Vietnam January-August 1963
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III. BEGINNING OF THE BUDDHIST CRISIS, MM 9-JUNE 16: INCIDENT IN HUE, THE FIVE BUDDHIST DEMANDS, USE OF TEAR GAS IN HUE, SELF- IMMOLAHON OF QUANG DUC, NEGOTIAl-IONS IN SAIGON TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS, AGREEMENT ON THE FIVE DEMANDS 112. Telegram From the Consulate at Hue to the Department of State’ Hue, May 9, 1963-3 p.m. 4. Buddha Birthday Celebration Hue May 8 erupted into large- scale demonstration at Hue Radio Station between 2000 hours local and 2330 hours. At 2245 hours estimated 3,000 crowd assembled and guarded by 8 armored cars, one Company CG, one Company minus ARVN, police armored cars and some carbines fired into air to disperse mob which apparently not unruly but perhaps deemed menacing by authorities. Grenade explosion on radio station porch killed four chil- dren, one woman, Other incidents, possibly some resulting from panic, claimed two more children plus one person age unknown killed. Total casualties for evening 8 killed, 4 wounded. ’ I Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 S VIET. Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 8:33 a.m. 2 At 7 p.m. the Embassy in Saigon sent a second report of the incident to Washing- ton, listing seven dead and seven injured. The Embassy noted that Vietnamese Govern- ment troops may have fired into the crowd, but most of the casualties resulted, the Embassy reported, from a bomb, a concussion grenade, or “from general melee”. The Embassy observed that although there had been no indication of Viet Cong activity in connection with the incident, the Viet Cong could be expected to exploit future demon- strations. (Telegram 1005 from Saigon, May 9; ibid., SOC 14-l S VIET) Subsequent accounts of the May 8 incident in Hue have generally listed the casualties as nine killed and fourteen wounded. (United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 3, p. 5; Hilsman, To Moue a Nation, p. 468; Mecklin, Mission in Torment, p. 153) In a detailed assessment of the Buddhist demonstrations in Hue May E-10, Consul Helble reported that seven people died on the evening of May 8, and one of those injured subsequently died. He noted that approximately 15 additional demonstrators were injured, but added that exact figures were difficult to determine. Two of those killed, both children, died from being crushed by armored vehicles. (Airgram A-20 from Hue, June 3; Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-l S VIET) 277 278 Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume III Background this incident started May 7 when police attempted enforce law that no flags other than Viet-Namese to be flown. 3 Police apparently encountered popular resistance to enforcement of law as thousands Buddhist flags publicly displayed. At police request evening May 7 Province Chief Dang reportedly rescinded order. Morning May 8 demonstration at large Tu Dam Pagoda resulted in speech by Chief Bonze in presence Buddhist Dang criticizing GVN suppression free- dom religion, favoritism of Catholics. Parade banners during day anti- GVN orientated. Translations of same will be forwarded when avail- able. Evening May 8 crowd gathered at radio station where Head Bonze scheduled broadcast speech. Permission refused at last minute by GVN. Bonzes on scene urged people remain peaceful. GVN fire hoses and exhortations of Province Chief unsuccessful in dispersing crowd. Troops arrived and ordered dispersal. Bonzes said stand still, do not fight, GVN claims some threw rocks at radio station, although indications are this not true. Firing then broke out. 1100 hours May 9, Province Chief addressed estimated 800 youth demonstrators, explained crowd actions spurred by oppositionist agi- tators had necessitated troop action to maintain order. Head Bonze requested crowd disperse peacefully and turn in flags. Some of crowd heard chanting “down with Catholicism”. At moment Hue quiet. Population controls and unusual troop deployment not observed. However, situation very fluid and reports of Buddhist demonstration to occur afternoon May 9 flowing in. Bud- dhists very upset. American community on Emergency Phase II Alert but no threat to Americans apparent at present. Helble 3 The law limiting the use of religious flags was established by Decree 189/BNV/ NA/PS, which became effective on May 12, 1958. According to the law, religious sect flags could be flown only on religious holidays at places of worship or private homes with the permission of the local authorities. In airgram A-20, cited in footnote 2 above, Helble noted that the law was “never observed” until the attempt to enforce it, appar- ently on orders from President Diem, at Hue on the most important Buddhist holiday of the year. (The text of the regulations outlined in Decree 189 is contained in a communi- que issued by the Mayor of Danang on Apri 8, 1963, which was transmitted to Washing- ton as enclosure 6 to airgram A-20) Beginning of