Jaded Optimists: the Young Guns of Foreign Policy

Culture & Society

Jaded Optimists The Young Guns of Foreign Policy John Hallett Norris

There are two central truisms regarding the foreign policy John Hallett Norris is Special Adviser to the profession in the United States. President of the Inter- One: The post-World War II crop of diplomats—Dean national Crisis Group. He previously served in Acheson, George Kennan, Paul Nitze, Averell Harriman, both the State Depart and others—represented a golden age when men of honor ment and the U.S. Agency for Interna and wisdom guided the United States with a steady hand and tional Development. remarkable vision as they held the Soviets in check and The opinions expressed in this article are his molded modern institutions ranging from NATO to the own. World Bank. Two: Things have pretty much gone to hell in a hand-basket ever since, with the foreign policy field increasingly dominated by partisans, ideologues, and the shortsighted, as a once-proud profession has been reduced to little more than a special inter- est lobby bent on personal indulgence. Yearning for the elitism of the forties, fifties, and early six- ties has become fashionable. Yet, as extensive conversations with young American foreign policy professionals reveal, much of the current conventional wisdom regarding the next generation of foreign policymakers is remarkably wrongheaded.

The “New” Elitists? The adulation of the generation of post-World War II foreign policymakers expressed by today’s pundits borders on an embarrassing crush. Walter Isaacson

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and Evan Thomas, in The Wise Men, I.M. Destler, Les Gelb, and Tony Lake describe Dean Acheson, Averell Harri- bemoaned that U.S. foreign policy had man, Charles Bohlen, and Robert Lovett become “far more partisan and ideolog- as men who forged a common belief both ical,” with experts “spending more time, “in America’s sacred destiny—and their energy, and passion in fighting ourselves own.”1 The authors portray foreign policy than we have in trying, as a nation, to giants gliding between a patrician world understand and deal with a rapidly of high finance and Georgetown foreign changing world.”7 policy salons, their shared values “nur- Each of the aforementioned authors tured in prep schools, at college clubs, in offer token caveats that they think it is the boardrooms of Wall Street, and at unrealistic to go back to the “good old dinner parties in Washington.”2 days.” Nonetheless, the sense of nostalgia Fareed Zakaria argues in his most is overwhelming. Zakaria insists that recent book that the Anglo-American “what we need in politics today is not elite “embodied certain values—fair play, more democracy but less,”8 while Lake decency, liberty, and a Protestant sense and Gelb noted with sadness that, “just as of mission—that helped set the standards war had become too important to be left for society.”3 John Judis enthuses about to the generals, foreign policy was now

To some, establishment elites represented an almost Athenian ideal.

an elite that developed policies “based on too important to be left to the diplo fact and knowledge,” as “they nourished mats.”9 All the more striking, then, that public trust in government by defending one of the original Wise Men, George and explaining complex decisions that Kennan, felt that even in 1938 the pub the ordinary voter did not have time to lic had too much say in public affairs, study.”4 suggesting the establishment of a “benev Given the view that establishment olent despotism”—a benevolence that he elites represented an almost Athenian felt should include denying the vote to ideal, it is no surprise that the “new” elit women, blacks, and immigrants, with the ists find much to dislike in the current country governed by an “enlightened environment. Zakaria denounces an elite” to be “selected on the basis of indi “unwieldy system, unable to govern or vidual fitness for authority.”10 command the respect of the people,” and driven by a “simple-minded populism.”5 Not Your Father’s Oldsmobile. Judis laments an age during which deci The subtext of the new elitist arguments sions to use force are often motivated by is that America would be better served if “transient political pressures and passing the ladder could be pulled back up and a diplomatic fancies.”6 small cadre of great foreign policy Upon closer inspection, the “new” thinkers could steer the ship of state. elitists are expressing well-worn ideas. In These authors neglect to mention that it their 1984 book, Our Own Worst Enemy, was an insular and Groton-educated elite

