EAST ASIA INSIGHTS TOWARD COMMUNITY BUILDING Japan Center for International Exchange Vol. 1 No. 2 | March 2006 Japan and China at a Crossroads Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIE Postwar ties between Japan and China, while distin- and deeply reproaches itself.” This document is now guished by normalized relations, economic coopera- recognized as the basic foundation of postwar Japan- tion, and political dialogue, are now at a crossroads. China relations. Although often cited as causes of the impasse, sources In 1972, as Japan established relations with China, of disagreement such as visits to Yasukuni Shrine by it ended official ties with Taiwan, but it has retained Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi are, rather, nongovernmental relations through the Taiwan offices manifestations of structural changes taking place in the of the Interchange Association. Taiwan maintains unof- region’s most important bilateral relationship. Regard- ficial representation in Japan through the Taipei Eco- less of these issues, most East Asian countries believe nomic and Cultural Representative Office. that an improvement in Japan-China relations is essen- Six years later, in 1978, Japan and China concluded tial for the future stability and prosperity of the region. the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The treaty affirms Restructuring bilateral relations requires a critical mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, understanding of broad, long-term geopolitical and mutual nonaggression, noninterference, and further structural changes that have been taking place in Japan, development of economic and cultural relations. This China, and around the world for the past two decades. document is the second foundation of Japan-China relations. Historical Framework of Japan-China Relations Normalized relations brought increased economic The U.S. détente with China in the early 1970s prompted interdependence. Trade grew from US$1.1 billion in Japan to rethink its China policy, and the 1972 Japan- 1972 to almost US$20 billion in 1988. Japan understood China Joint Communiqué was a response to this rap- the importance of a strong Chinese market: not only idly changing world. The communiqué contains three would it benefit Japan, but it would also help stabilize key points. First, it states that Japan “recognizes . the East Asia. In 1979, it launched an official development Government of the People’s Republic of China as the assistance (ODA) program for China to promote eco- sole legal Government of China.” Second, it affirms that nomic stability and growth. Several rounds of loans, China considers Taiwan part of its territory and that grant aid, and technical cooperation totaling more than Japan “fully understands and respects this stand of the US$30 billion have been disbursed to China since the Government of the People’s Republic of China.” Al- start of the program. More than three-fourths of these though not noted in the communiqué, Japan has since loans have been used to fund large-scale economic in- expressed that it “strongly hopes that the issues sur- frastructure projects to develop roads, rail, airports, and rounding Taiwan will be solved in a peaceful manner power stations. by direct talks between the parties concerned.” Finally, Japan also promoted international political engage- the communiqué notes that Japan “is keenly conscious ment with China—even in the aftermath of Tiananmen of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan Square in 1989. The G7 Summit Communiqué released caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, in July of that year urged China to “create conditions which enable them to avoid isolation.” This was a result changes in recent years. These developments have of Japan’s efforts during negotiations on the communi- changed the way that Japan and China view each other, qué. Two years later, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu was the and they have altered the nature of the relationship. first G7 leader to visit China after Tiananmen Square. The end of the Cold War and China’s pursuit of eco- Political relations in the 1990s were marked by three nomic growth have played key roles in transforming re- historic milestones. In 1992, Emperor Akihito and Em- gional geopolitics. First, the fall of the Soviet Union en- press Michiko of Japan made the first Imperial visit to abled China to vastly improve relations with its neigh- China since World War II. The emperor expressed his bor. The two countries signed an agreement that re- sorrow about the war and deep remorse about past ag- solved all border demarcation issues. Second, relations gressions. On the 50th anniversary of the end of World between China and the United States have significantly War II in 1995, Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi improved over the past five years. Third, Chinese rela- Murayama issued a public statement of “heartfelt apol- tions with other Asian countries have also improved. ogy” to the people who suffered from colonial rule For example, long-standing