Grand Valley Review

Volume 27 | Issue 1 Article 11

2004 The Reluctant Heretic: George F. Kennan and the Vietnam War, 1950-1968 Randall Doyle Grand Valley State University

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Recommended Citation Doyle, Randall (2004) "The Reluctant Heretic: George F. Kennan and the Vietnam War, 1950-1968," Grand Valley Review: Vol. 27: Iss. 1, Article 11. Available at: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvr/vol27/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@GVSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Grand Valley Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@GVSU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ment service, were The Reluctant unpopularity ofU.~ Thus, this artid lowing: Heretic: George a)The origins of the post-WWII pe1 E Kennan and sophical foundatim political and militaJ b)Kennan's willi the Vietnam War, eign policy during 1 c)Kennan's reluc rgso-rg68 policies concerning the wrath of the "~ establishment upor ot a perfect man. Not a man without human d)Kennan's lega1 weaknesses. Nevertheless, he remained a proud Professor 'fV!ndall crJoyle is N ment in Vietnam ac man with uncommon wisdom, unafraid to express currently a Visiting cASsistant Pro­ held concerning otl inner thoughts even if it caused him pain or humili­ fessor in the %story crJepartment e)The lessons th: ation. Insecure and thin-skinned, he had a need to be at grand Valley Jtate University. learn from its great heard. This serious man struck by bouts of depression, CJ!is primary teaching and research affected American foreign policy like no other since Part 1: The Origi areas are UJ. %story, c.American John Qyincy Adams. Anti-Vietnam Pc 54 :fOreign Policy, and c.American George Frost Kennan, from Wisconsin in America's George F. Kennan, and Pacific 'J\im politics. Professor heartland, provided a philosophical blueprint for a nomic global strate1 crJoyle has lived, studied, or taught nation's strategic actions and responsibilities during participant in the r in cASia, c.Australia, Burope and the Cold War. His analysis and thoughts brought him U.S. policies and 1 ~rth c.America during his academic fame and respect within the profession of diplomats, ing its foundation career. CJ!is first book concerning but his new stature did not protect him from the vicis­ era. Twenty years I Idaho politics, c.APolitical crJynasty situdes of American politics. Hailed as a prescient policies and princ in ~rth Idaho, is being published observer of foreign affairs in 1947, Kennan found him­ evaluate our involv this year. '1fe is currently writing self driven from government service in 1952 only to see and Evan Thomas, a book on the world's first green his reputation re-established in the 1960s, thanks to his cally acclaimed we Party, created in 1972, in Tasma­ interpretation of the tragic U.S. involvement in South­ evidence of his inca nia, c.Australia. east Asia. Whether the issue was Soviet expansionism, ment of post-Worl the relevancy of the Korean War, German unification A generation later or the Vietnam War, George Kennan was frequently new generation wi interpreted by both friends and critics as the "heretic concerning anothe in the house" of American foreign policy. His pronounceme1 The Vietnam War and the 1960s represent a dif­ they were respecte ficult and tumultuous period in our nation's history, power. especially for those who participated in the making of Kennan becam' post-WWII American foreign policy. Kennan found foreign policy ci himself enmeshed in his own political policy guerilla­ (approximately 8,( war among his former colleagues and friends. Longtime State Department relationships, established during his years in govern- ing the academic v Randall Doyle

ment service, were tested severely due to the growing serious diplomat from Milwaukee, :tnt unpopularity of U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia. Wisconsin, in July 1947. It was then Thus, this article will attempt to address the fol­ that they read in Foreign Affairs jour­ lowing: nal an article called, "The Sources of orge a)The origins of Kennan's beliefs concerning Asia in Soviet Conduct," signed "X." The the post-WWII period, which later became the philo­ article was considered monumental llld sophical foundation for his prescient dissent on U.S. and its author, though a mystery at political and military activities in Southeast Asia. first, to be a first-rate interpreter of b)Kennan's willingness to challenge American for­ Soviet intentions in the post-WWII n War, eign policy during the Cold War. era. This celebrated work, and his past c)Kennan's reluctant but consistent criticism ofU.S. performance as a diplomat, primarily policies concerning Vietnam, even though it brought in Germany and Russia, landed him the wrath of the "Wise Men'' of the U.S. foreign policy the position of Director of the Policy establishment upon himself. Planning Staff(PPS) within the U.S. nan without human d) Kennan's legacy. Was his analysis of U.S. involve­ State Department. 1e remained a proud ment in Vietnam accurate and consistent with views he From 1948 to 1950 the primary unafraid to express held concerning other parts of the world? function of the PPS was to develop him pain or humili­ e)The lessons that Kennan believed America should rational and sound recommendations, ' he had a need to be learn from its greatest foreign policy blunder. concerning operational principles that ' bouts of depression, represented the strategic thrusts of Part I: The Origins of George F. Kennan's r like no other since American activities Europe. The staff Anti-Vietnam Policy Statements worked out three principles, in rela­ ·isconsin in America's George F. Kennan, author of the diplomatic and eco­ 55 tion to the Marshall Plan, that were tical blueprint for a nomic global strategy of containment, was an important swiftly implemented for Europe's >ponsibilities during participant in the mid to late-1940s in the creation of U.S. policies and philosophical principles establish­ economic recovery: toughts brought him a)Europeans should themselves ~ession of diplomats, ing its foundational moorings during the Cold War ask the U.S. for assistance. era. Twenty years later, Kennan used these very same t him from the vicis­ b)All European states, including policies and principles as measuring instruments to ailed as a prescient the Soviet Union, should be eligible Kennan found him­ evaluate our involvement in Vietnam. Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, who included Kennan in their criti­ for aid. ce in 1952 only to see c)The decisive emphasis of the cally acclaimed work, The Wise Men, provide detailed ~ 1960s, thanks to his program should be on the rehabilita­ evidence of his incalculable contribution to the develop­ vulvement in South­ tion of the German economy.2 ment of post-World War II American foreign policy. 1 )oviet expansionism, Kennan, according to Richard A generation later, in the 1960s, Kennan educated a German unification Russell, who teaches American new generation with his typical clarity and profundity man was frequently national security policy at U-C ritics as the "heretic concerning another foreign policy dilemma: Vietnam. Berkeley, was intensely aware of the His pronouncements were not always welcomed, but policy. need for the American government they were respected and, at times, feared by those in SOs represent a dif­ to conduct its foreign policy from a )ur nation's history, power. set of principles, though he did not Kennan became a household word, at least within ed in the making of necessarily articulate these policy foreign policy circles, when he sent his famous >licy. Kennan found principles in his own work, except in (approximately 8,000 words) 'long telegram' to U.S. :ical policy guerilla­ the implementation of the Marshall d friends. Longtime State Department in 1946. The general public, includ­ Plan and the policy of containment.3 ing the academic world, became aware of the quiet but tis years in govern- Yet it was this absolute belief in such principles in the facilitation of U.S. "sinews of modern war."The four areas mentioned were flict. 13 He believed tha foreign policy in a post-WWII world Great Britain, Germany, Soviet Union and Japan. He America's top priorit: that were the intellectual origins from emphasized that these were the areas that were crucial the abandonment of which Kennan's anti-Vietnam War and vital to U.S. security, strongly implying that Viet­ Thus, from a sect sentiments arose. nam did not measure up to this criterion. 8 national interests fo In 1950, Kennan's principles were Most foreign policy analysts, including Kennan, of Korea to either t sorely tested by the invasion of South agreed that there were no developing industrial powers influence in Asia. H Korea from the North. Initially, he on the Asian mainland. Thus, there was no present, or during the early mot supported a limited war in Korea. near-future threat to America. Kennan commented, litical interpretations He believed that the attack gave U.S. "China did not figure. There was no place on the embattled Dean Ach military planners an opportunity to mainland of Asia where industrial strength could be be intimidated by the evaluate the Soviet Union as a hos­ developed on a scale large enough to do us significant and right-wing reacti' tile force in international relations. harm."9 vention by force, she America's involvement in Korea was In October 1950, Kennan shocked the sensibilities interests and not by P' important because the future secu­ of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, with an analysis of perhaps naive, his fo, rity and stability ofJapan, within our the Korean situation that was perceived by Acheson as matters gave him a n containment strategy aimed at the "flatly unrealistic and irrelevant to the crisis at hand."10 those who vehement Soviet Union in Northeast Asia, was Kennan bluntly blamed the U.S. government for its Kennan maintain at stake.4 indifference to the balance of power in Asia before the upon his Korean dise Also, a forceful response was neces­ Korean WarY He noted that Korea, due to its geo­ redevelopment repre sary to protect America's commitment graphical location, was situated between two major ing a counter-weigh s6 to stand by its allies, no matter how powers, Japan and the Soviet Union. Since Japan was in northeast Asia. K dubious the importance to our over­ in the process of post-war reconstruction, it only made containment policie: all national security.5 Kennan believed sense that Korea would eventually be absorbed into the the industrial capac that America's involvement extended Soviet sphere for the short-term: an enhancement of only to restoring the status quo upon A period of Russian domination (of Korea) while resources, according t the Korean peninsula. He "saw in undesirable, is preferable to continued U.S. involve­ such as Japan and Tai the North Korean attack adequate ment in that unhappy area, as long as the means tant economic and m reason for us to undertake military chosen to assert Soviet influence are not, as was Asia strategy to con1 operations for this limited purpose. the case with those resorted to in June (1950), later on, gave damnit (He) did not see in it justification for ones calculated to throw panic and terror into about the relevance involving ourselves in another world other Asian peoples and thus to achieve for the overall Asian strateg; war."6 Kremlin important successes going far beyond the of (their) gifted aut In 1967, Professor Kennan gave Korean area.U times contradictory, a talk at the Charles Warren Center Needless to say, Secretary Acheson was not happy prophetic insight an' at Harvard University concerning with Kennan's unvarnished assessment of Korea. The cally."J4 the lack of a "conceptual element U.S. had already committed itself to a war ten thousand Yet, despite their 7 in recent American foreign policy." miles away. Kennan, though respected for his keen ana­ Asia, in May 1951 Sf Though this lecture focused upon lytical skills concerning U.S. foreign policy, had a habit contact Jacob Malik U.S. policies concerning Vietnam, of giving his analysis outside the vacuum of American begin peace talks cor Kennan asserted that after World politics. He didn't appreciate the forces of American Kennan as a 'hawk' a War II there were only four areas in domestic politics, and their attending realities. Kennan Kennan as an expert' the world where conflict represented was certain the security of Japan and Taiwan might the Truman Admin a threat to U.S. security, due to their inadvertently be jeopardized due to the Korean con- the Soviets indicate~ industrial potential to produce the Randall Doyle

