Grand Valley Review Volume 27 | Issue 1 Article 11 2004 The Reluctant Heretic: George F. Kennan and the Vietnam War, 1950-1968 Randall Doyle Grand Valley State University Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvr Recommended Citation Doyle, Randall (2004) "The Reluctant Heretic: George F. Kennan and the Vietnam War, 1950-1968," Grand Valley Review: Vol. 27: Iss. 1, Article 11. Available at: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvr/vol27/iss1/11 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@GVSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Grand Valley Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@GVSU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ment service, were The Reluctant unpopularity ofU.~ Thus, this artid lowing: Heretic: George a)The origins of the post-WWII pe1 E Kennan and sophical foundatim political and militaJ b)Kennan's willi the Vietnam War, eign policy during 1 c)Kennan's reluc rgso-rg68 policies concerning the wrath of the "~ establishment upor ot a perfect man. Not a man without human d)Kennan's lega1 weaknesses. Nevertheless, he remained a proud Professor 'fV!ndall crJoyle is N ment in Vietnam ac man with uncommon wisdom, unafraid to express currently a Visiting cASsistant Pro­ held concerning otl inner thoughts even if it caused him pain or humili­ fessor in the %story crJepartment e)The lessons th: ation. Insecure and thin-skinned, he had a need to be at grand Valley Jtate University. learn from its great heard. This serious man struck by bouts of depression, CJ!is primary teaching and research affected American foreign policy like no other since Part 1: The Origi areas are UJ. %story, c.American John Qyincy Adams. Anti-Vietnam Pc 54 :fOreign Policy, and c.American George Frost Kennan, from Wisconsin in America's George F. Kennan, and Pacific 'J\im politics. Professor heartland, provided a philosophical blueprint for a nomic global strate1 crJoyle has lived, studied, or taught nation's strategic actions and responsibilities during participant in the r in cASia, c.Australia, Burope and the Cold War. His analysis and thoughts brought him U.S. policies and 1 ~rth c.America during his academic fame and respect within the profession of diplomats, ing its foundation career. CJ!is first book concerning but his new stature did not protect him from the vicis­ era. Twenty years I Idaho politics, c.APolitical crJynasty situdes of American politics. Hailed as a prescient policies and princ in ~rth Idaho, is being published observer of foreign affairs in 1947, Kennan found him­ evaluate our involv this year. '1fe is currently writing self driven from government service in 1952 only to see and Evan Thomas, a book on the world's first green his reputation re-established in the 1960s, thanks to his cally acclaimed we Party, created in 1972, in Tasma­ interpretation of the tragic U.S. involvement in South­ evidence of his inca nia, c.Australia. east Asia. Whether the issue was Soviet expansionism, ment of post-Worl the relevancy of the Korean War, German unification A generation later or the Vietnam War, George Kennan was frequently new generation wi interpreted by both friends and critics as the "heretic concerning anothe in the house" of American foreign policy. His pronounceme1 The Vietnam War and the 1960s represent a dif­ they were respecte ficult and tumultuous period in our nation's history, power. especially for those who participated in the making of Kennan becam' post-WWII American foreign policy. Kennan found foreign policy ci himself enmeshed in his own political policy guerilla­ (approximately 8,( war among his former colleagues and friends. Longtime State Department relationships, established during his years in govern- ing the academic v Randall Doyle ment service, were tested severely due to the growing serious diplomat from Milwaukee, :tnt unpopularity of U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia. Wisconsin, in July 1947. It was then Thus, this article will attempt to address the fol­ that they read in Foreign Affairs jour­ lowing: nal an article called, "The Sources of orge a)The origins of Kennan's beliefs concerning Asia in Soviet Conduct," signed "X." The the post-WWII period, which later became the philo­ article was considered monumental llld sophical foundation for his prescient dissent on U.S. and its author, though a mystery at political and military activities in Southeast Asia. first, to be a first-rate interpreter of b)Kennan's willingness to challenge American for­ Soviet intentions in the post-WWII n War, eign policy during the Cold War. era. This celebrated work, and his past c)Kennan's reluctant but consistent criticism ofU.S. performance as a diplomat, primarily policies concerning Vietnam, even though it brought in Germany and Russia, landed him the wrath of the "Wise Men'' of the U.S. foreign policy the position of Director of the Policy establishment upon himself. Planning Staff(PPS) within the U.S. nan without human d) Kennan's legacy. Was his analysis of U.S. involve­ State Department. 