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Korea and Vietnam: Limited War and the American Political System

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Korea and Vietnam: Limited War and the American Political System Korea and Vietnam: Limited War and the American Political System By Larry Elowitz A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 1972 To Sharon ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to express his very deep appreciation to Dr. John W. Spanier for his valuable advice on style and structure. His helpful suggestions were evident throughout the entire process of writing this dissertation. Without his able supervision, the ultimate completion of this work would have been ex- ceedingly difficult. The author would also like to thank his wife, Sharon, whose patience and understanding during the writing were of great comfort. Her "hovering presence," for the "second" time, proved to be a valuable spur to the author's research and writing. She too, has made the completion of this work possible. The constructive criticism and encouragement the author has received have undoubtedly improved the final product. Any shortcomings are, of course, the fault of the author. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii LIST OF TABLES viii ABSTRACT xii CHAPTER 1 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM AND LIMITED WAR 1 Introduction 1 American Attitudes 6 Analytical Framework 10 Variables and Their Implications 15 2 PROLOGUE--A COMPARISON OF THE STAKES IN THE KOREAN AND VIETNAM WARS 22 The External Stakes 22 The Two Wars: The Specific Stakes. 25 The Domino Theory 29 The Internal Stakes 32 The Loss of China Syndrome: The Domestic Legacy for the Korean and Vietnam Wars 32 The Internal Stakes and the Eruption of the Korean War 37 Vietnam Shall Not be Lost: The China Legacy Lingers 40 The Kennedy and Johnson Administra- tions: The Internal Stakes Persist . 44 NOTES 49 3 THE KOREAN INTERVENTION--STRAINS IN THE MIDST OF CONSENSUS 52 Introduction to the Intervention Periods of Both Wars 52 The Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in the Two Interventions 55 iv , CHAPTER Page The Korean Intervention: The Failure to Deter 58 The North Korean Aggression: Gradualism Amidst Force Limits 61 The Rally Point: The Intervention Consensus is Formulated 69 The Specific Nature of the Support Dimension 72 Presidential Legitimation and the Korean Intervention 81 The Public Response 84 Korea: Post-Inchon 91 Strains in the Korean Consensus .... 93 Magnifying the Strains: The GOP and the Korean Intervention 95 The Taft-MacArthur Alliance: Its Ramifications for the Truman Inter- vention Consensus 100 NOTES 107 4 THE VIETNAM INTERVENTION--THE BIFURCATED CONSENSUS 110 Introduction . 110 The Gulf of Tonkin and the 1964 Presidential Election: The Appeals to Dove and Hawk 114 Dissent in the Pre-Intervention Phase . 118 Coercive Diplomacy: The Active Intervention Period ( February- Jul y 1965) 1 26 The Shift from Retaliatory Raids to Sustained Bombing 127 Pleiku: A "Non-Rally" Point 131 Pleiku: organized dissent 138 The morality issue 140 Coercive Diplomacy After Pleiku .... 141 The Announcement of July 28: From Gradualism to an Open-Ended War .... 152 PUBLIC OPINION, CONGRESS, AND THE PRESIDENT DURING THE VIETNAM INTERVENTION 159 Public Opinion: The Vietnam Inter- vention Period 159 V CHAPTER Page The Attraction of GOP Support 159 Congressional Hawk-Dove Division - The Politics of Consensus 166 The President Maneuvers 170 The John Hopkins Speech 172 John Hopkins: Aftermath 175 The Bombing Pause and Further Administration Maneuvers 177 NOTES 184 5 KOREA AND THE CHINESE INTERVENTION. .... 