• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text

THO FACTSHEET November 22, 2017 A Brief History of U.S.-Turkey Tensions (1960-2017) In early October, the arrest of a Turkish employee at the U.S. consulate in Istanbul prompted Washington to take an unprecedented, retaliatory measure. The U.S. announced it would suspend non-immigrant services in Turkey, its NATO ally of more than sixty years. Turkey responded in kind. While the crisis has recently been partially diffused, the spat has been called the lowest point in U.S.-Turkey relations.1 Yet the two governments have had their difficulties before. As a CFR task force described in a 2012 report, “a mythology surrounds U.S.-Turkey relations, suggesting that Washington 2 and Ankara have, through six decades, worked closely and with little friction.” While the overarching relationship remains strategic and important, here are some of the notably sour moments. June of 1964 Exchange of Letters Between President Late 1960’s Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu Sixth Fleet Clashes over Cyprus Turkish anti-American sentiment grew rapidly over ACTORS these years, particularly from left-wing elements U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Turkey’s Prime concerned with Turkey’s perceived dependence Minister (PM) Ismet Inonu on the U.S. and NATO. Protests often focused on the presence of American servicemen in Turkey, CONTEXT the privileges they enjoyed, and a general desire Ethnic tensions and violence in Cyprus (home to a for a non-aligned Turkey (“bagimsiz Turkiye”). sizeable ethnic Turkish minority) led Turkey to Mass demonstrations and violent clashes broke consider an invasion of the island. out during several U.S. Sixth Fleet visits. INCIDENT U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a letter to his Turkish counterpart Ismet Inonu. He warned that a Turkish invasion of Cyprus could provoke U.S.S.R. involvement in any potential conflict, and that, if so, Turkey’s NATO allies might not automatically come to Turkey’s aid. Johnson also warned against the use of U.S. military equipment in any potential invasion. The 1971-1974 letter was leaked to the Turkish press and spurred a Opium Crisis wave of anti-Americanism. A 1964 CIA analysis of the situation stated bluntly that “Johnson’s letter has done ACTORS more to set back United States Turkish relations than U.S. Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, any other single act” and that “the general consensus Turkey’s PMs Suleyman Demirel, Nihat Erim, and was that this letter makes it almost mandatory for Bulent Ecevit Turkey to become more independent of the United States in the field of international relations.” CONTEXT As an increasingly damaging wave of opium and RESOLUTION heroin addiction was sweeping across the U.S., Turkey ultimately did not invade Cyprus. That same President Nixon sought to curtail its importation month, PM Inonu visited Washington to discuss the into the U.S. Turkey was a significant producer Cyprus situation with President Johnson.3 (and exporter to the U.S.) of opium poppy, and it was a lucrative crop for Turkish farmers. 2 1971-1974 Opium Crisis (Continued) INCIDENT In the late sixties, U.S. officials began pushing 1974-1978 Ankara to crack down on or abolish opium Cyprus Intervention and U.S. Arms production. The politically weak regime of Suley- man Demirel found it impossible to accede to Embargo U.S. demands, as such a move would be fiercely ACTORS unpopular with Anatolian farmers. The general Turkish public was opposed as well, viewing it as Turkey’s PM Bulent Ecevit, U.S. President another instance of American priorities superced- Gerald Ford ing those of their allies. After the 1971 coup, CONTEXT newly appointed PM Nihat Erim did ban opium Responding to the persecution of Cyprus’ ethnic production, a move that was predictably very Turkish minority, PM Bulent Ecevit sent Turkish unpopular. In 1974, PM Bulent Ecevit reversed troops to the island in July of 1974. the ban. INCIDENT RESOLUTION Turkey’s intervention was widely condemned by Ecevit’s reversal of the ban was also accompa- the global community, with the U.S. among this nied by some measures that regulated opium’s contingent. On February 5, 1975, Congress sale and distribution. This blunted Washington’s imposed an arms embargo on its NATO ally against displeasure. In any case, Turkey’s Cyprus inter- the Ford administration’s wishes. From Ankara’s vention in 1974 made opium a secondary issue in U.S.