Special Report No. 132 United States Department of State

September 1983

“Revolution Beyond Our Borders” Sandinista Intervention in Central America

“This revolution goes beyond our borders.”

Tomas Borge July 19, 1981 “Revolution Beyond Our Borders” Sandinista Intervention in Central America

CONTENTS Page I. What the Controversy Is About...... 1 II. The Praxis of Intervention ...... 3 A. El Salvador...... 5 B. Honduras ...... 13 C. Costa Rica ...... 16 III. The Collective Response...... 19 IV. Conclusion...... 31

APPENDICES 1. Glossary ...... 35 2. Chronology ...... 37 3. Former Guerrillas ...... 41 4. Nicaraguans in Exile ...... 43 5. Rifles From Vietnam ...... 46 6. FMLN Evaluation of the 1981 Offensive ...... 47 7. Sources ...... 49

ILLUSTRATIONS Map of Central America: Major Locations Mentioned in Text...... ii Photograph of Papalonal Airstrip in Nicaragua ...... 8 Map of Central America and the Caribbean ...... 33

I. What the Controversy Is About

A nation that provides material, logis- tics support, training, and facilities to insurgent forces fighting against the I am aware of the allegations made by the government of the United government of another state is engaged States that my government is sending arms, ammunition, com- in a use of force legally indistinguishable munications equipment and medical supplies to rebels conducting a from conventional military operations by civil war against the government of El Salvador. Such allegations regular armed forces. As with conven- are false, and constitute nothing more than a pretext for the U.S. to tional uses of force, such military action is permissible under international law if continue its unlawful military and paramilitary activities against it is undertaken in the exercise of the Nicaragua intended to overthrow my government. In truth, my right of individual or collective self- government is not engaged, and has not been engaged in, the pro- defense in response to an unlawful use vision of arms or other supplies to either of the factions engaged of force.1 But such action is unlawful in the civil war in El Salvador. [Emphasis added] when it constitutes unprovoked aggression. Miguel D’Escoto Brockmann, Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, A striking feature of the public in an affidavit filed before the International debate on the conflict in Central Court of Justice dated April 21, 19843 America is the degree to which all parties concerned accept these propo- sitions. As Nicaragua has stated to the World Court: Nicaragua charges that, since at tatives, such as that quoted above from least 1982, the United States has used Foreign Minister D’Escoto’s affidavit . . . There is now a substantially force against Nicaragua in the form of unanimous modern view concerning indirect filed with the World Court, denying any use of force through armed groups of assistance to Nicaraguans fighting involvement in insurgencies and subver- mercenaries or irregulars. Whatever legal against the Sandinista regime. Any such sion in neighboring countries.4 But, as doubts may have existed prior to World War actions, Nicaragua argues, are illegal the U.S. Congress, the executive II were dispelled by the events of the post- and improper since Nicaragua has never branch, the National Bipartisan Commis- war period. If the prohibition on the use of taken any action against neighboring sion on Central America, and others force in Article 2(4) [of the U.N. Charter] was to have any meaning, it would have to cover countries that would give them or their who have studied the facts have this new and dangerous mode of military ally the United States the right to act repeatedly found, the Sandinista leaders activity . . . . 2 against Nicaragua in self-defense. The have, since at least 1980, engaged in a fighting in El Salvador and the violence The critical element of the debate, carefully concerted use of force against in Honduras and Costa Rica are, the its neighbors. A leading critic of U.S. therefore, is not the identification of the Sandinistas say, entirely the work of applicable legal standard but the deter- Nicaragua policy, Congressman Edward home-grown movements with which P. Boland, Chairman of the House Per- mination of the facts to be measured Nicaragua has immense sympathy but against that undisputed legal standard. manent Select Committee on In- to which it has provided no material telligence, stated in March 1982: In determining the facts, it is important assistance. to assess both the evidence of what has There is ... persuasive evidence that the Nicaragua’s case thus rests on Sandinista government of Nicaragua is help- been done and the credibility of what statements by Sandinista represen- has been said. ing train insurgents and is transferring arms

1Other lawful bases for the use of force 3Affidavit; of Foreign Minister Miguel hands of an attacker cannot himself be include actions taken by a state pursuant to D’Escoto Brockinarin, Nicaraguan Exhibit II charged with assault (nor can the gunman’s decisions of the UN Security Council or at submitted to the International Court of action itself be excused) on the basis of the invitation of another state within its Justice at its public sitting of April 25-27, speculation that he would “no doubt” have territory. 1984, Case concerning Military and Para- struck the gunman even had the gunman not 2Nicaraguan Memorial (Merits), Case con- military Activities in and against Nicaragua attacked first. The fact that Nicaragua has cerning Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States of America), p. 1. offered no serious alternative argument con- in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. the Resubmitted to the Court as Annex B to stitutes implicit recognition by the San- United States of America), International Nicaraguan Memorial (Merits), April 30, 1985. dinistas that they have no case once it Court of Justice, p. 126. The Sandinistas 4The only concession the Sandinistas becomes apparent that they have engaged in epouse these principles to Western audi- make to the argument that their actions acts of aggression against their neighbors. In ences while internally extolling their commit- justify a response against them is their claim these circumstances, their neighbors and the ment to “revolutionary internationalism”: the that the United States would act against United States have the right to respond. asserted right to aid “national liberation” them in any event and hence has forfeited movements elsewhere. Nevertheless, it seems any right to assist in the defense of neighbor- appropriate to judge their actions by the ing states. This argument has nothing to do standards which they use to judge others and with the facts of U.S. policy toward which they claim to apply to themselves. Nicaragua since 1979. It also has no basis in law—a person who wrestles a gun from the and financial support from and through the factors that are relevant to the provided covert support and training for Nicaragua to the insurgents. They are fur- legality and morality of the use of force: the paramilitary wings of far left ther providing the insurgents bases of opera- aggression and self-defense. groups, and supported several terrorist tions in Nicaragua.... What this says is that, contrary to the repeated denials of The record is documented in this actions. Nicaraguan officials, that country is study. It demonstrates that: • Finally, the Sandinistas’ military buildup threatens Nicaragua’s thoroughly involved in supporting the • Almost precisely a year after the Salvadoran insurgency. That support is such neighbors. It has emboldened the San- as to greatly aid the insurgents in their fall of Somoza in July 1979, the San- dinistas to engage in military incursions struggle with government forces in El dinistas began a major effort to help into the territories of Honduras and 5 Salvador. guerrilla forces overthrow the Govern- Costa Rica, incursions in which citizens The full Congress has on repeated ment of El Salvador by repeating the of these and other countries have died occasions made formal findings concern- strategy followed by the Sandinistas in as a direct result of Nicaraguan military ing Sandinista aggression: their own final offensive against actions. Somoza. As a direct result of support by . . . by providing military support (including Nicaragua and by other states using From the outset the United States arms, training, and logistical, command and Nicaragua as a conduit, the Salvadoran has been aware of Nicaraguan aggres- control, and communications facilities) to sion and has sought to help end it groups seeking to overthrow the Government guerrillas were transformed from ter- of El Salvador and other Central American rorist factions that had been limited to peacefully, using diplomatic appeals and governments, the Government ... of robberies, kidnapping, and occasional economic and political measures. Not- Nicaragua has violated article 18 of the street violence into an organized armed withstanding the Sandinistas’ claims Charter of the [OAS] which declares that no force able to mount a coordinated na- that the United States has consistently state has the right to intervene, directly or tionwide offensive, inflicting significant sought for its own purposes to over- indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other loss of life and economic damage on El throw their regime and has only re- state. . . . 6 Salvador. Although this first interven- cently “manufactured” a collective self- tion failed in January 1981, the San- defense rationale for its actions, the That the Sandinistas have engaged dinistas have continued to ship and diplomatic and public record clearly and continue to engage in aggression is store arms and to provide training, shows that after July 1979 the United not in doubt to Nicaragua’s neighbors in headquarters, and coordination on States assisted the new government in Central America. There is no need to Nicaraguan territory for a new “pro- Nicaragua and tried to develop friendly prove to these countries what they are longed war” strategy. As of early bilateral relations. experiencing on a daily basis. Nor are September 1985, Sandinista support con- The record shows as well that the 7 the Contadora countries in doubt about tinues to be an essential element in the United States responded in a measured the nature of Nicaragua’s behavior. In- training, communications, and logistics and graduated fashion when the San- deed, as El Salvador informed the Inter- systems of the Salvadoran guerrillas. dinistas refused to cease their interven- national Court of Justice last year: • Sandinista security services have, tion against other states in Central Foreign Minister Miguel D’Escoto, when both directly and indirectly, through America. And the record shows that the pressed at a meeting of the Foreign training, supply, and support of subver- Sandinistas themselves, through persis- Ministers of the Contadora group in July sive groups in Honduras and Costa tent aggression and refusal to par- 1983 ... on the issues of Nicaraguan material Rica, engaged in bombings, assassina- ticipate seriously in efforts to address support for the subversion in El Salvador, shamelessly and openly admitted such sup- tions, and other unlawful attacks against the regional conflict through peaceful port in front of his colleagues of the Con- the people and institutions of those na- means, bear the primary responsibility tadora group.8 tions. In Honduras, they supported for the distrust and resentment of the Sandinistas that is found throughout The purpose of this study is to ad- ”vanguard” groups first to supply the attack on El Salvador, then to engage in Central America and for the current dress the reality and consequences of strife within Nicaragua itself. Nicaragua’s longstanding and continuing kidnapping, hijacking, and more recently intervention against its immediate in efforts to establish guerrilla fronts in neighbors and to do so by focusing on the Honduran Departments of Olancho (in 1983) and El Paraiso (in 1984 and 1985). In Costa Rica, the Sandinistas redirected alliances established during the anti-Somoza struggle to support the expanded insurgency in El Salvador,

5Press release dated March 4, 1982, by Development Cooperation Act of 1985, ap- 7See Appendix 1,Glossary. Congressman Edward P. Boland, Democrat proved August 8, 1985, which expresses the 8Declaration of Intervention of the of Massachusetts, p. 1. (See also Permanent finding of Congress that “the ... Govern- Republic of El Salvador, Case concerning Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on ment of Nicaragua ... has flagrantly violated Military and Paramilitary Activities in and H.R. 2760 [Amendment to the Intelligence ... the, security of the nations in the region, against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1983], H.R. in that it ... has committed and refused to States of America), submitted to the Interna- Rep. 98-122, p. 5. cease aggression in the form of armed tional Court of Justice, August 15, 1984, 6Intelligence Authorization Act for 1984 subversion against its neighbors ” pp. 10-11. (P.L. 98-215), Section 109(a). See also Section (P.L. 99-83). 722(c)(2)(C) of the International Security and

2 II. The Praxis of Intervention

The Sandinista National Liberation the FSLN the opportunity to develop Front (FSLN) was founded in Teguci- The foreign policy of the alliances with moderate and democratic galpa, Honduras, in July 1961, at a groups and individuals who previously meeting among Tomas Borge, Carlos Sandinista People’s Revolution would have shunned the FSLN because Fonseca, and Silvio Mayorga. All had is based on the full exercise of of its Cuban ties and penchant for been student activists in Nicaragua; all national sovereignty and violence. In January 1978, Pedro Joa- had participated in preliminary meetings independence and on the prin- quin Chamorro, the editor of La Prensa, in Cuba; all identified with the Cuban ciple of revolutionary Nicaragua’s leading newspaper, was revolution and with armed conflict. The murdered by assailants widely believed first armed FSLN guerrilla units internationalism. to be associated with Somoza. Chamorro entered Nicaragua from Honduras in FSLN “72-hour Document,” was Somoza’s leading critic and a strong 1962 carrying Cuban-supplied weapons.1 September 19794 democrat. His death set off the national By the time the FSLN was founded, revulsion that eventually destroyed internationalism and guerrilla warfare This revolution goes beyond our Somoza. had already been united in Sandinista borders. Our revolution was Throughout 1978, while Nicaraguan praxis in the form of the “Rigoberto business, religious, and civic leaders Lopez Perez” Column. This guerrilla always internationalist from the were moving irrevocably into opposition group had been organized in mid-1959 moment Sandino fought [his first to Somoza, Armando Ulises Estrada, a with advice from Ernesto Che Guevara battle]. high-ranking member of the America and supplied by Cuba. The 55 Nicara- Department of the Communist Party of guans, Cubans, and other interna- Tomas Borge Cuba, made numerous secret trips July 19, 19815 tionalists who belonged to it were seeking to unify the three major factions dispersed by the Honduran Army before of the FSLN. In March 1979, the three they could enter Nicaragua.2 We cannot cease being inter- Sandinista factions entered into a for- The FSLN suffered repeated defeats nationalists unless we cease malized alliance with Fidel Castro’s sup- in its armed opposition to the Somoza being revolutionaries. port.7 Once unity was achieved, Cuba dynasty, which after 1967 was headed increased covert support operations, by Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Fifteen Bayardo Arce May 6, 19846 providing weapons, training, and ad- years after their opening attacks, visory personnel to the FSLN. Estrada Fonseca and Mayorga were dead and and Julian Lopez Diaz, later Cuba’s first FSLN forces had no more than 300 ambassador to Sandinista Nicaragua, guerrillas belonging to three feuding especially with non-Marxist states and concentrated on building a supply net- factions.3 organizations, gradually developed in work for channeling arms and supplies A new strategy to gain alliances the wake of a failed October 1977 cam- to Sandinista guerrilla forces.8 By May beyond the borders of Nicaragua, paign against Somoza. Events soon gave

1Claribel Alegria and D.J.F. Falkoll, 4Analisis de la Coyuntura y Tareas de 8Cuba today has air extensive intelligence Nicaragua: la revolucion sandinista (Serie la Revolucion Popular Sandinista (Tesis and training apparatus, modern military Popular Era) Mexico, 1982, quote Borge, on Politicas y Militares Presentadas por la forces, and a large and sophisticated the establishment of the FSLN and its 1962 Direccion Nacional del Frente Sandinista de propaganda network. Making Che Guevara’s operation on pp. 166-168. The organization Liberacion Nacional en la Asamblea de attempts look amateurish, the Castro govern- established in Honduras in July 1961 was Cuadros “RIGOBERTO LOPEZ PEREZ” ment is now able to utilize agents and con- originally to be named simply the National celebrado, el 21, 22 y 23 de Septiembre de tacts nurtured over 20-25 years. Most of the Liberation Front. “Sandinista” was added 1979), Managua, October 1979, p. 24 (often covert operations in Nicaragua were planned because of Fonseca’s belief in the need for a referred to as the “72-Hour Document”). and coordinated by the America Department historic Nicaraguan symbol. In this way, 5At a military ceremony broadcast on of the Cuban Communist Party. Headed by Augusto Sandino, a nationalist, became the Managua domestic service, as reported by Manuel Pineiro Losada, the America Depart- symbol of an internationalist movement. FBIS on July 21, 1981. ment emerged in 1974 to centralize opera- 2The defeat brought a wounded Fonseca 6Comandante Bayardo Arce’s Secret tional control of Cuba’s covert activities in to Havana where he made personal contacts Speech before the Nicaraguan Socialist the Western Hemisphere. The department with the Cuban leader that c6ntributed to Party (PSN), Department of State Publica- brings together the expertise of the Cuban the founding of the FSLN. In 1960, Borge tion 9422, Inter-American Series 118 military and the General Directorate of also met with Che Guevara in Havana. (Washington, D.C., March 1985), p. 4, Intelligence into a farflung operation that 3Leaders of the three factions were: translated from the text published in La includes secret training camps in Cuba, net- Tomas Borge, “Prolonged Popular War,” Vanguardia, Barcelona, August 23, 1984. works for covert movement of personnel and Humberto and Daniel Ortega, “Third Force” 7Cuban radio announced as early as materiel between Cuba and abroad, and or “Insurrectionist,” and Jaime Wheelock, December 1978 that the three factions had sophisticated propaganda support. (See ”Proletarian.” The factions are described in agreed to merge. Also see Richard L. Millett, Cuba’s Renewed Support for Violence in George Black, Triumph of the People: The ”Historical Setting,” in Nicaragua: A Latin America, Department of State Special Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua Country Study (Washington, 1982), p. 51. Report No. 90, December 14, 1981.) (London, Zed, 1981), pp. 91-97. Black (op. cit.), pp. 142-148, discusses unifica- tion without mentioning Cuba.

3 1979, these supply and support opera- keys to Sandinista foreign policy, had taining support networks for the DGSE tions reached levels that helped been discussed and approved without and the Fifth Directorate of Intelli- neutralize the conventional military publicity.10 By 1981, the Sandinistas felt gence. The Fifth Directorate has been superiority of Somoza’s National Guard confident enough to reissue their 1969 headed since its creation by Renan and permitted the launching of a “final program, which was more specific. The Montero Corrales (former name, Andres offensive.” FSLN called for “authentic unity” of Barahona Lopez), a Cuban-born natural Within weeks of Somoza’s fall in Central America to “lead the way to ized Nicaraguan who was with Che- July 1979, the FSLN was reaffirming its coordinating the efforts to achieve na- Guevara in Bolivia. It provides the ”internationalism” and solidarity with tional liberation.”11 operatives and the liaison necessary to guerrillas elsewhere in Central America. To coordinate “national liberation” maintain the clandestine links and sup- Using their ties with Cuba, the Soviet efforts, the Sandinistas developed by port networks for activities on behalf of Union and other Eastern bloc nations, mid-1980 the apparatus to sustain the guerrilla organizations in the the FSLN began to develop a monopoly regionwide guerrilla operations and to Central American region. hold on domestic power and to convert give them political as well as military Sandinista success in mediating dif- Nicaragua into an operational center of support. With the assistance of the ferences among four Guatemalan guer- ”revolutionary internationalism.”9 Cubans, Soviets, and East Europeans, rilla groups in November 1980 made FSLN leaders in Managua quickly con- the Sandinistas created two institutions clear Nicaragua’s new role. Unlike the firmed relationships of mutual support essential to such operations: the Depart- similar previous Nicaraguan (1979) and with the leaders of various armed ment of International Relations (DRI) of Salvadoran (1980) guerrilla unity movements throughout Central America. the FSLN, and the Fifth Directorate of agreements, which were forged in Cuba, Contacts were also established with Intelligence associated with the govern- the statement of “revolutionary unity” organizations and political movements ment’s General Directorate of State among the Guatemalan guerrilla that were not directly engaged in armed Security (DGSE).12 organizations was signed and dated in struggle but that could become, or were The Sandinistas’ practice of revolu- Managtia.”13 already, part of a regional support net- tionary internationalism is implemented Those attending the signing epito- work for armed revolutionary activities largely through these two organizations. mize the apparatus: members of the in Central America. The DRI, which is closely modeled after FSLN National Directorate, delegates In 1979, the FSLN’s program, which the America Department of the Cuban from the Cuban Communist Party, declared that the “principle of revolu- Communist Party, provides administra- including America Department chief tionary internationalism” was one of the tive support for political trainees from Manuel Pineiro, and the Managua repre- Central America. Headed by Julio sentatives of the Salvadoran Unified Lopez Campos, it reports directly to the Revolutionary Directorate, the DRU. FSLN National Directorate and is responsible for establishing and main-

9In this, of course, the Sandinistas are strument of analysis of our Vanguard for 13 See the unity statement entitled, Prin- squarely in line with Cuban doctrine and understanding its historic role and for cipios Generales y Acuerdos de la Unidad de practice. Article 12 of the Cuban Constitution carrying out the Revolution; . . . Without las Organizaciones Revolucionarias EGP, ”espouses the principles of proletarian inter- Sandinismo we cannot be Marxist- FAR, ORPA y PGT (Managua, Nicaragua, nationalism and of the combative solidarity of Leninists, and Sandinismo without November 2, 1980). According to one of the the peoples.” Section (c) states that help to Marxism-Leninism cannot be revolu- Guatemalan participants, the four guerrilla . . . peoples that struggle for their liberation tionary; that is why they are indissolubly groups accepted at) invitation from the FSLN constitutes . . . [an] internationalist right and linked and that is why our moral force is to utilize “optimal conditions of security duty.” Between mid-1979 and mid-1981, the Sandinismo, our political force is San- [Nicaragua] . . . so that they could dedicate period in which the FSLN effectively drove dinismo, and our doctrine is Marxism- themselves to the process of unity.” The plan out the other members of the national coali- Leninism.” (From the text printed Oc- was to negotiate in Managua and then fly to tion that defeated Somoza, Cuban involve- tober 9, 1981, in La Nacion, Tegucigalpa, Havana to sign the document of unity in the ment in the daily affairs of the Nicaraguan using the edition of the speech circulated presence of Fidel Castro, members of the Government became comprehensive and on August 25, 1981, by the Political and Cuban Communist Party, representatives direct. Cuban military, security, and Cultural Training, Section of the San- from the FSLN and the Unified Revolu- intelligence advisers served in many key dinista People’s Army.) tionary Directorate (DRU) of El Salvador. roles in such ministries as Defense and 12 However, a decision was made to sign the Interior. According to Miguel Bolanos Hunter, document in Managua to reaffirm “the coor- 10See footnote 4, p. 3. who served in Nicaraguan counterintelligence dination and unity of Central America’s 11From “The Historic Program of the 1979-1983, in 1983 the 2,800-3,000 revolutionary vanguard forces” and to be the FSLN” in Resset and Vandermeer, The Nicaraguans in the state security services first revolutionary organizations to unify on Nicaragua Reader (New York, Grove Press, were supplemented by about 400 Cubans, 70 Central American soil. (Drawn from a tape 1983), p. 145. 1981 was also the year in which Soviets, 40-50 East Germans, and 20-25 recorded account entitled Informe de Manola Minister of Defense Humberto Ortega Bulgarians. He added that many of the [Manolo’s Report] and obtained by declared in a private meeting with army and Cuban military advisers were posing as Guatemalan security forces in March 1981.) militia officers that: civilian teachers. (Don Oberdorfer and Joanne Omang, “Nicaraguan Bares Plan to Discredit “Marxism-Leninism is the scientific doc- Foes,” Washington Post, June 19, 1983, trine that guides our Revolution, the in- p. A1).

4 The featured speaker was Bayardo Arce, who spoke on behalf of the FSLN A. El Salvador and promised “unconditional assistance to the revolutionary process in Guate- mala and El Salvador.”14 Before the Sandinista Directorate took Mobilizing for a “Final Offensive” To ensure that they would be invul- power in Managua, there were guer- On July 21, 1979, 4 days after Somoza nerable to retaliation from their neigh- rillas in El Salvador but no guerrilla bors for their expanding internationalist Red from Nicaragua, both Carpio’s war. Extremist forces of El Salvador’s Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) and role, the Sandinistas undertook a sub- left were violent but fragmented into stantial increase in Nicaragua’s conven- Borge’s GPP faction of the FSLN were competing factions. They had neither a present at a meeting in Managua to tional military power.15 By the end of unified organization nor the heavier, 1980, Nicaragua’s armed forces were discuss Sandinista support for armed more destructive modern weaponry. To struggle in El Salvador. The mobiliza- twice as large as the Somoza National use Carpio’s imagery (see p. 6), the San- Guard at its height. The Sandinista Peo- tion of external support did not get fully dinistas were decisive in uniting the in- underway, however, until a meeting ple’s Army doubled in size again by the ternal Salvadoran struggle with a end of 1982.16 held in Havana in December 1979 pro- broader international conflict. duced agreement among the Communist The country studies that follow illus- Building on a base of solidarity in trate the practical content the Sandin- 1 Party of El Salvador (PCES), the exile and armed opposition. Sandinista Armed Forces of National Resistance istas give to “revolutionary interna- support for violent warfare in El tionalism.” (FARN), and the FPL to form a Salvador falls into two distinct periods: trilateral coordinating body.2 During • An attempt to repeat in El 1980, the original three were joined by Salvador the pattern of the Sandinistas’ two additional groups, the People’s 14Informe de Manolo, pp. 18-22. own final military offensive against Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the 15Concern about “counter-revolutionary” Somoza; and Central American Revolutionary activities by former National Guardsmen and • “Prolonged war” against El Workers’ Party (PRTC) to form the other opponents of the regime was expressed from the earliest days (e.g. in the “72-Hour Salvador’s economy, elections, and in- Farabundo Marti National Liberation Document” cited in note 4, p. 3.). But the stitutions after the first approach failed. Front (FMLN), which, with its political Sandinistas do not assert that the armed arm, the Democratic Revolutionary resistance had reached dimensions requiring Front (FDR), has served as the um- military buildup before 1982. (See Contrar- brella organization for the Salvadoran revolucion [sic]: Desarrollo y Consecuencias, guerrilla movement. Datos Basicos 1980-1985, Managua, 1985). In addition to attempting to preclude military, action by their neighbors in response to the Sandinistas’ intervention in their affairs, the explanation for the early focus on developing a large military establishment also may be 1During the war against Somoza, several 2Detailed information on these meetings, found in the capacity it gave the FSLN to Salvadoran groups on the extreme left pro- the subsequent trip of Salvadoran Communist exercise control over Nicaraguan society. The vided support to the FSLN, but Carpio and Party (PCES) Secretary General Jorge Shafik country’s new armed forces were organized his FPL and the Prolonged Popular War fac- Handal to the Soviet bloc, and the specifics of around the FSLN’s armed elements, which, tion of the FSLN (FSLNIGPP) headed by the supply routes through Nicaragua, was numbered some 5,000 by July 1979. Tomas Borge probably had the closest links. contained in PCES documents obtained in, Significantly, they were denominated the Carpio and Borge were cut to similar pat- November 1980, and ERP documents col- Sandinista People’s Army and had an ex- terns: both formed militant splinter groups; lected in January 1981. This information was plicitly political, FSLN-related function as both were rigidly partisan in their revolu- published in the State Department’s Special well as the customary duty of protecting tionary philosophies, espousing prolonged Report No. 80, Communist Interference in Nicaragua from attack. The police forces armed struggle from a rural support base; El Salvador, February 23, 1981. Facsimilies were also organized by the FSLN, The party and both were committed “internationalists.” of 19 documents were also released that same with the Ministry of Interior troops com- Part of the estimated $50-100 million ac- day: Department of State, Communist In- manded by FSLN Directorate member cumulated in 1977-79 by leftist extremist terference in El Salvador: Documents Tomas Borge and other smaller FSLN- groups in ransom and protection payments Demonstrating Communist Support of the controlled forces) thus had a monopoly on was invested in the Sandinista revolution Salvadoran Insurgency, February 23, 1981 force within Nicaragua exercised through next door. Salvadoran radicals engaged in (cited hereafter as Documents). The authen- highly politicized bodies. acts of “revolutionary solidarity” such as the ticity of these documents and of the story 16According to the International Institute February 14, 1978, People’s Revolutionary they tell have since been corroborated by of Strategic Studies, Nicaragua’s regular Army (ERP) attack on the Nicaraguan Em- new intelligence sources and defectors. (See armed forces numbered 7,100 men and 4,000 bassy in San Salvador, proclaimed as an “act also “Response to Stories Published in the paramilitary forces in 1977, just before the of repudiation against Somoza” (FBIS, Wall Street Journal and the Washington civil war heated up in 1978-9. (See The February 15, 1978). Post about Special Report No. 80,” Depart- Military Balance 1977-1978, London, 1977, ment of State, June 17, 1981, which contains p. 74.) By 1982, the Sandinista armed forces a 25-point response to the factual criticisms numbered 21,500 and its paramilitary forces of the February 23 report.) around 50,000. (See The Military Balance 1982-1983, London, 1982, pp. 104-106.) By 1984, the Sandinista People’s Army numbered 61,800 regular troops. (See The Military Balance 1984-1985, London, 1984, p. 123).

