Issue No. 915, 14 June 2011 Articles & Other Documents: Featured Article: US Satellite Images Capture New Buildings at North Korea Nuclear Plant

1. Iran Accelerates Uranium Enrichment: Danger or Bluff? 2. Iran Nuclear Chief Refutes IAEA Claims 3. Iran Produces over 50 kg High-Grade Enriched Uranium: Envoy 4. Iran Wraps Up 2nd Intl. Nuclear Confab 5. Iran Successfully Tests Domestic Air Defense Missiles 6. U.S. Intercepted N. Korean Ship Suspected of Carrying Military Contraband: Official 7. N.Korea Likely Can Miniaturize Nuclear Device: Seoul 8. North Korea Keeps Silent on Ship's Turnaround 9. US Satellite Images Capture New Buildings at North Korea Nuclear Plant 10. Air Chief PV Naik in Favour of Flexing Missile Power 11. 'Not Pak Nukes, but Their Vulnerability a Worry' 12. Abdul Kalam for Hypersonic Version of BrahMos Missile 13. Russian-Indian JV to Develop Brahmos-2 Hypersonic Missile 14. China-Pakistan Strategic Ties Deepen 15. Pakistan Got Nuclear Weapons with Chinese Help: US Senator 16. High-Ranking Russian Military Official Does Not Believe in Iran Missile Threat 17. Russia, NATO should Build Missile Shield against Short and Medium-Range Missiles, Not ICBMs 18. Defense Secretary Nominee Backs Prompt Global Strike Effort 19. Terrorist Leader Killed in Somalia Carried Plans for Bombing the West 20. Under Siege 21. Eruptions in China’s PLA? 22. Iran Nuclear Progress Report 23. A Historic Opportunity for Missile Defense

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at http://cpc.au.af.mil/ for in-depth information and specific points of contact. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

Issue No. 915, 14 June 2011 The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

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The Christian Science Monitor Iran Accelerates Uranium Enrichment: Danger or Bluff? Western experts aren't sure why Iran is speeding up its nuclear enrichment. Is it bravado for domestic political consumption or a genuine move toward developing weapons that can be hidden from attack? By Howard LaFranchi, Staff writer June 11, 2011 Washington: Iran’s announcement this week that it plans to speed up its enrichment of uranium – and to move part of its enrichment process from the desert to a more defensible mountain site – has spawned wide-ranging speculation on Tehran’s nuclear intentions. If Iranian officials made the point of publicly announcing the plans after a ministerial meeting Wednesday, the intention was to promote the world’s gradual acceptance of Iran eventually developing a nuclear weapon, some nuclear experts say. Another line of thinking is that the plans to develop more efficient and higher grade uranium-producing machines at a site inside the mountains near the city of Qom suggest the Iranians are preparing their program to be able to withstand an eventual attack by Israeli or American bombers. Speculation aside, what seems clear is that Iran is intent on accelerating production of what is currently its highest grade of uranium – 20 percent enriched – to expand its options in the face of international demands that it cease enrichment altogether. “They’re shortening their decision time” between amassing the enriched uranium it would take to begin building a nuclear weapon and actually moving forward with building one, says Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington. “We’re busy trying to fool ourselves into thinking we have all the time in the world,” he adds, “while the Iranians are intent on getting to where they could make some extremely critical decisions in a very short period of time.” Yet one factor tamping down reaction to Iran’s announcement is that no one knows if Iran has either the genuine intention or the technical capability to follow through on enrichment acceleration. “One thing we know for sure from following the Iranians in this process since 2002 is that they have made a lot of announcements like this one, and some of the things they have done, and some they haven’t,” says Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington. A tendency to make startling claims about Iran’s next big step in its nuclear program is especially true of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. And the difficult political straits Mr. Ahmadinejad finds himself in at home could be part of the explanation for the enrichment announcement. “This is part bravado, and the statement being made at this time is clearly designed to shore up a government that is internally divided,” Mr. Kimball says. But the statement is also aimed at an international audience, he adds, noting that the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog agency, just issued its “toughest report yet” on Iran’s nuclear program. “This is Iran’s response,” Kimball says. “It suggests they are determined to expand their enrichment capabilities despite the difficulties they are facing as a result of sanctions, and despite the fact they are more and more isolated.” Western intelligence experts generally concur that Iran’s nuclear progress has been slowed over recent months by a combination of UN-sanctioned economic measures, improved constraints on Iran’s importation of technology and machinery for its nuclear program, and a covert Western mission to infect Iran’s nuclear program with a computer worm known as Stuxnet.

Issue No. 915, 14 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Kimball says Iran’s statement “puts the world on notice” about the country’s determination. But he adds that, short of signs of progress in the intended direction, the statement does not suggest a crisis moment. “There is still time to arrive at a diplomatic solution,” he says. The international community’s focus, he adds, should be on “limiting the size of Iran’s enrichment facilities,” and requiring Iran to accept a much more extensive monitoring and inspections program. http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2011/0611/Iran-accelerates-uranium-enrichment-Danger-or-bluff (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Press TV – Iran Iran Nuclear Chief Refutes IAEA Claims Monday, June 13, 2011 The Iranian nuclear chief has refuted the International Atomic Energy Agency's report about Tehran's program having military aspects as “lies.” “Other *countries+ in the world commit crimes and seek to make nuclear weapons, but the Islamic Republic of Iran which has always called for peace is accused of pursuing a covert program for producing atomic bomb,” Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Fereydoun Abbasi said on Monday. On June 6, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano claimed that the UN nuclear body had received new unspecific information indicating that Iran may not be only developing nuclear energy for civilian purposes. Abbasi said Iran does not need non-peaceful nuclear activities and they are not economically beneficial for the country. “They want to hamper Iran's scientific and technological progress… through psychological war and false reports,” Abbasi added. The United States, Israel and their allies accuse Iran of pursuing military objectives in its nuclear program. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran maintains that it has the right to develop and acquire nuclear technology meant for peaceful purposes. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/184526.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

China Daily – China Iran Produces over 50 kg High-Grade Enriched Uranium: Envoy Xinhua June 13, 2011 TEHRAN, June 12 (Xinhua) -- Iran's permanent representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Ali-Asghar Soltanieh, said Sunday that Iran has so far produced over 50 kg 20 percent enriched uranium. Talking to Xinhua on the sidelines of an international nuclear disarmament conference in Tehran on Sunday, Soltanieh said that " We need 120 kg enrichment up to 20 percent. Of course, we have been able to produce successfully over 50 kg." "But, we still need. We have to speed up," he said, adding that "Because Tehran research reactor is in desperate need for fuel, because Tehran reactor should produce radioisotopes for hospitals." http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/xinhua/2011-06-13/content_2877686.html

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Press TV – Iran Iran Wraps Up 2nd Intl. Nuclear Confab Monday, June 13, 2011 The second International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, hosted by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the capital city of Tehran has wrapped up. Nuclear experts from more than 40 countries, ambassadors and representatives from international bodies such as the United Nations and the IAEA attended the two-day conference. Issues such as Israel's deliberate ambiguity on its nuclear weapons, and the violation of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by the US were discussed at the conference. Israel, widely believed to be the sole possessor of a nuclear arsenal in the Middle East with over 200 undeclared nuclear warheads, pursues the policy of "deliberate ambiguity" on its nuclear program. Tel Aviv has rejected global demands to join the NPT and does not allow IAEA inspectors to observe its controversial nuclear program. The first such conference was organized by Iran in 2010 with the theme “Nuclear Energy for All, Nuclear Weapon for None.” Iran plans to hold the 3rd International Nuclear Disarmament Conference at a ministerial level where the country will once again promote its message that all nations are entitled to peaceful nuclear energy. http://www.presstv.com/detail/184506.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency Iran Successfully Tests Domestic Air Defense Missiles 13 June 2011 Iran has successfully tested on Sunday two domestically built air defense missiles, Xinhua said citing Iranian army commander. Mersad and Shahin missiles that were designed by Iran's Defense Ministry had already been submitted to the country's air defense system, the senior Iranian Army commander, General Farzad Esmaili told country's official TV. Esmaili said that Mersad air defense system was capable of hitting targets at the average and low altitude up to 150 km away. The general did not specify on Shahin characteristics. In February the commander of the Iran's Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, General Mohammad Ali Jafari said that Iran had started mass production of ballistic missile defense systems, armed with missiles with a speed three times more than the speed of sound. In mid-April Iran tested a new anti-aircraft missile, Said 2 in the central Iranian city of Arak. MOSCOW, June 13 (RIA Novosti) http://en.rian.ru/world/20110613/164590209.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Yonhap News Agency – South Korea

