AUTHOR
Frode Overland Andersen
The flags of the 28 NATO member countries flap in the wind in front of headquarters in Brussels.
2 | FEATURES PRISM 6, no. 1 NATO in Context Geopolitics and the Problem of Russian Power
BY ROBERT E. HUNTER
ince the end of the Cold War, the question “Whither NATO—and why?” has come up regularly, especially in the United States. This is not an idle question nor one that can Ssimply be dismissed. If anything, it is remarkable that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization still exists a quarter-century after the key reason for its creation—the widely shared perception of a political, strategic, and military threat from the Soviet Union—ceased to exist. To be sure, there is now renewed challenge from the Soviet Union’s principal successor state, the Russian Federation. From the beginning of the 1990s, however, until the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014, a span of nearly 25 years, the argument could have been made that there was no need for continuing the Western alliance that did so much to contain Soviet power and the Warsaw Pact and that played a significant role in the dissolution of both. Many people did argue just this point, both in the United States and elsewhere, but they were never in the majority (or at least they never prevailed in public and parliamentary debate). The reasons for NATO’s continued existence are important to understand, including to provide a basis for considering its future and, more precisely, the tasks it should be asked to perform and its very character as an alliance of sovereign states spanning the two sides of the Atlantic.1 Power in Europe: Until the End of the Cold War
NATO has been only one of the many instruments and political-security efforts designed to deal with problems of power in Europe. The modern history of this subject can be said to have begun
Robert Hunter is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He served as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 1998, as well as U.S. representative to the Western European Union. He was Director of the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies at NDU from 2010 to 2012.
PRISM 6, no. 2 FEATURES | 3 HUNTER with the end of the Napoleonic wars, when the on the other, there was tacit East-West agree- Congress of Vienna fashioned a set of under- ment to keep the country divided—one of the standings that, based on the overarching con- few things on which all could agree. cept of the balance of power, largely kept the But concern about growing German power peace on the continent until 1914, when it fell from 1867 onward was not the only problem with a crash that led to the most cataclysmic plaguing Europe. Beginning in the mid-1940s, war (to that time) in European history. The there was awareness of Soviet power in the collapse that led to the Great War had many heart of the continent—awareness that had causes, but perhaps none so important—and been building for some time, certainly from certainly none so consequential for the after- the solidification of Bolshevik control in math—as the problem of German power. This Russia and the formal creation of the Soviet had emerged with full force upon the comple- Union in 1924—that embraced the old tion of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s project Russian empire at close to its furthest historical to forge a more or less united Germany, with dimensions. The Second World War and the the final phase in the period between 1867 defeat of Nazi Germany—and especially the and 1871. From that time until 1945 (with a central role of Soviet forces in bringing about hiatus from 1918 until the late 1930s, or the that defeat—brought Soviet military power “phony peace”), dealing with the “German and then progressively developing communist problem” was central to forging arrangements control to the middle of Germany, as well as that could bring some reasonable predictabil- north and south along a line that stretched, as ity and a method of preventing a radical Winston Churchill put it, “[f]rom Stettin in the imbalance of power (and hence the risk of a Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic[.]”3 Thus, the major European war). These efforts, too, failed problem of Soviet power overlapped with that and cataclysmically so. After the Second World of German power from the late 1940s until the War, one of the central problems on the conti- end of the Cold War, when further basic trans- nent was how to deal with the future of formations took place. First, by the beginning German power. of the 1990s, it became evident that the One key objective, shared by all the German “problem” had been “solved,” in large nations of Europe and extending into the time measure because of developments within of the division of Europe between East and German society—a truly remarkable event in West, was to keep Germany from again being European history. This “problem” had to of a principal source of instability and potential course remain “solved.” Second, the contem- conflict in Europe—in other words, to “keep poraneous collapse of the Soviet internal and Germany down,” in the oft-quoted phrase external empires appeared (erroneously) to attributed to Lord Ismay, NATO’s First many observers to be at least a partial solution Secretary General.2 Furthermore, once the lines to the problem of Soviet power in Europe and, of division in Europe solidified, with Germany more broadly, elsewhere in the world. Indeed, divided between the American, British, and the collapse of these two Soviet empires was French occupation zones on one side and the the most profound retreat of any major Soviet zone (later becoming the separate nation’s or empire’s power, without war, in all nations of West Germany and East Germany) of recorded peacetime history.
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At that time, views regarding Germany’s particular insurance policies was Helmut Kohl, future coalesced. As Soviet military forces and who served as Chancellor of both West the resultant political influence were with- Germany (1982-1990) and of a reunified drawn from both East Germany and elsewhere Germany (1990-1998). in Central Europe, leaders in Moscow swal- The United States as a European Power lowed hard and accepted not only that the two halves of Germany could be unified, but also This analysis is important background to the that it could be a member of NATO, subject to entry of the United States as a European power, some transitional arrangements contained in first episodically (1917-1919 and 1943-1946) the so-called Two-Plus-Four Agreement (the and then continually from the late 1940s two Germanies and the four post-World War II onward. The third U.S. engagement was occupying powers).4 In effect, the Soviet derived in part from memories of what had Union/Russia had decided (or accepted) to happened after the United States left Europe rely on the United States to keep watch over following the First World War; it was also stim- united Germany, in part through embedding ulated by emerging concerns that the rapid it in a Western institution that had its own withdrawal of the overwhelming bulk of U.S. practices for organizing security relationships forces from the continent after the end of and behavior-expectations among allied coun- World War II could lead to exploitation by the tries. This embedding was also facilitated by Soviet Union. Of course, that conclusion was the membership of a united Germany in what not immediately obvious and did not reflect a is now the European Union. consensus at the time. Indeed, there is still Even so, added insurance was useful. This some debate about whether there had to be a was especially important for Germany, as it division of Europe and a Cold War with the sought to forestall the reawakening of fears Soviet Union. That point is raised here because among some Central European peoples and it is relevant to current circumstances. Is it pos- governments. Therefore, when NATO and then sible for leaders (and nations) to live with an the European Community took in new mem- anomalous situation in terms of relations bers—most important in the first tranche were involving powerful states—a powerful Soviet Poland and the Czech Republic, which “sur- Union in the late 1940s and today’s resurgent rounded” Germany with these two institu- Russia—or is the cliché “nature abhors a vac- tions—it helped to ensure that the future eco- uum” (of power) too psychologically compel- nomic success of—and perhaps even ling? Is this the case even in circumstances dominance by—a united Germany would not where solidifying lines of division and requir- be perceived as “here comes Germany again,” ing certainty in calculations about relation- but rather as “here are NATO and the European ships could be antithetical to the securing of Union.” The same logic applied to the creation national interests? It is no accident that many of the euro: the German economy would still of those in both the United States and, pre- be uppermost (and it continues to be so in sumably, Russia who talk about a “new Cold Europe), but a visible instrument of that pre- War” come from the ranks of those who fought dominance would not be the deutschmark. the first Cold War. These individuals were then Notably, the leading architect of these reassured by the confidence and predictability