disputes over the Spratley and aggression. Then in 1998, Chinese President Jiang Islands, and the China-Vietnam and China-India bor- Zemin made a historic visit to Japan as the first Chinese ders have been addressed. Fourth, China has actively head of state to do so since the end of the war. There pursued multilateral diplomacy in the region through are differing views as to the success of this significant forums such as the six-party talks on North Korea and visit, but regardless, the Joint Declaration on “Building ASEAN+3. a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace China has developed much stronger relations with and Development,” in which Japan expresses “deep re- most of its regional partners, and it has become a major morse” for the war, was adopted, becoming the third international player. Its adoption of a more accommo- foundation of Japan-China relations. These events are dating foreign policy stems in large part from a need manifestations of the recognition of past history on for stable relations with its partners to ensure economic both sides. growth. Perhaps ironically, Japan’s policy of engaging Economic ties expanded throughout the 1990s as China with the international community has helped well. Japan continued to cooperate with China through contribute to a situation in which Japan’s importance its ODA programs, investment, and its strong support has decreased somewhat in the eyes of China. for China’s accession to the World Trade Organization The growing strength of the Chinese economy in 2001. But toward the end of the 1990s, the Japanese coupled with the continued stagnation of the Japanese media and National Diet members began to question economy over the past 15 years have started to change the rationale of an economically stagnant Japan pro- the way Japan views its neighbor. While Japan used viding ODA to a booming China. An official review was to consider China as a still-developing entity, recently conducted, and in 2001 Japan significantly scaled back there has been a growing feeling that China is rapidly its assistance. “catching up” with Japan. It is becoming a formidable Since that time, numerous irritants in the relation- economic competitor and a possible geopolitical rival. ship have risen to the fore. On the Japanese side, these The relative strengths of the two countries are chang- include the North Korean refugee incident at the Japa- ing, and Japan is watching its neighbor’s growth with a nese consulate in Shenyang in 2002; heckling of the feeling of uncertainty about its own future. Japanese national soccer team by Chinese fans at the Major structural changes inside China, most signifi- Asian Cup in China in 2004; the intrusion of a Chinese cantly a proliferation of new venues for public expres- nuclear attack submarine into Japanese waters in 2004; sion in Chinese society, have also played a major role China’s move to block Japan’s candidacy for the UN in changing relations. Although the Communist Party Security Council in 2005; and violent anti-Japan dem- used to have widespread control over independent po- onstrations across China in 2005. On the Chinese side, litical expression in China, recent market expansion irritants include Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s and the resulting influx of inexpensive cellular phone repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and in 2003, a leak and Internet technologies have created new spaces for of mustard gas from chemical weapons barrels left by public discussion and action in China that never existed the Japanese Imperial Army, injuring dozens. These before. The anti-Japan movement of 2005, for example, and other incidents have exacerbated what has become was catalyzed and coordinated by ordinary citizens who a tense relationship. had access to this technology. Deliberate dissemination of key information helped galvanize what became an Framing the New Relationship: Geopolitical adhoc, popular anti-Japan movement. and Structural Changes A second structural change in China is the rise to Thinking anew about Japan-China relations requires power of the current “fourth generation” of Communist looking back at important geopolitical and structural Party leaders. This group has the potential to positively EAST ASIA INSIGHTS 2 Vol. 1 No. 2 | March 2006 influence the bilateral relationship: its members came genuine remorse for its past and believes that it is not of age two decades after the war, and they have a more a responsible member of the international community. flexible approach toward Japan than their predecessors. Despite its past 60 years of peaceful development and The rise of the anti-Japan movement, however, has lim- democracy, Japan is not qualified, in the eyes of China, ited the fourth generation’s ability to engage Japan. to assume international leadership positions in East Meanwhile, Japan has been undergoing major struc- Asia or the United Nations, and it is not to be trusted. tural changes of its own, starting with its domestic poli- Another interpretation is intertwined with geopo- tics.