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June 13, 2011 U.S. Intercepted N. Korean Ship Suspected of Carrying Military Contraband: Official SEOUL, June 13 (Yonhap) -- The United States recently intercepted a North Korean ship suspected of carrying military-related contraband, causing the vessel to eventually sail back home, a U.S. official said Monday. The remarks by Gary Samore, special assistant to U.S. President Barack Obama, came after local media reported that the North Koreans turned back after apparently sensing their cargo would be inspected if they stopped at a foreign port. It was not clear where the ship was headed or what it was carrying, but the vessel returned home at the end of last month after drifting in international waters near Southeast Asia, the reports said. In an interview with Yonhap News Agency, Samore identified the cargo ship as "The Light," saying it may have been going to Myanmar carrying military-related contraband, such as small arms or missile-related items. "We talked directly to the North Koreans. We talked directly to all the Southeast Asian countries, including Myanmar, urging them to inspect the ship if it called into their port," he said, speaking on the sidelines of the Asan Plenum, a nuclear forum, at a Seoul hotel. "The U.S. Navy also contacted the North Korean ship as it was sailing to ask them where they were going and what cargo they were carrying." Samore is also the White House coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism. North Korea has been under multiple international and United Nations sanctions for its missile and nuclear tests. Under Resolution 1874, adopted by the U.N. Security Council in June 2009, the communist state has been subject to an overall arms embargo, as well as financial sanctions and interdiction of cargo on the high seas to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, missiles and other weapons of mass destruction. Another North Korean ship was forced to turn back in 2009 after being suspected of delivering missile components or other military-related supplies to Myanmar. "I think what this shows is that if the international community works together and pays attention, then we have a very good chance of preventing North Korea from exporting military-related commodities that are prohibited by (Resolution) 1874," Samore said. "And obviously, in Southeast Asia, which is a very peaceful part of the world, it would be a real problem if North Korea sells destabilizing technology to Myanmar. So, we're working directly with the Burmese government as well." Samore left open the possibility of North Korea staging a third nuclear weapons test, but warned the communist state it would face even more sanctions against its already crippled economy. "I have no doubt that if North Korea carries out another provocation -- missile or nuclear test -- we will go back to New York and we will get agreement from everybody, including China and Russia, for another sanction. I don't think that's in North Korea's interest." http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2011/06/13/54/0401000000AEN20110613005800315F.HTML (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Star – Malaysia Monday, June 13, 2011 N.Korea Likely Can Miniaturize Nuclear Device: Seoul

Issue No. 915, 14 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

SEOUL (Reuters) - North Korea has probably succeeded in miniaturizing a nuclear device, South Korea's defense minister said on Monday, an advance that would in theory allow the hermit state to place an atomic warhead on a rocket. Regional powers have for years tried -- with a mix of aid offers and punitive sanctions -- in vain to stop Pyongyang pressing ahead with a nuclear weapons program it argues is a necessary defense against a hostile United States and South Korea with which it still has no peace treaty to formally end the 1950-53 Korean War. Kim Kwan-jin offered no evidence to back his assertion but said the North had had enough time for such a development. "It has been quite a while, enough time for them to have succeeded in miniaturization," he told a parliamentary defense committee. If true, it would mark a key advance in the North's drive to develop a functioning nuclear weapon though that threat appears to be potential rather than actual. It detonated nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009 but neither was considered by weapons experts to have been successful, though they say the impoverished state has enough fissile material for up to 10 nuclear weapons. It is believed to be preparing a third test at a test site on its east coast. The North has also been working, so far with little success, to build a missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon across the Pacific, as far as the United States. Talks with major powers on its nuclear weapons program have been on ice for more than two years though the North has signaled it wants them to resume. However, both the United States and key allies South Korea and Japan have been reluctant to head back into negotiations which in the past have rewarded the North for little if anything in return. Reporting by Jack Kim; Editing by Ken Wills and Jonathan Thatcher. http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/6/13/worldupdates/2011-06- 13T154107Z_01_NOOTR_RTRMDNC_0_-576638-1&sec=Worldupdates (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Wall Street Journal June 14, 2011 North Korea Keeps Silent on Ship's Turnaround By EVAN RAMSTAD SEOUL—The turning back of a North Korean ship suspected of transporting missiles and parts, the highest-profile interdiction against Pyongyang in more than a year, shows that the cat-and-mouse game over its weapons program is still on—and that it remains unclear which side is winning. Under pressure from the U.S. and other countries, a North Korean vessel called the M/V Light turned around in the South China Sea two weeks ago and returned to the North last week, U.S. and South Korean officials said Monday. Among the countries that agreed to apply pressure was Myanmar, a previous destination for North Korean weapons, a senior U.S. official said. Some reports said the North Korean ship was bound for Myanmar, but the U.S. official, Gary Samore, special assistant to President Barack Obama on weapons of mass destruction, said its final destination wasn't clear.

Issue No. 915, 14 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

"It was headed for the Straits of Malacca, which would have required it to pass between Malaysia and Singapore," Mr. Samore said. "Since we had alerted the Singaporean and Malaysian authorities, there might have been concern [in Pyongyang] whether it could pass through the straits without action by either of those countries." The ship turned around, without the U.S. resorting to force, before reaching the straits. North Korea's state media haven't reported on the latest journey of the M/V Light, keeping with a silence it maintained over previous interceptions of its weapons-ferrying ships and planes. The incident is unlikely to change the fundamental standoff between North Korea and other nations over its nuclear-weapons program. The U.S., China and other countries have tried to lure North Korea back to the so-called six-party talks, in which Pyongyang has been encouraged to give up its nuclear pursuit in exchange for economic incentives and security guarantees. Mr. Samore said the multilateral cooperation is a signal to North Korea that other nations remain committed to enforcing the trade limitations set forth by the U.N. Security Council several weeks after Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon in 2009. "To the extent we can persuade North Korea to engage in negotiations over their nuclear program, we have to demonstrate to them that they're paying a penalty for refusing to engage, for violating the U.N. Security Council resolutions," Mr. Samore said. "Denying them revenue from weapons sales is one of the tools that we have available." Estimates about the size of North Korea's weapons exports are widely varied and imprecise, but the country has a long history of weapons sales to countries such as Iran, Syria and Myanmar. Since the 2009 sanctions, North Korean weapons shipments have been stopped several times at sea, but analysts believe air shipments have increased. At a nuclear-disarmament conference Monday in Seoul, participants said the development showed Pyongyang's authoritarian regime is still hoping to use its weapons program to boost its impoverished economy. "Today's news shows the challenge of trying to manage the flow of [nuclear] technology," Leonard Spector, deputy director of the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Washington, said at the conference. U.S. officials in late May began tracking the M/V Light, and a U.S. Navy destroyer intercepted it on May 26 and followed it down the Chinese coast for several days. Meanwhile, American diplomats won agreement from several southeast Asian nations to stop the ship if it attempted to make port. U.S. officials also discussed the M/V Light with North Korean officials several times via the North's U.N. delegation, a so-called back channel the two countries use because they don't maintain official diplomatic relations. "The North Koreans claimed the ship was going to Bangladesh with a cargo of industrial chemicals," Mr. Samore said. "We have no way to verify whether any of that was true. And we had good reason to be suspicious with this ship, which in the past has been involved in the export of weapons to [Myanmar] and other locations in the Middle East." The U.S. military intercepted a North Korean cargo ship suspected of carrying weapons in July 2009. That ship was bound for Myanmar and returned to North Korea after being shadowed by a U.S. military ship for several days. Around the same time, the United Arab Emirates detained a ship carrying conventional arms made in North Korea that were headed for the Middle East. India, South Africa and South Korea made similar searches or seizures of North Korean ships later that year. And in December 2009, Thailand grounded a cargo plane that was transporting missile parts from North Korea to the Middle East. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304665904576383153093450180.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