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conferred by the existence of a stable, more or competition with NATO, of the EU’s Common less rigid, and overarching paradigm of East- Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).8 West confrontation, as opposed to the anoma- In the late 1940s, the United States came lous and psychologically unsettling situation to believe that, without a reassertion of of a “paradigm gap”5 in U.S. foreign policy American power on the continent on a lasting, following the disappearance of the Soviet rather than an episodic, basis, Soviet power Union. (both geopolitical and ideological-economic) Viewed in retrospect, U.S. grand strategy was likely to prevail across Europe, to the det- toward the European continent from April riment of U.S. interests and values, as well as 1917 onward can be summarized as preventing those of the European liberal democracies.9 It the domination of Europe by a hostile hege- is important to note that the establishment of mon or, at a minimum, by any country or American power in Europe did not happen empire that would seek to deny to the United overnight but was progressive10, and that it also States the prosecution of its own national involved both public and private sector ele- interests, especially defined in economic ments.11 Revival of democratic politics (and terms.6 (This resistance to a “hostile hegemon” opposition to communist politics, especially also has a major “values” dimension: the in France and Italy) went hand in hand with advance of liberal democracy, the twin, his- economic revival. torically, to pursuit of national interests as It was only near the end of the decade that prime movers of American engagement in the these political and economic efforts appeared outside world). This definition fit the Germany to be insufficient as Soviet power and influence of Kaiser Wilhelm II (with the Austro- were being consolidated farther east. There was Hungarian Empire in its wake), Nazi Germany a growing belief that the United States had to (and, until September 1943, fascist Italy), and make a strategic commitment to the continent then the Soviet Union with its European satel- to promote confidence on the part of what lites. By contrast, the United States supported were becoming known as West European the rise of a “friendly” hegemon—what is now countries. As such, in signing the North the European Union because, beginning with Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the United States for the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the European the first time committed itself permanently to Economic Community and its successors the defense of other countries.12 Even so, the helped provide coherence and capability in North Atlantic Treaty contains no automatic dealing with the problems of German and commitment by any ally to come to the Soviet power, while at the same time advanc- defense of another signatory against “armed ing the Kantian proposition that democracies aggression.” Rather, in the words of Article 5, are more pacific than authoritarian or totalitar- each of the Allies is obligated to take “such ian societies. Even this American acceptance of action as it deems necessary.”13 At U.S. insis- a role for the EU has its limits, however, as the tence, sovereignty was and continues to be U.S. does from time to time still try to play EU fully preserved. (It is not for nothing that the members off one another7 and it still has not North Atlantic Council takes all decisions by fully accepted a major role, in potential consensus, which in itself conveys strength, not weakness. When the Council has taken a
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decision, including for the use of military and North Africa, or critical security issues on force, no allied country has ever gone against the continent, including the influx of refugees that decision, even though no NATO operation and other migrants that is posing the most has ever included all of the Allies. NATO has severe crisis for the EU in decades. always operated militarily as a “coalition of the NATO’s First Break-Point: When the willing,” though not in terms of the political Music Changed commitment to stand together). Even so, the U.S. commitment to the secu- The most remarkable thing about NATO in the rity of its initial 11 Allies was political—a stra- post-Cold War period was that it continued tegic commitment without any tangible mani- on, something that historically does not hap- festation at first. However, critically important pen to alliances when the war is over. Equally despite that limitation—especially as mea- remarkable was that the United States did not sured against the historic reluctance of the leave Europe, either by taking out all of its United States and the American people to military forces16 or—more importantly, in make such a commitment—was the fact that it fact—by in any way slackening its strategic received bipartisan support in the U.S. commitment to the continent. Senate.14 It was only after the start of the There were a number of reasons for both Korean War in June 1950, which seemed to phenomena. Perhaps most important was iner- show that the Soviet Union was prepared to tia, an all-important quality in international use military force to advance its geopolitical relations or indeed in any big organization; ambitions, that NATO was militarized. Indeed, there was no impetus to dismantle NATO, Allied Command Europe only came into being especially with its elaboration of processes and almost two years to the day (April 2, 1951) products that had made it truly the most suc- after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. cessful (political-) military alliance in history. This review is important because it pres- That included the historically unique inte- ages so much of what happened at the end of grated military command structure, the layer- the Cold War, as well as what is happening ing of committees and processes to take deci- now.15 The process in the late 1980s and the sions across national lines, the standardization early 1990s was remarkably similar to what of many weapons and procedures, and the fact had happened in the late 1940s and early that, for most of the European Allies (plus 1950s, and consisted of an amalgam of poli- Canada, though not the United States), mili- tics, economics, strategic commitment, and tary affairs and activities had been effectively military forces and institutions. It is this pro- “denationalized.” Each nation retained its sov- cess and its relevance to the problem of deal- ereignty and maintained its own way of con- ing with Russian power in Europe today that is ducting its national security, but all of these the focus of the balance of this article. Further, non-American Allies focused in the first given the centrality of the problem of Russian instance on responsibilities that were denom- power, the article will not explore other key inated by their membership in the North aspects of the development of NATO, includ- Atlantic Alliance.17 ing the so-called “out of area” issues, extend- Why the United States sustained such a ing beyond Europe and into the Middle East strong European commitment is more
PRISM 6, no. 2 FEATURES | 7 HUNTER complex. The United States was then and con- quantified, the United States has learned over tinues to be, in NATO jargon, the “800-pound the years that its strategic commitment to gorilla.” Without going into the full history of European security, however that may be what transpired, there was the memory of defined in any period, buys it a lot of political what had happened at earlier moments when and economic influence. In short, it gets cut a the United States had withdrawn strategically lot of slack by Allies simply because it can be and militarily from the continent. More sig- relied upon to be ready and willing to help if nificantly, Europe continued to be important there are security-related troubles. Indeed, test- to the United States, although following the ing whether that proposition continues to be end of the Cold War this was denominated true and, if so, to what degree and in what more in economic and other non-military forms, is one of the key conundrums facing the terms than militarily. There was also strategic Alliance at the moment and is likely to be so security business to be done, both to ensure for the foreseeable future. The United States at that the great challenge to European security, the end of the Cold War confirmed itself as a the Soviet Union, was indeed fractured beyond European power; the extent to which it will repair, as at the same time its forces were being continue playing that role lies at the heart of withdrawn, and to help restructure relations many of the challenges that face the West, among countries that were emerging or including the future and value of NATO. reemerging from decades of suppression under The reconstruction of European security Soviet power and tutelage.18 While it cannot be and other developments made possible by the U. Ivanov
Leaders from Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine gathered to sign the documents dissolving the Soviet Union and creating the Commonwealth of Independent States on December 8, 1991.
