Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Research Paper: Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore, April 1980
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Description of document: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) research paper: Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore, April 1980 Requested date: 01-July-2015 Released date: 02-December-2015 Posted date: 04-January-2016 Source of document: Freedom of Information Act Request Information and Privacy Coordinator Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505 Fax: 703-613-3007 Filing a FOIA Records Request Online The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website. Central Intelligence Agency Washington,• D.C. 20505 2 December 2015 Reference: F-2015-02095 This is a final response to your 1July2015 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for "a copy of the following six CIA documents: 1. FDD-6440, World Press Treatment of the Use of Gas in Vietnam (translation), May 6, 1965. 2. Potential Implications of Trends in World Population, Food Production and Climate, August 1974. 3. A Study of Climatological Research as it Pertains to Intelligence Problems, August 1974. 4. China: The Coal Industry, November 1976. 5. Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore, April 1980, XD-OSD/NA. 6. The Biological and Chemical Warfare Threat, January 1997." We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3141, as amended. Our processing included a search for records as described in our 22 July 2015 acceptance letter. We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and located the enclosed three documents, consisting of 114 pages, which we determined are releasable to you in their entirety. Because you are entitled to the first 100 pages free, and the cost for the remaining pages is minimal, in accordance with our regulations, as a matter of administrative discretion, there is no charge for processing your request. Sincerely, /llfLJ}~ Michael Lavergne Information and Privacy Coordinator Enclosures C00036554 Approv€d for Re!~a~e Date _ _AP..RJ98lL- "" C00036554 DECEPTION RESEARCH PROGRAM Everest Consulting Associates Princeton Jct., New Jersey and Mathtech, Inc. Princeton, New Jersey and OAD/ClA Analytic Methodology Research Division June 1981 "DECEPTION MAXIMS: FACT AND FOLKLORE" J , J / Office of Research and Developmen i Central Intelligence Ageflcy, Washington, DC 20505. Telephone (703) 351-3458 I C00036554 I I I I I I I I I I I I This documenr is a research paper prepared by the 6ecept.'on Research Program staff Cof the Office of Research and Development of the Central Intelligence Agency. As such, the views and conclusions contained herein are I those of the research staff and should not be interpreted as necessarify representing the official position, either e)(pressed or implied, of the Centraf Intelligence Agency. I I I The Dancing F<.Jun, the fogo on the cover, ;s the Greco-Roman fi~ure emblemat ic of the work of the London Controlling Section, the secrer organization I founded by Churchill lo plan the stratagems that would leave Hitter puzzled as we// as beaten. I I C00036554 DECEPTION MAXIMS: FACT AND FOLKLORE ABSTRACT Th;~ deceptions maxims discussed in this report represent the synthesis of a number of historical case studies. These case studies are part of an ORD exploratory research program on deception. It is anticipated that these maxims and other results from this research will aid intelligence analysts in thinking about the problem of deception and in detecting, analyzing and evaluating foreign deception schemes relevant to current intelligence problems. Deception Research Program June 1981 I C00036554--~~~~~~~~ TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUC'r ION I AN ASIDE: REMARKS ON THE DATA BASE 2 THE DECEPTION MAXIMS 4 Maxim 1: Magruder•s Principle--the Exploitation of Preconceptions 5 Maxim 2: Limitations to Human Information Processing 10 Maxim 3: The M~ltiple Forms of Surprise 15 Maxim 4: Jones' Lemma 21 Maxim 5: A Choice Among Types of Deception 22 Maxim 6: Axel~od's Contribution: The Husbanding of Assets 2 7 Maxim 1: ..'