General Conclusion
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
General conclusion Though each of the essays here presented contains conclusions perti nent to its subject matter, one can make a few general points based on an impressionistic overall view of Russia's economic development since the earliest times. The first point to be made is that, though Russian economic and social history was full of dramatic interludes, overall economic change was relatively slow and uneven, leaving large areas of the economic landscape unaffected by modern development. Poverty was too long seated and endemic, costs of development too high and the magnitude of the task too overwhelming, for even great advances to make sig nificantly large impacts upon aggregates in the short run. Islands of modern growth were surrounded by seas of traditional or semi traditional economies. The task of first gaining and then sustaining great power status, though it often provided the impetus for development policies, was in the long run among the most pernicious influences upon Russia's ability to sustain an economic effort. It constituted a constant drain on resources away from productive employment, especially as much of Russian military equipment could not be produced domestically. It led to considerable public indebtedness, much of it to foreign coun tries, and to a legacy of monetary anarchy, which in their turn imposed upon the Russian government sets of policies (in the mone tary, commercial and budgetary fields) not always consistent with achieving optimal growth rates. Where the role of the state in the economy is concerned we suggest that a dynamic rather than static approach, indicating an evolving and frequently shifting balance between state policy and market forces, offers the most correct assessment of Russian historical reality. When considered statically, government policy in the economic sphere was rarely monolithic or consistent, not only because government did not speak with one voice, but because military, political and general financial interests took precedence over macroeconomic aims. Never- 218 General conclusion theless it seems to us that under Witte there was a conjuncture of various policies, pursued with great intensity over a relatively long time and entailing a considerable volume of government expenditure, which in interaction with market forces had contributed to an indus trial take-off. Despite tariffs and various interventionist economic policies, the Russian economy evolved in interaction with the international economy; foreign trade in its widest sense was not just a residual as during the Stalinist period in the USSR but constituted a significant proportion of the GNP. Because of the uneven economic advance, Russia as a latecomer scored some advantages as so ably argued by A. Gerschenkron, but was also exposed to many disadvantages and hazards. International diplomatic and military involvements on occa sion aided her and more often compounded her difficulties. It is commonly believed that there was continuity between the industrial strategies of the 1880s and 1890s and under Stalin. While there is no denying that the economic environment and traditions made for certain common features, there was nothing in these earlier policies which in any way approximated to the Stalinist pricing and taxation policies to the detriment of the rural sector, whether as pro ducer or consumer. Neither does the study of the structure of pre revolutionary industry confirm the alleged similarity between Russian and Soviet industrialisation patterns with the emphasis on heavy in dustry. Both in terms of employment and output value industries catering for the mass consumer market were the leaders in the pre- 1914 industrialisation. Though the historian's attention has been rightly focused on large scale industry where the real drama of fast growth rates was taking place and though agriculture was advancing albeit very slowly in terms of yields and techniques, the most promising development, and one most likely to make the recurring theme of direct government in volvement unnecessary in the long run, was the gradual but uninter rupted erosion of the subsistence economy and the growing involve ment of the population and of the country in the market. Unlike the majority of West European countries, which had become market econ omies before the onset of industrialisation, in Russia the creation of a market economy was part of the process of industrialisation. It is because a market meant much more than just effective demand, or the use of money in exchange, or even good transport facilities, but also confidence in the stability of the currency, a proper credit organis ation, a system of reliable and enforceable law, and knowledge which came from the experience of the operation of market forces, that the stabilisation of the currency, its convertibility into gold, the banking General conclusion 219 and fiscal policies of the state from the 1860s onwards were so impor tant. However much one might