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(Mac Bundy graduated summa cum laude at America’s young foreign policy profes- age sixteen) that led us into Vietnam sionals have come of age at a time when without understanding the situation on the United States’s role as the lone super the ground. It was also the same foreign power has been unquestioned. They have policy elite that engineered the Bay of lived their entire adult lives in general Pigs, “lost” China to the Communists, peacetime; few question the need for the and sat on its hands during the 1956 United States to be broadly engaged in the Hungarian uprising. world. America’s social, economic, polit The notion of a handful of barons ical, and military influence is seen as part controlling U.S. foreign policy runs of a broad international superstructure. directly counter to both common sense This new generation is smart, reflexively and important trends. Today’s young for- ironic, curiously insecure, and, like most eign policy practitioners are far more Americans, far less willing to work for any diverse than in the past, and they are likely company or institution for a lifetime. to hail from upper middle class families They are also defined by both remarkable in Cherry Hill, New Jersey (birthplace of strengths and a lingering unease with the strip mall), or Vidalia, Georgia assuming leadership that could prove to (known more for its onion festival than its be an Achilles heel. internationalism) than the elite estates of New England. One young Foreign Service After the Fall. The end of the Cold Officer from Redwood City, California War opened up an unprecedented flood- joked that many people mistakenly think gate of confusion and opportunity for he works for the U.S. Forest Service. young internationalists, and offered a In contrast to their predecessors, most missed chance to revolutionize how the of these young professionals possessed United States organizes its foreign policy. considerable international exposure Here the generation gap is profound. before selecting their careers. In the past, Consider the story of Martina Vanden- many internationalists received their ini- berg, thirty-four, a researcher at Human tial exposure to the world while in the Rights Watch: “In 1991, I was studying employ of Uncle Sam, shaping their command and control of Soviet nuclear opinion of the world upon arriving at weapons and the politicization of the their first military or diplomatic post. Soviet military under Gorbachev. Sud This new cohort has gone out into the denly I went from being a political scien world-backpacking through Central tist to being a historian—literally America, studying abroad in Europe, overnight.”11 attending parliamentary exchange While in Russia during 1990, Van- groups-and then made a conscious deci denberg met a woman who had been sion that it wanted to work in interna raped by a neighbor. Angered that the tional affairs. This new generation has a Russian police had told the woman to “go fundamentally different view of America’s home and sleep it off,” Vandenberg place in the world: one that is less overtly became determined to start a rape crisis nationalistic and more accepting of the center in Moscow.12 Only twenty-two at overlapping layers of interaction that the time, she received a “bevy of rejection now define relations among modern letters” from international foundations states. when she spelled out her proposal.13 Her

Winter/Spring 2004 [81] JADED OPTIMISTS vision deferred, she took a temporary job lectuals.18 Hillen argues, “with no central with the U.S. Department of Agriculture organizing proposition about the way the working out of the U.S. embassy moni world should work and what America’s toring the distribution of 100,000 tons role in it should be, the public lost inter of dairy products, an effort that led one est. The threat was gone.”19 diplomat to dub her the “butter lady.”14 As Vandenberg put it, “by day I was the The Lost 1990s. During much of butter lady, but by night a group of radi- the 1990s, national leaders of both par cal feminists would come to my house ties shamefully neglected foreign policy. and we would plot and plan and talk.”15 The leading lights of U.S. foreign policy After a year and a half the rape crisis cen- appeared mystified as how to sell U.S. ter got off the ground and is still running foreign affairs to the general public in the today. Vandenberg recognizes that the absence of the Soviet menace, and were end of the Cold War “allowed me and the slow to see the entrepreneurial prospects others to create organizations from readily apparent to those like Vandenberg nothing—something that would have and Hillen. The Gingrich revolution been totally impossible, completely brought to Washington a group of Con- unheard of, just eight months before.”16 gressmen who wore their disdain for While young people in the field were events beyond our shores as a badge of presented with a bonanza, many grey- populist honor. Military and humanitar beards lamented the collapse of policy ian debacles in Somalia, Rwanda, and structures that disappeared along with the Bosnia fed a sense that the foreign policy calculus of containment. John Hillen, establishment was not only in disarray, thirty-six, a former army captain and but also badly out of touch. Due to bud veteran of the first Gulf War, comments get constraints, the Foreign Service exam on the end of the Cold War, “it would be was not even offered in 1995. an understatement to say that this was All of this shows the danger of having close to home for me, because I was liter small elites in charge of foreign policy. ally patrolling the inter-German border The elders of the foreign policy commu- the night the wall went down. My unit nity failed to convince America that it had responsibility for 196 kilometers of needed to support foreign affairs— iron curtain that disappeared on despite the fact that there was a larger November 9, 1989.”17 natural constituency for foreign policy In Hillen’s view, the fundamental re- than ever before: More than 20 million altering of the landscape presented new American jobs are now linked to interna- choices and persistent ambiguity. Gone tional investment, tourism, and trade; was the traditional pathway for career More than 700 American municipalities progression, specializing in Cold War are in Sister City programs; and U.S. issues such as strategic military affairs or states maintain more than 160 offices nuclear doctrine. Topics traditionally at overseas to help promote trade and the bottom of the pecking order—devel- tourism. Millions of Americans now fol opment, peacekeeping, public health, low events in countries across the world and women’s issues—quickly gained new on the Internet. prominence in the “eat what you can kill” The idea that a small elite of foreign environment facing foreign policy intel- policy experts can handle the vast and