the Buddhist Crisis 279 113. Minutes of a Meeting of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency, Washington, May 9,1963,2 p.m. ’ PRESENT Governor Harriman, Mr. Giipatric, Mr. Bell, General Taylor, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Wilson vice Mr. Murrow, Mr. Helms vice Mr. McCone, Mr. Nolan vice The Attorney General Mr. Koren, General Krulak, Mr. Colby and Mr. Jantzen were present for Item No. 1 Mr. Wellman was present for Item No. 2 Mr. Maechling was present for the meeting Item I. Southeast Asia [Here follows discussion of part a, “Southeast Asia Status Re- port,” which included a brief discussion of the proposed agreement with the Diem government on the joint counterinsurgency fund. Koren noted that the agreement in significantly reduce U.S. control over the funds, and Bell observed that AID personnel in the field were con- cerned that the Vietnamese would not push counterinsurgency pro- grams with sufficient vigor.] b. Report on the Honolulu Conference General Krulak presented a summary review of the Secretary of Defense’s recent Honolulu Conference bringing out the following points: General Harkins cited indicators that identify favorable trends in the situation in Viet-Nam. Ambassador Nolting stated that the Vietnamese confidence in the U.S. is not as good as it was some months ago, but recent speeches by senior Government officials have somewhat restored lost ground. Other items mentioned by General Krulak included: The USOM effort is now geared to counterinsurgency; revised rules for border operations should assist in actions against the Viet-Cong; border patrol operations are moving forward but will not seal off the border; plan- ning is going forward on a contingency basis for future MAP and force structure adjustments; air interdiction is being applied under stringent rules and is achieving good results. At the request of the Chairman, Mr. Colby agreed to look into recent developments in the Laos/South Viet-Nam border area. The Group discussed the problem of reconciling differences of opinion on the situation in Viet-Nam as between officials on the scene and the U.S. press. Mr. Wilson commented that our military in Viet- ’ Source: Department of State, Special Group Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 451, Special Group (CI). Secret. Drafted by Dingeman who is not listed among the participants. 280 Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume III Nam should take the press more into their confidence. Mr. Bell sug- gested that we should explore sending opinion leaders other than the press out to Viet-Nam, The Group agreed that Mr. Bell should make a recommendation as to when it would be advisable to have General Harkins return for appearances before various Congressional committees. General Taylor indicated that he sees no problem in having General Harkins return for this purpose. [Here follow part c, “Man-Pack Jungle Radio;” item 2, “Vene- zuela;” and a general discussion of developments in the Middle East.] James W. Dingeman Executive Secretary 114. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Heavner) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)’ Washington, May 9,1963. SUBJECT Related Problems of Counterinsurgency Funding and Commercial Import Program 1. Cl Funding We are pressing the GVN to pick up the piaster costs of the CI program and other AID projects which until now have been financed by our $10 million piaster purchase of last year and by counterpart funds. It is our best estimate that the GVN can undertake the amount of deficit spending required without incurring dangerous inflationary pressures. In the past the GVN has resisted deficit financing, clinging to very conservative fiscal policies. GVN resistance to deficit spending for the CI programs has not up until now however been couched in fiscal terms. Their objection to our proposed joint counterinsurgency fund was political. Diem and Nhu apparently feel that to share control of a fund predominantly made up of “their” monies would be an unacceptable infringement on Vietnamese sovereignty and their control of the levers of power. ’ Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, AID-7, CIP. Secret. Drafted by Heavner and Montgomery and sent to Hilsman through Robert W. Barnett. Beginning of the Buddhist Crisis 281 We have taken a very firm line on this issue. We have insisted that economic and social CI projects undertaken in support of the strategic hamlet program are essential to winning the war. We have further insisted that the GVN is obligated to finance them after our piaster purchase funds are exhausted. These funds will run out about the end of September. The outcome of these negotiations will not be known for quite a while. The GVN has agreed to finance all of these projects up to the total amount of 2.3 billion piasters which we requested. However, these projects will be subject to GVN control and in most cases will have to be negotiated, project by project, with the USOM.