Issue No. 912, 3 June 2011 Articles & Other Documents: Featured Article: Why We Should Study Developing Nuclear Earth Penetrators – and Why They Are Actually Stabilizing

1. ‘Nuclear Powers Want to Keep their Deadly Toys’ 2. Saudi Arabia Plans to Build 16 Nuclear Reactors by 2030 3. Iran Sanctions Should Be Eased to Foster Nuclear Cooperation, Russia Says 4. Asian Arms Race 'Has Potential for Calamity' 5. N. Korea Commands 3,000-Strong Cyber Warfare Unit: Defector 6. Leading Physicist Calls China's Nuclear Programme 'Rash and Unsafe' 7. China PLA Officers Call Internet Key Battleground 8. How Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons could Be Jeopardised 9. US Plans to Seize Nuke Stockpile if Terrorists Take over Pak 10. Slain Pakistan's Journalist's Mumbai Attack Theories from Beyond the Grave 11. “US should Freeze Deployment of Anti-Missile Systems in European Countries” 12. Russian Defense Ministry to Resume Bulava Trials from Mid-June. 13. MI6 Attacks al-Qaeda in 'Operation Cupcake' 14. Pentagon Details Plan for New Nuclear Bomber 15. US: Russia Cutting Nuclear Arsenal Faster than Required 16. Why We Should Study Developing Nuclear Earth Penetrators – and Why They Are Actually Stabilizing 17. EDITORIAL: Wishing Away Iranian Nukes 18. The Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation 19. Terrorism and Pak Nuclear Assets

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at http://cpc.au.af.mil/ for in-depth information and specific points of contact. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

Issue No. 912, 3 June 2011 The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

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Tehran Times – Iran Thursday, June, 2 2011 ‘Nuclear Powers Want to Keep their Deadly Toys’ Tehran Times Political Desk TEHRAN -- The United States and other nuclear weapons states do not want to dismantle their nuclear weapons, Iran’s ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency said on Tuesday. Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh made the remarks in an interview with the IRNA news agency in Vienna on Tuesday after a conference held by the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP). Soltanieh said, “In fact, we face this bitter issue that the countries possessing nuclear weapons, including the United States, have no inclination to eliminate their nuclear weapons and they want to keep their nuclear weapons as a deterrent.” He went on to say that the meeting examined the problems caused by nuclear weapons and their proliferation as well as the inability of the international community, including nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatories, to stop the arms race that is currently underway. Iran’s proposal to set a deadline for the complete eradication of all nuclear weapons was also discussed during the meeting, he said, adding that the proposal has been welcomed by all Non-Aligned Movement members. During the meeting, it was also announced that the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states are opposed to the idea of setting any deadline for total nuclear disarmament, even the deadline of 2025, which was supported by NAM, Iran’s IAEA ambassador stated. The participants at the meeting also expressed their opposition to the new U.S. doctrine, according to which Washington says it maintains the right to use nuclear weapons to attack other countries under certain circumstances, Soltanieh noted. http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=241862 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Al Arabiya News – U.A.E. Saudi Arabia Plans to Build 16 Nuclear Reactors by 2030 Thursday, 02 June 2011 By EMAN EL-SHENAWI, Al Arabiya with Agencies Saudi Arabia plans to build 16 nuclear power reactors by 2030, which could potentially cost more than $100 billion. The Kingdom and its Gulf neighbors regard nuclear power as a way to meet rising electricity demand while reducing reliance on polluting fossil fuels, a Saudi-based newspaper reported on Wednesday. Abdul Ghani bin Melaibari, coordinator of scientific collaboration at King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy announced a plan for Saudi Arabia’s reactors. “After 10 years we will have the first two reactors,” Mr. Melaibari told Arab News. “After that, every year we will establish two, until we have 16 by 2030.” Saudi is striving to keep up with rapidly rising power demand and nuclear reactors will allow the Kingdom to boost its domestic energy capacity usage. The country plans to cover 20 percent of its electricity needs using nuclear energy, Mr. Melaibari added. He estimated the cost of each reactor to be around $7 billion, adding that the Kingdom is in the process of planning for the nuclear project while coordinating with specialized companies.

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Many nations have taken a step back from nuclear plans following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan. But oil-rich Gulf States are pursuing their plans with major investments in nuclear power. Neighboring United Arab Emirates in December 2009 awarded a South Korean consortium the contract to build four nuclear power plants worth $20.4 billion, reported Reuters. The UAE was also recently reported to be weighing options of the long-term storage of nuclear waste from the country’s proposed nuclear power plant. The Fukushima disaster following the Japan tsunami and earthquake has also made it more critical for new nuclear nations to lay out schemes for waste disposal. The UAE is considering an underground cave that could hold radioactive uranium and plutonium for thousands of years. The cave would come at a high cost but has been widely recommended by scientists. Finland and Sweden are currently on track to build waste sites, while America’s planned site in Nevada has been abandoned since May due to insufficient funding from the federal budget. The UAE cave would be shared with other nations from the region, although the Emirates has not yet held formal talks with other states about the investment. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait are the clear choices as they plan for their own civil nuclear programs. In Saudi Arabia, power demand in the top oil exporter is estimated to grow seven to eight percent during the next 10 years. It is the largest economy of the GCC, with an annual GDP of $622 billion and a GDP per capita of $24,200. http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/06/02/151472.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Bloomberg News Iran Sanctions Should Be Eased to Foster Nuclear Cooperation, Russia Says By Henry Meyer and Ilya Arkhipov June 2, 2011 World powers should offer to ease sanctions to gain Iran’s cooperation in resolving the dispute over the country’s nuclear program, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said. Talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany have stalled since January and Russia believes incentives are needed to kick-start the process, Lavrov said yesterday in an interview in Moscow. “We have to show to Iran that if it cooperates, if it answers satisfactorily the IAEA demands, then it should see the light at the end of the tunnel,” Lavrov said, referring to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN’s nuclear watchdog. The Persian Gulf state in mid-2010 came under a fourth set of UN sanctions, which Russia supported. The U.S. and European Union later imposed tougher unilateral measures. Russia won’t support new sanctions against Iran, Lavrov said. “It’s a process that can only be successful if we count not on new sanctions and threats, but on negotiations,” he said. The IAEA, based in Vienna, has been probing Iran’s nuclear work since 2003, when it was revealed that the government had hidden atomic research for two decades. The U.S. has accused Iran of seeking to build a nuclear weapon, while Iran says its program is for civilian energy production.

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Russia built Iran’s first nuclear power plant, in Bushehr, and plans to start full operations at the facility “very soon,” Rosatom Corp., Russia’s state nuclear holding company, said May 26. Tougher Inspections If Iran agrees to resume tougher IAEA inspections, the EU and U.S. should pledge not to introduce any new, unilateral sanctions, Lavrov said. “And then when Iran does something else, expanding access for the IAEA to the places where the agency wants to go, then we suspend sanctions,” he said. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said in July that Iran was getting closer to achieving the capability to make nuclear weapons. Iran, the world’s fourth-largest oil producer, has rejected UN demands to suspend uranium enrichment, which can be used both for generating electricity and for making nuclear warheads. Negotiations broke down in January after talks in Istanbul between Iran and the so-called P5+1 group, comprised of China, France, Germany, Russia, the U.K. and U.S. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-02/iran-sanctions-should-be-eased-to-foster-nuclear-cooperation- russia-says.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Australian – Australia Asian Arms Race 'Has Potential for Calamity' By Rowan Callick, Asia-Pacific editor, The Australian June 01, 2011 AUSTRALIA'S leading expert on Asian military power has warned that a dangerous arms race is gathering pace in the region, with growing "possibilities for calamity" from the proliferation of naval weaponry. Des Ball of the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre told a Kuala Lumpur conference of "disturbing new capabilities" in regional naval power. "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile systems is now proceeding much more rapidly and extensively in Asia than in any other part of the world," he said. "It is both a much more complicated and a potentially more volatile process than the bipolar superpower strategic nuclear arms race of the Cold War. East Asia is embroiled in a serious maritime strategic competition." Professor Ball predicted that, within a year, China would have its first aircraft carrier at sea. He told the Asia-Pacific Roundtable, organised by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, that the first 50 pilot cadets were inducted at the Dalian Naval Academy in 2008 to start training on what was reported as "ship- borne aircraft flight". China accounts for nearly half of Asia's defence spending. Zhang Junshe, vice-president of China's Naval Research Institute, told the roundtable there was "no discernible naval arms race, but modernisation". "China pursues a national defence policy which is purely defensive in nature, and implements a strategy of active defence," he said. "Where conflict threatens our national interests, a strong navy can deter the ambitions of aggressors and protect our citizens while working to maintain good order at sea."