[82] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs NORRIS Culture & Society increasingly decentralized portfolio of world, in addition to being a Foreign America’s interactions with the world is Service officer, that can satisfy those laughable. Yet, because many foreign interests and, in some ways, even satisfy policy leaders were appalled by the them better.”20 prospects of leaving the cozy confines of The lack of enthusiasm for stamping the Council on Foreign Relations and visas is so common as to be almost explaining their work (and its worth) to emblematic among these young profes the public, the foreign policy community sionals. With thousands of NGOs now as a whole did an atrocious job defending working around the globe, there are itself. With all the ammunition it needed many opportunities—albeit often low- to build a broad constituency outside the paying ones—for people to get their boots Beltway for positive international dirty and take on responsibility at an early engagement, most foreign policy leaders age. There is comparatively limited could only invoke Robert Kaplan-esque appeal in sitting in a heavily fortified warnings of plague and civil war—the U.S. embassy amid vintage 1960s fur closest specter they could marshal to the nishings reviewing visa applications and “clearer than the truth” rationales of the writing heavily-edited cables. Cold War. While the Foreign Service has recently The irony is obvious. At a time when made strides toward reform, this trans- the world is becoming more inter-con- formation has been slow. The time from nected than ever before, and the term taking the initial Foreign Service exam to “globalization” is thrown around with being offered a job can stretch well past a mind-numbing regularity, the wealthi- year, and the private sector pays better. est and most powerful nation on Earth Foreign Service officers are expected to failed to reach out to its own citizens commit to three-year rotations, a long with a vested interest in events beyond timeframe for a generation weaned on our shores. frequent job changes and remarkable workplace flexibility. Moreover, Foreign A Chill at Foggy Bottom. While Service careers are daunting for working the increasingly egalitarian nature of couples. the foreign policy field may rankle Rob Chase, thirty-five, spent his teens some, it is a healthy development. With in Morocco where his father ran the U.S. increasing opportunities in the foreign foreign aid program. Chase is now a pro- policy arena, traditional bastions such fessor of international economics at as the Foreign Service have had to do Johns Hopkins, and he sees foreign pol- something that they rarely had to do in icy as a domain where “the ethos of a the past: compete for talent. While mandarin class” has traditionally pre- budgets and morale have bounced vailed, and where people were drawn to under Secretary of State Colin Powell, the work because it felt “more valuable, the Foreign Service is no longer the first more exciting, and more honorable.”21 choice of many of the best and brightest. While Chase finds many of his students Derek Chollet, thirty-two, a Senate driven by a similar desire to blend duty staffer, comments, “For people inter- and globetrotting, what was once a small ested in international affairs there are mandarin class has expanded immensely. just more things that you can do in the The sense of “being in an inner circle of

