I T W How the fight against drugs is n militarizing Latin America he t a e r r n a l 1: THE IMPACT OF “NEW THREATS” ON SECURITY POLICY 1 THE INTERNAL WAR How the fi ght against drugs is militarizing Latin America Los Estados latinoamericanos frente a la protesta social 3 CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES

Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales - CELS

Research Luciana Pol, Ross Eventon, Florencia Kligman Text Juliana Miranda, Manuel Tufró, Paula Litvachky Editing Ximena Tordini Design Mariana Migueles Photo editing Jazmín Tesone Translation into English Sarah Smith The We are grateful for the contributions of Juan Gabriel Tokatlian and Adam Isacson Financed by Open Society Foundations Internal

Asociación Civil Centro de Estudios War Legales y Sociales The Internal War: How the fi ght against drugs is militarizing Latin America. 1a ed . Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales CELS, 2018. 1 60 p. ; 27 x 21 cm. ISBN 978-987-4195-04-3 The impact of 1. Derechos Humanos. 2. Política sobre Drogas. “new threats” on 3. Política de Seguridad. CDD 323 security policy PAGE 4

The2 toughening and militarization of security policies in Latin America PAGE 16

The3 impact of “new threats” on human rights PAGE 40

Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales Piedras 547, 1er piso C1070AAK Buenos Aires, Argentina. Tel/fax: +54 11 4334-4200 e-mail: [email protected] www.cels.org.ar 4 THE INTERNAL WAR 1: THE IMPACT OF “NEW THREATS” ON SECURITY POLICY 5 the impact of “new threats” on security policy

1 6 THE INTERNAL WAR 1: THE IMPACT OF “NEW THREATS” ON SECURITY POLICY 7

chapter 1 The impact of “new threats” on security policy

Why do some political actors sustain that the armed that, in the absence of armed confl icts in the region, the In contrast, the terrorism agenda in the majority of forces should intervene in aff airs other than their primary principal threats to the stability of states now come from The notion of “new countries is not associated with any widespread societal mission of defending a country from military attack? Are transnational organized crime, and in particular from ac- concern. Its presence in defense and security discourse there security threats that can be equated with outside tivities linked to drug traffi cking and phenomena such as threats” leads to and programs is more closely linked to the needs of threats and that justify the use of military might inside poverty, migration and “populism.” In recent years, the hemispheric diplomatic agendas and bilateral relations borders? In order to respond to these questions, we United States has insisted on adding terrorism to this the militarization of with the United States. In some countries, anti-terrorism must examine how the notion of “new threats” was group. Viewed from this standpoint, the armed forces laws have used this agenda to persecute and stigmatize constructed, who is promoting it as doctrine, and what in each country should be re-trained to confront these domestic security, groups and social confl icts. these supposed dangers are. heterogeneous issues that, in more than one case, are When incorporated into public policy, the notion of “new complex socioeconomic phenomena. the depiction of In the 1980s and 1990s, a process of democratization threats” leads to the militarization of domestic security, put an end to the military governments that had prolif- The reason why these problems should be met with a social issues such the depiction of social issues such as poverty and mi- erated in Latin America during the twentieth century. military response is not quite clear. In some cases, it is gration as security matters, or both things at once. This The “national security doctrine,” pushed by the United argued that these are transnational phenomena, as if as poverty and involves the expansion of the state’s capacity to carry States and adopted throughout the Americas, was this were synonymous with foreign military aggression. out intelligence-related tasks or exchange information also abandoned once the ghost of Communism could In other instances, it is posited that, in the absence of migration as security across diff erent state agencies. The new threats, drug no longer be used to conjure internal enemies. At the any potential scenario of military confl ict, the armed traffi cking especially, are presented as justifi cation for same time, democracy weakened the existing tensions forces should be turned into a sort of police force so matters, or both investigative techniques and forms of surveillance sup- between the countries of the region. War with a neigh- as not to waste resources. In all cases, those seeking posedly aimed at criminal groups, but which often are boring country, which had been the main hypothesis to convince the authorities and public opinion that things at once. used against political opponents or other social actors of military confl ict for most Latin American countries, there is no diff erence between citizen security and na- and impact the rights of assembly, participation, protest began to disappear from the realm of possibility. With tional defense use these “new threats” as their central and privacy. There has also been a backdrop of policy nuances depending on the situation and history of argument. In that sense, this position represents conti- reforms involving the weakening of due process, whereby each country, the armed forces generally began to lose nuity with the national security doctrine. Various factors guarantees are reduced or eliminated for certain crimes relevance as political actors in the wake of democracy. explain the spread of this paradigm and the institutional that supposedly require exceptional responses. and policy transformations that it has brought about in In the same period, the issues of crime and citizen terms of security and defense. security became central themes on the political agenda throughout the region. This led many countries to favor The fi ght against drug traffi cking has been at the center military involvement in “combating crime.” To varying of many countries’ political and electoral agendas, and extents in each country, the persistence of economic a string of security responses have been implemented, disparities and the expansion of illegal markets such as often including the internal use of military might. Even arms and drug traffi cking—underpinned by increased after proving ineff ective and conducive to the intensifi - consumption in the United States—contributed to cation of violence, these policies usually have relatively transforming Latin America into one of the most violent solid social backing. This explains to a large extent why regions in the world. the drug trade has been one of the greatest social con- cerns associated with crime and violence. It awakens a In this context, some US government agencies—in- social panic that is not unconnected to the prohibition of cluding the US Southern Command—and lobbyists drugs and their historical conceptualization as a societal for the armed forces of the region created and spread evil that must be “combated” at all costs. the doctrine of “new threats.” This doctrine sustains 8 THE INTERNAL WAR 1: THE IMPACT OF “NEW THREATS” ON SECURITY POLICY 9

enables an agenda of militarization and restrictions on The construction of “narco-terrorism” The geopolitical dimension The toughening of security The vague defi nition of “threats” and the lack of a rights that in the United States and Europe is associated policies in Latin America serious diagnosis foster a scenario in which the issues with the “war on terror,” and which is also promoted in The issue of “new threats” and the militarization of internal The doctrine of new threats has an impact on the encompassed by this agenda are constantly expanding, countries where there is no scenario of terrorist threats. security have to do with regional geopolitical matters. The security policies of Latin American countries in that it and the defi nitions and solutions shift from one problem Finally, the association drawn between both phenomena adoption of this doctrine is linked to Latin American coun- encourages a toughened state response to diverse to another. A good example is the category of “narco- does not lead to developing better policies to address tries’ failure to discuss and develop a national and regional criminal phenomena and even social problems unrelated terrorism” increasingly used by some US agencies and either of the two problems. defense policy that is autonomous from the United States. to any crime-linked dynamics. This process consists of other regional actors. In choosing this route, the defense dimension tends to two trends. One, the militarization of security gets the The term “narco-terrorism,” used as an equivalent to disappear as it is subsumed under strategies of militarized military forces involved in police tasks. The second “narco-guerrilla,” became common currency back in security dependent on the directives and aims of the US involves the reorientation of the traditional components the 1980s in Peru to characterize the Shining Path. The demarcation between defense and security military apparatus. of the criminal justice and security systems—the police, It was later adopted to describe the Revolutionary laws and criminal codes, the intelligence apparatus—to Over the past 30 years in Latin America, two opposing Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). According to the address problems redefi ned as matters of national tendencies have been at odds with each other when US Department of Defense, “narco-terrorism” refers to security and to pursue internal enemies. acts of violence—murders, kidnappings, bombings— it comes to how state violence is exercised. The fi rst committed by drug traffi ckers to cause disruption and is aimed at establishing a clear distinction between In some countries, both trends can be observed; in divert attention from their illegal operations. The US security and defense and taking power away from the The confl ation of others where the role of the armed forces continues Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) uses another defi ni- armed forces as a political actor, as a condition for the to be limited, the alignment with the doctrine of new tion: “narco-terrorism” is considered a sub-dimension democratization of the region. The second follows a drug tra cking, threats is manifested primarily in how the police function of terrorism, where there is evidence of participation recipe from the United States, according to which the and in regulatory changes. by individuals or terrorist groups in activities associated armed forces must continue to intervene in security terrorism and other with the growing, manufacture, transportation and dis- issues, because military threats have ceased. tribution of drugs. In general terms, and with local nuances, it can be said criminal networks After the September 2001 attacks on the United that in the northern part of the region—Mexico, Central The militarization of security America, the Caribbean—the latter tendency has States, the idea of “narco-terrorism”1 was used to enables an agenda The police corps is based on the same premise as the dominated. And in the Southern Cone, the distinction broaden the scope of the defi nition of terrorism. For military in the sense that they are the instruments that between security and defense has been an important example, in 2004, the former executive director of the of militarization and embody and implement the state’s monopoly on exer- aspect of recent political history, cemented in a broad United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) cising legitimate violence. But the missions of security consensus regarding the importance of limiting the affi rmed that “fi ghting drug traffi cking is the same restrictions on rights. and defense are qualitatively distinct in terms of training, armed forces’ signifi cance as a political actor and re- as combating terrorism.” In this same vein, the US skills, equipment, and principles of action and use of stricting its scope of authority to its principal mission. House Committee on Homeland Security proposed in In the Andean countries, the armed forces tend to be force, among other matters. 2012 that organizations devoted to drug traffi cking be multifunctional since, in addition to their traditional role automatically classifi ed as terrorist groups, arguing that In recent years, the emergence of citizen security par- of defense and intervention in security matters, they fulfi ll This shift has intensifi ed since some governments this would generate greater capacity to counter their adigms and “community approaches” to police work other functions related to social issues, infrastructure suspended their participation in the Union of South threat to national security.2 In March 2017, more than has sought to further the conceptual diff erence between and transportation, and even participate in administer- 400 people from 14 countries attended a seminar on American Nations (UNASUR), a forum that, despite its the security and defense spheres. But in the same ing state companies. “Transnational Crime and International Terror Networks problems and tensions, had functioned as a platform period, the doctrine of new threats has functioned as as Hybrid Threat Factors,” organized by the Colombian At the same time, an analysis of citizen security policies for posing the need for a regional defense policy and an opposing force since it seeks to do away with the Ministry of Defense with support from the US Special shows that even within the countries of the Southern a departure from the doctrine of new threats. The distinction between security and defense and promote Operations Command South. According to the director Cone, there are tensions. On the one hand, there is a governments that came to power in the past fi ve years the militarization of security. tendency toward police reform based on the notion that of Colombia’s School of War, hybrid threats are “the in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and 6 it is an armed civilian corps and on promoting a vision A series of indicators can be used to assess the exis- combination of conventional and non-conventional Chile have chosen a new, more explicit alignment tence or the intensity of militarization processes in each threats.” “In a conventional war or threat, we know who of police as workers and not soldiers. On the other, there is an opposing trend that, through the creation with US policy, instead of strengthening autonomous national context. the enemy is… Something that is non-conventional acts regional instruments. An important part of this realign- in irregular ways, we do not know where to fi nd them, of heavily armed tactical teams used for urban patrols, ment is the adoption of the “new threats” agenda and 1. Regulations we do not know who the enemy is,”3 he explained. is conducive to diff erential security strategies for poor neighborhoods that are subject to territorial occupa- the “war on terrorism” promoted by the United States. This refers to the existence or absence and, depending on The term “narco-terrorism” suggests that there is a tion. One component of the pendulum eff ect between Although the adoption of a drug policy based on a pro- the case, the weakening or strengthening of regulations symbiotic relationship between two phenomena, a re- citizen security and hardline policies is this back and hibitionist paradigm and warlike approach to supply is that distinguish the roles of the police from those of the lationship that empirical evidence rarely confi rms. At the forth between demilitarization and remilitarization of not the only problem associated with the militarization military. Thus, legislation that endorses the intervention same time, it overestimates the importance that drug the police corps and their deployment and intervention of the armed forces in internal security entails more 4 of security forces, it does constitute one of its core money has on the fi nancing of terrorism. techniques.5 points of anchorage and development, along with the militarization, while the regulation and diff erentiation of the At the regional and global levels, the confl ation of functions of national defense and domestic security is a war on terrorism. drug traffi cking, terrorism and other criminal networks step in the opposite direction. 10 THE INTERNAL WAR 1: THE IMPACT OF “NEW THREATS” ON SECURITY POLICY 11