\ Sequencing Rule 3 2 Maxim 8: The Importance of Feedback 33 Maxim 9 : "The Monkey' s Paw" 3 6. Maxim 10: Care in the Design of Planned Placement of Deceptive Material 41 TURNING THESE AROUND: IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTER-DECE~TION 46 A NEED TO BROADEN THE PERSPECTIVE 4 6 FOOTNOTES 48 PEFERENCES 51 c-oo-6365.s4·'----------------------~- I I I Figures I I 1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DECEPTION, PRECONCEPTION AND SURPRISE I 2. THE 'LORE' OF SMALL NUMBERS: SOME EVIDENCE IN THE POLITICAL MILITARY DIME~SION 12 I 3. DESE~SITIZATION BY FALSE ALERTS--SOME HISTORICAL QUOTJ?S AND A TONQUE-IN-CHEEK I DECISION RULE FOR THEIR ELIMINATION 17 4. DECEPTION, CRY-WOLF SYNDROME AND SUR PRISE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT I OF FOLKLORE 18 I s. A CO~CISE STATEMENT OF AXELROD'S GAME 31 I I I I I I I I I C00036554-.-..~.._.. ._._ ________________ ~~~~~- Introduction The past several years have witnessed a substantial growth of interest in the role and effica~y of deception and surprise in military and political affairs. This growth has been reflected in an increased number of scholarly analyses on the subject1 and spurred by the release of some of the most cl')sely held secrets of World War II.2 As well, political scientists, sociologiats, intelliqence analysts, and others have explored and codified theory and hypotheses relevant to misperception, failures and cognitive biases in intelli9ence analyses, and other related topics. 3 It seems appropriate to explore, integrate, and summarize this work into a unified body of knowled9·e. To help catalyze this synthesis, several hypotheses or maxims relevant to deception and surprise are offered herein. These maxims have been distilled from historical accounts, summarized from analytical expositions, and extracted from conversations with some of the leading deception planners of World War II vintage. They are ventured as hypotheses for further testin9 and analysis, much in the spirit of Jervis' useful "Hypotheses on M:i.sperception11 (14) a work which influer"ced both format and content of this paper. The wisdom of some of these I l C00036554•,-.-.._._.._._..... ._ ........ ___________________ ~~- maxims, however, can be supported from historical evidence. Others emer9e from relevant social science theory, decision analysis, and/or game theory. Finally, some are· suggested by anecdotal rnat~ria.l and, though plausible, are untested and of unknown generality. An 1'.s i de : Remarks 2fi the Data ~ Elsewhere in this paper, reference will be made to analyses based upon an historical data base. This data base was prepared by Dr. Barton Whaley, then of M.I.T., as part of an ongoing research effort on deception. From Alam el Halfa to Y\lgoslavia, the data base currently consists of over fifty quantitative and qualitative attributes of 232 military ~ngagernents over the period 1914 to 1973. Data elements include categorical attributes (e.q., was deception ~mployed, was surprise achieved, did the attack plan reflect the opponent's preconceptions, etc.) as well as quantitative variables (e.q., strengths, casualties, etc.). For many entries in this data base, there is 9eneral agreement I among the various source materials consulted. For some, however, the data were more ambiguous or even I contradictory. Finally, there are cases for which some data are missing entirely and reasonable estimates I I I 2 C00036554 I I I inserted and/or indirect evidence used as a surrogate. Despite these difficulties, the evidence for many of the I conclusions drawn in this paper is sufficiently strong I that the analysis is robust to even substantial errors of omission/commission. Both strategic and tactical I level engagements on land, sea, and air are include-d. In analyzing a subset of these data in his I manuscript, Stratagem, Dr. Whaley presented numerous cross-tabulations, sorts, counts, trends, etc. as raw or I summarized data but omitted vari1.::ms statistical tests of I hypothesis. This oruission was jeliberate, reflecting two considerations; I First, the major battles constituted nearly an I exhaustive sample.4 If the population is viewed as I finite, i.e., only those battles that actually took place in this time period, then statistical tests I are unnecessary as the variances of all estimates are essentially zero. This was the assumption in I Whaley's original analysis. However, i£ the I battles themselves are regarded as a sample from a larger population - i.e., battle situations that I might have occur.red, then statistical methods are appropriate and, indeed, are necessary. I I I 3 C00036554 I I I Second, the tactical en9a9ements contained in the data base constitute what is termed a convenience I sample rather than a random sample (inter alia a I function of data availability) and may not be fully representative. Thus, statistical tests of I hypotheses could be misleadinq -- but then so too would be counts, cross-tabulations, etc.