Lreas mentioned were flict. 13 He believed that the rebuilding of]a pan remained Inion and Japan. He America's top priority in East Asia, even if that meant ·eas that were crucial the abandonment of U.S. responsibilities in Korea. implying that Viet- Thus, from a security standpoint, Kennan saw no ~iterion.8 national interests for the U.S. in the potential loss including Kennan, of Korea to either the Soviet or Chinese sphere of ng industrial powers influence in Asia. His view of Korea did not change ~e was no present, or during the early months of the war. Kennan's geopo­ ~ennan commented, litical interpretations landed him in hot water with the as no place on the embattled Dean Acheson. However, Kennan refused to u strength could be be intimidated by the domestic politics ofMcCarthyism to do us significant and right-wing reactionaries. He believed wars, or inter­ vention by force, should be based upon vital national ked the sensibilities interests and not by petty political expediencies.Though 1, with an analysis of perhaps nai:ve, his focused and withering candor in all eived by Acheson as matters gave him a measure of credibility even among the crisis at hand."10 those who vehemently disagreed with him. government for its Kennan maintained, though Acheson had frowned :r in Asia before the upon his Korean disengagement argument, that Japan's rea, due to its geo­ redevelopment represented the real objective in creat­ )etween two major ing a counter-weight to possible Soviet expansionism m. Since Japan was in northeast Asia. Korea was simply irrelevant to our 57 uction, it only made containment policies in the region because it lacked )e absorbed into the the industrial capacity to be a real force against, or an enhancement of, Soviet activities. Limited U.S. (of Korea) while resources, according to Kennan, were needed for nations ued U.S.involve­ such as Japan and Taiwan that represented more impor­ ,ng as the means tant economic and military allies within our overall East

~ are not, as was Asia strategy to contain Soviet adventurism. Acheson, in June (1950), later on, gave damning praise to Kennan's observations and terror into about the relevance of Japan and Korea to America's ' achieve for the overall Asian strategy when he noted that it was "typical tg far beyond the of (their) gifted author, beautifully expressed, some­ times contradictory, in which were mingled flashes of son was not happy prophetic insight and suggestions ... of total impracti­ r1ent of Korea. The cally."14 a war ten thousand Yet, despite their policy disagreements concerning ~d for his keen ana­ Asia, in May 1951 Secretary Acheson chose Kennan to L policy, had a habit contact Jacob Malik, Soviet Ambassador to the UN, to cuum of American begin peace talks concerning Korea. Though Malik saw orces of American Kennan as a 'hawk' and anti-Soviet, he also recognized Lg realities. Kennan Kennan as an expert on Russia who had influence within md Taiwan might the Truman Administration. In the following month, ) the Korean con- the Soviets indicated that they were receptive to peace negotiations. Unfortunately, it would the restrictions forced upon his troops, he argued, vic­ less and less impac take until1953 to enact a cease-fire on tory was achievable in the near future. 18 He ended his growing disagreeme the peninsula.15 letter to Congressman Martin with his famous dictum, increasingly intense By January 1951, the Korean War "There is no substitute forvictory."19 In early April1951, ship with General C was a political lightning rod within after conferring with his top advisers including Gen­ of State from 1947 American society. Early support for erals George Marshall and Omar Bradley, President and mutual respec the war had diminished significantly. Truman fired MacArthur for gross insubordination gone forever. A majority of the public wanted U.S. and replaced him with General Matthew Ridgeway. In retrospect, A< involvement in Korea to end as soon Kennan believed that Truman's controversial decision have the intellectu~ as possible. Many critics ofTruman's to be wise and courageous. He pointed out that to have produce a cohesive policies felt it was a waste of Ameri­ foreign policy driven by military considerations alone to both parties. Th( can lives and resources. On the other was dangerous. In fact, Kennan saw disaster awaiting became increasing!) hand, right-wing militarists, such the United States in Korea (and Asia generally) had dialogue as the Col as General MacArthur, saw it as an structural governmental discipline not been re-estab­ By 1950, the n~ opportunity to eradicate communism lished in Truman's administration.20 more rigid and int< from East Asia. This view frightened Kennan believed two lessons were evident from the ist approach towarc Kennan. In August 1950, Kennan near-fiasco of the Korean War. First, that war must was seen as irreleva warned that military activities north be subordinate to political objectives. Secondly, that McCarthy began 1 of the 38'h parallel might result in the secret, discreet and informal diplomacy can be great voices of liberal dis direct involvement of the Chinese aids to the public and formal processes of diplomacy He desired to es and/or Russians.16 in the global arena.21 Almost fifteen years later, Kennan of the nation's politi sB The one influential voice from would be advising a new generation of political leaders most of the next tw the war-expansionists that was heard that these lessons from the Korean War continued to of Advanced Study within the political melee in Wash­ be valid with regards to our involvement in Vietnam. in his Pulitzer Prize ington, D.C. was that of General The Korean War was a prelude to Kennan's philosophi­ Kennan expressed 1 MacArthur. The General vehemently cal dissent concerning the tragic struggle in Vietnam. climate that stifled : opposed Truman's policies and, in late­ For him, U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia was even that dominated U.: March 1951, his opposition became more dubious and irrelevant than our involvement in Kennan, for examp public knowledge. MacArthur had Northeast Asia.22 NATO, the re-arn written House Republican minority Part II: George F. Kennan's Thinking and ment of the hydro leader, Joseph Martin, agreeing with Writing In The 1950s and Early 1g6os the United Nations Martin's opinion concerning the use During the 1950s and the early 1960s, George F. Kennan in Germany. He s1 ofChiang Kai-shek's troops from For­ sought a "peace" in his personal and professional lives. Germany and pulli mosa against Communist China on He had witnessed his containment policy become Secretary of Sta 17 the mainland. MacArthur supported militarized with the creation ofNSC-68 (April1950) Kennan's ideas ace a wider war on the mainland of China by Paul Nitze, Kennan's replacement as Director of the the State Departmt that included the Korean peninsula. PPS, and overseen by Secretary of State Dean Acheson. jester, expected to 1 A few days earlier, before his letter to This document was a further extension ofNSC-48, cre­ shocking things, va Congressman Martin became public ated in 1949, which envisioned Southeast Asia as an hides of slower coli< 25 knowledge, the General had snubbed important source of raw materials and trade. America's ously." Kennan, ir the Chinese forces, and had under-cut failure in Vietnam began with this national security Washington politi< Truman's attempt for a cease-fire, by memorandum.23 Kennan sensed that his opinions and in. This irrefutable suggesting that China's military forces observations concerning the direction of Cold War poli­ bore this frustratio were close to being defeated. If only cies, including the on-going Korean War, were having Leonard Bushk the U.S. government would remove 1967 for 1he Detro Randall Doyle

