................... 1 II. The Praxis of Intervention .......................................................... 3 A. El Salvador.............................................................................. 5 B. Honduras ................................................................................. 13 C. Costa Rica ............................................................................... 16 III. The Collective Response............................................................ 19 IV. Conclusion................................................................................... 31 APPENDICES 1. Glossary ...................................................................................... 35 2. Chronology ................................................................................. 37 3. Former Guerrillas ....................................................................... 41 4. Nicaraguans in Exile .................................................................. 43 5. Rifles From Vietnam .................................................................. 46 6. FMLN Evaluation of the 1981 Offensive ................................. 47 7. Sources ........................................................................................ 49 ILLUSTRATIONS Map of Central America: Major Locations Mentioned in Text............................................................................... ii Photograph of Papalonal Airstrip in Nicaragua ................................ 8 Map of Central America and the Caribbean .................................... 33 I. What the Controversy Is About A nation that provides material, logis- tics support, training, and facilities to insurgent forces fighting against the I am aware of the allegations made by the government of the United government of another state is engaged States that my government is sending arms, ammunition, com- in a use of force legally indistinguishable munications equipment and medical supplies to rebels conducting a from conventional military operations by civil war against the government of El Salvador. Such allegations regular armed forces. As with conven- are false, and constitute nothing more than a pretext for the U.S. to tional uses of force, such military action is permissible under international law if continue its unlawful military and paramilitary activities against it is undertaken in the exercise of the Nicaragua intended to overthrow my government. In truth, my right of individual or collective self- government is not engaged, and has not been engaged in, the pro- defense in response to an unlawful use vision of arms or other supplies to either of the factions engaged of force.1 But such action is unlawful in the civil war in El Salvador. [Emphasis added] when it constitutes unprovoked aggression. Miguel DEscoto Brockmann, Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, A striking feature of the public in an affidavit filed before the International debate on the conflict in Central Court of Justice dated April 21, 19843 America is the degree to which all parties concerned accept these propo- sitions. As Nicaragua has stated to the World Court: Nicaragua charges that, since at tatives, such as that quoted above from least 1982, the United States has used Foreign Minister DEscotos affidavit . There is now a substantially force against Nicaragua in the form of unanimous modern view concerning indirect filed with the World Court, denying any use of force through armed groups of assistance to Nicaraguans fighting involvement in insurgencies and subver- mercenaries or irregulars. Whatever legal against the Sandinista regime. Any such sion in neighboring countries.4 But, as doubts may have existed prior to World War actions, Nicaragua argues, are illegal the U.S. Congress, the executive II were dispelled by the events of the post- and improper since Nicaragua has never branch, the National Bipartisan Commis- war period. If the prohibition on the use of taken any action against neighboring sion on Central America, and others force in Article 2(4) [of the U.N. Charter] was to have any meaning, it would have to cover countries that would give them or their who have studied the facts have this new and dangerous mode of military ally the United States the right to act repeatedly found, the Sandinista leaders activity . 2 against Nicaragua in self-defense. The have, since at least 1980, engaged in a fighting in El Salvador and the violence The critical element of the debate, carefully concerted use of force against in Honduras and Costa Rica are, the its neighbors. A leading critic of U.S. therefore, is not the identification of the Sandinistas say, entirely the work of applicable legal standard but the deter- Nicaragua policy, Congressman Edward home-grown movements with which P. Boland, Chairman of the House Per- mination of the facts to be measured Nicaragua has immense sympathy but against that undisputed legal standard. manent Select Committee on In- to which it has provided no material telligence, stated in March 1982: In determining the facts, it is important assistance. to assess both the evidence of what has There is ... persuasive evidence that the Nicaraguas case thus rests on Sandinista government of Nicaragua is help- been done and the credibility of what statements by Sandinista represen- has been said. ing train insurgents and is transferring arms 1Other lawful bases for the use of force 3Affidavit; of Foreign Minister Miguel hands of an attacker cannot himself be include actions taken by a state pursuant to DEscoto Brockinarin, Nicaraguan Exhibit II charged with assault (nor can the gunmans decisions of the UN Security Council or at submitted to the International Court of action itself be excused) on the basis of the invitation of another state within its Justice at its public sitting of April 25-27, speculation that he would no doubt have territory. 1984, Case concerning Military and Para- struck the gunman even had the gunman not 2Nicaraguan Memorial (Merits), Case con- military Activities in and against Nicaragua attacked first. The fact that Nicaragua has cerning Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States of America), p. 1. offered no serious alternative argument con- in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. the Resubmitted to the Court as Annex B to stitutes implicit recognition by the San- United States of America), International Nicaraguan Memorial (Merits), April 30, 1985. dinistas that they have no case once it Court of Justice, p. 126. The Sandinistas 4The only concession the Sandinistas becomes apparent that they have engaged in epouse these principles to Western audi- make to the argument that their actions acts of aggression against their neighbors. In ences while internally extolling their commit- justify a response against them is their claim these circumstances, their neighbors and the ment to revolutionary internationalism: the that the United States would act against United States have the right to respond. asserted right to aid national liberation them in any event and hence has forfeited movements elsewhere. Nevertheless, it seems any right to assist in the defense of neighbor- appropriate to judge their actions by the ing states. This argument has nothing to do standards which they use to judge others and with the facts of U.S. policy toward which they claim to apply to themselves. Nicaragua since 1979. It also has no basis in lawa person who wrestles a gun from the and financial support from and through the factors that are relevant to the provided covert support and training for Nicaragua to the insurgents. They are fur- legality and morality of the use of force: the paramilitary wings of far left ther providing the insurgents bases of opera- aggression and self-defense. groups, and supported several terrorist tions in Nicaragua.... What this says is that, contrary to the repeated denials of The record is documented in this actions. Nicaraguan officials, that country is study. It demonstrates that: • Finally, the Sandinistas military buildup threatens Nicaraguas thoroughly involved in supporting the • Almost precisely a year after the Salvadoran insurgency. That support is such neighbors. It has emboldened the San- as to greatly aid the insurgents in their fall of Somoza in July 1979, the San- dinistas to engage in military incursions struggle with government forces in El dinistas began a major effort to help into the territories of Honduras and 5 Salvador. guerrilla forces overthrow the Govern- Costa Rica, incursions in which citizens The full Congress has on repeated ment of El Salvador by repeating the of these and other countries have died occasions made formal findings concern- strategy followed by the Sandinistas in as a direct result of Nicaraguan military ing Sandinista aggression: their own final offensive against actions. Somoza. As a direct result of support by . by providing military support (including Nicaragua and by other states using From the outset the United States arms, training, and logistical, command and Nicaragua as a conduit, the Salvadoran has been aware of Nicaraguan aggres- control, and communications facilities) to sion and has
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