Nato – Towards a New Strategic Concept 2010

MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU STRATEGIAN LAITOS JULKAISUSARJA 4: TYÖPAPEREITA No 33

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES SERIES 4: WORKING PAPERS No 33

NATO – TOWARDS A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2010

AGILOLF KESSELRING

MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU Strategian laitos HELSINKI 2009

Agilolf Kesselring: NATO – Towards a New Strategic Concept 2010. Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Strategian laitos Julkaisusarja 4: työpapereita No 33 National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 4: Working Papers No 33

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ISSN 1236-4983 Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu – National Defence University Strategian laitos – Department of Strategic and Defence Studies

Edita Prima Oy Helsinki 2009 NATO – TOWARDS A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2010 Agilolf Kesselring

The aim of this paper is to present and analyse the emerging decisions on the future strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in a broader context. As NATO is the main provider of security in Europe, a change in its strategy is not just a matter for the alliance itself, but affects – at least – the whole continent of Europe. The procedure of developing the new Strategic Concept is still at an early stage. A strategy paper will be formulated by the time of the Portugal summit in spring 2010, where it should be adopted by the NATO member states. Its content cannot be an- ticipated, of course. The main focus of this brief study will be on NATO’s current security debate and the implications of that debate for NATO’s “New Strategic Concept 2010”. It will approach the basic lines of the future strategy by highlighting the open questions, difficulties and opportunities that exist at present in the context of NATO’s own strategic history.

After the crisis which started with the tion of France into NATO’s military Prague summit in 2002, where the structures had also been orchestrated as USA clashed with France and Ger- a rapprochement between the different many over basic disagreements regard- positions adopted within the Alliance.4 ing George W. Bush’s anti-terror strat- The political agenda for the summit in egy,1 the recent 60th Anniversary sum- Strasbourg and Kehl focused on mit at Strasbourg and Kehl gave a dem- “broader and more strategic issues that onstration of orchestrated unity.2 This face the organization”, these being “the “new unity” was underlined by sym- strategy review undertaken by the new bolic acts, such as the fact that France US Administration, relations with Rus- and Germany co-hosted such an event sia, France’s closer involvement in the for the first time in NATO’s history, or Alliance and its impact on NATO-EU the choice of Strasbourg for the event, with its symbolic value of a “European capital” and a focal point for German- French reconciliation.3 The reintegra- [www.strasbourg.eu/international/europe_stras bourg/accueil?ItemID=587026657 / 13.5.09]. Both Chancellor Angela Merkel and President 1 Neue Feinde, neue Nato. Allianz am Nicolas Sarkozy emphasized this symbolism in Wendepunkt: In Prag will US-Präsident Bush their respective speeches and declarations at seinen Anti-Terror-Kurs durchsetzen, Focus the summit. See Government Statement by Nr. 47 (2002), 18.11.2002. [www.focus.de/ Chancellor Merkel on NATO Summit, politik/ausland/gipfeltreffen-neue-feinde-neue- 26.3.2009. [www.usa.diplo.de/Vertretung/ nato_aid_206239.html / 22.4.2009] usa/en/_PR/P_Wash/2009/03/26_Merkel_NAT 2 Inszenierte Einigkeit am Nato-Gipfel, Neue O_sp.html / 13.5.2009]. Züricher Zeitung, 6.4.2009. [www.nzz.ch/ 4 Sarkozy to end France’s 40 years NATO nachricten/international/inszenierte_einigkeit feud, The Guardian online, 11.3.2009. _am_natogipfel_1.2337199.html / 6.4.2008] [www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/11/fran 3 Strasbourg is the official domicile of the ce-sarkozy-nato / 13.5.2009]. Cinco claves European Parliament, the European Council para entender la Alianza, El País, 5.4.2009, p. and the European Court of Human Rights. 6. President gains little amid NATO rifts, In- Strasbourg official homepage. ternational Herald Tribune, 6.4.2006, p. 3. 2 relations.”5 Furthermore, NATO has The setting: NATO ten years after decided to initiate work on a New Stra- the Alliance’s Strategic Concept tegic Concept to be ready to be signed (1999) at the NATO summit in Portugal in 2010. The paper called “Declaration on It has often been stated that NATO Alliance Security”, which may be un- needs a new Strategic Concept, because derstood as the basic blueprint for the the security environment has changed process of developing this New Strate- since the currently valid Alliance’s gic Concept, calls on “the Secretary Strategic Concept was approved in General to convene and lead a broad- 1999. It is therefore reasonable to based group of qualified experts, who begin by taking a closer look at the in close consultation with all Allies will Strategic Concept of 1999 with respect lay the ground for the Secretary Gen- to the often cited “changed world”. eral to develop a new Strategic Concept and submit proposals for its implemen- About one year before the approval of tation for approval at [the] next sum- the concept, NATO decided to work out mit.”6 Even so the document makes military options for deployment against “only very general political state- Yugoslavia. This followed Milošević’s ments, it sets the tone for the upcom- denial of international help in settling ing debate”.7 the Kosovo conflict by peaceful means and was in full accordance with NATO’s emerging strategy, which could also be seen as an answer to the massacre of about 7000 Bosniaks by 5 Strasbourg, France / Kehl, Germany, 3-4 Serb troops in the West Bosnian town April 2009 Agenda outline. [www.nato.int/ of Srebrenica in June 1995. At the time docu/comm/2009/0904-summit/agenda.html / when the concept was being approved 2.4.2009] 6 by the heads of state and government at Declaration on Alliance Security, Issued by th the Heads of State and Government participat- NATO’s 50 Anniversary meeting, ing in the meeting of the North Atlantic Coun- NATO’s air strikes in the context of cil in Strasbourg / Kehl 4.4.2009, Press Re- Operation Allied Force had been al- lease (2009) 043. [www.nato.int/cps/en/ nato- ready going on for one month. During live/news_52838.htm?mode=pressrelease / the Kosovo campaign the Alliance’s 6.4.2009] The other declarations deal with more current issues: Strasbourg / Kehl Summit members proved their solidarity and the Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and incontestable power of NATO as an Government participating in the meeting of the international player. Although Russia North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl was not willing in the UN Security 4.4.2009, Press Release (2009) 044 Council to condone the threatening of [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.ht Milošević with NATO airpower, the m?mode=pressrelease / 6.4.2009]. Summit Declaration on Afghanistan, Issued by the application of military force took place Heads of State and Government participating anyway. It was at this moment at the in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in latest that the era of a bipolar world Strasbourg / Kehl 4.4.2009, Press Release order came to an end. (2009) 045 [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ news_52836.htm?mode=pressrelease / 6.4.2009] The Alliance’s Strategic Concept 7 Karl-Heinz Kamp, The Way to NATO’s New (1999) defines NATO as “an Alliance Strategic Concept, Research Paper No. 46, of nations committed to the Washington Research Division, NATO Defense College, Treaty and the United Nations Char- Rome, June 2009, p. 2. 3 ter”8 with certain “fundamental security ized crime, and by the disruption of the tasks”, namely “Security” (for the flow of vital resources”.10 Euro-Atlantic security environment), “Consultation” (on any issues that af- At a conference in Budapest in March fect its members’ vital interests, under 2009, NATO Secretary General Jaap de NAT, Art. 4), “Deterrence and De- Hoop Scheffer stated that the Alliance fence” (against any threat of aggression needed to define a new strategy to deal against any NATO member state, under with the challenges it now faces, such NAT, Art. 5), “Crisis Management” (by as the mission in Afghanistan, the rela- consensus, under NAT, Art. 7, and ex- tionship with Russia and new threats as plicitly including crisis response opera- exemplified by cybercrime, energy se- tions) and “Partnership” in the Euro- curity and piracy, which could only be Atlantic area. The document stresses contained by a “comprehensive ap- the important role of developing a proach” to the security challenges of European Security and Defence Identity our time.11 The concept would need to (ESDI) within the Alliance as well as “combine the Alliance’s core purpose the importance of the United Nations of collective defence […] with the (UN), the Organization for Security and many requirements of out-of-area op- Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the erations”12 All these issues can already European Union (EU) and the Western be found implicitly or explicitly in the European Union (WEU) as “central Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999), in features of the security environment”.9 that the 1999 document refers in many ways to questions ranging from Af- The strategy paper is based on a wide ghanistan firms affected by terrorism to approach to security problems, “com- Russia and its problems (including the plex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace”, Ukraine) and stressing the partnership including “oppression, ethnic conflict, aspect. Similarly, cybercrime can be economic distress, the collapse of po- understood as a specific form of sabo- litical order, and the proliferation of tage, energy security can be described weapons of mass destruction”. Under as an aspect of the “flow of vital re- the chapter “Security challenges and sources”, and piracy can be seen as one risks”, the paper states that “Alliance specific kind of “organized crime” or security interests can be affected by an effect of “the collapse of political other risks of a wider nature, including order”, as in the case of Somalia. Piracy acts of terrorism, sabotage and organ- has also been identified as a threat at