)ops, he argued, vic­ less and less impact within the U.S. government. His ture.18 He ended his growing disagreements with Secretary Acheson became 1 his famous dictum, increasingly intense and problematic. His prior relation­ 19 In early April1951, ship with General George Marshall, Truman's Secretary sers including Gen­ of State from 1947 to 1948, had been one of creativity r Bradley, President and mutual respect. Those days he discovered, were )SS insubordination gone forever. 'vfatthew Ridgeway. In retrospect, Acheson and Kennan simply did not mtroversial decision have the intellectual or personal chemistry needed to 1ted out that to have produce a cohesive foreign policy that was acceptable :onsiderations alone to both parties. The political environment in America LW disaster awaiting became increasingly narrower in terms of foreign policy Asia generally) had dialogue as the Cold War progressed. : not been re-estab- By 1950, the nation's political scene had become 20 more rigid and intolerant. Kennan's rational and real­ :re evident from the ist approach toward Soviet/Communist expansionism, 'irst, that war must was seen as irrelevant and impractical. Senator Joseph ives. Secondly, that McCarthy began his nationwide crusade to destroy )macy can be great voices ofliberal dissent in America. :esses of diplomacy He desired to escape the new harshness and venom Lyears later, Kennan of the nation's politics in Washington, D.C., so he spent 1 of political leaders most of the next two years (1950-1952), at the Institute 59 1 War continued to of Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. Later on, 'ement in Vietnam. in his Pulitzer Prize winning memoirs published in 1967, ennan's philosophi­ Kennan expressed his exasperation with the Cold War truggle in Vietnam. climate that stifled any ideas outside the new militarism h.east Asia was even that dominated U.S. politics, including foreign policy. our involvement in Kennan, for example, strongly opposed the creation of NATO, the re-armament of Germany, the develop­ inking and ment of the hydrogen bomb, admission of China to ly 1g6os the United Nations, and the accelerated de-Nazification s, George F. Kennan in Germany. He supported the uniting of (a neutral) 24 d professional lives. Germany and pulling troops out ofEurope. :nt policy become Secretary of State Dean Acheson's cool reception of )C-68 (April1950) Kennan's ideas accelerated the latter's departure from Lt as Director of the the State Department. Kennan writes, "I felt like a court tate Dean Acheson. jester, expected to enliven discussion, privileged to say on ofNSC-48, cre­ shocking things, valued as an intellectual gadfly on the 'utheast Asia as an hides of slower colleagues, but not to be taken fully seri­ nd trade. America's ously."25 Kennan, in 1950, found himself in the world of .s national security Washington politics, suddenly on the outside looking at his opinions and in. This irrefutable reality disturbed him greatly, but he n of Cold War poli- bore this frustration with his dignity intact. 1 War, were having Leonard Bushkoff, reviewing Kennan's memoirs in 1967 for 1he Detroit News wrote, "Kennan's goal since 1950 has been nothing less than an after 27 years. Thus began his academic odyssey: Insti­ Part III: George attempt to change the basic nature and tute of Advanced Study, Princeton University, Oxford Foreign Policy 1 outlook ofAmerican foreign policy. "26 University, and BBC Reith Lecturer.32 Unlike his experie He also pointed out that "Kennan was The prestigious Reith Lectures, given in Great not hailed as a vis aloof, distant, reserved, often arrogant, Britain, again, provided Kennan an opportunity to celebrated for ere and largely contentious, was actually express his thoughts on the changing nature of the strategy that beca1 a sensitive man, but thin-skinned in Cold War, particularly concerning Germany. Qyietly for nearly fifty yea 27 the extreme." Kennan, according and succinctly, Kennan once again showed his philo­ the "Wise Men'' " to the reviewer was, "his own worst sophical contrariness on the topic ofU.S. foreign policy. cisms that were di enemy, a man whose inability to deal Walter Lippman wrote that his ideas were, again, seen they had presentt with others prevented his ideas from as cogent, lucid and controversial: among the men w 28 receiving much of a hearing." Per­ It was at the beginning of this reappraisal that after World War I haps. Putting Keenan's personality Mr. Kennan spoke out. He spoke gently and the diplomatic elit traits aside, it is still hard to see the quietly, as it is in his nature to do. But because within.341his wast Washington political establishment, nobody in authority, not (John Foster) Dulles, as the most cerebr in 1950, giving him an opportunity to not Dr. (Konrad) Adenauer, not (British Prime 20'h century. explain his ideas as a new foundation Minister) Macmillan, had anything at all to say America's new 1 for the post-war era. on the political implications of the great disclosures F. Kennan's analysi In 1961, Professor Kennan was about the balance of power, Mr. Keenan's words clear and hard obst appointed U.S. ambassador to Yugo­ have resounded and reverberated throughout the driving forces in t1 slavia by President John F. Kennedy. world. the President, U.S Observers saw this nomination as part 6o But while this explains why his lectures attracted the Pentagon. The of a Kennan diplomatic comeback. He so much attention when they did, there is still brethren, Kennan ' had resigned as the U.S. ambassador the question of why they have attracted so much gadfly and a disap to the Soviet Union in 1952, shortly support. My own view is that the Western allies civil war that was p after being appointed, due to intem­ had come to a dead end on the road which they Vietnam was mirrc perate remarks to a reporter during had been following in the post-war years. The In hindsight, it's c1 an interview in Berlin. Kennan said road which Mr. Kennan pointed out is the only ment was in the pn that living and diplomatic conditions alternative which some promise of leading to the the Vietnam Wart in Russia were worse than those that reunification of Germany and to the national inde­ reputations of the' existed in Nazi Germany. This did pendence of the East European states.33 and Johnson's Adr not endear him to the Soviet leader The 1950s, for the most part, represented the "wil­ rians and political Joseph Stalin, who had hardened his derness years" for George F. Kennan. He became an the charred rubble position toward the United States. outsider within the foreign policy establishment. Southeast Asia of The Soviet government-sponsored Kennan continued to write and lecture about U.S. fought with aggn newspaper Pravda called Kennan, foreign policy, but he no longer had an official status the tides of histor 29 "a war monger and a potential spy." within the U.S. government. overcome. The Soviet government labeled him In 1961, President Kennedy brought 'Mr. X' in History, unqm an "enemy of the Soviet Union," after from the cold. Unfortunately, Kennan's experience in Kennan's reputati< his careless remarks became public.30 Yugoslavia was something of a disappointment for him. pretations and pre Presidents Truman and Eisen­ He tendered his resignation in the summer of 1963, to ramifications for . hower did not re-appoint Kennan President Kennedy. Yet, ironically, he to another ambassadorial post after anti-war moveme1 the Soviet debacleY In July 1953, he ing the thinking o resigned from the Foreign Service Randall Doyle