5 Redirecting the Costa Rican Net- works. The first step was to revitalize They say that we are sending weapons to El Salvador but they have the networks originally established in Costa Rica during the struggle against not offered any real proof. But let us suppose that weapons have Somoza to support armed struggle in El reached El Salvador from here. This is possible. More than that, it Salvador. Aided b v a few Costa Rican is possible that Nicaraguan combatants have gone to El Salvador, officials, the Cubans arranged for the but this cannot be blamed on any decision of ours. collection of Sandinista arms still in Costa Rica. Modest amounts of arms Tomas Borge were infiltrated into El Salvador by April 19816 Costa Rican and Panamanian pilots. On June 15, 1980, a twin engine Aero Com- One thing is evident, the members of the [Sandinista] Directorate mander crashed in El Salvador. The and all its working teams, some inside the country and others out- weapons and ammunition on board were side the country, are steadfastly at work fully aware of the need to recovered by the Salvadoran military. unite the internal struggle with international solidarity and with Arms from Costa Rican caches were the struggle of all peoples for the liberation of Central America and also smuggled overland assisted by the El Salvador . . . . The Central American peoples’ struggle is one FSLN and the Communist Party in Honduras.3 single struggle. [Emphasis added] Nicaragua Becomes the Hub. Dur- Salvadoran Guerrilla Leader Salvador Cayetano Carpio ing the second half of 1980, Nicaragua 7 became the center of the clandestine Managua, April 9, 1983 arms flow. Unlike Costa Rica and Hon- duras, Nicaragua provided a favorable environment, including secure com- ticipant reported that, in the first week Le Duan, the Secretary General of the munications and transportation links to of June, the FSLN Directorate offered a Vietnamese Communist Party, and Cuba by both sea and air. headquarters (“sede”) in Nicaragua for other high-ranking party and military of- In late May 1980, after negotiations the DRU with “all measures of securi- ficials. The Vietnamese agreed as a in Havana, the ERP joined the guerrilla ty,” that it was “disposed to contribute ”first contribution” to provide 60 tons of in material terms,” and that it “assumes arms-overwhelmingly of U.S. manufac- coalition. The new coalition, known as 5 the Unified Revolutionary Directorate the cause of El Salvador as its own.” ture, including 1,620 M-16 automatic rifles with 1,500,000 rounds of ammuni- (DRU), issued a press release in Havana Transshipping Weapons From the tion, enough to equip an entire combat announcing the broadened alliance. Dur- Soviet Bloc. While other DRU leaders infantry battalion.” ing this visit, the DRU leaders met went to Managua, Salvadoran Com- three times with Fidel Castro and munist Party leader Jorge Shafik Managing the Weapons Flow in discussed military plans with the Cuban Handal left Havana for Moscow. In ear- Nicaragua. FSLN Directorate member Directorate of Special Operations—the ly June, Shafik Handal met with Mikhail Bayardo Arce met with members of the same covert operations/special forces Kudachkin, an official of the Soviet DRU General Staff in July 1980 to unit that had organized Cuba’s interven- Communist Party Central Committee. review the logistical infrastructure for tion in Angola .4 The Soviets suggested that Shafik Han- the guerrilla war in El Salvador. Arce After the Havana meetings, DRU dal travel to Vietnam to seek arms. In leaders went to Managua to meet with Vietnam, Shafik Handal was received by Sandinista officials. One Salvadoran par-

3A Special Commission established in 4"Informe de Eduardo/Viaje de 5 de 8See Appendix 5. From .1unc 19 to July 3, June 1980) by the Costa Rican legislature con- Mayo al 8 de Junio/80" (Report of trip of 1980, Shalik Handal visited the German firmed that the clandestine arms-supply link Eduardo from May 5 to June 8, 1980), Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, Documents, D, pp. 2-3. Bulgaria, and Hungary. His requests pro- established in the fight against Somoza, con- 5Ibid., p. 3. duced several promises of arms and military tinued to function between Costa Rica and El 6Bohemia, Caracas, April 20-26, 1981. equipment, The East Germans told Handal Salvador after July 1979. According to the 7The senior FMLN Comandante until his that they would be willing to divert some Commission’s report, “arms trafficking, suicide, Carpio was speaking at funeral ser- medical supplies they had already sent to originating in Costa Rica or through Costa vices in Managua for murdered FPL Coman- Nicaragua, and that they would train Rican territory, [began] toward El Salvador, dante Ana Maria. as transmitted by Managua Salvadoran guerrillas. Because they did not directly or using Honduras as a bridge.” The domestic service, April 9, 1983, and by FBIS, possess suitable Western arms, both East quotation is from the Commission’s Report, April 11, 1983. The, murder, funeral, in- Germany and Hungary raised the possibility which was excerpted May 15, 1981 in La Na- vestigation, and suicide were all covered in of exchanging communist for Western cion, San Jose, and reprinted by FBIS on great detail in the FSLN newspaper, Bar- manufactured arms with either Ethiopia June 12, 1981. ricada, during April 1983. Angola. The Czechs promised Czech-made arms, of types already available in the West so as to maintain plausible denial.

6 questioned the DRU’s military and set up a commission to oversee the pro- equipment were still in Nicaragua political preparations but agreed to fur- vision of material aid to the Salvadoran awaiting shipment to El Salvador. He nish ammunition, arrange meetings with guerrillas. Originally scheduled for added that approximately 300-400 tons the FSLN military commission to Managua, the meeting was shifted to of weapons and materiel would be in discuss military matters, and suggested Havana at the request of the San- Cuba by mid-November, ready for that they might provide Western- dinistas so as to obscure their transfer to Nicaragua and then to El manufactured weapons from FSLN involvement. Salvador. The DRU coordinator urged stocks.9 By that time, the Nicaraguan At the end of October 1980, immedi- the armed groups in El Salvador to security forces had already begun to ately after the second tranche of a work harder to absorb more arms receive weapons from the Soviet bloc. specially enacted $75 million program of shipments, noting that some communist As bloc weapons were absorbed, the U.S. aid to Nicaragua was authorized countries had doubled their promised Sandinistas transferred some Western for disbursement, the Nicaraguans pro- aid and adding that: “This is the first arms in their inventories to the vided the Salvadoran guerrillas with a revolution in Latin America to which Salvadoran insurgents. new delivery schedule and resumed they have committed themselves uncon- By mid-September 1980, the arms weapons deliveries by sea and air on an ditionally with assistance before the promised to Shafik Handal during his even larger scale than before the seizure of power.”13 earlier travels were en route to Cuba suspension. Also in late October, the and Nicaragua. In September and Oc- Salvadoran guerrillas decided to operate Air Routes From Nicaragua. Ex- tober, aircraft flight frequencies and a clandestine radio station with the isting land infiltration routes could not intelligence reporting both indicated a move this growing volume of arms in sharp increase in the flow of military time for the planned FMLN offensive of equipment into Nicaragua from Cuba. The Salvadoran revolutionaries early 1981. Accordingly, Nicaragua— Sandino International Airport was do not have military bases here. with Cuban support—assumed a more closed for normal traffic between 10:00 direct role and began airlifting arms p.m. and 4:00 a.m. for several weeks to If they have bases outside of El from airfields in Nicaragua. This airlift accommodate cargo planes ferrying arms Salvador, they are in Guatemala was directed by the Commander of the and other equipment from Cuba. and Honduras. Nicaraguan Air Force, Raul Venerio In late September, the United Daniel Ortega Granera, and a Cuban adviser. States made strong protests to the June 198311 The principal staging area came to Nicaraguan Government about the arms be an airfield at Papalonal. The pattern flow from Nicaragua to El Salvador. and speed of construction at Papalonal, Fearful that discovery would jeopardize technical help of the Cubans and which is in an isolated area 23 nautical the recently approved $75 million in Nicaraguans.12 On December 15, Radio miles northwest of Managua, lacking ad- economic support funds from the United Liberacion began to broadcast from jacent commercial or economic activity, States, the Sandinistas held up trans- Nicaragua. A second clandestine station, made clear its military function. In late shipment of the arms for 1 month— Radio Venceremos, subsequently began July 1980, this airfield was an agricul- despite Salvadoran guerrilla appeals to broadcasting in the vicinity of the tural dirt airstrip approximately 800 move these weapons onward. To the Honduras-El Salvador border. meters long. By December, photography U.S. demarche, the Nicaraguan Govern- On November 1, 1980, the DRU revealed a lengthened and graded run- ment responded that while some logistics coordinator in Managua in- way with hard dispersal areas and Nicaraguans, including individual of- formed the guerrilla General Staff that storage buildings under construction. By ficials, might be involved in arms approximately 120 tons of military January 1981, the strip had been shipments, the government itself was lengthened to 1,200 meters. A turn- not responsible.10 around had been added at each end. A In mid-October, Havana was the site dispersal parking area with three hard- of a meeting at which representatives of stands had been constructed at the west the Communist parties of Central end of the runway. Three parking America, Mexico, and Panama agreed to aprons had been cleared, and three

9"Informe Sobre Viaje” (Trip Report), 11Time, June 6, 1983, p. 18. Documents, K, p. 2. This hand-written letter- Documents, G, p. 3. The meeting with Arce 12Documents, P, transmits an “official” report from the PCES files adds that: “It is took place on July 23, 1980. FMLN request for both a permanent impressive how all countries in the socialist 10The diplomatic exchange is discussed clandestine station in Nicaragua and a mobile bloc fully committed themselves to meet our below in Section III. The guerrillas discuss radio unit to overcome the success Duarte every request and some have even doubled their logistics problems in Documents, J, K, was having in “confusing” the people. their promised aid.” L, M, N, and O. 13"Informe #4" (Report #4) addressed to ”Joaquin, Jacobo, Marcial, DRIT del FMLN,”

7 hangar or storage buildings, each about 15 meters wide, had been constructed on the aprons.14 On January 2, 1981. a C-47 was observed at Papalonal for the first time. Two C-47s were observed in February. These C-47s and DC-3s (the civilian version) were used to ferry larger cargoes of arms from Papalonal to areas of guerrilla infiltration in southeastern El Salvador. Several pilots were iden- tified in Nicaragua who regularly flew the route into El Salvador. Radar track- ing also indicated flights from Papalonal to southeastern El Salvador. On January 24, 1981, a C-47 dropped arms by parachute in the vicinity of a small strip in southeastern El Salvador. On January 24, 1981, a Cessna from Nicaragua crashed upon takeoff after unloading passengers at an airfield in El Salvador close to where the C-47 air- drop occurred. A second plane, a Piper Aztec, sent to recover the downed crew, was strafed on the ground by the Salva- doran Air Force. The pilot and numer- ous weapons were captured. The pilot stated he was an employee of the Nica- raguan national airlines, LAN1CA, and In one of several photographs taken beginning in mid-1980, two C-47/DC-3 cargo that the flight originated from Sandino planes are parked next to sheds at the Papalonal airstrip. Note that fresh grading International Airport in Managua.15 appears in a lighter tone on this photograph, which was taken on March 12, 1981.

14Following is an extract from an in- Nicaragua to Lempa and Santa Teresa “Recent imagery [aerial photography] telligence summary prepared for the White airstrips in El Salvador. Costa Rican substantiates this reporting. Papalonal House on January 9, 1981, the day before the pilots in the pay of the Nicaraguan airstrip was lengthened and new hangars ”Final Offensive” was launched. The analysis Government conducted six flights during and parking aprons were Constructed late appears on pages 2 and 3 of a classified November, delivering an estimated 5,000 last year. Moreover, imagery also con- memorandum entitled “Nicaragua-Cuba: In- pounds of arms—FAL and Galil rifles, am- firms the presence of a new C-47 at creasing Support for Central American In- munition, grenades, and dynamite. The Managua’s Sandino Airport on (late, surgents.” It was confirmed by subsequent clandestine night flights were coordinated when our sources reported the planes’ ac- events and information in virtually every with Salvadoran leftist, who secured and quisition and the December training respect although the volume of weapons, lit the airfields and unloaded the aircraft flights; imagery also subsequently showed, estimated below at about 60 tons by in minutes. A Nicaraguan Government of- a C-47 at Papalonal in early January at December, proved larger than this contem- ficial and a Cuban adviser reportedly the same time there was a return to the porary analysis suggested. oversaw the operations. By December, normal inventory of C-47 planes in some 60 tons of weapons had been Managua . . . . “Nicaragua has taken a more direct role stockpiled in Nicaragua for transfer to El “There are indications of more in supplying arms and materiel to the Salvador. widespread Nicaraguan support opera- Salvadoran left, which is now receiving “Following the crash of one of the tions in the offing. A camouflaged com- larger quantities of sophisticated planes at Santa Teresa on 25 November, munications intercept site has been weapons. Multiple sources previously had FSLN authorities ordered a halt to fur- reported in extreme northern Nicaragua reported Sandinista arms shipments to El ther flights until mid-December; at the across the bay from El Salvador, and its Salvador—by boat across the Gulf of pilots’ request, the stand-down was ex- presence appears confirmed by imagery. Fonseca , by land via Honduras, or by air tended until after the holiday season. It will reportedly he augmented with ad- with the collaboration of Panamanian and Plans call for at least four flights per ditional equipment in the near future. Costa Rican gunrunners. Recent report- week from both Papalonal and Rosario This area was earlier reported to be the ing, however, indicates that by last airstrips, with daily flights once the planned staging ground for a future November the FSLN had begun airlifting Salvadoran insurgents begin a general of- Nicaraguan-supported assault by weapons directly from Nicaragua to El fensive . . . . Salvadoran insurgents against a coastal Salvador. “In addition, a Nicaraguan Government Salvadoran target.” “Four separate sources have reported C-47—piloted by a Sandinista Air Force 15 on such flights or related preparations. In (FAS) officer and with a joint Nicaraguan- The FBIS for January 27 and 28, 1981 November, a Costa Rican arms trafficker Cuban crew-was to begin ferrying arms arrives accounts of this incident from ACAN, made a “paper sale” of several planes to to El Salvador in mid-December, accord- ACAN-EFE, Latin, and La Prensa Grafica, a Honduran aviation company to conceal ing to detailed information provided by San Salvador, January 26, 1981. acquisition of the aircraft by the FSLN. two separate sources. The flights, under A second source identified two of the the supervision of Col. Carlos Rodriguez, same planes making clandestine flights Cuban adviser to the FAS, were to from the isolated Papalonal airstrip in originate from an unnamed airstrip in the same area as Papalonal.

8 Land and Sea Shipments From ers, at least three .50 caliber and one been captured; the guerrillas broadcast Nicaragua. While air resupply was .30 caliber machineguns, 125 boxes of a tape to rally support, announcing that playing a key role, infiltration was also TNT, and 10 M-79 granade launchers. the assassination of Jose Napoleon taking place by land and sea. Overland Duarte and other Salvadoran leaders arms shipments reached El Salvador Impact of Nicaraguan Aid. By was imminent. Using the weapons through Honduras from Nicaragua and December 1980, the guerrillas were smuggled from Nicaragua, guerrilla Costa Rica. Small launches operating employing weapons never before used in units struck at 40-50 locations out of several Nicaraguan Pacific ports El Salvador. Among them were U.S.- throughout El Salvador, downed two crossed the Gulf of Fonseca at night, made M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade helicopters, and overran a National carrying arms, ammunition, and launchers. Unlike the M-1s and the Guard post. Hit-and-run street actions personnel.16 G-3s used by the Salvadoran military, were everywhere. In the cities, buses In mid-January 1981, Honduran most of these weapons were not were burned; in the countryside, guer- security forces intercepted a trailer available in the quantities involved in rillas boarded buses and exhorted sur- truck in Comayagua that was part of an the FMLN offensive either locally or on prised passengers to take up arms. The arms supply network run by FPL guer- the Central American black market. cities of San Salvador, Santa Ana, rillas working through Nicaragua. The They were a far cry from the handguns, Chalchuapa, Chalatenango, and truck contained weapons and ammuni- hunting rifles, shotguns, and homemade Zacatecoluca came under especially tion in a false compartment in the roof. explosives which until mid-1980 had heavy fire. The governor of Santa Ana This one truck contained over 100 M-16/ been the basis of the guerrilla arsenal in described the city as “under siege.” AR-15 automatic rifles, 50 81mm mortar El Salvador. Both airports were closed, their access rounds, approximately 100,000 rounds of Before January 1981, no nationwide roads cut.20 5.56mm ammunition, machinegun belts, or even departmentwide offensive had The guerrillas had hoped for a field packs, and first aid kits. Over 50 of been launched by the guerrillas. In fact, popular insurrection, which, with their these M-16/AR-15 rifles were traced to the DRU and the FMLN, and even the armed attacks, would result in a total Vietnam where they had been left when FAL, one of their key components, were breakdown of the government and lead U.S. troops departed.17 all founded only after the FSLN had to an immediate victory. This did not In May 1981, a Salvadoran defector demonstrated its willingness to help. happen because the overwhelming from the Armed Forces of Liberation majority of El Salvador’s population (FAL), Luis Alvarado Saravia, made a The “Final Offensive.” On Jan- ignored the guerrillas’ appeals. Although lengthy statement to the Salvadoran uary 10, 1981, broadcasting from a four army officers joined the guerrillas, press. He detailed how the Nicaraguan clandestine radio station located inside the army remained basically united and Government provided food, transporta- Nicaragua, the guerrillas proclaimed fought back. tion, and false documents to enable him that “the decisive hour has come to in- The costs of this Nicaragua-based to train in Cuba. He also described itiate the decisive military and insurrec- assault on El Salvador’s society were movements of guerrillas and arms from tional battles for the seizure of heavy. They were all the more tragic in Nicaragua into El Salvador days prior power.”18 Radio Managua took up the that by 1981 the Salvadoran Govern- to the January 1981 offensive. The arms call, broadcasting: “A few hours after ment was beginning to address the and supplies he described included 2,200 the FMLN General Command ordered a serious political, social, and economic rifles (FALs, M-1s, and M-2s), two final offensive to defeat the regime problems that most concerned the radio transmitters, ammunition, established by the military-Christian people of El Salvador. In its commit- grenades, more than 15 rocket launch- Democratic junta, the first victories in ment to reform, the Christian the combat waged by our forces began Democratic/armed forces junta of El being reported.”19 Salvador had the full political support of Within the first hours of January 10, the United States. On January 16, 1981, four San Salvador radio stations had President Carter reacted to Sandinista

16Arquimedes Canadas, alias Alejandro together with over 900 other Salvadorans. Threshold of a Democratic Revolutionary Montenegro, described these routes in detail Morales said he was trained in underwater Victory, distributed in the United States in after his arrest in Honduras in August 1982. demolition. English during February-March 1981. (See Appendix 3 and Hedrick Smith, “A 17ACAN-EFE reported the seizure on 19The next day, January 11, 1981, the Former Salvadoran Rebel Chief Tells of January 21, 1981 with a Tegucigalpa dateline FSLN paper Barricada published an Extra Arms from Nicaragua,” New York Times, (FBIS, January 22, 1981). (See also Appendix that bannered “The final offensive has July 12, 1984, p. A10.) An individual account 5.) Although many weapons only have lot begun,” complete with photographs of this same period was provided by numbers that do not allow definitive traces, advancing guerrillas. Salvadoran guerrilla Santo Salome Morales, M-16s can be individually traced once cor- 20The FMLN’s own summary of its ac- who defected in Honduras in September responding records of serial numbers are tions as of January 21, 1981, is reprinted in 1981, reported that he and 12 others went located. Most of the M-16s in the truck re- Appendix 6; also see “El Salvador’s Civil from El Salvador to Nicaragua via a point ferred to above were traced to Vietnam. War,” Newsweek, January 26, 1981. By the near the Gulf of Fonseca in May 1980. From 18See “A Call by the General Command time fighting slowed, some 10 days after the Managua, they proceeded to Cuba where of the FMLN to Initiate the General Offen- offensive began, about 400 people were dead they received extensive military training, sive,” reproduced on pp. 82-83 of the and 800 injured. FMLN-FDR booklet El Salvador on the

9 arms supply activities by authorizing a exceptions—the highly sophisticated and Continuing Patterns of modest resupply of ammunition.21 successful attack on Salvadoran military Nicaraguan Support Except for transportation and com- aircraft at the Ilopango Airbase early in munication equipment and other non- the year and the nationwide, coor- Continued Sandinista backing for the lethal items, the United States had dinated, guerrilla offensive against the FMLN’s military strategy consisted of provided no military aid, and no March 1982 elections, which failed in its three major components: arms and other weapons or ammunition, to El Salvador goal of preventing the vast majority of logistical supplies, training, and com- since 1977. voters from going to the polls. In the mand and control. Levels of material countryside, the guerrillas were mass- support have fluctuated occasionally. The most notable declines took place Prolonged War ing, operating in larger numbers, utiliz- ing more sophisticated communications during 1981 in the disorganization that The failure of the “final offensive” pro- equipment and weaponry and, in briefly followed the defeat of the duced a decision to carry on a prolonged isolated areas, conducting operations January offensive and again in late 1983 war of attrition and economic sabotage more typical of a conventional war than after the U.S.-Caribbean action in while drawing on Nicaragua to increase a guerrilla conflict. These tactics con- response to the collapse of the New the military strength of the guerrillas.22 tinued through 1983, a year marked by Jewel government in Grenada. This con- Although the FMLN was generally re- an attack on the military headquarters tinuing Nicaraguan aid was what jected by the population at large, guer- of the 4th Brigade in El Paraiso, allowed the Salvadoran guerrillas to con- rilla numbers continued to increase for Chalatenango Department and destruc- tinue their operations on a large scale. tion of the Cuscatlan Bridge on the Pan some time after the “final offensive.” Arms Supplies. With Cuba as a The sophistication of their military American Highway in December and January 1984. main source,23 Nicaraguan supplies of equipment and strategy also improved. arms to FMLN units were stepped up Seeking to compensate for the Damage Caused by the Guerrillas. to make possible an offensive to disrupt failure of the “final offensive,” the a peaceful vote in the March 28, 1982, FMLN launched a series of terrorist at- As of early 1983, some of the most fer- tile land could not be cultivated because Constituent Assembly elections. tacks starting in late February 1981. In the first 3 months of 1982, The American Embassy in San Salvador of guerrilla attacks. Guerrilla actions had destroyed 55 of the country’s 260 shipments of arms into El Salvador was rocketed twice and strafed five reached the highest overall volume since times in March and early April. Guer- bridges and damaged many more. The national water authority had to rebuild the “final offensive” in 1981. The rilla attacks against the economic in- Nicaraguan-based arms flow into El frastructure reached higher levels, as 112 water facilities damaged by guerrilla action; 249 attacks on the telephone Salvador utilized both sea and overland they increasingly targeted power routes through Honduras. In February towers, water pumping stations, elec- system caused millions of dollars in damage. In the 22-month period ending 1982, for example, a large shipment of trical generators, highways, and produc- arms arrived by sea from Nicaragua to tive facilities such as farms and November 1982, the guerrillas caused over 5,000 interruptions of electrical the Usulutan coast. Early in March businesses. 1982, a guerrilla unit in El Salvador In October 1981, in a sophisticated power-an average of almost eight a day. The entire eastern region of the received several thousand sticks of TNT attack displaying better training than and detonators (five sticks of TNT are they had previously shown, a large country was blacked out for over a third of the year in both 1981 and 1982. The sufficient to blow up an electrical pylon). guerrilla contingent succeeded in In addition to small arms and vitally destroying the major Puente de Oro guerrillas destroyed over 200 buses in 1982 alone. Less than half the rolling needed ammunition, guerrilla supply bridge over the Rio Lempa. By that operations in 1982 provided greater time, the strategy of attacks aimed at stock of the railways remained opera- tional by early 1983. quantities of heavier weapons, including targets leading to a rapid popular upris- 57mm recoilless rifles and M-72 antitank ing, as hoped for in the “final offen- In short, unable to win the unco- sive,” had given way to the attrition erced loyalty of El Salvador’s people, and economic starvation inherent in the the guerrillas set out deliberately and ”prolonged war” concept. systematically to deprive them of food, The prolonged war concept was con- water, transportation, light, sanitation, tinued in 1982, with two noteworthy and work.

21By mid-January 1981, enough informa- Nicaragua “certainly with the knowledge and Central America,” Current Policy No. 414, tion was available to make the Nicaraguan to, some I extent the help of Nicaraguan U.S. Department of State, August 20, 1982, link clear to the Carter Administration, authorities.” p. 3). which undertook the private demarches noted 22The decision was probably joint. The 23In a Bonn press conference on June 19, in Section III and the Chronology. In an in- Salvadorans needed Nicaraguan help. The 1981, German Social Democratic leader Hans- terview with editors of the Washington Post Sandinistas saw the war in El Salvador as a Jurgen Wischnewski reported that when he published January 30, 1981, newly departed means of diverting attention from Nicaragua. had personally confronted Castro with State Secretary of State Edmund Muskie said that In that period, Daniel Ortega told Assistant Department contentions that Cuba had arms and supplies being used in El Salva- Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders that shipped weapons to Salvadoran guerrillas, dor’s bloody civil war were flowing through the FMLN was “nuestro, eseudo”— Castro had admitted it was true. Nicaragua’s “shield.” (“Building the Peace in

10 weapons, thus significantly increasing According to Napoleon Romero, of Fonseca, and arriving at the coast of guerrilla firepower. Individual units also formerly the third-ranking member of El Salvador’s Usulutan Department. regularly received tens of thousands of the largest guerrilla faction in the Thousands of rounds of ammunition dollars for routine commercial purchases FMLN who defected in April 1985, his translate into relatively small numbers of supplies. group was receiving up to 50 tons of of boxes, easily transported by man, On March 15, 1982, the Costa Rican material every 3 months from Nicaragua animal, or vehicle over multiple routes. Judicial Police announced the discovery before the reduction in deliveries after The lack of constant government of a house in San Jose with a sizable the U.S.-Caribbean action in Grenada. presence, and the relatively short cache of arms, explosives, uniforms, Romero gave a detailed description of distances from the coastline to all major passports, documents, false immigration just how the logistics network operated. guerrilla fronts, reduce the difficulties of stamps from more than 30 countries, The first “bridge” implemented for providing the guerrillas with certain and vehicles with hidden compart- infiltration was an air delivery system. types of logistics support from ments—all connected with an ongoing Romero stated that arms would leave Nicaragua.26 arms traffic through Costa Rican ter- Nicaragua, from the area of the ritory to Salvadoran guerrillas. Nine Cosiguina Peninsula, for delivery to the Training. The Sandinistas also pro- people were arrested: Salvadorans, coast of San Vicente Department in El vided training to the Salvadoran in- Nicaraguans, an Argentine, a Chilean, Salvador. He described the first such surgents and served as a transit point and a Costa Rican. Costa Rican police delivery as consisting of 300 weapons to other external training locations. also seized 13 vehicles designed for arms infiltrated at the end of 1980 in prepara- Nicaraguan and Cuban political and smuggling. Police confiscated some tion for the January 1981 “final offen- military training created the basic 150-175 weapons from Mausers to sive.” Romero claimed that air routes framework for the use of the arms by machineguns, TNT, fragmentation were suspended when the Salvadoran the guerrillas within El Salvador. The grenades, a grenade launcher and am- Armed Forces succeeded in capturing a two countries coordinated the training munition, and 500 combat uniforms. One large quantity of arms that came by air efforts, with Cuba providing most of the men captured told police that the from Nicaragua. It was at this point in specialized training for sabotage and arms and other goods were to have 1981, he continued, that seaborne demolition operations.27 The Sandinistas, been delivered to the Salvadoran delivery became—as it continues to be— for their part, trained Salvadoran guerrillas before March 20, “for the the primary method of infiltration. guerrillas in military tactics, weapons elections.”24 Romero described the sea route as The flow of supplies from Nicaragua departing front Nicaragua’s Chinandega continued at high levels into 1983. Department or islands (like La Concha25) off its coast, crossing the Gulf

24La Nacion, San Jose, March 16-21, The basic system, which continues into infrastructure was able to provide some 1982. 1985, is as follows: boats or large canoes 20,000-30,000 rounds of ammunition per 25In 1983, reporters visiting La Concha deliver the materials along the coastline month for the FPL alone. Some 300 found that: “A radio-equipped warehouse and where they are picked up and transported by guerrillas could be provided 100 rounds each at facility, disguised as a fishing animals, persons, or small vehicles into the (the usual load carried by a combatant), or cooperative on an island in northwestern Jucuaran region of southern Usulutan to the 150 guerrillas could be provided with 200 Nicaragua, has served for three years as a several dozen guerrilla logistics basecamps, rounds for a major battle. Such a delivery transshipment point for smuggling arms to El From Jucuaran, the supplies are transported would weigh about 1,300 pounds and be Salvador, numerous residents here say.” along four major “corridors,” within which packaged in about,34 metal boxes which (Sam Dillon, “Base for Ferrying Arms to El there are dozens of routes depending on the would be easily transported by 15-20 men, six Salvador Found in Nicaragua,” Washington method of transportation, the presence of pack animals, or one small pickup truck. Post, September 21, 1983, p. A29.) Salvadoran security forces, and the weather. Given El Salvador’s small size and the short 26Guerrillas defecting or captured as late These routes lead west out of Jiquilisco-Tres distances involved, material entering along as 1985 stated that the Department of Calles, northwest via Tapesquillo Alto, north the Usulutan coastline could arrive at any of Usulutan, especially the area around to El Brazo, and northeast to Tierra Blanca- the guerrilla fronts in about 1 week under Jucuaran and the coastline from Isla el Arco Bolivar. All major guerrilla fronts receive optimal conditions. to Playa el Cuco, continues to be essential for supplies through the Usulutan logistics 27Cuban Vice-President Car Rafael the distribution and transshipment of network. Rodriguez confirmed that Salvadoran guer- materials arriving in El Salvador from Within the Jucuaran area and along the rillas are trained in Cuba in at least two in- Nicaragua. While deliveries by land through four “corridors” and the dozens of roads, terviews, (Der Spiegel, September 28, 1981 Honduras and Guatemala continue, and time- trails, and rivers are located a series of and El Diario de Caracas, October,29, 1981). sensitive air deliveries (including essential storage facilities, usually natural eaves or The “Nidia Diaz” PRTC documents captured documents, personnel, and medicines) also underground bunkers that have been fortified in April 1985 show that the Salvadoran guer- take place sporadically, the largest volume of and concealed. Once materials are off-loaded rillas continue to receive training throughout arms, munitions, and materials from along the coastline, they seldom remain in the Soviet bloc. (See “Captured Salvadoran Nicaragua arrives by way of the Usulutan one location for more than 72 hours— Rebel Papers List Training Classes Over- coastline and interior transit points which reflecting both security precautions and the seas,” New York Times, May 21, 1985.) lead to all the major guerrilla fronts in El pressing need to sustain FMLN operations. Salvador. Napoleon Romero, the former FPL com- mander, estimated that this supply