8 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved 10 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government partici- by the Heads of State and Government partici- pating in the meeting of the North Atlantic pating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D. C. on 23rd and 24th Council in Washington D. C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999, Press Release NAC-S(99)65 April 1999, Press Release NAC-S(99)65, nr. [www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm / 24 [www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm 7.4.2009]; following citations refer to the same / 7.4.2009]. source. 11 NATO chiefs wants new strategy for the 9 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved alliance, PR-inside.com, 12.3.2009 [www.pr- by the Heads of State and Government partici- inside.com/print1109572.htm / 2.4.2009]. pating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 12 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Speech at the Semi- Council in Washington D. C. on 23rd and 24th nar on ”NATO Challenges and Tasks Ahead” April 1999, Press Release NAC-S(99)65, nr. in Warsaw, Poland, 13.3.2009 [www.nato.int 13, 14 [www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e. /cps/en/natolive/opinions_51770htm / htm / 7.4.2009.]. 2.4.2009] 4 the Kehl / Strasbourg Summit; the the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – North Atlantic Council is already pre- which were crucial for US security – paring a political directive for NATO’s were not made in Brussels but in Wash- long term role in counter piracy activi- ington. As a consequence of this radical ties.13 Also, “the comprehensive ap- shift towards unilateralism, a growing proach”, which is so fashionable nowa- NATO with new members accepted in days and to which the German chancel- 2004 fell more into the role of a con- lor Angela Merkel pointed as a “revolu- tributor of troops or “cleaning up” or- tion”,14 can already be found in para- ganization for US missions. At the graph 60 of the 1999 paper. Article 5, same time the enlargement policy in of course, has been seen as lying at the combination with US and NATO en- core of the Treaty ever since 1949. gagement in traditional Russian zones of interest, such as Afghanistan or the So why is a new Strategic Concept former Yugoslavia (e.g. the former Ser- needed? The security environment has bian province of Kosovo) could not be in fact changed since 1999. It is obvi- communicated as forms of partnership ous, that the terrorist attacks on the with Russia – but might have been said USA on 9/11 fundamentally altered the to be perceived as “encircling Russia”. US-American perception of existing threats.15 NATO seemed no longer to Future historians could describe 2008 be confronted only by threats in the as a crisis year in relations between European theatre (the Balkans, the tran- Russia and NATO. The problems with sition in the post-Soviet era), but sud- Russia escalated with the Ukrainian gas denly the most seriously threatened area dispute and Russian policy in Georgia seemed to be the USA. This new threat (which Russia had openly threatened to could not be combated at national or implement earlier in the case of a uni- alliance borders, as the violent radical lateral declaration of independence for Islamic ideology lying behind it turned Kosovo).17 NATO had given both out to be a global phenomenon. Even Ukraine and Georgia a clear perspective so, NATO decided quickly that NAT, on NATO membership and the Russian Art 5, would have to be applied – in a reactions can to a certain extent be in- different manner from that postulated in terpreted as an answer to Western Kos- the valid Strategic Concept. NATO did ovo policy or as a “veto” against further not turn out to be “the essential transat- NATO enlargement into the “Russian lantic forum for Allied consultations on sphere of interest”.18 The unilateral any issues that affect their vital inter- ests”.16 In other words, the decisions on pating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D. C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999, Press Release NAC-S(99)65, nr. 13 NATO International Military Staff, PAA 10 [www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm Office, News Release 7.5.2009. / 7.4.2009]. 14 Regierungserklärung, Kämpferische Merkel 17 The Republic of Kosovo declared its inde- will Nato-Strategie ändern, 26.3.2009, Zeit pendence unilaterally but with the approval of ONLINE [images.zeit.de/text/online/2009/14 most NATO and EU states in February 2008. /merkel-nato / 2.4.2009]. 18 For a deeper understanding of the Russian 15 Die Nato – zu spektakulärem Wandel fähig. view towards NATO enlargement see: Alpo Nur teilweise verdaute folgen von Mauerfall Juntunen, Itään vai länteen? Venäjän und ”Nine Eleven””, Neue Züricher Zeitung, vaihtoehdot, Gummerus, Jyväskylä 2003, p. 4./5.4.2009. p. 7. 62-78 and Alpo Juntunen, Venäjän imperiumin 16 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved paluu, Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Strategian by the Heads of State and Government partici- Laitos, Helsinki 2009, p. 124-126. 5 declaration of independence for Kosovo partner, the USA, has slightly altered was backed up by most of the NATO the US threat perception once again. member states (but not by the organiza- tion itself due to the policies of Spain All this leads us to the conclusion that and Greece) and can be understood as a the aim of the New Strategy paper for setback for Russia’s position in South- 2010 will largely be to reunite the USA eastern Europe. About the same time and Europe in times perceived as Russia started a more pro-active policy “tough” in terms of a combination of vis-à-vis the NATO members and for- economics, classic security and “new mer Soviet republics of Estonia (2007) threats”. The point will be to “redis- and Lithuania (2008). Cyberconflicts cover” rather than “reinvent” NATO. following the same scheme as seen dur- Any sorrowfully conducted analysis is ing the conventional armed conflict in bound to come to the result that it is not Georgia could be witnessed as epiphe- NATO as an organization which needs nomena.19 On the other hand, the US a new direction, but the national poli- and NATO policy in Afghanistan and cies of its member states, which can Iraq – though forming an impressive only start again to act convincingly like show of American military power in true allies if they “remember” their 2002/3 – seemed to be based on weak common transatlantic interests. Being political concepts and lacking in com- perceived a “true Allies” by others is a mon acceptance within the NATO basic precondition for any kind of de- states. terrence. Therefore a “soft asset” such as consultations about issues concern- Having said all this, it can be stated that ing their vital interests, as agreed on in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999) NAT, Art. 4, means much more than is not in itself outdated, but it simply “just talking”. But again, why does the has not been implemented any longer Alliance need a new strategy paper in since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. such a situation? A look into the past NATO policy has not been stringent, may perhaps help us to understand this and “the writing has been on the wall” issue. regarding a division between “new” and “old” NATO members in Europe since “Déjà vu”? - Strategy papers and 2002. It is not only the open disagree- NATO’s problems in the past ment with France and Germany over the war in Iraq that should be held re- From its very first days onwards NATO sponsible for the often-mentioned crises has been struggling for common strate- in NATO, for the ESDI in Europe has gic concepts. The organization of not developed into NATO’s strong NATO was already causing difficulties “second pillar” as was still expected – in 1951. One major disagreement, for or at least envisaged – in 1999. Now the example, arose between Great Britain global economic crisis that began in and the USA out of the question of 2008, which is seen as the biggest leadership of the Supreme Allied threat to security by the transatlantic Command Atlantic (SACLANT), which led to the establishment of a