iemic odyssey: Insti­ Part III: George F. Kennan, Vietnam and the n University, Oxford Foreign Policy Elite 32 rer. Unlike his experience in the late-1940s, Kennan was 1res, given in Great not hailed as a visionary in the 1960s, though he was 1 an opportunity to celebrated for creating a geo-political containment nging nature of the strategy that became the heart of U.S. foreign policy g Germany. Qyietly for nearly fifty years. Despite this, several members of n showed his philo­ the "Wise Men" were not amused by his public criti­ )fU.S. foreign policy. cisms that were directed at the policies and solutions eas were, again, seen they had presented to President Johnson. In short, among the men who helped form U.S. foreign policy s reappraisal that after World War II, there developed a division among poke gently and the diplomatic elite. Kennan became an outsider from , do. But because within.34 1his was typical of a man whom many describe 1 Foster) Dulles, as the most cerebral of America's policymakers in the )t (British Prime 20'h century. ning at all to say America's new leaders reacted aggressively to George e great disclosures F. Kennan's analysis and observations in the 1960s. His :. Keenan's words clear and hard observations were not appreciated by the d throughout the driving forces in the U.S. foreign policy establishment: the President, U.S. State Department, and, of course, lectures attracted the Pentagon. Though highly respected amongst the 61 did, there is still brethren, Kennan was seen and treated as a heretic, a ttracted so much gadfly and a disappointment by one-time peers.35 1he 1e Western allies civil war that was playing itself out in the rice paddies of road which they Vietnam was mirrored in the halls of power in America. t-war years. The In hindsight, it's clear that the foreign policy establish­ :l out is the only ment was in the process of self-immolation. By the time of leading to the the Vietnam War ended in 1975, the careers, futures and he national inde­ reputations of the "Wise Men," the foreign policy elite, ;tates.33 and Johnson's Administration were in tatters.36 Histo­ presented the "wil­ rians and political scientists are still combing through lan. He became an the charred rubble of U.S. policy toward Vietnam and icy establishment. Southeast Asia of this period. The Vietnam War was lecture about U.S. fought with aggressive "manifest destiny" fervor, yet td an official status the tides of history and anti-colonialism could not be overcome. )fought 'Mr. X' in History, unquestionably, has enhanced George F. nan's experience in Kennan's reputation in relation to his prescient inter­ 1pointment for him. pretations and predictions of the domestic and foreign summer of1963, to ramifications for America, due to the Vietnam War. Yet, ironically, he was never fully embraced by the anti-war movement for his contribution toward alter­ ing the thinking of many Americans. His prestige and command ofU.S. foreign policy gave Although Southeast Asia was not his area of exper­ own achievements at dovish politicians cover with constit­ tise as an American foreign-service officer, Kennan create its own image uents who supported the war. He gave continually argued that due to the lack of industrial This "American an intellectual gravitas to the anti-war development within the region, the countries within increasingly importat movement that was perceived in some this region were not a crucial component to America's if America could trat quarters as being un-American, per­ containment of the Soviet Union. In 1965, Kennan itself, then Russia an haps even a communist-inspired plot stated that the "communization'' of the region, in and be diminished greatl) to undermine America. of itself, did not represent a defeat for the U.S. from a light of democratic"' Kennan provided a credible foun­ geo-political standpoint: facto West Berlin, in : dation for creating a new dialogue on Our present involvement in Vietnam is a classic one of the foundatio1 Vietnam. The man who inspired the example of the sort of situation we ought to avoid ally debated within containment doctrine in the late- if we do not wish to provoke in Moscow precisely Southeast Asia's chea 1940s could not, and would not, those reactions that are most adverse to our interests for Japan, in its atten have his patriotism questioned by ... Not to worry so about these remote countries post-war economy. TI the powers that be. The anti-Viet­ scattered across the southern crescent (Southeast role by the U.S. in the nam factions were provided with an Asia), to let them go their own way, not to regard in northeast Asia. V\ intellectual spine to stand up to the their fate as our exclusive responsibility, to wait was determined tha increasingly unsound policies of the for them to come to us rather than our fussing by Russia or China. Johnson Administration. 37 continually over them.39 a recognized factor, Kennan's dislike of U.S. involve­ Kennan, in 1964 at Tokyo University, represented Vietnamese leader ment in Vietnam had its intellectual Asia in general as a challenge for our policymakers. by U.S. foreign poli~ roots in the late 1940s. They were Though most of the American people did not see consideration when ~ not developed in the volatile 1960s, themselves as imperialistic or as foreign oppressors at aims of the Soviet l like those of most critics who pro­ this time, Kennan believed that the U.S. did not want to regional hegemony. tested America's greatest foreign appear as if they were simply handing over the region to Kennan continua policy blunder. Kennan writes in his the Chinese Communists. Perhaps America could find Vietnam to our over memoirs that the United States was a middle ground in this region of the world. Kennan Asia. Committing A1 greatly overextended in the Far East. believed that the U.S. had something to contribute: vention of the expan He saw Japan and the Philippines as the world that had n Disagree as one may with specific American poli­ the cornerstones of a Pacific security security appeared to cies, America's positive contribution in the world arrangement. As far as having per­ Kennan, an imprope has not be so small, nor is it so meaningless poten­ manent land bases on mainland tially for the future, that the world will really wish doctrine."Whatwas' Asia to ensure U.S. national security, to dispense with it entirely. This being the case, the was, in his mind, a Kennan stated clearly and without new and unaccustomed involvement of the United justification for the 42 ambiguity: States people in world affairs will continue in one did in Korea. There was, as will be seen, no way or another.40 Robert McNama of the Vietnam War hint in this exposition (his Yet many observers saw a condescending cultural Retrospect (1995), th< analysis of our military pres­ "Manifest Destiny" at the heart of America's inten­ ence in Asia) of a view that we Asia was based upot tions for these agriculturally-based and technologically require for the assurance of our Yet, McNamara and backward nations. America presented itself as a great national security any special ignored Kennan's p( example of a multi-cultural democracy. The U.S., being military position anywhere on bright Senate hearin an ethnically, racially and religiously assimilated nation, the mainland of Asia.38 of China's failure of insisted that Asia, with our guidance, achieve a similar Indonesia. Also, the level of harmony.41 In short, the U.S., convinced of its indirectly addressed Randall Doyle

not his area of exper­ own achievements and infallibility, was attempting to had obsessed the foreign policy elite :vice officer, Kennan create its own image in this part of the world. within Southeast Asia. Sadly,McNa­ :he lack of industrial This "American Exceptionalism" had become mara admits that Kennan's larger the countries within increasingly important in relation to Vietnam, because point went unnoticed.43 1ponent to America's if America could transform Vietnam into a version of Kennan began his public criticisms m. In 1965, Kennan itself, then Russia and China's future influence would ofU.S. policy in Asia as early as 1959. of the region, in and be diminished greatly. Vietnam could become a shining He provided testimony before the tt for the U.S. from a light of democratic western capitalism and values, a de Senate Committee on Foreign Rela­ facto West Berlin, in Southeast Asia. That objective was tions on his views concerning Asia ietnam is a classic one of the foundational arguments that were continu­ and U.S. foreign policy in a volatile we ought to avoid ally debated within the foreign policy establishment. and evolving post-colonial world. Moscow precisely Southeast Asia's cheap resources were seen as necessary Admittedly, Kennan noted that Asia ~rse to our interests for Japan, in its attempt to develop a growth-oriented was not his area of expertise, but the : remote countries post-war economy. The Japanese were given a substantial events in the region concerned him ·escent (Southeast role by the U.S. in the containment of the Soviet Union as an American citizen and as a vet­ way, not to regard in northeast Asia. Without American intervention, it eran observer of international affairs, onsibility, to wait was determined that Vietnam would be dominated "This is an area about which I have than our fussing by Russia or China. Vietnamese nationalism, though said very little publicly, because I have a recognized factor, relentlessly promoted by North not served there, and I have visited tiversity, represented Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, was interpreted the area only briefly. I can only say or our policymakers. by U.S. foreign policy analysts as being a secondary now that, like many other Americans, people did not see consideration when compared to the perceived global I look with a certain uneasy feeling 63 oreign oppressors at aims of the Soviet Union, or even China's pursuit of at our situation out there."44 At this U.S. did not want to regional hegemony. point, Kennan was concerned with ng over the region to Kennan continually questioned the importance of the situation between China and ; America could find Vietnam to our overall national security objectives in Formosa. U.S. involvement in Viet­ · the world. Kennan Asia. Committing American resources toward the pre­ nam was miniscule in terms of troops mg to contribute: vention of the expansion of communism, in a part of and national commitment. Kennan, however, also warned the senators c American poli­ the world that had no real importance to our national tion in the world security appeared to be pure folly. It was, according to that "the greatest danger, perhaps, as Americans, is to fail to realize that ~aningless poten- Kennan, an improper application of the "containment ld will really wish doctrine."What was occurring in Vietnam in the 1960s this is always a changing world ..... the •eing the case, the was, in his mind, a possible repeat performance and task of statesmanship is to be on top ent of the United justification for the Chinese to get involved as they of this process."45 1 continue in one did in Korea.42 In 1961, Kennan wrote an article Robert McNamara, one of the primary architects entitled, "The American Student and of the Vietnam War, wrote in his belated memoir, In Foreign Affairs," that pointed out :lescending cultural Retrospect (1995), that U.S. involvement in Southeast what was wrong with the education >f America's inten­ Asia was based upon Kennan's containment strategy. of our students who desired a career and technologically Yet, McNamara and other White House officials had in the field of international affairs. ted itself as a great ignored Kennan's penetrating testimony at the Ful­ Kennan indicated three areas that ·acy.The U.S., being bright Senate hearings in 1966, about the significance students needed to master before 'assimilated nation, of China's failure of gaining controlling influence in entering the diplomatic ranks: Profes­ :e, achieve a similar Indonesia. Also, the potency of the domino theory, sional preparation, factual knowledge S., convinced of its indirectly addressed by Kennan during his testimony, and understanding different cultures. Cc

He wrote in an article, "Geography, An interesting item must be noted. Kennan was a world history, religion and culture guest on the television show, Meet 7he Press, in August meet this need for factual knowledge 1963, where he was asked not a single question about about the world around us."46 The Vietnam. Despite a growing concern in the White article had an eerie prescient qual­ House, the issue of Vietnam was not, yet, on the radar­ ity to it. It would be these very same screen of the mainstream media. Four years later, on characteristics that critics pointed to the same show, Kennan would speak on this issue of when things began to go wrong in Vietnam quite extensively.50 Vietnam. Later, MeN amara again President Kennedy's assassination in November 1963 asserted that these fundamental ele­ had a deep effect upon Kennan. He sensed that America ments of knowledge were missing had lost a leader of great potential who was still in the within the decision-making structure stage of development and growth. The question, asked concerning Vietnam.47 later on, about whether the U.S. would have sent combat In 1963, Kennan wrote a brief troops into Vietnam was not addressed in an interview analytical piece for Look Magazine shortly after the President's death. Yet the implication called, "Our Foreign Policy is Para­ that JFK was capable of taking the U.S. in a new and lyzed." He criticized how America different direction was quite clear in his comments to gave out foreign aid to nations claim­ the Zurich newspaper, Tagesanzeiger, interview pub­ ing a need of such funding. Kennan lished 30 November 1963, Kennan stated: was especially suspicious of those By the time the hand of the assassin reached him, who were ideologically blackmailing he was only approaching the peak of his powers. He us during the Cold War. He stated had grown steadily in stature, under the discipline with his typical clarity, "I personally of his office ... His conduct of American foreign am skeptical about foreign aid, espe­ relations would, I am sure, have led to major results, cially when it is given as a condition of decisive value to a world weary of passion, war of not going Communist. We should and insecurityY help those who say, 'we are going In the spring of 1964, Kennan visited the Interna­ to survive whether you help us or tional House in Tokyo. The issue of Vietnam and the not'- like Finland. When a country upcoming 1964 presidential election were addressed says, 'If you don't help us, we will go during his presentation. He saw the U.S. reaching 48 under,' we should get off the trolley." a point of critical mass in terms of its involvement It is interesting to note that President in Vietnam. Kennan did not want to predict which Kennedy, when interviewed in early direction American policy was heading, or might be September 1963, by CBS anchor­ heading, in terms of Vietnam, but the situation was man Walter Cronkite, stated that "highly unstable,'' and "at some point either (we) have to the South Vietnamese government get out or to go in in a manner which will also produce needed to make a greater effort for great changes there."52 popular support. Without popular In the fall, a month before the presidential election, support, he doubted the war could Kennan publicly defended Johnson's benign Vietnam be won. However, he was not ready policy. He "deplored demands (by Goldwater) for so­ to withdraw U.S. support. In short, the called 'victory','' and for the administration to spell out President would continue to supply publicly exactly what it intended to do (in Vietnam) _53 arms and logistics to Vietnam, despite Kennan told the audience oflawyers and legal represen­ his public reservations about the situ­ tatives, representing the California State Bar, that the ation.49