186 The Support Dimension 186 The 1 950 Election 192 The Chinese Interventi on--The Con- solidation of the Lock-In Point 198 The Growth of Disenchantment 206 January-April, 1951: The Victory Objective is Abandoned 214 The United Nations: Catalyst of Further Dissent 216 The Europe Debate 221 Truman-MacArthur : The Conflict Intensifies 225 The MacArthur Firing: Public Opinion and the "Lock-In"' Point 233 Postscript: The Role of the Korean War in the 1 952 Election 241 The 1 952 Campaign 247 NOTES 253 6 THE TET OFFENSIVE--TURNING POINT IN VIETNAM 255 July, 1965-July, 1967 The Deepening Involvement 255 Stage One: August, 1 965-December , 1 965-- Solid Public Support Amidst Increasing Hawkishness 262 Presidential -Congressional Relations. 267 1966: The Bombing Pause--The Consensus Begins to Crumble 277 January-June, 1966: The Birth of the "Lock-In" Point 289 September, 1966-July, 1967: A Shifting Public Mood Between Escalation- Deescalation 292 vi CHAPTER Page August, 1 967--January , 1 968: Prelude to Tet 298 The Congressional Sector and Increasing Doubt 305 The "Victory" Offensive 313 The Tet Offensive: The Final Crisis in Vietnam 318 The Tet Offensive: Administration Credibility Questioned 321 The Administration: Its Counter- Reaction 331 The Ides of March: Political Disaster for the President 339 The Westmoreland-Wheeler Request: Catalyst for Deescalation 341 Congress, McCarthy, New York Times, Kennedy--Di saf f ection Spreads 347 The Policy Reversal: The President Withdraws 358 Postscript: The Vietnam War and the 1968 Election 368 The 1 968 Campaign 374 The Salt Lake City Speech and the Bombing Halt 378 NOTES 383 7 LIMITED WAR AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM RECONSIDERED 390 Conclusions 390 The President and Public Opinion: Support and Punishment in Limited War . 397 Congress: The Legitimator of Dissent . 402 No More Limited Wars? 404 NOTES 409 REFERENCES 411 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 419 v i i LIST OF TABLES ^BLE p^ge OF TROOPS 1 NORC POLL--JULY 1950 ON APPROVAL TO KOREA . 72 ^ 2 GALLUP POLLS--TRUMAN'S HANDLING OF 74 PRESIDENCY • 3 PARTY APPROVAL OF TRUMAN 74 4 KOREAN LEGISLATION — CONGRESSIONAL VOTES (1 950) 77 5 KOREAN RALLY POINT: FREQUENCY OF THEMES FROM PRESTIGE NEWSPAPERS (EDITORIALS) JUNE 25 TO JULY 1 0 , 1 950 78 6 "JUST YOUR BEST GUESS, ABOUT HOW MUCH LONGER DO YOU THINK THE WAR IN KOREA WILL LAST?" . 85 7 "TOTAL WAR" THEME PRESENT IN PRE-INCHON EDITORIALS 89 8 HARRIS POLL, DECEMBER 21 , 1 964 1 1 7 9 GALLUP POLL, DECEMBER, 1964 117 10 SUPPORT FOR LBJ'S HANDLING OF VIETNAM (1965) HARRIS SURVEY 160 11 LBJ JOB RATING TREND - HARRIS SURVEY 161 12 GALLUP POLL - QUESTION: "DO YOU APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF THE WAY JOHNSON IS HANDLING OUR FOREIGN POLICY--THAT IS, OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS?" 161 13 INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA - GALLUP POLL . 163 14 SENATE HAWK-DOVE DIVISIONS 168 15 PRESENCE OF THEMES IN INTERVENTION SPEECHES . 171 16 NORC POLLS: RIGHT TO SEND TROOPS? 187 17 NORC POLLS: FOREIGN AFFAIRS APPROVAL .... 