11 use, communications, and explosives at importantly, weapons and ammunition, large numbers and has impeded their temporary training schools scattered Although some “free-lancing” takes massing for a major attack. In response, around the country and on Sandinista place in the field as targets of oppor- they have maintained the assault on the military bases. tunity appear, decisions on locations to economic infrastructure and have Training in Cuba and Nicaragua in- be attacked and supply deliveries have returned to small-group tactics and ur- cluded rehearsing for attacks on specific generally been coordinated with ban terrorism. Again, their weaponry targets in El Salvador—including the Managua.29 has improved; use of contact-detonated Puente de Oro Bridge in October 1981, The FMLN General Command was and command-detonated mines has made the Ilopango Air Base in January 1982, in Managua from 1981 until late 1983, guerrilla ambushes, even with relatively and the 4th Brigade Headquarters in when the FMLN, in conjunction with few personnel, more lethal and has in- December 1983. Adin Ingles Alvarado, Cuban advisers and the Sandinistas, creased collateral damage to civilians.30 formerly a commander of the special decided that the FMLN military leader- Although the FMLN probably forces unit of the FPL and a guerrilla ship should relocate to El Salvador, in achieved its greatest military strength from 1977 until his defection this year, particular to Morazan and Chalatenango in late 1983, and thereafter increasingly recently acknowledged publicly that he Departments. The changes were ap- lost the little popular support it had and 27 others rehearsed in Cuba the parently due to Sandinista desires to been able to maintain until then, the December 30, 1983, attack on the 4th maintain a lower profile in their support guerrillas have continued to operate in Brigade, making simulated assaults for the Salvadorans in the wake of the 1984 and 1985 as an effective fighting using a mockup of the 4th Brigade gar- U.S.-Caribbean action in Grenada. force. Guerrilla numbers may be down rison constructed from sketches. Ingles Romero points out that, despite to about two-thirds of their 1983 levels. also stated that the materiel used in the these changes, a “secondary direc- The strategic focus increasingly shifted actual attack-explosives, machineguns, torate” remains in Managua providing, to acts of terrorism and economic and ammunition-came in via Nicaragua. via radio communications, all the “sug- sabotage, as acknowledged by senior gestions” of the Cubans and Sandinistas guerrilla leaders in recent interviews Command and Control. As noted to the FMLN General Command in El with the Western press. above, Salvadoran guerrilla actions were Salvador. In addition to the “secondary Little has changed in the coordinated first by the Unified Revolu- directorate,” the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan support system. Although tionary Directorate (DRU), then by the Cubans have created special logistics Romero noted that the level of aid FMLN, using a general staff consisting organizations in Managua to coordinate dropped after Grenada in October 1983, of three members from each of the arms smuggling. supplies have continued to come in from guerrilla groups active in El Salvador.28 the warehouses in Managua. Romero Planning and operations were (and Holding On: 1984-85 said that his faction still receives about to a large extent continue to be) guided three-quarters of its ammunition from Managua, where Cuban and The increasing political sophistication and military professionalism of the supplies from Managua and virtually all Nicaraguan officers provide advice. The its supply of explosives. The Sandinistas guidance is radioed to guerrilla units Salvadoran Armed Forces has forced the guerrillas to forego movement in continue to control the distribution of throughout El Salvador. DRU/FMLN the supplies, approving or disapproving officials coordinate logistical support for the requests from individual guerrilla the insurgents, including food, groups on the basis of the tactical medicines, clothing, money and, most

28Public indications, of centralized control Esperanza. He states that the Sandinistas rilla action has inflicted $120 million on the come from the guerrillas themselves. On encouraged the FMLN to stay in Guazapa, owners of the transport industry and $20 March 14, 1982, the FMLN clandestine Radio and mentioned that he had presented a million on the National Association of Private Venceremos located in El Salvador broadcast logistics plan that was approved. Discussions Industries. In an interview in Perquin, El a message to guerrillas in El Salvador urging were held with representatives of the Salvador, top guerrilla leader Joaquin them “to maintain their fighting spirit 24 General Command. He observes that “as long Villalobos told the Western press that the hours a day to carry out the missions as the General Command remains inactive in FMLN “proposes a policy of attacking basic ordered by the FMLN general command” the interior, it is necessary to participate in commerce, electrical energy, the roads, with (emphasis added). this representation at the maximum level, frequent paralyzation of transport, railroad 29Notes kept by Roberto Roca of the otherwise we would remain ignorant of lines, telephone communication, export crops PRTC on meetings in Managua in March important decisions and we would lack infor- like sugar, cotton and coffee—aimed at break- 1983 with “Simon,” the pseudonym of the mation of great importance.” In a letter from ing the war economy and the regime.” MLN representative in Managua, refer to ”Simon” to Roberto Roca, leader of the (Quoted by Dan Williams, “Salvadoran War talks with the “Sandis” telling them of PRTC, the former discusses the need to com- Will Widen, Rebel Warns,” Los Angeles Salvadoran guerrilla needs and making the municate with “Fidel” (presumably Fidel Times, July 7, 1985.) Guerrilla spokesmen fre- Nicaraguans aware of two successful opera- Castro) concerning logistics and operational quently state that 60,000 persons have been tions in El Salvador—Calle Nueva and La problems with the “Sandinos.” killed since 1979. Whatever the number, it is 30Economic damage is now estimated at certain that the guerrilla war continues well over $1 billion. Radio Havana reported directly to claim many victims and to impede on August 27, 1985, that in 1985 alone guer- consolidation of political and economic reform.

12 soundness of their planned operations. Weapons continue to be infiltrated by B. Honduras land and sea.31 The Sandinistas also continue to pro- vide training for the Salvadoran guer- rillas. From March to June 1984, for ex- Immediately after July 1979, the San- second shipment in a tractor-trailer. ample, 100 ERP members received a dinistas and the Cubans paid little atten- This truck had entered Honduras at the self-defense course at Cerro Chiribis- tion to “solidarity” activities in Hon- Guasaule crossing from Nicaragua and quira in Leon Department at kilometer duras. Radical leftists in Honduras had was apparently heading for Guatemala. 28 on the Old Leon Highway.32 Alfredo never been particularly effective and in Ammunition and propaganda materials 1979 were not yet in a position to carry were hidden in the side walls of the Fernandez Flores, an ERP member cap- 1 tured in early August 1985, indicated out serious subversive activities. Hon- trailer. The same arms traffickers during his debriefing that Nicaragua duran territory, however, was, from the operated a storehouse in Tegucigalpa, start, of primary importance as a transit Honduras, with a false floor and a continues to provide ERP with combat 3 training. Fernandez said that he spent route for the flow of arms from special basement for storing weapons . 15 days in May 1985 in Nicaragua’s Nicaragua to the Salvadoran insurgency Honduran territory was also the Matagalpa Department fighting with the and, to a lesser extent, to guerrillas likely conduit for the arms caches cap- Sandinista People’s Army (EPS) to gain active in Guatemala. In 1980 the San- tured by Guatemalan security forces at combat experience. Eight other dinistas also began to provide logistical safehouses in Guatemala City in April Salvadorans also participated in this support, training, and advice for the and July 1981. As with arms captured in fighting.33 proliferating Honduran factions seeking January in Honduras, traces made on the violent overthrow of the Honduran the serial numbers of individual U.S.- Government. manufactured weapons seized in Guatemala revealed that 17 Transfer of Arms to El Salvador M-16/AR-15s had originally been 31On August 27, 1985, Salvadoran and Guatemala shipped to American units in Vietnam. authorities apprehended a pickup truck enter- Several of the vehicles captured at the ing El Salvador from Honduras at the El Poy Honduran territory and radical cadres Guatemala City safehouses bore recent checkpoint. The truck was carrying 84 became part of the logistics network for customs markings from Nicaragua.4 50-round boxes of assorted pistol and rifle the transfer of arms to Salvadoran ammunition of U.S. manufacture in a con- The discoveries pointed to the insurgents. The operations were done in cealed compartment. greater effectiveness of Honduran 32 ways to minimize actions that might Santos Enrique Garcia, who was a security operations along the border provoke the Honduran Government into member of ERP in Nicaragua from 1981 until with Nicaragua. In response, the level March 1985 and trained in Cuba, was cap- abandoning the passivity it had and size of arms shipments passing tured by the National Police in July 1985 previously displayed toward Sandinista through Honduran territory began to after he had returned to El Salvador, During operations against Somoza. Indeed, it Garcia’s stay in Nicaragua, the ERP had fall off. They did not cease, however. A was some time before the Honduran approximately 150 members in Nicaragua. former guerrilla commander of the Government was able to move effec- According to Garcia, as of March 1985, ap- Salvadoran People’s Revolutionary Ar- proximately 75 of those members had left the tively against the supply routes my (ERP), Alejandro Montenegro, ERP, complaining of poor treatment and a operating through Honduras. stated that guerrilla units under his lack of monetary compensation for their In January 1981, Honduran command in 1981-82 received monthly work. authorities made their first major inter- 33Debriefing of Alfredo Fernandez Flores, shipments of arms from Nicaragua, diction of supplies headed for the rebels August 1985. mostly via the overland route from Hon- in El Salvador when they discovered the duras.5 More recently, another senior arms trafficking network in the Hon- duran town of Comayagua.2 In April 1981, the Hondurans intercepted a

1In the November 1981 national elections, FBIS, April 10, 1981.) In May and June 1982 the two traditional parties received 96% of the security forces discovered three more the popular vote from a high turnout of 80% safehouses in Tegucigalpa, including caches of of eligible voters (see “Liberal Party in Hon- arms believed to have come from the San- duras Takes Big Lead in Vote,” New York dinistas (see State Department unclassified Times, November 30, 1981; “Honduran Vic- cable Tegucigalpa 4821, June 9, 1982). tor in Overture to Foes,” New York Times, 4The discovery of the safehouses was December 1, 1981). reported by ACAN-EFE, July 21, 1981, 2See text and footnote 17, p. 9. Radio Nuevo Mundo, Guatemala City, and 3Initelligence on the first major interdic- Radio-Television Guatemala, July 21 and 22, tions of arms shipments by the Honduran 1981, as reported in FBIS July 24, 1981. security forces was declassified and 5"A Former Salvadoran Rebel Chief Tells presented by the Honduran delegation to the of Arms From Nicaragua,” New York Times, XIV Conference of the American Armies in July 12, 1984, p. A10. 1981 (see also broadcast by Radio America, Tegucigalpa, April 9, 1981, as reported in

13 Salvadoran guerrilla leader, Napoleon authorities that the Nicaraguan Govern- authorities—to the point of refusing Romero, confirmed after his defection in ment had provided them with funds for them access to the control tower to com- April 1985 that Honduras continues to travel expenses and explosives. municate directly with the hijackers. be an important transit route for arms Documents captured in the raid and The Hondurans were forced to accede to from Nicaragua. His group, the Popular statements by the detained guerrillas the terrorist demands, freeing the Liberation Forces (FPL), brings supplies further indicated that: Salvadorans and flying them to Cuba.9 overland from Nicaragua to Tegucigalpa In September 1982, the Cinchoneros whence they are transferred to • The group was formed in seized control of the Chamber of Com- Chalatenango Department in northern Nicaragua at the instigation of high- merce in San Pedro Sula (Honduras’ El Salvador. He has stated that most level Sandinista leaders; second largest city), holding 107 promi- shipments now, in contrast to earlier • The group’s chief of operations nent businessmen and three Cabinet years, are small so as to minimize the resided in Managua; and ministers hostage. The demand once danger of discovery.6 • Members of the group received again centered on the release of cap- military training in Nicaragua and Cuba. tured Salvadorans and other imprisoned Armed Struggle: 1981-83 guerrillas. The Cinchonero attackers finally ended the hostage incident Prospects for vanguard activism in Hon- The documents included classroom without achieving any of their demands duras itself began to change in late 1981 notes from a 1-year training course held except safe passage to Cuba on when the country’s small Marxist par- in Cuba in 1980. Other documents September 28, 1982.10 ties fragmented. The splits were often revealed that guerrillas at one safehouse Another armed Honduran group, the generational in nature and took the form were responsible for transporting arms Popular Revolutionary Forces (FPR), of differences over the road to power. and munitions into Honduras from carried out an airplane hijacking on Almost invariably the new younger Esteli, Nicaragua. April 28, 1982. They demanded the factions—inspired by Sandinista release of over 50 prisoners but again success—favored armed struggle over settled for safe passage to Cuba on May the gradual methods favored by the At no time has there been any 1, 1982.11 The FPR was also responsible older generation. attack on Honduran territory for a number of bombings and attacks By 1981 the Sandinistas were from Nicaragua . . . . on the offices in Honduras of U.S. com- working closely with the new groups. In panies in 1982.12 On July 4, 1982, they an October 1981 interview in the pro- Nicaraguan Foreign sabotaged the main power station in government Nicaraguan newspaper El Ministry Communique 8 Tegucigalpa.13 In roughly the same time Nuevo Diario, the Morazanist Front for June 22, 1983 period as the attacks, the FPR was also the Liberation of Honduras (FMLH), training cadres in Nicaragua and Cuba founded in 1979, was described by “Oc- for a future “invasion” of Honduras. tavio,” one of its leaders, as a political- During 1981 other “post-Nicaragua” military organization formed as part of groups made their presence felt. The Olancho 1983, El Paraiso 1984-85 the “increasing regionalization of the most formidable was the People’s Central American conflict.” On Revolutionary Union/Popular Liberation The extent to which the Sandinistas November 17, 1981, the Honduran police Movement (URP/MLP). It was more back subversive movements inside Hon- raided a safehouse in Tegucigalpa popularly known as the “Cinchoneros.” duras became apparent when Honduran belonging to the Honduran Front for In March 1981 Cinchonero members hi- guerrillas—trained and supplied by Popular Liberation (FHLP).7 Police jacked a Honduran Airlines flight and Nicaragua and Cuba—attempted to ultimately captured several members of diverted it to Managua. Tellingly, they establish guerrilla bases in the Olancho this group, including a Honduran, a demanded the release of 10 Salvadoran Uruguayan, and several Nicaraguans. guerrillas who had been captured in The captured terrorists told Honduran Honduras while smuggling arms to the FPL in El Salvador. Sandinista officials refused to cooperate with Honduran

6Debriefing of Napoleon Romero, April 9See “Honduran Plane is Hijacked and 12For the company bombings, see State and May 1985 (see also “Salvadoran Rebels Lands in Managua,” March 28, 1981; Department unclassified cable Tegucigalpa Change Tactics,” Washington Post, May 17, ”Hostages Released from Honduran Jet,” 6502, August 6, 1982. The cable provides a 1985; “New Sources Describe Aid to March 29, 1981; and “Panama Plane Will Fly translation of the FPR communique claiming Salvadoran Guerrillas,” Washington Post, Captives from Honduras,” New York Times, credit for the attacks on the U.S. firms. June 8, 1985). March 30, 1981. 13For the July 4 bombing, see State 7Official Infbrme sobre la Captura y Des- 10See Agence France Presse (AFP), El Department unclassified cable Tegucigalpa mantelamiento del Grupo Subversivo Auto- Tiempo (Tegucigalpa), La Prensa (San Pedro 5564, July 7, 1982; see also broadcast by denominado “Frente Hondureno de Libera- Sula), El Heraldo (Tegucigalpa), ACAN- Cadena Audio Video, Tegucigalpa, July 11, cion Popular,” Tegucigalpa, December 2, EFE, as reported in FBIS, September 22-24, 1982, as reported in FBIS, July 12, 1982. 1981. 1982. 8As reported by Managua domestic serv- 11An extremely detailed account of the hi- ice, FRIS, June 23, 1981. jacking, including government and guerrilla statements, as reported by Radio Cadena Audio Video, Tegucigalpa, AFP, and ACAN-EFE, is reported in FBIS, April 29-May 3, 1982 (see also “Hijackers Release Hostages, Fly to Cuba,” New York Times, May 2, 1982).

14 Department of Honduras in 1983 and in however. The “invasion” was foiled by and U.S. intelligence reports current El Paraiso in 1984.14 Honduran security forces, and Reyes training of Honduran guerrillas in The two Honduran groups involved Mata was killed. Many of the par- Managua. in the attempted “invasions” were the ticipants captured by the Honduran Ar- Honduran branch of the Central my gave detailed descriptions of their Intimidation American Revolutionary Workers’ Party raining in both Nicaragua and Cuba. The Sandinista government, in addition (PRTC) and the aforementioned FPR. In July 1984, a similar effort was to supporting subversive movements in- The PRTC was then led by Jose Maria made to establish the base for a rural side Honduras, has engaged in a cam- Reyes Mata, a radical activist since the insurgency with the attempted infiltra- paign apparently devised to intimidate 1960s who had accompanied “Che” tion of 19 FPR guerrillas into the El the Honduran Government and keep it Guevara on his ill-fated adventure in Paraiso Department along the border from effectively controlling its borders. Bolivia.15 In April 1980, in the month between the two countries. As was the Border incursions by the Sandinistas when Honduras was holding democratic case with the Olancho group, the FPR have soured relations between the two elections for a constituent congress, cadre received training at Pinar del Rio countries almost from the moment Reyes Mata was arrested in connection in Cuba and afterward trained in Somoza fell in July 1979. The first of with a wave of pre-election violence and Nicaragua fighting the armed opposition nearly 300 border incidents through the kidnapping of a Texaco executive. He to the Sandinistas. Again the operation mid-1985 occurred on July 22, 1979—3 was freed after a general amnesty was contained by the Honduran Army. days after the Sandinistas entered decree and moved to Nicaragua later Afterward, members of the group led Managua.17 Before the year was out, the same year. Honduran authorities to several arms there were at least a dozen more in- Once in Nicaragua, Reyes Mata caches and subversive groups in the cidents. While the early missions were began planning to open a front inside Comayagua area. usually characterized by small units Honduras with Sandinista support. In In April 1985, the Sandinistas were operating with light weaponry, by 1985 1981 he conducted an active recruitment again caught trying to provide support the Sandinistas were employing 120mm campaign inside Honduras, and the first for the Honduran guerrilla groups, but mortar rounds. Heavy shelling from recruits departed via Managua for this time the operatives arrested were Nicaraguan territory by rockets and military training in Cuba. The trainees Nicaraguans. Between April 11-14, heavy artillery has also occurred. returned to Nicaragua in late 1982 and seven Nicaraguans were arrested in El The Sandinistas, in addition, have early 1983 and fought alongside San- Paraiso Department trying to infiltrate placed antipersonnel land mines along dinista army units against the arms to Cinchoneros based in Olancho both sides of the Honduran/Nicaraguan Nicaraguan resistance to gain combat Department. One of them was a border. Although the mines are justified experience. member of the Nicaraguan Directorate by the Sandinistas as self-defense In July 1983, Reyes Mata and his of State Security (DGSE) who stated against incursions by Nicaraguan 96-man force, armed by the Sandinistas, that he had coordinated similar arms in- resistance forces, the net effect is to en- entered the isolated and underpopulated filtrations since November 1984.16 danger the resident rural population in Department of Olancho in eastern Hon- The leadership of Honduran guerrilla the border areas. In June 1983, two duras. The operation was structured as groups continues to reside in Nicaragua, American journalists were killed when a vanguard action for other groups. The their car hit a Czechoslovakian- other forces were never infiltrated, manufactured mine on a Honduran road.18

14Most of the information on the two 15The PRTC is a regional group with statement by public relations department of operations was provided by defectors and/or branches in several countries. A history of the Public Security Forces, May 9, 1980, as captured guerrillas. (For Olancho, see State the connections between the various factions reported by FBIS, May 12, 1980. Department unclassified cable Tegucigalpa is given in an undated “Brief Historical Over- 16State Department unclassified cable 10769, October 11, 1983. See also “Honduran view of the PRTC,” captured on April 18, Tegucigalpa 6152, May 8, 1985. Army Defeats Cuban-Trained Rebel Unit,” 1985, by Salvadoran security forces, which 17Incidentes Protayonizados por La Washington Post, November 22, 1983. For El states that by 1979 “the PRTC had Republica de Nicaragua en Perjuicio de Paraiso, see statement made by Department developed an organized structure in Honduras, annual reports from 1982 on- of National Investigation as broadcast by Voz Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and wards. Also Resumen de las Principales Ac- de Honduras, Tegucigalpa, October 29, 1984, Costa Rica.” The. Salvadoran branch of the tividades del Ejercito Popular Sandinista en as reported in FBIS, November 1, 1984. See PRTC was responsible for the June 19, 1985, la Frontera con Honduras desde Enero 1984 Appendix 3. Also see detailed unclassified attack on a sidewalk cafe in San Salvador hasta 1 Junio 1985, Estado Mayor Conjunto account released in November 1984 by the which left six Americans and seven Latin de las Fuerza- Armadas (Honduran Armed U.S. Southern Command, Cuban-Nicaraguan Americans, dead (see Washington Post and Forces). Support for Subversion in Honduras: El New York Times, late June 1985, passim). 18News Conference by Foreign Minister Paraiso, July 1984.) On Jose Reyes Mata’s 1980 arrest, see Edgardo Paz Barnica, broadcast June 22, CAN-EFE, Tegucigalpa, May 8, 1980, and 1983, as reported by FBIS the same day.

15 Army and over the years became an in- C. Costa Rica tegral part of Sandinista defenses along the border with Costa Rica. The Nicaraguan Government supplies the Costa Rican support was essential to the advent of the Sandinista regime in unit with training, uniforms, arms, and the success of the struggle against Managua in July 1979, however, the tac- food, and in return, the unit carries out Somoza. In November 1978, the Costa tical allegiance to democracy of some of military actions against Nicaraguan Rican Government severed diplomatic the radical groups in Costa Rica began resistance forces operating along the relations with the Somoza regime and to shift. A peaceful political process Nicaragua-Costa Rica border. over the next 8 months allowed Costa could no longer be taken for granted. Rican territory to be used as a conduit The orthodox Communist Party in Arming for the Revolution for arms and supplies to the anti-Somoza Costa Rica, then called the Popular While Panama and Venezuela were pro- war effort on its northern border. Vanguard Party (PVP) and led by viding aid to the anti-Somoza opposition In the process of aiding the insur- Manuel Mora Valverde, contributed through Costa Rica in 1979, Cuba—with rection, however, Costa Rica’s stable cadres to Sandinista units to fight the aid of corrupt Costa Rican officials— democracy unwittingly opened the door against Somoza and to accelerate the established its own clandestine arms to future troubles directly related to the supply network for the Sandinistas. This Sandinistas. The Sandinistas’ disdain for network was later used to supply the what Defense Minister Humberto In 40 years of Somocismo, we Salvadoran insurgency and internal Ortega referred to as a “bourgeois never had the threat that we Costa Rican leftist groups. democracy in the hands of the rich,” The circumstances surrounding these soon made itself apparent.1 Costa Rican have in 4 years of Sandinismo. shipments were established by a special territory was used to transfer weapons commission created in June 1980 by the to the Salvadoran rebels, and groups in- Luis Alberto Monge, Costa Rican legislature to investigate side Costa Rica were armed and given President of Costa Rica charges then circulating that after the December 19833 military training. Terrorism became a Nicaraguan civil war, a black market persistent problem from 1981 on, and had developed in connection with war Nicaraguan opponents of the Sandinistas materiel left behind in Costa Rica.5 Dur- became targets of assassination at- PVP’s military preparedness in the ing the course of its investigation, the tempts. Tensions with Nicaragua in- event conflict broke out later in Costa commission discovered the shipments creased in general with the growth of Rica.4 By early 1979, the PVP had from Cuba. Then-President Rodrigo internal opposition to the Sandinistas several hundred combatants in Carazo of Costa Rica first denied that and recurring border incidents. Nicaragua. the flights had occurred when ques- The PVP maintained its force in tioned by the commission on November Early Ties to the Sandinistas Nicaragua after the Sandinistas came to 4, 1980, but later admitted them. On Costa Rica has long accepted the power. Major elements of it remain March 25, 1981, five Costa Rican pilots democratic participation of socialist and there today and provide permanent publicly admitted their participation in training for paramilitary cadres who Marxist parties in its political life.2 With return to Costa Rica. The unit did not act in isolation. From the start, it main- tained close contact with the Sandinista

1Humberto Ortega, Secret Speech, America: A Nation Divided, New York, in 1983. In March 1985, La Republica in San reproduced in La Nacion, San Jose, October 1976, pp. 223-224). For the 1978 and 1982 Jose ran a story of 100 Costa Ricans training 10, 1981. Among other things, he observed elections, the radical parties formed coalitions in Cuba and Nicaragua and quoted Security that “the Costa Ricans . . . very intelligently in an effort to expand their representation at Minister Benjamin Piza as saying “we have have maintained [but softened] the exploita- the national level. They received 7.3% of the always beard of the possibility that there are tion of man by man . , . [T]hat is the kind of vote in 1978 and less than 4% in 1982 (see groups harboring such a line of operation. We democracy four opposition] wants . . . that we Harold D. Nelson, ed., Costa Rica: A Coun- will do everything possible to neutralize the Sandinistas be like the left in Costa try Study, Washington, 1984, pp. 216-218). them” (see La Republica, San Jose, March Rica—a group which mobilizes politically and 3Georgie Anne Geyer, “Taking the San- 14, 1985, as reported by FBIS, March 25, puts out its own newspaper but where the dinistas at Their Word,” Wall Street Jour- 1985). In May 1985, La Nacion in San Jose bourgeoisie controls power.” nal, August 23, 1985, p. 15. quoted MRP leader Sergio Erik Ardon that 2The Costa Rican Marxist left is made up 4Many scattered reports confirm the ”there are presently Costa Ricans fighting at of several parties, foremost of which is the brigade’s presence in Nicaragua. In 1982 a the side of the Sandinista forces, just as Costa Rican People’s Party headed by Mora newspaper article referred to 700 Costa there are in the counterrevolutionary Valverde. Until 1984 his party was known as Rican leftists training in Nicaragua (La groups.” the Popular Vanguard Party (PVP). In 1948 Republica, Panama City, February 7, 1982, 5Report on arms trafficking issued by a military cadres of the PVP supported the un- as reported in FBIS, February 9, 1982). A special Costa Rican legislative commission on successful efforts by the incumbent govern- former Nicaraguan official, who defected in May 14, 1981. The report is the basis for the ment to thwart the outcome of democratic July 1985, recently gave details on a group of following comments (La Nacion, May 15, elections (see Ralph L. Woodward, Central PVP militants being trained in Nicaragua 1981, as reported by FBIS, June 2, 1981). during 1983. One of the Hondurans captured Also see “Arms Scandal is Charged in Costa in connection with the infiltration of El Rica,” New York Times, May 21, 1981. Paraiso in July 1984 spoke of training with a PVP cadre in the “internationalist” brigade