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Randall Doyle

U.S., "By and large, has not done too badly. Our adver­ sary (Communism) has not disappeared from the face of the globe. But neither has he gained his objectives."54 He also commented that the situation in Vietnam was a delicate one for the U.S. government. Extreme care must be recognized and utilized to maintain stability.55 LBJ campaigned as a rational man of peace. In an effort to win the presidency in his own right, he stated that he would not send American boys ten thousand miles away to do what Vietnamese should being doing for themselves. He also portrayed his opponent, Repub­ 6 lican Barry Goldwater, as a dangerous war-monger. 5 In a tragic twist of fate, Johnson, though a self-proclaimed peace candidate, was preparing for war. He made the commitment of sending U.S. combat troops to Vietnam in July 1965. How he reached that decision remains con­ troversial. Nevertheless, he must bear the responsibility for the eventual debacle that nearly caused a second civil war in America.57 In February 1965, The New York Times published an article concerning a speech, "The United States and the Communist Giants," given by George Kennan at Princ­ 73 eton University. Kennan told the audience that U.S. involvement in Vietnam could very well provoke the kind of reaction from Moscow that was not in our best interest. Because of our strategic geo-political errors, the U.S. finds itself in a dangerous and rigid situation. Kennan stated, with typical directness, that the U.S. "not to worry so much about these remote countries scattered across the southern crescent, to let them go their own way, not to regard their fate as our exclusive responsibility. To wait for them to come to us rather than our fussing continually over them."58 The following month, Kennan gave testimony before the House Sub-committee on the Far East and the Pacific concerning the rift between the Soviet Union and China. Both countries, according to Kennan, were competing for the leadership of the communist world. Though this titanic struggle was important, Kennan believed that the U.S. should seek a self-interested advantage in achieving global peace. However, it is important to note that Kennan recommended that the U.S. take no sides in this quarrel. It was important that the U.S. understand the varied and volatile differences

'Ork has been ing cMagazine. between China and the Soviet Union, Kennan pointed out that democracy was not the Vietnam did not fow but nevertheless remaining outside norm throughout the world. Democracy is a Western to assure themselves c the hostilities existing between these idea. Hence, the U.S. confronted a multitude of abuses they should, at any ti 9 two major powers. 5 George Kennan concerning self-government throughout the world, to save their position also warned of a possible Russia­ particularly in non-Western regions. Due to this real­ In March 1966, D China alliance due to the Vietnam ity, Kennan was convinced that the U.S. could not paper, Campus Dialo, War. The possibility of bombing possibly adjudicate militarily or politically all the cases by Kennan during hi China could quite possibly bring ofinjustice. Kennan stated matter-of-factly that, "some attacked U.S. policy Russia into the equation. This was an of them (abuses) are closer to home than Vietnam."63 It Vietnam. He strong unacceptable development. Several was not the last time that Professor Kennan expressed America to impose it senators silently agreed, but they felt concern that America's obsession to convert the world World country. Kenr they had to be publicly supportive of to democracy, especially since the U.S. was struggling our political ideas an Johnson's policies.60 in providing these same fundamental rights to many a long and specific 1 David Halberstam, in an inter­ of its own citizens. believed our system view in 1997, stated that Congress As the Vietnam War began to heat up and U.S. Asia in 1966, then was scared of "losing Vietnam." The involvement increased incrementally, Kennan's opin­ this period that he ghost of China's communist takeover ions about Vietnam and Asia also showed an equal odology in attempt in 1949 had haunted the Democratic growth of intensity. In early 1966, Kennan gave the policymaking: Party during the 1950s. Republicans, Goodspeed Lecture at Denison University. He provided This is a great pr such as Richard Nixon and Joseph an in-depth analysis about Asia and the continuing plunge these peo McCarthy, during the 1952 presi­ struggle between China and Russia for hegemony in civilian losses, sin 74 dential campaign reminded voters the communist world. According to Kennan, China's sort of developrr that it was the Democrats who had leaders were arrogant and bitter. They intended to the cost of it- tf 61 "lost" China. humiliate the United States globally. Kennan strongly the price you pa) At the end ofl965, Kennan pub­ implied that our relationship with them was bound to In April1966, ~ licly spoke out, in the Miami Herald, be difficult diplomatically. 64 Foreign Relations C for the first time concerning the In terms of Asia, Kennan saw the importance of William Fulbrigl developing anti-Vietnam interven­ J. the region, particularly Southeast Asia, as being not attempt by the ser tion movement. The intentions of nearly as important as Western Europe after World questioning our ac this growing faction remained a War II. There were two factors concerning Asia that that probably shou mystery to the elderly statesman. he addressed: when the Gulf ofT Kennan said, "the young Americans l)The countries of Southeast Asia, that is ....while unanimously (Ho-c who march around with Viet Cong certainly important in many ways, is not a major indus­ congressional deb flags, or profess to favor a Viet Cong trial area. These countries are not in the same category understanding. (r victory, are choosing a very strange as Japan, Korea or Western Germany. Morse and Ernest way to demonstrate an attachment 2)The Chinese-Russian conflict has had the effect ofTonkin Resoluti to the cause of either independence of practically forcing every other communist regime in with typical cando or freedom, if this is indeed what they the world to think for itself, to make its own decisions, were the major str are interested in."62 This was not the and to develop certain elements of independence in its Vietnam: last time that Kennan questioned the own policy. 65 !)Southeast A~ intentions of the anti -war movement. Kennan noted that North Vietnam made a concerted major priority for Perhaps it was a generational thing, effort to remain in China's good graces during its war Communism. Viet but there is no doubt that the two against the United States, "This is true of the North tary threat to U.S. principles never saw their respective Vietnamese even now, to some extent; and it would roles in the same light. be much more true of them if the logic of the war in Randall Doyle