188 V i i i TABLE Page 18 NORC--PARTY SUPPORT ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HANDLING OVER TIME 190 19 GALLUP POLLS--"DO YOU APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF THE WAY PRESIDENT TRUMAN IS HANDLING HIS JOB?" 191 20 GALLUP POLL: WAR A MISTAKE 204 21 GALLUP POLL: DECEMBER 19, 1950 QUESTION: "DO YOU THINK OUR GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON HAS BEEN DOING A GOOD JOB OR A POOR JOB OF HANDLING OUR FOREIGN POLICY IN ASIA--THAT IS, IN KOREA, CHINA, ETC.?" 205 22 ACHESON POPULARITY 209 23 TRUMAN POPULARITY (GALLUP): "DO YOU APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF THE WAY TRUMAN IS HANDLING" HIS JOB AS PRESIDENT?" 210 24 TAFT-TRUMAN POPULARITY 212 25 EISENHOWER-TRUMAN POPULARITY 212 26 TRUMAN REELECTION ... 213 27 UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT NORC: "ARE YOU SATISFIED OR DISSATISFIED WITH THE WAY THE UNITED NATIONS HAD HANDLED THE SITUATION IN KOREA?" 220 28 GALLUP POLLS: KOREA AND EUROPE 223 29 MACARTHUR FIRING (NORC) "WAS PRESIDENT TRUMAN RIGHT OR WRONG IN FIRING MACARTHUR?" . 235 235* 30 MACARTHUR'S REMOVAL (GALLUP, MAY 16, 1951). 31 NORC POLLS (MAY, 1951): CROSS TABULATIONS ON MACARTHUR FIRING 236 32 OPINIONS ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS FROM KOREA (NORC) 238 33 KOREAN TRUCE OPINIONS (GALLUP) 240 34 NORC SURVEY - JANUARY, 1953: ELECTION PREFERENCE 252 35 GALLUP POLL: VIETNAM MISTAKE-POPULARITY RELATIONSHIP 260 ix TABLE Page 36 HARRIS POLLS (STAGE I): WAR HANDLING AND JOB RATING 263 37 GALLUP: HOW VIETNAM WOULD END 264 38 LOU HARRIS POLL --DECEMBER 6, 1965: OPTIONS IN VIETNAM. 265 39 GALLUP, NOVEMBER, 1965: COMMUNISM IN DEMONSTRATIONS 266 40 BASIC STAND ON U.S. POLICY--PERCENTAGE OF POSITIVE RATING ON JOHNSON'S HANDLING OF VIETNAM--HARRIS POLL, FEBRUARY 28, 1966. 285 41 GALLUP--VIETNAM APPROVAL 287 42 LENGTH OF WAR (HARRIS) 289 43 HARRIS SURVEY (1966 TREND LINE): ESCALATION OR DEESCALATION 294 44 HARRIS SURVEY--MAY 16, 1967: TREND TOWARD ESCALATION 296 45 JOHNSON'S P0PULARITY--1 967 GALLUP POLLS-- "DO YOU APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF THE WAY JOHNSON IS HANDLING HIS JOB AS PRESIDENT.". 301 46 PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE (1 967) 302 47 HAWK-DOVE POLARIZATION (1967) GALLUP, OCTOBER, 1967: "JUST FROM WHAT YOU HAVE HEARD OR READ, WHICH OF THESE STATEMENTS COMES CLOSEST TO THE WAY YOU, YOURSELF, FEEL ABOUT THE WAR IN VIETNAM: (A) THE U.S. SHOULD BEGIN TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS, (B) THE U.S. SHOULD CARRY ON ITS PRESENT LEVEL OF FIGHTING, OR (C) THE U.S. SHOULD INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF ITS ATTACKS AGAINST NORTH VIET- NAM?" 303 48 HARRIS SURVEY, DECEMBER 4, 1967: POLICY IN VIETNAM 316 49 BOOST IN PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY (1967) ... 316 50 GALLUP POLLS: PERCENTAGE CALLING THEMSELVES HAWKS OR DOVES 318 51 (GALLUP) PROGRESS IN WAR 340 X TABLE Page 52 SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 353 53 GALLUP TREND ON PARTY AND PROSPERITY 372 54 GALLUP TREND ON WAR AND PARTY HANDLING. ... 373 55 GALLUP TREND ON CANDIDATES HANDLING OF VIETNAM 373 56 (GALLUP) 1 968 PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST 379 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy KOREA AND VIETNAM: LIMITED WAR AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM By Larry Elowitz August, 1972 Chairman: John W. Spanier Major Department: Political Science Traditionally, studies of limited war have focussed upon the strategic requirement of the United States to main- tain a flexible response when confronting external aggression.
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