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The Telegraph – U.K. US Satellite Images Capture New Buildings at North Korea Nuclear Plant North Korea is feared to be accelerating its nuclear programme after US satellite images captured new buildings at the country’s Yongbyon nuclear facility. By Julian Ryall, Tokyo 14 June 2011 The discovery of the new buildings has sparked concern that they may be part of a drive by Pyongyang to fabricate fuel for nuclear reactors or to enrich uranium. Renovation of some of the buildings at the sprawling plant have also been identified in new satellite images released by the Institute for Science and International Security. The organisation, based in Washington, DC, identified a number of entirely new buildings, including some that were apparently only completed this spring. The release of the report coincides with a report to parliament by South Korea’s defence minister, Kim Kwan-Jin, that the North may have developed a nuclear warhead small enough to be loaded onto a ballistic missile and warning that the risk of another “surprise provocation” from Pyongyang is now rising. The South has claimed that its assessment of the nuclear capabilities of its belligerent neighbour is not based on specific intelligence, but its analysts will have been carefully watching developments at Yongbyon. Construction of the new facilities apparently started after Pyongyang expelled teams from the International Atomic Energy Agency in April 2009 that had been charged with disabling three plutonium production facilities at the site. North Korea later confirmed that it had begun construction of a gas centrifuge plant at the fuel fabrication facility, an enlarged site around 2 miles south of the 5-megawatt experimental reactor that first reached criticality as far back as August 1985. Reprocessed plutonium from the reactor is believed to have been used in nuclear tests North Korea carried out in 2006 and 2009. ISIS analysts have also confirmed that extensive work has been carried out at an earlier fuel fabrication plant, which has been enlarged and given a new roof. The location of additional new buildings close to the gas centrifuge facility also indicate they are being used for the fabrication of reactor fuel, for enriching uranium or its conversion into uranium hexaflouride, a compound used in the enrichment process to produce fuel for nuclear weapons. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8574955/US-satellite-images-capture-new- buildings-at-North-Korea-nuclear-plant.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Hindustan Times – India Air Chief PV Naik in Favour of Flexing Missile Power By Rahul Singh, Hindustan Times New Delhi, June 11, 2011 India must develop strategic missiles with intercontinental reach to deliver warheads more than 5,500 km away, the country's senior-most military commander has said, proposing a dramatic increase in the country's strike

Issue No. 915, 14 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 range. India plans to cap its strategic missile reach at 5,000 km, establishing a posture of deterrence against China and Pakistan. India's rising global stature demands developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), air force chief Air Chief Marshal PV Naik told HT in an exclusive interview. This is the first time that a serving military chief has argued for broadening India's strike capabilities beyond the immediate neighbourhood. Naik, who heads the chiefs of staff committee, said, "India should pursue an ICBM programme to acquire ranges of 10,000 km or even more. Breaking out of the regional context is important as the country's sphere of influence grows. We have no territorial designs on any country, but India needs the capability to match its sphere of influence." The air chief believes that an ICBM is within India's grasp: "There's no point capping the missile programme at 5,000 km. If we have the technical capability, we should build on it." ICBMs can hit targets up to 15,000 kilometre away. Ballistic missiles exit earth's atmosphere and re-enter to hit their targets. Currently, the 3,000-km range Agni-III is the only missile in the Indian arsenal that can strike targets inside China. The maiden test of the 5,000-km range Agni-V intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) is being planned by the end of this year. Five countries have deployed operational ICBMs with nuclear warheads - the US, Russia, China, France and the UK. China's 14,000-km range Dong Feng-31 ICBM can target virtually the entire world. A top Defence Research and Development Organisation scientist said India had the building blocks to develop ICBMs, "but where the warhead should go or what the range should be will have to be a political call." Development of an ICBM could cost India upwards of Rs 10,000 crore, about 6% of the country's defence budget. Ashley J Tellis, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said, "As of now, New Delhi has no strategic need for deploying ICBMs. But there's no legal regime that stops India from acquiring intercontinental reach." Apart from Agni-III, the 750-km short-range Agni-I and the 2,000-km medium-range Agni-II have been inducted into the armed forces. http://www.hindustantimes.com/rssfeed/NewDelhi/Air-chief-PV-Naik-in-favour-of-flexing-missile-power/Article1- 708062.aspx (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Times of India – India 'Not Pak Nukes, but Their Vulnerability a Worry' Tamil News Network (TNN) June 11, 2011 NEW DELHI: Pakistan might be rapidly bolstering its nuclear arsenal and missiles with China's help but India is not too worried about that since it's confident of its own deterrence capabilities. The real worry is the prospect of jihadis gaining access to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, enriched uranium or technological know-how to make "dirty bombs".

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"We know Pakistan is strengthening its nuclear arsenal. We are also taking care (of our arsenal). We are not unduly worried it because we are capable of meeting any threat," said defence minister A K Antony on Friday. "Our only worry about Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is that there is always the danger and threat of it going into the hands of militants and terrorists. That is our main worry," he added. Army chief General V K Singh has also held that India's "major concern" at present, rather than conventional conflicts or wars, was the ongoing "attempts" by "non-state actors" to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This comes in the backdrop of estimates by global nuclear watchdogs and reputed think-tanks, which hold that Pakistan has surged ahead of India in terms of nuclear warheads. On an average, Pakistan is said to have 80 to 100 nuclear warheads, compared to India's 70 to 90. Moreover, as earlier reported by TOI, Pakistan is fast supplementing its ongoing enriched uranium-based nuke programme with a weapons-grade plutonium one. The two new heavy-water reactors at Pakistan's Khushab nuclear facility are clearly meant to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in its latest report, holds India and Pakistan are fast stockpiling nuclear weapons, with both adding almost 20 to 30 warheads over the last one year. But then SIPRI went ahead to warn that Pakistan is in danger of "losing control of part of its nuclear arsenal" to terrorists. Fears around the world on this count have increased after last month's well-planned Taliban attack on the PNS Mehran naval airbase at Karachi, which could not have taken place without the help of "insiders". Infiltration of fundamentalists into the Pakistani armed forces, which have already undergone a high degree of Islamization at the lower ranks, makes the possibility of "diversion" of nuclear supplies to jihadi hands a clear and present danger. Asked about India's preparedness, Antony said, "Considering the present security scenario and the threat from terrorist outfits, our armed forces will have to be vigilant 24x7. That they are doing, especially after Osma bin Laden's killing. Our forces are closely monitoring everything." http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-worried-about-terrorists-gaining-access-to-Pak-nukes- Antony/articleshow/8808109.cms (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Hindu – India New Delhi, June 12, 2011 Abdul Kalam for Hypersonic Version of BrahMos Missile Press Trust of India (PTI) Former President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam on Sunday asked the BrahMos aerospace company to develop an advanced version of the cruise missile to maintain India’s leadership in this field. “You should develop a hypersonic version of BrahMos which can be reused...meaning that the missile should be able to deliver its payload and return to base. This will help in maintaining our leadership in this arena,” he said. The former President was addressing a function on the 10th anniversary of the launch of BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. India is the only country to have a supersonic cruise missile developed in a joint venture with Russia. Speaking on the occasion, BrahMos Aerospace chief A. Sivathanu Pillai said BrahMos is a unique missile which can be configured for multiple types of platforms on land, on sea and underwater against different types of targets on land and sea.