nocracy was not the Vietnam did not force them to keep close to Peking and nocracy is a Western to assure themselves of Chinese favor, for the event that 1 multitude of abuses they should, at any time, require Chinese intervention oughout the world, to save their position."66 ns. Due to this real- In March 1966, Denison University's campus news­ the U.S. could not paper, Campus Dialogue, published an interview given >litically all the cases by Kennan during his visit to the school. He indirectly ·of-factly that, "some attacked U.S. policy that justified our intervention in ethan Vietnam."63 It Vietnam. He strongly felt that it was impossible for 1r Kennan expressed America to impose its system ofgovernment on a Third­ :o convert the world World country. Kennan commented, "Our institutions, U.S. was struggling our political ideas and our principles are the product of ntal rights to many a long and specific historical experience."67 If Kennan believed our system was not replicable in Southeast ) heat up and U.S. Asia in 1966, then it should not surprise analysts of lly, Kennan's opin­ this period that he was dead-set against our meth­ o showed an equal odology in attempting to implement such fallacious ,, Kennan gave the policymaking: versity. He provided This is a great problem. What good does it do to 1nd the continuing plunge these people into suffering, bloodshed and .a for hegemony in civilian losses, simply in order to try to bring some :o Kennan, China's sort of development program to them? If that is 75 They intended to the cost of it- the question is whether it is worth y. Kennan strongly the price you pay. 68 hem was bound to In April 1966, Kennan appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by U.S. Senator the importance of 1\sia, as being not William J. Fulbright. The Fulbright Hearings were an attempt by the senator to provide a forum for those 1rope after World questioning our actions in Vietnam. It was a debate teeming Asia that that probably should have been held in August 1964, when the Gulf ofTonkin Resolution was passed almost ia, that is ....while unanimously (House: 416-0; Senate: 88-2), without a not a major indus­ congressional debate of any substance, or depth of the same category y. understanding. (Note: Only U.S. Senators Wayne Morse and Ernest Groening voted against the Gulf ilas had the effect 1munist regime in ofTonkin Resolution) Kennan, in his testimony, spoke its own decisions, with typical candor and eloquence on what he believed were the major structural weaknesses of U.S. policy in dependence in its Vietnam: 1)Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam, was not a made a concerted :es during its war major priority for the U.S. in its global struggle against Communism. Vietnam was not a major industrial-mili­ rue of the North nt; and it would tary threat to U.S. vital interests. gic of the war in 2)Kennan called U.S. military U.S. war policies. In short, the window of debate was "That is absolute! intervention, in Vietnam, as being closing.This process had purposely diminished a needed concept of containm "unfortunate." He believed that the dialogue about U.S. involvement in Vietnam. This which I was connec U.S., given the same circumstances, development disturbed Kennan greatly. He believed support our present would not intervene if given the same that there existed a real possibility that a larger and Max Frankel, a r choice again. more dangerous war might develop in Southeast Asia. asked Kennan abm 3)Kennan warned, once again, that Kennan also believed it was time for increased public dominating non-co the defeat of North Vietnam's abil­ discussion domestically, and internationally-perhaps U.S. military presen ity to wage war in South Vietnam in the U.N. General Assembly. He stated that world I think that re< would probably trigger another Chi­ opinion was turning against us, the strategic bombing examination and nese intervention-An intervention did not appear to be effective, and the China factor as international that could prove disastrous for the remained erratic and unpredictable. All of these fac­ believe there are , U.S., due to the hostile terrain that tors, according to Kennan's estimation, could lead to could be brought American forces would find them­ a wider war. 70 have the unsettlir selves fighting in. (The Korean War In early 1967, Arkansas U.S. Senator William J. attention.76 analogy was not lost upon members Fulbright decided that a wider inquiry was needed to As 1968 drew to of the Senate Foreign Relations Com­ discuss the Vietnam War. These hearings, in February, in Vietnam, and ap mittee)69 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, were a diers. There were c: Kennan's testimony gave credibil­ follow-up of those held in April1966. Kennan again someone should cl ity to those academic, congressional testified for several hours about U.S. policy in Southeast nomination for the 71 and social critics who questioned Asia. He pointed out that the war in Vietnam was a Kennedy, George lV President Johnson's war policies. civil war, and not a war ofliberation controlled by China to attempt to unse: 72 Kennan was widely respected for or the Soviet Union. one man did step f< his war analysis of global events. The following month, at Harvard University, Kennan Minnesota, Eugene Now, in 1966, the "Wise Men"'who was seen pounding away at U.S. policy toward Vietnam. the 'Children's Cru designed post-war foreign policy now An audience of seven hundred heard him criticize the changed American on opposing sides. It was America's American decision-making process, which was, accord­ In February196 most divisive war since the American ing to Kennan, based upon "sentiment and emotions the White House : 73 Civil War, a hundred years earlier. Old than on concept of an overall foreign policy." He also American public s colleagues, like Dean Acheson, Averill stated that if the U.S. government had truly evaluated perhaps an exercisc Harriman, Robert Lovett and Charles Vietnam based upon merit alone, then the whole sad going to take an e Bohlen, were now opponents from a debacle might have been avoided altogether. Unfor­ America, for the policy standpoint. Kennan knew and tunately, it was wounded pride, illusions of our own tiations, or some respected them all, but he would not power, a sense what is moral and legal for global rela­ in Southeast Asia. let old friendships alter his opinions. tions among all nations and a sentimental approach to White House whe In Kennan's opinion, the war was our standing in Asia that was the foundation ofour folly Minnesota U.S. Se fundamentally wrong for America. It in Southeast Asia. Finally, the militaristic attitude of our Hampshire Demc was a waste of resources badly needed foreign policy, mixed with an ignorance of the evolution the White House 74 for more important U.S. priorities at of global communism kept us in the quagmire. respective foundat home and abroad. Kennan made another appearance on Meet the Press New York U.S. Se Kennan continued his assault on in November 1967. Unlike the previous appearance, electoral fray. The the misguided American policies Kennan was indeed asked about China and Vietnam and LBJ knew th: concerning Vietnam. In September by the panelists. Elie Abel, affiliated with NBC News, The New York 1966, he criticized, in The New York asked Kennan about the principle of containment being Attacks Vietnarr Times, what he saw as a hardening of applied to Vietnam incorrectly. Kennan replied: Randall Doyle

tdow of debate was "That is absolutely correct. I would not consider the Error," that reflected George Kennan's liminished a needed concept of containment, which I put forward and with continuing anger with U.S. policy in in Vietnam. This which I was connected 20 years ago, as applicable to Vietnam. The article also mirrored reatly. He believed support our present effort in Vietnam."75 the discontentment of millions of v that a larger and Max Frankel, a reporter with 7he New York Times, Americans who believed the war was ' in Southeast Asia. asked Kennan about the possible danger of China a mistake, that it represented a com­ or increased public dominating non-communist Asian nations if a large mitment they were no longer willing ationally-perhaps U.S. military presence was removed. Kennan replied: to make. Nevertheless, it was time for : stated that world I think that requires a great deal of critical a new game plan, and Kennan's words strategic bombing examination and re-examination at every stage were now finding a larger audience. [ the China factor as international developments proceed .... .I do He described LBJ's policy as a "mas­ :. All of these fac­ believe there are other ways in which this conflict sive miscalculation and error of policy, tion, could lead to could be brought to an end, and which would not an error for which it is hard to find have the unsettling effect to which you have drawn any parallels in our history."79 Kennan enator William ]. attention.76 went on to say that the war was: tiry was needed to As 1968 drew to a close, there were 500,000 troops Grievously unsound, devoid rings, in February, in Vietnam, and approximately 30,000 dead U.S. sol­ throughout of a plausible, coher- :ommittee, were a diers. There were calls from anti-war Democrats that ent and realistic object ...... It is '66. Kennan again someone should challenge LBJ for the Democratic clear what most Americans have >olicy in Southeast nomination for the 1968 presidential election. Robert known for many months: We in Vietnam was a Kennedy, George McGovern and Frank Church refused cannot wage war in Vietnam mtrolled by China to attempt to unseat a sitting president. In December, and at the same time alleviate 77 the hopelessness that leads to one man did step forward. He was a U.S. Senator from Jniversity, Kennan 80 Minnesota, Eugene McCarthy. Thus, the beginning of riots. vtoward Vietnam. the 'Children's Crusade' began and its eventual success On the day that the article was [ him criticize the changed American politics dramatically. published, Kennan made supportive vhich was, accord­ In February 1968, the Tet Offensive caught not only remarks on behalf of U.S. Senator ~nt and emotions the White House and the Pentagon off-guard, but the Eugene McCarthy at the Military policy. "73 He also American public saw for themselves that the war was Park Hotel in Newark, New Jersey. td truly evaluated perhaps an exercise in futility. Vietnam, it seemed, was He spoke, with his usual eloquence, en the whole sad going to take an even larger commitment to succeed. of his reasons for his public support ltogether. Unfor­ America, for the first time, began to support nego­ of this underdog candidate. Kennan ;ions of our own tiations, or some type of downsizing of U.S. forces stated that McCarthy represented 1l for global rela­ in Southeast Asia.77 This reality was made clear to the for millions of voters and, perhaps, ~ntal approach to White House when President Johnson barely defeated America as a whole, "a distinguished :lation of our folly Minnesota U.S. Senator Eugene McCarthy in the New American, a man of long and deep tic attitude ofour Hampshire Democratic Primary. The outcome shook political experience, a man who by e of the evolution the White House and the Democratic Party to its the courage and consistency of his :juagmire.74 respective foundations.78 A few days after the primary, conduct and by his readiness to on Meet the Press New York U.S. Senator Robert F. Kennedy entered the place the public interest ahead of ious appearance, electoral fray. There was blood in the political waters, personal ambition or advantage."81 na and Vietnam and LBJ knew that his days were numbered. Professor Kennan believed that if vith NBC News, 7he New York Times printed an article, "Kennan McCarthy did well at the polls this 'ntainment being Attacks Vietnam Policy As Massive, Unparalleled would awaken the other presidential m replied: candidates to the fact that the war had put itself in a vulnerable position within the 1968 represente1 could not continue with America global community. Our friends and foes would see us terms of popular su: 82 deeply split. as warmongers, or as weak and undependable in the many public offici~ In June 1968, Kennan accepted an fight against communism. He believed it was time for a apologies or ration: invitation to address the organization benign detachment globally, to re-evaluate our policies to stand up to LBJ called Colonial Williamsburg at the and purposes so that another Vietnam will not occur not suffer from gui Hall of the House of Burgesses at the again. The process, to say the least, would be painful correct in his analy Capitol in Williamsburg, Virginia. It and full of lessons for future generations. It was time Southeast Asia fro1 was the kind of high profile event at to rebuild America. This commitment to rectifY the never gloated, or tri' which Kennan could enunciate his problems at home would, in the end, strengthen our stance. The Vietnarr beliefs about America and Vietnam reputation overseas. In short, a new effort was needed painful lesson for } and know that his comments would at home without which our foreign influence would principles represent reach a large segment of the Ameri­ continue to suffer. 84 Kennan, I believe, saw our failure self or the aggrandi can public. By this time, Kennan had in Vietnam as a direct reflection of our failures at paramount in his p escaped his earlier caution in his home. The post-Vietnam period would entail a major factors that separat criticisms of U.S. domestic and for­ commitment of America's energies to right the ship of though, at times, m eign policies. His address, ''America state at home. ego-driven political After Vietnam," declared that it was In September 1968, Kennan was quoted by Pulitzer­ during the 1960s. I time for a fundamental change of Prize winner and journalist, Felix Morley, in an article, Vietnam, but he to U.S. policies, domestically and inter­ "Trends: The State of the Nation," that: Part IV: Postscri nationally. Thus, if our nation's leaders Our problems are of enormous profundity ... A observations did not recognize these dangerous nation in such a state of internal disarray ... (We) In 1975, The New Yi developments the country might cannot afford the luxury of extravagant excursions, ofwriters speak on come apart. whether of altruism or of military adventure, into of the contributon Kennan did not want to talk the world beyond its borders; it has no choice but that the primary le about Vietnam specifically, but the 85 to prune its external involvements to the bone. ment in Vietnam i topic could not be ignored since his In a few weeks, Republican presidential candidate, 'communism' and 1 domestic analysis was directly tied to former Vice-President Richard Nixon, defeated the wars where there i U.S. activities in Southeast Asia. He Democratic nominee, Vice-President Hubert Hum­ interest at stake."81 expressed incredulity at the govern­ phrey, in a close election. Nixon told supporters that Kennan goes on ment's continued effort in a part of the he had a "secret plan'' for ending the war in Vietnam. perception of Russ world that did not represent a military Unfortunately, Kennan's prescient instincts, in 1968, and not as bulwai threat or possess any vital interests for were quite correct concerning America's self-defeating stablization of the our national interests. Kennan was negotiating methodology concerning its disengagement proliferation of m not optimistic about how effective from its quagmire in Southeast Asia. The war, for the abuse of the envi1 negotiations might be in our pursuit U.S., did not officially end until January 1973. The lenges for the U.S to disengage from this dreadful situ­ human casualties were significant (58,000 U.S. dead and Kennan finds ation. He believed that the quicker we 304,000 wounded). Over (2) million Vietnamese, Cam­ ments overseas is i: could "liquidate" ourselves from this bodians and Laotians died, and millions of others were Providing these c< conflict the sooner policies could be wounded. Valuable national treasury, international good in U.S. forces to created to heal the nation. 83 will, and respect were spent in vain by the U.S. Indo­ hardware borders Kennan felt that our involvement China suffered grievously as well; they would spend the Charles Neu, ~ in Southeast Asia had cost America next generation rebuilding a shattered region. Lost Ttar, writes t an immeasurable amount of prestige dilemma confror and respect in the world. The U.S. Randall Doyle