It is essential to also assess whether mechanisms have At the same time, society’s concern with violence and been put in place to get around existing provisions. crime has been enlisted as an excuse for successive This can be observed, for example, in the use of lower- governments in the region to deploy the military as an ranking or internal regulations aimed at exploiting the anti-crime measure. These policies are often designed ambiguities in national legislation to involve the armed and executed in keeping with short-term political or forces in security tasks. electoral aims that resort to the armed forces as a way to reinforce the idea that the “war on crime” is being 2. Joint organization stepped up.8 In line with this, policies of militarization are The way security and defense systems are organized usually grounded in the view that sustains that the and function can be observed in specifi c institutional police’s operational capacities are too overwhelmed to arrangements. For instance, the institutionalization confront the increasingly complex problems of security. of joint decision-making by the military, police and The strategies for taking on drug traffi cking and other civilian entities or the exchange of intelligence between “national security threats” are usually presented in the police and the military indicate a move forward in warlike terms, in conjunction with pessimism about the terms of militarization. The same is true when there are state’s capacity to address them. This contributes to the joint operational groups made up of military and police legitimization of all kinds of “combat” measures, such as forces with military training in security matters. the intervention of the armed forces in police tasks, in addition to the use of elite tactical groups for tasks 3. Military participation in anti-crime actions formerly carried out by ordinary police. Police corruption and the notion that the armed forces are not The most advanced degree of militarization involves “contaminated” are also arguments used to justify the direct participation of military forces in anti-crime military intervention. operations. The insistence on “new threats” often works as a The experience in Latin America with the militarization political communication strategy to distract attention of drug policy allows for identifying three distinct from other salient phenomena such as state collusion scenarios of military intervention: in rural contexts, in (police, political, judicial and even military), without the forced eradication of illegal crops, for example; which the same illegal markets that are deemed to be in urban settings, to patrol high-crime areas, carry state threats could not prosper. out raids and confront criminal gangs; and third, in operations to intercept land, air and sea or river traffi c associated with illegal activities.7 In addition to these, there is military intervention in criminal intelligence The negative consequences work, especially after the incorporation of terrorism Military involvement in security tasks brings political and into the new threats agenda. institutional problems. First, this policy has a direct impact on the de-profes- sionalization of the armed forces, whose members have The justifi cations been trained and equipped for complex issues related A variety of arguments are usually enlisted to justify to national defense, not for resolving the problems of military intervention in security. crime. And at the same time, recourse to the armed forces overshadows the structural problems of the The basic justifi cation—because it is the reason for police, both in terms of corruption as well as ineff ective- being of the new threats doctrine—is the idea that wars ness. Thus, military participation becomes an excuse to between states no longer exist and that threats arise avoid the deeper police reforms needed in the region. from drug traffi cking, other crimes or socioeconomic problems. According to this viewpoint, Latin America’s In the second place, experience has shown that using armed forces are idle and should be tasked with pro- the armed forces for police work usually leads to the tecting internal security. This same approach served to erosion of the military as an institution. This occurs involve the military in other functions further removed because the military gets involved in the same processes from security but equally outside its core missions, such of corruption aff ecting the police, under diff erent modal- as the safeguarding of geostrategic points or assisting ities: collusion with the members of criminal networks, in citizen aid during natural disasters. development of para-state groups associated with members of the military, or direct implication of military 12 THE INTERNAL WAR 1: THE IMPACT OF “NEW THREATS” ON SECURITY POLICY 13

offi cials in illegal markets. For example, former members The reorientation of the criminal justice The equipment and technology the forces use are also of the special unit of the Guatemalan Army known as system and security policies Assigning non- indicative, especially when related to the expanded the Kaibiles were recruited by the Mexican cartel the use of military weapons in internal security contexts. Juan Gabriel Tokatlian observes that the evolution of Zetas to instruct them in the specifi c techniques and primary missions Military equipment has greater fi repower than the 9 drug policies since the instatement of the international knowledge acquired during their military training. police’s and the training it requires is much more prohibitionist regime at the beginning of the twentieth complex and specifi c. Its high levels of harmfulness Third, assigning non-primary missions to the armed century entailed, among other things, “securitization” to the armed and lethality make such equipment inappropriate for forces implies an expansion of military presence in the —converting a health problem into a security problem— engagement with citizens. political system and in society. This is particularly risky in and, going a step further, militarization or involvement forces implies countries with relatively new and unstable democracies, of the armed forces as a tool of the prohibitionist Finally, interventions involving the territorial occupation of and where the military forces retain multiple duties paradigm.10 If the “securitization” of the drug problem an expansion of poor neighborhoods have been on the rise in recent years in internal security matters after the restoration of is a long-standing phenomenon in the region, the as a priority security strategy in diff erent countries. With democracy. In many cases, the military continues to inclusion of this problem in the doctrine of new threats military presence in important diff erences, these occupations are presented hold weight with a broad capacity to impact political constituted a fresh push for tougher policy that can be as operations to “recuperate” areas supposedly lost to and social life and shape how confl ict management seen not only in the militarization of security but also the political system drug traffi cking and crime. The absence of any serious strategies are defi ned. Militarization tends to grant more the reorientation of the security and criminal justice assessment of these policies ensures that they continue autonomy to the military forces and upset civic-military systems. The latter implies a shift away from the notion to be applied and recommended, despite their negative relations, reducing the political stewardship of civilian and in society. of citizen security, as understood from the standpoint impact on the population in these areas. power as a result. of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), for instance, which defi nes it as “an approach The exponential growth of the prison population in the Finally, involving the military in internal security serves that focuses on building a stronger democratic citizenry, region and critical situations of overcrowding are also to weaken the very defense capabilities for which it while making clear that the central objective of the in good measure a result of the toughening of anti- was trained. Hence, the strategy of militarizing security policies established is the human person, and not the drug policies. If the doctrine of new threats illustrates may jeopardize the strengthening, modernization and security of the State or a given political system.”11 the geopolitical dimension of this phenomenon, the sovereignty of policies designed to defi ne national defense strategy and the survival of the state. This According to the doctrine of new threats, the state diverse “wars on small-scale drug dealing” and even the situation enshrines the hegemony of the United States and a certain public order are subject to protection. criminalization of drug users seen all over the Americas in the region, given that it reinforces its infl uence on Latin With the restoration of national security as a priority, have a troubling impact on neighborhoods, streets and American countries. At the same time, the militarization even in countries where the armed forces have not prisons. This impact combines extreme prohibition, of security has negative impacts on human rights, as intervened in internal security, phenomena of police the construction of internal enemies, high-profi le analyzed in Chapter 3 of this publication. militarization occur as well as regulatory modifi cations communications campaigns and an approach to crime that open the door to labeling certain groups or actors as a matter of national security—all of which constitutes as internal enemies or threats to state sovereignty. At a risk to the entire region. the same time, the opaqueness and secrecy that typify The deployment of “combat” strategies has proven to the military and defense have spread to the security be ineff ective when it comes to reducing drug traffi cking forces and criminal intelligence routines, which cease or the violence associated with criminal behavior. to be accountable, as if revealing any information, or On the contrary, these measures tend to reproduce any assessment of their modes of operation, could the dynamics of social and institutional violence that constitute disclosure to an unknown “enemy.” characterize the region. Without disregard for the The application of military patterns and ideas to the potential seriousness of security problems like drug organization of the internal security system mainly traffi cking or terrorism, these phenomena cannot be aff ects police institutions. The processing of crime addressed with the same strategy, because they are through a military lens infl uences how the police and not manifested in the same way in every country. The other crime-control agents think about their strategic result of these interventions is, in all cases where it functions, the institutional structure they adopt, the has been attempted, the failure to solve the problem decisions they make and other organizational elements that prompted the decision to promote “war” tactics that lead the police to act in accordance with patterns in in the fi rst place. Despite the fact that the eff ects of keeping with the military model. these policies are very hard to reverse in the short or 12 One indicator of police militarization is the creation medium term, their toughening and militarization persist of special units or tactical or elite groups for routine and are on the rise, underpinned by a series of regional tasks like detentions, raids, confi scations or other processes, although with national specifi cities operations, and the expansion of their functions within the security forces. 14 THE INTERNAL WAR 1: THE IMPACT OF “NEW THREATS” ON SECURITY POLICY 15

ARGENTINA DANGEROUS HEADWAY MADE BY THE PROHIBITIONIST COALITION

Argentina is one of the few countries that have the possibility of the armed forces safeguarding Now the armed forces are part of the country’s sustained a clear policy separation between “strategic objectives” such as nuclear facilities or The “war” on drugs security apparatus in that, whether they actively national defense and domestic security. natural resources. In the same vein, the govern- intervene or not, they will be taken to the border ment repealed the military directives in force and and terrorism is used to replace the police forces deployed in urban The Cristina Fernández de Kirchner adminis- replaced them with a plan related to the “new as justifi cation for centers. This type of patrol duty is presented tration opted for military intervention to protect threats” and placed Venezuela at the center of as utterly harmless. However, it opens many the country’s northern border, enlisting the regional instability. blowing the security questions, such as its relationship to military Fortín I and II and Escudo Norte operations to intelligence, a practice that is prohibited by law. reinforce air and land surveillance as a strategy This transformation reinforced the infl uence of apparatus out of in the fi ght against drug traffi cking. This decision the United States that, in drug traffi cking matters, Prohibitionist, militaristic tendencies are ex- was related to another to reassign the National has been channeled through the DEA13 since proportion and pressed through policy and extremely punitive, Gendarmerie—the federal security force in the 1990s. The prioritization of the US agenda security-focused rhetoric in the face of social charge of border control—to patrol urban was made explicit in meetings and high-level expanding punitive issues such as migration, land disputes and centers and poor neighborhoods. That interven- visits to increase cooperation, in particular social protest. tion was de facto, without a legal framework. policies and actions. with the State Department and the Southern Thus, the “war” on drugs and terrorism is used During the government of Mauricio Macri, the Command, and in exchanges on training and as justifi cation for blowing the security apparatus trend to authorize military intervention in internal arms deals, mainly with Israel. But this agenda out of proportion and expanding punitive policies security has deepened and been framed in an is not entirely an external imposition since it also and actions. Argentina has a per capita police explicit policy agenda aligned with the “new incorporates the worldview of local elites. It is presence nearly triple that recommended by threats” doctrine and a prohibitionist and puni- this local prohibitionist coalition that sustains, the United Nations—300, compared to nearly tive perspective. The current government has without any data to corroborate it, that Argentina 900 per 100,000 inhabitants in Argentina—but put the war on drugs and combating terrorism is in a situation of emergency caused by the the prohibitionist coalition insists this is still at the center of its agenda. This discourse is a drug market and the infl uence of terrorism that not enough. At the same time, based on the political break with the principle of demarcation requires measures that go beyond the capacity never-substantiated idea that the police are between defense and security that legitimizes of the security apparatus. overwhelmed in their duties, the intervention military intervention in security and renounces of elite police units is sanctioned. Furthermore, the development of a national defense policy This approach has not translated into military the intelligence agenda has been expanded in and professionalization of the armed forces. deployment in the country, both because of the name of national security, incorporating new social and political resistance—in good measure procedural tools for surveillance, cooperation This shift has been refl ected in various mea- resulting from the military’s actions during the and exchange of intelligence information sures. Right after taking power, the government last dictatorship—as well as from the armed between countries, along with the expansion declared a security emergency to be able to forces themselves, which are hesitant to assume of the logic of secrecy. All of this is already intervene in these new threats, which included this new policing role without a budget or real having an impact on a sustained increase in a decree authorizing the downing of aircraft. modernization plan. incarceration rates (especially for minor drug- In 2018, the administration amended Decree related off enses such as small-scale dealing), 727/06 regulating the National Defense Law: it This “gestural militarization”14 has limited operation- on greater state surveillance and on reports of eliminated the reference to military aggression al scope but does create a scenario conducive to illegal intelligence. by other states as the sole cause for military the militarization of security and tougher policing. In retaliation, expanded its intervention under the Argentina, what happens in practice is a transfer of modality of “logistical support,” and authorized resources from the defense apparatus to security. the toughening and militarization of security policies in Latin America

2 18 THE INTERNAL WAR 2: THE TOUGHENING AND MILITARIZATION OF SECURITY POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 19

chapter 2 The toughening and militarization of security policies in Latin America

The processes involved in the toughening of security in the laws can either back or limit the use of the armed US fi nancial aid for security, cumulative Cooperation with Latin America are varied but have certain features in forces in security tasks. Countries that already had a by country 2010-2018 (in USD) the United States common that make for a regional trend. The policies military tradition have readily adopted prohibitionist implemented indicate direct infl uence by the United thinking with regard to toughening the state’s response. States in this agenda, but there are also any number of In others, the military was given a new role. Aid programs and fl ows Argentina The funds fl owing from the United States to the region local military and civilian stakeholders whose political In recent years, treating crime-related problems as sov- 9,884,935 increased steadily between 2001 and 2007, and then agendas are aligned with these prohibitionist and ereign or state security threats has resulted in a series Brazil diminished consistently. In part, this was the result of punitive militarized strategies. of reforms that give the armed forces a more signifi cant 25,869,069 general budget cuts for foreign aid from the United Washington encourages Latin American states to role in the domestic setting. Nearly throughout the States after the Barack Obama government tried improve their defense capabilities in the face of phe- region, anti-terrorism laws were passed, some autho- Northern Triangle to reduce the defi cit from the 2008 fi nancial crisis. nomena characterized as threats to the region and, rizing military force in security tasks and the downing of 365,220,085 There were two exceptions to this reduction: Central above all, to the United States. In other words, it seeks planes, as well as rules aimed at giving immunity to the Peru America, which had a fi nancing peak in 2016 that to reinforce and broaden its own security and military military and police for possible human rights violations. 442,847,540 tripled the funding received in 2015, and the Andean apparatus through joint conjuring of these hypothetical In some countries, these processes were deepened to Mexico region, which maintained a stable level of fi nancing confl icts in the name of greater stability in the region. the extent that they ended in military deployments for 1,882,228,128 between 2011 and 2017. This fi nancing varies at the This infl uence is not merely rhetorical, but is a reality in anti-drug and anti-terror operations, and to a lesser Colombia sub-regional level according to US strategy and the terms of cross-border information fl ows, reforms and degree for urban patrol tasks, anti-crime programs or 2,426,727,052 regional geopolitical order. concrete institutional practices that are repeated across border operations. In countries where this deployment diff erent countries. reached a signifi cant scale, participation by the armed The fi rst foreign aid budget under the government of forces in these tasks was institutionalized in settings for Source: Author’s compilation based on Donald Trump, submitted for congressional approval in A clear example is bi- and multilateral cooperation in data from Security Assistance Monitor. joint decision-making with civilian authorities (police, May 2017, requested an abrupt cut in State Department terms of fi nancial aid for security matters, training of fi nancing and development aid for Latin America and, to police and military personnel, and weapons acquisition. judicial and migration) or in mixed operations groups and joint task forces. a lesser extent, also in military and security-related aid. These processes involve the expansion of the weapons With respect to the previous year, it requested cutting a industry in countries with violent military and security At the same time, other processes have evolved in third of expenditures for Mexico, Colombia and Central forces and with large illegal fi rearms markets. The main the region that do not entail direct participation by the America. However, in March 2018 Congress rejected justifi cation for these exchanges has been to “fi ght drug military in the pursuit of crime, but that transform the the budget and kept the fi nancing levels similar to those traffi cking” from a perspective of controlling supply, but design and implementation of security policies and law from 2017. For 2019, the White House again asked for the issue of terrorism also forms part of the exchange enforcement. cuts in aid to Latin America. agenda. In recent years, countries like Colombia have Adopting the ideology of national security, the notion of The money is channeled through an array of fi nancial aid been the centerpiece of such exchanges, in a sort of a “war” on drugs or “combating” terrorism all serve to programs to diverse initiatives in each country. In the last outsourcing of the training of armed forces, police and reorient the security, prison and intelligence systems. three decades, the majority of these programs focus on offi cials. When it comes to training, there have been This is manifested for instance in the training of local or have some drug-related component, always from a soldiers training police, as well as armed forces involve- police in theories and practices patterned on the military, prohibitionist perspective aimed at controlling supply. ment in internal security matters. These dynamics of which in turn have an impact on the use of excessively socialization and training are key aspects of the mili- violent and aggressive police tactics. tarization process, because they blur the line between the duties of one force and the other. Another relevant aspect is the string of regulatory changes that broaden or authorize military intervention in aspects of internal security. Depending on the country, 20 THE INTERNAL WAR 2: THE TOUGHENING AND MILITARIZATION OF SECURITY POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 21

US-Latin America aid programs Aid to Colombia, Mexico and Central America select programs

Program Start Authority Activities fi nanced Recipients Amounts (USD) 2000 2008 2016 Andean Counterdrug Initiative - Colombia US$ 832,000,000 US$ 245,000,000 N/A Foreign 1961 State Dept. and Purchase of articles and defense Colombia, Costa Rica, 82,665,000 Military Defense Security services from the United States. El Salvador, Guatemala, (2017) Merida Initiative N/A US$ 400,000,000 US$ 139,000,000 Financing Cooperation Weapons training. Funds cover Haiti, Honduras, (FMF) Agency (DSCA) purchases through Foreign Military Mexico, Panama, Peru. CARSI N/A US$ 60,000,000 US$ 348,500,000 Sales (between states) and Direct Commercial Sales (between states Source: Author’s compilation based on data from the Central America Monitor of the and businesses). Washington Offi ce on Latin America (WOLA) and the Congressional Research Service.