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“Its competitor is yet to be born. Its speed and devastating power has made it unparalleled,” he said. The missile system has already been inducted in the Army and the Navy and its orders for the next ten years from all the three services. Work is also underway to develop an air-launched and underwater version of the missile. The first launch was carried out a decade ago at the Interim Test Range at Chandipur-on-sea which coincided with Russia Formation Day which falls on June 12. The name BrahMos is a portmanteau formed from the names of two rivers, the Brahmaputra of India and the Moskva of Russia. The missile travels at speeds of Mach 2.8 to 3.0 and is about three-and-a-half times faster than the US’ subsonic Harpoon cruise missile. http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/article2098747.ece (Return to Articles and Documents List)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency Russian-Indian JV to Develop Brahmos-2 Hypersonic Missile 12 June 2011 The Russian-Indian joint venture Brahmos Aerospace will start developing a new Brahmos-2 hypersonic missile this year, Brahmos Aerospace Director Alexander Maksichev said on Sunday. "During the year, we are planning to start work on a hypersonic missile, Brahmos-2. This will be a completely new missile,' he said on the sidelines of a conference on the 10th anniversary of the first launch of the Brahmos missile. Maksichev said the JV intended to start the tests of airborne Brahmos missiles next year. "We expect to be able to start the tests of Brahmos missiles launched from aircraft. Various types of aircraft, including Su-30 MKI fighters, are expected to be armed with these missiles," he said. Established in 1998, BrahMos Aerospace Ltd manufactures supersonic cruise missiles based on the Russian- designed NPO Mashinostroyenie 3M55 Yakhont (SS-N-26). The BrahMos missile has a range of 290 km (180 miles) and can carry a conventional warhead of up to 300 kg (660 lbs). It can effectively engage targets from an altitude as low as 10 meters (30 feet) and has a top speed of Mach 2.8, which is about three times faster than the U.S.-made subsonic Tomahawk cruise missile. Sea- and ground-launched versions have been successfully tested and put into service with the Indian Army and Navy. NEW DELHI, June 12 (RIA Novosti) http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110612/164581169.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Pakistan Observer – Pakistan Sunday, June 12, 2011 China-Pakistan Strategic Ties Deepen By Brahma Chellaney After the daring US raid that killed Osama bin Laden in his hideout next to Pakistan’s premier military academy, Islamabad has openly played its China card to caution Washington against pushing it too hard. And China has been

Issue No. 915, 14 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 more than eager to show itself as Pakistan’s staunchest ally. China’s deepening strategic penetration of Pakistan — and the joint plans to set up new oil pipelines, railroads, and even a naval base on the Arabian Sea that will serve as the first overseas location offering support to the Chinese navy for out-of-area missions — are spurring greater U.S. and Indian concerns. For India, the implications of the growing strategic nexus are particularly stark because both China and Pakistan refuse to accept the territorial status quo and lay claim to large tracts of Indian land. An influx of up to 11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army into Pakistan’s Himalayan regions of Gilgit and Baltistan to supposedly work on new projects, including a railroad, an upgraded highway, dams and secret tunnels, has raised concerns that those strategic borderlands could come under the Chinese sway. The predominantly Shiite Gilgit and Baltistan are in Kashmir, where the borders of China, India and Pakistan converge. The PLA influx has resulted, according to India, in the presence of Chinese troops close to Pakistan’s line of control in Kashmir with India. This presents India with a two-front theater in the event of a war with either country. Despite the bin Laden affair, the United States is seeking to repair its relationship with — not discipline — Pakistan, the largest recipient of American aid. Yet Pakistan and China have made a public show of their close strategic bonds. Within days of bin Laden’s killing, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani travelled to Beijing. The accompanying defence minister, Ahmed Mukhtar, reported that whatever requests for assistance the Pakistani side made, the Chinese government was more than happy to oblige, including agreeing to take over operation of the strategically positioned but underused port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea upon expiry of an existing contract with a Singaporean government company. Beijing also decided to gift Pakistan 50 JF-17 fighter jets. More important, Mukhtar disclosed that Pakistan had asked China to begin building a naval base at Gwadar, where Beijing funded and built the port. “We would be ... grateful to the Chinese government if a naval base is ... constructed at the site of Gwadar for Pakistan,” he said in a statement. He later told a British newspaper in an interview: “We have asked our Chinese brothers to please build a naval base at Gwadar.” Mukhtar’s comments on the naval base embarrassed Beijing, which wants no publicity. China usually makes strategic moves by stealth. It launched work even on the Gwadar port quietly. So how can plans on a naval base be publicised? After Pakistan spilled the beans on the Gwadar naval base, China responded with equivocation, saying “this issue was not touched upon” during the visit. But the Chinese Communist Party’s hawkish Global Times was not shy about advertising China’s interest in setting up bases overseas. In an editorial titled, “China Needs Overseas Bases for Global Role,” the newspaper urged the outside world to “understand the need of China to set up overseas military bases.” Opened in 2007, the port at Gwadar — which overlooks Gulf shipping lanes and is near the Iran border — was intended from the beginning to represent China’s first strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea and to eventually double up as a Chinese-built naval base. It was widely seen as part of China’s efforts to assemble a “string of pearls” along the Indian Ocean rim. Yet until Mukhtar’s recent statements unmasked the larger plans, China and Pakistan continued to deny that Gwadar had any role other than commercial. Whereas Pakistan wants to help the Chinese navy counterbalance India’s naval forces, China’s aim is to have important naval presence in the Indian Ocean to underpin its larger geopolitical ambitions and get into great- power maritime game. It thus needs Gwadar to plug its main weakness — the absence of a naval anchor in the region. China’s plan also is to make Gwadar a major energy hub transporting Gulf and African oil by pipeline to the Chinese heartland via Pakistan-held Kashmir and Xinjiang. Such piped oil would not only cut freight costs and supply time but also lower China’s reliance on U.S.-policed shipping lanes through the Malacca and Taiwan Straits. Significantly, as China’s involvement in strategic projects in Pakistan has grown, it has started openly started needling India on Kashmir, one-fifth of which is under Chinese occupation. It has used the visa issue and other innovative ways to question India’s sovereignty over Indian-controlled Kashmir. It also has shortened the length of the Himalayan border it claims to share with India by purging the 1,597-km line separating Indian Kashmir from the Chinese-held Kashmir part.

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By deploying troops in Pakistani-held Kashmir near the line of control with India and playing the Kashmir card against India, China is clearly signalling that Kashmir is where the Sino-Pakistan nexus can squeeze India. The military pressure China has built up against India’s Arunachal Pradesh State — at the opposite end of the Himalayas — seems more like a diversion. In truth, the more Pakistan has slipped into a jihadist dungeon, the more China has increased its strategic footprint in that country. And 2011 has been proclaimed the year of China- Pakistan friendship. The writer, professor at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research, is the author of ‘Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan’ and ‘Water: Asia’s New Battlefield’. Courtesy: The Japan Times http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=97137 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Pakistan Today – Pakistan Tuesday, 14 June 2011 Pakistan Got Nuclear Weapons with Chinese Help: US Senator WASHINGTON - A top US Senator has said that Pakistan would have never acquired nuclear weapons without the assistance of China. "Pakistan wouldn't have acquired nuclear weapons if it hadn't have been for Chinese assistance," Senator Jim Webb, said at the Council on Foreign Relations, a Washington-based think tank. He said that China has a long-standing relationship with Pakistan. "When Chairman Kerry (John Kerry) left Pakistan recently, as soon as he left, the Prime Minister of Pakistan went to China and said China's our greatest friend," Webb said. The Senator said that the US and the international community should encourage China to take part in solutions in a way that is proportionate to the influence the country has accumulated with its growing economy and sophisticated military. Webb, however, alleged that China has not being doing that. http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/06/pakistan-got-nuclear-weapons-with-chinese-help-us-senator/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Kyiv Post – Ukraine High-Ranking Russian Military Official Does Not Believe in Iran Missile Threat June 11, 2011 Interfax-Ukraine Iranian missiles cannot pose a threat to Europe, said Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov. "Who is threatening Europe today? You mentioned Iran. Why should Iran launch a missile upon Berlin or Rome? Iran's policy, as far as how it is declared by the Iranian leadership, is development of relations with European countries. I cannot say that Iran is a threat," Antonov said on Echo Moskvy radio in commenting on outcomes of a recent NATO-Russia Council meeting in Brussels. What should be considered is not only this or that country's ability to create missile weapons but also its intentions and plans, while Iran does not intend to attack Europe, Antonov said.