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Hideaki Kaneda, a retired Japanese vice-admiral, now director of the Okazaki Institute, said China had begun "acquiring capability for missions beyond the Taiwan issue to perform operations in areas more distant from China's shores". He said the presence of the US military in northeast Asia remained "extremely important" to maintain regional stability. Professor Ball said that, during the 1980s and 90s, Asian countries genuinely used their defence spending to modernise, replacing obsolescent equipment. This century had seen the rise instead of "action-reaction dynamics", shown by the acquisition of destroyers and frigates; large amphibious transports, helicopter carriers and "sea control ships"; submarines and anti-submarine capabilities; sea-based air and missile defence platforms; and electronic warfare systems. The US maintained the most powerful naval and air forces in the region, which were primarily directed against China. China now had 62 attack submarines compared with the US's 53, he said. Taiwan had acquired 14 new frigates and four guided missile destroyers, while South Korea had built the first of three Aegis-equipped destroyers, and was constructing nine German-designed submarines. "The expansion of China's nuclear arsenal could also cause other countries in northeast Asia to exercise their own nuclear options," Professor Ball said. Another fast growing feature was the increase in cyber warfare capabilities, he added, and he believed this "arms- racing" would continue to increase: "Action-reaction generates its own momentum." During the more predictable, bipolar Cold War situation, there were numerous arrangements, constraints and firebreaks, he said. Now, however, "there are no arms control regimes whatsoever in Asia that might constrain or constrict acquisitions, which since 2000 have all been aimed at one or other particular neighbour". http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/asian-arms-race-has-potential-for-calamity/story-e6frg6so- 1226066822263 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Yonhap News – South Korea June 1, 2011 N. Korea Commands 3,000-Strong Cyber Warfare Unit: Defector SEOUL, June 1 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has expanded its cyber warfare unit to staff 3,000 people and continues to train prodigies to become professional hackers, a defector said Wednesday, after South Korea recently accused the North of crippling the online services of one of its banks. Intelligence officials in Seoul believe the North runs a 1,000-strong cyber warfare unit under the command of the country's top intelligence agency, the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Prosecutors here blamed the bureau last month for launching a cyber attack on the computer system of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, or Nonghyup, in April. "North Korea last year raised the status of its cyber warfare unit under the Reconnaissance General Bureau and increased the number of troops in the unit from 500 to about 3,000," said Kim Heung-kwang, according to a transcript of his speech at a cyber terrorism seminar in Seoul. "North Korea is putting all efforts into cyber warfare after recognizing that its investments in maintaining and building cyber military strength fall short of what goes into its regular armed forces," said Kim, who heads a defectors' group called North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity.

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He also said the North Korean regime is luring gifted young people from all parts of the country to receive training in Pyongyang as professional hackers. "These prodigies are provided with the best environment, and if they graduate with top grades, their parents in the provinces are given the opportunity to live in Pyongyang," Kim said. "After studying at local universities, these students are given the special privilege of continuing their studies abroad." Once they return, most of the students are assigned to work for special hacking units, he added. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2011/06/01/46/0401000000AEN20110601004200315F.HTML (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Daily Telegraph – U.K. Leading Physicist Calls China's Nuclear Programme 'Rash and Unsafe' One of the scientists who worked on China's atomic bomb has warned that the "giddy speed and zero preparation" of the country's hugely ambitious nuclear energy programme could end in disaster. By Malcolm Moore, Shanghai 01 June 2011 As other countries scale back their reliance on nuclear power, China is dramatically ramping up its plans, allocating $120 billion to roll out more than 50 nuclear power stations and increase its nuclear capacity from 9GW to 400GW. The government has pledged to stick to the plan even after the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan underlined the risks of nuclear power. However, Professor He Zuoxiu, one of the mainland's leading theoretical physicists, has warned that China is "seriously unprepared, especially on the safety front" for the rapid expansion. Mr He compared the plan to Chairman Mao's Great Leap Forward, a period at the end of the 1950s when plans to industrialise and collectivise the Chinese economy led to disaster and mass famine. "Of course it is just like the Great Leap Forward," he said. "It's all about giddy speed and zero preparation. We have not solved the problems of technology, cost or safety but rashly rushed out an over-ambitious plan. I think it is a mission impossible." In an article for Science Times, a Chinese journal, Mr He also questioned whether the government's calculations about the cost of nuclear power were accurate. "China is not rich in uranium resources," he said. "How much can we import from abroad? And would it not be more difficult than importing oil and gas?" He also remarked that large swathes of China are earthquake zones and the cost of improving the safety of nuclear power stations in these areas would make them uneconomical. Mr He said that while he has been attacked for his views, "most people I know in the nuclear energy industry more or less agree with me, or do not have adequate answers to my questions." A researcher with China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group told the South China Morning Post that Mr He's article had sent a shock through the industry, as the first influential scientist to challenge the government line. "He knows where our weaknesses lie. The quake resistance level, for instance, is still under fierce debate in the industry, because it will have a huge impact on the cost of future nuclear projects," the researcher said. "I basically agree with Mr He," said Wu Libo, the deputy director of the Energy Economics and Strategy Research Centre at Shanghai's Fudan University. "Ever since the start of the current nuclear energy development plan, we have been very optimistic and positive about the prospects for nuclear energy and its safety. But the leaks in Fukushima should be a warning. We really

Issue No. 912, 3 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 should be more strict in evaluating our nuclear investments and be really careful about any project that could have an effect on public security." http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8549384/Leading-physicist-calls-Chinas-nuclear- programme-rash-and-unsafe.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

International Business Times – New York China PLA Officers Call Internet Key Battleground By Chris Buckley June 3, 2011 China must make mastering cyber-warfare a military priority as the Internet becomes the crucial battleground for opinion and intelligence, two military officers said on Friday, two days after Google revealed hacking attacks that it said came from China. The essay by strategists from the People's Liberation Army's Academy of Military Sciences did not mention Google's statement that hackers apparently based in China had tried to steal into the Gmail accounts of hundreds of users, among them U.S. officials, Chinese rights activists and foreign reporters. Google said on Wednesday that the attacks appeared to come from Jinan, capital of China's eastern Shandong province, home to a signals intelligence unit of the People's Liberation Army. The Chinese Foreign Ministry on Thursday dismissed Google's statement as groundless and motivated by "ulterior motives." The essay by two PLA scholars, Senior Colonel Ye Zheng and his colleague Zhao Baoxian, in the China Youth Daily nonetheless stressed that Beijing is focused on honing its cyber-warfare skills, and sees an unfettered Internet as a threat to its Communist Party-run state. "Just as nuclear warfare was the strategic war of the industrial era, cyber-warfare has become the strategic war of the information era, and this has become a form of battle that is massively destructive and concerns the life and death of nations," they wrote in the Party-run paper. The Chinese military has been conducting simulated cyber battles pitting the "blue army" against "red teams" using virus and mass spam attacks, the PLA newspaper Liberation Army Daily said last month. Last year, contention over Internet policy became an irritant between Beijing and Washington after the Obama administration took up Google's complaints about hacking and censorship from China. Google partly pulled out of China, the world's largest Internet market by users, after the dispute. So far, neither Google nor Washington has outright blamed China for the hacking attacks. Both governments have sought to steady their relations after last year's turbulence, and they may want to avoid another escalating feud. But Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on Thursday that the "allegations are very serious." DOMINO EFFECT The PLA scholars, Ye and Zhao, said China has its own fears about the Internet being wielded as a tool for political challenges, and pointed to the anti-authoritarian uprisings across the Arab world as an alarming example. "The targets of psychological warfare on the Internet have expanded from the military to the public," they wrote. The Internet "has become the main battleground of contention over public opinion," they said, citing the "domino effect" across the Middle East and north Africa.

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China's ruling Communist Party fears it could become one of those dominoes, despite robust economic growth and stringent domestic security and censorship. In February, overseas Chinese websites, inspired by the "Jasmine Revolution" across the Arab world, called for protests across China, raising Beijing's alarm about dissent and spurring a burst of detentions of dissidents and human rights lawyers. Three Chinese dissidents told Reuters their Google email accounts had been infiltrated, although eight others who were contacted said they had no problems. China has also tightened censorship of the Internet, and it already blocks major foreign social websites such as Facebook and Twitter. The PLA scholars said the threats to China come from more than sophisticated intelligence operations on the Internet. "Cyberware is an entirely new mode of battle that is invisible and silent, and it is active not only in wars and conflicts, but also flares in the everyday political, economic, military, cultural and scientific activities." The latest Google hacking attempt follows a series of high-profile hacking cases, including an attack on the U.S. defense giant Lockheed Martin. A U.S. official familiar with progress on the investigation said there was increasing suspicion that attack originated with "someone in China." Editing by Sanjeev Miglani http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/156777/20110603/china-pla-officers-call-internet-key-battleground.htm (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Economic Times – India June 1, 2011 Reuters How Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons could Be Jeopardised ISLAMABAD: It's a nightmare scenario: al Qaeda militants gain control of a Pakistani nuclear weapon, either through a base assault, theft or a rogue commander's cooperation, possibly in the event of hostilities with nuclear- armed neighbour India. While most experts believe Pakistan's strategic nuclear arsenal is safe, items such as low-yield, mobile nuclear delivery systems, called "shoot and scoot" tactical nuclear weapons, could be highly vulnerable. The Nasr (Hatf-9) system being developed is a short-range, surface-to-surface multi-tube ballistic missile system. With a range of 60 km (37.5 miles), it's designed for battlefield use. Deploying small, portable nuclear weapons onto a battlefield increases the risk of things going wrong, either through miscalculation, an accident or possible infiltration by militant groups, nuclear experts say. Here are some scenarios of how Pakistan might lose control over some of its nuclear arsenal. FOG OF (NUCLEAR) WAR In the event of hostilities between India and Pakistan, militants could seize control of a Hatf-9 system, essentially a rocket launcher on a truck. But could they use it? It's necessary to understand the circumstances. In case of war between Islamabad and New Delhi, India is developing a "Cold Start" doctrine, which envisions armored battle groups quickly pushing into Pakistani territory, holding key pockets and then forcing Islamabad to the negotiating table. The plan is to avoid antagonizing Pakistan to the point that it would retaliate with ballistic missiles against Indian cities, but Pakistani doctrine, and the Hatf-9 system, appears to envision using tactical nuclear weapons, possibly