International 1961 State Dept. Equipment, training and services Bolivia, Brazil, 302,775,000 Some programs provide aid to countries or specifi c US fi nancial aid is regulated by the Leahy Law, which Narcotics to counter drugs, crime and Colombia, Ecuador, (2018) sub-regions, such as Plan Colombia, which began in prohibits the training of any foreign security forces or Control money laundering. Cybersecurity, Guatemala, Haiti, 2000 to reduce the production and export of illegal units implicated in human rights violations and which is and Law police and judicial reform. Mexico, Panama, drugs and to strengthen the counter-insurgency incorporated into the national defense laws. However, Enforcement Financed military equipment for Paraguay, Peru. (INCLE) Plan Colombia and the Merida campaign against the FARC. But a good portion of the fi nancing channels exist that are not covered by the law Initiative and aerial fumigation in funds for Plan Colombia were channeled through the and are often used to elude it. The State Department Colombia. Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). As of 2009, the and Defense Department apply this provision to most United States began fi nancing Colombia through other forms of training, but not to all forms of cooperation, programs. At least since the turn of the twenty-fi rst such as technical assistance, intelligence sharing or International 1961 State Dept. Military and police education and Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 106,325,000 century, it is the Latin American country that has joint military exercises. Arms sales made within the Military training. Promotes joint work Colombia, Costa Rica, (2018) received the most US funding, regardless of the political Foreign Military Sales program are also not subject to Education between foreign and US armed Dominican Republic, El orientation of the US government. As for its impact on these restrictions. and Training forces and those of NATO countries. Salvador, Guatemala, (IMET) Haiti, Honduras, reducing supply, the eff ectiveness of these actions is The IMET fi nances courses on The aid programs do not have outcome indicators Mexico, Panama, dubious: according to data from the United Nations defense resource management, or standardized evaluation mechanisms to measure Paraguay, Peru, Offi ce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), between 2016 military justice and human rights, whether they are eff ective at meeting their objectives. Uruguay, Venezuela. and 2017 the area of coca cultivation expanded by civilian oversight of the military US embassies function as interlocutors on the local 17%, reaching a record 171,000 hectares. and military-police cooperation in situation and have great decision-making power over anti-drug operations. Other programs focused on specifi c regions are the what is considered priority in each country, the evolution Merida Initiative, which supports the purchase of of programs and the power to decide what works. In Section 1004 1991 Defense Dept. Military and civilian training in Colombia, Costa Rica, 185,411,000 military equipment from US corporations as well as general, the formal requirements for disbursing funds Counter-Drug anti-narcotics operations and to Dominican Republic, (2017) training and funds for the Mexican police and armed are not well defi ned and low standards of compliance and Counter- counter crime networks. El Salvador, Guatemala, forces, and the Central American Regional Security are common. This is combined with reduced transpar- Transnational Transport, infrastructure, detection Honduras, Jamaica, Initiative (CARSI), which fi nances equipment, training ency in aid and military operations. Between 2010 and Organized of substance traffi cking, air and/or Mexico, Nicaragua, and technical assistance for operations to combat a 2018, more than US$1.3 million were allocated to coun- Crime land reconnaissance, intelligence Panama, Peru, Uruguay. variety of criminal phenomena in Guatemala, Honduras tries without specifi cation through a general budget and information analysis. and El Salvador (Northern Triangle). In recent years, allowance for the “Western hemisphere.” In 2010, these these countries were the recipients of more funding, in unspecifi ed funds represented 5.5% of the total budget Combating 2002 Defense Dept. Training of foreign military and Argentina, Brazil, 2,911,000 US response to high levels of crime and violence and allotted to Latin America. Under the requested amount Terrorism defense and security offi cials in US Chile, Colombia, (2016) the migration crisis that displaced thousands of people for 2019, this percentage would ascend to 42.4%. In Fellowship military institutions on lethal and Costa Rica, Dominican who headed toward the southern border of Mexico. At parallel, the Defense Department’s budget for foreign Program non-lethal techniques. Seeks to Republic, El Salvador, the same time, cooperation with Mexico has declined. military assistance tripled between 2008 and 2015, in (CTFP) standardize a vision of terrorism Guatemala, Honduras, comparison to 23% for the State Department. It is clear and counter-insurgency and create Mexico, Panama, that the real amount of fi nancing sent to the region is not a global network of professional Paraguay, Peru, available to the public. experts to support US actions. Uruguay.

Source: Author’s compilation based on data from Security Assistance Monitor. 22 THE INTERNAL WAR 2: THE TOUGHENING AND MILITARIZATION OF SECURITY POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 23

Training of offi cials from Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Mexico and Training and education 2000 - 2017 Argentina at WHINSEC, 2009-2015 The training of military and police is central to any anal- ysis of militarization processes, in particular with regard Programs that fi nanced the courses Type of training to police training by the military, on the one hand, and military forces being trained in internal security matters, Colombia Foreign Military Financing, INCLE, IMET Combating transnational threats, analysis of intelligence on the other, because the distinction between the func- and narco-terrorism information, joint operations and tions of one force and the other is blurred. anti-narcotics, peace operations.

This is a fundamental component of US foreign policy for Peru Section 1004, IMET, INCLE, Anti-narcotics operations, intelligence, combating Latin America, which receives a fi fth of all training sup- Foreign Military Financing narco-terrorism and transnational threats. plied by the United States to foreign offi cials. Between 2000 and 2017, more than 255,000 offi cials (civilian and 255,000 civilian and military Brazil Section 1004, IMET, Regional Analysis of narco-terrorism information, anti-narcotics military) were trained with US fi nancing. Centers for Security Studies operations, joint operations and engineering, medical aid. offi cials trained with Between 2011 and 2016, the number of Latin American US fi nancing Mexico Section 1004, IMET, INCLE Transnational threats, anti-narcotics operations, security and military offi cials trained grew by nearly 67%. information analysis, human rights, medical aid, joint This increase is not uniform across all countries: since operations and engineering. 2000, Colombia has received the greatest portion of this training, followed by Mexico and, much further behind, Argentina Section 1004 Analysis of narco-terrorism information, medical aid, Peru. In 2017, training fell in nearly all countries except The majority of anti-narcotics operations. Brazil. The majority is fi nanced through the Section 1004 the funds were for program, which is mainly focused on counter-narcotics Colombia, Mexico Source: Author’s compilation based on data from Security Assistance Monitor. initiatives: in 2016, more than half of Latin American and Peru. offi cials trained were instructed in this area. Other training is done through the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), the name given since 2001 to the School of the Americas, The Colombian police and military have also provided Outsourcing is a way of eluding the restriction estab- which trained agents in counter-insurgency techniques, training to other countries. These offi cials were trained lished under the Leahy Law that prohibits cooperation sharp-shooter skills, military intelligence and interroga- in US cooperation programs and are currently used to with security forces that have committed human rights tion techniques in the framework of the doctrine of na- outsource training. This policy of “exporting security” violations. The current chief of staff under Trump tional security. Graduates from this academy commit- has become a fundamental component of Colombian admitted this in 2014 before Congress when he said ted human rights violations during the Latin American foreign policy, although it in large part abides by a US “the beauty of having a Colombia” to train the Central dictatorial regimes. Currently, WHINSEC is the US strategy, the primary eff ect of which is to confer new Americans was being able to elude “restrictions on Department of Defense’s main combat academy in the roles on countries with a certain degree of affi nity.1 Much working with them for ‘past sins’”.2 Spanish-speaking world. In addition to traditional mili- of this training is part of the US-Colombia Action Plan The armed forces of many countries participated in joint on Regional Security (USCAP), signed in 2012 with the tary training, the institute incorporates courses on training exercises with each other on internal security specifi c purpose of “exporting” the capacities built in democratic sustainability, peace operations and human matters, generally on anti-drug traffi cking actions, or to Colombia, especially on policies to counter crime, drug rights, in line with the principles of the Organization of foster civil-military cooperation. One of these exercises traffi cking and terrorism, but also on human rights and American States. Between 2009 and 2015, more than is Operation Hammer, led by the Southern Command institutional strengthening, despite the human rights 900 civilian and military offi cials from Peru, Brazil, as part of a US strategy to contribute to multinational violations committed by the Colombian forces in the Mexico and Argentina were trained there. operations of detection, monitoring and confi scation of context of their interventions against crime. Since 2013, drugs and weapons in Central America. This operation USCAP has trained 5,600 military and police offi cials created in 2012 involves the US Navy and Coast Guard from Panama, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa and other police and military agencies from 14 partici- Rica and the Dominican Republic in matters such as river pating countries. operations, naval intelligence and infantry tactics. Other military exercises that train Latin American These trainings pose problems of transparency and armed forces in internal security tasks are UNITAS, accountability with regard to their specifi c content, the PANAMAX, Teamwork South, RIMPAC, Bold Alligator participants in them and the mechanisms through which and Fuerzas Comando. the budget is allocated to avoid having to submit it for US congressional approval. Nor is the impact of “skills exportation” on the local reality evaluated. 24 THE INTERNAL WAR 2: THE TOUGHENING AND MILITARIZATION OF SECURITY POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 25

• Bold Alligator began in 2011 and involved military participation by the United States, Panama and Chile. training for amphibious marine operations against “new In 2016 and 2017, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru threats.” According to the Department of Defense, had crucial roles, either because it was their fi rst time “the fi ght today is a mixture of threats on a non-linear participating or they led or carried out some aspect of its battlefi eld (…). We are fi ghting in a domain made up of components. These new roles were highlighted by the the marine, air, land and cyber spheres.”3 This training United States as a signifi cant achievement. was done in 2017 in the state of North Carolina, with • Rim of the Pacifi c (RIMPAC) is one of the biggest participation by Mexico, Peru, Brazil, France, Germany, maritime exercises in the world. It is organized bian- Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom. nually off the coast of Hawaii. Begun in 1971 with the • Fuerzas Comando is sponsored by the Southern objective of impeding Soviet bloc expansion, only four Command under Special Operations Command South countries participated. Today it is aimed at training (SOCSOUTH). Around 700 military, civilian and security the armed forces of 20 countries in a wide array of offi cials participate. It is composed of two blocks: a tech- security situations, including the traffi cking of goods and nical and practical skills competition, and a Distinguished persons, and operations to counter the proliferation of Guests Program provided through the Combating arms of mass destruction. In 2018, it was led by Chile, Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) focused on “com- marking the fi rst time in the history of this exercise that a bating terrorism, organized crime and drug traffi cking.” Spanish-speaking country was in charge of the training. In 2018, it was held in Panama with participation by Brazil participated for the fi rst time in RIMPAC. Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and the countries of the Northern Triangle, among others. Latin American countries are assuming a greater leader- • Teamwork South is a biannual naval exercise created ship role in these exercises, promoting the involvement by the Chilean Army in 1995 jointly with the United and training of their armed forces in security tasks. There States, which has expanded the range of operational is little information in general on the specifi c content of exercises. Its current objective is to train Chilean and these events, other than what the states themselves foreign forces and to standardize the approach to make public. terrorism, drug, contraband and human traffi cking. In 2017, it was held between the areas of Talcahuano and Coquimbo, Chile.