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At the same time, the southern area could be viewed as potentially dangerous to Europe in the future, Antonov said. "This issue needs to be discussed and resolved. There are two ways to eliminate the threat, namely military- technical, through the creation of a missile shield, and diplomatic, which Russia proposes," he said. "What's the problem if a country or a group of countries decide to reinforce their defenses? This should not be detrimental to Russia's defense, so that we could spend money on increasing pensions rather than invest in the military-industrial sector. I believe it is a job of military diplomats and diplomats in general to show how pernicious the U.S.-proposed course is," he said. http://www.kyivpost.com/news/russia/detail/106549/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Kyiv Post – Ukraine Russia, NATO should Build Missile Shield against Short and Medium- Range Missiles, Not ICBMs June 11, 2011 Interfax-Ukraine Russia and NATO should jointly build a system in Europe against short- and medium-range missiles, said Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov. "If we say that there is a potential threat from the proliferation of short- and medium-range missiles, let's build a system responding to such threats," Antonov said on Echo Moskvy radio in commenting on outcomes of a recent NATO-Russia Council meeting in Brussels. Interceptor missiles integrated in such a missile defense system should not be able to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Antonov said. "Their velocity should be up to 3.5 kilometers per second, and it should not reach 5, 6, or 7 kilometers per second. It should not be able to overtake an ICBM if one is launched, God forbid," he said. Moreover, the number of such interceptor missiles should be limited, Antonov said. "There should be not a thousand but 100, 200, or 300 of them, so that they cannot intercept all ICBMs," he said. In addition, Antonov insisted that missile defense bases should be located in the southern rather than the northwestern part of Europe, since, according to the U.S.' and NATO's claims, the potential missile threat emanates from the south. "If the threat is from the south, why are they huddling up to Russia's northwestern borders, where our missile bases are stationed?" he said. http://www.kyivpost.com/news/russia/detail/106548/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

National Journal Defense Secretary Nominee Backs Prompt Global Strike Effort By Diane Barnes June 10, 2011 The development of a capability to deliver conventional warheads to any point on Earth within minutes "would be a valuable option for the president to have at his disposal," CIA Director Leon Panetta told lawmakers ahead of a hearing on his nomination to succeed Robert Gates as Defense secretary. Panetta's statements suggest that the Pentagon under his leadership would continue with the controversial program.

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A "conventional prompt global strike" capability would enable the United States "to strike time-sensitive targets, so that distant, hard-to-reach places will no longer provide sanctuary to adversaries," Panetta said in written testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee. "It is my understanding that the only current prompt global strike capability in the U.S. inventory is a nuclear- armed ballistic missile," he said. The United States might consider employing such a system against "regional adversaries considering an attack using weapons of mass destruction," "high-priority" nonstate entities, or "situations where a fleeting, serious threat was located in a region not readily accessible by other means," Panetta said. The CIA chief declined to express a preference for any of the technologies now being studied for carrying out a rapid nonnuclear strike. One such system would involve use of a hypersonic drone aircraft designed to travel at speeds of up to 4,000 mph. "I understand that [the Defense Department] is developing and testing technologies relevant to both land-based and sea-based CPGS [conventional prompt global strike]," Panetta said in his written testimony. "It would be premature to make any decisions regarding a future deployed system until the results of these tests are in-hand. The White House informed Congress earlier this year that the Defense Department "at present has no plans to develop or field" ICBMs or submarine-launched ballistic missiles that would be tipped with conventional warheads and delivered "with traditional ballistic trajectories," Arms Control Today reported in April. Earlier discussion of such a scheme had prompted concerns that other nuclear powers would be unable to distinguish such a weapon from a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, potentially leading to catastrophe. Effective use of such a weapon system "would depend on the availability of timely and accurate intelligence on the nature, location, and disposition of a potential target," Panetta stated. "If confirmed, I will consider what specific improvements in intelligence capabilities may be needed to enable effective use of CPGS systems for various types of targets." Separately, Panetta did not rule out recommending that new underground nuclear test detonations be conducted if he could not "certify the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable." His "recommendation ... would depend critically on the root causes of problems in the stockpile," Panetta said. The CIA director endorsed expansion of the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative to regions outside the former Soviet Union, and backed the program's broad goals of countering threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and related materials (see GSN, April 14). Speaking before the Senate panel on Thursday, Panetta reaffirmed Obama administration stances in, among other things, U.S. nuclear weapons modernization and the atomic threats posed by Iran and North Korea. Asked by Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., whether the failure to oust Libyan dictator Muammar el-Qaddafi from power would signal that Iran has no need "to fear America when it comes to developing nuclear weapons," Panetta appeared to agree. "I think it tells them that our word isn't worth very much if we're not willing to stick to it," he said. President Obama has demanded that Qaddafi step down. Gates is slated to exit the Pentagon's top post on June 30. Panetta is expected to be confirmed by the Senate and to take his new job on July 1. http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/defense-secretary-nominee-backs-prompt-global-strike-effort- 20110610http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/defense-secretary-nominee-backs-prompt-global- strike-effort-20110610 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

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Globe and Mail – Canada Terrorist Leader Killed in Somalia Carried Plans for Bombing the West GEOFFREY YORK, JOHANNESBURG June 12, 2011 Suspected al-Qaeda terrorist leader Fazul Abdullah Mohammed was carrying “very specific” plans for bombings in Western countries when he was killed by Somali soldiers near Mogadishu, a Somali intelligence official says. Mr. Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the 1998 bombings that killed 224 people at two U.S. embassies in East Africa, was shot dead when his vehicle apparently blundered into a military checkpoint by mistake. He was believed to be the senior al-Qaeda commander in East Africa, and for more than a decade he was Africa’s most wanted fugitive, with a $5-million bounty on his head. He was a bomb-making specialist who was suspected of involvement in a series of recent bombings, including the explosions in Uganda last July that killed 79 people who were watching the World Cup final on television. After he and another suspected militant were shot dead in an exchange of gunfire at midnight at an army checkpoint near Mogadishu last Tuesday night, he was originally identified as a Somali-Canadian who fought for the militant al-Shabab group under the nom-de-guerre “Abdurrahman Canadian.” Somali sources are now uncertain why he was linked to Canada, but they say he was carrying a South African passport, not a Canadian passport. After the shootout, Somali soldiers discovered that his SUV contained a cache of weapons, mobile phones, video cameras, laptop computers, photos, about $40,000 in cash, and Qaeda-linked documents in English and Arabic. “By the next morning, it was clear that he was a very, very important person,” said the Somali government intelligence official, speaking on condition of anonymity. Mr. Mohammed’s fingerprints and DNA were sent to Nairobi, where his identity was eventually confirmed. “This is going to be huge,” the Somali intelligence official said. “The documents we got from him are about plans not only in Somalia but throughout the world. I think we’ve saved a lot of lives.” The bombing plans in Mr. Mohammed’s possession were “very specific” and included targets in the West, the official said. “We will share these with all the relevant agencies.” Mr. Mohammed was a master of disguise and forgery who reputedly spoke five languages and used 18 different names, along with three different dates of birth on his multiple passports. Born in the Comoros Islands off the eastern coast of Africa in the early 1970s, he reportedly trained at al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At a young age, he is said to have participated in the “Black Hawk Down” battle in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed in Mogadishu in October, 1993. He was allegedly the chief planner of the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. And he was a key organizer of the bombing of a Kenyan beach resort in 2002, which killed 16 people, along with an attempted missile attack on an Israeli passenger jet at the same time. He was reportedly appointed by Osama bin Laden as the head of al-Qaeda operations in East Africa. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the death of Mr. Mohammed was “a just end” and “a significant blow to al-Qaeda, its extremist allies, and its operations in East Africa.” As she placed flowers at a memorial to the embassy victims in Dar es Salaam on Sunday, she noted the recent deaths of Mr. bin Laden and Mr. Mohammed. “I know justice was served and I hope that that gives you some measure of comfort,” she told those at the memorial service. A senior U.S. intelligence official, quoted by the Long War Journal, described Mr. Mohammed as one of al-Qaeda’s “most dangerous and most capable leaders.” The official added: “He has been at the top of our list for some time.”