Winter/Spring 2004 [83] JADED OPTIMISTS people who are the ones that set foreign activity abroad is embedded within an policy, that exclusive clubishness, is dissi interlocking, and sometimes competing, pating.”22 Chase contends, “it is a very series of institutions, interests, and laissez faire attitude—you’ve got the gov- strategic considerations. ernment as one actor, and you’ve got business as another, and you’ve got the Taking on the World? The con NGO community as a third, and the tentious post-9/11 environment has press as a fourth. You have lots of actors opened up important political fissures in each of these estates and none of them among these young professionals. Jen has paramount sovereignty.”23 nifer Windsor, thirty-eight, the Execu- Chase argues, “if you believe in the tive Director of Freedom House, a non- marketplace of ideas you don’t need the partisan NGO specializing in democracy Star Chamber, you don’t need the people promotion, notes, “we have seen a more guiding the policy from either the State polarized political foreign policy debate Department, or the National Security re-emerge after 9/11.”25 She argues, “one Council, or academia. If you believe that of the main divisions is between those the marketplace of ideas is going to allow who have involved themselves in and things to move toward improving the sit- defined themselves by the Cold War uation, let it.”24 While this “let a thou struggle, and those that have come after sand flowers bloom” approach may not wards. Some people are using some of necessarily create a more coherent U.S. the same rhetoric from the Cold War and foreign policy, it does allow a broader set applying it to the war against terrorism.”26 of actors to influence how policy is set— Those serving in the administration, a shift from the insularity that helped particularly Republican political foster some of America’s more notable appointees, argue that America is now foreign policy blunders. pulling together behind a greater sense of Operating absent the lodestar of the national purpose. This is not just politics; Cold War can at times be muddy busi- the sentiment is underpinned by a gen ness. Yet, among this newer generation, uine desire to defend the national inter- there is little desire for a bumper sticker est. They continue to be hopeful that the foreign policy; the concept of a single country will remain steadfast in support operating principle feels outdated and of the president’s foreign policy vision. dangerous to many of these young pro Many of those outside of government fessionals. They see the world as complex feel the administration has gone astray. and America’s interactions with it multi- Independent and Democratic young for- tudinous. Simple, straightforward eign policy professionals sharply ques schemes that encompass something as tion whether America’s position is vast as the national interest, covering strengthened by an approach they view as everything from economics, security, the often unilateral and arrogant. They environment, public health, immigra- would prefer to see a more complex tion, law enforcement, and beyond, carry matrix of resources and tools used to a whiff of alchemy. This younger genera- advance U.S. interests. Anthony Richter, tion cannot imagine all foreign policy thirty-nine, the Director of the Central designs flowing from a single wellspring Eurasia Project at the Open Society in a world where almost every American Institute, maintains that the “securitiza

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tion of foreign policy flows back not only that the post-Cold War generation “has into government, but really into military not yet raised leaders capable of evoking a and intelligence, for setting the policies commitment to a consistent and long- and priorities of how we interact with the range foreign policy.”29 British historian world is very striking. The intellectual, Niall Ferguson has similarly labeled the political, the financial momentum is America “an empire in denial,” whose with the Pentagon and with the intelli- natural anti-imperialism has blinded it gence community.”27 He argues that in a to its own sweeping responsibilities.30 dangerous development the military has Given their slim record of military become “a defining discourse for dealing experience, few of America’s young for with the world.”28 eign policy professionals have been tested The splits among this cohort over for in life and death situations. This has left eign policy during this tumultuous period some in the military to complain that the are natural, but striking, given that many new generation of diplomats simply does of these young professionals are normally not understand. Indeed, one young for tepid partisans. Because they do not eign policy scholar confided, “I may be enjoy the remarkable financial and polit- an aberration, but it is sort of incredible ical connections that were the trademark if you think about it. I sit here and pon- of the traditional establishment, many of tificate about what the U.S. should or these individuals have instead been quite should not do with regard to military adept at finding patrons rather than ide- force all the time, and yet I don’t know ology. Knowing it was the best way to shit about the military.”31 In contrast, punch their tickets, they worked in Georgetown professor Daniel Byman, offices on the Hill or as trusted special thirty-four, argues that the lack of mili

Among this newer generation, little desire exists for a bumper sticker foreign policy.

assistants to senior policymakers and tary experience during the Clinton traded off these connections. Before administration often left the Pentagon 9/11, many viewed the differences with a free hand: “Most people thought between the parties largely as Coke and ‘the military is being ignored, they are Pepsi. In areas like trade or China policy, being disrespected.’ The result was that there seemed to be little difference no one could question the military, between administrations for a generation because who knew enough?”32 notoriously averse to joining bowling Asking young U.S. foreign policy leagues or political parties. leaders about their heroes is fascinating. Almost to a person, they struggle to name Leadership in an Un-Heroic contemporary American political figures Age. Perhaps the more important ques- they view heroically. For those between tion is whether this generation has the twenty-five and forty, no administration force of personality to exercise leader- has been without blanket media coverage ship. Henry Kissinger has complained that has glaringly exposed the flaws of