• UNITAS is the longest-running US Navy maritime Arms and equipment exercise, in which Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, El The United States and other countries have sold Salvador, Guatemala, Brazil, Honduras and Peru equipment and weapons to Latin America to supply its participate, among others. It has been held every year military and police forces. In the majority of cases, the since 1960. In 2017, it was carried out on the Ancón purchase and sale is justifi ed in the name of “combating” military base in Peru, with participation by 17 countries drug traffi cking and other forms of crime. Between 2000 and included exercises in military war scenarios by air, and 2016, the countries of Latin America spent nearly land and sea and in cyberspace. The diff erent fl eets US$9 billion on purchases of this kind from the United were trained in naval operations combined with the States. The biggest buyers were Colombia and Mexico, “fi ght against organized crime,” the “digital war,” and and to a lesser extent Brazil and Chile. air, amphibious and communications operations. Vice Admiral Manuel Vascones Morey, of the Peruvian Navy, • Mexico: During 2015, the State Department approved said that the objective was to train the military forces “to the purchase of three Blackhawk helicopters, used by be able to combat any common threat in our countries, the US Army in Iraq and Afghanistan, to support the such as drug traffi cking, contraband, pirating; the type Mexican military. Another 18 helicopters of the same of scourges we currently have.”4 model equipped with GPS and machine guns had been acquired in 2014. In the offi cial communication from the • The PANAMAX exercise is an annual program orga- Defense Security Cooperation Agency, an agency of the nized by the Southern Command focused on training Department of Defense, this transaction was justifi ed as for possible confl ict scenarios around the Panama a contribution to the security of a strategic ally in the Canal, especially terrorism, but also illegal substance “combating of organized crime and drug traffi cking.” traffi cking and natural disasters. It has land, maritime, air In May 2015, these helicopters were used in a federal and special forces components. It began in 2003 with police operation that left 42 civilians dead in Michoacán. 26 THE INTERNAL WAR 2: THE TOUGHENING AND MILITARIZATION OF SECURITY POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 27

• Peru: The modernization of its armed forces in 2011 and abuses. Moreover, this is a fl ow of potentially highly sought to “improve the eff orts of Peru in interdiction violent arms coming into a region with a signifi cant illegal operations, its capacities for executing anti-narcotics market. This proliferation of weapons translates into one and anti-terrorism operations, and to ensure the of the highest fi rearm homicide rates, surpassing the Armed forces intervention Mexico maintenance of border security.”5 In 2016, the United world average. Illegal arms traffi cking in border zones in internal security permitted The organic laws governing its armed forces stipulate States sold infantry vehicles, machine guns and gre- —for instance in the Tri-Border Area between Argentina, by Constitutions that its missions include “guaranteeing internal security nade-launchers to Peru, because “it is in the interest Paraguay and Brazil, or among the countries of the and external defense” and “undertaking civic actions Brazil and Colombia of US national security for Peru to provide its security Northern Triangle—is just one of the problems. There is and social works aimed at the country’s progress; and forces with multipurpose equipment for border security, a huge quantity of arms that, once they come into the The national Constitutions of Brazil and Colombia in the case of disaster, helping maintain public order.” establish that the armed forces are for the purpose of disaster response and to confront destabilizing internal country through legal channels, are easily fi ltered into Paraguay 6 “homeland defense” but also incorporate maintaining the threats, such as the Shining Path terrorist group.” illegal markets. The armed forces may be called upon to undertake public order and guaranteeing law and order among their security tasks when ordered by a Crisis Committee • Brazil: In 2014, Brazil acquired 20 Harpoon Block II missions. In both cases, they stipulate that the country’s or in the face of situations in which police capabilities missiles for its armed forces to use “for the purpose of president holds the power to use the armed forces during encouraging its eff orts to counter transnational orga- prove inadequate, as provided under its Law of National a set timeframe if public security were to be compro- nized crime.”7 That same year, it also bought Blackhawk Defense and Internal Security. mised and the capacities of the civilian forces exceeded. helicopters. In June 2018, seven people died as the Recent regulatory reforms In Brazil, this legal framework enabled military intervention result of an operation led by the Civil Police in the The armed forces in Latin America intervened in security in the state of Rio de Janeiro in February 2018. Countries with a clear distinction Complexo da Maré, where a helicopter belonging to matters for many years, and in many cases they still between security and defense that force fl ew over the favela and fi red from above into hold political weight. In various countries, they main- Peru and Bolivia Argentina, Chile and Uruguay have a clear distinction the population. tained internal security functions after the restoration of The Constitutions of these countries allow military between the functions of internal security performed democracy.8 In the Southern Cone, after the civil-military intervention in the social and economic development of by the police and other security forces, and those of dictatorships there, this role was more minor than in the country. This defi nition authorizes the involvement national defense in the hands of the armed forces. This other countries. This may be attributed to the unique of the military in the operational functions of security, demarcation is laid out in the regulatory plexus of these The United States is not the only country providing arms characteristics of those dictatorships and especially to either temporarily or permanently, if the tasks are framed three countries, with some exceptions provided by law to the region. According to its latest arms exports report, how the subsequent transitions to democracy played within attacks on national security or sovereignty. and by the express authority of the presidency in specif- the European Union issued licenses for arms sales in out in these countries. For instance, more than a decade Guatemala ic cases of crisis or national upheaval. 2015 of some 5.89 billion euros to Brazil, 2.75 billion to ago, the countries of the Andean region upheld that the Its Political Constitution states that the Army’s functions Mexico, 1.14 billion to Peru, 478 million to Colombia, armed forces played a very important role in the “war include maintaining “internal and external security.” 440 million to Argentina, and 13 million to the countries on drugs,” while in the Southern Cone it was sustained The United States of the Northern Triangle. Israel, Russia and Taiwan also that this task lay with the police.9 This scenario began to Honduras Its Constitution specifi es that the armed forces “shall Within its national territory, the United States sustains traded arms and equipment with the region. In the case change, however, in conjunction with the realignment of a strict separation between the functions of the police of Argentina, following an offi cial visit by its security min- various countries with the “new threats” agenda. Thus, provide logistical support of technical advice in com- munications and transportation in the fi ght against drug and the armed forces. This principle does not arise from ister to Israel in 2017, the country acquired four Shaldag in 2012, more than 20 nations in the region declared to the Constitution but is enshrined in the Posse Comitatus vessels and surveillance systems for land-border the Organization of American States that they regularly traffi cking” and “shall cooperate with public security institutions, at the request of the Secretariat of Security, Act, in force since 1878. This law, conceived to prevent crossings for more than US$80 million. The equipment engaged their armed forces in security activities, using the interference of the military in political-electoral aff airs 10 to combat terrorism, arms traffi cking and organized is supposedly for fl uvial border patrol and potentially for diff erent procedures. and in the repression of protests, has remained largely anti-narcotics operations. However, these are vessels of crime,” among other functions. Most Latin American countries do not establish a clear unchanged ever since. Its text provides for exceptional war. Israel, for example, uses them in combat zones like cases in which, with the authorization of the president the Gaza Strip. Their use in places where there is no division between security and defense functions in their Armed forces intervention in internal or Congress, the armed forces could be deployed for confl ict of this type, such as the shores of the Paraná legal framework. security permitted by legislation internal use. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the River, puts populations residing in these areas at risk. In military can participate in anti-narcotics operations to October 2017, Argentina purchased four Texan II aircraft Ecuador and Venezuela In Ecuador, the armed forces have the fundamental carry out activities of detection and monitoring, but not for the “logistical support” that the Air Force provides to in seizures or detentions. border security forces in the northern part of the country mission of “defending sovereignty and territorial integrity,” to “combat drug traffi cking.” but the Organic Law of National Defense establishes The division between military and police powers is that they may collaborate “on the economic and social rooted in US political culture, and attempts to substan- Military equipment purchases in the context of these development of the country.” Something similar occurs in tially modify the law have not won consensus. As is measures against “new threats,” especially in the case Venezuela, where under its organic law, one of the armed evident, this is in contrast to its foreign policy whereby of drug traffi cking, run the risk of worsening social forces’ missions is “cooperation in maintaining internal the country promotes strategies that would be prohibited and institutional violence. First, the acquisition of this order and active participation in national development.” in its own territory. 11 equipment by historically violent police forces increases the use of lethal force and risks of police executions 28 THE INTERNAL WAR

Based on these diverse regulatory structures, the mili- After decades Laws and regulations that Mexico’s Internal tarization of security over the past two decades has pro- permit shooting down planes Security Law duced signifi cant changes in local laws and institutions. of these policies This phenomenon is manifested in a variety of ways: • Regulations have been adopted permitting the shoot- in Mexico and Brazil (2004) For years, the growing military presence on the streets ing down of aircraft suspected of having ties to illegal In Brazil, the Lei do Abate was passed in 1998 and its of Mexico developed without a specifi c legal frame- drug traffi cking. This has occurred in Colombia, Peru, Colombia, three detailed regulations issued in 2004. This law provides for work to regulate the internal security tasks performed Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Honduras, Paraguay and outcomes can be the possibility of fi ring at aircraft “in clandestine fl ights” by the armed forces. In 2017, the government of Argentina. The armed forces are in charge of shooting without approved fl ight routes and which are linked to Enrique Peña Nieto promoted an Internal Security Law them down, since any aircraft determined to be “hostile” seen: the restriction illegal drug traffi cking, including any proceeding from that was passed by Congress, despite widespread is considered an attack on national sovereignty. areas of drug production or supply, any following routes opposition from an array of civil society sectors. of fundamental typically used by drug traffi ckers, or that omit information The law stated that “the armed forces may intervene in • Anti-terrorism laws have been passed throughout the or refuse to respond to requests from the control tower. region. threats to internal security when the latter compromise rights; the or exceed the capacities of the authorities, and when • Regulations have been created to authorize greater Venezuela (2012) The Integral Airspace Defense Law was passed in 2012 there are threats arising from a lack of or inadequate involvement of the armed forces in security tasks along militarization of by the National Assembly and regulated in 2013. It was collaboration by entities and municipalities in the with others that increase impunity for human rights public authority; conceived as one more element in the “fi ght against preservation of national security.” The law thus violations committed by the military and police in the drug traffi cking” and has been invoked on various legalizes a situation that had been the exception until pursuit of crime. and the emergence occasions against aircraft suspected of transporting then: military intervention in tasks traditionally reserved for the police. The ambiguous wording was criticized The consequences of these reforms are vast. For drugs. Venezuela is one of the countries in the region as enabling arbitrary application of the law. example, according to specialists, after decades of and consolidation that has used its law on downing planes the most. these policies in Mexico and Colombia, three outcomes The negative consequences of this law include the of the exception in Bolivia (2014) can be seen: “the restriction of fundamental rights; the growing de-professionalization of the police, the ex- Law 521 on the Security and Defense of Bolivian pansion of intelligence tasks carried out by the military militarization of public authority; [and] the emergence criminal justice Airspace established “the procedures for interdiction of and consolidation of the exception in criminal justice.”12 without public oversight mechanisms, increased civil aircraft and the use of force against aircraft declared violence, lack of accountability for actions by the In parallel to these reforms, ambiguities are also in violation, illegal or hostile” for the purpose of “identifi - armed forces, the expansion of military jurisdiction exploited—through legal loopholes and other informal cation, providing aid, requiring it to return to its route or over civil legal matters upon giving the armed forces mechanisms—so that the armed forces can carry out to land.” The law stipulates that any physical aggression the power to participate in civil criminal investigations, tasks that, by law, are under the purview of the police or against aircraft in these circumstances is deemed rightful the insuffi cient regulation of the use of force, and an other agencies. In general, this is achieved by giving them in legitimate defense of the state. imbalance in civil-military relations. a complementary role to the one played by the security Peru (2015) In July 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador won the forces. In El Salvador, for instance, eight decrees were Law 30.339 on Control, Surveillance and Defense of presidential election with more than 50% of the vote. issued between October 2009 and March 2014, National Airspace authorizes the downing of “hostile” During the campaign, Alfonso Durazo, nominated authorizing the participation of military agents in diff erent aircraft suspected of transporting illegal items (drugs, for secretary of security, assured that López Obrador tasks and functions related to public security. This arms, explosives) and any that disobey military orders. would not order the immediate withdrawal of the military militarization by decree, which led to an unprecedented Peru previously had a similar law in force between 1990 from security duties but would do so gradually. After increase of soldiers on security detail and an expansion of and 2001, which was suspended after the death of a winning the election, more than 300 social organiza- the armed forces’ authority in this setting, was justifi ed in woman and her seven-month-old baby when their plane tions asked the future president to repeal the law. The the context of increased crime.13 Various countries in the was mistakenly shot down. incoming government sustained that it would await a region are introducing reforms to their current regulatory Supreme Court ruling on claims of unconstitutionality. frameworks regarding the functions of the military forces Argentina (2016) The interior minister, Olga Sánchez Cordero, affi rmed Decree 228/2016 declared a Public Security Emergency and their accountability within the scope of these that the government will implement a peace strategy for a year, establishing the Rules of Airspace Protection functions, both new and old. At the same time, many in conjunction with the United Nations and will seek to and stipulating that, for the purpose of “reverting the countries have ongoing situations of military deployment decriminalize the cultivation of marijuana and poppies. situation of collective danger created by complex crime that national laws only allow as an exception. and organized crime,” the Air Force is empowered to in- In other words, there is a clear tendency in the region to tercept aircraft when they are suspected of transporting legally guarantee the enabling conditions for and con- illegal substances and, if necessary, to employ fi repower tinued use of the military as an instrument to address to take them down. This regulation was extended in security problems or other social phenomena. This January 2017 for another year. trend has rapidly grown over the last decade. 30 THE INTERNAL WAR 2: THE TOUGHENING AND MILITARIZATION OF SECURITY POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 31