8 | FEATURES PRISM 6, no. 2 NATO IN CONTEXT end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Alliance, with the integrated military com- internal and external Russian empires, and the mand structure being most important, along withdrawal of most of Russian military and with continued efforts to forestall the “rena- strategic capacity from Central Europe all have tionalizing” of NATO military forces; many fathers and mothers, as is true of most ■■ Keeping the German problem solved; great historical developments.19 One such ■■ Taking the Central European countries “father,” as noted earlier, was certainly Federal off the European geopolitical chess board Chancellor Helmut Kohl. But perhaps the where they had been proximate causes of the most important was U.S. President George 20th century’s two world wars and, to a sig- H.W. Bush, who argued in Mainz, Germany, as nificant degree, the Cold War. This includes early as May 1989 (six months before the inhibiting the reemergence of old national opening of the Berlin Wall), for a “Europe quarrels or at least doing as much as possi- whole and free,” later supplemented with the ble to suppress them. (Of course, what the words “and at peace.”20 It may be that European Union has done is also important President Bush did not himself at the time and arguably more so than what NATO has understand the full import of what he was pro- done to achieve this purpose); posing. These few words constituted a basic ■■ Preventing, if at all possible, an impetus grand strategy for the United States and the in Russia—following the Soviet Union’s geo- West in Europe and set forth an ambition that political, political, and economic collapse— has never been realized in European history. for revanchism, as had happened in Germany after the First World War and the Pursuing a Europe Whole and Free and at Peace “unequal peace” imposed on it in the series of treaties that came out of the Versailles and In the first years after the end of the Cold War, other post-war conferences;22 the United States provided most of the leader- ■■ Ensuring that Ukraine, newly indepen- ship in transforming NATO so that it could dent and the most important country bor- attempt to accomplish this basic strategic dering on European Russia, would not fall vision.21 This included several elements, each under Moscow’s sway but would also not, at of which was designed to meet a particular least at first, be formally and fully integrated strategic problem and, more importantly, was into key Western institutions, including dependent on all of the other elements. The NATO, even though Western “aspirations” most important were as follows: would be honored; ■■ Retaining the United States as a ■■ Downsizing and repositioning NATO European power, in whatever terms and military forces, in effect reorienting them dimensions are necessary to make this con- about 120 degrees from the old inner-Ger- vincing to all, as well as both to foster stra- man border toward southeast Europe (for tegic confidence in Europe and to advance example, the nations of the former America’s own national goals on the conti- Yugoslavia and possibly beyond), with the nent; U.S. Air Force notably being largely moved ■■ Preserving the “best of the past,” notably from its principal locus at Ramstein, the structure and practices of the NATO Germany, to Aviano, Italy. At the same time,
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the U.S. proposed, and the Alliance President George H.W. Bush’s vision, as accepted, the creation of Combined Joint elaborated both during the balance of his Task Forces, which would provide the NATO administration and in much of the Clinton military with greater flexibility; and administration, was also to try achieving ■■ Beginning to break down walls between something even more fundamental in terms of NATO and the European Union, operating relations among states, especially given on the principle that “security” in Europe Europe’s often painful and tragic history: to try would be as much as, if not more than, to move beyond two historic practices, namely about economic and political develop- the balance of power and spheres of influence. ments—that is, democracy—as about mili- This was a tall order and, in fact, this transfor- tary matters.23 The EU would thus necessar- mation has so far proved to be unattainable, ily play an instrumental role in economics though at first there did seem to be some and politics that had proved so successful in promise of doing so and it remains a goal Western Europe during the previous four worth pursuing. decades. The Western ambition at the start Key to achieving the strategic elements of of the 1990s was to extend this principle and the overarching grand strategy was and still is practice into countries suddenly coming out dealing effectively with the great problem of from under Soviet influence and control. power on the continent that remained after the There were even hopes that this could hap- end of the Cold War: the future of Russia. pen in Russia. Clearly, making it possible to avoid a reintro- The principal reason for listing these core duction of spheres of influence and balance of parts of the new grand strategy is to denote power politics, as well as the risks of renewed that each element related to a fundamental challenges to European security writ large, objective of European security, including would require incorporating Russia into a America’s interest in it. They show the intersec- larger framework. More than any other, it is tion and interaction of political, economic, this problem that has not been solved, nor is and security (military) factors, in a symbiotic there currently much prospect of achieving relationship, as had been true from the onset that goal, if it can be at all, at least for the fore- of the Cold War. Of course, the private sector seeable future. Indeed, from the time “Europe also has had a major role to play. Indeed, one whole and free and at peace” was proposed as reason for the continuing strength of transat- an organizing principle for Europe, three crite- lantic ties is that economic relations between ria regarding Russia had to be fulfilled: 1) there the United States and the EU countries, in would not be an onset of serious revanchism both public and private sectors, are closer to in Russia; 2) Russia would have to abstain balance both in terms of trade and balance of from trying to establish suzerainty over coun- payments, as well as in cross-border invest- tries in its neighborhood;24 and 3) any new ments and ownership, than is true, in particu- arrangements in European security could not lar, with China, and as was true at the time of be at the expense of the security or other legit- U.S. concerns with Japanese economic compe- imate interests of any European country tition. (including Russia and every other European nation) or of the continued operation of the
10 | FEATURES PRISM 6, no. 2 NATO IN CONTEXT