Issue No. 912, 3 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 on its own soil, against the invaders. But deploying tactical weapons to the battlefield means command and control has to be dispersed to individual military units. And while Pakistan normally separates warheads and delivery systems, in times of crisis, weapons would be armed and deployed, although still "locked" by authentication codes, says Professor Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at the University of Bradford. "However in a fluid battlefield context such codes will likely be released to prevent the weapons being overrun before they can be used," he told Reuters in an email. "In such a 'release delegated' state ... it's possible that terrorists could seize a functioning weapon." Pakistan says its weapons have indigenously developed safety systems to prevent misuse, but it has never allowed outsiders to inspect these systems, Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, senior fellow for South Asia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, told Reuters. ROGUE COMMANDERS Another scenario is the "rogue commander". Militant groups have had varying degrees of success in infiltrating the Pakistani military , but it's unclear how deeply they go. In addition to mechanical safety systems, Pakistan says its nuclear weapons are secure because of rigorous background checks and continuous monitoring of personnel for extremist sympathies. That monitoring appears insufficient. As far back as 2006, the United States was reporting in diplomatic cables, recently published by Wikileaks, that Pakistani pilots and flight crew were engaging in "petty sabotage" of American F-16s to prevent them being used against Taliban militants in the northwest. The bodyguards for Punjab governor Salman Taseer were also heavily screened, but he was killed by an extremist who managed to get assigned to his security detail. Speculation is also rife that the Taliban assaults on the PNS Mehran naval base in Karachi this month and on the Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi in 2009 were aided by sympathisers from within the military. While a commander going rogue is unlikely, "this is an ongoing struggle," Roy-Chaudhury said. "The expected increase in radicalisation, especially within the Pakistani army after the U.S. raid and killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad ... raises additional concerns." Rogue commanders could, in a conflict with India, hand over codes and weapons to militants or cooperate with them. The more mercenary types might simply sell them. SEIZING A TACTICAL WEAPON FROM A BASE Another possibility doesn't require a fight with India. The PNS Mehran attack shows militants have developed the ability to attack and hold ground inside sensitive military bases. And while no nuclear facilities have been penetrated yet the possibility has caused great concern. "I think the attack on PNS Mehran (and on the GHQ in 2009) show that terrorists are developing tactics which enable them to penetrate highly-secure bases and hold space within them for hours," Gregory said. "This suggests nuclear weapons security is increasingly vulnerable." Because of their smaller size, tactical weapons are more portable. And while the warheads wouldn't be armed, the fissile materials of the cores could conceivably be extracted and used with conventional explosives to create a "dirty bomb". Militants could attack a base, seize a warhead or its core materials and then escape. A Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon might contain as little as 15-20kg (33-44 lbs) of enriched uranium.

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"Responsible Pakistani stewards of their nuclear assets have no choice but to re-evaluate their security requirements and procedures," said Michael Krepon, director of the South Asia and Space Security programs for Stimson, a Washington-based think tank for international security. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/how-pakistans-nuclear-weapons-could-be- jeopardised/articleshow/8679920.cms (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Chandigarh Tribune – India June 1, 2011 US Plans to Seize Nuke Stockpile if Terrorists Take over Pak By Shyam Bhatia In London Pakistan’s worst fears that the US has plans to seize its nuclear stockpile have been confirmed by US expert, Dr Jack Caravelli, a former adviser to at least two US Presidents. This is the first time someone of Caravelli’s eminence has confirmed that secret plans are in place to take control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in case terrorists take control of that country. His revelation underlines the concerns expressed by former Pakistani diplomat Asif Ezdi, who said in the aftermath of the Osama raid in Abbottabad that “the nation’s confidence in the viability of our defences has been badly shaken”. “Clearly, there is a need to carry out a comprehensive reassessment of these threats and to prepare ourselves for all eventualities,” he wrote in a Karachi newspaper. Significantly, Ezdi continued. “The most troubling question is whether our nuclear deterrent is safe from a similar US assault.” Caravelli’s disclosure seemingly contradicts visiting US Senator John Kerry’s reassuring “guarantee” only a week earlier that the US had no designs on Islamabad’s nuclear weapons. “It would be irresponsible for the US government not to have some kind of plans, given what it knows and understands of the current nuclear situation of Pakistan,” Caravelli told BBC Radio 5 Live.

Washington tolerated Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions hatched during the height of the cold war because they were seen as balancing the military strength of what the Americans perceived as a pro-Soviet India. It was after the May 1998 tests that the US and its NATO allies became aware that Pakistani nuclear information was being clandestinely sold to any number of so-called “rogue” governments at the time, including North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya. While none of these governments - even with nuclear weapons - had the capability of taking on the US, there were concerns that they could pass on their secretly acquired know-how to terrorists. These concerns reached crisis point following Al-Qaida’s terrorist attacks on US targets in September 2001 when Osama bin Laden’s teams hijacked four commercial jets, crashing two of them into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York. On their part, the US authorities are now no longer as tolerant as these once were of Pakistan’s nuclear activities. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Washington has made several unsuccessful attempts to gain access to Khan and several of his senior scientific colleagues to get a better understanding of what nuclear weapons technology has been exported and to whom. Despite various obstructions, US experts have ploughed on with their efforts to get a better understanding of how to safeguard the Pakistani nuclear programme. After 2001 the Bush administration is estimated to have spent some US$ 100 million to help Pakistan secure its steadily growing nuclear armoury. Less well-known were the

Issue No. 912, 3 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 contingency plans developed by the Clinton and the Bush administrations to take over Pakistan’s nuclear sites in the event these came under threat from terrorists. These plans have taken on a new urgency following reports that Pakistan has embarked on a plan to develop small tactical nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield against India, but which would also be ideal for terrorists to use against individual cities in the West and elsewhere. But according to Caravelli, who served under both Clinton and Bush, the contingency plans will come into operation if the “perfect storm” occurs and terrorists take control of Pakistan. “For a number of years, the plans existed that in the most dire of circumstances the US would at least have the options to undertake operations to try and secure those weapons and materials, if necessary,” Caravelli said in his radio interview. A leading US nuclear expert on non-proliferation and terrorism, Caravelli is also a former Deputy Assistant Secretary at the US Department of Energy and had served on the White House National Security Council where he was the President’s main adviser for non-proliferation policies affecting Russia and the Middle East. His insights will chill the hearts of those Pakistanis who believe that the bottom line of US policies affecting Pakistan is to somehow gain control of the country’s nuclear weapons and infrastructure. In fact, many Pakistanis believe that recent terrorist attacks on some of their supposedly secure military centres were designed to highlight Islamabad’s inability to safeguard its vital nuclear facilities. http://www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20110601/main2.htm (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Telegraph – U.K. Slain Pakistan's Journalist's Mumbai Attack Theories from Beyond the Grave The 2008 Mumbai attacks were originally planned by Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency but hijacked by rogue retired military officers and al-Qaeda figures who believed a devastating attack could provoke a new war with India, according to Syed Saleem Shahzad, the journalist found murdered in Pakistan earlier this week. By Dean Nelson, New Delhi 02 June 2011 His claims are published in his new book 'Inside al-Qaeda and the Taleban – beyond bin Laden and 9/11' and detail how the attacks, in which ten commando-style 'fedayeen' terrorists killed 166 people in a three day massacre, were inspired by Ilyas Kashmiri, a senior al-Qaeda commander. They will intensify fears that elements in Pakistan's military establishment are sabotaging the war on terror. According to Mr Shahzad, who many in Pakistan believe was killed by Pakistan's intelligence agency over his claims that the Pakistan Navy had been infiltrated by al-Qaeda, Kashmiri believed a war with India would force the United States to abandon its war in Afghanistan and its drone strikes against on terrorist camps in Pakistan's tribal areas. Kashmiri, head of the al-Qaeda affiliated 313 Brigade and tipped as a potential successor to Osama bin Laden, had suggested a massive attack on India to distract the United States from its attacks on militant leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan's lawless border tribal areas. The proposal 'stunned' and excited the al-Qaeda's leadership, which approved the plan, he wrote. Kashmiri then passed the suggestion on to retired Pakistan Army officer and former Lashkar e Taiba commander Haroon Ashik, who was aware of an earlier ISI plan to attack Mumbai. "Haroon knew about a plan by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) that had been in the pipelines for several months," he wrote, but added the agency had dropped it.