16 the transshipment of arms from Cuba The commission concluded that the rying a Costa Rican driver and three and gave details of the operations and imported weapons had been widely U.S. Embassy security guards. It was the names of the Cuban and Costa distributed inside Costa Rica. It followed in June 1981 by the killings of Rican officials involved in supervising reported that “weapons of war” had three policemen and a taxi driver. Both the clandestine flights.6 The commission been confiscated from various private attacks were traced to a radical splinter established that at least 21 such flights homes, including properties owned by group from the Marxist People’s had been made, most of the shipments Echeverria. Nine months later, on Revolutionary Movement (now known as arriving at a secondary airport, in March 25, 1982, another cache of arms the New Republic Movement), whose Liberia, removed from public scrutiny. was found in the house of Mora leader—Sergio Erik Ardon—has close Many of the weapons flown in by Valverde, the leader of the PVP. At the ties to Cuba and Nicaragua and who at the Cuban airlift were diverted to the time of the seizures, he claimed that the the time of the attacks stated that the insurgency in El Salvador. The pilots, in weapons were for “self-defense.”8 terrorism could be explained, if not their March 25 statement, recalled that The supply network, once in place, justified, in terms of the injustices of on one of the trips to Cuba, Manuel continued to operate for some time after Costa Rican society. Ardon was the only Pineiro of the Cuban Communist Party’s the air shipments from Cuba had Costa Rican political leader not to con- America Department asked whether ceased. In March 1982, Costa Rican demn the attacks as terrorism.10 they would be willing to fly arms to El security forces raided a safehouse in San Actions more clearly linked to exter- Salvador.7 The legislative commission Jose, arresting nine persons, including nal support followed. traced three shipments to El Salvador two Nicaraguans, in connection with an through Costa Rican territory in 1980 arms trafficking operation to El • Six armed persons—including and 1981. Salvador. About 175 weapons were Nicaraguans affiliated with the Importantly for the Costa Ricans, seized, including 70 M-16s, 50 of which Sandinistas—were arrested in July 1981 the commission confirmed that a were traceable as rifles originally crossing the Nicaraguan border into substantial number of these weapons re- shipped to Vietnam.9 Costa Rica on a mission to seize the mained in Costa Rica after the fall of Guatemalan Embassy in San Jose and demand the release by Guatemala of Somoza. The Minister of Public Security Terrorism: 1981-85 11 in 1979 was Juan Jose Echeverria convicted terrorists. The new orientation of Costa Rican Brealey—a man with close ties to Cuba • On January 19, 1982, two radical groups helped set off a wave of and now the leader of the Radical Salvadoran PRTC members—Jose Mar- violence inside the country over the Democratic Party. The commission in its roquin and Jonathan Rodriguez—were next few years. Many of the terrorist May 1981 report held Echeverria arrested in Costa Rica in connection acts, however, were attributable to ex- responsible for the fact that “there were with an attempted kidnapping of a ternal forces. While hiding behind a no controls over the war materiel that Salvadoran businessman. They later told screen of legitimate international rela- entered the country” and for the “disap- Costa Rican police that they passed first tions, Nicaragua took actions which pearance” of war materiel from state through Nicaragua, where they and were clearly meant to intimidate the arsenals, including 2,018 firearms. others were provided with false identity Costa Rican Government. documents to enter Costa Rica. Marro- The initial terrorist act took place in March 1981: an attack on a vehicle car-

6ACAN-EFE, March 24, 1981, as re- conduct passes issued them by Minister of 8Nelson, op. cit., p. 254. The police found ported in FBIS, March 26, 1981. During the Public Security Juan Jose Echeverria firearms, dynamite, and fragmentation months leading up to the overthrow of Brealey. grenades in his possession. Somoza in July 1979, a group of officers of 7It became public knowledge that, with 9La Nacion, San Jose, March 16-21, 1982, the America Department of the Cuban Com- Cuban financial support and guidance and passim. munist Party played a major role in the assistance from Fernando Comas, an America 10The activities of the group attracted Nicaraguan revolution. A number of America Department officer assigned as a consular of- considerable media coverage in Costa Rica. Department officers were assigned to Costa ficial in Costa Rica, the Chilean Fernando For details on the police investigation of the Rica and were responsible for moving arms Carrasco (a member of Chile’s Movement of group, see broadcasts of Radio Reloj, San and men into Nicaragua from Costa Rica. the Revolutionary Left—MIR) became the Jose, as reported in FBIS, June-August 1981, This group was headed by Julian Lopez Diaz, leading figure in a sophisticated air support passim. The terrorists had connections to a senior intelligence officer, who became operation to provide arms and ammunition to Uruguayan Tupamaros, Cinchoneros, and Cuba’s Ambassador to Nicaragua less than 2 insurgents in El Salvador. By virtue of his the FMLN. weeks after Somoza’s fall. Lopez and his position as the head of several air express 11Radio Reloj, San Jose, July 6, 1981, as associates moved freely throughout Costa companies, including one based in Costa Rica, reported in FBIS, July 8, 1981. Rica during this period, thanks to safe- Carrasco handled logistical details for supply missions. Carrasco initially based his opera- tion in Costa Rica and later changed the venue to Nicaragua.

17 quin told a Costa Rican court on Attacks on Nicaraguans in Costa Rica Monge administration asked Moscow to February 4, 1982, that he “received withdraw 17 of the 25 officials at its Much of the terrorism experienced military and political training” during Embassy in San Jose. The Soviets had by Costa Rica was directed at elements the several months he spent in been active promoting labor strife inside of the Nicaraguan opposition who have Nicaragua.12 Costa Rica since 1979.21 sought refuge in Costa Rica. In • In November of the same year, In the case of Nicaragua, approx- February 1982, an attempt was made to members of the Costa Rican branch of imately 90 incidents involving diplomatic assassinate Fernando Chamorro, former- the PRTC seriously wounded a protests were recorded before Costa ly a prominent anti-Somocista, now an Japanese businessman—who later died— Rica ordered Nicaragua, on February anti-Sandinista.16 The principal suspect in a botched kidnapping attempt. Two 19, 1985, to reduce its Embassy person- in the case was the Nicaraguan consul Salvadorans, a Honduran, and two nel from 47 to 10.22 The Sandinista at- in the town of Liberia, but by the time Costa Ricans were arrested in connec- tempts to intimidate the Costa Rican police sought him out, he had returned tion with the attempted kidnaping.13 Government began as early as 1980, 2 to Nicaragua. On October 6, 1982, an • Three Nicaraguan Embassy of- years before former Sandinista Eden Argentine associated with the ficials were expelled from Costa Rica on Pastora began his armed resistance to Nicaraguan opposition was kidnapped off July 28, 1982, for their involvement in the regime on its southern borders. In the streets in Costa Rica. He later ap- the July 4 bombing of the San Jose of- October 1980, Sandinista forces fired on peared on Nicaraguan television for a fices of SAHSA, the Honduran national Costa Rican vessels engaged in medical public “confession.” He was never heard airline. Costa Rica’s investigation of the missions on the San Juan River, which from again.17 case implicated a Colombian terrorist partially divides the two countries. In In April 1983, a Basque terrorist in- recruited by Nicaraguan Embassy of- 1982 Nicaragua’s challenge to Costa filtrated from Nicaragua was arrested in ficials in Costa Rica. One of the three Rica’s rights on the San Juan became connection with a plot to kill Eden Nicaraguan diplomats was arrested at a more sustained, and in June and July Pastora, a former Sandinista com- clandestine meeting with the Colom- 1982 several tourist boats on the river mander.18 On June 29, 1983, one FSLN bian.14 were intercepted. In 1983 units of the member was killed and another Nicara- • Terrorist actions on Costa Rican EPS began regular incursions into Costa guan injured in San Jose when a bomb soil peaked in 1982 but did not end. Rican territory. they intended for the opposition leaders Members of the New Republic Move- The seriousness of the incidents be- exploded prematurely.19 In November ment were responsible for a major bank tween Costa Rica and Nicaragua, if 1984, an attempt was made on the life robbery in Guanacaste Province in anything, has deepened this year. On of another opposition leader, Alfonso February 1985. When they were ar- May 31, 1985, a Costa Rican Civil Guard Robelo, with a fragmentation grenade.20 rested, they were found to have col- unit on border patrol was fired on by lected information on the movements of Sandinista army troops; two guards Attempted Intimidation U.S. Embassy personnel in Costa Rica were killed and nine were injured. San- as well as those of Costa Rican officials Not surprisingly, Costa Rica’s relations dinista units continued to bombard the and other foreign diplomats.15 with Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet area well after their unprovoked attack, Union deteriorated after 1979. Consular making it difficult to retrieve the relations with Cuba were severed in bodies.23 May 1981. In November 1982, the

12State Department unclassified cable San 16State Department unclassified cable San 22The downgrading of relations with the Jose 5710, August 23, 1982. Jose 4835, June 23, 1984. Sandinistas was precipitated by the violation 13Broadcast by Radio Reloj, San Jose, 17La Nacion, San Jose, various stories of the immunity of Costa Rica’s Embassy in November 9, 1982, as reported in FBIS, October-December 1982. Managua on December 24, 1984, when a November 10, 1982. Also see State Depart- 18"Cien Etarras en Nicaragua,” Cambio Nicaraguan citizen was abducted from Em- ment unclassified cable San Jose 7701, 16, Madrid, October 3, 1983, p. 22. bassy grounds (see Calendario de Incidentes November 12, 1982. 19"Bomb Kills Nicaraguan in Costa Rica,” cited in footnote 14 on this page). 14Broadeast by Radio Reloj, San Jose, Washington Post, June 30, 1983, p. A35. 23The incident received international July 28, 1982, as reported in FBIS, July 29, 20See President Monge’s condemnation of media coverage and was considered serious 1982; also included in Calendario de In- the attack as recorded by Radio Impacto, enough by the OAS to merit an investigation. cidentes Entre el Gobierno de Costa Rica y San Jose, November 5, 1984, as reported by el Gobierno de Nicaragua, February 1985. FBIS, November 8, 1984. 15Classified diplomatic correspondence. 21For the break with the Soviets and the Cubans see Nelson, op. Cit., pp. 238-239.

18 III. The Collective Response

The five Central American coun- American countries and the United The United States. Contrary to tries have agreed on the follow- States were determined to cooperate many popular misconceptions, the in the rebuilding of Nicaragua and the United States had directed its efforts ing objective: “to promote na- reintegration of that country—in accor- since mid-1978 toward facilitating a tional reconciliation efforts dance with its promises to the OAS— peaceful resolution to the conflict. Hop- whenever deep divisions have into the inter-American system that had ing to ensure that Somoza would not be taken place within society, with played an essential role in the removal followed by an equally repressive a view to fostering participation of the Somoza regime.2 regime, the United States participated in democratic political processes actively in an OAS-endorsed mission Nicaragua’s Neighbors. Of that sought to avoid violence. in accordance with the law.” Nicaragua’s immediate neighbors, only Consistent with this policy goal, the Costa Rica reacted in a fully positive United States viewed with concern the Contadora Document of Objectives Panama City, September 9, 1983 manner to the removal of Somoza. Costa role of the Sandinista front in the Rican territory had been available for military events culminating in Somoza’s the supply of weapons from Cuba, ouster. Nonetheless, the presence on the July 1979 Panama, Venezuela, and other foreign five-member junta of Violeta de sources to the anti-Somoza rebels. Costa Chamorro (widow of Pedro Joaquin The July 19, 1979, assumption of power Ricans hoped that the advent of a Chamorro, editor of La Prensa) and pro- by the junta of the Government of Na- popular, democratic government in minent businessman Alfonso Robelo, tional Reconstruction changed the Cen- Nicaragua had finally freed Costa Rica both of whom were unquestionably com- tral American scene. Several neighbor- from a longstanding military threat to mitted to democracy, gave the United ing governments were concerned at the its democratic, unarmed status and States and other countries of the collapse of Nicaraguan institutions and given it a new partner in the protection hemisphere reason to believe that the the looming power struggle within the and advancement of democracy in Cen- junta’s announced program and its pro- coalition which had led the uprising that tral America. mises to the OAS would be honored. removed Somoza from power. The more The reactions of the governments in general attitude in the hemisphere, Honduras and El Salvador were 1979-80 however—particularly among those cautious. Neither had opposed the OAS states which had contributed materially resolution which stripped the Somoza The fall of Somoza increased the ap- to the effort to remove Somoza—was regime of its legitimacy. But the strong preciation in neighboring countries of one of deep satisfaction at the replace- position of the FSLN, which they saw the need for substantial reform. At the ment of the Somoza dictatorship with a as an agent of “International Com- same time, however, actual and poten- popularly supported coalition publicly munism,” was a source of real fear. The tial guerrillas throughout Central committed to a program of democratic Government of El Salvador, in par- America were encouraged by the San- reform. ticular, feared the influence and impact dinista example to believe that they too Concerns about the role to be played of the Sandinistas on El Salvador’s could, with sufficient external support, by the Sandinistas in the new govern- troubled internal situation. succeed in shooting their way into ment were largely set aside in the in- power. This was particularly the case in terest of providing the support and El Salvador and Guatemala. The United assistance needed to reconstruct States, despite major misgivings about Nicaragua after the civil war.1 Latin developments in Nicaragua, embarked

1The United Nations estimated that 1979, American Foreign Policy: Basic mitments to democracy, pluralism (“full par- 45,000 people had been killed, 160,000 wound- Documents, 1977-1986, pp. 1321, 1323). The ticipation. . .[of] all sectors of the country.. in ed, and 40,000 orphaned in the fighting in OAS Inter-American Commission on Human the political structures. . .of the nation. . .”), a Nicaragua, the great majority in the 10 Rights provided estimates which, though mixed economy, a nonaligned foreign policy, months preceding Somoza’s fall. It estimated slightly lower, confirmed the massive scale of full observance of human rights, and the as well that I million Nicaraguans were in death and destruction. it estimated 35,000 holding of free municipal and national elec- need of food and 250,000 of shelter. Economic deaths (80% civilian), 100,000 wounded, and tions. That these undertakings were made losses approached $2 billion, and the 40,000 orphaned. By its estimates, 40% of the directly to the OAS as well as to the Nicaraguan economy was completely country’s population was dying of starvation Nicaraguan people was especially appropriate disrupted (statement by Assistant Secretary (Inter-American Commission on Human in light of the unprecedented OAS action, of State Viron Vaky before the Subcommit- Rights, Report on the Situation of Human joined in by the United States depriving the tee on Inter-American Affairs of the Senate Rights in the Republic of Nicaragua, June Somoza government of legitimacy even Foreign Relations Committee, September 11, 30, 1981, p. 155). before Somoza had abandoned the instrumen- 2The junta conveyed its July 9 program talities of power (Resolution 11, 17th Meeting to the OAS on July 12. It included com- of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Af- fairs, June 23,1979).

19 on a major program of economic not abuse civil rights. There had not yet for guerrillas in El Salvador. While assistance to Nicaragua.3 The inter- developed a pattern of violent political these reports were at first fragmentary American and international communities extremism or armed antigovernment ac- and difficult to confirm, they gave rise as a whole took a similar approach of tivity. The first step in the return to to increasing concern about the role the large-scale assistance to enable the new democratic civilian rule announced by Sandinistas intended to play in Central regime to overcome the destruction of the Honduran military government was America. The U.S. Ambassador to the civil war. the popular election of a Constituent Nicaragua was instructed to raise this Assembly in April 1980. issue with the Government of Nicaragua Nicaragua’s Neighbors. On October and to urge that any material support 15, 1979, a coup led by reformist officers The United States. Between July for the FMLN cease.” Nicaraguan of- overthrew the regime of General Carlos 1979 and January 1981, the United ficials denied any “governmental” in- Humberto Romero in El Salvador. States provided more than $100 million volvement but asserted that the Govern- Three months later a new junta was in economic assistance to Nicaragua. It ment of Nicaragua could not be held formed, with the participation of the encouraged other Western countries to responsible for the activities of in- Christian Democratic Party. By March provide major assistance as well and dividual Nicaraguans.9 1980, a civil-military junta, headed by urged private banks to reach a re- Despite reports of involvement by Jose Napoleon Duarte, had begun a scheduling agreement with Nicaragua. high-ranking and individual FSLN series of major social and political It offered to reinstate a Peace Corps members in furnishing arms and train- reforms designed to address ills which program to assist in Nicaraguan recon- ing to Salvadoran guerrilla groups, on seemed to justify the violence of the struction and to help meet that coun- September 12, 1980, the President made antigovernment guerrillas. Duarte’s pur- try’s need for teachers and medical the certification required by the legisla- pose was to demonstrate that serious care,5 as well as a military training pro- tion providing the special assistance. and effective reform could be achieved gram to assist in the professionalization This decision was taken on the basis without civil war. These reforms encom- of its armed forces following the dissolu- that the information then available was passed land redistribution, basic changes tion of the National Guard. Both offers not “conclusive” as to Nicaraguan in the banking and commercial sectors, were refused, as was a Costa Rican Government involvement in terrorist ac- and opening the political system. The offer of teachers. The Sandinistas gave tivities.10 While some officials believed junta committed itself to the holding of priority to obtaining both teachers and that the accumulation of evidence was free elections for a constituent military assistance from Cuba.6 such as to preclude certification, the fact assembly.4 Disturbances by groups en- In late 1979, the Administration pro- that the evidence was not conclusive couraged by the Sandinista success posed a special appropriation of $80 was seen as contributing to the U.S. in- peaked in the spring of 1980, but by million in assistance for Central terest in attempting to retain a positive summer, as the newly united guerrilla America; $75 million—over 90%—of this relationship with the new government in forces began to prepare for their assistance was to be provided to Nicaragua. The resulting certification January offensive, the reforms began to Nicaragua. Concerns in Congress about made possible disbursement of $75 take hold, and several strike calls Sandinista activities led to a require- million in economic assistance to received only limited support. ment that, before disbursing assistance Nicaragua. Honduran social and political ten- to Nicaragua, the President certify that The decision to certify was accom- sions, while significant, were less ex- Nicaragua was not “aiding, abetting, or panied by a decision to send the Deputy plosive than in El Salvador or Nicara- supporting acts of violence or terrorism Assistant Secretary of State for Central gua, and the military government did in other countries.”7 America to Managua to ensure that the In the middle of 1980, the United Government of Nicaragua was aware States began to receive reports of that continuation of the support for the Sandinista involvement in logistical support-including provision of arms—

3The United States had provided 732 tons culminated in the election of President 536(g) was later redesignated as Section of food and a large supply of medicine to the Duarte in 1984 and by legislative and 533(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Nicaraguan Red Cross by the time the White municipal elections in March 1985. as amended. House announced, on July 27, a further pro- 5Details of diplomatic exchanges described 8CIassified diplomatic correspondence. gram of emergency food and medical below are drawn in part from classified cable 9Ibid. assistance to Nicaragua. The United States traffic and other records of the Department 10The operative portion of the President’s provided a total of $48 million in assistance to of State. certification stated simply: Nicaragua by the end of 1979. As noted 6The first Cuban military advisers arrived below, a further $75 million was provided in in Managua in July 1979. By the end of the “I hereby. . .certify, pursuant to sec- special legislation proposed by the President year, there were some 1,400 Cuban teachers tion 536(g) of the Act and on the basis of in November 1979. (For a more extensive and medical personnel and over 200 Cuban an evaluation of the available evidence, account of the efforts made to develop close military and political advisers in Nicaragua. that the Government of Nicaragua ‘has relations with Nicaragua following the July By mid-1981, U.S. intelligence indicated there not cooperated with or harbors any inter- 19 takeover, see Lawrence E. Harrison, “We were no less than 5,000 Cubans in Nicaragua, national terrorist organization or is Tried to Accept Nicaragua’s Revolution,” of whom 600-800 were military and security aiding, abetting, or supporting acts of Washington Post, June 30, 1983, p. A27.) advisers and the rest teachers, doctors, and violence or terrorism in other coun- 4On October 15, 1980, 1 year after taking ”internationalist” -workers. tries’. . . “ (Presidential Determination power, the junta announced a schedule for 7See. 536(g) of the Special Central No. 80-26, September 12, 1980, 45 constituent assembly and presidential elec- American Assistance Act of 1979, P.L. Federal Register 62779). tions. Implementation of this schedule 96-257, approved May 31, 1980. Section

20 Salvadoran guerrillas would have a of intelligence information demonstrat- At the same time, Honduras realized negative impact on U.S.-Nicaraguan ing Nicaraguan supply to the Salva- the threat to its own institutions posed relations. He emphasized the U.S. doran guerrillas. by the Sandinistas and by the desire to preserve good relations with Sandinista- supported terrorist groups Nicaragua but made clear to his in- Nicaragua’s Neighbors. Following becoming active within Honduras. The terlocutors that provision of support to the failure of the “final offensive,” the United States expanded assistance to Salvadoran guerrillas could force the Salvadoran junta continued political and the Honduran Government to develop United States to terminate the assist- social reforms along with the military ef- the capacity of its armed forces to de- ance program. The officials with whom fort against the FMLN. The military fend Honduras against a Sandinista he met, including Daniel Ortega and assistance provided by the United military attack.16 other members of the junta, Foreign States was subject to severe restrictions Costa Rica became increasingly con- Minister D’Escoto, and Comandantes and conditions designed to encourage cerned by the progressive takeover of Bayardo Arce, Humberto Ortega, and the security forces to professionalize the Nicaraguan Government by the San- Jaime Wheelock, promised that all steps themselves and to end human rights dinistas and the crackdown on opposi- would be taken to ensure that such ac- abuses.13 Elections for a Constituent tion groups. Nicaraguan forces increased tivities did not occur.11 Assembly were held in March 1982. Par- the frequency and seriousness of their ties associated with the FMLN refused border incursions, against which Costa 1981-82 to participate in the elections. The Rica—which has a small, lightly armed FMLN tried to disrupt the elections by civil and rural guard force—realized it The “final offensive” of January 1981 in destroying voting records, intimidating could offer no effective military defense El Salvador was premised on over- voters, mining roads, and burning buses. on its own. whelming the Salvadoran Armed Forces Honduras held legislative and at a time when the United States was presidential elections in November 1981. The United States. In January 1981 in transition between the Administra- The transition to democratic govern- and the months that followed, the tions of President Carter and President ment culminated in the inauguration of United States, on repeated occasions, in- Reagan. (Indeed, on January 9 Radio an elected, civilian president in January sisted through diplomatic channels that Liberacion, an FMLN radio station 1982. Honduran concerns focused on the Nicaragua cease its material support for operating out of Nicaragua, boasted that alarming Nicaraguan military buildup14 the FMLN.17 In repeated approaches to the new U.S. President would come to and continuing Sandinista army opera- Nicaraguan leaders, the United States office too late to stop the guerrilla vic- tions across the border in Honduras.15 stressed that, while it understood tory.12) On January 17, the Carter Ad- Honduran efforts to close down the land Nicaraguan sympathies for the Salva- ministration announced a package of $5 arms-trafficking route from Nicaragua to doran guerrillas, good relations with the million in military assistance to El El Salvador removed a major incentive United States depended on an im- Salvador. The United States also sus- for Nicaragua’s earlier relative restraint mediate halt to the provision of material pended assistance to Nicaragua because toward Honduras and increased the and logistical assistance to the FMLN. threat of direct attacks against Hon- The United States identified specific duras by the Nicaraguan Armed Forces. support activities within Nicaragua, in-

11Classified diplomatic correspondence. of Nicaraguan and Honduran forces; Hon- experience with the Sandinistas in the 3 12The clandestine Radio Liberacion duras preserved an advantage only in air years since the ouster of Somoza, were (1) broadcast from Nicaragua its attack on the power. By 1982, Nicaraguan active duty reduction in arms and foreign military ad- incoming “cowboy president” of the United military personnel numbered 21,500, with an visers; (2) respect for non intervention; and (3) States on January 9, 1981 (as reported by additional 50,000 border, militia, and reserve international verification of commitments, FBIS, January 12, 1981). personnel; the Honduran Armed Forces This plan drew only limited support at the 13In fiscal years 1981 and 1982, U.S. numbered 12,000, with a 3,000-member time, but its three elements were reflected as economic and development assistance security force. B late 1981, the Sandinista key objectives in the Contadora Document of (development assistance, P.L.-480 food aid, armed forces had acquired 152mm and Objectives adopted on September 9, 1983. and economic support funds) totaled $290 122mm long-range artillery, T-55 tanks, ar- 16U.S. military assistance to Honduras million. Security assistance (military mored personnel carriers, and SA-7 anti- rose from $8 million in fiscal year 1981 to $31 assistance program, foreign military sales, aircraft missiles. The Honduran Armed million in fiscal year 1982. and international military education and Forces had no long-range artillery, no 17On January 9, the eve of the “final training) totaled $117 million for the same 2 modern tanks, and no anti-aircraft missiles. offensive,” the U.S. Ambassador reminded years. The Sandinista advantage has continued to Borge of the government’s promises not to Economic support funds (ESF) are grow since that time, despite substantial U.S. become involved in the Salvadoran conflict, classified in the budget as security assistance assistance to Honduras and an expansion of warning that the first casualty of any such rather than development aid. The principal Honduran military forces. action would be U.S.-Nicaraguan relations. criterion for their use is the strategic impor- 15Nicaragua made no pretense that these He was assured that that policy had not tance of the recipient to the United States, a incursions were errors, but rather justified changed. Borge acknowledged the possibility criterion differing from the standards ap- them as pursuit of “Somocista ex- that some arms might have passed through plicable to distribution of development Guardsmen.” According to Honduran Govern- Nicaragua and some people connected with assistance, ESF is used almost exclusively ment records, the Sandinista People’s Army the govern-ment might have assisted in some for balance-of-payments support and other crossed Honduras’ borders 35 times in 1981 way but insisted that Nicaragua was acting nonmilitary economic support purposes. and 68 times in 1982. responsibly and had even recently inter- 14By early 1982, the Sandinista People’s In March 1982 Honduras proposed a Cen- cepted a truckload of arms passing from Army was dominant in any direct comparison tral American peace plan in the OAS. Its Costa Rica to El Salvador (classified diplo- principal elernents, reflecting Honduras’ own matic correspondence).