Anti-terrorism laws and the construction vagueness of anti-terrorism legislation has permitted of internal enemies its discretionary application against members of these Hand in hand with the “new threats” paradigm and groups, whom it labels as dangerous. In a number of international pressure to join the “fi ght against terror- countries, this has led to selective police practices, ism,” many countries of the region in recent years have greater levels of institutional violence, and illegal intelli- passed or amended anti-terrorism laws. Some of them, gence practices and surveillance aimed specifi cally at like Chile and Peru, already had legislation on this matter, these groups. These regulations overlap with the fact but in most cases the laws and reforms occurred from that military and police forces and other public offi cials 2010 onward. Some countries that passed or amended depict them as “enemies” of state security or national anti-terror legislation in this period are: sovereignty. Thus, state interventions and security policies against them are framed in terms of “war” and authorize the use of military techniques, resources, Chile Law 18.314 from1984, equipment and personnel for “combat” purposes. last amended in 2015 El Salvador Legislative Decree 108 from 2006 Regulations expanding the powers Paraguay Law 4.024 from 2010 of the armed forces Regulatory reforms have often involved reducing legal Argentina Law 26.734 from 2011 restrictions on police and armed forces’ activities. Venezuela Published in Offi cial Bulletin Peru: Law 30.151 from 2014 modifi ed the Criminal Code No. 39.912 from 2012 by exempting from all criminal liability any armed forces Mexico Reform of Federal Code in 2014 or police offi cials who, “cause injury or death in carrying out their duty and using their weapons or other means Ecuador Entry into force of Comprehensive of defense.” In practice, this legalizes extrajudicial killings. Organic Criminal Code in 2014 Honduras: Crimes committed in the line of duty by the Brazil Law 13.260 from 2016 Military Police for Public Order, created in 2013, can only Honduras Reform of Criminal Code in 2017 be investigated by prosecutors and tried by judges as- Operational deployment of the overlaps with the anti-narcotics agenda. In a context signed by the National Council of Defense and Security, armed forces in security tasks that remains uncertain with regard to implementation of a body under the purview of the armed forces.15 the peace agreements, some research contends that The deployment of the armed forces in operational the armed forces not only will not be reduced in size These laws may entail limitations on the exercise of the Colombia: In 2013, Law 1689 was passed creating tasks to “fi ght crime” is a critical aspect for analyzing the or equipment, despite the fact that their growth was right to protest, freedom of association and expression, the System of Technical and Specialized Defense of evolution of militarization processes in Latin America. justifi ed in response to that of armed groups, but that among other civil and political rights. The ambiguity of Members of the Public Forces. This system guarantees Mexico is perhaps the most extreme case. In the context their tasks could possibly be expanded. For instance, the criminal off enses included in them enables their and fi nances the legal representation of police and of an armed approach to drug traffi cking, the military is they may be tasked with carrying out peace missions or use for criminalizing social confl icts. For instance, the military, on duty and retired, who are being tried in disci- currently carrying out detentions, patrols, inspections, providing training in other countries. The military was left Paraguayan law criminalizes as terrorist acts any eff orts plinary proceedings or ordinary criminal proceedings. In raids and seizures in 27 states in the country, or in charge of safeguarding the areas of FARC infl uence intended to “obligate or coerce (…) constitutional bodies 2015, Colombia’s Congress passed Law 1765 expand- three-quarters of Mexican territory. Between September during the demobilization process, especially in rural or their members to act or to abstain from doing so in ing the scope of the military justice system. Under that 2016 and June 2017, on record there were 182 opera- areas with low police presence.18 However, episodes of the exercise of their duties.” These defi nitions can be law, crimes such as homicide committed by police or tions bases with 4,706 military troops assigned to public violence by paramilitary groups continue to occur. applied to social protests. One of the most worrisome the military, when considered related to the line of duty, security tasks, with support from 468 vehicles. This Similarly, in Peru, the river valley area of Apurímac, Ene aspects of these regulations is that they distinguish will be tried by military justice. represents an increase of 150% in fi ve years. The and Mantero (known as VRAEM) is still occupied by the between legal and illegal protests, and authorize re- budget allotted to the Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR) Mexico: In 2008, the government of Felipe Calderón ini- military. In October 2016, former Peruvian President pressive state intervention when demonstrations do not and the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) has tiated a special criminal justice regime for off enses com- Pedro Pablo Kuczynski gave the armed forces principal comply with established criteria. Sometimes this occurs doubled in the last ten years.16 In its 2015-2016 report, mitted in the “organized crime” modality, restricting the jurisdictional authority in that area, declared an “emer- explicitly, because the law authorizes such repression, SEDENA informed having detained 3,808 persons in rights of anyone charged with this type of crime. These gency zone.” He appointed an Army general to lead the while in other cases it happens indirectly.14 “operations to reduce violence indicators” and eradicated changes were incorporated at the constitutional level VRAEM Special Command, and a Navy admiral to lead 7,500 hectares of marijuana crops and 35,000 of Anti-terrorism legislation is invoked in some countries and led to a series of reforms that criminalized diverse the VRAEM Joint Special Operations and Operational poppy.17 The anti-narcotics operations it participates in to criminalize members of indigenous peoples, like the forms of collective action, accentuated discretionary Intelligence Command (CIOEC), to jointly carry out land, also grew exponentially. Mapuche in Chile and Argentina, and rural communities action by police, and increased impunity in cases of air and river operations. The former stated that Army in Colombia and Peru. Something similar occurs in human rights violations committed by members of the In Colombia, the “counter-insurgency” agenda aimed at members were “proud to be the strong arm of the state Central America with members of gangs or maras. The military and police. the armed groups leading the internal confl ict explicitly in its comprehensive fi ght against terrorism and drug 32 THE INTERNAL WAR 2: THE TOUGHENING AND MILITARIZATION OF SECURITY POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 33

traffi cking in this part of the country.”19 The Peruvian The impact of “new threats” Honduras: In 2014, the National Police created an elite Argentina: Elite groups have been used in operations government has justifi ed its activities in the VRAEM as on security forces special forces unit, the Intelligence Troop and Special with lethal results. This was the case in the death of Alan “anti-narcoterrorist” operations. Security Response Groups (TIGRES). They received Tapia in a raid by the Argentine Federal Police’s Special In addition to using the armed forces in internal se- training from both the US special forces as well as Federal Operations Group (GEOF) in a poor neighbor- In addition to direct interventions via the military occu- curity operations, there are other pertinent aspects Colombia’s Jungle Command (an elite unit under the hood of Buenos Aires in 2013. It was a routine operation pation of territories, the armed forces perform internal that explain how the doctrine of “new threats” aff ects Anti-narcotics Offi ce of the Colombian National Police). in which an elite corps intervened because, according security actions in coordination with police institutions security policies. These include the adoption of training, Because it was prepped for intervening in the most to police authorities, his home was in a “dangerous or other civilian agencies. In countries where this is equipment and military-type tactics by the police and violent areas of the country, this training included tech- area.” In November 2017, Rafael Nahuel died during an more established as public policy, such as the Northern other security forces, military training received by police niques for “countering common and organized crime,” eviction of the Lafken Winkul Mapu Mapuche commu- Triangle, there is evidence that military intervention has offi cials, the creation of new military police forces, the criminal investigation, patrol and urban operations. In nity carried out by the Albatross Group, a special unit become more institutionalized through the creation proliferation of tactical groups within the police force, recent years, the government of Honduras deployed of the Naval Prefecture. He died from a gunshot wound of specifi c programs and special bodies made up of and the use of military-like tactics in their deployment.22 this elite group and the Special Tactical Operations infl icted by one of the unit members. That episode civilian and military personnel. In Guatemala, the Law Group (GOET) to prevent the emigration of minors was surrounded by warlike statements by the National on Support for Civilian Security Forces prevails, which escaping violence. This operation, which presented a Ministry of Security, which issued a statement justifying stipulates that civilian police can also be “supported in Structural and functional modifi cations migration control procedure and border militarization as the action by the Albatross Group during what it under- their duties to combat organized and common crime by of security forces acts of childhood protection, has resulted in increased stood to be an “armed confrontation.” The statement units of the Guatemalan Army, as deemed necessary.” Some countries have created or strengthened military vulnerability of children since they are intercepted at depicted the members of the Mapuche community as There are also various inter-agency task forces on the police corps in recent years, many of which cooperate borders with Mexico (Tecún Umán Inter-Agency Task actively with the armed forces on internal security tasks. border crossings by armed agents who have not re- using “a methodology of armed violence inadmissible ceived the proper training to ensure their correct care in a democracy.” Forces like the GEOF and Albatross Force), with Honduras (Maya Chortí Inter-Agency Task Honduras: The Military Police for Public Order is a prime during transit.25 are specially trained to employ the most violent tactics Force) and with El Salvador (Xinca Inter-Agency Task example of this. One of its functions is “to cooperate in and therefore should not be used in scenarios of low Force). These forces were established between 2013 the framework of national defense and security strategy Based on the Colombian model, in June 2018 Chile: complexity or of social confl ict. and 2016 to confi scate illegal drugs in border zones and in the recovery of areas, neighborhoods, colonias, the Carabineros Special Forces Unit on Criminal combat other forms of organized crime, and they joined human settlements or public spaces where organized Organizations and Terrorists, also known as the Jungle 23 forces with the Kaminal Task Force created in 2012, crime proliferates, putting people’s lives in danger.” Command, was created. This unit is composed of combining police and military personnel for patrol work This force has trained, along with other units of the troops from the Carabineros Special Police Operations in public spaces. Many of these forces are composed Honduran Army, members of the Honduran National Group (GOPE), trained in Colombia and the United of members of the Army, National Police and Attorney Police. In the two years after its creation, it was involved States, as part of a state response to the territorial General’s Offi ce as well as personnel from Customs and in more than 30 cases of violent raids without a court claims of the Mapuche people in the Araucanía region, 24 Migrations. Its members were trained by the US Army. order, beatings, arbitrary detentions and murders. despite the fact that this scenario of social confl ict is in 26 With a similar function to the Guatemalan task forces, Colombia: The Army’s Military Police Battalions were no way like Colombia’s internal confl ict. reactivated in 2010 “in the face of the onslaught of crime Honduras created the Inter-Institutional National A process of militarization of the in the country,” according to the Army’s explanation The United States: Security Force (FUSINA) in 2014 to “fi ght organized police can be observed in the United States. The on its website. In areas like Barranquilla, the military and common crime.” Led by the Honduran Army and American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the largest rights also made up of members of the police, the Attorney police carry out patrol tasks, and the Army has initiated coordinated operations with the police to patrol the city and liberties organization in the country, points out in General’s Offi ce and intelligence agencies, this force its 2014 report War Comes Home that the country has 20 perimeter, as well as entry and exit routes. This same goes on patrol to identify and capture gang members. used federal aid programs (particularly the Section El Salvador established the Cuscatlán Joint Group initiative was applied in other Colombian cities, such as Medellín and Cali. 1033 Program created in the 1990s at the height of (GCC) in 2012, made up of the armed forces and the the “war on drugs”) to transfer to state and local police anti-narcotics division of the National Civil Police, in In other countries, new elite corps have been created military weapons and training in war tactics, practically addition to customs authorities. The GCC, which acts within civilian security forces, which receive training or without oversight. The cases studied in the report show in collaboration with the National Attorney General’s equipment from military forces. the use of highly aggressive equipment and tactics for Offi ce, is tasked with “combating transnational orga- Guatemala: The Anti-narcotics and Anti-terrorism Aerial making raids to search for small quantities of drugs. nized crime,” especially drug traffi cking, and was trained Interdiction Task Force (FIAAT) was created in 2014 In most cases, SWAT teams are deployed. This has by various US agencies. Under the Sumpul Operations under the purview of the National Civil Police. It was aff ected vulnerable groups and caused physical injury Plan, some 700 armed forces troops are deployed, in created for a term of fi ve years to combat and eradicate on repeated occasions, as well as deaths. The use coordination with the General Offi ce of Migrations and the production, manufacture, use, possession, traffi ck- of military equipment was also seen in operations to Aliens, to control 130 unauthorized border crossings for ing and sale of drugs. Later, an elite unit was formed repress social demonstrations, resulting in increased the purpose of combating the contraband of goods and within that same force called Los Halcones. This group police violence in these situations.27 21 persons, illegal drugs and arms traffi cking. Despite of police agents trained in 2015 with special forces their purported exceptional nature, these military inter- of the US Army in air and ground operations against ventions have been extended until today. criminal groups. 34 THE INTERNAL WAR 2: THE TOUGHENING AND MILITARIZATION OF SECURITY POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 35

Security forces trained in study centers reporting to the US Department of Defense. Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and Peru (2009-2015)

Security forces trained Place Subjects

Argentina Center for Hemispheric Border security, inter-agency coordination Federal, Airport Security Defense Studies (CHDS) and combating terrorism. and Buenos Aires Province police forces William J. Perry Center for Terrorism and counter-insurgency. Hemispheric Defense Studies Defense strategy and policy, combating WHINSEC transnational organized crime.

Mexico Center for Hemispheric Intelligence and surveillance. Federal Police, Secretariat Defense Studies (CHDS) of Public Security, Inter-agency coordination and Attorney General’s Offi ce Inter-American Air combating terrorism. Forces Academy Terrorism and counter-insurgency. Search and rescue.

MILITARY INTERVENTION Brazil National Defense University Anti-narcotics operations. IN RIO DE JANEIRO Federal and Maritime police forces; Civil Police from the Center for Hemispheric Narco-terrorism information analysis. Defense Studies (CHDS) states of Bahía, Amazonas, Inter-agency coordination and In South America, the current situation in Brazil is a state of Rio de Janeiro was fast-tracked through the Goias, Pernambuco, the WHINSEC combating terrorism. turning point for processes of militarization. President Chamber of Deputies and Senate and passed in a week. Federal District, Rio de Janeiro, On-site training in Brazil Tactics and vehicle inspection. Michel Temer issued a decree for military intervention in Sao Paulo and Pará In his speech presenting the measure, Temer indicated given by US Navy the security operations of Rio de Janeiro state through Terrorism prevention at large events. that the reason for adopting this measure lay in the high December 2018 and appointed Army General Walter levels of violence related to drug traffi cking and organized Maritime crisis management, response Braga Netto to oversee it. This means the armed crime. Generic arguments were put forth to justify this to incidents, emergency operations. forces have assumed the command of the civilian intervention that could be used to legitimize perpetual police and the state military police, as well as the police militarization. In that speech, Temer sustained that the fi refi ghting squad, the penitentiary system and the area intervention is aimed at “putting an end to the grave of intelligence. And although the military has intervened Peru Center for Hemispheric Analysis of operations and compromising of public order in the state.” in domestic security in Rio numerous times in the past National Police of Peru (PNP), Defense Studies (CHDS) narco-terrorism information. decade, it has always done so jointly with the civilian Numerous specialists and human rights activists spoke PNP Police Aviation Division and Anti-drug Division, Attorney Inter-American Air Joint/civil-military operations. security forces rather than taking command of them, out against the military intervention, sustaining that it is General’s Offi ce, National Forces Academy as in this case. far from being a valid solution to the country’s long- Anti-narcotics operations. Customs Superintendency, standing security problems.29 Since the sanctioning of WHINSEC The Brazilian legal system permits the use of military National Intelligence Offi ce Combating organized crime. this measure, the armed forces have acquired a social resources for security operations only for a set period National Defense University and political magnitude that they had not had since the Inter-agency coordination and of time and at a specifi c location. This is guaranteed end of the dictatorship. combating terrorism. under the missions set forth in the Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO), regulatory instruments governed by In the six months since the intervention began, shootings Medical assistance. the Constitution and other complementary laws. These and deaths at the hands of police have been on the rise Search and rescue. operations, which should be used only temporarily, were in various districts, in some cases accompanied by an invoked by the president’s offi ce more than 130 times increase in intentional homicides, and what was touted Defense strategy and policy. between 1992 and 2018, according to data from the as a decrease in robberies was actually the displacement 28 30 Brazilian Ministry of Defense. The GLO decree in the of crime dynamics to other municipalities. Source: Author’s compilation based on data from Security Assistance Monitor. 36 THE INTERNAL WAR 37