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A spokesman for al-Shabab confirmed that Mr. Mohammed was one of the men killed in the checkpoint shootout last week, according to Agence France-Presse. Somali officials say Mr. Mohammed was carrying a South African passport under the name “Daniel Robinson.” The passport was issued on April 13, 2009, and it contained visa stamps indicating that he had been in South Africa as recently as March of this year, the officials said. The South African government has been widely criticized for corruption that allows criminals to easily obtain fraudulent South African passports. One source said a fake South African passport can be obtained in three days with $1,000 in bribes. With a report from Colin Freeze in Toronto. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/africa-mideast/terrorist-leader-killed-in-somalia-carried-plans-for- bombing-the-west/article2057763/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

FRONTLINE – India Volume 28 - Issue 13 June 18 – July 01, 2011 India’s National Magazine TERRORISM Under Siege The radicalisation of Pakistani society and institutions is more worrying than the terror attacks. By ANITA JOSHUA in Islamabad SUCH is the nature of the brand of terrorism that the United States and Pakistan together begot in the 1980s that several days after Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI) commander Ilyas Kashmiri was reportedly killed in a drone attack in South Waziristan, neither country could confirm the death. All that the world has by way of confirmation is a statement purportedly faxed by HUJI to Pakistani media offices, but questions remain, given the manner in which Kashmiri earlier resurfaced after being declared dead. Adding to the confusion, HUJI released a photograph which it claimed to be that of Kashmiri's face after he was killed. The image was posted on Shamukh al Islam, a website frequented by Al Qaeda sympathisers. It turned out to be that of Abu Dera Ismail Khan, a Lashkar-e-Taiba operative who was part of the suicide squad that attacked Mumbai in November 2008. This, according to the analyst Amir Mir, has put a question mark on the credibility of the HUJI statement. So the guessing game goes on in a narrative that is now clearly being determined by the terrorists. On April 22, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) Ashfaq Parvez Kayani reportedly said that the armed forces had broken the militants' back. He was addressing cadets at the Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul, within hearing distance of the compound where Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had been hiding. Since that speech, nearly 200 lives have been lost across the country in terrorist attacks. The attack on the Frontier Constabulary camp in Charsadda alone killed 90 people in a matter of seconds. In May, the terrorists not only told General Kayani that their back was far from broken but also showed him how vulnerable the armed services had become. Six men breached the high-security naval airbase, PNS Mehran, in Karachi and held out against the elite forces of the armed services for well over 12 hours. Two of them even managed to escape despite the heavy presence of security personnel in and around the facility. That one attack exposed Pakistan's armed services even more than the U.S. raid on the compound in Abbottabad on May 2. If the May 2 action showed up the chinks in the resource-guzzling armour of the Pakistan Army and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) , the May 22-23 siege of PNS Mehran completed that dismal picture by showing up the

Issue No. 915, 14 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 weaknesses within the Navy. And, through it all, the failure of the intelligence agencies, particularly the much- feared “mother-of-all” Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). At least in the case of the U.S. raid deep inside the country's territory, the Pakistani security establishment had the excuse that it was dealing with far superior technology as the stealth helicopters used in the Abbottabad operation were something probably no other country could have detected. While questions still remain on the entire operation, the harsh reality is that shooting down U.S. choppers in a non-war zone is not an easy option for any country to exercise. But none of this holds true for what happened in PNS Mehran. How could six terrorists survive the might of Pakistan's “pampered” armed forces for over 12 hours? PNS Mehran was a naval base, housing some of the Navy's most prized possessions, including the India-specific PC-3 Orion aircraft. The intruders were hugely outnumbered by the men in uniform. Yet, it took the elite forces of the armed services 17 hours to declare the base sanitised. While only four of the terrorists were killed, 14 security personnel lost their lives in the gun battle. Of course, the security personnel were hemmed in by the need to ensure minimum damage to the naval assets in the exchange of fire, while the heavily armed attackers were not similarly burdened and could fire and lob grenades indiscriminately. But that brings up the question how they could actually enter the base with rocket launchers and light machine guns. They almost certainly had inside help: the official version itself said that the terrorists, after scaling a rear wall to enter the base, exploited a blind spot between two security cameras to move to the area where one of the two PC-3 Orion aircraft was parked. That they, apart from gaining knowledge of this blind spot, managed to get in so much firepower, moved with all the heavy weaponry for a kilometre and half undetected in a naval base, and announced their presence by exploding the $35 million U.S.-built Orion also suggest inside help. Subsequent events, relating to the mysterious disappearance and murder of the journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad two days after he wrote an article about the presence of Al Qaeda elements in the naval ranks – and in PNS Mehran in particular – suggest the extent of the radicalisation of the armed forces. More than the attacks – which are just an outward manifestation of a deep-rooted malaise – it is this radicalisation of every institution of the Pakistani state and society that should shake the establishment out of the mindset that has wreaked so much damage on Pakistan. It is almost like shooting oneself in the foot knowingly and repeatedly. While the symptoms of the malady have been evident in society for long now – with doomsday prophecies of Pakistan going the Afghanistan way and Al Qaeda being “Pakistanised” – the spread of the disease into the armed forces has not been spoken about much, primarily because they have always kept themselves out of public scrutiny. One of the earliest recorded instances of religious right-wing elements coming in battle fatigues dates back to the 1995 “Operation Khilafat” – an attempted coup to topple the Benazir Bhutto government and take over the General Headquarters during a Corps Commanders' Conference. Not much detail is available on this in the public domain, but scattered references show that the plan was led by an officer of the rank of major general and included brigadiers, colonels and lieutenant colonels. Also, the plot was linked to HUJI. More recently, PAF personnel were reportedly involved in an assassination attempt on former President Pervez Musharraf. In fact, explosives used in the attempt had been stolen from a PAF depot. Though the armed services never spoke about it publicly, radicalisation of the rank and file had become a worry for the military leadership, going by what Gen. Kayani is reported to have told Western diplomats in the wake of the assassination of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer by a member of the elite force of the Punjab Police earlier this year. Writing in The New York Review of Books blog, Ahmed Rashid, the author of Descent into Chaos, quoted Gen. Kayani as stating that he did not publicly condole with Taseer's family because there were too many soldiers in the ranks who sympathised with the killer. According to Rashid, the COAS hinted that any public statement could endanger the army's unity.

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The natural fallout of all this is apprehension about Pakistan's nuclear installations. Time and again, over the past month, Pakistan's political and military establishment has said that the nuclear programme is secure and has an exclusive security net. That offers little comfort as the personnel – however much screened – are picked from a society that has been radicalised systematically. If it can be of any consolation, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has issued a statement that it will not attack any nuclear installation because Pakistan is the only Muslim nuclear weapons state. On one side of the nuclear discourse in Pakistan, Shireen Mazari of the Strategic Technology Resources insists that non-state actors cannot access and take over Pakistan's nuclear weapons or destroy them because the nature of these weapons makes them cumbersome for terrorists – who are always on the move – to carry around. And, the academic Pervez Hoodbhoy, who believes that Pakistan is using its nuclear programme as an ultimate weapon of blackmail, contends that even the U.S. will not contemplate swooping down on the country to take out its nuclear assets because of the risk of a full-scale war with a nuclear power. Terrorists are thus provided a security net in the country. While the spectre of nuclear terrorism or even an accident triggered by terrorists remains a constant concern, the bigger danger facing Pakistan is the radicalisation that has been whipped up over the decades to maintain the one- point agenda of projecting the country as being in perpetual danger from its mortal enemy – India, which has been made synonymous with Hindus. This curriculum of hatred – introduced from the school level and perpetuated systematically through the propaganda machinery – provided a fertile ground for the Takfiri school of thought imported to this land of Sufi Islam by the likes of bin Laden, thereby further fuelling sectarianism. and rendering even Sunni Muslims insecure. With 35,000 Pakistanis already killed in terror attacks, terrorism has consumed more people in Pakistan than all the wars with India put together. Yet, India is Enemy No. 1. This was apparently stated by ISI Director General Shuja Pasha on May 13 during the in-camera briefing of the security establishment to the joint session of Parliament on the Abbottabad operation. The PNS Mehran attack 10 days later has not forced a course correction, and if anything, Shahzad's murder – allegedly by intelligence agencies – has been viewed largely as a signal that it will be business as usual in Pakistan. So, the armed forces walked away with a sizable portion of the Budget for the next fiscal, and it remains to be seen whether former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's call to put the defence budget under parliamentary scanner is met. This is one guess everyone is willing to hazard. Though the events of May offered the civilian set-up enough opportunities to hold the military and intelligence agencies accountable and take the lead in defining national security issues, the harsh reality is that, the return to democracy notwithstanding, it is the security establishment that calls the shots in Pakistan and the elected representatives remain within the Lakshman Rekha that has been drawn for them. http://www.frontline.in/stories/20110701281304100.htm (Return to Articles and Documents List)

South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) OPINION/Analysis June 10, 2011 Eruptions in China’s PLA? By Bhaskar Roy The Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece, the People’s Daily (June 09) carried a revealing article on the SECOND ARTILLARY FORCE (SAF), China’s strategic missile force which also controls the country’s nuclear weapons, stressing it “should promote loyalty and obedience in their ranks towards the Communist Party of China”. What