Winter/Spring 2004 [85] JADED OPTIMISTS public figures. Many insist that we live in bombed out remnants of 1948. All of a a time in which there is “too much infor- sudden it made sense to me that I was mation” to have heroes. The very notion living in a completely different universe of heroism seems almost quaint to a gen than these people. To even have a choice eration steeped in relativism. at all was a fantastic endowment.”35 This Given their daily exposure to the is an endowment that Kelly and many world, it is small wonder these interna young foreign policy professionals are tionalists are jaded. (As the comedienne eager to share: “I remember, over time, Lily Tomlin demurred, “No matter how people’s impression of the United cynical I get, I just can’t keep up.”) Lillian States was that it was not a place on a Rice, twenty-seven, who practices inter- map but an idea called America, and national law in New York City, notes that people are still in love with this idea. there is “a greater sense of irony about And for some reason I feel like we need everything” among her contemporaries. to live up to it.”36 She feels that while the new environment Ultimately, the idea of returning to a has provided ample opportunity, it has foreign policy elite is badly out of kilter also been corrosive in that “there is no with our own ideals. For all those who right answer to almost anything.”33 Taught would propose a new age of elitism, one to look at the world through a lens of need only to thumb again through the skepticism, these professionals are pages of The Best and the Brightest to be “always looking for the frayed edge, or reminded why Vietnam devastated the the bad story. You are always undercut- foreign policy establishment: ting your own words and everybody else’s. Probably sadly, it makes it impossible to They had manipulated the public, the Con wholeheartedly admire pretty much any- gress, and the press from the start, told half one.”34 The greatest challenge for this truths about why we were going in, how deeply generation of foreign policy specialists we were going in, how much we were spending, may be its inability to think in terms of and how long we were in for. When their pre- black and white, right and wrong. dictions turned out to be hopelessly inaccurate, There is still hope. Having seen the and when the public and the Congress, annoyed end of the Cold War, many of these pro- at being manipulated, soured on the war, then fessionals remain optimistic—often the architects had been aggrieved. They had more than they are willing to admit—and turned on those very symbols of the democratic believe that the United States has a society they had once manipulated, criticizing unique opportunity to lead. Lorelei them for their lack of fiber, stamina, and lack of Kelly, thirty-five, runs a bipartisan for belief.37 eign policy study group on Capitol Hill, and lived in West Berlin just before the Maybe the lesson both then, and now, Wall fell. She often spoke with counter- is that U.S. foreign policy need only be parts in the East German underground, explained in terms as clear as the truth. and Kelly’s feelings about her own free- doms changed dramatically because of her experience dealing with people who Author’s Note: The author interviewed forty U.S. for- “were never going to make it in line for eign policy experts between the ages of twenty-five and an apartment or a car. They lived in the forty in preparing this article.

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NOTES

1 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men 21 Rob Chase, interviewed by John Norris, Wash- (New York: Touchstone Books, 1986). ington, D.C., 25 March 2002. 2 Ibid., 25. 22 Ibid., 25 March 2002. 3 Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom (New York: 23 Ibid., 25 March 2002. W.W. Norton, 2003), 236. 24 Ibid., 25 March 2002. 4 John Judis, The Paradox of American Democracy (New 25 Jennifer Windsor, correspondence with author, York: Pantheon Books, 2000), 31. Washington, D.C., 20 April 2003. 5 Zakaria, 240. 26 Windsor, 20 April 2003. 6 Judis, xi. 27 Anthony Richter, interviewed by John Norris, 7 I.M. Destler, Leslie Gelb, and Anthony Lake, Our Washington, D.C., 14 March 2002. Own Worst Enemy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 28 Ibid., 14 March 2002. 1984), 13. 29 Henry Kissinger, Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Cen- 8 Zakaria, 248. tury (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 9 Destler, et al., 248. 30 See, for example, Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise 10 Isaacson and Thomas, 171—173. and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global 11 Martina Vandenberg, interviewed by John Nor- Power (New York: Basic Books, 2003). ris, Washington, D.C., 29 March 2002. 31 This quote remains anonymous in order to pro- 12 Ibid., 29 March 2002. tect the identity of the source. 13 Ibid., 29 March 2002. 32 Daniel Byman, interviewed by John Norris, 14 Ibid., 29 March 2002. Arlington, VA, 11 January 2002. 15 Ibid., 29 March 2002. 33 Lillian Rice, interviewed by John Norris, Wash- 16 Ibid., 29 March 2002. ington, D.C., 25 January 2002. 17 John Hillen, interviewed by John Norris, tele 34 Ibid., 25 January 2002. phone interview, New York, 26 April 2002. 35 Lorelei Kelly, interviewed by John Norris, 18 Ibid., 26 April 2002. Washington, D.C., 12 December 2001. 19 Ibid., 26 April 2002. 36 Ibid., 12 December 2001. 20 Derek Chollet, interviewed by John Norris, 37 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New Washington, D.C., 13 December 2001. York: Ballantine Books, 1992), 665–656.

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