- 4 perspective, this move was both symbolically and Turkey relations. practically unacceptable – Turkish honor was wounded, and around 90% of the Turkish armed forces’ equipment was American-made. In retalia- tion, the Turkish government closed down a number of American installations and proscribed operations at Incirlik and Izmir bases; non-NATO operations were forbidden. Steven V. Roberts of the New York Times reported that in Ankara, “many April of 1987 Turks and Americans here agree that relations Genocide Controversy between Ankara and Washington ‘will never be the same again.’” Actions and threats by the U.S. House of Representatives concerning aid limits, Turkey’s RESOLUTION presence in Cyprus, and a draft resolution On September 26, 1978, Congress lifted the arms acknowledging the Armenian Genocide led to embargo, and U.S. use of bases in Turkey the cancellation of Turkish President Kenan 5 6 returned to pre-embargo status. Evren’s planned trip to the U.S. October of 1989 Genocide Controversy As Congress mulled over a draft resolution recog- nizing the Armenian Genocide, Ankara retaliated by October of 1992 freezing military relations and blocking F-16 flights 7 USS Saratoga, Muavenet Incident from Incirlik Air Base. The USS Saratoga fired upon the Turkish destroyer Muavenet during NATO exercises, killing five soldiers. 3 1994 Human Rights Report Turkey told the U.S. it would reject military aid after Congress decided to withhold a portion of funding pending a human rights report. The Senate flirted with adding a condition that military aid not go towards Turkey’s domestic security concerns. President Clinton eventually signed a bill detailing 1998 that 10 percent of aid should go towards human Turkish Refusal to Allow U.S. Usage of rights causes in Cyprus and southeast Turkey, but Turkey’s Bases to Bomb Iraq Turkey rejected that portion of the aid package.8 Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish deputy prime minister and the leader of one of the parties that made up the coalition government, came out against Turkey’s cooperation with a U.S. military campaign 2000 against Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime. Ecevit Armenian Genocide Resolution thought Turkey’s regional interests would be hurt by Ankara’s involvement in any military action. When the U.S. Congress considered recognizing “Unless diplomacy is exhausted, a military opera- the Armenian Genocide, Turkey threatened to tion will be dangerous and Turkey will suffer the 9 scale back military-to-military ties, including consequences,” he said. curtailing U.S. use of Incirlik Air Base.10 March of 2003 Invasion of Iraq Vote ACTORS July of 2003 U.S. President George W. Bush, Turkey’s PM Abdullah Gul Hood Incident CONTEXT ACTORS Under the pretext of disarming Saddam Hussein’s Turkey’s PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan purported cache of weapons of mass destruction, a coalition of countries led by the U.S. sought to invade Iraq. CONTEXT The U.S. wanted to launch a second front from Turkey Turkey had intermittently kept troops in Northern and asked its NATO partner for permission to do so. Iraq since the 1990’s in its fight against the PKK, INCIDENT and Turkey had long been sensitive to the poten- tial irridentist claims of Iraqi Kurdistan. The U.S. offered a 15 billion dollar aid package should Turkey vote in favor of the motion, but the INCIDENT impending war was deeply unpopular in Turkey (polls A few months after the invasion of Iraq, U.S. showed 80% disapproval). The recently elected AK soldiers detained a group of Turkish special forces Party brought the vote to Parliament. Approval for in Iraqi Kurdistan. Hoods were placed over their U.S. deployment fell just short of the majority, and heads as they were led to interrogation, where the measure was defeated. The U.S. was shocked they were held for sixty hours. Turkey’s PM Recep by Parliament’s decision. Scholar Soner Cagaptay Tayyip Erdogan called the event “a totally ugly wrote that “the Iraq War vote strained U.S.-Turkish incident,” and it was widely viewed in Turkey as relations more than any other military conflict to date. an insult to Turkish pride. Many in Washington took a hostile view of Turkey for not supporting the United States in the War.” RESOLUTION Both sides expressed “regret” in a joint statement, RESOLUTION but resentment lingered in Turkey. To many Turkish Turkey allowed logistical support for the war effort to citizens, the incident was viewed as retaliation for flow through Incirlik, and the base proved invaluable their country’s refusal to participate in the invasion. to the U.S. campaign. Turkey’s “no” vote, however, A nationalist film depicting the event in a particularly 12 led the U.S. to exclude Turkey from a decision-mak- negative light became a blockbuster hit in Turkey. ing role in post-war Iraq.11 4 July of 2016 Coup Attempt On the night of July 15, a violent coup attempt took place in Turkey. The Turkish government blamed exiled, U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gulen. Ankara was disappointed by Washington’s lackluster gestures of support for the elected government. Turkish officials were further frustrated by a perceived lack of alacrity on Washington’s part 13 May of 2017 concerning Turkey’s request for Gulen’s extradition.

Load more

  4

Copy Link