1sition within the 1968 represented a turning point for the U.S. in l foes would see us terms of popular support for the Vietnam War. Unlike dependable in the many public officials, who later wrote post-mortem ·edit was time for a apologies or rationalizations for their lack of courage raluate our policies to stand up to LBJ and his war policies, Kennan did tam will not occur not suffer from guilt-ridden self-revisionism. He was , would be painful correct in his analysis concerning U.S. involvement in ttions. It was time Southeast Asia from the very beginning. Yet, Kennan tent to rectifY the never gloated, or tried to benefit professionally from his 1d, strengthen our stance.The Vietnam War represented an extraordinarily effort was needed painful lesson for America. For Kennan, the ideas and 1 influence would principles represented by America, not the promotion of ve, saw our failure self or the aggrandizement of his reputation, remained of our failures at paramount in his professional life. Perhaps it was these uld entail a major factors that separated Kennan from the well-meaning, o right the ship of though, at times, misguided student protestors, and the ego-driven political and military leaders in Washington uoted by Pulitzer­ during the 1960s. George F. Kennan was right about orley, in an article, Vietnam, but he took no joy from his vindication. 1at: Part IV: Postscript = Post-Vietnam/Kennan ofundity ... A observations sarray ... (We) In 1975, The New York Review ofBooks had an ensemble 79 ;ant excursions, ofwriters speak on the "The Meaning ofVietnam." One adventure, into of the contributors was George F. Kennan. He stated ; no choice but that the primary lesson to be learned from our involve­ 85 to the bone. ment in Vietnam is not to be "hypnotized by the word :iential candidate, 'communism' and not to mess into other people's civil :on, defeated the wars where there is no substantial American strategic 1t Hubert Hum­ interest at stake."86 ] supporters that Kennan goes on to say that the U.S. must re-adjust its war in Vietnam. perception of Russia and China as international powers, nstincts, in 1968, and not as bulwarks of monolithic communism. De­ :a's self-defeating stablization of the international balance-of-power, the ts disengagement proliferation of nuclear missiles, nuclear war and the . The war, for the abuse of the environment are the much bigger chal­ muary 1973. The lenges for the U.S. in the immediate future.87 )00 U.S. dead and Kennan finds that a curtailment of U.S. commit­ ·ietnamese, Cam­ ments overseas is in order, especially in the Third World. ns of others were Providing these countries with arms and then sending 1ternational good in U.S. forces to be confronted by its own military •y the U.S. Indo­ hardware borders upon lunacy.88 .would spend the Charles Neu, author of After Vietnam: Legacies ofa l region. Lost T#Jr, writes that Kennan spotlighted a profound dilemma confronting the American people in con- nection to the Vietnam War. Neu unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of 14Mayers, Dilemm~A notes that Kennan, in 1977, asked his extravagant and uncompromising objectives."90 15 Isaacson and Th< fellow citizens, "whether the great Colonel David Hackworth, the most decorated 16 Russell, Strategic miscalculations which led us into the living U.S. military figure and prominent Vietnam vet­ 17 David Halbersta folly of Vietnam were not something eran, defined the integrity and visionary gifts of George more than just the shortsightedness F. Kennan, in contrast to Henry Kissinger. Kissinger 18 Ibid., p. 113. of a few individuals-whether they was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for helping to end 19 Ibid., p. 114. did not in fact reflect a certain unfit­ the Vietnam War. However, many critics believe Kiss­ 20 Russell, Strategi, ness of the system as a whole for the inger was undeserving of this honor due to his amoral 21 Ibid., p. 110. conceiving and executing of ambitious diplomacy. Hackworth writes that Kennan was "dead­ 22 political-military ventures far from on regarding the insanity of America's involvement in Ibid., p.111. our own shores."89 1his was certainly Vietnam. Unlike Kissinger, he doesn't have a butler to 23 Benjamin Schw a difficult observation because of walk behind him picking up his dog droppings. He Monthry,June 1 Kennan's own relationship within this (Kennan) lives modestly and has never sold advice to 24 Leonard Bushk' particular system. He never separated anyone. In a word, he's a straight-shooter without any Detroit News. ~ himself from this process during the hidden agendas."91 25 Ibid. Vietnam debacle, but Kennan did Yes, a straight-shooter, but a pained one. America 26 Ibid. eventually become a critical voice suffered greatly from the Vietnam debacle, and this 27 Ibid. within this foreign policy apparatus. reluctant heretic, in the end, stood his ground and found 28 This result occurred because he was himself on the right side of history. Ibid. 29 Jay G. Hayden, deeply respected by both sides of the Endnotes 1953' , The Eve~ 8o Vietnam argument, and he didn't 1 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Supplemental attempt to make any one the villain. Six Friends And The World They Made, p. 24. John Lewis Gaddis gave a speech 30 Ibid. 2 Richard L. Russell, George F Kennan's Strategic titled, "What History Teaches About Thought: The Making of an American Political Real­ 31 Ibid. Grand Strategy," at the National ist, p.12. 32 Mayers, The Dil Defense University symposium. 3 Ibid., p. 13. 33 Walter Lippma Gaddis pointed to the fact that 4 1958, p. 2. (Th( Kennan, in typically blunt manner, Russell, Strategic Thought, p. 112. 34 stated that sometimes there is more 5 David Mayers, George Kennan and the Dilemmas of David Halberst wisdom in knowing when to fold a US. Foreign Policy, p.180. 35 Walter Isaacson bad policy. Kennan displayed a stub­ 6 Russell, Strategic Thought, p. 110. 36 Halberstam, Th born courage when he spoke against 7 George F. Kennan, 'The Conceptual Element In 37 Robert Mann,~ NATO expansion after the demise of Recent American Foreign Policy," lecture at the 38 George F. Kenr the Cold War, and with the same lucid Charles Warren Center (Harvard University); 19 and cold-eye analysis that he applied April1967; p.l.; File 1-B, Box 13, Seeley G. Mudd 39Lecture at Prin1 to Vietnam. Kennan gave a solid and Manuscript Library. lished in The 1 Asia Role," 'U rational counter-argument to those 8 Ibid., pp. 10-11. Kennan Colle who said American credibility would 9 Ibid., p. 11. 40 be damaged by the withdrawal of George F, Ken1 10 Mayers, Dilemmas of US. Foreign Policy, p.183. U.S. forces. He testified, to the U.S. University, 4 J 11 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Russell, Strategic Thought, p.110. 41 George F. Kem in 1966, "There is more respect to be 12 Mayers, Dilemmas of US. Foreign Policy, p.183. Press, 1951), p won in the opinion of this world by a 13 Ibid., pp. 181, 183. 42 Myers, Dilemn resolute and courageous liquidation of Randall Doyle