Military training of police

Much of the impact of regional trends on the security forces revolves around the training that police offi cers receive from the armed forces, both in techniques as well as in military theory and defense. The training of police implies the re-defi ning of crime as “insurgency” and the conception of social confl ict as “civil disobedi- ence.” Therefore, these are deemed spaces to convey military know-how that is later applied by the security forces in territorial interventions with an excessive use of force and characteri- zation of the population as an “enemy.” The Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program sends US agents to diff erent countries to train local forces. Through these missions, the local forces are trained in military tactics, urban combat and other skills such as pistol and rifl e marksmanship, riot control or informa- tion gathering, while the Special Forces become familiar with the culture of the recipient country, its language and geography. Although there was a policy of reducing the size of the armed forces under the Obama administration, the Special Forces actually expanded their pres- ence in Latin America. The JCET is one of the principal lines of work in the region. The number of training missions carried out by the US Special Forces in Latin America tripled between 2007 and 2014, while in the same period mili- tary aid to the region was on the decline. According to the Southern Command, in 2016 these missions provided content on anti-terror- ism, “narco-terrorism insurgencies” and illicit traffi cking networks. 38 THE INTERNAL WAR 2: THE TOUGHENING AND MILITARIZATION OF SECURITY POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 39

While these trainings are of a military nature, in numer- Occupation of poor neighborhoods ous cases the units being trained are police forces: in or areas of social confl ict 2009, Argentina received a mission from the US Army Other actions that indicate an excessively violent Special Operations Command that trained agents approach to confl icts, but without the participation of from the Special Federal Operations Group (GEOF) of the armed forces, include police deployments that are the Argentine Federal Police in special operations and conceived and executed according to the logic of ter- sharp-shooting, spatial-cultural reconnaissance, infi l- ritorial occupation, a euphemism for population control tration techniques, rescue and other counter-terrorism and police saturation in poor neighborhoods or areas of skills. This training was repeated in 2018 at the request heightened social confl ict. of the Argentine Ministry of Security, as part of the JOINT COMBINED EXCHANGE TRAINING MISSIONS IN LATIN AMERICA preparation for the G20 Leaders Summit, which will be The framework for this type of deployment goes back held in November in Buenos Aires. The training provided to the military operations of “pacifi cation” in Vietnam in to 40 GEOF agents was given by eight offi cers from the the 1960s, and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. 2009 2014 2016 Southern Special Operations Command (COESUR), a According to this logic, certain zones are controlled by unit under the Southern Command. an “enemy” and therefore must be militarily invaded, re-taken and put under control in order to then carry out the tasks of “reconstruction”.31 In the case of security op- 21 missions 36 missions 25 missions erations under this logic, such as the Police Pacifi cation Argentina Honduras Brazil Units (UPP) in Rio de Janeiro, the Safe Neighborhoods Brazil Colombia Colombia While these plan in Buenos Aires or the Operation Liberation Colombia Peru Peru and Protection of the People (OLP) in Venezuela, the Northern Triangle among others Northern Triangle trainings are of a “enemy” is organized crime. Once the invading military among others among others forces or police tactical units evict the criminals, new military nature, in police corps trained for proximity work would then have Source: Author’s compilation based on data from ongoing presence in these neighborhoods. Security Assistance Monitor and offi cial documents numerous cases the from the US Southern Command. Chile’s Jungle Command is currently intervening in units being trained the Araucanía region to “pacify” the area in which the Mapuche community is defending its ancestral are police forces. territories. Meanwhile, a month after beginning the TRAINING IN COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME (CTOC) intervention, Chilean Interior Minister Andrés Chadwick acknowledged that violent incidents had been on the rise since the deployment of the Carabineros special Who was trained Who provided training Financed under what program unit in the territory.32 There is a similar scenario in the training sessions that SEDENA, SEMAR, Jalisco state the US Army South (ARSOUTH) provides on Countering Argentina has also involved intermediate security Mexico government, among others Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC). These sessions forces like the National Gendarmerie and the Naval are carried out in centers reporting to the Department of Prefecture in carrying out tasks of occupying poor Defense, although their intended audience is generally neighborhoods. These new uses of intermediate forces Argentina National Ministries of the Interior, Justice and Human Rights; from civilian agencies in the recipient countries: both the for police functions include everything from urban patrol All courses provided by Ministries of Security for provinces 1. Combating Terrorism police and members of other security agencies, as well in poor areas with high levels of social confl ict, to vehicle the Center for Hemispheric of Buenos Aires and Santa Fe, Fellowship Program (CTFP) checks and identifi cation of persons, to providing safe Defense Studies (CHDS) and as ministry and even some judicial offi cials. Federal Police, among others custody for women who are victims of gender violence, the William J. Perry Center for 2. Regional Centers for to neighborhood intelligence tasks or interventions in Hemispheric Defense Studies. Security Studies Brazil Superior School of War, family and neighbor disputes. Tactical groups belonging Both report to the US Both report to the US Defense Federal Police, Ministry of to the Naval Prefecture were deployed in Patagonia in Defense Department Department the context of social confl icts with indigenous groups Defense, among others claiming rights of access to land. These forces were not created specifi cally to fulfi ll these functions, and Peru Air Force, National Intelligence in fact pre-exist the emergence of drug traffi cking as Offi ce, Judiciary, Ministry of the a problem on the public agenda, but nevertheless are Interior, Attorney General’s Offi ce, placed at the service of strategies to counter this and among others other phenomena. Source: Author’s compilation based on data from Security Assistance Monitor. the impact of “new threats” on human rights

3 42 THE INTERNAL WAR 3: THE IMPACT OF “NEW THREATS” ON HUMAN RIGHTS 43

chapter 3 The impact of “new threats” on human rights

Countries that have adopted strategies of militarization, 2004 to 325 in 2007. This should have been alarming to This raid was part of Operation Anvil, an anti-drug traf- to fake an armed confrontation.5 No punishment has meaning the widespread, long-term participation of the authorities since, in contrast to interventions against fi cking program in Honduras for which the United States been ordered in the case, although a judge recently the armed forces in internal security duties, have the guerrilla forces, the use of lethal force in fi ghting crime provided surveillance and detection services, as well as ruled that the investigation carried out by the National most serious violations of human rights, including ex- is authorized only under very specifi c circumstances. armed aerial support. When the matter became public, Attorney General’s Offi ce was not comprehensive and ecutions, torture and enforced disappearances. Grave When the scandal became public in 2009 (under the the DEA ceased the joint operations between FAST and ordered that the probe be reactivated.6 In May 2017, human rights violations have also been reported where name of “false positives”) and the authorities began to the Honduran National Police. during an Army operation in Puebla, images were taken “wartime” strategies were employed, such as the mili- take steps, the estimated number of alleged criminals that show soldiers shooting a person to death. Amnesty The participation of the military in combating drug traf- tarization of the police or police tactics or deployment killed by the Colombian armed forces dropped to an International verifi ed the authenticity of these images fi cking in Mexico dates back to the 1960s but increased based on territorial occupation. These negative eff ects average of nine per year.1 and demanded an investigation.7 after 2006, when the national government decided to should serve as a warning to those governments that, In Honduras, where the Special Forces of the armed implement mass involvement of the armed forces. In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in the few months between the disregarding them, choose to move forward with mili- forces intervene in operations to combat drug traffi ck- After that deployment, there was a sharp increase in decision to hand city security over to the military in tarization processes. ing, it has been reported that they were responsible reports of human rights violations committed by the February 2018 and the writing of this report, executions for dozens of executions occurring in the Bajo Aguán military forces coordinated by the Secretariat of National at the hands of soldiers have already been reported. In region. Between 2010 and 2013, at least 88 farmers Defense. This is clear in reports prepared by the National late August, citizens residing in the Complexo da Penha Human Rights Commission of Mexico; the UN Special favela told offi cials from the public defender’s offi ce that Executions, disappearances, torture from that region were killed. A large number of testimo- nies indicated that these murders were committed by Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or military intervention in their neighborhood was charac- Colombia, Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador and “death squads” made up of military personnel from the Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the UN Special terized by searches without a warrant, abuse and Guatemala are the countries in the region that system- Special Forces, police and private security agents that Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary torture; they also reported the execution of several atically use or have used the armed forces for internal work for palm oil production companies involved in a Executions; and the Inter-American Commission on youths whose bodies were allegedly hidden in the jungle 8 security tasks in recent decades. These are also the confl ict with peasant communities over land ownership. Human Rights (IACHR). Summary executions are abutting the slum. one of the gravest types of incidents reported. Some countries with the worst human rights violations perpe- The Special Forces suspected of executing farmers were Disappearances are another grave occurrence associat- of them were presented as alleged errors by military trated by military personnel in Latin America since the trained by military personnel from the United States and ed with military intervention in security matters as they personnel who later tried to cover them up by faking downfall of dictatorships in the region. Israel and also receive material assistance from those may often cover up executions or enforced disappear- armed confrontations. This is what occurred in Nuevo countries. The Honduran government tried to justify ances. There is concern over the situation in Mexico, Extrajudicial executions at the hands of military per- León in March 2010 when a group of military person- the actions of the armed forces, maintaining that armed where actions by criminal groups and illegal interventions sonnel occur when members of the armed forces nel supposedly mistook two Instituto Tecnológico de revolutionary groups operate in the area and character- by the armed forces feed into each other. According to operationally intervene against organized crime, and Estudios Superiores de Monterrey students for hit men izing the farmers’ fi ght for access to the land as terrorism the National Register of Information on Missing and their victims may be people involved in illegal networks and executed them outside the university, then planted and organized crime. These cases were documented Disappeared People, more than 34,000 disappearances and also farmers, human rights activists, or members of weapons with the bodies.3 A month later in Nuevo by various human rights and farmers’ organizations. A were reported between 2007 and 2017.9 In 2006, before the political opposition. In Colombia, more than 3,000 Laredo, nine-year-old Martín Almanza Salazar and fi ve- report by the organization Rights Action analyzed at least large-scale military intervention began, the National cases of executions carried out by the Army in opera- year-old Brayan Almanza Salazar were killed by military 34 cases of grave human rights violations by Honduran Human Rights Commission received four reports of en- tions against guerrilla forces and organized crime were personnel who opened fi red and threw grenades at the Special Forces personnel in the area.2 forced disappearance. By 2010, during military interven- investigated between 2002 and 2008. In some cases, car in which their family was traveling, which allegedly tion, that number had increased to 77 per year. According the victims were individuals with no connection whatso- In 2012, during a nighttime raid in the town of Ahuas, did not stop at a vehicle checkpoint.4 There have also to civil society organizations, at least 3,000 enforced dis- ever to these activities and, after they were murdered, the Honduran National Police killed four people after been mass executions like the one that took place in appearances occurred between 2006 and 2010. they were dressed up as guerrilla fi ghters or planted fi ring on a boat they suspected of traffi cking illegal sub- June 2014 in Tlatlaya. The Army reported that “combat” with weapons and presented as combat casualties. In stances. It was later shown that the people killed had there left 22 criminals dead and one soldier wounded. Diff erent recommendations made by the National other cases, common criminals were murdered. During no connection to drug traffi cking. The Honduran forces A subsequent investigation by the National Human Human Rights Commission to the Defense Secretariat this period, the number of common criminals allegedly were accompanied by DEA agents as part of a special Rights Commission showed that at least 15 people between 2006 and 2015 show that participation in dis- killed in clashes with the Army increased from 27 in unit known as FAST (Foreign Advisory Support Team). were executed and that the scene had been altered appearances by members of the armed forces is a fact 44 THE INTERNAL WAR 3: THE IMPACT OF “NEW THREATS” ON HUMAN RIGHTS 45

that has been established by the Mexican government the goal of extracting information, as well in cases of ex- The atrocities committed by military personnel in charge of human rights” (OAS, 2017). In Peru, Law 30.151 and itself.10 It is unclear what role was played by the military tortion and military participation in illegal networks. In of combating crime seem to go unpunished in the vast Legislative Decree 982 of 2014 modifi ed Article 20 of in the enforced disappearance of the 43 students from Apaneca, El Salvador in 2016, a group of soldiers was majority of cases. This is due in part to the weakness of the Criminal Code, declaring immunity for any member Ayotzinapa in September 2014, which, in principle, was sent by their superiors to capture and torture two youths judicial systems but fundamentally to a series of mech- of the armed forces and the National Police who “cause perpetrated by the municipal police of Iguala. According who had recently robbed the home of an Army colonel. anisms that the armed forces and political authorities injury or death in carrying out their duty and using their to the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts As a result of this incident, eight soldiers were sentenced have set in motion to cover up crimes and guarantee weapons or other means of defense.” Special laws (known as the GIEI), which investigated the case, the to 14 years in prison, and three senior Army command- impunity. One of these mechanisms consists of trying passed to perpetuate the militarization of security, Army was continually aware of what was happening, ers face charges for having given the order and later at- crimes committed by military personnel in a specifi c tri- such as the Internal Security Law passed in Mexico there were soldiers and military intelligence agents tempting to bribe and threaten the court.13 Also in El bunal or jurisdiction. This means that military personnel in December 2017, have the same thrust. As military present at diff erent scenes linked to the disappearanc- Salvador, in early 2018, three military servicepeople and are tried by their fellow servicepeople. It has generally personnel ensure accountability only to themselves, es, and they did nothing to prevent them.11 fi ve police offi cers were arrested for torturing a young been observed that these tribunals act in a corporatist interventions by the armed forces operate within a woman after stopping her at a vehicle checkpoint.14 In manner and without autonomy. framework of a state of exception in which special laws Disappearances have also been a mass phenomenon in Honduras, military presence in the management of and regulations suspend the application of ordinary Colombia in recent decades and have been carried out The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has prisons has also given rise to multiple reports of torture legislation and individual guarantees. both by the armed forces and by revolutionaries and observed that when a state “permits investigations to and abuse.15 In Mexico, the Claudia Medina Tamariz criminal organizations. The Single Registry of Victims of be conducted by the entities with possible involvement, case illustrates the use of torture as an investigative the Colombian government states that between 1985 independence and impartiality are clearly compro- “method.” In August 2012, Medina Tamariz was arrested and 2018, at least 47,259 people were direct victims of mised.”16 Regardless, Mexico in 2016 and Brazil in 2017 along with her husband by members of the Navy in enforced disappearance and another 123,113 were in- extended military jurisdiction over crimes committed Veracruz during an illegal search. They were transported directly aff ected.12 against civilians. The IACHR and the Regional Offi ce for to a naval base where they were tortured for 36 hours South America of the Offi ce of the United Nations High Torture and other types of abuse have also been report- and then left with the National Attorney General’s Offi ce, Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) rejected this ed in countries where the armed forces intervene in inter- which forced them to sign a statement without knowing initiative, emphasizing that it was “incompatible with nal security. These human rights violations are reported its content. Medina Tamariz was accused of leading a international obligations assumed by Brazil in the area both in the context of alleged criminal investigations, with drug cartel and was released on bail in 2014. 46 THE INTERNAL WAR 3: THE IMPACT OF “NEW THREATS” ON HUMAN RIGHTS 47