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"The former army major, with the help of Ilyas Kashmiri's men in India, hijacked the ISI plan and turned it into the devastating attacks that shook Mumbai on November 26, 2008 and brought Pakistan and India to the brink of a war," Mr Shahzad added. Their gambit almost worked. British and American intelligence officials feared the attack would provoke Indian military retaliation in the immediate aftermath, and believed it had been conceived to that end. As tensions increased between the two countries following the attacks, Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, who was allied with al-Qaeda, offered to end his group's attacks and support Islamabad in any war with India. The Pakistan Army responded by praising Mehsud and other militant leaders as 'Pakistani patriots.' Mr Shahzad's account appears to support statements made by David Headley, the self-confessed terrorist who helped plot the Mumbai attacks, who said although some ISI officials were aware of the plot, the agency's leaders were not. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/8552735/Slain-Pakistans-journalists-Mumbai-attack- theories-from-beyond-the-grave.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Russia Today – Russia “US should Freeze Deployment of Anti-Missile Systems in European Countries” 1 June 2011 Russia is pushing hard for a joint European missile defense system with NATO, a system which is spearheaded by the US. But as of late, Moscow has been complaining about lukewarm co-operation from its Western partners. The US should freeze the current deployment of US anti-missile systems in certain European countries, Konstantin Kosachev, the head of the State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee told RT. At the G8 summit in France last week, Russia’s president Dmitry Medvedev said the US could spark a new arms race if it keeps building its missile defense system in Europe. According to Kosachev, there are some ways to avoid this, though “nobody believes we will ever have a joint button to be pushed simultaneously by the two participants.” “Number one is not to take any practical steps immediately to create a future global anti-missile system. Number two is to make a legally-binding agreement on the purposes of the future system and to ensure the US or NATO system will not be aimed at Russia. And number three is to start practical co-operation on exchange of information on missile launches and to introduce certain elements of joint commander on the future integrated anti-missile system,” said Kosachev. Whether or not the US decides to keep building up its missile defense system and military potential in Europe, and Russia’s response to that is a matter for the future negotiations, said Kosachev. “As for tactical nuclear weapons, Russia now does not have any tactical nuclear weapons outside its borders, while the US have deployed certain amounts of these armaments in five or six European countries, so the first step to be taken here is to get tactical nuclear weapons inside national borders of each country that possesses these types of weapons and, later on, start further negotiations. When that happens, Russia will be ready to enter the process,” Kosachev said. Missile defense, along with its global implications, is to become one of the main issues at the meeting between Russian and the NATO defense ministers in Berlin on June 9, and also of the next summit of Russia and the European Union in Nizhny Novgorod on June 9 and 10.

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Russia warned it would consider withdrawing from the latest Russian-American Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, New START, if there was no progress. “There was no sufficient progress in any of the cases because NATO countries in Europe are not ready to take on the expenditures for the expensive system. They want the US to spend their money on European security. And in the dialogue between NATO and Russia, we discuss all possible options. But as nobody knows how NATO will behave, we are not making any progress here either,” Kosachev believes. http://rt.com/news/us-russia-missile-defence/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

ITAR-Tass – Russia June 2, 2011 Russian Defense Ministry to Resume Bulava Trials from Mid-June. MOSCOW, June 2 (Itar-Tass) — The Russian Defense Ministry will resume trials of the newest submarine-launched ballistic missile "Bulava" from mid-June, the Ministry's press service told Itar-Tass on Thursday. The missile will be test-fired from a standard carrier, the Yuri Dolgoruky nuclear power submarine. "It is planned to perform five launches of the missile from the White Sea toward the designated district of the Kura range on the Kamchatka peninsula. "A state commission will be monitoring the Bulava launches. Its members will be present on board the nuclear submarine during the trials. "In case of successful tests, the Bulava missile might be added to the Navy's arsenal as early as in 2011 or in the beginning of 2012," the Defense Ministry said. The previous launch of the Bulava missile was performed on October 29, 2010, from the Dmitry Donskoi strategic nuclear submarine. The missile was fired from the White Sea, and successfully delivered the re-entry vehicles to the Kura range. On May 13, director general of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT), the Bulava designer, said "we have five trial launches ahead, to be performed from the new Yuri Dolgoruky submarine. This work must be fulfilled successfully. We're looking at the future with optimism." The SLBM R30 3M30 (Bulava-30), also called RSM-56 in international treaties, is Russia's newest three-stage solid fuel rocket designed for 4th generation submarines of Project 955 Borei. Its range is 8,500 kilometers. The missile is capable of carrying up to ten supersonic maneuvering re-entry vehicles with the capability to change the course and altitude of flight. The Defense Ministry plans to take the missile in service by the end of this year, but everything depends on whether the tests are successful, Vladimir Popovkin, a former deputy defense minister, said in late March. At present, he is director of the Roskosmos space agency. The missile's basic performance characteristics should match the Defense Ministry's requirements, Popovkin said then. The number of launches must bring its reliability co-efficient to 0.99 - 0.98, he said. Also on Thursday, the Defense Ministry confirmed that the first trial launch of Bulava this year would be performed from a standard platform. The Yuri Dolgoruky submarine (head vessel of Project 955 "Borei") was floated out in April 2007. By now, it has already made ten cruises to a sea range, and its trial runs program was completed last year.

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It is planned to put Borei project vessels into service together with Bulava. Previously, all the 14 test-launches of Bulava were performed from the Dmitry Donskoi submarine of Project 941 "Akula", specially updated for the purpose. The St.Petersburg-based Rubin bureau is the developer of the "Borei" project. It used the latest achievements in the field of radio electronic equipment and noise reduction. Each submarine can carry up to 12 Bulava missiles. The submarines are equipping with a rescue capsule that can accommodate the whole crew. The submarine's length is 170 meters, width - 13.5 meters and diving depth 450 meters. It has a 107-strong crew. The Defense Ministry plans to build at least eight "Boreis." The Russian military are hoping the Bulava program will reach the designated objective to make this intercontinental ballistic missile the backbone of Russia's strategic nuclear forces in the period to 2045. http://www.itar-tass.com/c154/156577.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Daily Telegraph – U.K. MI6 Attacks al-Qaeda in 'Operation Cupcake' British intelligence has hacked into an al-Qaeda online magazine and replaced bomb-making instructions with a recipe for cupcakes. By Duncan Gardham, Security Correspondent 02 June 2011 The cyber-warfare operation was launched by MI6 and GCHQ in an attempt to disrupt efforts by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to recruit “lone-wolf” terrorists with a new English-language magazine, the Daily Telegraph understands. When followers tried to download the 67-page colour magazine, instead of instructions about how to “Make a bomb in the Kitchen of your Mom” by “The AQ Chef” they were greeted with garbled computer code. The code, which had been inserted into the original magazine by the British intelligence hackers, was actually a web page of recipes for “The Best Cupcakes in America” published by the Ellen DeGeneres chat show. Written by Dulcy Israel and produced by Main Street Cupcakes in Hudson, Ohio, it said “the little cupcake is big again” adding: “Self-contained and satisfying, it summons memories of childhood even as it's updated for today’s sweet-toothed hipsters.” It included a recipe for the Mojito Cupcake – “made of white rum cake and draped in vanilla buttercream”- and the Rocky Road Cupcake – “warning: sugar rush ahead!” By contrast, the original magazine featured a recipe showing how to make a lethal pipe bomb using sugar, match heads and a miniature lightbulb, attached to a timer. The cyber attack also removed articles by Osama bin Laden, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri and a piece called “What to expect in Jihad.” British and US intelligence planned separate attacks after learning that the magazine was about to be issued in June last year. They have both developed a variety of cyber-weapons such as computer viruses, to use against both enemy states and terrorists. A Pentagon operation, backed by Gen Keith Alexander, the head of US Cyber Command, was blocked by the CIA which argued that it would expose sources and methods and disrupt an important source of intelligence, according to a report in America.