19 Cyber attacks Against Georgia. Legal Les- separate British command, the Allied sons Identified. Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), NATO Un- classified, Version 1.0, Tallinn, November 2008, p. 44. 6

Command Channel, in 1953.20 Also, The sources of this difference have after the second NATO enlargement proved to lie in different perceptions of with the incorporation of the Federal Soviet policy: while the idea predomi- Republic of Germany, structures and nated in Norway that the Soviet Union strategic concepts had to be adjusted to would follow a realistic defensive pol- the changed situation. In structural icy after all, the perception in West terms, it took six years, until 1961, with Germany was that it would follow an the establishment of Command Baltic ideologically determined expansionist Approaches (COMBALTAP), to solve policy. Both perceptions have been the dilemma of the West-German Fleet “true” in a regionally historical sense: being divided under two NATO com- for while the historical experience in mands. The strategic question of “for- Norway had been that the Red Army ward defence” (Vorneverteidigung) led had left voluntarily after having to distinctive views on how to counter marched into North Norway, the Soviet the Soviet threat (on which all members zone in Germany had been manned by were as such agreed). enemy troops, leading to a de facto par- tition and the presence of a repressive The German view during the 1950s and Soviet communist satellite on German 1960s was that defence should be im- soil. One result of such different his- plemented as far east as possible, to torical experiences is that different per- save as much German territory as pos- ceptions emerged, so that the Germans sible and to add a more aggressive agreed to the stationing of nuclear character to the Alliance’s strategic ar- weapons on German soil but Denmark senal. Against that stood the Norwegian and Norway adopted a restrictive policy position, which could be explained as a on the same issue. Thus, although strategy of de-escalation or “don’t wake Denmark, Norway and (West) Germany the bear” – trying not to “provoke” the shared similar threat perceptions on a Soviet Union – on the grounds that in more abstract level and had a common the case of war their own territory task in securing the northern flank of would be anyway be lost or de- NATO, they could still adopt differing stroyed.21 approaches towards such central de- fence issues as the deployment of nu- 20 Gregory W. Pedlow, Putting the »O« in clear weapons. History matters – or as NATO: The Organizational Development Donald C. Watt had already made clear of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1949-1956, in 1988, today’s differing threat as- in: Hans-Joachim Harder (ed.), Von Tru- sessment can only be understood within man bis Harmel. Die Bundesrepublik the context of differing perceptions Deutschland im Spannungsfeld von NATO rooted in the history of the previous 20 und europäischer Integration, Oldenbourg to 100 years.22 Verlag, München 2000, p. 153-168. 21 Helge Ø.Pharo, Knut Einar Eriksen, Nor- wegen in der NATO 1950-1956, in: Norbert 22 Donald C. Watt, Bemerkungen mit dem Ziel Wiggershaus, Winfried Heinemann (eds.), einer Synthese, in: Norbert Wiggershaus, Ro- Nationale Außen- und Bündnispolitik der land G. Foerster (eds.), Die westliche Sicher- NATO-Mitgliedstaaten, Oldenbourg, München heitsgemeinschaft 1948-1950. Gemeinsame 2000, p. 79-99. Bruno Thoß, NATO-Strategie Probleme und grundsätzliche Nationalinteres- und nationale Verteidigungsplanung. Planung sen in der Gründungsphase der Nordatlan- und Aufbau der Bundeswehr unter den Bedin- tischen Allianz. Boppard a.Rh. 1988, [also gungen einer massiven atomaren Vergel- available in English under the title: The West- tungsstrategie 1952 bis 1960, Oldenbourg, ern Security community 1948 – 1950. Common München 2006, p. 260. Problems and Conflicting National Interests 7