MEXICO 2008-2013 Increase in lethality and Two security plans were implemented in Venezuela in escalation of violence recent years. The Safe Homeland Plan (2013-2015) and Operation Liberation and Protection of the People Ratio of civilians killed to police or soldiers killed In addition to illegal practices such as torture, summary (2015-2017) incorporated armed forces personnel into in operations against organized crime executions and disappearances, military intervention in regular saturation patrols of poor neighborhoods. These internal security is associated with an escalation of vio- saturation patrols entail military and police occupation, lence in general. First, it has been observed that military often with aerial support, of a specifi c area in which intervention tends to be accompanied by an increase arrests and searches are carried out. The authorities Year Federal Police Mexican Army in the lethality of police forces. Second, experiences considered the number of people killed to be an indicator such as those of Mexico and Brazil demonstrate that, of the success of these patrols, an approach that incen- 2008 faced with greater fi repower, organized criminal groups 1.1 5.1 tivizes state violence. According to judicial sources, in acquire other weapons, and their tactics become even the period in which these joint patrols began, the number more violent. The intense circulation of war materials 2009 2.6 17.6 of civilians killed at the hands of state forces increased and personnel trained by the armed forces and/or by more than 100%, from 837 in 2013 to 1,052 in 2014 criminal groups, as in the case of the Zetas in Mexico or 2010 3.5 15.6 and 1,777 in 2015.21 Other fi gures compiled by the the Kaibiles in Guatemala, is another phenomenon that Venezuelan Observatory of Violence indicate that 5,281 leads to an escalation of violence. 2011 9.4 32.4 deaths were reported in 2016 due to “resisting authority” The mass participation of military personnel in internal (that is, killed by police or military forces), and in 2017 security duties in Mexico correlated with an enormous 2012 10.4 23.5 this number grew to 5,535. In 2012, deaths at the hands increase in the homicide rate in general and the lethality of state forces accounted for 4% of total homicides over of state forces in particular. In the past ten years, the the course of the year; in 2013, 5%; in 2014, 7%; and in 2013 6.7 20.1 number of intentional homicides increased by 250%, 2015, 10%.22 This exponential increase in state violence from 8,867 homicides reported in 2007 (the fi rst year of does not appear to have contributed to the pacifi cation Source: Forné, Corre & Rivas, 2017.17 military intervention) to more than 29,000 in 2017. This of the country. On the contrary, state violence increases represents a jump from 8 to 24 homicides per 100,000 violence in general: the rate of violent deaths rose from inhabitants. In total, intentional homicides account for at 73 per 100,000 in 2012 to 91.8 in 2016.23 least 250,000 deaths.18 Lethality can be measured as the ratio of civilian deaths to the number of police and/or The process of militarization in Rio de Janeiro underwent military personnel killed, or as the ratio of civilian deaths a qualitative change in February 2018 when manage- to the number of civilians injured in police and/or military ment of city security was handed over to military com- interventions. In interventions by the Mexican Army, an manders, who assumed operational control of the police BRAZIL average of eight deaths were reported for each indi- and also deployed troops in the favelas. This is a typical RIO DE JANEIRO vidual injured, and in the Navy, 30 deaths per individual case in which an increase in violence is presented as injured. This is an extremely high lethality rate given that justifi cation for military intervention. Rio de Janeiro is a organizations like the Red Cross state that in wartime state with historically high homicide rates and extremely People contexts generally, an average of one death is reported high levels of police lethality. Between 2008 and 2012, killed by for every four individuals injured.19 An annual compar- the homicide rate trended downward such that in 2012 state forces ative breakdown of lethality rates of the Army and the the lowest homicide rate in recent decades was reported Federal Police between 2008 and 2013 not only shows (28 per 100,000). But as of 2013, the number of homi- 236 279% the extremely high lethality rate of the Army, but also that cides began to increase again, and in 2017 the rate was 895 increase there was an alarming increase in the lethality rate of the nearly 40 per 100,000. Police homicides accounted for 2013 Federal Police after military personnel became involved nearly 10% of violent deaths annually. In this context, in 1st half in operations against organized crime. six months of intervention (between February and July of Between 2008 and 2014, the offi cially reported number 2018), 738 deaths were caused by the action of state of people killed by state forces in operations against or- forces. The period from January to July 2018 was the 2018 ganized crime was: Army, 1,755; Navy, 320; Federal most violent in the last fi ve years: during the same period 1st half Police, 523. Other sources indicate that between 2007 in 2013, police killed 236 people, compared with 895 in and 2012, the Army alone killed 3,000 people and that 2018. This is equivalent to a 279% increase in deaths 24 158 soldiers were killed,20 a ratio of nearly 20 to 1. caused by state forces over fi ve years. According to information from the Center for Research Figures from these countries show that the authorities and Teaching in Economics (CIDE), between 2006 and use high levels of violence as a justifi cation for military 2011, 86.1% of civilian deaths resulted from clashes with intervention, but rather than decreasing violence, that “perfect lethality,” that is, with no wounded, only dead. intervention feeds back into it. The supposed solution This tends to be an indicator of summary executions. becomes a central part of a much larger problem. 48 THE INTERNAL WAR 3: THE IMPACT OF “NEW THREATS” ON HUMAN RIGHTS 49

Militarization of social confl icts “militarization of public security operations to dissuade and repression of protests and, in some cases, impede the exercise of the right to peacefully protest” and noted that “the militarization of COLOMBIA MEXICO Various countries in the region have mobilized military citizen security produces violations of other human rights, forces to suppress social confl icts. The reason presented 1997- 2 012 2007-2017 in addition to the right to peaceful social protest and to for using the armed forces or for sanctioning legislation freedom of expression.” 27 that allows for this possibility is the supposed existence of “violent groups” that aim to destabilize the state. In Colombia, despite the fact that the Constitution diff eren- tiates between police and military functions, the armed Violence against migrants confl ict has been used to justify participation of the armed and forced displacement forces in protests, particularly when the executive branch has accused them of being “motivated” or “infi ltrated” by The vague defi nition of “new threats” allows for socio- guerrilla forces. In Peru between 2006 and 2016, there economic problems such as migration to become part were at least 15 interventions by the armed forces that of national security agendas. When associated with 6.5 millon 35,090 people were complaints fi led over arose from social confl icts.25 In 2010, a presidential decree issues such as drug traffi cking or terrorism, migration forced to move disappearances granted the armed forces the authority to support police stops being a human right and becomes a potential forces and consider mobilized social groups as “hostile crime. The use of military forces to control borders ex- groups.” The protection of “strategic facilities” also served acerbates the already vulnerable situation of migrants, as a justifi cation for sending military personnel to control who are nearly always poor people trying to escape social confl icts. These facilities tend to be the very source hardship and violence. In some countries, this phenom- of the confl icts, for example those associated with ex- enon is also seen internally, with hundreds of thousands tractive industries. Therefore, many social demonstrations of people displaced by armed confl icts. organizations were demanding transfer of management The consequences of constructing tend to be directed against them. In 2012, in the context The militarization of border control can lead to inci- of these mechanisms to civilian public bodies in the internal enemies of a protest in Cajamarca against the establishment of a dents like the one reported on the border between social and health areas.29 mining megaproject, a joint operation by the police and the Dominican Republic and Haiti in July 2000. The The introduction of the issue of terrorism on the agenda the armed forces caused fi ve fi rearm-related deaths, Dominican Republic had militarized its border with Haiti With regard to forced displacements within a country, of Latin American governments has implications that go along with dozens of injuries. ostensibly to prevent the traffi cking of drugs or weapons. the most violent confl icts that have had massive armed beyond geopolitical matters. The rhetorical construction forces involvement are those of Colombia and Mexico, A legislative reform in Paraguay in 2013 allowed the coun- A truck carrying 30 Haitians, including a minor and a of a link between specifi c groups and terrorist activities and the most serious problems of forced displacement try’s president to utilize the armed forces in “cases of pregnant woman, failed to stop at a military checkpoint is one strategy for identifying those groups as internal have also occurred in these countries. In the case of threats or violent actions against legitimately constituted in Dominican territory. Soldiers chased the truck and enemies or threats to the state. Exceptional measures Colombia, this is a long-standing problem arising as a authorities that impede the free exercise of their constitu- riddled it with bullets, killing seven people. Another ten are thereby deployed, on the basis of special criminal direct consequence of the country’s internal armed tional and legal functions” – an abstract description that were injured. The survivors were arbitrarily detained in procedures or antiterrorism laws that were sanctioned confl icts and its strategies to “combat drug traffi cking” could allow use of the armed forces in protests. Military military facilities and deported to Haiti without initiation or modifi ed in many of the region’s countries in recent whereby military intervention increased the degree of vi- years. This can also provide justifi cation for the use of personnel were also involved in controlling and repressing of a formal procedure. An investigation was carried out olence infl icted on rural populations. The Colombian heavily armed elite tactical police units against groups public demonstrations in Honduras, Guatemala and by Dominican military justice, which absolved all military government acknowledged that between 1997 and that have been identifi ed as dangerous. In El Salvador, Mexico. According to the Committee of Relatives of the personnel involved. The Dominican Republic was con- 2012, some 4.9 million people were the victims of forced the antiterrorism law of 2006 allows for gangs, or maras, Detained and Disappeared in Honduras,26 the Honduran demned for this incident by the Inter-American Court of 28 displacement. According to the Consultancy for Human to be defi ned as terrorist organizations. In Guatemala, military has been involved in human rights violations Human Rights in October 2012. Rights and Displacement (CODHES), the number of the Law Against Terrorist Acts that began to be debated against activists, community leaders, indigenous people In recent years, the Venezuelan economic crisis has led people displaced between 1985 and 2012 was 5.5 in late 2017 has a similar thrust and could even classify and human rights defenders, as well as participating in to a signifi cant increase in emigration. The response of million, and the situation persists: in the fi rst half of 2018, practices such as social protest and roadblocks as evictions and violent raids without a warrant. In neighboring countries Colombia and Brazil has been to more than 35,000 forced displacements were report- terrorist acts. Antiterrorist legislation in Chile, which Guatemala, soldiers and police were used to break up an 30 militarize border control and also, in the case of Brazil, to ed. Since the beginning of military intervention in includes very severe penalties, has been used to educational protest in October 2012. They opened fi re on delegate the task of receiving migrants to the Ministry of Mexico, from 2006 through 2017, there were a reported charge and place under pre-trial detention Mapuche the demonstrators, killing eight and wounding dozens. Defense and the armed forces. Human rights organiza- 330,000 victims of internal forced displacement to avoid leaders accused of various acts of violence. In the Norín In Venezuela, the intensifi cation of social confl ict seen in tions reported that the Army’s plan for receiving migrants the eff ects of armed confl ict, situations of widespread Catrimán v. Chile case, the Inter-American Court of recent years was addressed by the government through entails violating the human right to migrate, as it involves violence and human rights violations, according to the Human Rights condemned the Chilean government for a 2015 decree that authorizes greater involvement of the building shelters in areas far from cities, creating a Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of using the antiterrorism law in a discriminatory manner military in the maintenance of “public order” and “social system of permits to move from place to place, and es- Human Rights (CMDPDH).31 against the Mapuche people. In 2014, the same court peace” in “public assemblies and demonstrations.” tablishing a medical barrier that, with the excuse of pre- ordered Chile to overturn guilty verdicts rendered and Violence at public demonstrations has only increased venting health problems, serves as an obstacle to free revoke prison terms, releasing the victims and paying since then. The IACHR expressed its concern over the movement. As this report was being fi nalized, social them reparation. In August 2018, the UN Committee 50 THE INTERNAL WAR 3: THE IMPACT OF “NEW THREATS” ON HUMAN RIGHTS 51