argue that alternative sets of policies might have induced more and faster growth, infusion of confidence and the development of a business mentality were in the long run most important. Though, as with all modern development, the balance of advantage was often with the expansion of the large concern based on advanced technology, Russian development offered still before 1914 much scope for small-scale autonomous entrepreneurship which was constantly surfacing anew and displaying great resilience. From the socio-political point of view the continuous existence and vitality of small and medium business units was a positive phenomenon in the evolution of Russia. It was however cut short by the policies of War Communism during 1918-21 and of the late 1920s when the collectivisation drive and the attack on Nepmen effectively removed all scope for any size able legal autonomous entrepreneurship. Glossary arshin- measure of length equal to 28 inches or 71 em. barshchina - labour obligation of peasants desyatina- a land measure equal to 2·7 acres dvor- peasant homestead guberniya - an administrative area, province ispravnik -local government official kazyonnaya palata - treasury office kopek (copeck)- a Russian coin, 1/100 of a rouble krugovaya poruka -joint liability for taxes and dues kustar- peasant engaged in cottage industry ministerstvo gossudarstven'!)'kh imushchestv- ministry of state domains mir- peasant commune obrok- quitrent paid by peasants in cash and kind odnodvortsy- 'One-homesteaders'. State peasants descended from the small servitors on the southern frontiers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries polovnik - share cropper pomeshchik - fief holder, noble landowner pomestye- until the eighteenth century a fief: later a general term for an estate owned by nobles pood- weight equal to 36 lb. possessional workers - workers attached to the factory not the person of factory owner szlachta- Polish nobility udel - land belonging to members of the Imperial family uyezd- district, subdivision of a gouberniya vedro -liquid measure equal to 3·25 gallons versta - verst, measure of length equal to 0·66 miles volost'- subdivision of a district, territorial commune yassak - a tax in furs paid by non-Orthodox subjects of the Tsar zhalovannaya gramota - charter Notes CHAPTER 1 Raymond W. Goldsmith, 'The economic growth of Tsarist Russia 1860-- 1913', in Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 9, pt n (1961) pp. 441-75. 2 A. Gerschenkron, 'The rate of growth of industrial production in Russia since 1885', Journal of Economic History, VII-s (1947). 3 A. Madison, Economic growth in Japan and the USSR (London, 1969) p. I 04. 4 Seep. 112, this study. By 1913 the weight of Russia's pig iron production in the total of five most advanced countries rose from 3·7 in 1890 to 6·5 per cent in 1913, demand for cotton from 7·8 to 12 per cent; but industrial output was not more than 3·14 of total world output. 5 ]. F. Karcz (ed.), Soviet and East European agriculture (Berkeley, 1967) p. 250; A. Kahan, 'Natural calamities and their effect upon the food supply in Russia', Jahrbikher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, bd 16/68. 6 A. Baykov, 'The economic development of Russia', Economic History Review, VII (1954) pp. 137-49. 7 Even in the first three centuries there were already elements of relative backwardness. Large-scale landed property was late to emerge and only very incipient features of a feudal system were in evidence. More impor tantly having acquired their Christianity through the medium of Church Slavonic, not Greek, the Russians made no contact with original Byzan tine written work, and there is little evidence of any body of conceptual law, of speculative thought, or political theory. 8 There is evidence too that this rigid state-organised system became necessary when massive increases in taxation burdens coupled with the lure of new lands to the east and south resulted in mass flights from the centre in the second half of the sixteenth and the early seventeenth century. 9 K. Kocharovsky, Sotsyal'ny stroy Rossii (Prague, 1926) p. 13. 10 J. Hicks, A theory of economic history (London, 1969). 11 P. G. Ryndzyunsky, 'Gorodskoye naseleniye', in M. K. Rozhkova (ed.), Ocherki ekonomicheskoy istorii Rossii . •• (Moscow, 1959) pp. 276-358. 12 Gerschenkron, Europe in the Russian miffor (London, 1970) lecture 3. 224 Notes 13 Ibid. 14 M. Tugan-Baranovsky, Russkayafabrika, 3rd ed. (Leningrad, 1934) p. 12. 15 P. Struve, Kriticheskiye zametki (St Petersburg, 1904) p. 83. 16 Tugan-Baranovsky, op. cit., pp. 105 ff. and V. K. Yatsunsky in Rozhkova, loc. cit., p. 226. 17 A. Kahan, 'Continuity in economic activity and policy during the post Petrine period in Russia', Journal of Economic History, vol. xxv, no. I (Mar 1965). 18 D. Landes, Cambridge Economic History, vol. VI, pt 1, p. 286. A. Kahan, 'The costs of "Westernization" in Russia', Slavic Review, vol. xxv, no. 1 (Mar 1966). 19 Yatsunsky, loc. cit., pp. 174 ff. 20 B. Kafengaus, Voprosy Istorii, no. 7 (1962) pp.