The problems described above reflect 4, by giving itself the economic, social disputes over troop dislocation or and propaganda tasks of adapting to the chain-of-command settings. Strategic new trends in Soviet policy. The NAC documents have always been influ- decided to establish a commission of enced by both inner difficulties and “three wise men”: the foreign ministers changing perceptions of external of Canada, Norway and Italy. As the threats. The first major change in US was not in those days in favour of NATO’s threat assessment can be said giving NATO political tasks in the to have occurred during the mid 1950s, fields of economics or development after the death of Stalin and with the policy, the document produced by the emergence of the Soviet “new look” “three wise men” dealt only with issues and “peaceful co-existence” policies under Art. 4, and little of what they said under Khrushchev. In those days the about those could actually be imple- perceived threat changed from the idea mented.25 It is worthwhile mentioning, of a direct Soviet attack against NATO however, that NATO already had a territory to that of a long-term arms “wide” understanding of security in the race and global political “chess game” 1950s, including “soft power” assets – referred to as “the long haul”.23 such as economics, social issues (mainly to counter the internal commu- NATO’s problem was to build up and nist threat) and development politics. maintain strong bodies of troops while On the other hand, NATO had not been at the same time trying to use this phase required to deal with these “soft power” of a first détente to find a modus aspects – mainly due to US concerns vivendi with the Eastern block, and to over the probable transfer of sover- accomplish all this, if possible, while eignty to a multinational organization. ensuring unity among its own lines just There is also another interesting point: in case Khrushchev was only bluffing. in 1956 NATO referred to the commis- And all this had to be done in a critical sion charged with ”advising the Council environment of freedom of speech and on ways and means to extend coopera- democracy, where – like today – the tion in non-military fields and to people had to be “taken along” to sup- strengthen unity in the Atlantic Com- port their government’s decisions. For munity”26 as a “council of wise men”, NATO to be successful in this “long haul” phase, the Belgian Foreign Minis- ter, Paul Henri Spaak, suggested that it defence arrangements”. Secretary of State for 24 should implement its NAT, Art. 2 and External Affairs to Ambassador in France, in Belgium and in the Netherlands, Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 15, 1949, During the Foundation Phase of the North Chapter IV, p. 52, in: NATO DECLASSIFIED Atlantic Alliance, Berg, Oxford 1993.], p. 346. 1949-1959, NATO Public Diplomacy Divi- 23 NATO Archives, C-R(55)46, Policy vis-à- sion, CD-ROM, NATO, Brussels 2009. vis the Soviet Union and the education of 25 Winfried Heinemann, Vom Zusammen- NATO public opinion. wachsen des Bündnisses. Die Funktionsweise 24 Art. 2, NAT, which was supposed to deal der NATO in ausgewählten Krisenfällen 1951 with economic and social cooperation, had bis 1956, Oldenbourg, München 1998, p. 244- been a matter of major dispute when deciding 260. See also: Joseph P Sinasac, The Three on the NAT in 1949. While Canada, France, Wise Men. The Effects of the 1956 Committee Belgium and the Netherlands thought NATO of Three on NATO, MA Thesis, University of should go beyond military matters, the US Waterloo, 1989. opinion was that economic and social coopera- 26 Lawrence S. Kaplan, Report of the “Three tion would divert attention from the “straight Wise Men”: 50 years on, NATO Review, 8 and similarly in 2009, the wish was ex- come “out of the box” and probably pressed, especially by the Germans, to also to bypass the institutionalized su- entrust the task of developing the strat- periority of the USA in NATO and egy paper to “wise men” instead of only thereby to be able to place stronger em- to NATO staff.27 Where the issue of phasis on the security needs of the Cen- excluding the smaller allies from deci- tral European powers. sion-making processes brought sugges- tions for consultations on foreign policy The main difference between a paper and cooperation in the fields of eco- written inside an institutional process nomics, culture and information in the and one written by “wise man” is that 1950s,28 the question nowadays is the inevitable controversies have a rather one of whether NATO should higher degree of transparency before also deal with issues such as energy or the paper is endorsed than is the case climate change (as suggested by the US within a bureaucracy, where it is easy but disapproved of by France and Ger- to decide upon certain concepts before many), or whether the future role of they have even been discussed. NATO should be one of dealing with European security problems or also It was the Suez Crisis in 1956 which with those of the Pacific region (the led to a major rupture in the Alliance, latter being advocated by the USA, as British and French security interests Canada and Poland).29 The question of concerning their colonial heritage were whether NATO would be limited to fundamentally opposed to the tradition- “regional defence planning” (as advo- ally anti-colonialist US policy. One cated then by the USA and the United year later a new strategy paper had been Kingdom) or whether it should provide decided on, introducing a conventional “a medium for the planning of global accent into the absolute strategy of strategy” (as advocated by France) was massive retaliation: the nuclear- already being discussed in 1949.30 As determined sword-and-shield doctrine in the 1950s, it is thought that passing also known as MC 14/2. The nuclear on the task to “wise men” might pro- “sword”, the US Strategic Air Capabil- vide a chance to enable thinking to ity, was to be covered by a European territorial (nuclear and conventional) “shield”. This new doctrine not only Spring 2006. [www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/ issue1/english/history.html / 13.5.2009] formed a transatlantic compromise but 27 Nato beschließt Ausbildungsmission in Af- it also led to a concentration on unify- ghanistan, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, ing issues and common interests in 6.4.2009, p. 3. NATO. Despite MC 14/2, however, a 28 Text of the Report of the Committee of Three deep mistrust grew up in Europe as to on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO. whether the USA would really defend [www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b561213a.htm] 29 Nato in der Sinnkrise, Handelsblatt, the Europeans against a Soviet threat of 3.4.2009. [www.handelsblatt.com/politik/ in- a total nuclear attack. In the end the ternational/nato-in-der-sinnkrise;2223552;2 / solution proved to be a fairly practical 13.5.2009] one: the United States responded to the 30 Memorandum from Secretary of Chiefs of growing European mistrust by integrat- Staff Committee to Secretary to the Cabinet, Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 15, 1949, Chapter IV, p. 633, in: NATO DECLASSIFIED 1949-1959, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, CD-ROM, NATO, Brus- sels 2009. 9 ing its European nuclear basis into the rule of law.”33 NATO’s aim is defined Alliance’s structures.31 as “to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.”34 At the As today, strategy papers alone were meeting of the North Atlantic Council unable to bring unity; only their practi- (NAC) in May 2009, NATO’s heads of cal implementation could do this. In state and government endorsed a “Dec- practical terms, the main guarantee laration on Alliance Security”, reaffirm- against deeper ruptures in the Alliance ing the “values and objectives and obli- has consisted of the General Defence gations of the Washington Treaty which Plan, welding the NATO troops and unite Europe with the United States and thereby also the NATO member states, Canada”.35 Furthermore, NATO is into one and the same Central European stated to be “the essential transatlantic theatre, sharing the same dangers and in forum for security consultations among that way building up mentally a com- Allies” and NATO’s enlargement is mon defence identity. called “a historic success in bringing us closer to our vision of a Europe whole Rediscovery: NATO’s common val- and free”.36 This leads the analysis of ues the new NATO paper in two similar directions: by stressing the core NATO US President Barack Obama referred in values “individual liberty, democracy his first letter to the Secretary General and rule of law”, NATO is backing up of NATO, in which he called for a re- the “new look” of US policy concern- newal of the Alliance, to the common ing the “war against terror”, especially values and aims of the NATO members: the release of the Guantánamo Bay “Our nations share more than a com- prisoners. This can already be seen as a mitment to our common security – we – more than symbolic – move towards a share a set of common values. […] The common policy under Art. 4. Such an lesson of the 21st century is that the se- approach, by emphasizing “the essential curity of our nations and our people is transatlantic forum”, points towards the shared.”32 What are the values which Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999) make NATO more than “just another and its references to Art. 4. defence alliance”? Basically they can be seen as “Western values”. Following US Vice-President Joseph R. Biden the preamble of the North Atlantic made the point at his Munich speech in Treaty, NATO members “are deter- February this year that the new US mined to safeguard the freedom, com- government would not believe in a mon heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the 33 The North Atlantic Treaty 4.4.1949 [www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm / 7.4.2009]. 34 Ibid. 31 Agilolf Kesselring, 60 Jahre NATO. Wech- 35 Declaration on Alliance Security, Issued by selnde Bedrohungen- neue Strategien, Militär- the Heads of State and Government participat- geschichte (1/2009), p. 4-7. ing in the meeting of the North Atlantic Coun- 32 Barack Obama, Letter to the Secretary Gen- cil in Strasbourg / Kehl 4.4.2009, Press Re- eral of NATO and the Members of the North lease (2009) 043 [www.nato.int/cps/en/ nato- Atlantic Council 20.1.2009. World Security live/news_52838.htm?mode=pressrelease / Network [www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/ 6.4.2009] printArticle3.cfm?article_id=17075 / 2.4.2009] 36 Ibid. 10