21 cluding use of the Papalonal airstrip and dinista supply to the FMLN had halted. tinued to mount that the FSLN was Sandino airport to supply the FMLN This decision constituted, in effect, a engaged in continuing supply efforts as and support for Radio Liberacion. provisional determination that the cer- well as accumulating in Nicaragua arms At the same time, the United States tification requirement of the assistance for the FMLN. offered Nicaragua “a way out” of the legislation was no longer met. The U.S. Faced with this additional evidence, difficult situation created by its decision as to whether Nicaraguan ac- the United States concluded that it assistance to the FMLN, should it tions would permit the continuation of could no longer certify that Nicaragua demonstrate that it was, in fact, cutting aid would be based on the situation in 1 was not engaged in support for ter- off that support. While frequently in- month’s time; if the Nicaraguan re- rorism abroad. On April 1, 1981, the sisting that they could not control ac- sponses were not satisfactory, a public President made a determination to that tivities by every individual Nicaraguan, determination leading to a formal cutoff effect, thereby formally suspending junta members and other Nicaraguan of- of assistance would be forthcoming. disbursement of the final $15 million in ficials stated that they were taking In reply, junta members Ortega and assistance made available the previous ”strong measures” to prevent the Ramirez replied that the FSLN Direc- year. Even then, however, in the in- ”funny business” at the airfields and torate had authorized them to state that terest of preserving the best possible other “unofficial activities” and were they understood U.S. concerns about El relations under the circumstances, the pursuing the Radio Liberacion Salvador, would not “risk our revolution President waived the provision of law problem.18 for an uncertain victory in El Salvador,” which would otherwise have required In mid-February 1981, on instruc- and had taken a firm decision not to the immediate repayment of all eco- tions from Washington, the U.S. Am- permit Nicaraguan territory to be used nomic support fund loans made to bassador to Nicaragua again reviewed for transiting arms to El Salvador. Nicaragua.20 the situation with junta members Daniel Orders had been given to interdict the With these events, U.S.-Nicaraguan Ortega and Sergio Ramirez. He noted arms flow. Ortega acknowledged that relations entered a new stage. While that evidence available to the United the credibility of the Nicaraguan Sandinista actions had forced the United States confirmed that supply to the Government was at stake and that the States to cut off assistance to Nica- FMLN was continuing despite previous Sandinista front understood the conse- ragua, the United States continued ef- clear promises by the Sandinistas. He quences of the commitments it had forts to reach an accommodation with made clear-in view of the fact that made. These promises were reiterated the Sandinista regime which would halt Nicaragua’s previous assurances that it later in February and in early March Nicaragua’s supply of arms and other would not support the FMLN had 1981.19 support to the Salvadoran guerrillas. proven false—the U.S. intention to In the immediate aftermath of these In August 1981, the Assistant Secre- monitor the situation to ensure that meetings, U.S. intelligence indicated tary of State for Inter-American Affairs these actions were taken. He stated that that arms traffic through established presented Nicaragua with a five-point the United States would expect the routes, particularly by air, from Nica- proposal for improved relations. This Nicaraguans to provide evidence that ragua to El Salvador had slowed if not proposal was designed to meet Nica- they had carried out their undertakings. stopped but that other routes from ragua’s concerns with U.S. policy, in- He specifically identified a number of ac- Nicaragua were being sought. The cluding its expressed fear of a U.S. in- tions, the taking of which the United United States continued to press for vasion and desire that Nicaraguan exile States would consider evidence of concrete and verifiable actions. In- groups in the United States and else- Nicaraguan good faith. telligence reporting and evidence con- where should be tightly controlled, The Nicaraguans were informed that while also addressing the Nicaraguan ac- the United States had decided to withhold new disbursement of U.S. assistance until it was satisfied that San-

18It is significant that these high-ranking pressed a desire to preserve a cordial rela- Policy: Current Documents. 1981, p. 1298). officials no longer, as during the previous fall, tionship with the United States (classified The President’s formal determination was attempted to deny the activities taking place diplomatic correspondence). made on April 14 (Presidential Determination in Nicaragua or to suggest that they were 20On April 1, the Department of State No. 81-5, April 14, 1981, 46 Federal Register unable to control them. released a statement announcing the Presi- 24141). A 1982 U.S. offer of some $5 million 19On February 17, Ortega promised that dent’s decision to terminate economic support in assistance for nongovernmental organiza- ”not a single round” would transit Nicaragua fund assistance under the law. Nicaragua was tions was rejected by the Government of thereafter and acknowledged that the FSLN informed of this decision at the same time. Nicaraguan August of that year. had theretofore been “very permissive in Citing “recent favorable trends” with respect allowing the FMLN to mount operations in to Nicaraguan support for the FMLN and Nicaragua.” He asserted in early March that the importance of continuing assistance to the FMLN had been told of the FSLN deci- moderate forces within Nicaragua, the official sion to end its involvernent. While acknowl- Department of State statement held out the edging that U.S. economic assistance would further possibility of resuming P.L.-480 food probably not continue, the Sandinistas ex- assistance, development assistance and economic support funds should the situation in Nicaragua improve (American Foreign

22 tions most troubling to the United Sandinistas of previous commitments to Resistance forces25 began to take on States. The U.S. proposal, based upon pluralism, free elections, nonalignment, importance for the broader effort to an end to Sandinista support for guer- and a mixed economy. The United counter Sandinista “internationalism.” rilla groups, called for both sides to States made clear that a halt to San- For those concerned with Nicaragua’s make public declarations of noninter- dinista support for subversion beyond intervention in neighboring countries, vention in Central America; a U.S. Nicaragua’s borders was the sine qua the significance of the resistance groups statement on the enforcement of U.S. non for achieving results on the other lay in the pressure that their operations law pertaining to the activities of elements of the proposal.24 could bring on the Sandinistas to turn Nicaraguan exile groups in the United Nicaragua responded by taking their attention away from subversion States;21 an end to the Nicaraguan refuge in procedure, demanding that the beyond Nicaragua’s borders and reduce military buildup; reestablishment of U.S. talks take place at a higher level and the availability of material to be sent to economic assistance; and expansion of that the Mexican Government be drawn the FMLN. The growth of armed cultural ties between the two coun- into the dialogue but avoiding any com- resistance by other Nicaraguans would tries.22 In October, the Sandinistas re- ment on the substance of the proposals. make clear to the Sandinistas that they jected this proposal as “sterile,” at the Building on continued denials by could no longer count on conducting same time renewing their assertions Nicaragua of involvement in El Salvador paramilitary and military operations out- that the Nicaraguan Government was and assertions that Nicaragua wished to side Nicaragua without feeling the con- not supporting the FMLN.23 ”fulfill its international obligations,” the sequences within Nicaragua. At the urging of the President of United States also requested that Mexico, the United States made a sec- Nicaragua demonstrate its desire to The San Jose Declaration. In Oc- ond attempt in April 1982. The previous engage in serious efforts to resolve tober 1982, under Costa Rican leader- five points were expanded to call for: (1) regional problems by closing down the ship, a new, multilateral approach was an end to Nicaraguan support for in- command and control center of the undertaken by seven democracies from surgencies in other countries; (2) a U.S. FMLN operating in Nicaragua. the region, including the United pledge to enforce laws pertaining to ex- The U.S. response during this period States.26 The Declaration of San Jose ile activities in the United States; (3) a was not confined to its continuation of reflected the growing conviction of these joint pledge of noninterference in each diplomatic approaches to Nicaragua. Ex- countries that the Central American other’s affairs or in the affairs of others panded economic assistance and support conflict could not be addressed effective- in the region; (4) a regional, reciprocal for strengthened defense efforts were ly without dealing with the full range of ban on imports of heavy offensive provided to both El Salvador and Hon- underlying problems which gave rise to weapons; (5) a reciprocal reduction of duras. At the same time, the San- the crisis. The declaration set forth a foreign advisers in the region; dinistas’ repeated rejection of U.S. series of simple principles describing (6) international verification of the diplomatic efforts led to concern by the foregoing points; (7) exchange of cultural United States that a policy confined to groups; and (8) the reaffirmation by the diplomatic representations could not be effective in modifying Nicaraguan behavior and forced consideration of alternative means of achieving that objective.

21Nicaragua had expressed concern about intend to interfere in our internal affairs. personnel and was held October 7-9. 1981, off antigovernment activities of Nicaraguans who However, ‘you should realize that if you the Caribbean coast of eastern Honduras. It had fled to the United States and countries behave in a totalitarian fashion, your was the latest in a series of many years’ neighboring Nicaragua. By this (late, it is neighbors might see you as potential ag- standing in which U.S. and Latin American cleat, that some such groups, unvaryingly gressors.’ My perception was that, military forces cooperated in small-scale characterized as “Somocista” regardless of despite its peremptory nature, the U.S. exercises. the actual views of their members, were position vis-a-vis Nicaragua was defined 24These proposals were discussed in a engaging in preparations for armed activity by Mr. Enders with frankness, but also State Department background press briefing against the Sandinista regime. The prepara- with respect for Nicaragua’s right to (American Foreign Policy: Current tions had not yet led to significant attacks in choose its own destiny. . . . When the con- Documents, 1982, p. 1437). Nicaragua, however. versations concluded, I had the feeling 25The goals of the resistance groups 22The description later given of Assistant that the U.S. proposal had not been varied but were identical in their adherence Secretary Enders’ demarche by Arturo Cruz, received by the Sandinistas as an im- to the key elements of the original program then Nicaragua’s Ambassador to the United perialist diktat. However, nothing on which the Government of National Recon- States, is instructive: positive developed . . . “ (Arturo J. Cruz, struction had come to power (see Appendix ”Nicaragrua’s Imperiled Revolution,” 4). Some of the groups in Zelaya Province “In August of 1981, . . . [Enders] met Foreign Aft4irs, Summer 1983, pp. 1031, were drawn largely from indigenous Indian with my superiors in Managua, at the 1041-42). and Creole populations, and their goals em- highest level. His message was clear: in phasized retention of the autonomy and tradi- exchange for non-exportation of insurrec- 23Barely I month earlier, however, Direc- tional systems that were being threatened by tion and a reduction in Nicaragua’s armed torate member Bayardo Arce had stated to Sandinista policies. forces, the United States pledged to sup- the U.S. charge d’affaires in Managua that 26The declaration was issued by Belize, port Nicaragua through mutual regional the United States “had better realize that Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Hon- security arrangements as well as continu- nothing you can say or do will ever stop us duras, Jamaica, and the United States (text ing economic aid. His government did not from giving out, full support to our fellow of Final Act reprinted in American Foreign guerrillas in El Salvador “ At the same time, Policy: Current Documents, 1982, p. 1470). Arce expressed concern about the “Halcon Vista” exercise announced in September. ”Halcon Vista” that year involved 400 U.S.

23 conditions necessary for an effective Nicaragua’s Neighbors. Despite the on the border with Nicaragua, the peace agreement in Central America: FDR refusal to participate in elections, United States and Honduras carried out and guerrilla efforts to derail them, El Big Pine I, the first of a series of joint (1) To free the area from East-West Salvador carried out four national elec- exercises in Honduras, in February competition, foreign military advisers tions resulting in an elected president, 1983.28 With U.S. assistance, a Regional and trainers should be removed; assembly, and municipal officials. The Military Training Center (RMTC) for (2) To free Central American coun- level of political violence from both the Salvadoran and Honduran military per- tries from fear of each other’s aggres- extreme left and right declined sonnel and Costa Rican civil guardsmen sion, the import of heavy weapons significantly; death squad activities from was established in Honduras in 1983; should be banned, support for insurgen- the right were at the lowest levels in the RMTC was closed in mid-1985. cy on neighbors’ territory should be pro- many years. The newly elected Duarte Costa Rica was forced by Nicaraguan hibited, and frontiers should be subject government declared its readiness to border incursions to expand and moder- to international surveillance; and conduct a dialogue with the FMLN. In nize its modest rural and civil guards. It (3) Democratic institutions open to October 1984, consistent with the Con- made clear, however, its expectation of opposition elements should be tadora goal of encouraging national assistance under the Rio Treaty in the established. reconciliation, President Duarte opened event of overt Sandinista attack.29 President Reagan personally en- a dialogue with leaders of the FMLN- dorsed these proposals in San Jose in FDR at La Palma; a followup meeting The United States. With the steady 1982 and before a joint session of Con- aimed at continuing the dialogue failed political and military progress in El gress on April 27, 1983. due to FMLN-FDR insistence on un- Salvador, controversy sharply declined The seven countries asked Costa constitutional powersharing rather than within the United States over providing participation in the electoral process. major support to the countries of the Rica’s Foreign Minister to present these 30 principles to Nicaragua as a basis for The FMLN launched an unsuccessful region. The January 1984 recommenda- dialogue, but the Sandinista government fall offensive in 1983 but did not even tions of the National Bipartisan Com- insisted that it would receive the attempt one in 1984. As part of its open- mission on Central America, chaired by Foreign Minister only if the discussions ly acknowledged policy of making it im- former Secretary of State Henry Kis- were confined “exclusively” to bilateral possible to govern the country, the singer, for adoption of a long-term pro- issues. FMLN strategy now focused almost ex- gram of economic and security clusively on destruction of democratic assistance for the region were accepted institutions and economic targets. The and largely enacted into law by the U.S. 1983-85 Salvadoran Government has repeatedly Congress.31 Increasingly U.S. policy attention The polarization of Central America be- held Nicaragua responsible for sustain- ing the FMLN’s ability to continue its concentrated on Nicaragua, which ap- tween Nicaragua and its three im- peared unwilling or unable either to ad- mediate neighbors grew more intense attacks, in particular the attacks on 27 dress its internal problems or to cease during the next 3 years. Armed opposi- dams and bridges. Honduras overcame two major San- its efforts to intervene in the affairs of tion within Nicaragua, generated by the its neighbors. While there has been policies of the Sandinistas, continued to dinista efforts to initiate guerrilla activi- ty within its borders, as well as con- disagreement over how to induce grow. Nicaragua’s neighbors, by con- Nicaragua to modify its aggressive trast, continued to open their political stant cross-border attacks by the San- dinista military. To demonstrate U.S. policies, the Congress and the executive, and social systems and succeeded in for several years, have been in agree- reducing internally generated violence. resolve and willingness to support its regional allies, improve the readiness of ment that Nicaragua has made possible U.S. forces with contingency missions in the continuation of the FMLN’s war ef- Latin America and elsewhere, and fort through provision of substantial reduce Honduran anxiety over tension

27Declaration of Intervention of the 30The Congressional findings contained in 31A substantial portion of the funds re- Republic of El Salvador, Intervention Pur- Section 702 of the International Security and quested in support of the Commission’s suant to Article 63 of the Statute of the In- Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. recommendations for 1984 and 1985 was ap- ternational Court of Justice, Case concerning 99-83), demonstrate the change from the time proved by the Congress in the Supplemental Military and Paramilitary Activities in and when assistance to El Salvador was con- Appropriations Act for 1984 (P.L. 98-396), against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United sidered by many to be support for a corrupt the Supplemental Appropriations Act for the States), August 15, 1984, pp. 12-13. and brutal military dictatorship. Section Department of Agriculture for 1984 (P.L. 28The United States has conducted joint 702(a)(2), for example, expresses the 98-322), and the Fiscal Year 1985 Continuing exercises with Honduras for two decades. Resolution (P,L. 98-473). In the recently Since the Big Pine I exercise, eight joint ex- “sense of Congress that — enacted International -Security and Develop- ercises have been held involving U.S., Hon- ment Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83), duran, and, on occasion, Salvadoran land and (A) President Duarte is to be con- Congress authorized additional appropriations sea forces. The largest of these exercises, Big gratulated for his outstanding leadership for fiscal years 1986-89 to carry out the long- Pine II in 1984, involved 5,000 U.S. and under difficult circumstances and for his term plan recommended by the Commission. several thousand Honduran troops. efforts to foster democratic government 29Ne1son, op. cit., discusses Costa Rica’s and institutions in his country. . . . and” security concerns on pp. 244-57 and 274. (B) the armed services of El Salvador are to be congratulated for their improved performance and profes- sionalism in defending Salvadoran citizens and their democratically-elected govern- ment from attack by armed insurgents. . . .”

24 support for the FMLN and has fostered part, U.S. policy also included a variety as congressional desires that no form of and conducted terrorist activities in of pressures in response to continuing peaceful pressure be left untried before Honduras and Costa Rica as well.32 Sandinista aggression. Some of these further assistance was provided to the While the United States repeatedly were economic in nature. In May 1983, armed resistance, a trade embargo was made clear that it would respond to con- Nicaragua’s sugar quota was sharply imposed in May 1985. Bilateral ap- crete and meaningful actions by the San- reduced in response to the Sandinistas’ proaches to Nicaragua also continued, dinistas with similar action on its own continued destabilization of their but within the context of the com- neighbors. In response to Nicaragua’s prehensive approach to regional prob- continued aggressive behavior, as well lems proposed by the Contadora group

32On March 4, 1982, Chairman Boland tinue providing—training to the any reason whatsoever, in the internal or of the House Permanent Select Committee on Salvadoran insurgents. external affairs of any other state. . . “ Intelligence stated: (Intelligence Authorization Act for 1984 “Cuban and Sandinista political sup- P.L. 98-215, section 109(a)). “The Committee has received a brief- port for the Salvadoran insurgents has ing concerning the situation in El been unequivocable [sic] for years. The The National Bipartisan Commission on Salvador, with particular emphasis on the Committee concludes that similarly strong Central America, in its January 1984 report, question of foreign support for the in- military support has been the hidden com- concluded: surgency. The insurgents are well-trained, pliment [sic] of overt support. . . . well-equipped with modern weapons and “Another area of serious concern to “Whatever the social and economic supplies, and rely on the use of sites in the Committee is the significant military conditions that invited insurgency in the Nicaragua for command and control and buildup going on within Nicaragua. . . . region, outside intervention is what gives for logistical support. The intelligence Considering the small population of the conflict its present character. . . . supporting these judgments provided to Nicaragua—two and one. half million “Propaganda support, money, sanc- the Committee is convincing. people—and its weakened economic tuary, arms, supplies, training, comrnu- “There is further persuasive evidence status—such a buildup cannot be ex- nications, intelligence, logistics, all are that the Sandinista government of plained away as solely defensive. Within important in both morale and operational Nicaragua is helping train insurgents and the Central American isthmus, it poses a terms, Without such support from Cuba, is transferring arms and financial support potential threat to its neighbors. The Nicaragua and the Soviet Union, neither from and through Nicaragua to the in- substantial Nicaraguan support for the in El Salvador nor elsewhere in Central surgents. They are further providing the Salvadoran insurgents offers no assurance America would such an insurgency pose insurgents bases of operation in that the Sandinistas will constrain their so severe a threat to the government. . . . Nicaragua. Cuban involvement— growing military might within With the victory of the Sandinistas in especially Nicaragua’s own borders” (Permanent Nicaragua, the levels of violence and in providing arms—is also evident. Select Committee on Intelligence, Report counter-violence in Central America “What this says is that, contrary to to accompany H.R. 2760 [H.R. Rep. rapidly increased, engulfing the region” the repeated denials of Nicaraguan of- 98-122, Part 1, May 13, 19831, pp. 5, 6). (Report of the National Bipartisan, Com- ficials, that country, is thoroughly in- mission on Central America, January 10, volved in supporting the Salvadoran in- The 1983 findings are particularly signifi- 1984, pp. 87-88). cant because they were made by the commit- surgency. That support is such as to Most recently, in the 1985 foreign greatly aid the insurgents in their strug- tee in the context of recommending approval of a bill opposing the executive branch’s assistance legislation Congress found that, gle with government forces in El having Salvador” (Press Release, March 4, 1982). policy toward Nicaragua. In congressional debate on the fiscal year “formally accepted the Time 23, 1979 In the committee’s May 13, 1983, report 1985 intelligence authorization bill, Chairman [OAS] resolution as a basis for resolving on H.R. 2760 (the “Boland amendment”), this Boland confirmed that the findings remained the Nicaraguan conflict in its [plan] . . . conclusion was reaffirmed: as “true today, as . . . at the time of that submitted to the [OAS] on July 12, [May 1983 report” (Congressional Record, 1979, . . . the Government of Nica- “At [this] time, the Committee August 2, 1984, pp. H 8268-69). The resulting believes that the intelligence available to ragua . . . has flagrantly violated the bill contained the following congressional provisions of the June 23, 1979, resolu- it continues to support the following findings: judgments with certainty: tion, the rights of the Nicaraguan people, “(1) the Government of . . . Nicaragua and the security of the nations in the “A major portion of the arms and has failed to keep solemn promises, made region . . .” (International Security and other material sent by Cuba and other to the OAS] in July 1979, to establish full Development Cooperation Act of 1985 Communist countries to the Salva- respect for human rights and political [P.L. 99-83], section 722(c)(2)(A) and (C)). doran insurgents transits Nicaragua liberties, hold early elections, preserve a The legislation cites a variety of events in with the permission and assistance of private sector, permit political pluralism, the Sandinistas. support of this finding, including that and pursue a foreign policy of nonaggres- Nicaragua “The Salvadoran insurgents rely on sion and nonintervention: the use of sites in Nicaragua, some of “(2) by providing military support “has committed and refuses to cease Which are located in Managua itself, (including arms, training, and logistical, aggression in the form of armed subver- for communications, command-and- command and control, and communica- sion against its neighbors in violation of control, and for the logistics to con- tions facilities) to groups seeking to over- the Charter of the United Nations, the duct their financial, material and prop- throw the Government of El Salvador and Charter of’ the Organization of American aganda activities. other Central American governments, the States, the Inter-American Treaty of “Nicaragua provides a range of Government ... of Nicaragua has violated Reciprocal Assistance, and the 1965 other support activities, including article 18 of the Charter of the [OAS] United Nations General Assembly secure transit of insurgents to and which declares that no state has the right Declaration on Intervention . . .” from Cuba, and assistance to the in- to intervene, directly or indirectly, for (Section 722(c)(2)(vi)). surgents in planning their activities in El Salvador. “In addition, Nicaragua and Cuba have provided—and appear to con-

25 and expressly agreed to by Nicaragua Contadora. Since 1983 diplomatic ac- initiative, therefore, has taken a com- and the other four countries of Central tivity aimed at resolving Central prehensive and integrated approach America.33 America’s problems has focused on the toward the social, economic, political, While exercising the full range of mediation effort begun on Contadora and security problems underlying the nonforceful measures available to it, Island in January 1983 by the Foreign conflicts in Central America. however, the United States in addition Ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Although meetings among the Con- continued to believe that more direct and Venezuela. To allay expressed San- tadora mediators and the five Central pressures were crucial to stopping dinista concerns that a multilateral ef- American countries took place in April Nicaraguan aggression.34 Congress fort involving the United States would and May 1983, Nicaragua refused to par- established limits on the provision of be unfairly weighted against Nicaragua, ticipate in formal multilateral discus- funds for the armed resistance in late outside parties (including the United sions. Preferring to deal with its 1982.35 In fiscal year 1984, $24 million States) were excluded from this Latin neighbors and with the United States on was provided to the resistance.36 A American mediation effort. Approached a bilateral basis, Nicaragua resisted the desire to demonstrate to Nicaragua that privately by Contadora group countries concept of developing a single, all- the United States was prepared to to request its understanding and sup- encompassing peace treaty dealing with relieve the military pressure should the port, the United States gave the media- all aspects of the regional crisis. On July Sandinistas modify their behavior, tion effort its encouragement. 17, 1983, the Contadora chiefs of state, among other factors, led to a The thesis of the Contadora group, in the Cancun Declaration on Peace in withholding of support for a year.37 San- like that underlying the earlier San Jose Central America, called for renewed ef- dinista support for the FMLN, its initiative, is that any hope of reaching a forts to continue the peace process. This military buildup, and its refusal to re- lasting and solid peace both among and appeal, sent to the United States and spond to calls by the Catholic bishops within the Central American countries Cuba as well as the five Central and by virtually every opposition group requires that fundamental causes of con- American states, was responded to to enter into a dialogue contributed to a flict within and among countries of the favorably by the United States and the resumption of humanitarian assistance region be addressed.39 The Contadora other four Central American states. to the democratic resistance.38 On July 19, Nicaragua also officially accepted Contadora’s multilateral

33Bilateral diplomatic contacts with rank- military exchange between Nicaragua and tions in El Salvador or other Central ing Nicaraguan officials were conducted by Honduras” (Farther Continuing Appropria- American countries” (Section 8066(b)(1)(A)). Assistant Secretary Enders in August 1981; tions Act of 1983 [P.L. 97-377], section 793). The President made such a request on April by Ambassador Quainton in April 1982; by 36The funding was cast in terms of a ceil- 3. residential Special Envoy Richard Stone ing of $24 million “for the purpose or which 38$27 million was approved for provision between June 1983 and January 1984; by would have the effect of supporting, directly to the anti-Sandinista resistance of food, Stone’s successor, Ambassador Harry or indirectly, military or paramilitary opera- clothing, medicine, and other humanitarian Shlaudeman, in April 1984 and oil repeated tions in Nicaragua by any nation, group, ass6tance; a prohibition on provision of occasions (including eight meetings in Man- organization, movement, or individual” (In- weapons, weapons systems, ammunition or zanillo) later that Year; by Enders’ successor telligence Authorization Act for fiscal year other equipment, vehicles, or material usable Assistant Secretary Langhorne Motley, in 1984 [P.L. 98-21,51, section 108; relevant con- to inflict injury or death remained in effect December l983, April 1984 (,with Shlaude- gressional findings contained in that act are (International Security and Development man), and October 1984; and by Secretary of quoted in footnote 32, p. 25). Identical Cooperation Act of 1985 [P.L. 99-831, section State Shultz in June 1984 and March 1985. language was contained in the Department of 722(g): Supplemental Appropriations Act of 34Public confirmation that assistance to Defense Appropriations Act of 1984 [P.L. 1985 [P.L. 99-881, Title I, Chapter V). The the armed resistance has been effective was 98-212], section 775. findings relating to Nicaragua made in P.L. provided by President Duarte of’ El Salvador 37The Continuing Appropriations Act of 99-83 are quoted in part in footnote 32, p. 25. in a letter supporting the U.S. Administra- 1985 [P.L. 98-4731, section 8066, and the In the same statutes, $2 million was made tion’s April 1985 proposal to provide Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal available to hell) defray immediate expenses assistance to the, Nicaraguan resistance: Year 1985 1P.L. 98-6181, section 801, con- of implementation of a Contadora agreement tained absolute prohibitions phrased in terms (Section 722(h); Title 1, Chapter V). “We remain concerned . . . by the con- identical to the limitation quoted in the 39Although stated more clearly on some tinuing flow of supplies and munitions preceding, note. Those laws permitted the occasions than on others, this thesis has been from Nicaragua to guerrilla forces . . . president, after February 1985, to request at the heart of every approach to the Central which are fighting against my govern- renewed funding for the armed resistance of American crisis since the OAS first called for ment and our programs of reform, democ- up to $14 million following submission of Somoza’s replacement by a pluralistic, demo- racy, reconciliation, and peace. [W]e specific findings and congressional approval cratic government. The junta’s program deeply appreciate any efforts which your of the request. Reflecting continued concern reflected a similar balancing of values, and government can take to build a broad about Nicaraguan subversion, the first of the U.S. policy in Central America as a whole barrier to such activities—efforts which a required findings on the basis of which Con- and toward Nicaragua in particular has been small country like El Salvador cannot gress indicated a readiness to consider based, through both the Carter and the take in its own behalf “ (Letter to Presi- renewal of funding was that “the Govern- Reagan Administrations, or, implementation dent Reagan, April 4, 1985). ment of Nicaragua is providing materiel or of a range of measures directed at the root 35After lengthy debate, Congress ap- monetary support to anti-government forces problems of the crisis it. the region. Despite proved carefully crafted legislation prohibit- engaged in military or paramilitary opera- its ostensible acceptance of the goal of ing use of funds only if destined “to furnish national reconciliation, in its actions Nica- military equipment, military training or ad- ragua has consistently opposed this approach. vice, or other support for military activi- ties, . . . for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a

26 framework. On that date, however, Jun- posal. Two days later, however, the ment of Objectives called, inter alia, for ta Coordinator Daniel Ortega announced other four Central American countries verifiable steps to end support for exter- a diplomatic proposal calling for cessa- joined in presenting a plan emphasizing nal subversion, reductions in the tion of all outside assistance to “the two the importance of democratization to the numbers of foreign military and security sides” in El Salvador (thus implicitly restoration of peace and stability in the advisers, a halt to illegal arms traffick- acknowledging the outside assistance it region. ing, and controls on armaments and had been providing) as well as external On September 9, 1983, Contadora’s troop levels. It emphasized the need for support to paramilitary forces in the most significant achievement to date oc- greater regional cooperation in social region. The plan proposed a prohibition curred when the Foreign Ministers of all and economic matters and assistance to on foreign military bases and exercises five Central American states agreed to refugees. Democratization, national in the region, a Nicaraguan-Honduran a 21-point Document of Objectives. This reconciliation, and respect for human nonaggression pact, noninterference in document comprehensively addresses rights were central elements of the internal affairs, and an end to economic the root problems, as well as the major political objectives, which call for discrimination. The proposal ignored the specific concerns, of the countries of the establishment throughout the region of issues of foreign military advisers40 and region. In the document, the par- democratic, representative, and the Nicaraguan military buildup. ticipants committed themselves to an pluralistic systems ensuring fair and Democratization, national reconcilia- agreed set of objectives, including regular elections.41 tion, and effective verification, all cen- political, economic, and security con- tral to the Contadora approach, were cerns, to be reflected in a definitive also ignored by the Nicaraguan pro- treaty. In the security field, the Docu-