1e remained a proud ment in Vietnam accurate and consistent with views he From 1948 to 1950 the primary unafraid to express held concerning other parts of the world? function of the PPS was to develop him pain or humili­ e)The lessons that Kennan believed America should rational and sound recommendations, ' he had a need to be learn from its greatest foreign policy blunder. concerning operational principles that ' bouts of depression, represented the strategic thrusts of Part I: The Origins of George F. Kennan's r like no other since American activities Europe. The staff Anti-Vietnam Policy Statements worked out three principles, in rela­ ·isconsin in America's George F. Kennan, author of the diplomatic and eco­ 55 tion to the Marshall Plan, that were tical blueprint for a nomic global strategy of containment, was an important swiftly implemented for Europe's >ponsibilities during participant in the mid to late-1940s in the creation of U.S. policies and philosophical principles establish­ economic recovery: toughts brought him a)Europeans should themselves ~ession of diplomats, ing its foundational moorings during the Cold War ask the U.S. for assistance. era. Twenty years later, Kennan used these very same t him from the vicis­ b)All European states, including policies and principles as measuring instruments to ailed as a prescient the Soviet Union, should be eligible Kennan found him­ evaluate our involvement in Vietnam. Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, who included Kennan in their criti­ for aid. ce in 1952 only to see c)The decisive emphasis of the cally acclaimed work, The Wise Men, provide detailed ~ 1960s, thanks to his program should be on the rehabilita­ evidence of his incalculable contribution to the develop­ vulvement in South­ tion of the German economy.2 ment of post-World War II American foreign policy. 1 )oviet expansionism, Kennan, according to Richard A generation later, in the 1960s, Kennan educated a German unification Russell, who teaches American new generation with his typical clarity and profundity man was frequently national security policy at U-C ritics as the "heretic concerning another foreign policy dilemma: Vietnam. Berkeley, was intensely aware of the His pronouncements were not always welcomed, but policy. need for the American government they were respected and, at times, feared by those in SOs represent a dif­ to conduct its foreign policy from a )ur nation's history, power. set of principles, though he did not Kennan became a household word, at least within ed in the making of necessarily articulate these policy foreign policy circles, when he sent his famous >licy. Kennan found principles in his own work, except in (approximately 8,000 words) 'long telegram' to U.S. :ical policy guerilla­ the implementation of the Marshall d friends. Longtime State Department in 1946. The general public, includ­ Plan and the policy of containment.3 ing the academic world, became aware of the quiet but tis years in govern- Yet it was this absolute belief in such principles in the facilitation of U.S. "sinews of modern war."The four areas mentioned were flict. 13 He believed tha foreign policy in a post-WWII world Great Britain, Germany, Soviet Union and Japan. He America's top priorit: that were the intellectual origins from emphasized that these were the areas that were crucial the abandonment of which Kennan's anti-Vietnam War and vital to U.S. security, strongly implying that Viet­ Thus, from a sect sentiments arose. nam did not measure up to this criterion. 8 national interests fo In 1950, Kennan's principles were Most foreign policy analysts, including Kennan, of Korea to either t sorely tested by the invasion of South agreed that there were no developing industrial powers influence in Asia. H Korea from the North. Initially, he on the Asian mainland. Thus, there was no present, or during the early mot supported a limited war in Korea. near-future threat to America. Kennan commented, litical interpretations He believed that the attack gave U.S. "China did not figure. There was no place on the embattled Dean Ach military planners an opportunity to mainland of Asia where industrial strength could be be intimidated by the evaluate the Soviet Union as a hos­ developed on a scale large enough to do us significant and right-wing reacti' tile force in international relations. harm."9 vention by force, she America's involvement in Korea was In October 1950, Kennan shocked the sensibilities interests and not by P' important because the future secu­ of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, with an analysis of perhaps naive, his fo, rity and stability ofJapan, within our the Korean situation that was perceived by Acheson as matters gave him a n containment strategy aimed at the "flatly unrealistic and irrelevant to the crisis at hand."10 those who vehement Soviet Union in Northeast Asia, was Kennan bluntly blamed the U.S.