NATO Alliance25, including the critical contin- and also NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership ued engagement of the United States. Council and thus presumably have a chance Part of the problem has been the way in for Alliance membership.30 That definition which the different elements of the grand strat- included all of the so-called neutral and non- egy, as unpacked here, have been pursued.26 aligned countries, all components of the for- The most critical efforts have had to deal with mer Yugoslavia, and all components of the the triple issues of: 1) taking Central European former Soviet Union—thus defining as states off the geopolitical chessboard; 2) mak- “European” countries as far afield as ing a place for Ukraine, without either its fall- Kyrgyzstan! ing under the sway of Russia or its premature, Two major problems intruded. First, it was formal incorporation in Western institutions difficult to get the Russians to join PFP, as such that Russia would have legitimate (not something fashioned by NATO, though the “neo-imperial”) cause for concern; and 3) not Yeltsin administration eventually did so. isolating Russia, but rather trying to draw it Second, for many of the Central European productively into the outside world, and more states, PFP was clearly not enough, despite the particularly the West, without its either threat- working relationships with NATO that it ening or being threatened by others. afforded. For them, coming out of decades of NATO’s most important effort to try domination and with no confidence in their squaring these various circles was to create the future security in the absence of something Partnership for Peace (PFP).27 Given the differ- more tangible, only NATO membership would ing interests found within the West, in particu- suffice (even EU membership would not be lar on the part of national institutions (for enough, given that it would not include secu- example, the military), PFP coalesced around rity guarantees backed by the United States). three basic purposes: 1) to help transform and This desire, strongly backed for some countries “socialize” the militaries of non-NATO mem- by the German government (for reasons dis- ber countries that joined PFP and, building on cussed earlier), was responsible for the begin- the inculcation of Western standards and prac- ning of NATO’s enlargement into Central tices, to have a positive impact on broader Europe. However, moving in this direction society; 2) to help aspirant countries prepare raised two major problems with regard to the themselves for possible NATO membership so basic issues of dealing with Russian power in they could be “producers and not just consum- Europe, present or future. The first was how to ers of security;”28 and 3) to help countries that reassure Russia that including Central would never (or not soon) join NATO as full European states in the NATO Alliance would Allies to advance their security capabilities, not be a first step toward either “confronting” work with NATO, and, in the process, fall Russia, “excluding” it from Europe, or “sur- within the “penumbra” of NATO engagement, rounding” it with Western power, at least on though without the benefit of the Washington the European side. The second problem was Treaty’s Article 5 security guarantees.29 Further, that, if there were to be some effort to reassure it was decided that any countries that belonged Russia on these points, what needed to be to the Organization for Security and done about Ukraine so that it would not feel Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could join PFP itself to be consigned to a Russian sphere of
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influence, either hard or soft? The Ukraine NATO and Russia, even if Vladimir Putin had piece of the puzzle had to be pursued in a way not come to power but rather the Kremlin had that would not consign it to a no-man’s land continued with leaders such as Boris Yeltsin or or that would set aside the additional principle Dmitry Medvedev, who was Russian president that countries should have the right to decide from 2008 to 2012, between the two Putin their own future orientation and associations. presidencies. Indeed, there is a popular (Of course, that has never meant that any Western view that what Putin has done is more country wishing to join NATO can automati- or less in Russia’s DNA and thus inevitable.35 cally do so). This is a tricky balance to strike But whether what has transpired could and has often led to misunderstandings and have been different does have bearing on what disappointed expectations.31 might be possible in the future. In particular, is there anything the West, especially the The Interlocking Steps of 1997—And Russia’s Later Reactions United States, can do to deal with Russian power in Europe, while fully preserving Key developments took place in 1997 in a Western interests, without simply accepting the series of interlocking steps. NATO decided to need to confront the Putin administration for take in three new members (Poland, Hungary, as long as is necessary, presumably until there and the Czech Republic);32 it negotiated with is some change within the Russian govern- Moscow a NATO-Russia Founding Act which, ment, economy, and society analogous to the among other things, created a Permanent Joint developments that led the Soviet Union to dis- Council at NATO Headquarters and the ambi- solve? tion to work together in 19 areas;33 and it This article will prescribe a number of negotiated a NATO-Ukraine Charter on a steps for the United States, NATO, and other Distinctive Partnership and created a NATO- Western countries and institutions to take now Ukraine Council at NATO Headquarters.34 or in the near future to ameliorate the current For many officials and commentators in problem of Russian power in Europe.36 First, the West and, in particular, in the United however, it is necessary to examine things that States, these arrangements, taken together with have been done over the last several years that other steps, constituted a new set of under- contributed to the current imbroglio. They can standings about the future of power in Europe at least be instructive as illustrative “thou shalt and a way to avoid reversion to the kind of nots” for the future, on both sides. difficulties that had led to the two great wars With his seizure of Crimea in February of the 20th century and the Cold War. 2014 and the extension of Russian military Unfortunately, Russia has never accepted activities (both direct and indirect) into other this analysis, nor is it obvious that there was parts of Ukraine, President Putin’s Russia is any formulation that Russia would have been clearly violating agreements that bind the willing to accept, either then or since, short of country, notably the Helsinki Final Act of the dissolution of NATO and maybe not even 197537 and the Budapest memorandum of that. Perhaps nothing the West could have pro- 1994.38 Moscow has also not fulfilled its com- posed would have made possible a workable mitments regarding Ukraine under the so- similarity of interests and practices between called Minsk II Agreement.39 Russia’s direct
12 | FEATURES PRISM 6, no. 2 NATO IN CONTEXT military actions within Ukraine have been means for dealing effectively with the problem supplemented by activities in other spheres of Russian power in Europe in order to avoid and in other places in Central Europe, notably being condemned to another open-ended, cyber attacks, manipulation of energy markets, potentially dangerous, and certainly costly economic penetration, and either direct or confrontation. One step in this process is to indirect propaganda and efforts to subvert understand that the West and especially the democratic practices and institutions. These United States also played a considerable part efforts also supplement what Putin and others in bringing us to the current situation.40 have done to reduce the chances for develop- This understanding needs to start with rec- ment of liberal democratic politics and society ognition that it is incorrect to argue that Russia in Russia—a subject that is indicative of paral- has been violating agreed norms of the post- lel attitudes toward matters of Russia’s projec- Cold War world in Europe and a new order tion of power beyond its borders. (other than violation of particular treaty com- Yet while fully recognizing Russia’s pri- mitments). Since Russia has not in fact been mary responsibility for current challenges to involved in creation of such norms and order, European security, we in the West still need to it cannot be said to be in violation. This is a try devising a set of strategies that can offer a key point that is generally ignored by critics of Elizabeth Arrott
A group of unmarked soldiers conduct a routine patrol at the Simferopol Airport in Crimea. These “little green men,” as they were referred to by the media, were later identified as members of the Russian armed forces.