“clash of civilizations”,37 but would defensive approach to security, but it is fight a battle against “extremism”. For not limited to territorial issues. On the this fight a European partner would be other hand, as far as freedom, democ- needed.38 The British Foreign Minister racy and justice are concerned, advocat- David Miliband also emphasized that ing Western values also defines the Europe and the USA share the convic- “threat”: Generally speaking, all those tions that only “freedom, equality and who are against these values are poten- justice” could form a basis for “peace tially dangerous. With Albania joining and welfare”,39 while the French Presi- NATO as the second state with a high dent Nicolas Sarkozy emphasized on percentage of Muslims in its population the same occasion that “freedom” was a after Turkey, this can be interpreted as value “for all”40 and the German chan- a clear policy of offering partnership cellor Angela Merkel spoke of “free- towards the moderate Islamic (but not dom and democracy”.41 As in the extreme Islamist) world. Turkey and 1950s, NATO has to be “sold” to the Albania can both be regarded as coun- citizens of its member states within the tries with pro-American elites and “long haul” for preserving the Western strong political traditions of doctrines “way of life”. This is also why empha- based on the originally Western idea of sis is placed on common values, while laicism. In Turkey the Kemalist doc- another reason is that the USA under trine of laicism is backed up by the Obama presents itself as having re- military in an overall Muslim environ- gained its values and is now conse- ment, while in Albania, which has been quently also intent on regaining its al- an officially atheistic country for years, lies, which are perceived as having the traditional Bektashi kind of Islam been something like the “conscience of with its tolerance for catholic Christian the USA.” Pure power alone does not beliefs (which are also present in the bring sympathies – but power applied country)42 can serve as a “Western for “good” might do better. style” alternative to political Islamism. Since the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, NATO, as the Western Alliance, is not radical forms of Sunni Islam such as defined as Western only by geography, Wahhabism have been gaining weight but is also Western “in the mind”. If we in European countries such as Bosnia- can set this “cultural paradigm” on one Herzegovina, Kosovo and the former side, we can stress the point that Yugoslavian republic of Macedonia, NATO’s approach is not determined which are traditionally known for their (negatively) by any kind of enemy, but tolerant forms of Islam.43 (positively) by its own values. This is a

37 Referring to Samuel P. Huntington’s idea of 42 Miranda Vickers, Islam in Albania, Ad- five competing cultural paradigms, which was vanced Research and Assessment Group, De- adopted by the Republican government of fence Academy of the United Kingdom, March George W. Bush. 2008, p. 11-12. Nuray Bozbora, Die Rolle der 38 Joseph R. Biden, 7.2.2009, Europäische Religiongemeinschaften unter besonderer Sicherheit (3/2009), p. 30-33. Berücksichtigung des Islams, in: Bernhard 39 David Miliband, 7.2.2009, Europäische Si- Chiari, Agilolf Kesselring, Wegweiser zur cherheit (3/2009), p. 34-35. Geschichte Kosovo, Schöningh, Paderborn (3rd 40 Nicolas Sarkozy, 7.2.2009, Europäische ed.) 2008, p. 201-213. Sicherheit (3/2009), p. 26-29. 43 Armina Omerika, Der Islam – zur Bedeu- 41 Angela Merkel, 7.2.2009, Europäische Si- tung der Religiongemeinschaften, in: Agilolf cherheit (3/2009), p. 23-25. Kesselring, Wegweiser zur Geschichte Bos- 11