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However the Daily Telegraph understands an operation was launched from Britain instead. Al-Qaeda was able to reissue the magazine two weeks later and has gone on to produce four further editions but one source said British intelligence was continuing to target online outlets publishing the magazine because it is viewed as such a powerful propaganda tool. The magazine is produced by the radical preacher Anwar al-Awlaki, one of the leaders of AQAP who has lived in Britain and the US, and his associate Samir Khan from North Carolina. Both men who are thought to be in Yemen, have associated with radicals connected to Rajib Karim, a British resident jailed for 30 years in March for plotting to smuggle a bomb onto a trans-Atlantic aircraft. At the time Inspire was launched, US government officials said “the packaging of this magazine may be slick, but the contents are as vile as the authors.” Bruce Reidel, a former CIA analyst said it was “clearly intended for the aspiring jihadist in the US or UK who may be the next Fort Hood murderer or Times Square bomber.” In recent days AQAP fighters have capitalised on chaos in Yemen, as the country teeters on the brink of civil war. Tribal forces marching towards the capital, Sana'a, clashed with troops loyal to President Ali Abdullah Saleh for a third day running yesterday. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8553366/MI6-attacks-al-Qaeda-in-Operation- Cupcake.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Global Security Newswire Pentagon Details Plan for New Nuclear Bomber Wednesday, June 1, 2011 By Diane Barnes, Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON -- The U.S. Defense Department in a new acquisition document laid out preliminary plans to develop a fleet of next-generation nuclear bombers capable of carrying out long-range missions with or without onboard pilots (see GSN, May 23). A "new penetrating, nuclear-capable bomber program" would form the "centerpiece" of a broader suite of U.S. long-range strike aircraft intended to eliminate and discourage the development of barriers to military operations, the Pentagon said in a legally required aircraft procurement plan spanning the next three decades. Meanwhile, the nation's existing B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers would continue undergoing updates to ensure their readiness to carry out long-range missions until 2040, the document states. The department envisions preparing a fleet of between 80 and 100 of the new bombers at a cost of $550 million for each aircraft. The proposed quantity, the report says, would allow for Air Force "capabilities required to operate in an anti-access, area denial environment and ensure a sustainable inventory over the long term." The Pentagon's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review established broad objectives that guided the latest acquisition plan covering bombers, fighter jets and other aircraft. Those four "strategic priorities" are: achieving victory in present conflicts and staving off new conflicts; laying the groundwork for success against hostile forces in a variety of scenarios; and maintaining and bolstering the nation's military as an organization comprised solely of volunteers. The Defense Department projected a slight decline in its overall aircraft holdings between fiscal years 2012 and 2021; aviation force levels are slated to jump from 5,555 in the next budget period to 5,626 in fiscal 2016, before falling to 5,467 a decade from now.

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The military expects to maintain 156 long-range bombers for most of the next decade, before the total inventory declines by a single plane in fiscal 2021, according to the report. Modernization efforts would be funded to augment the "effectiveness and survivability" of the B-2 bomber, the document states. Meanwhile, the Air Force would cull six of its B-1 aircraft between fiscal 2012 and 2016 to finance updates to the remaining bombers from that fleet, it adds. The bombers and the rest of the updated fleet of fixed-wing aircraft are expected to support or conduct six crucial military mission areas, according to the Pentagon. These include countering the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction, battling terrorists, protecting the United States and supporting allied nations. "The aviation plan provides the aircraft needed to cover the full complement of operations that U.S. military forces could undertake in the decades ahead, and it will evolve as security needs change," the report says. "As [Defense Secretary Robert] Gates has stated, 'What is needed is a portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict.'" http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110601_6025.php (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Jerusalem Post – Israel US: Russia Cutting Nuclear Arsenal Faster than Required Moscow's 1,537 deployed strategic nuclear warheads are just under the 1,550 it must reach by 2018 under the New START arms reduction pact. By Reuters June 2, 2011 WASHINGTON - Russia has already cut its nuclear arsenal below the level required in an arms control treaty signed with the United States last year, according to figures released by the US State Department on Wednesday. Russia has 1,537 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, just under the 1,550 ceiling it is obliged to reach by 2018 under the New START nuclear arms reduction pact, while the United States has 1,800, according to a State Department fact sheet. The figures are accurate as of Feb. 5, 2011 and drawn from an exchange of data required under the treaty, which was signed on April 8, 2010 and entered into force on March 22, 2011. Under the treaty, each side agreed to reduce its deployed nuclear warheads to no more than 1,550 within seven years of the treaty's entry into force. Each also agreed to limit its intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, submarine ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers to no more than 800, whether deployed or not. The United States has 1,124 of these and Russia 865, according to the State Department figures. Finally, each committed to deploy no more than 700 intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine ballistic missiles or heavy bombers. As of Feb. 5, the United States had 882 of these and Russia 521. Tom Collina, research director of the nonpartisan Arms Control Association, a nonpartisan Washington-based group that seeks to promote arms control, welcomed Russia's cuts and said the United States should speed up its reductions. "New Start is working," he wrote in a blog post, saying Russia was previously estimated to have 2,000 deployed warheads.

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"Russia has already deactivated hundreds of nuclear weapons that otherwise could have been aimed at the United States, and the United States is using on-site inspections to verify these reductions," he said. "This is good news for US security." "If Russia can accelerate its reductions, so can the United States," he added. "There is no need for the Pentagon to wait until 2018 to get to New START levels. As a confidence-building measure, the United States should speed up its reductions." http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=223270 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Foreign Policy Research Institute – Philadelphia, PA OPINION/E-Notes Why We Should Study Developing Nuclear Earth Penetrators – and Why They Are Actually Stabilizing By Elbridge A. Colby May 2011 Elbridge Colby is a research analyst at CNA and has served in several national security positions with the U.S. Government, most recently with the Department of Defense working on the follow-on to the START Treaty and as an expert advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission. The views expressed herein are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of any institution with which he is affiliated.

With the ratification of the New START Treaty and the associated political commitments made by the Administration and Congress to modernize U.S. nuclear deterrent capabilities, attention is beginning to shift towards the shape of the future arsenal. Many questions remain: about the threats which we need to deter, about what we need to hold at risk in order to deter effectively, and about the size and nature of the arsenal needed to meet those requirements. One of the most pressing questions is what the United States can and should do about the growing ability of its most plausible state adversaries, including North Korea and Iran, [1] to locate their most valued assets underground in facilities effectively immune from missile, air, or naval attack. Estimates of the number of such “hard and deeply buried targets” (HDBTs) have ranged from as low as 50 in North Korea and Iran to as high as 10,000 worldwide according to an influential study by the National Academy of Sciences, citing the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (both estimates in 2005). [2] While reliable numbers are unavailable in the unclassified realm (and most likely also in the classified, due to the extremely formidable challenges of correctly identifying such facilities and accurately ascertaining their characteristics), it seems reasonable to assume that the number of significantly hardened and buried facilities in countries of concern stands at least in the hundreds and very possibly in the thousands. In any case, what is essentially undisputed is that potential adversaries such as North Korea and Iran are increasingly able to locate or move their most valued assets to underground depths beyond the effective reach of U.S. action (assuming that the most deeply buried facilities would be reserved primarily for the most important assets). This is because current U.S. earth penetration capabilities are insufficient to hold such facilities at risk. While the U.S. fields conventional earth penetrators, “many of the more important strategic hard and deeply buried targets are beyond the reach of conventional explosive penetrating weapons and can be held at risk of destruction only with nuclear weapons,” [3] as the 2005 National Academy panel reported. U.S. nuclear earth penetrator capabilities, on the other hand, are also limited, and U.S. Government officials have made clear that current U.S. nuclear weapons cannot penetrate to the depths required to hold at risk the most important HDBTs. [4]

