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The Failed Marshall Plan: Learning from US Foreign Policy Missteps Transcript The Failed Marshall Plan: Learning from US Foreign Policy Missteps Daniel Kurtz-Phelan Executive Editor, Foreign Affairs, Author, The China Mission: George Marshall’s Unfinished War, 1945- 47 Chair: Dr Leslie Vinjamuri Head, US and the Americas Programme and Dean of the Queen Elizabeth II Academy, Chatham House 10 September 2018 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the speaker(s) and participants, and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event, every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions. The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. © The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2018. 10 St James’s Square, London SW1Y 4LE T +44 (0)20 7957 5700 F +44 (0)20 7957 5710 www.chathamhouse.org Patron: Her Majesty The Queen Chairman: Stuart Popham QC Director: Dr Robin Niblett Charity Registration Number: 208223 2 The Failed Marshall Plan: Learning from US Foreign Policy Missteps Dr Leslie Vinjamuri And it’s wonderful to see so many people here on a Monday afternoon after a lovely weekend. I was saying, it’s a – on Mondays, you know, we all come back and feeling that panic of all the things that need to get started and so, it’s a sign, not only of our Members and their very focused interest on international affairs, on the US, but also, especially of our distinguished guest and the book, which is something that I’m, really, very much looking forward to reading. I’m Leslie Vinjamuri. I’m Head of the US and the Americas Programme here at Chatham House and Dean of the Queen Elizabeth the II Academy. It is an honour to be welcoming you here to Chatham House. Daniel Kurtz-Phelan is the Executive Editor of Foreign Affairs, which is the magazine that I’m sure you’re very well aware of and read, and if not, I would certainly encourage you to. And Daniel is here to speak to us about The Failed Marshall Plan: Learning from US Foreign Policy Missteps. It’s based on – actually, if you hold the book up, his new book The China Mission: George Marshall’s Unfinished War, 1945-47, it’s an interesting title, especially right now because I think so many of us look back and think, you know, we certainly don’t think about failure, when we think about the Marshall Plan. So, I have to say, from my vantage point, I’m especially interested to hear what you have to say. Daniel worked in the State Department during the first Obama Administration when Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State from 2009-2012, in a number of different roles, most recently, on the staff – on the Policy Planning staff. So, he brings tremendous policy experience, as well as now, his role at the Council in Foreign Relations and in Foreign Affairs and, clearly, as a distinguished author. So, I’m going to not say too much because I’m mostly curious to hear what you have to say about the book, and then we will open it up and engage in a broader conversation about, perhaps, whether it was a failed Marshall Plan or what the China part of the story is. So, to you. I’ll turn it over to you. Daniel Kurtz-Phelan Well, thank you so much, Leslie, and thanks to all of you for being here on a Monday afternoon. It’s great to be in a place where, I think, George Marshall’s name should be nearly as well-known as it is in the United States, maybe more, so given how we, in the US, tend to treat history. But I think that in the UK, like in the US, the China Mission, part of George Marshall’s career tends to be left out of the Archivist’s story, the, kind of, record of his very real achievements. He’s, of course, known for his role as the US Army Chief of Staff during World War II, one of the key Architects of the Allied victory and then later, when he was Secretary of State, as the namesake and key driver of the Marshall Plan. But the argument of my book is that to understand both Marshall and US foreign policy in the 1940s, when the world we still live in was, in many ways, being shaped. We have to understand not just World War II and Marshall’s time as Secretary of State the, kind of, heroic parts of his career, but also, this interlude that comes in- between those two heroic periods: The China Mission ,which is 13 months he spent trying to broker an end to the Civil War in China and prevent a Chinese Communist victory. This obviously doesn’t fit as well into the, kind of, heroic and triumphant-less narrative that certainly, we in the United States love. Yet, you have here one of the stories of – story of one of the greatest military and diplomatic figures, really in American history, someone that we consider one of the great statesmen of the last century. Taking on one of the hardest ever problems in American foreign policy, for a variety of reasons, and the outcome of this 13-month story, not just shaped Marshall’s thinking about the world, the post-war world and it shaped the way he approached the job as Secretary of State. It also shaped the US- China relationship, in the course of the Cold War, and US foreign policy really, up through the Presidents even, so, kind of, see the echoes of this in QAs. 3 The Failed Marshall Plan: Learning from US Foreign Policy Missteps My story begins in November 1945, at a time when Marshall is really one of the most towering figures, both in the United States and on the global stage. He’s just spent six years, as US Army Chief of Staff. His first day on the job, he took over the US Army the day that Hitler invaded Poland, so as he was preparing for his first day, he was – got a call in the middle of the night and was told to come to the office, earlier than he planned and he, you know, he’d spent that time leading the US Army, really building the modern US Military and become one of the key figures in Allied war planning and war fighting. He had, at this point, an immense public profile in the United States and globally. There was a draft Marshall movement trying to get him to run for President in 1948. He was Time Magazine’s Man of Year at a time in history when that was a really significant thing in the US, and then, when you read the accounts of the, kind of, great figures of the time, they go into these, sort of, giddy raptures, when talking about Marshall. So, if you read Churchill talking about his experience, working with Marshall during the war, he goes on and on about Marshall’s big brain and this is obviously from someone who has rather high-standards, when it comes to that kind of judgement, and he had started – Churchill had started really, not thinking much of Marshall. He seemed like this, kind of, stoic, plain-spoken, not especially articulate American Mid-Western military man, but over the course of their very close relationship, Churchill would just rave about him, and it was true of Harry Truman as well. Truman, shortly before Marshall’s return, had called him the greatest military leader that had ever lived. You read these accounts and you hear again and again about this, kind of, presence that Marshall had, this sense of, kind of, calm and authority that would enter the room, as soon as he walked into it, and they talk about this, kind of, great stoic. The great stoic Marshall, is the way he’s remembered. He refused to ever use first names. He even objected when President Roosevelt tried to call him George. He said, “I’d really prefer if you call me General,” which is quite a thing to say to the President of the United States. He had a line that is often quoted, “Whatever feelings I have, I reserve for Mrs Marshall,” which was repeated to, kind of, show you the, kind of, stoic character that Marshall was. But what was really fascinating to me, as I started digging in o Marshall, to look at this particular episode of the China Mission, was seeing how much of that image was something that Marshall had constructed. He, you know, had become this great stoic, but it was something that he – as a character, he had created, in many ways. There’s a line that I came across from an Officer, who worked alongside Marshall in World War II. Marshall, this Officer said, “Is the greatest actor in the US Army. Everyone thinks that Douglas MacArthur is, but the difference with Marshall is that you never know he’s acting.” So, MacArthur is this, kind of, theatrical and blustering and narcissistic character, and Marshall is this, kind of, stoic, disciplined and self-contained figure.
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