Issue No. 915, 14 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 is equally significant if not more, this short article was authored jointly by the Commander of SAF Gen. Jing Zhiyuan and Political Commissar of the SAF Gen. Zhang Haiyang. The two Generals who each are in charge of the military aspect and “political” aspects respectively, emphasized “Against the background of profound changes in the society and the increasingly complicated struggles in the ideological areas, continuous efforts should be made to resist the tendency of “Westernization” in the military forces as well as the idea of separating the military forces from the leadership of the CPC”. In military context in China, “Westernization” means an armed force which is bereft of ideological moorings, independent of political parties and the Commander-in-Chief is the Head of State. In China’s case, it would the President. China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping had tried to rear a professional People’s Liberation Army (PLA). He had almost stopped political education in the PLA and initiated the move to divest the PLA of its commercial ventures – hotels, discotheques, civilian goods manufacturing and even some military business. A veteran of the Long March and himself a political commissar, he concluded that political indoctrination was necessary at that time to motivate the largely peasant soldiers. When he came to power in 1978 he began to realize that the PLA had put professionalism on the second priority list and was more interested in business which benefitted mainly the officer class. Deng also dismantled what he called “mountain war-lordism” – top commanders spent their entire careers in one Military Region and used the forces under them as their own army. It is not known whether Deng Xiaoping would have liked to put the PLA under the government. But he would have realized that the Party was supreme and well above the government. But despite initial opposition from the PLA in the late 1980s, he succeeded in establishing the Party General Secretary and the President, a civilian, at the top of the military as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). If not the government, civilian control of the PLA with the Party Chief in Command. It was, therefore, left to Party the Chief to command the PLA and the extent of his control would depend on how politically strong he was. Neither of Deng’s appointees, Party General Secretaries Jiang Zemin and his successor Hu Jintao have demonstrated their unquestionable control of the PLA. Both had to compromise to execute their power, and the PLA grew in strength. As an aside, it would be interesting to note that when Defence Minister Gen. Liang Guanglie attended the Shangri- la Security dialogue in Singapore in May, he introduced himself as Vice Chairman of the CMC and State Councilor, not Defence Minister. It was because the defence ministry is known as a facade for protocol duties only and has no teeth of its own. In March this year, Gen. Liang Guanglie stated that the PLA was not under the government, but under the Party. He made it abundantly clear that the PLA was independent of the Chinese government. In the last two years, especially in 2010, signs were that the PLA, while remaining under the agreed frame work of “the Party commands the gun”, was pushing for a major say in both internal security issues, and external security and territorial claims. Following the 2008 global economic meltdown, very surprisingly the Chinese hierarchy miscalculated that USA was a declining power and China was a rising power which could dictate Washington. The PLA, emboldened by its rising power, decided to challenge the region including the return of the US in the Asia- Pacific region under the guidance US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The PLA’s surge was another example of its surge for autonomy. The SAF commentary is far reaching. In the one hand, it suggests that there is a rising consensus among SAF officers for autonomy from political decisions. At the same time, the party fears that the free world structure of the armed forces totally isolated from the political parties that run the government of the day is a threat to the CCP. In the US, whether it is the Democrats or the Republicans that is in power does not affect the military, though the US Congress has a say in budget allocations and policy. Even then, the executive president holds the veto power irrespective what its party’s position may be in the Congress. Decisions are taken in consultation with the Department of Defence (Pentagon), the CIA and the State Department.

Issue No. 915, 14 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

In India, it is even clearer. Political parties including the Party in power have little or nothing to do directly with the armed forces. For China, the situation would be much worse if the PLA were to take independent decisions on both internal and external security challenges. The SAF, as a free radical since the government is irrelevant in the military context, could portend a dangerous challenge not only to the Chinese authorities but to the neighbourhood. In this context, it would be prudent to remember that China’s “no first (nuclear) use” doctrine has become more opaque in recent years. It must also be taken into account that the more the Chinese leadership and official media emphasize the Party’s control over the PLA, the greater is the problem. This emphasis has sharply increased in recent months. The author is an eminent China analyst with many years of experience. http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers46/paper4538.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Wall Street Journal OPINION/Review & Outlook June 11, 2011 Iran Nuclear Progress Report Tehran gets closer to having a bomb. World wags finger. For six months, global attention has fixed on the historic upheavals roiling the Arab world from Tunisia to Bahrain. But the biggest Middle Eastern story continues to be the steady progress Tehran has made toward acquiring the components of a deliverable nuclear weapon. The most recent news is disquieting, to say the least. On Thursday, the International Atomic Energy Agency "de-restricted" its most recent report on Iran's nuclear progress. Despite hopes that the 2009 Stuxnet computer virus had slowed or even crippled Tehran's efforts, the IAEA reports that in the last six months Tehran had enriched some 970 kilos of uranium to reactor-grade levels, or LEU, bringing its total stockpile of LEU to 4,105 kilos. Iran has also enriched 56.7 kilos of uranium to a 20% level, ostensibly to produce medical isotopes but bringing it measurably closer to the 90% level needed for a bomb. Iran also announced this week that it will begin installing a more efficient type of centrifuge to enrich uranium at its once-secret facility near the city of Qom. The IAEA devoted considerable space to what it calls the "possible military dimensions" of Iran's nuclear program, noting that "there are indications that certain [undisclosed nuclear related activities] may have continued beyond 2004." This further discredits the flawed and politicized 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate that suggested Iran had halted its nuclear weaponization efforts after 2003. The authors of that estimate, which undermined Western efforts to stop Iran, have a lot to answer for. Iran's suspected activities, says the IAEA, include "producing uranium metal . . . into components relevant to a nuclear device"; "multipoint explosive initiation and hemispherical detonation studies"; and "missile re-entry vehicle redesign activities for a new payload assessed as being nuclear in nature." Perhaps there's an innocent explanation for all this, like Iran wanting to achieve technological independence in the manufacture of a new generation of refrigerators. And there will always be credulous Western reporters who will take Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's word that Iran's intentions are peaceful. We wonder what those reporters think of an article that appeared in April on the website of the regime's Revolutionary Guards Corps and talks openly about the prospect of an Iranian nuclear test—a break from the usual Iranian policy of denying any interest in a bomb. "The day after [the] Islamic Republic of Iran's first nuclear test will be an ordinary day for us Iranians but in the eyes of some of us there will be a new sparkle," reads the article. The author goes on to imagine that "the strength

Issue No. 915, 14 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 of the explosion was not so great as to cause severe damage to the region nor so weak that Iranian scientists face any problems running their test." The day of that test may not be far off. In an analysis this month for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Rand scholar Gregory S. Jones writes that even in the absence of a clandestine nuclear program, "Iran can now produce a weapon's worth (20 kilograms) of HEU [weapons-grade uranium] any time it wishes. With Iran's current number of operating centrifuges, the batch recycling process would take about two months." Rand later issued a press release saying that Mr. Jones's analysis was not an official Rand study, which suggests to us how reluctant members of America's foreign policy elite are to hear the truth about Iran's ambitions. If we admit the danger, then we might have to do something about it before Iran becomes a nuclear power. The Obama Administration has begun to take the nuclear threat from Iran more seriously after squandering a year in the fruitless pursuit of a negotiated settlement. The Administration also seems to have gotten wise to Iran's efforts to shape this Arab Spring to its own purposes, not least by backing the Assad regime in its repression of Syrians and providing support to radicals in Lebanon, Gaza and elsewhere. Yet so far, neither American nor U.N. sanctions have been much of a brake on the mullahs' nuclear pursuits. If President Obama is serious when he says a nuclear Iran is "unacceptable," he'll need to do more than arrange another round of sanctions and wag a stern finger at a regime that's grown emboldened by the perception of American weakness. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304392704576375951769762740.html/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