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EARTH PENETRATING WEAPONS ARE NEEDED This is a serious problem. The core of deterrence lies in being willing and able to destroy what your adversary most values. Bluntly, we need to be able to say credibly that “wherever you go, we can get at you.” If enemies can make themselves immune to retaliation, deterrence is seriously compromised. Yet the trend among our potential adversaries towards hiding underground, beyond the reach of our weaponry, poses precisely this challenge. This burrowing underground might not be so severe a problem as to warrant developing nuclear earth penetrating weapons (EPW) if we could rely on our ground forces eventually to occupy and/or destroy bunkers. Thus the United States has for the last two decades relied on the threat of regime change and leadership accountability to deter WMD use by rogue states. Because these states have generally had comparatively limited WMD capabilities—and no nuclear weapons—and could not strike the U.S. homeland, this threat has been highly credible and quite effective. For example, in 1990-1991 the United States could rely not only on a response of massive retaliation, but also on threatening Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath leadership with regime change and personal accountability if Iraqi forces used WMD against Coalition forces, a combined threat that sufficed to deter the Iraqis. But this option is unlikely to be as feasible in the future. This is because key potential U.S. adversaries, such as North Korea and Iran, are today developing nuclear weapons and fielding survivable delivery systems, such as mobile ballistic missile systems, even as they are building more hardened and deeply buried facilities. [5] This combination of sanctuary and survivable striking power would allow these countries to hide or shield their most valued assets beyond the range of U.S. strikes while threatening the United States and its allies with survivable nuclear delivery systems. States so armed could shield their most valued assets from U.S. strikes while holding the threat of nuclear attack over Washington and allied capitals to deter any attempt to disarm them or occupy their countries. Facing the prospect of a nuclear strike in reaction to an attempt at occupation, a future President would not be in as strong a position to make a threat of the kind that Secretary of State Baker made to Tariq Aziz and the Iraqi leadership: if you use WMD against us, we will occupy your country and hold you personally accountable. Instead, if current trends continue, a country like North Korea will be able to place its most valued assets in sanctuary underground beyond the reach of our weaponry while ensuring, through survivable nuclear and WMD forces, that we cannot sensibly attempt occupation and regime change. This would mean that the leadership of such a country might enjoy a degree of effective immunity from U.S. reprisal. Conversely, nuclear EPWs would be unnecessary if we could safely and with good conscience rely on only the threat to destroy unprotected cities and other soft targets to deter the North Koreas of the world. But the threat to confine ourselves to holding North Korean cities at risk in such a situation might well be ineffective in swaying a leader such as Kim Jong-Il, whose sensitivity to losses among his own population when weighed against the preservation of his own rule should not be overestimated. Moreover, we might contemplate what Kim’s response would be were we to attack his cities when he might be hiding in a hardened bunker and his mobile nuclear forces were dispersed. In light of North Korea’s retaliatory capabilities, does the United States want to be forced to contemplate “trading” cities with a Kim Jong-Il? Finally, it need hardly be stated that confining ourselves to the option of attacking an adversary’s cities would be, to say the least, morally troubling. The capability to destroy HDBTs, on the other hand, would give the United States a more sensible option that would enable us to get at what our adversaries most value while avoiding the most serious pitfalls posed by occupation or attacks upon cities as such. Unlike either of these approaches, a formidable EPW capability would give us the assured ability to target an opponent wherever he chose to go, thus ensuring that he would never feel immune to our retaliation and so giving him the strongest incentive to moderate his own behavior. Even better, such a posture would strengthen our basic pre-war deterrent, since a potential adversary would know that he would always be vulnerable in a conflict with the United States. This would, of course, greatly increase the risks and potential costs of going to war with the United States and so lower the chances of war in the first place. This was why the United States, during the Cold War and especially starting with the Carter Administration, sought to develop the nuclear capabilities needed to hold at risk the hardened and deeply buried sites the Soviets were

Issue No. 912, 3 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 building in order to ensure that we could target the Soviet leadership wherever they might go—even after a Soviet first strike. It was the same logic applied to more contemporary threats that drove the Clinton Administration to generate the initial requirement for the controversial robust nuclear earth penetrator in the 1990s. Of course, an effective strike on an HDBT would require accurate and timely intelligence, not only about the location and nature of the facility, but also about its contents. But the substantial difficulties of obtaining such intelligence would not undermine our fundamental capability to hold at risk an opponent in an HDBT, ensuring that an adversary would know that he would always be vulnerable to the exposure of his position—a well- grounded fear when the signatures associated with the operations and movements of a nation’s leadership are considered. Moreover, assuming substantial resolve on the part of the United States in the face of a grave attack, there would be no necessary time limitation on the acquisition of such intelligence. EARTH PENETRATORS ACTUALLY FOSTER STABILITY This deterrence requirement is relatively straightforward. Many criticisms of the development of nuclear EPWs, however, have focused on their allegedly destabilizing aspects, as in the opposition to the Bush Administration’s controversial Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) program. [6] Yet the truth is that such weapons would actually foster stability because they would reduce the incentives to strike early, before a window of opportunity passes, and because they would enable a retaliatory strike posture. If strategic stability is given its traditional definition of weapons and postures that mitigate incentives to strike first and/or fast in a crisis and that reduce the probability of war, then earth penetrating weapons are not destabilizing. Quite the contrary. Because effective EPWs would enable the United States to hit an opponent whenever and wherever it chose to do so, they would minimize any pressures on the U.S. to strike in a perceived window of opportunity while an enemy or his valued asset was still aboveground or in a vulnerable underground facility. A principal reason to strike first is to take advantage of opportunities while they exist, opportunities such as the ability to take out an adversary’s valued assets while they remain vulnerable to U.S. strikes. Think, for instance, of the pressures that a U.S. leader might face in a variant of the 2003 attempted decapitating strike against Saddam Hussein if the President thought there were a serious chance the opponent might use WMD—and then think of the response of the opponent in the wake of such a decapitation attempt. With EPW weapons, it would be less likely that a President would be boxed in by the hellish choice of “strike now, or lose the opportunity entirely” because there would be nowhere that an opponent could safely escape American action. An EPW capability would thus mitigate the window of opportunity quandary and so allow the President to wait, a vital component of stability. More broadly, an EPW capability would strengthen stability by giving U.S. decision-makers greater confidence in the general effectiveness of the American retaliatory capability, since there would be no sanctuary from it. This would give greater strength to the overall American deterrent, thereby lowering the probability of aggression against U.S. interests and war. Another important consideration in the stability equation is the confidence that Russia and China have in the survivability and effectiveness of their retaliatory force in light of U.S. assets. U.S. capabilities that could help give the United States a disarming first strike capability could well encourage Moscow or Beijing to adopt far less deliberate launch postures, in turn increasing the possibilities of catastrophe. Yet EPWs would not add significant counterforce capability against Russia or China’s retaliatory forces to the U.S. arsenal. Deployed mobile land or sea-based ballistic missiles as well as mobile or otherwise survivable command and control assets would not be more easily targeted because of an earth penetration capability. Thus the United States would not gain any added benefit from striking first in an attempt to disarm an opponent. Moreover, the United States could take additional steps to minimize disruptions in strategic relations with Moscow and Beijing; for instance, the United States might unilaterally commit to limiting the number of such weapons produced to limit their impact on strategic stability with Russia and China. Finally, EPWs would not lower the “threshold” for nuclear use—a nuclear strike would remain the extraordinarily grave step that it is today. Indeed, the very fact that effective nuclear EPWs would necessarily be very “dirty” in

Issue No. 912, 3 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 terms of radioactive fallout would ensure that no President would authorize their use except in the gravest circumstances. [7] EARTH PENETRATORS DO NOT NEED TO BE NUCLEAR, BUT NUCLEAR VARIANTS SHOULD NOT BE RULED OUT The requirement of deterrence with respect to HDBTs is that the United States needs to be able to hold at risk from afar whatever an opponent values, even if he goes deep underground. This does not perforce require that such capabilities be nuclear; indeed, the use of conventional weapons to disable or effectively destroy HDBTs by closing off airshafts, entrances, and other vulnerable points would of course be a preferable approach. U.S. opponents, however, are fully aware of these conventional capabilities and must be expected to anticipate U.S. attempts to close off tunnel entrances and ventilation systems and to adapt to such a threat by such measures as multiplying entrances/exits, airshafts, and communication links and by the use of decoys, among other tactics. Moreover, as the National Academy of Sciences report found, there are stark physical limitations on the destructive power of conventional munitions as earth penetrators. This means that, in order to defeat some HDBTs, especially the most hardened and valuable ones, the explosive power that only a nuclear weapon can provide might be required in order to destroy the facility. Indeed, even a nuclear earth penetrator strike might well need to be accompanied by conventional strikes to close off exits and/or to prepare the target area in advance of a laydown employment of more vulnerable types of nuclear EPWs, including those designed to burrow more deeply before detonating. While the technical characteristics of an effective EPW capability should not be too sharply defined in advance, the key is that nuclear options for EPWs should not be excluded from serious consideration. Prudence dictates, therefore, that the U.S. Government should carefully study the feasibility and utility of nuclear EPWs, specifically by ordering the National Laboratories to study the issue. One concrete step that Congress could take would be to allow the National Laboratories to conduct simulated “sled tests” to determine how a nuclear payload would operate against HDBTs. Congress in the FY2006 Defense Authorization Act prohibited the Laboratories from conducting such tests, in effect blocking off research into the nuclear option. [8] In order to minimize any negative political repercussions associated with the development of a nuclear EPW, it could be based on existing weapons, especially the B-61 Mod-11 or the more powerful B-83 nuclear gravity bombs; indeed, some work has already been done in this direction. [9] Focusing initial nuclear EPW work on gravity bombs would also lessen concerns in Moscow and Beijing, as bombers are far less suitable as first strike weapons than are fast-flying ballistic missiles. [10] To further assuage concerns, modifications could be trammeled to ensure that additional nuclear testing would not be required to certify the weapon while pursuing necessary hardening and other improvements. GETTING PAST THE POLITICS TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE The last time a study to look into a nuclear EPW was proposed, the idea fell victim to the political tempest surrounding the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the emphasis on preemption in the 2002 National Security Strategy, and the 2003 war against Iraq. A nuclear EPW ended up looking like a symbol and tool of aggression, preemption, and a policy of first strike. This was unfortunate, as it distorted the realities of the issue. An effective EPW capability—whether conventional, nuclear, or both—is crucial for deterrence and stability. Indeed, the requirement for such a capability is a logical deduction from the traditional American approach to nuclear policy, one that stretches back into the Cold War, when the United States initiated development of nuclear EPWs to ensure that the Soviet leadership could never feel immune from U.S. retaliation, and forward to the Clinton Administration’s decision to initiate work on a robust nuclear earth penetrator. Correctly couching consideration of a nuclear EPW in this context cannot but help to win it a fairer hearing. Beyond debates about stability, however, critics of a nuclear EPW have also argued that the development by the United States of any new nuclear weapons capabilities would undermine nonproliferation efforts by exposing Washington to charges of hypocrisy. How, runs this line of argument, would the United States be able to ask non- nuclear weapons states to forswear pursuing their own nuclear arsenals—and support firm efforts to prevent