NATO is emphasizing that it does not Stalinist times, NATO is emphasizing intend to act randomly nor to be just a its core values. Such a concept provides “club of the wealthy and powerful”, but the benefits of serving both as cohesion wishes to be a promoter of the Western force within the alliance and as a “posi- model – globally. From an American tive” approach in the long-term infor- perspective, the Republican “clash of mation war being waged against global civilizations” paradigm had been re- radical Islamism. placed by a Democrat “clash of values” paradigm. This is a policy on which all NATO’s common aims NATO members seem to agree, as shown by the effort to oppose the new, The common aims of NATO are de- allegedly discriminatory law on fined as stability and security for the women’s rights in Afghanistan, a me- Euro-Atlantic region. They are twofold: dia-relevant by-product of the NATO security in and security for Europe and summit in May 2009.44 Such a policy is North America.47 Security in Europe likely to be interpreted as “Western im- and North America refers to a region- perialism” by those who do not agree ally defined NATO, which will be de- with NATO’s common values, but this fended against any threat to its “territo- seems to have already been taken into rial integrity” and “state sovereignty” account. It should be noted that, on the (Art. 5, NAT). This NATO has the po- level of common values, the basic out- tential to be enlarged in Europe and lines of a future strategy will match under certain conditions enlargement completely with the paper “Towards a may be part of its overall long-term Grand Strategy for an Uncertain strategy. This is what could be seen as World” launched in 2007 by five high- the “traditional NATO”, strictly defen- ranked retired NATO generals, alluding sive, forming a collective security sys- to “the attraction of a free society” as tem on the inside and a defence alliance “the most powerful weapon in their in- against the outside and interlinked with ventory”.45 Like the title of the paper, a collective security system of “part- this accords well with the idea of a new ners”. Relations with Russia are crucial “long haul”. In the USA the term “Long in this context. Security for Europe and War” is a second name used for what North America is the “new” NATO was previously called the “Global War after the Cold War. This NATO is a on Terror”.46 As in the immediate post- global player but limited by its defined values. Promoting common values nien-Herzegowina, Schöningh, Paderborn (2rd means accepting the “new” task of ed.) 2007, p. 129-135. Kenneth Morrison, NATO, but not forgetting the “old” Wahhabism in the Balkans, Advanced Re- one. All relevant speeches and all re- search and Assessment Group, Defence Acad- cent documents lay emphasis on Art. 5. emy of the United Kingdom, February 2008, p. 11-12. This defence function is – as is com- 44 Karzai orders review of new law on women, mon agreed among all members – to be International Herald Tribune, 6.4.2006, p. 8. seen as lying at the heart of NATO it- 45 Henk Van den Breemen, Peter Inge, Jacques Lanxade, Klaus Naumann, John M. Shalikashvili, Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World. Renewing Transatlantic Partnership, Noaber Foundation 2007, p. 102. wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032 46 Scott Wilson, Al Kamen, ’Global War on 402818.html / 5.4.2009] Terror’ is Given New Name, The Washington 47 Cinco claves para entender la Alianza, El Post, 25.3.2009 [www.washingtonpost.com/ País, 5.4.2009, p. 6. 12 self. “Collective Defence is, after all, What could be new in the Alliance’s the bedrock of the Alliance.”48 Strategic Concept (2010) as seen from the perspective of values and aims? If To sum up so far, NATO is likely to we compare it with the Alliance’s Stra- continue to have the same four main tegic Concept (1999), probably not tasks in the Alliance’s Strategic Con- much is going to sound different. The cept (2010): Security (for the Euro- main point might be the political func- Atlantic security environment), Consul- tion of reunifying the Alliance to face a tation (on any issues that affect mem- changing threat perception. Further- bers’ vital interests, under Art. 4 more a stronger accent might be seen (NAT)), Deterrence and Defence on pro-active crisis management, and (against any threat of aggression against the – already exercised – practice of any member state, under Art. 5 (NAT), military intervention as ultima ratio and Crisis Management (under Art. 7 might be formulated more clearly. But (NAT), to promote NATO’s values of the United States not only has a new democracy, individual liberty and the president, but probably also a new rule of law ). In the above-mentioned threat perception. As it seems now, the paper by the “wise men”, “Towards a Alliance is going to prepare itself for Grand Strategy for an Uncertain the new threats of the coming years World”, which adopted a wide ap- (and not for what were called “the new proach covering political, economic and threats” ten years ago). What are those social aspects of security, the “four threats thought to be? phases of strategy implementation” read as follows: preventive protection, Perceived threats and challenges pro-active crisis management, en- th forcement by military intervention and On February 12 2009, the US Director post-intervention stabilization.49 Al- of National Intelligence, Dennis C. though this may sound more aggressive Blair, presented the “Annual Threat than the formulations in the Alliance’s Assessment of the Intelligence Com- 50 Strategic Concept (1999), it means ba- munity”. A brief analysis of the sically the same thing. This is even threats as described in that paper may more the case if we bear in mind that help us to understand the USA’s new the Strategic Concept had been adopted threat perception and will therefore help by the time the military intervention us to plunge deeper into the issue of actually happened in Kosovo, so that it NATO’s future strategy. Two points is subsumed under “crisis management” have to be kept in mind: the U.S. threat in the paper. assessment may be slightly different from NATO’s view – as was the case in

48 Prague 2002 or during the 1960s, due to Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Launching NATO’s the differences in geo-strategic contexts New Strategic Concept, Introductory remarks by NATO Secretary General at the opening of and historical developments in America the strategic concept seminar 7.7.2009 and Europe. Threat assessment is a [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_56513 permanent process and the priorities .htm / 21.7.2009] 49 Henk Van den Breemen, Peter Inge, Jacques Lanxade, Klaus Naumann, John M. 50 Dennis C. Blair, Annual Threat Assessment Shalikashvili, Towards a Grand Strategy for of the Intelligence Community for the Senate an Uncertain World. Renewing Transatlantic Select Committee on Intelligence, 12.2.2009 Partnership, Noaber Foundation 2007, p. 101- [www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimon 110. y.pdf / 20.4.2009] 13 among the different threats might still the overstretch of the African Union)56. be discussed and re-evaluated slightly A special chapter deals with “Cyber- among the Allies in the time elapsing crime and Organized Crime”.57 Blair’s until the envisaged presentation of the threat assessment concludes with the new Strategic Concept (2010). Anyway statement that “no dominant adversary the US view is likely to be the domi- faces the United States and threatens nant one in NATO. our existence with military force, but the global financial crisis has exacer- The recently published paper on threat bated what was already a growing set of assessment gives a – probably uncon- political and economic uncertainties”.58 ventional – new view of the primary security threat: the “global economic The security threat perceived by the crisis”.51 This shows a wide under- USA can be summed up under the standing of security, including eco- headings of world disorder and extrem- nomic, social and developmental issues. ism. These dangers are thought to be The paper goes on to highlight the global and interlinked, but can be at- “geopolitical implications” of this cri- tributed to certain areas. It is worth- sis, listing the various threats. Above all while to emphasize that it is not certain “violent extremism”, meaning global areas or states that are seen as a threat “extremist Muslim groups” is seen as but what is happening there. It is sig- the main threat. Particular mention is nificant, though, that even though Is- made of terrorist organizations such as lamic terrorism (in the worst case al-Qa’ida, al-Qa’ida in the Lands of linked with proliferation of weapons of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or Jemaah mass destruction) is still on the top of Islamiya (JI) all over the world, includ- the list of concrete threats and other ing key regions such as Afghanistan / “new” threats such as a cyberwar, pi- Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and North racy or organized crime are highlighted, and East Africa, but also Europe.52 In a substantial support can be found for regional sense, the security threats are what at first sight could be thought to attributed to the “Arc of Instability” be “old threats” – mainly in the context (ranging from the Middle East over the of China and Russia. Not only does Levant and Iraq to Afghanistan and each of these political players (named Pakistan),53 the rising nations of Asia by region) have a chapter of its own (above all China and its commitment in dedicated to it, but they are also men- Africa, Taiwan, India and North Ko- tioned throughout the paper (China 47 rea),54 Russia and Eurasia (particularly times and Russia 34 times) and in all Russian politics concerning Eurasia, the cases in a less than flattering context. Caucasus, Central Asia and the Bal- But even here careful reading shows kans),55 South America and Africa that China and Russia are not men- (emphasizing the Chinese grip, drug tioned as threats on their own – as used trafficking, Islamic fundamentalism and to be the case in Cold War times – but rather as factors of disorder, impeding the settlement of important problems 51 Ibid., p. 2, ”The primary near-term security (e.g. in Iran, North Korea and Palestine) concern of the United States is the global eco- and countering US policy on points of nomic crisis and its geopolitical implications”. 52 Ibid. p. 3-8. 53 Ibid. 9-21. 56 Ibid. 34-38. 54 Ibid. 21-26. 57 Ibid. 38-44. 55 Ibid. p. 26-28. 58 Ibid. p. 44. 14 principle and thereby worsening the thought likely to serve as a “fifth col- problems already catalysed by the eco- umn” of radical Islamism, like the “fel- nomic crisis. In the field of cybercrime, low travellers” during the Cold War. Russia and China are seen as potential “cyberaggressors” alongside al- The Western world seems to be in a Qaida.59 “long haul” situation with regard to the question of whether NATO’s values, It could be said, that in the eyes of the democracy, individual liberty and the US Intelligence Community, China and rule of law, will win out over the ideas Russia are thought to be part of the of radical Islam. This question will be “new” threats due to their Cold War- of special interest for European coun- style behaviour, instead of helping to tries such as Great Britain, France and fight the “real threat” of violent Islamic Germany, which already have a Muslim radicalism. In other words, they have in population of their own. NATO can a sense chosen an anti-American only fight such threats by continuing its stance. engagement “out of area”, but only a comprehensive approach, including What does such a threat assessment tell political and economic stabilization, us about the future NATO strategy? It will be appropriate to the “long haul” seems that – if this threat assessment is scenario. It is also likely that the USA more or less adopted by NATO – the will wish Europe to “take care” of the Alliance’s threat perception will bear African problems, as they will pose a some structural similarities to those of challenge for European security first. the mid-1950s. Even so, the origin of The Declaration on Alliance Security the threat itself will genuinely be seen mentions explicitly “cooperation with differently. […] the African Union, in order to im- prove our ability to deliver a compre- The most striking similarity will be that hensive approach to meeting these new – as after the death of Stalin – a major challenges, combining civilian and attack on NATO territory will not be military capabilities more effec- regarded as likely in the near future. tively.”61 On the other hand, the diffi- But a major threat to Western values culties with Russia and the emerging will be perceived in the longer run. threats to stability posed by Russian This threat – as in the 1950s – will not politics that run counter to NATO aims only need to be countered on the mili- will make it necessary to find a new tary front but will also come from “in- partnership between NATO and Russia. side”. The badly integrated 15-20 mil- lion Muslims in Western Europe60 are It should be mentioned that the precon- ditions for a substantial NATO-Russia