International Relations and Security Network (ISN) Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich OPINION/Commentary A Historic Opportunity for Missile Defense 14 June 2011 NATO and Russia continue to disagree about binding constraints on ballistic missile defense in Europe. One way out of this stalemate could be for Russia and NATO to conclude a new Founding Act on missile defense cooperation that would contain mutual pledges of non-targeting, but will not require ratification. By Simon Saradzhyan for ISN Insights Contrary to the initial optimism in Moscow, Brussels and Washington surrounding the NATO-Russia summit last November, the thorny issue of ballistic missile defense in Europe will not be resolved anytime soon. The 9 June meeting of the NATO-Russia Council failed to bridge the gaps between Moscow on one side and Washington and Brussels on the other. Moreover, as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has said directly, the issue may remain unresolved until around 2020, when, according to warnings from the Kremlin, either the sides will reach a deal or a new arms race will begin as the US starts to field land-based interceptors capable of chasing Russian ICBMs. Medvedev and US President Barack Obama have repeatedly discussed the issue since the US leader unveiled his European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) in 2009, but have so far failed to agree. Their 25 May meeting did not produce a breakthrough either. Although the White House released a statement after that meeting indicating that the Joint U.S.-Russia Report on Assessment of 21st Century Missile Challenges , which Obama and Medvedev ordered in 2009, was "finished", but that statement contained no details of the arrangements. Neither do we know what has happened to the proposed 'Joint Analysis of the Future Framework for Missile Defense Cooperation' that the 9 June meeting of the NATO-Russia Council was to assess. The lack of progress in negotiations is rooted in the different assessments made by Russia, the US and its European allies of the missile threats they face - and in the different interests they seek to advance through missile

Issue No. 915, 14 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 cooperation. Russia sees no urgent need to construct a pan-European ballistic-missile defense system, arguing that the continent currently faces no credible ballistic-missile threats - an assessment obviously at odds with Washington's assertions that Iran represents such a threat. Moscow is also concerned that the planned defense systems are too open-ended and may eventually come to undermine the second-strike capability of its strategic nuclear arsenal. Russian generals and diplomats have repeatedly asserted that SM-3 Block IIA and SM-3 Block IIB interceptors - that are to be deployed in Phases III and IV of EPAA in 2018 and 2020 respectively - would be fast enough to chase Russian ICBMs. It thus comes as no surprise that Moscow has been trying to steer the dialogue on cooperation to include binding constraints on the capabilities of EPAA and NATO's Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBM), even as the alliance has offered oral assurances of non-targeting. For its part, Washington knows perfectly well that it can build a missile defense shield against Iran without Russia, and Obama has already promised US legislators that he will not accept any binding constraints on his EPAA plan. However, both Washington and Brussels continue to pursue Russian engagement (especially in the dialogue on missile defense cooperation) to prevent Moscow from taking disruptive steps in this area. At the same time Washington and Brussels want NATO's missile defense system to remain separate from Russia's, while Moscow has advocated a joint 'sectoral' configuration with what is essentially a dual launch key. A way forward To dissolve this impasse, the NATO-Russian assessment of missile threats must first be completed. If the final product has any basis in reality, this assessment will conclude that Iran's program will be able to produce missiles capable of reaching targets not only in Europe but in the US and much of Russia in the foreseeable future. In fact, one thorough and authoritative joint assessment of missile threats put together by a group of US and Russian experts predicted in 2009 that Iran might be able to master independently the "critical technologies" for advanced mobile or silo-based IRBMs and ICBMs within 15 years. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, which the US believes it can in one- to- three years if it so decides, this threat will be magnified exponentially. In fact, Iran's existing IRBM program makes "military-strategic sense" only if these missiles are outfitted with warheads carrying weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear weapons, according to former-Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Andrei Kokoshin. While the doomsday scenario of Iranian ballistic missiles hitting western targets may be far-fetched, assuming the regime has a modicum of self-interest, it should not be forgotten that an Iran armed with long-range ballistic missiles would be far more assertive in challenging not only the West but also Russia, given Iran's historical interest in the Caspian region, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. And what if those missiles are tipped with nuclear warheads? Russia - which has no assets capable of intercepting ballistic missiles either in boost stage or mid-course - should keep these possibilities in mind when deciding, with NATO, whether Iran should be listed as a common missile threat. Once the threat assessment has been completed, Russia and NATO should then work together to build cooperative missile defenses against the identified threats. To do so, Russia and NATO could conclude a new Founding Act on Missile Defense Cooperation. Paraphrasing language from the 1997 Founding Act on NATO-Russian relations, this new document would declare that signatories "have no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy missile defense assets in Europe in such a way that they would target or intercept strategic delivery vehicles of each other. Such an act would allow signatories to elaborate on what their pledges of non-targeting would actually mean in practice; the US, for example, could commit to limit or refrain completely from deploying SM-3 Block II interceptors in areas (such as the Barents Sea) where they can shoot down Russian ICBMs. It is worth recalling that the 1997 Founding Act stated that NATO member states have "no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members." Although the US and its allies debated with Russia on whether that act was legally binding or required ratification, Washington kept its promise not to deploy nuclear weapons in new member states. A similar agreement on missile defense cooperation, that would entail a promise not to target Russian nuclear forces, would be more likely to reduce Russia's concerns than oral assurances. At the same time,

Issue No. 915, 14 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 such an act would also preempt attempts by parliamentary opponents in the West to derail cooperation since it would not require ratification. The general guidelines for the actual configuration of the systems in the new Founding Act could designate Russia and the NATO countries as separate defensive sectors, as Moscow wishes, but should not prevent the US and NATO from deploying assets against missile threats originating, for example, in countries south of Russia such as Iran, as long as those assets are not deployed in significant quantities in the lands and seas of northeastern Europe. The act should promote the continuous sharing of information from early warning systems, in order to enhance the mid-course interception capabilities of the cooperative missile systems. Russia can contribute its early warning capabilities, including the radar facilities at Armavir and the Gabala facility, which Moscow leases from Azerbaijan. The act should also introduce exchange liaison officers who would shuttle regularly between the command and control centers of the respective missile defense systems. It is hoped that by the time the Missile Defense Cooperation Act is signed, Russian designers will have completed the development of anti- ballistic missile systems equivalent to the US AEGIS Combat System, and can contribute those assets to the project. Opportunities on both sides For its part, Russia should avoid imposing artificial barriers in the cooperation act. Even if the yet-to-be-developed SM-3 Block IIBs are in fact deployed in Phase IV of the EPAA (i.e., circa 2020), a few dozen of them would not undermine the capability of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal, which has some 1,500 warheads on more than 500 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, according to the New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms. Moreover, the Commander of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, Lt General Sergei Karakayev, has said - and there is reason to believe - that Russia's single-warhead Topol-M and multi-warhead RS-24 ICBMs are "invulnerable" to all existing missile defenses and any that will be developed in the next 15-20 years. And according to Russia's lead designer of ballistic missiles, Yuri Solomonov, US missile defense in Europe is not a threat to Russia's strategic nuclear forces. While a missile defense cooperation act with NATO would be perceived as a victory by domestic audiences, the Russian leadership would know that the assurances in the act are not legally binding. But the Kremlin would also know also that NATO has so-far kept its promise not to deploy nuclear weapons in new member states, as per the 1997 NATO-Russia Act, which was not binding either. More importantly, Russian leaders would understand, perhaps all too well, that not cooperating would mean less opportunity in the future to influence US decisions on missile defense in Europe, less access to the technological and operational capabilities of US and NATO forces and thus less ability to anticipate and respond to them. The Kremlin would also know that it would have time to prepare an adequate response should the US or NATO decide to expand the system to target Russian ICBM's flying along the North Pole trajectories toward North America. There are well-grounded reservations in both the US and Russia about the effectiveness of missile defenses, but a US-NATO missile defense built without Russian cooperation may indeed convince Russian leaders to respond with a build-up of the offensive potential. It would also increase what theorists of strategic stability call "crisis instability" - a situation in which one side may be prompted to launch a preemptive first strike for fear that a delayed launch would cripple its capacity to cause unacceptable damage to the foe, which may strike first and then employ robust missile defenses to shoot down as many as possible of any surviving missiles launched in retaliation. If, however, Washington and Brussels agree with Moscow on cooperative missile defenses, such an agreement would pave the way for a substantive, sustainable defense and security partnership of the signatories against common security threats, which include not only emerging missile threats, but also the proliferation of WMD, nuclear terrorism and the failure of states. Simon Saradzhyan is Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. This commentary is based in part on the chapter on missile defense from the author's paper, "Breaking the Stalemate of Collective Insecurity in Europe," published by the Belfer Center in June 2011.

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Issue No. 915, 14 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530