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Putin’s behavior who stigmatize what he has when it led NATO in attacking Serbia in 1999 been doing. We do not like it, and we can and (over Kosovo), without a UN Security Council do oppose it, but he has not gone against Resolution, and in invading Iraq in 200342—a some agreed-upon understandings, since such country not close to Russia, but also not in a understandings could not exist in the absence part of the world of no interest to it.43 of serious Russian participation in framing Then, in 2004, NATO took in seven more them. This is a basic principle of statecraft and members in addition to the first three.44 Russia a lesson for the future. had moderated its criticism of the first enlarge- Following the period when the United ment because, as noted above, including the States and other Western countries believed Poles and the Czechs “surrounded” Germany that an effective system of security relation- with NATO, thus helping to insure against any ships had been put in place for Europe, several risk of German revanchism. For NATO to Western and especially U.S. actions, particu- invite the three Baltic countries to join could larly under President George W. Bush, could be cited as a “special case,” though the reasonably have been viewed by Moscow, Russians didn’t like it, since the West had never under any leadership, as pushing it aside or at accepted their incorporation into the Soviet least as not taking its legitimate interests into Union under the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop account. In effect, from the latter part of the Pact. But Romania and Bulgaria, along with Clinton administration through the next two Slovakia and Slovenia? And later Croatia, U.S. administrations, President George H.W. Albania, and now, in 2016, Montenegro? Bush’s ambition to try including Russia fully Including Romania and Bulgaria especially fed in development of European security was Russian fears, realistic or not, that NATO was largely ignored. Russia (the Soviet Union) had bent on determining the future of European lost the Cold War, so the reasoning went, and security on its own, particularly in Central it could be marginalized or at least accorded Europe.45 minor status in deliberations about the future Two other Western steps played into of Europe. The first part of this statement is Russian suspicions. The first was the U.S. deci- true (the Soviets lost the Cold War); the sec- sion, eventually blessed by NATO, to deploy ond (Russia could be ignored) helped to sow anti-ballistic missile sites in Central Europe. the wind. Ukraine, more than any other coun- These are designed to defend against North try, has reaped the resultant whirlwind. Korean missiles and those that Iran might Notably, in June 2002, the U.S. unilater- develop at some point in the distant future— ally abrogated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile the latter rationale being advanced on security Treaty.41 Following the Cold War and the effec- grounds but in fact essentially reflecting U.S. tive end of U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation, domestic politics. The U.S. has argued that the treaty arguably was no longer important these missile defenses would in no way impact strategically; symbolically, however, it showed Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal—that is, erod- that Russia was still “at the top table” along ing mutually assured destruction. In fact, the with the United States. Abrogation was a gra- U.S. is correct in its reasoning, and Russian tuitous act, a demonstration that the U.S. analysts know it. But that is not the point. As could do whatever it wanted, as it also did viewed from Moscow, the United States was
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showing it could act militarily at will in Ukraine’s future relationships, both with Central Europe, regardless of what the Russians Russia and with NATO, before there was a seri- might say, and, in the process, go against the ous exploration into whether to include Russia spirit (though not the letter46) of the 1997 in the future of European security arrange- NATO-Russia Founding Act. ments and, if so, how. In 2008, then-Russian More important, however, was NATO’s President Dmitry Medvedev sent NATO a num- declaration at its April 2008 Bucharest summit ber of proposals on a broader framework, but that “[Ukraine and Georgia] will become they fell well short of what the West could members of NATO.”47 This was designed as a accept and were thus not given serious consid- face-saving device for U.S. President George W. eration.48 Bush when several European members were The West also did not fully explore the not prepared to give these two countries even economic track. Russia was admitted to the a non-committal Membership Action Plan, World Trade Organization only in 2012, after pointing toward potential NATO membership 18 years of negotiations, whereas in order to at some unspecified point in the future, but demonstrate to Russia the West’s desire to without any guarantee that it would in fact include it in global institutions that step occur. Unfortunately, the wording of the sum- should have been taken immediately following mit declaration could only be read—however the collapse of the Soviet Union. Further, the unwittingly it was drafted—as the actual for- U.S. Congress only then repealed the Jackson- mal commitment by the Allies (“they will Vanik Amendment of 197449, which had lim- become members”) to the security of these two ited trade with the Soviet Union in order to countries against external aggression under punish it for restricting Jewish emigration, Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Georgia’s even though the rationale for the amendment President Mikhail Saakashvili read NATO’s had collapsed some 21 years previously. declaration that way and tested the proposi- Finally, no U.S. public officials of any stature tion in South Ossetia. Vladimir Putin also attended Putin’s showcase Winter Olympics in obviously read the NATO declaration the same Sochi in early 2014, a clear and obviously way and slapped Georgia down in a short con- intended departure from past practice and a flict. Given that no NATO ally came to rebuke to Russian human rights abuses as Georgia’s military defense, the Bucharest dec- viewed in the United States. (Despite American laration proved to be worse than useless, not actions, only Putin knows whether or not they just by showing that no ally truly saw Georgia had any instrumental impact.) as a future NATO member, but also by implic- A Way Forward in Dealing with the itly calling into question the worth of Article Problem of Russian Power 5. Matters may have rested there, but compe- With this brief analysis of “how we all got here tition over Ukraine began to increase. Russia from there” and without trying to be compre- sought to draw Ukraine closer to its orbit, hensive, a few general principles are in order while the U.S. worked gradually to draw regarding Western policies that could, among Ukraine fully into the West. Thus both sides other things, help to deal with the continuing acted to erode the tacit understanding about problem of Russian power in Europe:
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The United States In. The United States 5 (without a request from the United States to needs to remain deeply engaged as a European do so). Further, when the United States sought power. This is so in part because the basic U.S. European (and other) support for the grand strategy toward Europe, from April 1917 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) onward, is essentially unchanged. Clearly, the in Afghanistan, every single NATO Ally, as well potential challenge from Russia to the conti- as a number of PFP partners, sent military nent as a whole is not what it was during the forces and other security personnel. Arguably, Cold War. Nevertheless, most of the states on almost all of them did so not because they felt Russia’s western periphery, not just Ukraine, threatened at home by Taliban-instigated ter- are deeply concerned, and they would be even rorism, but rather to help ensure that the more so if none of them had become members United States would come to their aid if need of NATO. Of course, this statement begs the be—and the “need be” has meant, more than question whether, without NATO enlargement anything else, a potential threat from Russia. and other Western steps that ignored legiti- Thus it is natural that the Allies, whether those mate Russian interests, Putin would have taken directly in the potential line of fire from Russia the steps he did against Ukraine and also, less or others more remote within Europe, want directly, against a number of other Central the U.S. to be prepared to redeem this implicit European states. But “better safe than sorry” is bargain. a good principle when history cannot be Remember Europe. The United States must undone or “tested” in a controlled experiment. show that it has not reduced its interest in Further, there is a common understanding Europe. It does not take much imagination or in Europe that no matter how much military insight to realize that the attention paid by the capacity any European country has, none, even U.S. Government to Europe generally has been in combination, would be able to deal with a slackening over the years, especially after the Russia determined to have its way in this area, completion of NATO’s restructuring during the for example, against one or more Baltic States. 1990s, followed by the U.S.-led military The United States remains indispensable. actions in Bosnia and over Kosovo.50 Though Indeed, even after the Cold War, the European some reordering of U.S. global priorities Allies have worked assiduously to keep the between the time of operations in Kosovo United States engaged strategically on the con- (1999) and Russia’s seizure of Crimea (2014) tinent—with “strategically” defined more in was clearly merited, this did become a matter terms of political commitment than in actual of concern to Europeans when the U.S. deployment of military forces (though interest announced that it would undertake a “rebal- in the return to Europe of some U.S. forces has ancing” to Asia. This was a natural develop- risen since the beginning of Russian actions ment that derived from shifts in global eco- against Ukraine). Insuring continued U.S. stra- nomics and, thus, in some degree geopolitics. tegic commitment to Europe was a major rea- The United States has long been a power in son that the Allies responded so promptly and both the Pacific and the Atlantic, and did not strongly after the U.S. was attacked by terror- isolate itself from the Western Pacific in the ists on September 11, 2001, which led, the next 1920s and 1930s to the degree it did from day, to NATO’s only ever invocation of Article Europe. The United States thus correctly
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believes itself able to “walk and chew gum at “continuous air, land, and maritime presence the same time.” Nevertheless, concern devel- and meaningful military activity in the eastern oped in Europe about an excessive shift in U.S. part of the Alliance…developing force pack- attention and thus possibly reduced readiness ages that are able to move rapidly and respond to respond to perceptions of insecurity regard- to potential challenges and threats…[and] a ing Russian power in Europe. Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a This sense that the United States might new Allied joint force that will be able to not be as willing to engage in Europe or that it deploy within a few days to respond to chal- may not be making intelligent judgments was lenges that arise.”54 It is also important, how- compounded by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq ever, to recognize that NATO is unlikely to in 2003, which provoked the worst crisis ever prevail against Russian conventional forces if within the NATO Alliance and which has pre- Putin were to take further direct military sented major problems for the West ever action55, as opposed to steps in areas such as since.51 There has also been concern expressed cyber or energy, or stirring trouble among about the manner in which the military cam- Russian populations in any of these states. The paign against Muammar Gadhafi’s Libya was political and, hence, strategic commitment is conducted52, as a problem more of perception of the essence, beyond some “demonstration (U.S. “leading from behind”) than of reality, effects,” and it applies in particular to percep- considering the critical role of American air- tions of U.S. engagement, not just militarily or power in that conflict. Furthermore, there has even in NATO terms, but in terms of overall been a common belief in recent years (at least commitment to Europe.56 up until events in Crimea and even to a sig- Striking a balance. It is also important to nificant extent afterward) that Washington has differentiate between Western efforts to reas- been less interested in exercising leadership in sure Central European countries and actions Europe than in the past. Given the many that would contribute little to actually affect- uncertainties regarding Russian intentions, this ing Putin’s calculations, but which, by con- is not a good message for United States to send trast, he can represent to the Russian people as to its Allies. further evidence that Russia is being “sur- The military response. Some of the Western rounded” by the West or is being “disre- response to Putin’s actions thus far, as well as spected” and denied its “proper place in the to the uncertainties regarding what he might sun.” As argued above, the West, and particu- do next, does require a military response of an larly the United States, has been derelict in this appropriate and useful nature and needs to regard, although it is not possible to prove involve the United States. It must at least be whether the series of U.S. errors has been clear that the United States does take—and instrumental in helping to determine Putin’s will continue to take—seriously European projections of Russian military power against security matters. This is necessary in order to Ukraine and indirectly elsewhere in Central reassure Allied states, especially the three Baltic Europe. The NATO Allies need to be mindful nations, that NATO is committed to their secu- of the spirit as well as the letter of the NATO- rity. NATO took several steps at its 2014 sum- Russia Founding Act, as well as its original pur- mit in Wales.53 These steps included, poses, in deciding what to do militarily in
PRISM 6, no. 2 FEATURES | 17 HUNTER terms of deployments and bases. Balances the shield) than by economic power and polit- need to be struck. To be sure, Russia is in ical example (the sword). Something similar default on treaty commitments, but the cir- might also prove to be true regarding Russia’s cumstances of perception are not symmetrical. future. (This is the case for sanctions). The Putin uses what the West does in his domestic roles of political and economic factors are even propaganda, which is all the more psycholog- more applicable to Ukraine, where entrenched ically compelling given that it must be clear to corruption helps to facilitate Russia’s interven- all attentive Russians that their country is tion, notably because of the impact of corrup- indeed inferior in most of the constituent ele- tion on Ukraine’s economic and political fail- ments of national power and influence. ures. The failure of Ukrainian liberal Something similar relates to the imposition of democratic politics goes along with lagging sanctions on the Russian economy, in hopes Western investment in the country, as well as that domestic political pressures will cause Kyiv’s unwillingness to consider arrangements Putin to change course. Maybe they will, but that will grant significant autonomy to Western calculations reflect at least in part the Russian-ethnic and Russian-speaking regions. tendency to see in economic sanctions greater In short, dealing with the problem of Russian capacity to change behavior than is borne out power overall requires a package of instru- by historical experience, except on rare occa- ments, approaches, and attitudes that empha- sions. Furthermore, if a nation’s leadership size inherent Western strengths57 and needs to considers that something truly important is at include steps by