Against Torture expressed its concern over abusive The practice of constantly Discriminatory “community policing” initiatives in areas where security application of the antiterrorism law against Mapuche police deployment forces were only present to conduct illegal business or activists and requested that Chile review this legislation carry out violent searches. However, the absence of 32 patrolling neighborhoods, Population control operations or territorial occupation of and further specify its defi nition of acts of terrorism. political oversight and the inclusion of this permanent poor neighborhoods by police forces also entail various Despite these precedents, human rights defender establishing checkpoints, presence in population control programs, rather than in rights violations. These interventions tend to be justifi ed Francisca Linconao and ten other members of the proximity policing, make these operations a breeding as necessary measures to “fl ush out” drug traffi cking and Mapuche people are still being prosecuted for crimes carrying out procedures on ground for problematic interactions between security organized crime. The practice of constantly patrolling of terrorism in a judicial process investigating the deaths forces and people living in poor neighborhoods,39 who of Werner Luchsinger and Vivianne Mackay in 2013 public transportation, and neighborhoods, establishing checkpoints, carrying out suff er racial and class discrimination by the police. resulting from a fi re at their home, which was located in procedures on public transportation, and detaining and These territorial occupations constitute a type of police ancestral indigenous territory. detaining and repeatedly repeatedly searching residents creates a landscape deployment that would not be tolerated in middle- and similar to that of a military occupation. The same thing In its strategy against the Mapuche people, the Chilean searching residents creates high-income areas of the city. They thereby entail occurs with the de facto imposition of “curfews” by the government has undertaken practices of illegal intelligence discriminatory treatment toward a wide sector of the police, even when there are no regulations ordering them. and manipulation of evidence in order to incriminate a landscape similar to that population targeted for continual control. activists as part of an illicit terrorist organization. Operation The idea that there is a prohibition imposed by the police Hurricane was carried out by a special division of the of a military occupation. to move around at night, directed especially at young police, the Special Operational Intelligence Unit, which had people, exists in neighborhoods in Argentina and Brazil been specifi cally created to handle the Mapuche issue. that have a heavy police presence. The discovery that evidence incriminating the Mapuches In Brazil, during the period in which the Police Pacifi cation had been fabricated led to the prosecution of three police chiefs, a computer engineer and two expert witnesses,33 Units were functioning in Rio de Janeiro, there were also as well as the resignation of the force’s general director, reports of the police practice of prohibiting certain cultural 35 Bruno Villalobos. In Argentina, the government that took activities, such as “funk dances.” The units’ programs offi ce in 2015 adopted a similar position regarding the initially showed some success in reducing homicides, claims of Mapuche groups in the Patagonian provinces of largely based on the temporary decline in police lethality Chubut and Rio Negro. Various executive branch offi cials itself. But very soon the coexistence of “proximity” police at the provincial and national levels have publicly and people living in slums became highly problematic associated the members of this Mapuche community due to repeated abuse and the control exercised over all with terrorism, groundlessly accusing them of wanting to aspects of daily life in the communities.36 In Venezuela “impose an autonomous Mapuche republic in the middle since July 2015, there has been an increase in interven- of Argentina” or characterizing them as “criminals” and tions within the framework of Operation Liberation and “violent people who do not respect laws, our nation, or Protection of the People (OLP), with mass raids carried 34 the fl ag.” Federal forces were deployed in the area with out in low-income communities by police and military orders to enter communities and capture activists forces. According to a report by PROVEA and Human discovered in alleged fl agrant off ense of the law. In this Rights Watch, in the context of these raids there have context, a tactical group of the Argentine Naval Prefecture been reports of “human rights violations including extraju- killed the young Mapuche activist Rafael Nahuel, who dicial executions and other violent abuse, arbitrary deten- was unarmed. tions, forced removals, the destruction of homes, and the arbitrary deportation of Colombian citizens often accused without proof of having connections to ‘the paramili- tary.’”37 In Argentina, the presence of militarized security forces like the National Gendarmerie or the Naval Prefecture carrying out patrol duties in poor neighbor- hoods has led to repeated cases of abuse, humiliation and torture of youths in these areas.38 Operations like those of the Police Pacifi cation Units in Rio, Operation Southern Belt and the Safe Neighborhoods program in Buenos Aires, or the OLP in Venezuela are presented as a step forward in the state’s work to provide security for poor neighborhoods, and occasionally as 3: THE IMPACT OF “NEW THREATS” ON HUMAN RIGHTS 53

Mass incarceration Since the “war on drugs” and other quasi-warlike ap- proaches to diff erent criminal phenomena, there has been a massive increase in the number of people de- tained and/or incarcerated all across the Americas, in- INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE cluding in the United States. DETAINED AND/OR INCARCERATED Since 1950, in seven countries of the region (Argentina, The “war” against drug traffi cking and other Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru) the quasi-warlike approaches to other crimes number of criminal off enses that punish drug-related produced a huge increase in detentions. conduct increased tenfold, and the total number of pe- nalized conducts related to illicit substances increased BRAZIL from 67 to 344. The criminal codes in a large number 1992-2014 of Latin American countries disproportionately punish 250% conduct related to illicit drugs. The implementation of PERU hardline legislation has led to an overload of courts and 1992-2015 prisons, and to tens of thousands of people being de- 242% prived of their liberty for minor drug-related off enses, or COLOMBIA for simple possession. The weight of this legislation has 212% 1992-2015 mainly fallen on the most vulnerable sectors of society.40 There has been an exponential increase in incarceration URUGUAY rates over the last two decades in Latin America, though 182% 1992-2014 with local variations. Brazil shows the greatest growth with a 250% increase between 1992 and 2014, fol- PARAGUAY lowed by Peru (242% between 1992 and 2015), 1997-2014 Colombia (212% between 1992 and 2015), Uruguay 177% (182% between 1992 and 2014), Paraguay (177% ARGENTINA between 1997 and 2014), Argentina (163% between 1996-2016 1996 and 2016), and Ecuador (123% between 1992 163% and 2014).41 In El Salvador, there are nearly 500 people ECUADOR detained per 100,000 inhabitants, a rate exceeded only 1992-2014 by the United States, and prison overpopulation is re- 123% ported at 300%.42 All across the region, the period in which the prison population has sharply risen coincides with the increase in depriving people of their liberty for drug off enses. The Americas has the highest rate of people incarcerated for drug-related crimes: approximately 51 people per 100,000 inhabitants, compared with 28 per 100,000 in- habitants worldwide.43 The conditions of overcrowding aff ecting the majority of detainees constitute violations of basic human rights. In the case of women, mass incarceration for drug-re- lated crimes leads to grave violations. The percent- age of women in prison for this reason is higher than the percentage of men. Furthermore, that proportion has increased in recent years: between 75% and 80% in Ecuador; 64% in Costa Rica; 60% in Brazil; 66% in Peru; and between 65% and 80% in Argentina. These climbing numbers have no impact on the operation of drug traffi cking. 54 THE INTERNAL WAR 3: THE IMPACT OF “NEW THREATS” ON HUMAN RIGHTS 55

CONDUCT PROHIBITED INCARCERATED WOMEN According to offi cial data regarding the Federal IN LATIN AMERICA IN ARGENTINA Penitentiary Service, between 1990 and 2017 the The war on small-scale female inmate population grew 205%. In 2017, 85% of tra cking seems to be 1950-2018 1990-2017 the women detained in this service had infringed Law 23.737 on narcotics. Of those, only one out of every four an excuse for broadening had been convicted. In the case of women, prison terms entail a brutal severance of family or emotional ties.44 the scope of discretion 205%increase The exponential increase in the prison population is fed for police action on the 344 by police practices of mass drug-related arrests, gener- ally focused on users or small dealers apprehended on streets, as well as a the street and not as a result of prior investigation. In Chile between 2012 and 2016, the police detained policy of mass detention more than 130,000 people for alleged drug-related crimes, 68.8% of them for use, possession or mi- and incarceration of cro-traffi cking.45 In Mexico, the Attorney General’s Offi ce of Mexico City verifi ed that the majority of people arrest- users and small-scale 67 ed by police were detained in fl agrante. Less than 2% of dealers—in other words, arrests involved three or more people, indicating a focus on street dealers who are easily replaced and on users of population control in found in possession of drugs. There has also been an increase in the proportion of crimes for possession, low-income sectors. Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, which federal authorities classifi ed as use (grouping, or Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico y Peru confusing, users with small-scale traffi ckers), and which The number of penalized conducts related increased from 31.5% in 2010, to 41.6% in 2011, and to illicit substances went from 67 to 344. to 47.9% in the fi rst months of 2012. In Argentina, the government declared a “war on small- 85% scale traffi cking” in 2015 which led to an increase in of women are detained arrests. In the province of Buenos Aires, the government for drug-related cases announced that between December 2015 and May 2018, 57,000 raids against small-scale traffi cking were carried out, resulting in the arrest of 80,500 people.46 Information on the number of court cases initiated and later brought to trial suggests that a huge proportion of those police detentions did not later lead to criminal proceedings, meaning that they were either very minor cases, cases of detention without solid evidence, or staged arrests. This assumption is reinforced, in the case of federal forces, by the fact that between 80% 3 out of 4 and 85% of arrests made by these forces involve in have no conviction fl agrante cases that entail no prior investigation. The war on small-scale traffi cking seems to be an excuse for broadening the scope of discretion for police action on the streets, as well as a policy of mass detention and Data from the Federal incarceration of users and small-scale dealers—in other Penitentiary Service words, of population control in low-income sectors. 56 THE INTERNAL WAR

Militarization: An increase in state violence human rights violations that occur as a result particularly that precludes real solutions aff ect vulnerable social groups.47 The report includes recommendations to states, which must align their se- During the last three decades, the doctrine of “new curity interventions with human rights principles and end threats” has been the backdrop and justifi cation for tough- the punitive criminal justice policies that have fostered ening security policies and involving the armed forces in prosecution of marginalized populations and prison operations against crime in Latin America. The issue of overcrowding.48 drug traffi cking occupies a central role in this doctrine. Militarization, then, does not solve the problems of crime While the “war on drugs” and prohibitionism have been or violence and serves as an obstacle to fi nding real challenged in the international debate by diff erent actors solutions. The hardline measures typical of punitive proposing new paradigms for dealing with the issue demagoguery are justifi ed by supposed citizen demands of drugs—centered on state regulation of markets, for a “crackdown,” but rather than translating these decriminalization and harm reduction—the idea of demands into democratic and inclusive policies, they “new threats” seeks to perpetuate the status quo of feed into a cycle of violence and hatred. They are pre- prohibition and punishment, promoting the construction sented as an apparently easy way out that indefi nitely of internal enemies and the expansion of military power postpones the fundamental changes truly important for and of US infl uence in the region. The evidence shows social issues like health and migration and the deep the negative consequences of these processes of reform of police forces in the region in a democratic and “toughening” and militarization, which have not proven transparent way. They also avert any serious discussion eff ective in containing criminal phenomena or reducing about the characteristics, dimensions and strategic ori- levels of violence. entations of defense systems in the region. These negative consequences were described earlier as the political and institutional risks of de-profession- alization of the armed forces and security forces, the spread of corruption among military personnel, and the increased weight of the military vis-à-vis civilian author- ities. Multiple serious eff ects on human rights have also been reported: violations that range from compromising The idea of “new threats” the right to life, freedom and physical integrity of thou- sands of people to alarming limitations on fundamental seeks to perpetuate the political and social rights such as the right to protest, to freedom of expression, and to migrate. Governments status quo of prohibition that use these policies increase violence levels in their and punishment, promoting societies, sometimes exponentially, and reinforce men- talities of population control that particularly aff ect the the construction of internal poorest sectors of society. enemies and the expansion In recent years, human rights protection systems have focused attention on denouncing these violations. The of military power and of US various human rights impacts of the “war on drugs” are being fl agged by the UN Offi ce of the High Commissioner infl uence in the region. for Human Rights (OHCHR). This offi ce prepared a report at the request of the UN Human Rights Council, which will be presented in March 2019 to the organiza- tion responsible for designing the global strategy against drugs: the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in Vienna. The report by the Offi ce of the High Commissioner in- cludes a special section on security policies and their impact on human rights, acknowledging that there is an alarming trend of militarized state reactions, made pos- sible in many cases by institutional and legislative reforms that alter the legal frameworks in force. The notes

5 See Sozzo, Máximo (comp.), 9 Animal Político, “Kaibiles entrenan narcotráfi co y la militarización de 14 “El Salvador: a juicio policías y 26 WOLA. “Which Central American 39 Perelman, Marcela and Tufró, Postneoliberalismo y penalidad a Zetas en arte de la guerra y Argentina, Buenos Aires, Capital militares acusados de tortura y Military and Police Units Get the Manuel. “Entre la saturación y chapter 1 en América del Sur, Buenos manejo de explosivos: Aljazeera”, Intelectual, 2018. chapter 3 agresiones sexuales”, Resumen Most U.S. Aid?” April 15, 2016. la inclusión. Los operativos Latinoamericano, April 19, 2018. territoriales de seguridad Aires, CLACSO, 2016. Mexico, Aug. 15, 2011. 27 IACHR, “IACHR Strongly 14 Sain, Marcelo Fabian. “Las del gobierno nacional en 15 IACHR, “Preliminary observa- Condemns Indiscriminately 6 This scheme is based on that 10 Animal Político, “Kaibiles entrenan Fuerzas Armadas y la ‘guerra barrios pobres de la Región tions from the IACHR visit to Repressive Military Operations in proposed in Kraska, Peter, a Zetas en arte de la guerra y contra las drogas’ en Argentina 1 Human Rights Watch, “El rol de Metropolitana de Buenos Aires 1 “UN warns about nexus between “Militarization and Policing— manejo de explosivos: Aljazeera”, (2011-2018)”, in Tokatlian, Juan Honduras”, 2018. Venezuela”, June 27, 2017. drugs, crime and terrorism”, los altos mandos en falsos posi- (2010-2014)”. In Cartografías del Its Relevance to 21st Century Mexico, Aug. 15, 2011. Gabriel; Sain, Marcelo Fabián and tivos. 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Cover Mauricio Palos Michoacán, Mexico, 2009. P. 1 Mauricio Palos Guatemala City, 2008. P. 2-3 Mauricio Palos Ayutla de los Libres, Guerrero, Mexico, 2013. P. 4-5 Mauricio Palos Michoacán, Mexico, 2009. P. 11 Mauricio Palos Laguna Peten, Guatemala, 2008. P. 16-17 Pepe Mateos Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2006. P. 24 Fabiola Ferrero Caracas, Venezuela, 2016. P. 31 Ramón Campos Iriarte Antioquia, Colombia, 2018. P. 34 Mídia NINJA Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2017. P. 36 Rodrigo Abd Surcubamba, Peru, 2015. P. 40-41 Rodrigo Abd Guatemala City, 2012. P. 44 Rodrigo Abd Guatemala City, 2005. P. 45 Rodrigo Abd Madre de Dios, Peru, 2014. P. 52 above Rodrigo Abd Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 2009. below Rodrigo Abd Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 2009. P. 57 Ramón Campos Iriarte Bogotá, Colombia, 2014. P. 60 Ramón Campos Iriarte Bogotá, Colombia, 2016. www.cels.org.ar Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales