A Failed Elite: the Committee on the Present Danger and the Great Debate of 1951
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A Failed Elite: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Great Debate of 1951 A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Paul E. Isherwood March 2009 © 2009 Paul E. Isherwood. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled A Failed Elite: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Great Debate of 1951 by PAUL E. ISHERWOOD has been approved for the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences by Chester J. Pach Associate Professor of History Benjamin M. Ogles Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 ABSTRACT ISHERWOOD, PAUL E., M.A., March 2009, History A Failed Elite: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Great Debate of 1951 (154 pp.) Director of Thesis: Chester J. Pach This thesis examines the activity of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), a citizens committee founded in December, 1950, by James B. Conant and Tracy S. Voorhees. The CPD believed that neither the government nor the people of the United States paid sufficient regard to the military threat posed by the Soviet Union. To remedy this situation, the CPD favored a strong American response to a trend of aggressive actions by the Soviet Union and its allies highlighted by the Korean War. High on the CPD’s agenda was support for compulsory military service for a period of two years for all eighteen-year-old males, under a system known as universal military service. Previous studies have contended that the CPD played a major role in the political discussions on national security in the first half of 1951, known as the Great Debate. Through an examination of the evidence, including the committee’s own files, it is clear that the CPD’s role was far less significant than previously understood, that its relationship with the administration was far from harmonious, and that its political campaigning was often ineffective at a crucial time in the Cold War. Approved: _____________________________________________________________ Chester J. Pach Associate Professor of History 4 To Mum, (1952-2008) 5 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my advisor, Chester Pach, for his patience and guidance on this project. Steven Casey provided valuable advice on various matters relating to the Committee on the Present Danger and its relationship with the Truman administration. I would also like to thank my fellow graduate students at Ohio University for their support and feedback, particularly Jon Peterson, Steve Heise, Jeff Bloodworth, and Bill Knoblauch. Both the History Department and the Contemporary History Institute at Ohio University provided generous financial assistance for my research. The staff at the Alexander Library at Rutgers University, the archives of the Carnegie Institute, and the Truman Library were all very helpful in sifting through the myriad of papers and boxes. I would also like to thank my family and Rosie, who as always support me in everything I do. 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ 3 DEDICATION .................................................................................................................... 4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................. 5 ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................ 7 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 8 CHAPTER 1: JAMES B. CONANT, TRACY S. VOORHEES, AND THE INTERNATIONALIST AGENDA .................................................................................. 29 CHAPTER 2: THE CPD AND THE PENTAGON: AN INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNING ........................................................................................................................................... 67 CHAPTER 3: ELITE FAILURE – THE CPD AND THE GREAT DEBATE .............. 104 CONCLUSION: DANGERS PRESENTED .................................................................. 136 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 149 7 ABBREVIATIONS AAU: Association of American Universities CFR: Council on Foreign Relations CMP: Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery CPD: Committee on the Present Danger CPDC: Committee on the Present Danger Collection ERM: Edward R. Murrow HSTL: Harry S. Truman Library TSV: Tracy S. Voorhees UMS: Universal Military Service UMT: Universal Military Training 8 INTRODUCTION For Harry Truman, November 1950 proved to be a very bleak month. The New York Times weather report described the month as “unusually cold,” but the heavy snows and icy conditions were the least of the president’s concerns. For the second time in less than six months a large invading force had taken the United States by surprise on the Korean peninsula. The first in June, when North Korean forces crossed the Thirty-Eighth parallel in great numbers, threatened the destruction of the American backed Republic of Korea. The second occurred that November, when the People’s Republic of China attacked the American led United Nations forces, threatening a much wider escalation of the Korean War. General Douglas MacArthur summed up the situation succinctly when he informed the President that the United States faced “an entirely new war.” 1 As the month drew to a close the weather bureau issued its thirty day outlook and predicted a return to a mixture of “near normal” conditions and “above average” temperatures. The Truman administration could only pray for such a favorable political forecast.2 This thesis examines the activity of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), a citizens committee founded in December, 1950, by James B. Conant and Tracy S. Voorhees. The CPD believed that neither the government nor the people of the United States paid sufficient regard to the immediate military threat posed by the Soviet Union. 1 Robert L. Beisner, Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 410. 2 New York Times, December 1, 1950, 15. 9 To remedy this situation, the CPD favored a strong American response to what it perceived as a growing trend of aggressive actions by the Soviet Union and its allies, highlighted by the ongoing Korean War. High on the CPD’s agenda was support for compulsory military service for a period of two years for all eighteen-year-old males, under a system known as universal military service. Previous studies have contended that the CPD played a major role in the political discussions on national security in the first half of 1951, known as the Great Debate. Through an examination of the evidence, including the committee’s own files, it is clear that the CPD’s role was far less significant than previously understood, that its relationship with the administration was far from harmonious, and that its political campaigning was often ineffective at a crucial time in the Cold War. Aside from the weather issues, President Truman faced daunting challenges during what was a critical period of the Cold War, not least a severe decline in the his own approval ratings. Although the Democrats had retained control of Congress in the November midterms, the Republican Party had made significant gains. Although these gains by the non-incumbent party were not unusual, the coinciding of the elections and the reversals in Korea amplified the political effect of the results. Dean Acheson commented how a sense of “deepening gloom” had engulfed the administration by the end of 1950 to the point that the situation was nearing a “crash state.”3 A Gallup Poll taken in early December depicted the general feeling of despair within the United States as it revealed that over fifty percent of Americans believed that a third world war had 3 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York: Norton, 1969), 475. 10 begun.4 In this atmosphere the American outlook on the Cold War, much like the activity of its troops, was nothing less than a complete reversal from the elation following MacArthur’s daring landings at Inchon only two months before. In the midst of all this despair, a group of distinguished and experienced citizens offered to come to the beleaguered administration’s aid. In the guise of a citizens committee, these gentlemen, led by the president of Harvard, James B. Conant and former Under Secretary of the Army, Tracy S. Voorhees, proposed to help the Truman administration foster public and congressional support for the internationalist foreign policy and military buildup outlined in NSC-68.5 Established as a “non partisan, non political group of private citizens,” the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) viewed the Soviet Union as an immediate and implacable threat to the United States and its allies. Although this viewpoint did not represent a startling revelation, Conant and Voorhees’s impression that both the people and government of the United States had not grasped the urgent and grave nature of the Soviet threat fit together perfectly with the administration’s plans to dramatically alter the country’s national security posture. The members of the CPD viewed themselves as continuing an “American tradition” whereby a group of concerned, non-partisan, citizens came together to focus on an issue of national importance.6 This