40By this time, there were more Cuban [9] “To conclude agreements to [17] “To revitalize and restore military and security personnel in Nicaragua reduce the presence of foreign military economic integration machinery in order than similar U.S. personnel in Honduras, El advisers and other foreign elements to attain sustained development on the Salvador, and Costa Rica combined. involved in military and security activi- basis of solidarity and mutual advance; 41The text of the 21 objectives is as ties, with a view to their elimination; [18] “To negotiate the provision of follows: [10] “To establish internal control external monetary resources which will [1] “To promote detente and put an machinery to prevent the traffic in arms provide additional means of financing the end to situations of conflict in the area, from the territory of any country in the resumption of intra-regional trade, meet refraining from taking any action that region to the territory of another; the serious balance-of-payments problems, might jeopardize political confidence or [11] “To eliminate the traffic in arms, attract funds for working capital, support prevent the achievement of peace, secur- whether within the region or from outside programmes to extend and restructure and stability in the region; it, intended for persons, organizations or production systems and promote medium- [2] “To ensure strict compliance with groups seeking to destabilize the Govern- and long-term investment projects; the aforementioned [in a preamble] prin- ments of Central American countries; [19] “To negotiate better and broader ciples of international law, whose vio- [12] “To prevent the use of their own access to international markets in order lators will be held accountable; territory by persons, organizations or to increase the volume of trade between [3] “To respect and ensure the exer- groups seeking to destabilize the Govern- the countries of Central America and the cise of human, political, civil, economic, ments of Central American countries and rest of the world, particularly the indus- social, religious and cultural rights; to refuse to provide them with or permit trialized countries, by means of a revision [4] “To adopt measures conducive to them to receive military or logistical of trade practices, the elimination of tariff the establishment and, where appropriate, support; and other barriers, and the achievement improvement of democratic, represen- [13] “To refrain from inciting or sup- of the price stability at a profitable and tative and pluralistic systems that will porting acts of terrorism, subversion or fair level for the products exported by guarantee effective popular participation sabotage in the countries in the area; the countries of the region; in the decision-making process and ensure [14] “To establish and co-ordinate [20] “To establish technical co- that the various currents of opinion have direct communication systems with a operation machinery for the planning, free access to fair and regular elections view to preventing or, where appropriate, programming and implementation of based on the full observance of citizens’ settling incidents between States of the multi-sectoral investment and trade pro- right; region; motion projects. [5] “To promote national reconciliation [15] “To continue humanitarian aid “The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of efforts wherever deep divisions have aimed at helping Central American the Central American countries, with the taken place within society, with a view to refugees who have been displaced from participation of the countries in the Con- fostering participation in democratic polit- their countries of origin, and to create tadora Group, have begun negotiations ical processes in accordance with the law; suitable conditions for the voluntary with the aim of preparing for the con- [6] “To create political conditions repatriation of such refugees, in consulta- clusion of the agreements and [21] the intended to ensure the international tion with or with the co-operation of the establishment of machinery necessary security, integrity and sovereignty of the United Nations High Commissioner for to formalize and develop the objectives States of the region; Refugees (UNHCR) and other interna- contained in this document, and to bring [7] “To stop the arms race in all its tional agencies deemed appropriate; about the establishment of appropriate forms and begin negotiations for the con- [16] “To undertake economic and verification and monitoring systems. To trol and reduction of current stocks of social development programmes with the that end, account will be taken of the ini- weapons and on the number of armed aim of promoting well being and an tiatives put forward at the meetings con- troops; equitable distribution of wealth; vened by the Contadora Group” (UN [8] “To prevent the installation on Document S/16041**, October 18, 1983 their territory of foreign military bases or [UN translation], numbers have been any other type of foreign military inserted for easier reference). interference;

27 Signature of the document by the of national reconciliation on the basis of The United States, however, con- Foreign Ministers of the five Central democratic principles which the San- tinued to support the regional peace ef- American countries reflects their adop- dinistas had earlier accepted in the fort. In June 1984, at the request of the tion of the view that all of the matters Document of Objectives. They Contadora group, the Secretary of State addressed in the 21-point Document of disregarded the issue of restoring visited Managua and initiated bilateral Objectives must be addressed in order military balance in Central America and discussions held in Mexico during the to resolve the problems giving rise to deferred treatment of foreign military second half of that year. At the same conflict in the region and that they must advisers and the Nicaraguan arms time, the United States provided be addressed in a framework of mutual, buildup. They denied the legitimacy of technical support for its friends in Cen- binding, and verifiable reciprocal com- the Government of El Salvador by tral America as they grappled with the mitments. The United States has treating it as coequal with the FMLN. complex and difficult issues—such as ef- repeatedly made clear, both publicly and They made no serious proposals for fective verification-involved in a peace in private, that full implementation of verification. Finally—although the San- treaty.43 the 21 objectives would meet all U.S. dinistas asserted that these treaties In early June 1984, the Contadora policy goals for the region.42 were a good-faith effort to advance the mediators presented a draft “Contadora Although Nicaragua signed the docu- Contadora process—the proposals direct- Act for Peace and Cooperation in Cen- ment, its discomfort with many of the ly contradicted Contadora by attempting tral America.” This draft included Con- objectives has led the Sandinistas to deal with Nicaragua’s neighbors and tadora group proposals in those areas repeatedly to undercut the process by the United States through a series of where the “working commissions” pursuing their own agenda in other fora. bilateral, disconnected documents. established in January had been unable On several occasions, the Sandinistas In the fall of 1983, resolutions of to reach consensus. Following discus- have sought to involve the organs of the both the United Nations and the OAS, sions, a revised version of that treaty United Nations in Central American confirmed by unilateral statements of was issued on September 7, 1984. issues, anticipating a friendlier hearing support from virtually every country of Several Central American governments there than in Contadora or the OAS. the world, endorsed Contadora as the offered initial favorable reactions, while For example, in October 1983, 6 weeks most promising hope of achieving peace making clear that further negotiations after agreeing to the Document of Ob- in the region. Slow but measurable would be necessary. jectives, Nicaragua introduced the Cen- progress was made in reducing the 21 Nicaragua then announced, on tral American issue before the UN objectives to concrete commitments. In September 21, its readiness to sign the Security Council, breaking an explicit January 1984, the parties agreed to a draft treaty-provided that no substan- commitment to the Contadora group timetable and conceptual approach for tive changes were made in its text. This that it would not do so. the negotiations. Nonetheless, Nicaragua unexpected announcement attempted to On October 20, Nicaragua elaborated continued to press its agenda outside freeze negotiations at a moment of ad- its July 19 proposal by presenting four the Contadora framework. In April vantage for Nicaragua. Entry into force draft peace treaties covering Honduran- 1984, it once again brought before the of the draft presented in September Nicaraguan relations, U.S.-Nicaraguan United Nations specific complaints would have resolved the problems high relations, relations among the five Cen- against the United States. In that same on the Sandinista agenda.44 tral American states, and the conflict in month it brought before the Interna- El Salvador. The treaties were reveal- tional Court of Justice identical com- ing. They studiously ignored the issues plaints of U.S. support for the Nicaraguan resistance.

42In his affidavit filed with the Interna- ragua” (Affidavit of Secretary of State 44It would have prohibited international tional Court of Justice in August 1984, the George P. Shultz dated August 14, 1984, military exercises 30 days after signature. ecretary of State stated that Annex 1 to U.S. Counter-Memorial (Juris- Foreign military schools and bases were to diction), Case concerning Military and be eliminated in 6 months. Withdrawal of “The United States fully supports the Paramilitary Activities in and against foreign military and security advisers was objectives already agreed upon in the Nicaragua, Nicaragua v. United States of left to future negotiation. By eliminating all Contadora process as a basis for a solu- America). support for groups fighting the government tion of the conflict in Central America. 43 in any Central American country without also The objectives of’ United States policy Despite Nicaragua’s ready acceptance of providing for adequate verification, it would toward Nicaragua are entirely consistent the September 7 draft without change, the have, as a practical matter, terminated U.S. with those broader agreed objectives and fact is that verification of the security and support for the opposition in Nicaragua while full and verifiable implementation of the political commitments described in that draft allowing Nicaraguan-supported groups to con- Contadora document of objectives would would be extremely difficult. Central tinue to receive clandestine supplies. fully meet the goals of United States America is a mountainous, swampy, policy in Central America as well as the underdeveloped area larger than East and expressed security concerns of Nica- West Germany together. Verification that arms are not being smuggled or that certain kinds of weapons are not being acquired raises questions which cannot readily be answered or treated ad hoc.

28 Resolution of issues of concern to its Manzanillo. In a reversal of the In late September, the United neighbors, however, such as the concern that had led to exclusion of the States offered to limit the size, frequen- Nicaraguan arms and troop buildup and United States from the Contadora in- cy, and duration of its military exercises commitments relating to national recon- itiative, Nicaragua began to assert in to reflect progress made in other areas. ciliation, refugees, and democratization, 1983 and 1984 that no truly effective ar- It proposed a common, low ceiling on was left to negotiations and unilateral rangements could be agreed on in Con- foreign advisers in the region and a implementing actions following entry in- tadora in the absence of the United staged process for negotiations on arms to full force of the commitments in States. At Contadora request, in June and force levels among the Central which Nicaragua was interested. 1984 the United States initiated a series American states. To meet Nicaragua’s Nicaragua’s neighbors were being asked of bilateral discussions with the agreed contention that it could not reduce its to rely on Sandinista good faith in objective of facilitating the Contadora military establishment while facing an subsequent actions. process. Over the next 5 months, nine internal insurgency, the United States The other Central American states rounds of talks were held, all but one in suggested that adjustment down to proposed limited modifications to the Manzanillo, Mexico.47 The United States agreed limits might take place in text to meet their own concerns more entered the discussions prepared to phases, after steps were taken to end adequately. Amendments proposed reach bilateral understandings that, support for insurgency. jointly by Costa Rica, El Salvador, and channeled into the multilateral process, At the same round, Nicaragua Honduras in Tegucigalpa on October 20 would facilitate conclusion of a com- adopted the Contadora draft agreement maintained all of the substantive com- prehensive Contadora regional agree- of September 7 as its negotiating posi- mitments of the September 7 draft but ment. The Sandinistas’ purpose, it tion. It consistently refused, however, to amplified the verification mechanisms in became clear, was to negotiate bilateral contemplate any substantive modifica- the security and political spheres and accords dealing exclusively with their tion to that draft. It also refused to provided protection for the other parties own security concerns. discuss the commitments relating to in the event Nicaragua failed to Consistent with the Document of reconciliation and democratization con- negotiate in good faith on the key issues Objectives, the initial U.S. proposal was tained in its text. This refusal to con- of military limits.45 to develop jointly a calendar of sider modifications was maintained even The Contadora mediators reciprocal actions addressing the key after the Contadora mediators, accepted acknowledged the validity of these con- aspects of the regional crisis. In order the need for changes to meet the con- cerns. Since the fall of 1984, the talks to build confidence, the actions were to cerns reflected in the October 20 have concentrated on completing be carried out in phases and to be in- Tegucigalpa draft. negotiation of these points on the basis dependently verified. Nicaragua once At a subsequent meeting, the of the September 7 and October 20 again, as in October 1983, proposed a United States attempted to open up the drafts. Nicaraguan participation in these series of bilateral and multilateral Sandinista position by offering to discussions has been erratic, ranging treaties that would deal on a priority discuss bilateral assurances that would from apparent readiness to negotiate on basis with U.S. support for what meet specific Nicaraguan concerns about some occasions to—at the June 18-19, Nicaragua termed “counterrevolu- modifications of the draft. It proposed, 1985, meeting-complete refusal to tionary, mercenary forces” and the U.S. for example, that in exchange for discuss the draft treaty unless military presence and exercises in the Nicaraguan agreement to the continua- Nicaragua’s current complaints against region.48 tion of international military exercises, the United States were first addressed the United States would unilaterally and supported by the group.46 limit exercises to levels worked out with Nicaragua.

45The October 20 draft was substantially throughout the negotiating period, the Oc- to summarize the content of the discussions the same its the September 7 draft. Its com- tober 20 draft would limit the freeze to 60 with the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Rela- mitments would enter into force following days (the period during which the September tions following each round. Only the United ratification by all five parties instead of pro- 7 draft envisaged the negotiations would be States and Nicaragua were physically present viding for implementation of some provisions concluded). at the negotiating sessions. before ratification. It would regulate rather 46Nicaraguan “reasonableness” in its 48Nicaraguan statements that U.S. forces than prohibit international military exercises. negotiating posture is notably high at ses- will be used against them are recurrent. The It would, by providing an international corps sions—for example, the April 11-12, 1985, most famous of the many inaccurate San- of inspectors and a budget, strengthen the meeting at which verification procedures dinista predictions of U.S. invasion was made verification commission referred to in the were agreed in principle—immediately pre- by Junta Coordinator Ortega at the United September 7 draft. It would simplify the ceding significant votes in the U.S. Congress. Nations on October 2, 1984, when he declared postsignature negotiation of agreements on In the subsequent May session, Nicaragua that the United States would invade arms and troop ceilings, military installations, reneged on key elements of the procedures Nicaragua on October 15, 1984 (UN Doc. and advisers. Where the September 7 draft agreed upon in April. A/39/PV. 16). required a freeze on arms acquisitions 47The second round, to establish ground rules, was held in Atlanta. As part of the ground rules of the talks, both sides agreed

29 After requesting time to consider Costa Rica’s initial favorable tionship with the regime, Sandinista the proposal, Nicaragua rejected it at response to the 1979 revolution and support for the Salvadoran guerrillas the ninth and to date final Manzanillo readiness to develop close relations with and attacks on its other neighbors re- round, reiterating its position that any Nicaragua have shifted. Costa Rica now quired a termination of assistance. approach involving substantive changes faces a country engaged in subversion Subsequent efforts to reach a bilateral to the September 7 draft was unaccept- and intimidating direct military attacks, accommodation, particularly in August able. Nicaragua did hint at a willingness creating a pervasive climate of fear and 1981 and April 1982, failed. U.S. support to make concessions in the security uncertainty. In the Sandinistas, it sees a for the Contadora negotiations, most sphere but only in a bilateral agreement regime which has betrayed the revolu- notably through the Manzanillo talks, reached outside the Contadora tion for which Costa Rica had such high has been met only by efforts to under- framework—thereby freeing it from any hopes and which is even more ag- cut that multilateral process and to nar- obligation to address the issues of gressively hostile to Costa Rican row the issues to those of immediate democratization, national reconciliation, democracy than was Somoza. In Hon- interest to the Sandinistas. The United and regional arms reductions. duras, democratic reforms have taken States has provided assistance to the Given the Sandinista position, agree- hold, but an increasing proportion of Nicaraguan resistance in an effort to ment would have been possible only if that country’s resources has had to be make clear to the Sandinistas that they the United States approved the devoted to defense against the conven- cannot export their “internationalism” September 7 draft without change, tional military threat of the Sandinista with impunity, Termination of that despite the imperfections acknowledged People’s Army and the FSLN’s assistance for a year not having resulted by Contadora participants, or disre- repeated attempts to initiate guerrilla in any softening of Sandinista intran- garded Contadora entirely and entered war in Honduras. In El Salvador, sigence, assistance in the form of non- into purely bilateral negotiations. political and economic reforms are being lethal aid has been approved and will Neither alternative was acceptable, and carried out by a popular government begin in the immediate future. the United States declined to schedule now strong enough to command the Nicaragua’s neighbors, with U.S. further discussions pending demonstra- allegiance of a previously apathetic economic and security assistance, have tion that Nicaragua was prepared to population in the war against the persisted in addressing conditions that negotiate seriously within the Contadora FMLN. At the same time, however, a contribute to internal conflict through framework. The United States made weakening guerrilla movement, increas- programs of internal reform and clear that it does not rule out a resump- ingly dependent on the FSLN’s con- democratization. At the same time, they tion of bilateral talks but that they must tinued support, has focused its attacks have sought, through a combination of promote a comprehensive Contadora on the destruction of the country’s collective defense efforts and participa- agreement and national reconciliation in economic and political infrastructure—a tion in the Contadora negotiations, to Nicaragua.49 strategy based on exhausting the respond to Nicaragua’s continued government and population to the point military attacks, support for subversion September 1985 that power could eventually be seized and destabilization, and intimidating by armed force. military buildup. Despite the substantial Six years after the overthrow of The United States has tried a varie- progress made during this period, Somoza, earlier hopes for peace and ty of approaches to the Sandinistas. however, they remain under a cloud democratic development in Nicaragua U.S. policy throughout has been based created by a regime unyielding to the have not been realized. The ruling San- on implementation of the Sandinistas’ needs of its neighbors, the resistance of dinista regime has continued its ag- own 1979 promises of democratic its own people, or the efforts of other gressive behavior toward its neighbors, pluralism, a mixed economy, and states in the hemisphere to assist it in taken ever stronger control over the nonalignment—promises which the Con- addressing the problems it increasingly state and-despite its OAS and Con- tadora Document of Objectives ratified creates for itself. tadora commitments—refused any as essential to achieving peace in the dialogue with the Nicaraguan opposition region-and on a refusal to stand aside as a whole. in the face of Sandinista aggression against its neighbors. Despite deter- mined efforts, from 1979 through 1981, to maintain and develop a positive rela-

49U.S. support of Contadora was authori- tatively reaffirmed by the Secretary of State in Mexico City on July 26, 1985.

30 IV. Conclusion

There is a vast gulf between Sandinista a well-organized and -equipped guerrilla sive” in El Salvador in January 1981, claims and the reality of the situation in force of several thousand responsible for the United States suspended assistance Central America. Far from being inno- many thousands of civilian casualties to Nicaragua and renewed military cent victims of outside forces seeking to and direct economic damages of over $1 assistance to El Salvador to assist in its bring about their overthrow, the San- billion. defense. dinistas have engaged in a sustained ef- • Equipping, training, organizing, • In the spring of 1981, the United fort to overthrow or intimidate other and infiltrating Honduran guerrillas, as States offered to resume assistance to governments through the threat and use well as clandestine Nicaraguan security Nicaragua on the condition that it cease of force. And, the record shows, the personnel, into Honduras in an attempt its intervention against its neighbors pressures on the Sandinista regime are to foment insurgency, as well as engag- and discussed concrete steps by which not the product of a conspiracy to pre- ing in shelling, mining, and other con- Nicaragua could demonstrate its good vent the peaceful development of ventional military incursions into Hon- faith in this respect. Nicaragua but rather a collective duran territory. • Only when Nicaragua refused to response to specific acts of aggression. • Using their diplomatic presence in take serious steps to end its interven- The arguments the Sandinistas have Costa Rica to conduct bombings and tion was U.S. bilateral assistance made are revealing. They have sought assassinations; financing, equipping, and terminated-and then with indications to characterize their military expan- training Costa Rican citizens in subver- that it would be renewed if intervention sion—with the Sandinista People’s Army sive activities; and using their over- ceased. now dwarfing in size, sophistication, and whelming conventional military might to U.S. actions clearly are not the acts firepower those of their neighbors—as a conduct cross-border incursions and to of one government determined to necessary response to an externally sup- intimidate a nation that has been destroy another. Nor are they the acts ported insurgency and threat of inva- without a military establishment for 35 of a government seeking only to create sion.1 They have not even attempted, years. a pretext for intervention. They are ac- however, a similar effort to explain Yet the record shows that all of tions concerted with allies in an effort to away their own involvement in arming these patterns of aggression were well- persuade an aggressor government to and supporting guerrillas in neighboring established long before the Sandinistas cease its unlawful acts in the interest of countries. They have not alleged that alleged any significant threat to regional peace and security. their use of force against El Salvador, Nicaragua’s own security from the Most significantly, by the San- Honduras, and Costa Rica responds to United States or any other country. dinistas’ own accounts, no military any threat to Nicaragua from those Similarly, despite Nicaragua’s efforts response by any of its neighbors or by countries. Rather, they have denied, to characterize the United States’ role the United States was undertaken until flatly and publicly, their own aggression in Central America as driven by un- well after the pattern of Nicaraguan in- and questioned the legitimacy of the col- mitigated and ideologically motivated tervention was established and lective response by speculating that that hostility to the very existence of the flourishing. response would have taken place Sandinista regime, the facts show that: U.S. efforts to assist the nations of regardless of their own interventions. • Immediately after July 1979, the Central America in their defense against The Sandinista strategy of diverting United States became the single largest Nicaragua’s actions have involved attention from their own illegal actions contributor of economic assistance to the several interrelated elements, including: by accusing others of abusing the norms new Government of Nicaragua. • Bilateral and multilateral they themselves have violated has been • When the evidence of Nicaraguan diplomatic efforts to secure a peaceful reasonably successful as a propaganda material and other support for in- resolution based on objectives agreed to exercise. But for those who have scruti- surgency in El Salvador began to mount by the Central American parties nized the record, the facts speak for in 1980, the United States expressed its themselves in the Contadora process; themselves. concerns privately in diplomatic chan- • Economic and military assistance The Sandinistas can no longer deny nels and sought, while continuing to Nicaragua’s neighbors to sustain that they have engaged and continue to economic assistance, to persuade the their economies and provide for national engage in intervention by: Sandinistas to cease such unlawful defense in the face of Sandinista • Providing the arms, training behavior. intervention; areas, command and control facilities, • When Sandinista assurances to the • Economic measures, including a and communications that transformed United States were demonstrably reduction of Nicaragua’s sugar quota disorganized factions in El Salvador into violated at the time of the “final offen- and a cessation of most bilateral trade,

1As noted in the text and footnotes 15 for the most part, implemented well before and 16 to section 11, p. 5, of this study, the the time the Sandinistas allege any signifi- growth in armed forces and acquisitions of cant security threat existed. major weapons systems were planned and,

31 to demonstrate U.S. concern and to give unlawful—even as a response to The Sandinistas’ relief from the col- the Sandinistas an incentive to cease aggression—because many of the details lective response to their behavior lies their unlawful acts and participate in concerning this program are “covert.” not in continued efforts to present comprehensive and stable arrangements But the lawfulness of a use of force has themselves as the victims of an interna- for resolving the conflict in the region; nothing to do with the degree of secrecy tional conspiracy or in attempts to hide • An increase in the size and fre- maintained. their continued intervention against quency of joint military exercises with The simple fact is that Sandinista in- Nicaragua’s neighbors. The other na- the forces of neighboring states to tervention, including support for guer- tions of Central America and the United enhance the defense capabilities of those rilla forces in other countries, induced a States have made clear that a serious armed forces and to deter major conven- collective response. A nation engaged in effort on the part of the Sandinistas to tional military assaults by the San- the unlawful use of armed force against implement the agreed comprehensive dinista army against them; and another becomes the proper object of framework for ending the conflict that • Assistance to Nicaraguans necessary and proportionate action by they began will be reciprocated. A gen- resisting the repressive and interven- the victim and its allies in exercise of uine mechanism for ending aggression tionist policies of the Sandinista regime. their right of individual and collective and bringing about reconciliation is the self-defense. An aggressor cannot evade only way to bring a just and lasting This last element of the collective responsibility for its unlawful use of peace to Central America. This recon- response to Nicaraguan aggression has force, nor can it deprive its victims of ciliation remains where it has been from been the principal focus of Sandinista their inherent right of self-defense. The the outset-in the hands of the complaints. The Sandinistas have sought Sandinista protestations of innocence Sandinistas. to imply that such assistance is cannot alter the fact of their continuing, unprovoked aggression against their neighbors. Nicaragua cannot claim the protection of the very principles of in- ternational law it is itself violating.

32 33 APPENDICES

1. Glossary

Ahuas Tara: The “Big Pine” series EGP: The Guerrilla Army of the FMLN: The Farabundo Marti Na- of joint U.S.-Honduran military exer- Poor, Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres, tional Liberation Front, Frente cises begun in February 1983. a Guatemalan guerrilla group, became a Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion America Department: A section of member of the URNG, the umbrella Nacional, is an umbrella organization the Central Committee of the Cuban organization formed in Managua on formed in November 1980. Consists of Communist Party which handles rela- November 2, 1980. five Salvadoran guerrilla groups—ERP, tions with leftist organizations ERP: The People’s Revolutionary FAL, FARN, FPL, and PRTC. throughout the Western Hemisphere. Army, Ejercito Revolucionario del FMLN-FDR: FMLN and the ARDE: Democratic Revolutionary Pueblo, a Salvadoran revolutionary FDR-the Salvadoran guerrilla umbrella Alliance, Alianza Revolucionaria group, formed after a split within the organization and its political front. Democratica, a coalition of anti-FSLN FPL in 1972. It is led by Joaquin FPL: Popular Liberation Forces, organizations founded in 1982. Villalobos. Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion, the Cinchoneros: See URP. FAL: The Armed Forces of Libera- largest of the original Salvadoran guer- Contadora Group: Colombia, tion, Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion, rilla organizations that formed the Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela met in the Salvadoran Communist Party’s guer- FMLN. The FPL, founded in 1970 by January 1983 on the Panamanian island rilla wing formed by Jorge Shafik Han- Cayetano Carpio after he left the Com- of Contadora and formed the Contadora dal in 1979. munist Party of El Salvador, has long Group for the purpose of facilitating a FAO: The Broad Opposition Front, been linked to Cuba. The leadership was peaceful settlement to the Central Frente Amplio Opositor, formed in taken over by Leonel Gonzales upon American crisis. mid-1978 by an alliance of 16 non-FSLN Carpio’s death. Contadora Document of Objec- organizations including opposition FPR: The Popular Revolutionary tives: Adopted September 9, 1983. political parties and labor confedera- Forces, Fuerzas Populares Revolu- Document agreed to by all nine Con- tions. In August 1978 FAO presented a cionarias, is a Honduran guerrilla tadora participants (the Contadora 16-point plan for the democratization of organization. Group and the five Central American Nicaragua—eluding the departure of FSLN: The Sandinista National countries). Sets forth 21 objectives to Somoza. Liberation Front, Frente Sandinista de resolve the Central American crisis. Has FAR: The Rebel Armed Forces, Liberacion Nacional, is a politico- served as the basis of discussion in all Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, is a military organization founded in 1961. subsequent negotiations. Guatemalan guerrilla organization and a After playing the key military role in Coordinadora: Nicaraguan member of the URNG. the overthrow of Somoza, the FSLN Democratic Coordinating Board, Coor- FARN: Armed Forces of National displaced other members of the anti- dioadora Democratica Nicaragueose, a Resistance, Fuerzas Armadas de Somoza coalition and monopolized coalition of political parties, labor con- Resistencia Nacional, Salvadoran power. federations, and private sector organiza- revolutionary group that splintered from GRN: Government of National tions opposed to FSLN policies. the ERP in 1975. Reconstruction, Gobierno de Reconstruc- Declaration of San Jose: Adopted FDN: Nicaraguan Democratic cion Nacional, the official designation of October 4, 1982, by seven democratic Force, Fuerza Democratica the Government of Nicaragua from July governments including the United Nicaraguense, the largest of the anti- 1979 until January 1985, when Daniel States. Sets forth the conditions neces- FSLN resistance groups, founded in Ortega formally became president. sary for a regional peace settlement. 1982. Manzanillo: Mexican coastal city DGSE: The General Directorate of FDR: The Democratic Revolu- where bilateral talks between the State Security, Direccion General de tionary Front, Frente Democratico United States and Nicaragua were held Seguridad del Estado, of the Revolucionario, is the political wing of in 1984. Nicaraguan Ministry of Interior. the FMLN. It was created on April 1, National Directorate: The nine- DRI: The FSLN’s Department of 1980, by three small Salvadoran political member directorate of the FSLN, International Relations, Departamento parties and urban organizations to serve formed in March 1979, with three de Relaciones Internacionales, closely as the civilian arm of the guerrillas. representatives from each of the three modeled after the America Department FMLH: The Morazanist Front for main factions within the FSLN: Pro- of the Cuban Communist Party. the Liberation of Honduras, Frente longed Popular War (Guerra Popular DRU: The Unified Revolutionary Morazanista para la Liberacion de Hon- Prolongada—GPP) is represented by Directorate, Direccion Revolucionaria duras, is a Honduran guerrilla Tomas Borge, Henry Ruiz, and Bayardo Unificada, was the coalition of organization. Salvadoran guerrilla groups formed in May 1980 in Havana. It preceded the FMLN.