Ukraine that focus on its stake, sanctions almost always fail. The West future success as a nation. The same is true in does have to calculate that, at least in the other Central European states that are lagging short-term, sanctions that affect the average behind in economic and democratic develop- Russian can be used by Putin for anti-Western ment. domestic propaganda. Indeed, imposing sanc- Rethinking NATO Enlargement. Even if tions is classically more of a “feel good” option there were to emerge further credible threats when others are not attractive than a serious from the Russian Federation toward its effort to achieve goals. Western neighbors, the Alliance needs to con- Remember first principles. In seeking to deal sider carefully the pace and extent of further with the problem of Russian power in Europe, membership enlargement under Article 10 of both now and later, it is important to revert to the North Atlantic Treaty. The Allies have first principles of the 1940s: that military already accepted that they will cope with the instruments are only one element in the over- added administrative, political, and even mili- all mix for mobilization of Western power and tary integration challenges posed by having influence, both absolute and countervailing. many more members than before. But calcula- Politics (including support for democracy) in tions also need to be made about what added Central European states is a critical factor, as is security is truly to be gained, especially by economics—in both the public and private countries in Central Europe that are not “in sectors. Indeed, the “hollowing out” of the the line of fire” from Russia, so to speak. Every Soviet Union was accomplished less by country within Europe proper that could have Western military power (which proved to be legitimate concerns about the need for Article
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5 strategic-military guarantees against poten- terms of overall security and other require- tial aggression is already a member of the ments, especially in dealing with the problem Alliance.58 It can, in fact, be argued that there of Russian power and Putin’s domestic exploi- has already been too much NATO enlarge- tation of NATO’s expansion. Of course, this ment, at least prior to further attempts to see also means that Finland and Sweden should whether Russia could be included in a mutu- continue their current non-membership rela- ally advantageous and mutual security-produc- tionships with NATO, rather than seeking to ing way in a “Europe whole and free.” Of join. That would serve no useful purpose either course, most Central European states remain for them or for the Alliance. under the illusion that they can truly be full Ukraine’s case remains most important. members of the West and attractive to Western Given the value of not bringing Ukraine for- investment only by being members of NATO. mally into either NATO or the EU, at least This is not the case; rather, they must under- until efforts were exhausted to create some take necessary internal economic, political, overarching security arrangements in Europe and social reforms.59 PFP and the Euro-Atlantic that would include Russia—the original tacit Partnership Council (along with steps by the “bargain” of 1997—there is merit in consider- EU) put countries in the Western “family”; ing a status for Ukraine for the foreseeable increasing NATO membership at this point is future similar to that adopted by some of the likely on balance to be counterproductive in Neutral and Non-Aligned (NNA) countries Ilya
A pro-European protest held in Kyiv in 2013 embodied the willing nature of the Ukrainian democratic movement, however as of yet Ukraine has been unable to translate this into a successful and stable regime.
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during the Cold War. Most instructive were the conventional military forces would be limited position, politics, and practices of Finland. in dealing with a projection of Russian mili- While firmly within the Western family of tary power in Europe if Moscow were to do nations (and implicitly to be assisted if it were more than it already is doing.61 More relevant attacked by the Soviet Union), it also main- (and thus likely to be more efficacious for the tained relations with Moscow that were non- West over time) is to provide substantial threatening. This relationship was called resources to help build up economies (espe- “Finlandization” and, while some U.S. observ- cially that of Ukraine) that are vulnerable to ers found it morally unacceptable in terms of Russian inroads. It is therefore far better for the “friends versus enemies,” it proved to be effec- NATO nations to set a standard for contribu- tive. Something similar could be a useful tran- tions to security overall rather than military sitional device for Ukraine.60 spending, perhaps even a higher level of effort Instruments of Western power and influence: than two percent of GDP. Indeed, even if all of integration and balance. The requirements of the NATO Allies met the goal of two percent of dealing intelligently and effectively with the GDP in military spending, it would likely be problem of Russian power in Europe has now of marginal value in deterring or countering demonstrated beyond argument the critical any further hostile Russian intentions in requirement that NATO and the European Central Europe.62 A commitment to a broader Union finally break down remaining barriers definition of security, however, focusing espe- to their cooperation with one another, and not cially on the economic realm, could have a just those that involve the EU’s Common significant impact. Security and Defense Policy. The problems fac- At the same time, increased military and ing Europe and the United States do not related activities designed to dissuade Russia arrange themselves according to neat institu- from further adventures against Ukraine and tional lines, but rather will require broad other parts of Central Europe must not, in the understanding of interconnections and the West’s overall interests, lead it to drift into a need for coordinated responses. It is nonsense permanent confrontation with Russia as a that three countries—Turkey, Greece, and byproduct of taking those actions that are nec- Cyprus—have been able to stymie develop- essary, unless Russia makes such a permanent ments in NATO-EU cooperation that should confrontation unavoidable which, at this junc- have been achieved two decades ago. Further, ture, seems unlikely. Indeed, the original idea it is now necessary to have a method—a polit- of Partnership for Peace (and EU analogues)— ical-level process—that will foster integrated that participation by every “European” country Western analysis and action across the full is possible and even desirable—needs to apply range of political, economic, and strategic here as well. This is not to be naïve or to expect (including military) matters. This needs to that Russia will want to participate in institu- include analysis of the best uses of scarce tions and processes that it has had no role in resources. NATO has developed a goal of two designing anytime soon. It is also possible that percent of GDP spending on defense by each Putin has already decided that maximizing Ally, a goal that few Allies are able to meet. In Russian advantages, whatever the penalties, is fact, as argued above, the role of NATO the best course to pursue. Clearly, he has to