Issue No. 912, 3 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 others from acquiring them—if the United States is itself modernizing its arsenal? This debate touches on a much larger set of issues concerning why nations acquire nuclear weapons and the nature of the international system, but the essence of the problem with this critique is that it vastly overstates the influence that incremental U.S. nuclear policy decisions such as the one advocated here have on other nations’ calculus as to whether to obtain nuclear weapons of their own. Moreover, to the extent that there are concerns regarding the consequences of development of a nuclear EPW, the United States could mount a vigorous public diplomacy initiative to explain that the development was driven not by pursuit of a domineering, disarming capability but rather by the need to maintain an effective deterrent to preserve stability in light of changing conditions. The question of how technically to develop a nuclear EPW while maintaining U.S. commitments to restraint presents another set of challenges. It is true that developing and deploying a nuclear EPW might require a change in the U.S. policy, as laid out in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, that the United States would not develop new nuclear warheads or pursue new military missions or new capabilities for nuclear weapons. Of course, if an effective nuclear EPW could be entirely based on existing systems, then no change in U.S. policy on nuclear weapons development would be entailed. (A nuclear EPW would not be a new capability because the existing B61- 11 weapon is a penetrator.) But it is possible that, in order to field a credibly effective nuclear EPW, new capabilities might need to be pursued. For instance, if potential adversaries continue digging further underground, the United States will likely need to develop effective burrowing devices to “open the door” for follow-on weapons to couple their blasts more effectively to the target. This development would entail a change in national policy. Yet the change involved would be relatively modest, constituting an adaptation of the existing framework of deterrence to new technical and geostrategic realities rather than a basic change in our fundamental approach. More to the point, a rigid “no change” policy cannot be tenable if, as we must realize, nuclear deterrence will remain a cornerstone of our security for the foreseeable future. The instinct to keep nuclear competition in check is laudable, but this does not necessitate a straitjacket on adaptation, which is what a nuclear EPW would be. Ultimately, deterrence remains the best way to avoid war while protecting our core interests. Deterrence rests on the ability and the willingness to strike what one’s opponent most values wherever they are—no matter how long it takes. Weapons, postures, and strategies that contribute to this ability are to be commended and pursued, even if they at first glance seem frightening, for it may be the very qualities that make them frightening that also make them effective, and therefore stabilizing. GLOSSARY OF TERMS Earth Penetrating Weapons: A weapon designed to penetrate into soil, rock, concrete, or other material to deliver a weapon to a target buried in the earth. Hard and deeply buried targets: Intentionally hardened and buried facilities used to conceal and protect a state’s leaders, military and industrial personnel, weapons, equipment, and other assets and activities. Ranging from hardened, surface bunker complexes to tunnel facilities deep underground, HDBTs are typically large, complex, and well concealed, incorporating strong physical security, modern air defenses, protective siting, multifaceted communications, and other important features that make many of them able to survive attack by conventional weapons. Sled test: A test platform that slides along rails designed to test equipment such as missiles and bombs for collection on a variety of characteristics, including results of impact. Notes 1. [Text] See Christopher Ford, “Conventional ‘Replacement’ of Nuclear Weapons,” at http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=546. 2. [Text] For the low figure, see Jeffrey Lewis, “How Many Rogue State Hard and Deeply Buried Targets?” ArmsControlWonk.com, May 20, 2005, at http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/511/how-many- rogue-state-hard-and-deeply-buried-targets. For the high figure, see National Research Council of the National Academies, Committee on the Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons, Effects

Issue No. 912, 3 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons, Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2005, 14, available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11282&page=14. 3. [Text] Ibid., 1. 4. [Text] Statement of Linton F. Brooks, Acting Under Secretary of Energy and Administrator for National Security, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, before the Subcomittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 8, 2003, at http://armed- services.senate.gov/statemnt/2003/April/Brooks.pdf. 5. [Text] See, e.g., Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=842, and, for Iran, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/militarysumfolder/shahab-3.html. 6. [Text] See, for instance, Daryl G. Kimball, “Replacement Nuclear Warheads? Buyer Beware,” Arms Control Today, May 2005, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_05/focus. 7. [Text] See Chapter 6, “Human and Environmental Effects,” of the National Academies study for an analysis of the severe consequences of even a low-yield nuclear earth penetrator. 8. [Text] See the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Report of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, 463, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi- bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_reports&docid=f:hr089.109.pdf. For an account of the history of the termination of RNEP, see Jeffrey Lewis, “NNSA Denies Axeing RNEP,” November 15, 2005, http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/855/nnsa-denies-dropping-rnep. 9. [Text] See “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator” at GlobalSecurity.com at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/rnep.htm. 10. [Text] This would not be to exclude consideration of a nuclear EPW on a ballistic missile, but simply to investigate whether a gravity bomb option might be sufficient for deterrence and on technical grounds. http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201105.colby.nuclear.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Washington Times OPINION/Editorial EDITORIAL: Wishing Away Iranian Nukes The mullahs are working on the bomb, like it or not By The Washington Times Tuesday, May 31, 2011 The Iranian nuclear threat is much ado about nothing, says reporter Seymour Hersh. Writing in the latest issue of the New Yorker, the professional left-wing cynic ignores numerous signs that the Islamic Republic is dead set on achieving nuclear-weapons capability and claims there is "a large body of evidence ... suggesting that the United States could be in danger of repeating a mistake similar to the one made with Saddam Hussein's Iraq eight years ago - allowing anxieties about the policies of a tyrannical regime to distort our estimations of the state's military capacities and intentions." For Mr. Hersh, it's the "WMD issue" all over again. The comparison is dubious. Saddam never had working nuclear reactors, something the Islamic regime in Tehran openly brags about. Iraq also never approached Iran's current missile capabilities. Had Saddam possessed in 2003 what Iran has right now, the George W. Bush administration would never have been dogged by leftist critics like Mr. Hersh with never-ending charges of "intelligence failure." Mr. Hersh cites recent National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on Iranian Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, which he says found "no conclusive evidence that Iran has made any effort to build the bomb since 2003." He leaves out some of the fine print from the 2007 NIE, such as that the alleged halt was only for "at least several years," and beyond that, the United States did "not know whether [Iran] currently intends to develop nuclear weapons" but was "keeping open the option." Furthermore, the NIE narrowly defined "weapons development" only as warhead

Issue No. 912, 3 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 design, excluding Iran's extensive uranium-enrichment program. Since 2007, this program has expanded outside the control and supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), despite Tehran's pledges it would accept international controls. Even the 2007 document found that Iran would be "technically capable of producing enough [highly enriched uranium] for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 timeframe." We currently are in the second year of that window. The 2007 intelligence estimate was roundly criticized when it was released as a heavily politicized document intended to stall Bush administration momentum for dealing with the threat posed by Tehran. Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad mockingly called the document a "declaration of surrender" by America. The 2011 NIE, which won't be released in an unclassified version, reportedly walks back the conclusions reached in 2007. The mullahs' admitted pursuit of uranium enrichment and lack of cooperation with the IAEA are clear indications that something is amiss. In 2009, top-secret technical notes leaked from Iran's nuclear program detailed Tehran's research on a neutron initiator, the device that sets off a nuclear detonation. This mechanism has no peaceful "dual-use" purpose but is only used for weapons. It's the trigger of the atomic smoking gun. The Islamic Republic is an existential challenge to countries in the the Middle East. On Monday, Israel's Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya'alon said, "An Iran possessing nuclear weapons would be a threat to the entire civilized world," and that he hoped the international community would "take joint action to avert the nuclear threat posed by Iran, even if it would be necessary to conduct a preemptive strike." The Stuxnet computer virus, widely believed to have originated in Israel, pushed back the timeline for Iran's uranium-enrichment program by about four years. While cyber-attacks may buy time, they will not dissuade Tehran from its nuclear ambitions. It's worth remembering that every initial nuclear test in history by an adversary power took the U.S. intelligence community by surprise. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/may/31/wishing-away-iranian-nukes/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (IPCS) – India OPINION/Analysis June 2, 2011 The Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation By Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dipankar Banerjee Mentor, IPCS While the death of Osama Bin Laden closes one chapter of recent history against the global war on terror, the risk of terrorism merging with nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat today, even more starkly than a nuclear holocaust. Pakistan, representing the triangulation of a rogue military, terrorism (with suicide terrorism as a norm) and the world’s fastest growing nuclear arsenal, remains the world’s highest concern and the deepest source of anxiety. Conversely, India as one of the three de-facto nuclear weapon powers, maintains an excellent record at adhering to international laws and global norms pertaining to nuclear weapons. Till date, the parameters of India’s nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament policy have remained consistent. In June 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh restated India’s policy as "fully committed to nuclear disarmament that is global, universal and non- discriminatory in nature" and that for India, "the only effective form of nuclear disarmament is global nuclear disarmament"; nuclear disarmament cannot be "regionalized." India’s principled opposition to the NPT is well known and has been often stated. India does not participate in the NPT preparatory or Review conferences. Besides being a discriminatory treaty with no clear balance of responsibilities between the nuclear haves and have-nots, the NPT has done comparatively little over four decades to further the cause of nuclear disarmament in the world. It has instead led to a vast vertical proliferation, which even decades after of the end of the Cold War, does not quite seem to go away. The New START is a welcome