35 Arce; Proletarian Tendency (Proletarios) Armas, a Guatemalan guerrilla group dinista units prior to the overthrow of by Jaime Wheelock, Carlos Nunez, and which is a member of the URNG. Somoza. It was a Moscow-line com- Luis Carrion; and the Insurrectionalist PCES: Communist Party of El munist party until it split in 1984; the (Terceristas), by Daniel Ortega, Salvador, Partido Comunista de El faction now bearing the name is the Humberto Ortega, and Victor Tirado. Salvador, is the oldest Marxist party in more radical. NBCCA: National Bipartisan Com- El Salvador. Its military wing is the RMTC: Regional Military Training mission on Central America, better FAL guerrilla group. Center established in Honduras in June known as the “Kissinger Commission.” PGT: Guatemalan Labor Party, Par- 1983 for training of Honduran, Formed in July 1983, the Commission tido Guatemalteco del Trabajo, the Salvadoran, and Costa Rican military issued a report in January 1984 that led Moscow-line Communist Party of and security forces. (It closed in June to increased U.S. economic and military Guatemala. 1985.) assistance for the promotion of PRTC: Central American Revolu- UNO: Unified Nicaraguan Opposi- democracy and development in Central tionary Workers’ Party, Partido Revolu- tion, Unidad Nicaraguense Opositora, America. cionario de Trabajadores de Cen- an umbrella coalition of anti-FSLN New Republic Movement: Costa troamerica, organized and led by Rober- resistance groups and exile political, Rican political party. Some of its to Roca, who formed the party in El labor, and private sector organizations members have fought anti-Sandinista Salvador in 1976. This Trotskyite off- formed in June 1985. guerrillas in Nicaragua. shoot of the Communist Party has URP: Popular Revolutionary Union, Olancho: A political subdivision in counterpart parties in Costa Rica, Hon- Union Revolucionaria del Pueblo, a eastern Honduras where Sandinista- duras, and Guatemala. Honduran revolutionary organization supported guerrillas were defeated in El Paraiso: (1) A political subdi- also known as the “Cinchoneros.” July 1983. vision in Honduras where Sandinista- URNG: Guatemalan National OAS: Organization of American supported guerrillas were defeated in Revolutionary Unity, Unidad Revolu- States. 1984. (2) Also the name of the location cionania Nacional Guatemalteca, is an ORPA: Organization of the People in El Salvador where the headquarters umbrella organization, patterned after in Arms, Organizacion del Pueblo en of the 4th Brigade was attacked by the FSLN and the FMLN, the member- guerrillas in December 1983. ship of which includes four Guatemalan Papalonal: Site of airfield in guerrilla organizations: EGP, FAR, Nicaragua used to fly weapons to ORPA, and PGT. Created in Managua Salvadoran guerrillas during 1980-81. on November 2, 1980. PVP: The Popular Vanguard Party, Partido de la Vanguardia Popular, is a Costa Rican political party some of whose members fought alongside San-

36 2. Chronology

January 1978 July 1979 March 1980 10 Pedro Joaquin Chamorro 12 GRN Junta sends telex enclosing 3 Junta member Alfonso Robelo assassinated in Managua. its program and promising free informs United States of GRN elections to the Secretary General policy of noninvolvement in August 1978 of the OAS. Salvadoran internal politics but 21 The non-FSLN Broad Opposition warns that a “few individuals” Front (FAO), calling for Somoza’s 17 Somoza resigns and interim may be fighting with the departure, presents a 16-point plan government announced. Salvadoran guerrillas. for democratization of Nicaragua. 19 Collapse of interim government as 6 Agrarian reform begins in El 22 Eden Pastora, known as Com- FSLN military forces arrive in Salvador. mander Zero, leads successful Managua and GRN assumes FSLN raid on the National Palace power. 19 Agreement signed in Moscow in Managua. establishing party-to-party ties 21 Salvadoran guerrilla leaders and between FSLN and the Com- September 1978 Sandinista leaders meet in munist Party of the Soviet Union. Managua to discuss FSLN support 23 17th Meeting of Consultation of for Salvadoran insurgent Cuba makes large-scale weapons Foreign Ministers of the Organiza- organizations. * deliveries to Managua, including tion of American States (OAS) con- antiaircraft and antitank guns and siders the situation in Nicaragua. Cuban civilian and military artillery. * advisers arrive in Managua. October 1978 April 1980 27 United States announces airlift of 6 Under the auspices of the OAS, 16 Council of State is expanded to en- the United States, Guatemala, and food and medical supplies. sure FSLN control. the Dominican Republic begin a 3-month-long attempt to help September 1979 19 Violeta de Chamorro resigns from reconcile the differences in GRN. Nicaragua. 21- FSLN party meeting approves 23 “72-hour Document” committing 22 Alfonso Robelo resigns from GRN. January 1979 Sandinistas to revolutionary internationalism. May 1980 17 OAS mediation effort ends without resolving the Nicaraguan conflict. 24 Nicaraguan Government delega- Four Salvadoran guerrilla factions tion headed by Daniel Ortega * meet under Cuban sponsorship in February 1979 received at White House by Presi- Havana, form Unified Revolu- 8 United States formally terminates dent Carter, who offers substantial tionary Directorate (DRU). military aid to Nicaragua (already aid and cautions against inter- 31 President Carter signs legislation suspended for several months), ference in neighboring states. providing $75 million in assistance suspends new economic aid, with to Nicaragua, requiring certifica- draws military assistance group October 1979 tion that Nicaragua is not support- and Peace Corps volunteers, and 15 General Romero is overthrown in ing terrorism. reduces size of embassy staff by El Salvador by military coup one-half. promising extensive political, June 1980 social, and economic reforms. June 1979 * FSLN Directorate offers DRU 16 Provisional Junta of the Govern- November 1979 headquarters in Managua, along with advice, materiel, and a prom- ment of National Reconstruction 9 President Carter asks Congress to (GRN) formed in Costa Rica to ise to assume “the cause of El provide an emergency $75 million Salvador as its own.” replace the Somoza regime in ”to restore confidence, private ini- Nicaragua. tiative, and popular well-being in Salvadoran Communist Party Nicaragua.” * leader Jorge Shafik Handal leaves 21 At U.S. request, the 17th Meeting Cuba for the Soviet Union and of Consultation of Foreign December 1979 Vietnam seeking arms. Ministers of the OAS reconvenes to consider situation in Nicaragua. 16 Leaders of three Salvadoran organizations write to Fidel Castro 23 FSLN Directorate member Bay- ardo Arce meets with delegation 23 OAS approves a Venezuelan that “thanks to your help” they of Salvadoran guerrillas; agrees to resolution calling for the immedi- have signed in Havana a unity provide ammunition, training, and ate replacement of the Somoza pact to “advance the fight” for other support. regime by a democratic peace and socialism. government.

*Specific day not applicable or not known

37 August 1980 March 1981 July 1982 23 Sandinista Defense Minister 11 In Hanoi FSLN Directorate 28 Costa Rica expels three Humberto Ortega announces member and Minister of Defense Nicaraguan diplomats linked to postponement of elections until Humberto Ortega publicly thanks terrorist activities. 1985. Vietnam for its support of the ”bloody struggle” in El Salvador. October 1982 September 1980 4 In Costa Rica seven democratic 25- United States warns privately that April 1981 governments sign the “Declaration 26 continued Sandinista support for 1 United States announces suspen- of San Jose” outlining conditions Salvadoran guerrillas jeopardizes sion of economic assistance to for regional peace settlement. U.S. aid. Nicaragua responds that Nicaragua but does “not rule out” its government is not involved. its “eventual resumption.” 8 Nicaragua refuses to receive Costa Rican Foreign Minister as October 1980 August 1981 emissary of group. Venue for meeting of Central Text circulates of secret speech by * American communist parties * Humberto Ortega to military January 1983 switched in mid-October from cadres which asserts that San- 8 Foreign Ministers of Colombia, Managua to Havana at request of dinista doctrine is Marxist- Mexico, Venezuela, and Panama Nicaragua. Leninist. meet on Panama’s Contadora Island, issue declaration recom- October-November 1980 August-October 1981 mending dialogue and negotiation. FSLN begins airlift of supplies for United States initiates diplomatic * Salvadoran guerrillas from * exchanges with Nicaragua. United January-April 1983 Papalonal airstrip northwest of States offers bilateral nonaggres- Nicaragua resists meeting in Managua. sion agreement and renewed eco- multilateral setting, opposes idea nomic assistance if Nicaragua of comprehensive agreement deal- November 1980 stops aid to Salvadoran guerrillas ing with all interrelated issues. 2 URNG, Guatemalan guerrilla and limits its military buildup. umbrella organization, formed in Nicaragua labels U.S. offer February 1983 Managua. ”sterile.” 1 “Big Pine,” also known as Ahuas Tara, joint U.S.-Honduran military 17 Private sector leader Jorge March 1982 exercises begin. Salazar murdered by Nicaraguan 14 First major armed resistance State Security (DGSE) agents. actions in Nicaragua take place 28 El Salvador Peace Commission, in- when the Negro and Coco River cluding a representative from the December 1980 Bridges are seriously damaged church, established. Efforts fo- 15 Radio Liberacion, Salvadoran with explosives. cused on promoting the participa- guerrilla clandestine radio, begins tion of all social and political sec- transmissions from Nicaragua. 15 Nicaraguan Government declares tors in the democratic process. state of emergency, formally im- January 1981 posing prior censorship and April 1983 10 Salvadoran guerrillas announce suspending certain civil rights. 6 Salvadoran guerrilla leader Melida beginning of “final offensive” on Anaya Montes (“Comandante clandestine broadcast from 15 Honduras proposes Central Ana Maria”) is murdered in Nicaragua. American peace plan in the Orga- Managua. nization of American States to 14 United States warns Nicaragua reduce arms and foreign military 12 Salvador Cayetano Carpio, founder that continued support for advisers, to respect noninter- of the FPL and leader of the Salvadoran guerrillas could result vention, and to provide for inter- FMLN, commits suicide in in termination of aid programs and national verification of Managua after being accused of possibly even a demand for repay- commitments. ordering Ana Maria’s assas- ment of loans. sination. 28 El Salvador elects a Constituent 14 United States renews nonlethal Assembly. 15 Eden Pastora, “Commander military aid to El Salvador. Zero,” announces he will begin April 1982 military operations with his San- 17 United States provides El 9 United States offers eight-point dino Revolutionary Front in Salvador with ammunition for first proposal to Nicaragua. Nicaragua southern Nicaragua on May 1. time since 1977. demands high-level meeting in Mexico. 27 President Reagan announces appointment of a Special Envoy 15 Eden Pastora publicly announces for Central America for purpose of his opposition to the FSLN facilitating internal dialogue in regime, accusing it of betraying both El Salvador and Nicaragua. the anti-Somoza revolution.

38 June 1983 October 1983 July 1984 6 Nicaragua expels three U.S. 20 Nicaragua proposes four treaties A 19-member vanguard unit of the diplomats on false charge of plot- to implement its July six-point * Honduran Popular Revolution ting to assassinate the Nicaraguan plan, but proposals do not address Force “Lorenzo Zelaya” enters Foreign Minister; U.S. responds Contadora objectives of democratic from Nicaragua in an effort to by closing all Nicaraguan con- national reconciliation, reductions establish a guerrilla network in sulates outside Washington, D.C. in arms, and foreign advisers. the Honduran Department of El Paraiso. 29 RMTC begins training of Hon- 25 United States and Caribbean duran and Salvadoran military nations land military forces on September 1984 personnel in Puerto Castilla, Grenada. 7 Contadora Group submits, for Cen- Honduras. tral American comment by mid- December 1983 October, revised draft Contadora July 1983 24 Nicaraguan opposition Coor- agreement. 17 Declaration of Cancun of the dinadora issues communique call- presidents of the Contadora Group ing for dialogue leading to open 21 Nicaragua states willingness to calls for renewed efforts to con- elections. sign September 7 draft on condi- tinue peace process. Declaration tion that it is approved without sent to President Reagan, Central January 1984 modification. American chiefs of state, and Fidel 10 National Bipartisan Commission 25 6th round of Manzanillo talks. Castro. on Central America reports to Nicaragua adopts September 7 President. Contadora draft as its negotiating 19 Sandinistas announce six-point position but rules out any substan- peace plan, including acceptance of March 1984 tive modification. multilateral talks. 25 First round of presidential elec- tions held in El Salvador. September-October 1984 21 Costa Rica, El Salvador, International and regional efforts Guatemala, and Honduras propose April 1984 * fail to induce Sandinistas to allow peace plan drawing on Honduran 9 Nicaragua files complaint against open, fair competition for plan of March 1982 and emphasiz- United States in the International November 4 elections. ing relevance of democratization to Court of Justice. peace and stability of region. October 1984 22 Easter pastoral letter of the 2 Daniel Ortega announces at the 22 U.S. begins increased naval Nicaraguan bishops calls for United Nations that the United presence off the Pacific and Carib- dialogue, including with the armed States will invade Nicaragua on or bean coasts of Central America. resistance. after October 15.

23 President Reagan supports Con- May 1984 7 Daniel Ortega, in Los Angeles, tadora principles in letter to Con- 6 Jose Napoleon Duarte elected California, states that Nicaragua tadora Group presidents. President of El Salvador in runoff would feel more secure if it election. became a member of the Warsaw Honduran PRTC guerrilla force Pact. * trained in Nicaragua and Cuba June 1984 infiltrates into the eastern Hon- 1 U.S. Secretary of State Shultz 8 Salvadoran President Duarte at duran Department of Olancho. visits Managua to launch bilateral UN General Assembly calls for talks in support of reaching a com- dialogue with armed opposition; September 1983 prehensive Contadora agreement. meetings between government and 9 Contadora Document of Objectives FMLN take place October 15 at approved by the five Central 8- Contadora Group submits first La Palma and November 30 at American states. It sets goals for 9 draft Contadora agreement to Ayagualo. regional negotiations, including Central American governments for democratic pluralism, national comment by July. reconciliation, cessation of support to paramilitary forces, arms con- 25 First of nine rounds of bilateral trol, withdrawal of foreign talks between the United States advisers, and verification. and Nicaragua held at Manzanillo, Mexico.

39 November 1984 February 1985 May 1985 4 Nicaraguan elections held for 22 Statement calling for church- 1 United States announces selective president and National Assembly mediated dialogue issued in trade embargo of Nicaragua. without participation of Coor- Managua by the Coordinadora. dinadora, the democratic alliance 14 Second meeting of Contadora of the political opposition. March 1985 plenipotentiaries. Nicaragua 19 8th round of Manzanillo talks. 1 In San Jose, Costa Rica, the reneges on international corps of United States offers bilateral Nicaraguan resistance issues docu- inspectors for verification which assurances in return for ment calling for national dialogue. was agreed to in April. Nicaraguan acceptance of modifica- tions to September 7 Contadora 22 Communique of the Nicaraguan 31 Sandinista mortar fire into Costa draft. Episcopal Conference accepting Rica kills two Costa Rican Civil mediation role in dialogue. Guard members. The OAS estab- December 1984 lishes a special commission to 10 9th round of Manzanillo talks. 31 Legislative and municipal elections investigate. Nicaragua definitively rejects U.S. in El Salvador; fourth free election proposal; proposes bilateral in 3 years. June 1985 accords in lieu of Contadora, 18 Third meeting of Contadora pleni- addressing security issues only. April 1985 potentiaries disrupted when 4 President Reagan calls on Nicaragua refuses to consider Con- January 1985 Nicaraguan Government to accept tadora Group compromise 10 Daniel Ortega sworn in as Presi- dialogue. proposal. dent of Nicaragua. 11- First meeting of Contadora July 1985 18 United States suspends Manzanillo 12 plenipotentiaries reaches agree- 22 Contadora Group Foreign meetings pending further develop- ment in principle on revised Ministers announce consultations ments in the Contadora process. verification procedures. with each Central American government in lieu of negotiations among plenipotentiaries.

40 3. Former Guerillas

This appendix summarizes the careers Managua, Havana, Moscow, and Viet- Jorge Eduardo PANIAGUA of individual guerrillas representing four nam. In Managua, he spent a week with Verganza was captured by Salvadoran different groups and two officials of ”Valentin,” the FPL chief in Managua. authorities on June 18, 1985. He had Nicaragua’s General Directorate of Romero described in detail the logistical been recruited into the Armed Forces of State Security. Each has been involved network for supplying FMLN guerrillas. Liberation (FAL), the armed wing of directly with insurgency against the He has characterized Nicaragua as the the Communist Party of El Salvador, in Governments of El Salvador and Hon- FMLN’s “strategic rear guard.” July 1982. He initially drove pickup duras. Their histories give a human pic- trucks with secret compartments ture of the secret involvement of Nica- Arquimedes CANADAS, alias Com- holding arms and munitions for guerrilla ragua and its allies in supporting revolu- mander “Alejandro Montenegro,” was a units. The arms bad been transported tion in El Salvador and Honduras. member of the People’s Revolutionary overland from Nicaragua through Hon- About half deserted; the others were Army (ERP). He was arrested in duras into El Salvador. When the Salva- captured. Most were active into 1985. August 1982 in Tegucigalpa while en doran security forces broke up this net- route to Managua. As commander of the work in April 1983, Paniagua became GUERRILLAS Guazapa Front, he twice met Joaquin inactive. He resumed his work for the Villalobos, the ERP commander, at the FAL in July 1984, and 2 months later Salvadorans FMLN command post in Managua. He was assigned to the Metropolitan Front has described the logistical system for Marco Antonio GRANDE Rivera in San Salvador. delivering weapons, ammunition, and defected 011 May 25, 1985, to Salva- explosives from the Nicaraguan- William Daly RAMOS Orellana, doran Honduran border area of Las Manos arrested by Salvadoran authorities on security forces in Jucuaran, Usulutan. across the Honduran-Salvadoran border August 9, 1984, was recruited for the Grande was a political leader and propa- area of Amatillo to his headquarters at FPL in 1978. In July 1982, he traveled ganda officer in the “Francisco Sanchez Guazapa. He coordinated the special to Costa Rica and then to Nicaragua, Southeastern Front” of the Communist commando group that attacked the where he stayed for nearly 2 weeks Party of El Salvador (PCES/FAL). In Ilopango military airbase in January before flying to Cuba. In Cuba, he at- 1980, the party awarded Grande a 1982. In mid-September 1982, the Hon- tended a 3-month course in recruiting scholarship to study international rela- duran guerrillas known as “Cin- techniques and methods for organizing tions in the Soviet Union. In September choneros” demanded, among other ”masses.” He then returned to El 1982, he went from the U.S.S.R. to things, Canada’s release in exchange for Salvador where he became a recruiter Cuba for 6 months of military training. three Cabinet ministers and more than for the FPL’s “Clara Elizabeth In June 1983, he and four other Salva- 100 civilians held hostage. Ramirez” Front (CERF). dorans were given Nicaraguan docu- ments and flown to Managua. There, Domingo BARRERA Castro, Maria Elsy QUIJADA Valle, alias they were taken to a safehouse, which alias “Victor,” deserted the FPL in ”Delmy,” was captured by the Salva- Grande described as a way-station for December 1982. He had been active in doran National Police in September Salvadoran guerrillas en route to and the Popular Revolutionary Bloc and, in 1984. She had joined the FPL in May from El Salvador. Before leaving Nica- January 1980, was sent from an FPL 1979. In September 1980, she traveled ragua for El Salvador, Grande and camp in Chalatenango to Cuba for train- by bus to Guatemala and then flew to others in the house were visited by ing. He secretly left El Salvador, taking Nicaragua. After 2 weeks in Managua, various PCES leaders including Shafik a small boat at night across the Gulf of she flew to Cuba for a military training Handal. In late July 1983, Grande Fonseca to Nicaragua. From Nicaragua, course. In January 1981, she returned to reentered El Salvador by way of he flew to Cuba. There, he took a Nicaragua and then traveled overland Guatemala. 6-month basic military training course in through Honduras to El Salvador. Napoleon ROMERO Garcia, alias tactics and the use of weapons and ex- Commander “Miguel Castellanos,” was plosives. Later, he attended a 6-month Felicito MENJIVAR Briones, alias the third-ranking commander of the leadership course. After completing his ”Monico,” surrendered ‘.o Salvadoran Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) until training, he returned to Managua and authorities on January 30, 1985. He was his defection on April 11, 1985. He was flew to Guatemala where he took a bus an activist in the Popular Revolutionary responsible for organizing cadres and to El Salvador. In Chalatenango, he Bloc before being recruited into the reviewing political plans, ideological became an instructor for the FPL and, FPL. In May 1980, he was sent from an statements, and proposals for military in December 1981, was named chief of FPL camp in Chalatenango to Cuba. He and propaganda action. Since 1979, he the FPL’s Northern Front “Apolinario left El Salvador for Nicaragua on the had been a member of the FPL Central Serrano.” During 1982, Barrera became La Union-Potosi ferry. From Nicaragua, Committee and Chief of the FPL’s Met- disillusioned with the war and with the he flew to Cuba for a 6-month basic ropolitan Front (San Salvador). He par- FMLN’s treatment of the population military course in weapons, explosives, ticipated in meetings of the committee and deserted. and tactics. He spent 6 months in each year and in its 1983 congress, Nicaragua working with some 300 Salva- which took place in Managua. In early dorans from all five factions of the October 1983, Romero traveled to FMLN. In 1981, he flew from Managua to Guatemala and traveled by bus to El

41 Salvador. He became a squad leader for Adin INGLES Alvarado, alias Agapito”; Pedro Antonio Ginon Reyes, an FPL platoon, serving first near ”Vidal,” the second-ranking member of alias “Rolando”; Ricardo de Jesus Jucuaran and later Chalatenango. Dur- the special forces of the FPL, defected Ramirez Lemus, alias “Hector Caballero ing an operation to disrupt the March to the Salvadoran Armed Forces on Chavez” or “Mario”; and Ana Rosa 1984 elections, he was seriously May 19, 1985. The special forces group Rivera Perla, alias “Betty.” All were wounded. was formed in February 1983 as an elite members of the Popular Revolutionary combat unit for special missions. Nica- Force “Lorenzo Zelaya” (FPR-LZ). Ramon Aristides CHICAS Claros, ragua provided explosives and other Operationally, they were part of the alias “Tilo,” defected on April 8, 1984. equipment. The original 28 members 19-member Popular Revolutionary Com- He was recruited into the ERP in May were sent to Cuba to train and to mittee “Camilo Torres,” which began 1981. He spent his first year growing develop operations plans. While in Cuba, infiltrating into Honduras from food for guerrilla units in Morazan. He they rehearsed an attack against the Nicaragua in July 1984 to establish a made five trips to Santo Domingo, Hon- military headquarters of the 4th Brigade guerrilla network. duras, to pick up supplies. In August at El Paraiso In Chalatenango Depart- They have identified the FSLN’s 1982, Chicas was transferred to a guer- ment. They successfully carried out the Department of International Relations rilla camp at Guarumas. The camp was attack in December 1983. When Ingles (DRI) as essential in providing food, supplied with arms, munitions, and uni- defected, 12 new recruits were in train- lodging, transportation, and training forms from Cuba by sea from Nicara- ing programs abroad. while in Nicaragua. They also stated gua. In December 1982, he became a that they were members of an “Interna- bodyguard for the commander of the Maria Marta Concepcion VALLA- tional Brigade” led by Sandinista mili- ”Rafael Arce Zablah” Brigade (BRAZ). DARES de Lemus, alias “Nidia Diaz” tary officers that fought Nicaraguan or “Claudia Novale,” was a guerrilla armed resistance forces in the Jalapa Santos Enrique GARCIA Chilulo, commander of the Central American area of northern Nicaragua. They alias “Quique,” was an ERP member Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRTC). reported that the same “brigade” in- from 1981 until his capture by Salva- During President Duarte’s first discus- cluded some 50 Costa Rican members of doran security forces on July 27, 1985. sion with guerrillas on October 15, 1984, the Popular Vanguard Party. He joined the ERP in August 1981 in La Palma, Diaz was one of three while he was living in Chinandega, Nica- FMLN commanders present. Among the ragua. In January 1982, he was sent to documents captured with her on April NICARAGUAN SECURITY Cuba for a weapons training course, 18, 1985, were archives of the PRTC, PERSONNEL which also was attended by several including correspondence between the dozen Salvadorans. In May 1982, he FMLN and the FSLN, notes of meet- Miguel BOLANOS Hunter was a returned to Nicaragua where in Septem- ings, and other PRTC and FMLN member of the Nicaraguan General ber he began 6 months’ training in com- documents. Directorate of State Security (DGSE). A bat tactics at Montelimar. When not in Sandinista since 1978, he defected in training overseas, Garcia lived in ERP Hondurans May 1983. For 4 years, Bolanos worked safehouses in Managua. According to in the F-7 (Mass Organizations) and F-2 Garcia, ERP units in Managua include a Jorge Alberto GALVEZ, alias (Foreign Diplomats) sections of the special forces group and a propaganda ”Manuel,” was captured in El Salvador DGSE. He described the FMLN logis- team, which prints fliers and counterfeit on June 28, 1985, in the course of tics structure established by the San- documents and recruits from among the government efforts to solve the murder dinistas in Managua. According to estimated 20,000 Salvadoran refugees of 13 people at a sidewalk cafe in San Bolanos, members of the FSLN Direc- now living in Nicaragua. Salvador on June 19, 1985. He was a torate, the DRI, the Fifth Directorate, Honduran member of the Salvadoran the Ministry of Interior, and the armed Jose Juan MENJIVAR was a PRTC guerrilla organization. Galvez was forces oversee the deliveries to the member of the FPL from December born in Tegucigalpa and graduated from FMLN. 1982 until he defected in January 1985. the Honduran national university in In 1981, he spent several months in a 1983. In late July 1983, he flew to Reymundo MUNOZ Diaz and six refugee camp in Honduras before enter- Managua where he worked with seven other DGSE agents were arrested by ing Nicaragua with false documents in other Hondurans and Nicaraguans at Honduran security services in April August 1981. He was arrested by San- the Center for Economic Studies of 1985. While a member of the Nicara- dinista security forces and held for 2 Honduras. In November 1984, a Salva- guan General Directorate of State months as a suspected spy for the Hon- doran member of the PRTC recruited Security (DGSE), he commanded a duran Government. On his release in Oc- Galvez to work inside El Salvador. In group of DGSE agents whose mission tober 1981, he was sent to a refugee December 1984, Galvez flew to El was to smuggle weapons to the “Cin- camp in Leon Department where he Salvador’s international airport at choneros” in Honduras. Beginning in lived for more than a year. In December Comalapa and was taken to a PRTC November 1984, Munoz made three 1982, he was recruited by a Salvadoran camp in the Cerros de San Pedro. trips to Honduras transporting M-16 rifles and other weapons by hiding them working for the FPL in Nicaragua and Hondurans involved in the El reinfiltrated into El Salvador. in corn-filled gunnysacks carried by Paraiso operation and captured be- mules. tween July and October 1984 by the Honduran Armed Forces: Arnulfo, Mon- toya Maradiaga, alias “Felipe” or ”Elias”; Gregorio Pinto Arevalo, alias ”Guilberto Lopez Aballero” or “Jose Maria Reconco Zuniga” or “Ruben

42 4. Nicaraguans in Exile

Sandinista internationalism has victim- grams and early legislation of the new Sandinista intentions regarding the ized Nicaraguans as well as Nicaragua’s Government of National Reconstruction future direction of Nicaraguan society neighbors. Part of the problem arises (GRN) gave the Nicaraguan people, its became more explicit in mid-1980 when from the irony that the movement that neighbors, and the international com- Defense Minister Humberto Ortega bears the name of Sandino, a nationalist munity as a whole reason to hope that announced the postponement until 1985 who rejected communist ties, has the dictatorial patterns of the past had of the elections promised in the junta’s sacrificed Nicaraguan nationalism to in- been broken .2 program. Controls over the press and ternationalism.1 This has intensified the Within a year, however, Violeta de the private sector were expanded sub- suffering of ordinary Nicaraguan Chamorro3 and Alfonso Robelo,4 two stantially.6 A “State of Economic and citizens. In the political arena, many of non-Sandinista members of the GRN Social Emergency” was declared which, those who opposed Somoza and sup- Junta, resigned in protest at Sandinista among other things, made it a crime to ported the Sandinistas in 1979 were actions. Nonetheless, the Sandinistas spread “false” economic news or to forced into exile as the prospects of an retained a facade of pluralism by engage in strikes.7 Sandinista Defense open, democratic system of government appointing non-Sandinistas in their Committees, block organizations follow- emerging in Nicaragua faded. place.5 Nicaragua kept good relations ing a Cuban model, served as the “eyes Fears that the FSLN’s new men with Western countries and received and ears” of the FSLN in detecting with guns would be dominant were in- substantial amounts of assistance for the antiregime sentiment and organizing itially discounted in the hope that the reconstruction of Nicaraguan society. support for Sandinista activities.8 After Sandinistas would understand that rationing began, they assumed a role in governing it country demanded it dif- the distribution of some food and other ferent approach from that required to essential goods to party members and overthrow a dictator. Indeed, the pro- nonmembers alike.