t stubborn pursuit of 14M ayers, Dilemmas of U. S .. Foreign Policy, pp. 183-184. 90 objectives." 15 Isaacson and Thomas, 1he Wise Men, pp. 551-552. he most decorated 16 Russell, Strategic 1houghts, p.110. 1inent Vietnam vet­ 17 nary gifts of George David Halberstam, Fifties, p.114. Kissinger. Kissinger 18 Ibid., p. 113. e for helping to end 19 Ibid., p. 114. critics believe Kiss­ 20 Russell, Strategic 1houghts, p.110. ,r due to his amoral 21 Ibid., p. 110. Kennan was "dead­ ·ca's involvement in 22 Ibid., p.111. m't have a butler to 23 Benjamin Schwarz, "Why America Thinks It Has To Run The World," 1he Atlantic :log droppings. He Monthry,June 1996, p. 7. (The Atlantic online) 1ever sold advice to 24 Leonard Bushkoff, review of Keenan's memoirs, Memoirs: 1925-1950,5 November 1967, 1he hooter without any Detroit News. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 36, File 27 (1967). 25 Ibid. .ined one. America 26 Ibid. t debacle, and this 27 s ground and found Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Jay G. Hayden, "Kennan 'Rescued' by President": 'He Accepts Belgrade Post- 'Out' Since ;, 1he Wise Men: 1953', 1he Evening Bulletin, 27 January 1961, p.13 (b). Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 36, 81 fade, p.24. Supplemental Materials: Scrapbooks, 1960-1967. 30 ·an's Strategic Ibid. ·an Political Real- 31 Ibid. 32 Mayers, 1he Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy, pp. xiii -xiv. 33 Walter Lippman, "Mr. Kennan and Reappraisal in Europe," 1he Atlantic Monthry, April 1958, p. 2. (The Atlantic online) the Dilemmas of 34 David Halberstam, 1he Best and the Brightest, pp. 7-8. 35 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, 1he Wise Men, p.668. 36 Halberstam, 1he Best and the Brightest, p. 655. al Element In 37 Robert Mann, A Grand Delusion: America's Descent Into Vietnam, p. 493 . . "lecture at the 38 l University); 19 George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, p. 381. Seeley G. Mudd 39Lecture at Princeton University: "The United States and the Communist Giants" (Pub­ lished in 1he New York Times, 25 February 1965); Subtitles: "Kennan Bids U.S. Reduce Asia Role,"'Urges Softening of Policies Toward Soviet and China'; Box 36 George F. Kennan Collection, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library. 40 George F, Kennan speech, "1he Historical Development ofAmerican Foreign Policy,"Tokyo 0 olicy, p. 183. University, 4 June 1964. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University. 41 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950 (Chicago: The University of Chicago )olicy, p. 183. Press, 1951), pp. 52-53. 42 Myers, Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 278. 43 Robert McNamara, In Retrospect: 1be Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, pp. 214-215. 68 Ibid. 44 George F. Kennan's testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 12 May 69 Congressional Di~ 1959, 70 1be New York Tir. 86'h Congress-First Session. G. Mudd Libra 45 Ibid. 71 Boston Globe, 5 Ff 46 George F. Kennan, "The American Student and Foreign Affairs," New England Association Box 36, File 3/1' Review, February 1961, Volume IX, Number 2. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 10, File 1-B- 72 Article (newspap 103. 2/1967, Scrapbo 47 McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 322. (Point #4) 73 Associated Press, 48 George F. Kennan, "Our Foreign Policy is Paralyzed," Look Magazine, 19 November 1963, place at Harvan Volume 27, Number 23. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 10, File 1-B-118. 74 Ibid. 49 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, p. 306. 75 Meet The Press, ~ 50 Meet the Press (Television Program), 5 November 1967. 76 Ibid. 51 George F. Kennan interview about the JFK Assassination, Zurich newspaper, Tagesanzeiger, 77 William H. Chal 30 November 1963. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 10, File 1-B-119. 78 Ibid., p. 358. 52 George F. Kennan, "1be Passing the Cold Uilr," Bulletin, October 1964, Number 14. Seeley of 79 Ronald Sullivan, G. Mudd Library, Box 10, File 1-B-123. leled Error," 29 · 53 Gene Blake, "Kennan Raps Clamourfor Vietnam 'Victory' in a Speech to State Bar," Los Angeles 80 Ibid. Times, 2 October 1964, p. 2. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 36. 81 Introductory Re1 82 54Ibid. Jersey on 29 Fe' 55 Ibid. 82 Mayers, Dilemm, 56 Michael H. Hunt, Lyndon johnson's Uilr: America's Cold Uilr Crusade in Vietnam, 1945-1968, 83 George F. Kenm 99. p. ginia; 1 June 19< 57 Ibid., pp. 99, 106-107. 84 Ibid. 58 (Special to 1be New York Times), "Kennan Bids U.S. Reduce Asia Role: Urges Softening Poli­ of 85 Dr. Felix Morley cies Toward Soviet and China," 25 February 1965. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 36. of Our Next Pr 59 Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on the Far East and the Pacific, Chairman: Mudd Library. U.S. Representative Clement]. Zablocki; 11 March 1965, Rayburn HOB, Room 2255; 86 1he Editors, "Th Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 11, File 1-B-132. 87 Ibid. 60 Marquis Childs, "1be Dangers ofAsian Escalation," 1be Uilshington Post, March 1965. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 36. 88 Ibid. 89 61 Author interview with David Halberstam,January 1997, New York City. Charles Neu,Aj 90 62 George F. Kennan, "Simmer Down Viet Uilr, Kennan Urgres," 1be Miami Herald, 12 Decem- U.S. Senate Cor ber 1965, p. 5-H. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 36. Fiscal Year 196c 91 63 Ibid. David Hackwor 64 George F. Kennan, Goodspeed Lecture at Denison University, 9 February 1966. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Campus Dialogue, "Kennan Speaks Out: 1be U.S. Role in Foreign A.ffoirs," Denison University, 14 March 1966, Volume 1, Number 4. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 11, File 1-B-141. Randall Doyle

14-215. 68 Ibid. ~elations, 12 May 69 Congressional Digest, April1966, pp.108-109. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 12, File 1-B-142. 70 The New York Times, "Kennan Urges War Policy of Moderation," 25 September 1966. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 13, File 1-B-145. 71 Boston Globe, 5 February 1967, "Uncle Sam: World's Nervous Nellies''. Seeley G. Mudd Library, rsland Association Box 36, File 3/1967. Box 10, File 1-B- 72 Article (newspaper unknown), dated 31 January 1967. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 36, File 2/1967, Scrapbooks. 73 Associated Press, "Kennan hits US. Concept of Viet Policy," 20 March 1967. Speech took 1vember 1963, place at Harvard University. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 36, File 6/1967, Scrapbooks. 74 Ibid. 75 Meet1he Press, 5 November 1967. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 13, File 1-B-155. 76 Ibid. >er, Tagesanzeiger, 77 William H. Chafe, The Unjinished]ourney:America Since World Wclr II, pp. 357-358. 78 Ibid., p. 358. 1mber 14. Seeley 79 Ronald Sullivan, The New York Times, "Kennan Attacks Vietnam Policy As Massive, Unparal­ leled Error," 29 February 1986. Seeley G. Mudd Library, Box 37, Scrapbooks. Bar," Los Angeles 80 Ibid. 81 Introductory Remarks by George F. Kennan at the Military Park Hotel in Newark, New Jersey on 29 February 1968; (On the behalf of U.S. Senator Eugene McCarthy). 183 82 Mayers, Dilemmas of US. Foreign Policy, p. 283-284. nam, 1945-1968, 83 George F. Kennan, "America After Vietnam," Colonial Williamsburg, Williamsburg, Vir­ ginia; 1 June 1968. GFK Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Library. 84 Ibid. Softening of Poli­ 85 l)r. Felix Morley, "Trends: The State of the Nation," subtitled: "The Primary Responsibility ,Box36. of Our Next President," Nation's Business, September 1968, p.29. GFK Papers, Seeley G. cific, Chairman: Mudd Library. Room2255; 86 1he Editors, "The Meaning of Vietnam," The New York Review of Books, 12 June 1975, p.28. 87 Ibid. rch 1965. Seeley 88 Ibid. 89 Charles Neu,After Vietnam: Legacies of a Lost Wclr, pp. 10-11. rald,12 l)ecem- 90 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Hearings). Supplemental Foreign Assistance Fiscal Year 1966-Vietnam (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 335-336. 91 l)avid Hackworth, "Defending America," p.1, 5 March 1997. 966.

ison University, ~ 1-B-141.