59 Ibid. 39, ”We assess that a number of na- tions, including Russia and China have the Muslims is progressing slowly, creating oppor- technical capabilities to target and disrupt ele- tunities for extremist propagandists and re- ments of the US information infrastructure and cruiters.” for intelligence collection”. As examples the 61 Declaration on Alliance Security, Issued by paper mentions explicitly the Distributed De- the Heads of State and Government participat- nial of Service (DDoS) attacks on Georgia ing in the meeting of the North Atlantic Coun- (2008) and Estonia (2007). cil in Strasbourg / Kehl 4.4.2009, Press Re- 60 Ibid. 5, ”The social, political, and economic lease (2009) 043 [www.nato.int/cps/en/ nato- integration of Western Europe’s 15 to 20 mil- live/news_52838.htm?mode=pressrelease / lion 6.4.2009]. 15 partnership are different from those that The new focus on cyberwarfare is also existed in 1999, as “Russian challenges likely to be formulated in NATO’s next […] now spring more from Moscow’s strategy paper – a clear signal to the perceived strengths than from the state NATO members with the most tradi- weaknesses characteristic of the tional (Russian-based) threat percep- 1990s”62 tions, Estonia and Lithuania. The strength of NATO in the 1950s and NATO will definitely not wish to open 1960s lay in a common understanding “a new front” vis-à-vis Russia, if only of the threats not only based on same because the Alliance is already more values, but also focusing on common than occupied with fighting violent Is- interests. Another important capability lamic terrorism at the same time as be- continues to be the ability to formulate ing faced with a drastic economic crisis. compromises among different opinions. This will continue to be NATO’s main In the words of the NATO Secretary task, to be accomplished with a General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “sword” of light troops embedded in a NATO’s future will be determined by “comprehensive approach” and covered three key factors: evolution of the by a “shield” of a community of values global security environment, a sense of within the NATO area. The “sword” common purpose among the Allies will be intended to be used only for (threats and responses) and both suffi- short periods of time and to be replaced cient political influence and the accom- as soon as possible by various forms of panying military means (referring to the post-intervention stabilization, while political and military power of NATO the shield will be secured with a “mix” as an institution).64 of military assets (nuclear forces, mis- sile defence and “territorially based” NATO’s limits conventional forces) and political part- nership with Russia. The European One important question remains unan- NATO partners will play an important swered in this context: what are the role in building this partly contradictory geographical limits of NATO? It is cru- “shield”. cial to understand that this is a problem imposed by the Alliance’s strength Since partnership can only be based on rather than by its weakness. The limits common interests, unity and strength of enlargement are set by the geo- within NATO, the highly symbolic graphical limits of Europe, by the val- “show of unity” in Strasbourg and Kehl ues espoused by NATO and – probably might already be seen as an (informa- – by Russia. The “Declaration on Alli- tion warfare) part of the new strategy ance Security” states that NATO for a “long haul”.63 enlargement has been a success and that