1FSLN leaders claim the problem does not The principles for which we all fought until majority would represent Sandinista exist because their situation is unique. “Ours we won the departure from power of organizations. Only then was the council, a is one of the few revolutions, perhaps the Anastasio Somoza Debayle have been representative “revolutionary” body in only one, that achieved the formation of a flagrantly betrayed by the party in power, theory coequal with the junta, convened for vast alliance, internal as well as external” that is, the Sandinist Front of National the first time. Despite efforts by Sandinista (Victor Tirado Lopez, Barricada, December Liberation . . . .” Violeta B. de Chamorro, authorities to distinguish between them, from 17, 1984) August 13, 1985 (letter addressed to the this date the FSLN and the Government of 2Arnong many other explicit undertak- Honorable Joao Baena Snares, OAS Nicaragua must be considered as essentially ings, the junta promised: Secretary General, Washington, D.C.). identical. 4"I withdrew from the government junta 6By 1979 the FSLN had decided that “In • Full respect for enumerated human on 22 April 1980 after very serious July 1979, pressures . . . to preserve the rights, including freedom of the press and of disagreements with the Sandinist National bourgeois democratic approach . . . failed” thought, conscience, and worship; Liberation Front . . . [which] because it had (“72-Hour Document,” p. 12—see footnote 4, • The unrestricted functioning of political the arms, imposed some Marxist-Leninist p. 3). The FSLN rapidly took over almost all parties regardless of ideology; deviations. . . . I knew that there were Marx- press outlets, in the end leaving only La • An independent and nonaligned foreign ists within the Sandinist Front. I was not Prensa, a symbol of resistance to Somoza policy; aware that there was complete Marxist- and of the regime’s “commitment” to • A mixed economy and support for Cen- Leninist control . . . .” (Alfonso Robelo, pluralism, any degree of independence. Cen- tral American integration; February 1981, in an interview by Francisco sorship “regarding matters that relate to the • Establishment of union rights and Talavera in Managua, Nicaragua. as pub- country’s domestic security” was first in- guarantee of the right to strike; and lished by ABC, Madrid, March 12, 1981, stituted by Decree 512, issued in August • A “minimum” Permanent military pp. 8-9). Other prominent Nicaraguans who 1980. It has been expanded on several occa- establishment. left official positions in the government sions since then. The private sector has been include: Jose Francisco Cardenal, named Vice intimidated and its independence curtailed These promises and many others were set President of the Council of State in 1980 but through constant political attacks, regulation, forth in the July 9 program provided to the resigned soon after his appointment; Edgard and control of raw materials and foreign OAS, the July 20 Fundamental Statute, and Macias, anti-Somoza militant, head of the exchange. the September 17 Law on Rights and Popular Social Christian Party and former 7La Gaceta, September 10, 1981. These Guarantees of Nicaraguans. Vice Minister of Labor in the GRN; Jaime rights were further limited in 1982 by the 3"When after it few months I realized Montealegre, former Vice President of the ”Law of National Emergency” (La Gaceta, that the course promised did not correspond Council of State; and Alvaro Taboada, former March 20, 1982). to what was being done, I left the Junta . . . . Sandinista ambassador to Ecuador. 8Robert S. Leiken, “Nicaragua’s Untold 5Among the factors precipitating the Stories,” The New Republic (October 8, departure of Chamorro and Robelo was the 1984), pp. 46, 50. FSLN’s consolidation of its effective control over the government by modifying the com- position of the Council of State to ensure a

43 By 1982, the Sandinistas were open- Those measures included mob violence Selected Biographies ly abandoning the program on the basis against rallies, party candidates, and of which the GRN had taken power in headquarters; rationing of campaign Arturo Jose CRUZ Porras, a long- 1979. Civil rights were suspended in resources and media time to ensure that time member of the Conservative Party, March 1982, when the GRN declared a the well-established FSLN organiza- is an economist who holds graduate and state of emergency. The government tional resources and media dominance undergraduate degrees from George- moved against independent trade were preserved; and reduction of the town University. He has specialized in unions, intimidated business leaders, and voting age to 16 to expand the voting development banking and has worked began in January 1982 the well- lists with persons educated only under for the Inter-American Development publicized relocation of the Miskito In- Sandinista rule.10 Bank. He was jailed twice by Somoza, dians from their traditional homelands Not surprisingly, concern over the once for 3 months and later for on the Atlantic coast. The Sandinistas Sandinistas’ progressive abandonment of 11 months. In 1977, Cruz was invited by were also by this time encouraging the the original program of the revolution the Sandinistas to be one of “The Group development of the “people’s church” of 12,” prominent Nicaraguans who against the established church hier- would serve as a bridge between the archy. The latter, including Archbishop Sandinistas and other groups in the civil (now Cardinal) Miguel Obando y Bravo, These will not be elections to opposition to Somoza. Following the had initially been among the San- revolution, Cruz served as president of dinistas’ most important allies in the decide who is in power, because the Central Bank in 1979-80, as a battle against Somoza. the people hold power through member of the governing junta from By November 1984, when the San- their vanguard, the Frente May 1980 to March 1981, and as Nica- dinistas held elections earlier than Sandinista. ragua’s ambassador to the United previously announced, the prospects for States from June 1981 until his resigna- peaceful opposition to their rule had Humberto Ortega tion in December in protest over Sandi- August 198011 been considerably diminished. All the nista policies. Cruz was the presidential major communications outlets, with the candidate of the unified opposition in the exception of La Prensa and a few November 1984 elections but refused to private radio stations, were in the hands led to disagreements among those in the register his candidacy in protest over of the Sandinistas. All government government who had joined in alliance the Sandinista government’s refusal to bureaucracies and key ministries were with the FSLN and among some mem- permit a fair electoral contest. He in FSLN control. The Sandinista bers of the FSLN itself. The departure helped found UNO in 1985. Workers Central had undermined the of Chamorro and Robelo from the junta strength of non-Sandinista trade unions, Alfredo CESAR Aguirre earned a such as the Nicaraguan Worker’s Cen- in 1980 presaged the 1981 resignation of B.S. degree in industrial relations from tral (CTN) and the Confederation of the former Vice Minister of Defense and the University of Texas and an M.B.A. Labor Unification (CUS). The party’s Sandinista war hero Eden Pastora, who, from Stanford University. After serving youth and women’s wings in conjunction in April 1982, declared that the revolu- as general administrator of the Nicara- with the Sandinista Defense Committees tion had betrayed its ideals. guan Sugar Estates, he joined the San- had effective control over mass mobiliza- As the opportunities for effective dinistas in 1978 and was tortured and tion. The state share of GNP had risen and peaceful political opposition imprisoned by the government during from roughly 15% in 1978 to more than diminished, armed resistance to the Somoza’s last year. After Somoza fell in 40%, and Sandinista efforts to expand regime began to evolve to include a 1979, Cesar became executive director their economic control were continuing.9 broader base of leadership, recruitment, of the International Reconstruction In this context, the November 1984 and support. Both Pastora and Robelo Fund. In 1980-81 he was executive elections were another step in the anti- began armed opposition in 1983. The director of the Banking Superior Coun- democratic direction set by the FSLN. Sandinistas have maintained an un- cil. In 1981-82 he was president of the Although an Independent Liberal Party wavering policy of refusing to enter into Central Bank. After breaking with the (PLI) and a conservative group won sub- a dialogue with the resistance, many of Sandinistas, Cesar went into exile in stantial voter support, the main opposi- whose leaders came together in the Costa Rica and became an adviser to tion, the Coordinadora Democratica, summer of 1985 to form the Unified the Costa Rican Government specializ- refused to participate in the elections Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO). ing in external debt. In mid-1985 he when it became clear that the FSLN became the most prominent of six was doing everything possible to pre- founding members of the Southern Op- vent the mounting of an effective cam- position Bloc. paign by the democratic opposition.

9See H. W. Krumwiede, “Sandinist 10The formal correctness of the elections 11Quoted from “This Week: Central Democracy: Problems of Institutionalization,” themselves was reminiscent of Somoza’s 1974 America and Panama,” September 1, 1980, in Grabendorff, Krumwiede, et al., Political charade which Nicaragua’s Catholic bishops and cited by Thomas A. Anderson, Politics Change in Central Anterica: Internal and characterized as “legal war.” Also see “San- In Central America (New York, 1982), p. External Dimensions (Boulder and London, dinistas Claim Big Election Victory,” New 179. Ortega was referring to the elections 1984,) pp. 70-72. York Times, November 6, 1984; “Nicara- scheduled for 1985, actually held in 1984. guans Go to the Polls,” Washington Post, November 5, 1984.

44 Adolfo CALERO Portocarrero, a lifelong opponent of Somoza, has been I am an internationalist because I am a free man and I want to president of the National Directorate and commander in chief of the armed contribute to the liberation of all men . . . [But] in this moment, I forces of the FDN since December 1983. express the sentiments of the majority of Nicaraguans when I say Calero graduated from the University of that the hour has arrived when they [the internationalists] should Notre Dame in 1953, did graduate work leave us alone-those who are not involved in activities that con- in industrial management at Syracuse tribute to health and education. As someone who loves my people I University, and holds a law degree from take honor, like Sandino, in calling for all Nicaraguans to put the University of Central America in Nicaragua. He began his political career themselves on a war footing as long as there is a foreign soldier on in the 1950s as an activist in the Con- the native soil. servative Party. In 1959 he helped orga- Eden Pastora, April 15, 198212 nize managerial strikes in support of an insurrection headed by Pedro Joaquin I joined the Revolutionary Government with. . . the conviction that Chamorro, editor of the opposition daily the Revolution would be good, first and foremost, for Nicaragua. La Prensa. In 1978, Calero served as My experience has disillusioned me: dogmatism and adventurism his party’s representative in the Broad Opposition Front (FAO), and was jailed seem to have wiped out the democratic and pluralistic ideals which, for initiating a general strike against in 1979, united all Nicaraguan advocates of freedom. . . . Certain Somoza. After attempting to cooperate Sandinista revolutionary leaders . . . [profess] allegiance to an inter- with the Sandinistas, Calero went into nationalist ideology . . . at the expense of the basic interests of the exile at the end of 1982. He helped nation-state of Nicaragua. [Emphasis in original] found UNO in 1985. Arturo Cruz, 198313 Enrique BERMUDEZ Varela is the military commander of the FDN armed forces. He served in the National Guard regime. After the revolution Robelo was Pastora became Vice Minister of In- under Somoza and was assigned to one of the five members of the original terior and then Vice Minister of Washington as defense attache in 1977. 1979 junta. He resigned in 1980 because Defense. In April 1982 he announced his In December 1982, he was cleared of of Marxist tendencies in the FSLN- opposition to the Sandinista regime. ”war crimes” by the FSLN’s chief press dominated government and the growing That same year he was cofounder of spokesman. He has described himself as Cuban influence in the country. Har- ARDE. In April 1983 he took up arms a professional soldier and, under assed by the FSLN after his resigna- against the Sandinistas in southern Somoza, apolitical. He is a graduate of tion, he was finally forced into exile in Nicaragua. the Nicaraguan Military Academy and 1982, at which time he and Eden received training at the U.S. Army Pastora founded the Democratic Revolu- Wycliffe DIEGO is a Miskito Indian Command and General Staff College and tionary Alliance, ARDE. In 1985, leader from the Atlantic coast town of the U.S. Army School of the Americas. Robelo helped found UNO. Puerto Cabezas. He was a Moravian He also received military training in pastor and an active member of the Brazil. Eden PASTORA Gomez, the legen- Miskito organization ALPROMISU. He dary Commander Zero and leader of the was jailed by Somoza in 1971 for Alfonso ROBELO Callejas, political FRS (Sandino Revolutionary Front), allegedly being a communist. When coordinator of ARDE and head of the was the Sandinistas’ most popular hero MISURASATA was formed in 1979, Nicaraguan Democratic Movement and a senior official of their government Diego served as a member of its execu- (MDN), was trained as a chemical until he distanced himself from them in tive board. Reacting to the Sandinista engineer. He served as director of the 1981. In August 1978 Pastora led the mistreatment of Nicaragua’s indigenous University of Central America from unit that captured the National Palace population, Diego went into exile and 1970 to 1972 and was president of the in Managua. That operation gained the helped found the armed resistance Nicaraguan Chamber of Commerce until release of 59 political prisoners, but its group MISURA. He was wounded in a 1975. He then headed the development lasting significance was that it captured Sandinista-engineered 1982 assassination institute INDE. Following the assassina- the imagination of the Nicaraguan peo- attempt. tion of La Prensa editor Pedro Joaquin ple and enabled the Sandinistas to Chamorro, Robelo founded the MDN, a become the symbol of resistance to moderate, democratic-oriented political Somoza. After the fall of Somoza, party of businessmen, industrialists, and

12Statement read in San Jose, Costa Rica, 13Arturo J. Cruz, “Nicaragua’s Imperiled announcing his break with the FSLN and Revolution,” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1983), reported in FBIS, April 16, 1982. The pp. 1031-1032. translation used here is that of Shirley Christian, Nicaragua, Revolution in the Family (New York, Random House, 1985), p. 321.

45 5. Rifles From Vietnam

In June 1980, the Secretary General of Salvadoran Armed Forces6 and 7% the Communist Party of El Salvador, Last Delivery Point traceable to other destinations. Jorge Shafik Handal, visited Vietnam in in U.S. Records In March 1981, the Nicaraguan search of weapons. He was promised 60 Minister of Defense, Sandinista Direc- tons of arms and ammunition, including torate member Humberto Ortega, M-16 automatic rifles.1 No. of traveled to Hanoi. In a speech given The U.S. Government has, since Delivery Point weapons there March 11, Ortega said: early 1981, traced the serial numbers of Vietnam 581 almost 1,600 M-16s2 captured from U.S. military units 237 We sincerely thank the Vietnamese peo- Salvadoran guerrillas, turned in by during the 1960s with prob- ple and highly value their support for the defecting guerrillas3 or, on the basis of able delivery to Vietnam heroic Salvadoran people ... the fierce and captured guerrilla documents, still in Unknown, but probably 236 bloody struggle in El Salvador requires the Vietnam support of all progressive nations and forces guerrilla hands. throughout the world.7 The traces show that 66%, of these El Salvador 433 arms can be positively identified as hav- Other 101 Also in 1981, William Shaweross ing been shipped directly to South Viet- TOTAL 1,588 traveled to Vietnam and asked: nam,4 to depots involved in shipment to Southeast Asia during the Vietnam con- Had Vietnam been distributing any of the flict, or as having been manufactured by vast pile of weapons left by the Americans? U.S. companies contracted only for Colonel Bui Tin acknowledged, in effect, that materiel for the Vietnam war.5 The 34% it had. In Salvador? “It’s not fair to say the unrelated to Vietnam include 27% made U.S. can help the junta but we cannot help our friends. We do our best to support up of weapons originally shipped to the revolutionary movements in the world . . . .”8

1"Vietnam. From 9 to 15 June. Received vide information leading to the capture of WSN 961419, shipped 19 MAR 68, M/F by (high-ranking party and military weapons, are given monetary rewards com- USA depot, CAM RANH BAY, Vietnam. leaders] . . . . They agreed to provide aid in mensurate with the type and number of WSN 728973, shipped 10 May 67, M/F weapons, the first shipments consisting of . . . weapons turned in. USA SPT CMD, SAIGON, Vietnam. 1,620 AR-15 rifles . . . one and one half 4The sample below illustrates this WSN 1498058, shipped 23 Apr 69, M/F million AR-15 cartridges . . . approximate category. Colt Industries, Hartford, Connec- 241 ORD SUP CO, CAN THO, Vietnam. weight of the entire shipment: 60 ticut, manufacturers of M-16 rifles, furnished WSN 1208988, shipped 3 Oct 68, M/F tons . . . The above-mentioned materiel will be the following information on the disposition of USN Support Act, SAIGON, Vietnam. ready for shipment during the first five days weapons identified individually by their serial of September” (quoted from “Gira por los number: 5General Motors manufactured the paises socialistas, Asia y Africa” [Trip to the 3,000,000 series in the 1960s, and records on Socialist Countries, Asia, and Africa], WSN 725668, shipped 10 May 67, M/F these weapons have since been destroyed; Documents, E, p. 1). USA Support CMD, SAIGON, Vietnam. however, the large majority of these weapons 2Some guerrilla documents refer to WSN 1209738, shipped 2 Oct 68, M/F were shipped to Vietnam. M-16s as AR-15s. Both nomenclatures Naval Support Act, SAIGON, Vietnam. 6The first shipment of M-16s to El describe the same automatic rifle. The WSN 1237980, shipped 29 Oct 68, M/F Salvador from the United States began after original manufacturer, the Armalite Division 241 ORD SUP CO, CAN THO, Vietnam. January 16, 1981, in response to the realiza- of Fairchild Industries, designated the rifle WSN 1396129, shipped 19 Feb 69, M/F tion that the FMLN’s “final offensive” was the AR-15. The U.S. Army subsequently 250 ORD SVC CTR, NHA TRANG, being supplied through Nicaragua. designated it the M-16. Colt Industries Vietnam. 7Hanoi VNA in English, March 11, 1981 manufactured the definitive M-16 model, cur- WSN 1207644, shipped 3 Oct 68, M/F (reported in FBIS, Vol. IV (Asia and Pacific), rently priced at $446 each. USN Support Act, SAIGON, Vietnam. March 12, 1981, p. K8). 3Under a Salvadoran Government pro- WSN 1181866, shipped 16 Sep 68, M/F 8"New York Review of Books, September gram, guerrillas who turn in weapons, or pro- 241 ORD CO, CAN THO, Vietnam. 14, 1981. WSN 1237618, shipped 27 Oct 68, M/F 241 ORD SUP CO, CAN THO, Vietnam. WSN 1558102, shipped 31 May 69, M/F 230 ORD SVC CTR III ALC, SAIGON, Vietnam.

46 6. FMLN Evaluation of the 1981 Offensive1

FARABUNDO MARTI FRONT FOR In San Salvador • Harassment of enemy forces in NATIONAL LIBERATION Jutiapa the 14th of January. • The capture of three radio stations • Capture of Santa Clara, on TO THE SALVADOREAN PEOPLE on the l1th of January. January 11th. TO THE PEOPLE OF CENTRAL AMERICA • Attack on the Air Force. The Air • Continuous attacks in Tecoluca AND THE WORLD Force was unable to take off for several between the 10th and 15th of January. days. • Harassing actions against the bar- The General Command of the Fara- • The taking of Soyapango, Me- racks of the city of San Vicente from the bundo Marti Front for National Libera- jicanos, Cuscatancingo, and fighting in 11th of January on. tion (FMLN) declares to all its sister Ciudad Delgado, Tonacatepeque. • Control of the Pan American peoples—those of Central America and • Control of the highways of San Highway, from San Rafael Cedros to of all the world—that the great opera- Marcos, Santo Tomas and Comalapa. Apastepeque. tion comprised in the plan for the laun- • Harassment of the barracks of the • Control of the coastal highway ching of the general revolutionary offen- National Guard and of the Rural Police. from Puente de Oro to Zacatecoluca. sive, begun on the 10th of January, was carried out with success by the regular Western Front—Jose Feliciano Amas Eastern Front—Francisco Sanchez units, guerrilla and militia units of our • Attack against the 2nd Infantry • Occupation of the city of Perquin popular revolutionary army. Brigade in the city of Santa Ana, a unit and assault on the enemy garrison on Since the 10th of January, when this in which a company of soldiers led by the 11th of January, in the province of General Command of the FMLN issued two officers rose up and went over to Morazan. the orders for the offensive 1 and 2, the fight with the people and the FMLN on • Occupation of the city of Osicala, revolutionary armed forces carried out the 10th of January, after burning the Morazan on January 13th. the following actions. arsenal of the garrison. • Occupation of the cities of El • Attacks against the barracks of Rosario, Corinto, Nueva Esparta, Santa the National Police, the National Guard In the Central Front— Rosa de Lima on the 12th of January and the Rural Police, on the 10th, 11th Modesto Ramirez (provinces of Morazan and La Union). and 12th of January in Santa Ana. • Seige and assault on the barracks • Seige of the barracks of • Attack on the enemy garrisons in at Gotera during the 13, 14 and 15 of Chalatenango and the capture of the Metapan, in the province of Santa Ana, January. city during the 10, 11 and 12th days of and the capture of the city on the 12th • Ambush at the top of Rio Seco of January. and 13th of January. a powerful column of reinforcements • Seige of the barracks of Paraiso • Attack on the enemy barracks and marching to Gotera from the Central and control of the access routes between popular insurrection in the city of Barracks of the Infantry Brigade sta- this point and the city of Chalatenango Chalchuapa, the second largest in the tioned in San Miguel. This column, during the 10th, 11th and 12th days of province of Santa Ana; attacks on the which included armored vehicles and ar- January. enemy garrisons in San Julian, Armenia, tillery, was stopped and in large part • Attacks at enemy garrisons in the Acajutla, Sonsonate, Cara Sucia and disorganized. towns of San Antonio La Cruz, Areatao, Bola de Monte. • Ambush of reinforcements that La Palina Patanera, San Francisco • Attack on the Border Police, the were going from La Leona to the city of Morazan, San Antonio Los Ranchos, all 10th of January in Santa Ana. Puerto de La Union. in the province of Chalatenango. • Diversionary actions were carried • Taking of Suchitoto and seige of In the Nearcentral Front— out in the city of San Miguel. the enemy garrison on January 11 and Anastacio Aquino • Control of the highways between 12. San Miguel and Gotera, between San • Attack and harassment of the Na- • Capture of the city of Apopa on Miguel and Usulutan and El Delirio. the 10th of January. tional Guard barracks of Villa Victoria. • Control of the communication • Capture and annihilation of enemy routes between the Troncal del Norte military units in Cinquera in the prov- highway and the towns of Aguilares, ince of Cabanas on January 12th. Suchitoto and San Jose Guayabal.

1Appendix 12, “Evaluation by the Revolutionary Victory, distributed in the General Command of the FMLN Upon the United States in English during February- First Phase of the General Offensive,” March 1981 (complete text and spelling as in pp. 84-88 of the FMLN-FDR booklet, El original). Salvador on the Threshold of a Democratic

47 The high degree of coordination of supposed refusal of the popular masses The people of Sandino, who opened those actions in the four war fronts, the in the capital to take the road of revolu- the future of Central America, will not strength of the attacks, the high moral tion. We are absolutely certain that the kneel before the imperialists. The people of our fighters—demonstrate clearly the heroic and combative people of San of Central America, who are now living high military capacity of our forces. Salvador will give full lie to such in the most important hour of their During several days, they managed speculations and we call upon them to history, will close ranks to prevent the to annihilate numerous positions, lay prepare for the coming battles, at the sad mourderous designes of imperialism seige to and contain strategic military same time that we call upon the ranks from coming to pass. units of the genocidal Junta, stop its of our member organizations of the Nine of every ten U.S. made bullets communications and supplies, intercept FMLN and their revolutionary armed that come into the hands of the Junta the reinforcements that were sent in the forces to organize in all details the go directly to spill the blood of the majority of the few cases where the coming great revolutionary actions in unarmed population, and are designed to enemy high command was able to move San Salvador. kill children, women and the elderly. troops in the national territory. The Junta has had no recourse but Each new step that imperialism takes in The impact of the initial phase of the to seek the support of mercenaries and its military escalation against the general offensive on the ranks of the launch a lying campaign of propaganda, Salvadorean people, increases the threat puppet and assassin army, managed to backing itself with the muzzling of the against the Nicaraguan revolution and draw from its ranks patriotic officers means of communications, including per- against peace in Central America and and soldiers of our people who are today manently tying together all the radio the Caribbean, and threatens the peace fighting with their brothers, directing stations. of the world. their arms against the real enemies of But this will not permit it to make We are sure that the peoples of the our people, a valient attitude that is a up for its losses, nor recover the in- world and the governments that love vibrant call to those decent officers and itiative in the war. Our forces, within peace and defend the principles of self- soldiers who still remain within the the context of the general offensive, are determination, will raise their powerful structures of the fascist command. now carrying out a necessary and voices and set in motion their actions of Today, the Salvadorean workers, the previously planned movement that solidarity to hold back the military entire people, can have proof that their guarantees the continuation of the offen- escalation of U.S. imperialism against vanguard, the FMLN, has known how sive to new and higher phases. the Salvadorean people. to forge the instruments that will bring The military-Christian Democratic Forward fighters, forward guerrillas about a total revolutionary victory. Junta and its murderous armed forces and militias, forward companeros In San Salvador, where the elite were rocked by the energetic initiation workers and patriotic soldiers, continue strategic forces of the enemy are con- of our general offensive. Desperately, the battles that will bring peace, justice, centrated and where the massacre that they seized upon the intensification of liberty and true independence to our the fascist dictatorship has carried out the repressive terror against an un- native country. for several years reached its highest armed population as other rotten dic- volume in 1980, the working masses tatorships had done as their end ap- UNITED IN THE FIGHT most conscious carried out with great proached. They established the curfew TO THE FINAL VICTORY! valor the call for the strike. The FMLN and the Martial Law with this end to recognizes that, except for the attack on this end. REVOLUTION OR DEATH, the central base of the Air Force, it did The government of the United WE WILL WIN! not manage to strike the forceful States rushed to facilitate and increase SALVADOR CAYETANO CARPIO military blows in the capital that were the sending of military advisors, arms (MARCIAL) needed to sustain the full development and ammunition to help the Junta main- of the strike and to set off the popular tain itself and extend the massacre SCHAFIK JORGE HANDAL insurrection. against our people. At the same time, ROBERTO ROCA The genocidal government has tried the imperialists are threatening the to take advantage of this fact through Nicaraguan people and, with the new in- IN REPRESENTATION OF JOAQUIN its delirious and lying propaganda. terventionist steps they have taken, are VILLALOBOS—JUAN RAMON MEDRANO Other voices have also been heard mak- shaping up the serious danger of the ex- FERMAN CIENFUEGOS ing superficial judgements about the tension of the conflict to all of Central America, thus threatening the peace of January 21, 1981 the world. The FMLN, at the head of the heroic Salvadorean people, will continue advancing in its struggle to the final liberation of our people, without taking fright before the stubborn imperialist intervention.

48 7. Sources

Many of the materials used in this study Then there are written records. Be- • Telegrams, memoranda, reports, are readily available in major libraries. tween the day in November 1980 when and other records retained by the In addition to magazines and Salvadoran police found a cache of Foreign Affairs Information Manage- newspapers, examples of such readily documents hidden in the walls of the ment Center (A/FAIM) and the Bureau available materials include the Daily home of the brother of the Secretary of Inter-American Affairs (ARA), Report (Vol. VI, Latin America) of the General of the Salvadoran Communist Department of State. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Party, and the day in April 1985 when • Telegrams to and from U.S. (cited herein as FBIS), which records in Salvadoran Army units captured Com- diplomatic posts in Central America, English translation significant news mander Nidia Diaz along with archives especially Nicaragua, including items from throughout the world. Also of the Central Committee of the PRTC restricted-distribution records, as main- widely available are the annual volumes after a battle near a regional command tained in the Information Management of American Foreign Policy: Current post, literally thousands of Salvadoran Section of the Executive Secretariat Documents, published by the Office of guerrilla documents—including letters, (S/S-I), Department of State. the Historian, Department of State, diaries, travel records, weapons inven- • Records of the U.S. intelligence Washington, D.C., and other U.S. tories, and related papers—have been community with both technical and Government publications.1 captured. These now include, in addition human source reporting, including infor- Unfortunately, many other primary to the PCES and PRTC files mentioned mation from Nicaraguans from all walks sources for the study of contemporary above, major records of the People’s of life, members of the Nicaraguan in- history are not as readily available. As Revolutionary Army (ERP) captured in telligence and security organizations, as the Central American conflict has con- January 1981. Three of the five major well as full debriefing by various securi- tinued, however, the number of people components of the FMLN may, ty services in the region of captured in- who have discussed their experiences therefore, be studied through their own surgents and defectors. and direct participation in the conflict words and records. One final caveat-the fact that an has increased. Two separate appendices These FMLN documents constitute open citation is given for a particular to this study are dedicated to such an invaluable original source and will be event does not imply the absence of cor- people—frequently among the most made available to scholars and other in- roborating classified information. In valuable contributors to the under- terested analysts in a manner similar to some cases, unclassified sources were standing of contemporary events (see that of the documents obtained in sought out to protect classified ones. Appendices 3 and 4). Grenada which were deposited in the National Arehives.2 Finally, some sources have been con- sulted but cannot be released to the public for reasons of national security. They include:

1Examples of recent publications related The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central Background Paper: Nicaragua’s Military to this one include: America and the Caribbean, Departments of Build-up and Support for Central American State and Defense, Washington, D.C., March Subversion, Departments of State and Sustaining a Consistent Policy in Cen- 1985 Defense, Washington, D.C., July 18, 1984. tral America: One Year After the National “News Briefing on Intelligence Informa- 2Copies of 19 documents from the PCES Bipartisan Commission Report, report to tion on External Support of the Guerrillas in and ERP caches were made available to the the President from the Secretary of State, El Salvador,” U.S. Ambassador to El press by the Department of State, accom- U.S. Department of State, Special Report Salvador Thomas R. Pickering and Gen. Paul panied by English translations on February No. 124, April 1985. F. Gorman, Commander in Chief of the U.S. 23, 1981 (see footnote 2, p. 5 of this study). Southern Command, at the State Depart- ment, Washington, D.C., August 8, 1984.

49 Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. September 1985 • This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission; citation of this source is appreciated. Postage and Fees Paid United States Department of State Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 STA-501

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