20 | FEATURES PRISM 6, no. 2 NATO IN CONTEXT decide the balance of risks and benefits, espe- not exaggerating Russian capabilities, military cially regarding the potential long-term isola- and otherwise, and not forgetting lessons from tion of the Russian Federation from deep retrospective analysis of Cold War develop- engagement in the outside world, where poor ments, including, perhaps most critically, that choices made by the Soviet Union ultimately viewing military capabilities as a good predic- led to its self-defeat and fall from the ranks of tor of political intentions can be self-defeating great powers. In the meantime, however, the and even dangerous. Furthermore, it is perhaps West needs to make its own calculations most important that current debates not lead regarding whether it might, in time, be possi- to a solidification of views in the West, espe- ble to develop with all the countries of Europe cially in the United States, that Russian behav- a workable approach to the problem of ior is irremediable or that it must be con- Russian power that is also supportive of fronted for the indefinite future, perhaps in a Western interests. This goal should be kept in new Cold War. The risks of self-fulfilling mind in designing and implementing efforts prophecy are all too real, especially when for existing, reformed, and possibly new insti- viewed in terms of the tendency of human tutions. nature to desire sharp lines of division and In general, there needs to be balance even, as so often appears in U.S. debate, a divi- between acting where necessary against unac- sion between “good guys” and “bad guys.” ceptable assertions of Russian power and seek- Currently, Putin is quite willing to play his part ing opportunities to engage Russia produc- as the villain, and he may see his stature in tively, if at some point it will be prepared to do Russia rising as a result. But it would be a pro- so, rather than the West’s concluding now that found mistake for the West to take this as an Moscow will continue to choose the ultimately invitation to create a new line of division self-defeating path of single-country aggran- within Europe and to condemn ourselves to dizement. A major risk in the alternative to another lengthy period of self-defeating con- such a search for possible cooperation, of frontation or worse. course, is the development of a rigid approach, Attitudes in the West will be critical and the over-militarization of responses, and the must include self-confidence and a willingness playing into Putin’s hands (for as long as the to engage Russia where that can be both Russian leadership pursues current policies advantageous to the West and also mutually and approaches in Central Europe) with regard attractive and beneficial.63 This does not mean to his using Western actions to convince the neglecting what Putin has done so far; that Russian public that their country is being den- cannot—and must not—be ignored. But it is igrated and treated with far less respect than also important to be intelligent in judging Russians believe it merits as a (putative) great what is to be done rather than ceding the ini- power. tiative to Putin. A good place to begin looking Moving onward? Finally, in judging for potential opportunities is in the 19 areas of approaches for a long-term strategy regarding potential NATO-Russian cooperation con- the problem of Russian power in Europe, it is tained in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding important not to lose sight of an “off ramp” Act.64 These areas of potential cooperation from what Putin has been doing. That includes should include the NATO-Russia Council if
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Russia is prepared to engage seriously to Notes mutual benefit—a testing ground of its inten- tions. At some point, there could be consider- 1 Because of NATO’s current central concerns ation of supplementary security arrangements. with Russia, this article will focus primarily on In sum, the overall objective in dealing NATO’s role in continental Europe: in particular, its collective defense function, less so its crisis manage- with the problem of Russian power on the ment and cooperative security functions. See: European continent should be that first “Chicago Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of advanced by President George H.W. Bush: to State and Government participating in the meeting of build a “Europe whole and free and at peace.” the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012,”
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lead in developing the North Atlantic Treaty (Treaty the Cold War (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of of Washington) of April 1949. Kentucky, 2015): 404-413. 10 Former Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s 17 Of course, there were exceptions. Greece and now historic speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Turkey still have special preoccupations with one Missouri, on March 5, 1946, proclaiming the onset of another. And some allied countries with interests an “Iron Curtain,” was widely criticized in the United beyond Europe, notably France in francophone States and it can be argued even now that he was Africa, have continued to look in that direction as premature. It is also interesting to note that Churchill well as, and often in distinction to, engagements with had previously apparently tried to cut a deal with allies in Europe or across the Atlantic. Joseph Stalin on the future of the Continent. See: 18 For East Germans, the history of suppression Winston S. Churchill, “Sinews of Peace” (speech, that ended in 1989-1990 began in 1933 under the Westminster College, Fulton, MO, March 5, 1946), Nazis, for the Baltic States in 1940, for other parts of National Churchill Museum,
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23 Early in the author’s tenure as U.S. ambassa- not deal with the possible results of sanctions dor to NATO (1993-98), he characterized this as, imposed on the Russian Federation or on the “NATO and the European Union are two institutions complexities regarding Russia’s engagement in Syria living in the same city on different planets.” and elsewhere in the Middle East, including the idea 24 See: Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of that it is trying to “buy itself out of Ukraine sanc- the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy, (Chapel tions” by being helpful to the United States or, at least Hill and London: The University of North Carolina in partial contrast, by showing that it can “play in the Press, 2003). West’s backyard” in another region, as well. 25 That would also have to include operations 37 Helsinki Final Act, August 1, 1975,
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Joint Consultative Group on the Treaty on Russia cooperated with Western countries in helping Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. See: Kathrin both conflicts to end and, regarding the NATO-led Hille and Neil Buckley, “Russia quits arms pact as Bosnia peacekeeping forces, Russian troops played an estrangement with Nato grows,” Financial Times, active role, under U.S. command, for the first such March 10, 2015,
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57 Thus, surely, comments by the Chairman of the Russian Federation. It is an area for potential arms the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that Russia poses an control negotiations, however. “existential threat” to the United States are not only 62 This judgment leaves aside the value of the nonsensical and potentially dangerous, they play into defense spending goal in convincing the U.S. paranoia on both sides and reduce the opportunities Congress that the European allies are “pulling their for either side to move beyond the current imbroglio, weight,” an issue that has gained added saliency now even if both sides wanted to do so. See: “‘If you want that NATO has proclaimed the 2 percent goal; it also to talk about a nation that could pose an existential leaves aside the potential role that increased threat to the United States, I’d have to point to Russia,’ European defense spending could play in regard to Dunford said. ‘If you look at their behavior, it’s potential military actions “outside of area,” e.g., in nothing short of alarming.’” See: Dan Lamothe, the Middle East, if that were to transpire. Ironically, “Russia is greatest threat to the U.S., says Joint Chiefs the 2 percent goal actually betokens weakness rather chairman nominee Gen. Joseph Dunford,” The than strength since, as of the writing of this article, Washington Post, July 9, 2015, available at
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Photos
Page 2. Photo by Frode Overland Andersen. 2012. NATOs hovedkvarter. From
Page 8. Photo by U. Ivanov provided by the RIA Novosti Archive. 1991. Image # 848095. From
Page 19. Photo by Ilya. 2013. Euromaidan Kyiv 01-12- 2013 35. From
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