62 Dennis C. Blair, Annual Threat Assessment Scheffer, Launching NATO’s New Strategic of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Concept, Introductory remarks by NATO Sec- Select Committee on Intelligence, 12.2.2009 retary General at the opening of the strategic [www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimon concept seminar 7.7.2009 [www.nato.int/cps y.pdf / 20.4.2009] /en/natolive/opinions_56513.htm / 21.7.2009] 63 As de Hoop Scheffer puts it: “We will have 64 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Speech at the GMF to provide a clear vision for what NATO is for; Brussels Forum “The Future of NATO” in and get that public support by involving public Brussels, Belgium 22.3.2009. [www.nato.int/ opinion in our Strategic Concept exercise. […] cps/en/natolive/opinions_52005.htm / the medium is the message.” Jaap de Hoop 2.4.2009]. 16 further enlargement is envisaged: “Europe” and its limits is also an issue “NATO’s door will remain open to all that is being heavily disputed in the EU. European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are will- This brings us back to the question of ing and able to assume the responsibili- values, which is also highly applicable ties and obligations of membership, and to the theme of EU enlargement. The whose inclusion can contribute to growing geopolitical role of Turkey has common security and stability”.65 This been stressed in the context of the adds a further condition for the accep- NATO summit in Strasbourg and tance of potential NATO member Kehl,66 and President Obama has made states. New members don’t merely have it clear that the USA would wish to see to be European, democratic and able to Turkey as an EU member state, which do their share, but they should also add actually clashes with German and stability to the Alliance. The condition French opinions on this issue.67 The of having to be “European” already American understanding of the congru- makes it clear that plans for replacing ence of the EU with the European part the European-centred NATO with a of NATO corresponds to the idea of a Pacific-centred United States by includ- NATO ranging “from Alaska to ing Japan and other pro-US states is not Finland” as a community of values and likely to happen. At least in the near democracies visualized in the long run future, the main “link” between Atlan- in the (non-NATO) document “To- tic and Pacific interests is going to re- wards a Grand Strategy for an Uncer- main the USA itself. tain World”.68 As those major questions are not likely to be agreed on before Strengthening the European side has 2010, they will most probably not be been on the agenda ever since NATO reflected in the next strategic paper, but was founded. European weakness stood they will still form important issues in out from the beginning, and European the background, as EU enlargement and security was the main political task NATO enlargement are de facto inter- throughout the Cold War era. It is inter- linked procedures. In the short term esting to note that while NATO is per- only Macedonia is likely to become a ceived in Europe as “something Ameri- new NATO member as soon as the can”, it is traditionally thought of in name dispute with Greece can be North America as the “security tool” solved. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, for Europe. It often seems that from a US perspective “Europe” means the 66 U.S., Turkey: Washington’s Growing Confi- European NATO countries, just as, dence in Ankara, STRATFOR, 24.4.2009 “Europe” is understood in a political [www.stratfor.com/memberships/136663/analy sense within the continent itself as sis/20090424_u_s_turkey_washingtons_growi ng_confidence_ankara / 24.4.2009] meaning the European Union. Defining 67 Europäische Union. Barack Obama will Beitritt der Türkei forcieren, Welt online, 6.4.2009 [www.welt.de/politik/article3511992/ Barack-Obama-will-Beitritt-der-Türkei- 65 Declaration on Alliance Security, Issued by forcieren.html / 6.4.2009]. the Heads of State and Government participat- 68 Henk Van den Breemen, Peter Inge, Jacques ing in the meeting of the North Atlantic Coun- Lanxade, Klaus Naumann, John M. cil in Strasbourg / Kehl 4.4.2009, Press Re- Shalikashvili, Towards a Grand Strategy for lease (2009) 043 [www.nato.int/cps/en/ nato- an Uncertain World. Renewing Transatlantic live/news_52838.htm?mode=pressrelease / Partnership, Noaber Foundation 2007, p. 116, 6.4.2009]. 132. 17

Montenegro and – if it wishes – Serbia quickly if regimes compatible with seem to welcome as NATO candidates Western aims and values could be es- in a medium-term time frame. tablished. NATO will probably coordi- nate civil and military efforts and serve NATO, quo vadis? as a platform for common state building efforts in the context of stabilization. Although the emphasis in NATO’s Strategic Concept (2010) is likely to lie The key to the effectiveness of the on the “soft powers” (referring to Art. 2 “new strategy” will lie in Europe and and 4 (NAT)) and on the comprehen- the European contribution to the com- sive approach rather than on the “hard” mon efforts. For the USA, it seems to issues of Article 5 (NAT), it is most be of little relevance whether of the probable that Art. 5 will remain at the European nation states make their con- heart of NATO. Cooperation with the tributions under a NATO membership, UN, OSCE, EU and – a new aspect – Partnership-for-Peace or EU label – as the African Union will be stressed. The long as they do make them and bring development of concrete partnership some relief to the US efforts. The more issues with Russia will be envisaged, robust economic strength of the “old” but it is not likely that NATO would be European NATO-members will proba- willing or obliged to give up any central bly mean that their weight will grow position such as its “open door policy”. within the context of the global eco- In practice it might be that membership nomic crises by comparison with the for Georgia will be postponed on ac- “new” European countries (e.g. Estonia, count of the “stability paradigm”, while Latvia, Lithuania or Poland), whose membership for the Ukraine seems to bilaterally US-centred political agendas be more likely, but most probably in the based on troop contributions could face longer run. In territorial terms, Eurasia greater problems. and the Caucasus will remain of high geopolitical relevance for NATO, while From a current perspective NATO’s Africa is likely to grow in importance. Strategic Concept (2010) might look a NATO is clearly planning to expand lot like the Strategic Concept (1999), into the Balkans, and more attention is but anyway it will offer good possibili- likely to be paid to the southern than ties for overcoming the crisis of unity the northern flank. that NATO has been facing since 2002. The reintegration of France into the A stable NATO area will serve as an military structures of NATO might be a economic, social and military “shield” symbolic step, and this may also be the for the “swords” of pro-active crisis case with most of the steps which the management (including, if necessary, Obama administration has taken to- peace enforcement by military interven- wards NATO. Anyway, it does seem tion) and regional post-intervention sta- that the United States of America is bilization. The current situation will be willing to renew its strategic partner- perceived structurally as a “long haul”, ship with Europe, and that NATO is the as in the late 1950s, while on the opera- best instrument available for such a tive level the fight against al-Qa’ida purpose. In this context it should be and other terrorist groups will continue mentioned that after the summit of Kehl to be the principal task, although it and Strasbourg the general perception looks as if troops might be pulled out among analysts has been oscillating 18 between the poles of American69 and European weakness.70 Both observa- tions might be true in a globalizing world, but only if the two aspects of the Alliance on their respective sides of the Atlantic Ocean are regarded separately. Once this relative weakness is recog- nized, it could show the way for a bal- ance of naturally diverging interests within NATO.

69 Abdankung der USA als Führungsmacht? Strategische Studien, 15.4.2009 [www.strategische-studien.com/index.php?id =64&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=89&tx_ttnews[year] =2009&tx_ttnews[month]=04&tx_ttnews[day] =15&cHash=54221207c6 / 24.4.2009]. 70 U.S., Turkey: Washington’s Growing Confi- dence in Ankara, STRATFOR, 24.4.2009 [www.stratfor.com/memberships/136663/analy sis/20090424_u_s_turkey_washingtons_growi ng_confidence_ankara / 24.4.2009]. About the author

Dr. phil. Agilolf Kesselring is currently a visiting researcher at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies (DSDS). He has worked as a researcher for the German Military History Research Institute. He has published about NATO, as- pects of Nordic and Balkan security as well as on topics concerning military his- tory.

Latest publications in this series: (full list in http://www.mpkk.fi/fi/tutkimus-opetus/julkaisut/stratl/)

Series 4: Working Papers (ISSN: 1236-4983)

No 30, 2009 Jarno Limnéll ja Charly Salonius-Pasternak: Miksi Afganistan on tärkeä Suo- melle?

No 31, 2009 Sanna Vähänen: Strategian laitoksen julkaisutoiminnan vaikuttavuus.

No 32, 2009 Nina Græger: “Inside Nato - Outside the EU”: Norwegian Security and Defence Policy in the High North

Strategian laitos Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu PL 266 00171 HELSINKI

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