AUTHOR Frode Overland Andersen The flags of the 28 NATO member countries flap in the wind in front of headquarters in Brussels. 2 | FEATURES PRISM 6, NO. 1 NATO in Context Geopolitics and the Problem of Russian Power BY ROBERT E. HUNTER ince the end of the Cold War, the question “Whither NATO—and why?” has come up regularly, especially in the United States. This is not an idle question nor one that can Ssimply be dismissed. If anything, it is remarkable that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization still exists a quarter-century after the key reason for its creation—the widely shared perception of a political, strategic, and military threat from the Soviet Union—ceased to exist. To be sure, there is now renewed challenge from the Soviet Union’s principal successor state, the Russian Federation. From the beginning of the 1990s, however, until the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014, a span of nearly 25 years, the argument could have been made that there was no need for continuing the Western alliance that did so much to contain Soviet power and the Warsaw Pact and that played a significant role in the dissolution of both. Many people did argue just this point, both in the United States and elsewhere, but they were never in the majority (or at least they never prevailed in public and parliamentary debate). The reasons for NATO’s continued existence are important to understand, including to provide a basis for considering its future and, more precisely, the tasks it should be asked to perform and its very character as an alliance of sovereign states spanning the two sides of the Atlantic.1 Power in Europe: Until the End of the Cold War NATO has been only one of the many instruments and political-security efforts designed to deal with problems of power in Europe. The modern history of this subject can be said to have begun Robert Hunter is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He served as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 1998, as well as U.S. representative to the Western European Union. He was Director of the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies at NDU from 2010 to 2012. PRISM 6, NO. 2 FEATURES | 3 HUNTER with the end of the Napoleonic wars, when the on the other, there was tacit East-West agree- Congress of Vienna fashioned a set of under- ment to keep the country divided—one of the standings that, based on the overarching con- few things on which all could agree. cept of the balance of power, largely kept the But concern about growing German power peace on the continent until 1914, when it fell from 1867 onward was not the only problem with a crash that led to the most cataclysmic plaguing Europe. Beginning in the mid-1940s, war (to that time) in European history. The there was awareness of Soviet power in the collapse that led to the Great War had many heart of the continent—awareness that had causes, but perhaps none so important—and been building for some time, certainly from certainly none so consequential for the after- the solidification of Bolshevik control in math—as the problem of German power. This Russia and the formal creation of the Soviet had emerged with full force upon the comple- Union in 1924—that embraced the old tion of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s project Russian empire at close to its furthest historical to forge a more or less united Germany, with dimensions. The Second World War and the the final phase in the period between 1867 defeat of Nazi Germany—and especially the and 1871. From that time until 1945 (with a central role of Soviet forces in bringing about hiatus from 1918 until the late 1930s, or the that defeat—brought Soviet military power “phony peace”), dealing with the “German and then progressively developing communist problem” was central to forging arrangements control to the middle of Germany, as well as that could bring some reasonable predictabil- north and south along a line that stretched, as ity and a method of preventing a radical Winston Churchill put it, “[f]rom Stettin in the imbalance of power (and hence the risk of a Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic[.]”3 Thus, the major European war). These efforts, too, failed problem of Soviet power overlapped with that and cataclysmically so. After the Second World of German power from the late 1940s until the War, one of the central problems on the conti- end of the Cold War, when further basic trans- nent was how to deal with the future of formations took place. First, by the beginning German power. of the 1990s, it became evident that the One key objective, shared by all the German “problem” had been “solved,” in large nations of Europe and extending into the time measure because of developments within of the division of Europe between East and German society—a truly remarkable event in West, was to keep Germany from again being European history. This “problem” had to of a principal source of instability and potential course remain “solved.” Second, the contem- conflict in Europe—in other words, to “keep poraneous collapse of the Soviet internal and Germany down,” in the oft-quoted phrase external empires appeared (erroneously) to attributed to Lord Ismay, NATO’s First many observers to be at least a partial solution Secretary General.2 Furthermore, once the lines to the problem of Soviet power in Europe and, of division in Europe solidified, with Germany more broadly, elsewhere in the world. Indeed, divided between the American, British, and the collapse of these two Soviet empires was French occupation zones on one side and the the most profound retreat of any major Soviet zone (later becoming the separate nation’s or empire’s power, without war, in all nations of West Germany and East Germany) of recorded peacetime history. 4 | FEATURES PRISM 6, NO. 2 NATO IN CONTEXT At that time, views regarding Germany’s particular insurance policies was Helmut Kohl, future coalesced. As Soviet military forces and who served as Chancellor of both West the resultant political influence were with- Germany (1982-1990) and of a reunified drawn from both East Germany and elsewhere Germany (1990-1998). in Central Europe, leaders in Moscow swal- The United States as a European Power lowed hard and accepted not only that the two halves of Germany could be unified, but also This analysis is important background to the that it could be a member of NATO, subject to entry of the United States as a European power, some transitional arrangements contained in first episodically (1917-1919 and 1943-1946) the so-called Two-Plus-Four Agreement (the and then continually from the late 1940s two Germanies and the four post-World War II onward. The third U.S. engagement was occupying powers).4 In effect, the Soviet derived in part from memories of what had Union/Russia had decided (or accepted) to happened after the United States left Europe rely on the United States to keep watch over following the First World War; it was also stim- united Germany, in part through embedding ulated by emerging concerns that the rapid it in a Western institution that had its own withdrawal of the overwhelming bulk of U.S. practices for organizing security relationships forces from the continent after the end of and behavior-expectations among allied coun- World War II could lead to exploitation by the tries. This embedding was also facilitated by Soviet Union. Of course, that conclusion was the membership of a united Germany in what not immediately obvious and did not reflect a is now the European Union. consensus at the time. Indeed, there is still Even so, added insurance was useful. This some debate about whether there had to be a was especially important for Germany, as it division of Europe and a Cold War with the sought to forestall the reawakening of fears Soviet Union. That point is raised here because among some Central European peoples and it is relevant to current circumstances. Is it pos- governments. Therefore, when NATO and then sible for leaders (and nations) to live with an the European Community took in new mem- anomalous situation in terms of relations bers—most important in the first tranche were involving powerful states—a powerful Soviet Poland and the Czech Republic, which “sur- Union in the late 1940s and today’s resurgent rounded” Germany with these two institu- Russia—or is the cliché “nature abhors a vac- tions—it helped to ensure that the future eco- uum” (of power) too psychologically compel- nomic success of—and perhaps even ling? Is this the case even in circumstances dominance by—a united Germany would not where solidifying lines of division and requir- be perceived as “here comes Germany again,” ing certainty in calculations about relation- but rather as “here are NATO and the European ships could be antithetical to the securing of Union.” The same logic applied to the creation national interests? It is no accident that many of the euro: the German economy would still of those in both the United States and, pre- be uppermost (and it continues to be so in sumably, Russia who talk about a “new Cold Europe), but a visible instrument of that pre- War” come from the ranks of those who fought dominance would not be the deutschmark. the first Cold War. These individuals were then Notably, the leading architect of these reassured by the confidence and predictability PRISM 6, NO.