Issue No. 912, 3 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 development, but it does not meet global aspirations and is of limited disarmament consequence. The New START will not entice the other nuclear powers to even consider reducing their arsenals. It is pertinent to ask at this stage whether it is the nonproliferation treaty or the nonproliferation regime which is in crisis. Despite its opposition to the treaty, India’s nuclear policy is in fact in compliance with the objectives and goals of the NPT. Given its excellent nonproliferation record and the NSG approval to the India-US civil nuclear agreement, India will not have difficulty in the future to accede to the NPT as a nuclear weapons power and formally accept all the responsibilities that go with it. But in view of the country’s security environment, joining the NPT as a non- nuclear weapons state is not an option that any Indian government will contemplate now or in the future. Therefore some creative thinking is required towards modifying the NPT to accommodate India, Pakistan and Israel in the system rather than keeping them outside. One possibility is to introduce a third category of "state with nuclear weapons" or "advanced states with nuclear technological capability" to be added in the NPT. In keeping with certain carefully considered benchmarks, such as nonproliferation track record, civil control over arsenals, nuclear doctrines and such, exceptions can be made. No treaty should be embedded in stone and as circumstances call, should to be amended, howsoever difficult the process. It is also time to consider fresh approaches towards global elimination of nuclear weapons. India is aware of the new proposals that are currently being debated and hurdles that they face. In a landmark declaration at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in February 2008, India formally proposed two multilateral agreements and two global conventions in a detailed framework for nuclear disarmament and laid out a seven point agenda: 1.Reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines 2.Negotiation of an agreement on no-first use of nuclear weapons among nuclear weapons states 3.Negotiation of a universal and legally binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states 4.Negotiation of a convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 5.Negotiation of a nuclear convention prohibiting development, stockpiling and production of nuclear weapons, moving towards a global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of these weapons 6.Unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapons states to reduce risks and dangers arising from the possibility of accidental use of these weapons 7.Adoption of additional measures by nuclear states to reduce accidental use In early May 2011, India’s Acting Permanent Representative to the CD in Geneva reiterated India’s strong support to the UNSC Resolution 1540 on preventing proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. India is not yet a member of PSI as there are concerns about its consonance with international maritime law and the artificial distinction it makes with regard to rights and responsibilities of nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. However, India has no problems with the purpose and the strategy of the initiative; and there is a growing belief that India should join the PSI and support its expanded mandate as envisaged by President Obama. This fits in very well with India’s own concern over clandestine proliferation, especially in its own neighbourhood, which could facilitate the acquisition of nuclear weapons or fissile material by terrorist or a jihadist groups. Excerpts from a presentation made at the Conference on the Atlantic World and Rising Global Powers at Berlin, Germany on 15-16 May 2011 organized by the Council on Foreign Relations, USA and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin. http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/the-future-of-nuclear-nonproliferation-3395.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Pakistan Observer – Pakistan OPINION Friday, June 3, 2011

Issue No. 912, 3 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Terrorism and Pak Nuclear Assets By Ikram Ullah Khan Pakistan is a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) and fighting War on Terror (WoT) for a noble cause the elimination of the curse of terrorism. It is also an obligatory condition for its own self and as well as for the peace and security of world. Pakistani nation always supported this cause and cooperated with its security forces and received the bodies of martyrs with smiling faces. But as seems there are some regional and extra regional players those want to exploit the situation in their own favor. These players are attempting to breach Pakistani Nuclear Command and Control (NC2). In short we can summarized the most desired features of an effective, robust and reliable NC2 as Command ,Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR ). NC2 is not only related to nuclear weapons but it also encompasses the safety, security and survivability of the communications, delivery means (missiles & aircrafts), decision makers and also contingencies planning & training and intra forces coordination along with their “command centers”. The useful combination of C4SIR is obligatory for reliable and robust NC2 for effective nuclear deterrence. Pakistani authorities always declared its NC2 robust & reliable in any circumstances. Pakistan and its allies may or may not be losing this ongoing WoT. But one thing is clear that Pakistan is losing reliability / credibility of its NC2 which is lethal for “minimum credible deterrence.” Here is also another newly added aspect as there are speculations that USA would deploy its troops if Pakistan nukes come under threats, to assist Pakistan even without Pakistani willingness in this respect. In any case if it happened then it would be the end of Pakistani sovereignty and independence. US can do this even under UN flag through UNSC resolution as now it has many incidents to quote regarding failure, insecurity and vulnerability of Pakistan NC2. October 10, 2009 GHQ comes under terrorists attack a very significant command center. Extreme failure of strategic Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence by Pakistan on May 2, 2011 regarding successful execution of “Operation Geronimo “ by USA Navy Seals. The latest one is Terrorist attack on PNS Aviation Base, PNS Mehran on May 23, 2011 to destroy the Navy P-3C Orion aircraft. This is a four-engine turboprop anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft. Former Naval Chief Admiral Afzal Tahir has stated that its induction would be in an obvious reference to India’s growing naval presence. This P-3C Orion aircraft is a typical delivery means to make vulnerable Indians nuclear 2nd strike capability. All these tragic incidents are question mark over Reliability and credibility of Pakistani NC2. Satisfactory answers and concrete practical measures should come on the surface. Anti-Pakistan elements know that its real strength lies in its nuclear capability before any direct engagement with indirect method under the garb of terrorism activities they can breach into its NC2. This situation is putting fuel on fire regarding Indians Cold Start Doctrine; a sort of limited war for limited and precise objectives. Moreover the attack on PNS Mehran to annihilate P-3C Orion aircraft indicates that the offenders / terrorists were well informed and target oriented (target killing?). Terrorists (TTP) accepted the responsibility of this attack have no direct threat from Navy and from P-3C Orion aircraft as they don’t have their so-called safe havens on the Sea. Especially this time the involvement of at state level by anti-Pakistani forces is imminent. These sorts of incidents are exacerbating the threats of attacks on Pakistani strategic facilities in near future. Only a single attack on any Pakistan’s strategic facility either successful or not would make the situation worst for Pakistan. Then nobody would believe on Pakistani statements that we have reliable and robust NC2 and don’t have any need for foreign assistance to guard its nukes in any circumstances. Pakistan Navy spokesperson Commodore Irfan-ul-Haq said that it is not a security lapse and security was on high alert. It is quite contradictory to reality as world has seen the state of readiness as offenders have entered with latest weapons inside PNS-Mehran quite conveniently. Similarly if in future an attack launched by terrorist backed by foreign countries happens on any Pakistani strategic facility it would badly defame Pakistan NC2. I am quite convinced that Pakistani concerned authorities are not oblivious to this threat. But it is up to world to understand the limitation of Pakistan. Pakistani NC2 is quite capable to counter any traditional threats in respect of declared limited war or even first use of nuclear weapons by its neighbor. Pakistan

Issue No. 912, 3 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 has fully reliable and fighting fit operational C4ISR system against its traditional foe. This is the reason that even after Operation Geronimo Pakistani COAS has stated that Indians are even not in a position to think for such action against Pakistan. But this curse of terrorism is much unrelated to judge traditional standards of NC2. Even a country like Russia is not safe from terrorism which has no direct involvement against terrorism as in a suicide attack on January 24, 2011, it lost of 35 people and 130 were injured. This is not a single example July 2005 , London Bombing and the root cause of this WoT the incident of 9/11 are also here to quote. Pakistan is just like battlefield and here are few limitations for Pakistan although it is fighting WoT but it never declared itself war-zone country. Apex court is here to prohibit any extra constitutional steps by law enforcement agencies. Everything is normal except these terrorists’ activities. Pakistan is front line ally of USA but it never received in time strategic intelligence sharing by USA that your specific institution might come under attack. If we examine the situation from this aspect then we can judge that even USA is unable to detect this sort of terrorists’ activities before hand. Now here is a dire need that Pakistan should formulate such strategy in a reasonable balance that neither it ignores Indian threats nor terrorists. Pakistan should procure latest technology and provide necessary refreshers with compliance to this latest technology. http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=95619 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Issue No. 912, 3 June 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL | Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530