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Home , Animal consciousness

Is Animal Conscious? Joseph J. Lynch Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo

Editors' Note: This paper by Professor Lynch and the commentary by Professor Duran were presented at the Eastern Division meetings of the Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals, held in Atlanta, Georgia, December, 1993. moral sympathies. In part I of this paper, I briefly describe Carruiliers' and Harrison's positions. In parts II and III, I show iliat ilieir Cartesian conclusions are unjustified.

I.

Harrison's and Carruthers' arguments are related but distinct. Harrison acknowledges that the case for animal pain appears strong but argues that critical reflection shows that there is plenty ofroom for doubt nonetheless. Carruthers claims that his account of conscious makes it implausible that nonhuman animals It takes much philosophical resolve to deny that animals could be conscious oftheir experience generally, so iliey feel their . After all, the evidence in its favor can't be conscious ofilieir pain states in spite ofapparent appears to be overwhelming. As Richard Sergeant evidence to ilie contrary. Thus, they each contend that observed. Every particle of factual evidence supports the prima/acie evidence for animal pain is outweighed the contention Ulat the higher mammalian vertebrates by oilier considerations. Animals engage in pain­ experience pain sensations at least as acute as our own.! behavior, they argue, but do not and indeed cannot/eel The behavioral evidence is indeed very strong: many their pains. animals behavejust as humans do when in contact with Harrison urges that behavioral and neurological noxious stimuli. Pain-behavior includes not only cries evidences are insufficient to establish that a creature and yelps, but also increased blood pressure, dilated can feel its pain. First consider behavioral evidence. pupils, etc. In addition, many animals have aneurological Even very simple organisms will withdraw from structure sufficiently like ours, including bOtll C- and harmful stimuli, yet few are tempted to attribute A-fibers that serve as pain-transmitters, to warrant the conscious pain-states to such organisms. These creatures belief that they feel their pains. And finally, as Gareth engage in behavior similar to what we associate wiili Matiliews has urged, 2 would lead us to expect being in pain, but few would attribute conscious pain apsychological continuity between ilie species; it would states to them on the basis of their behavior alone. The be surprising if among the creatures of tlle earUl only human beings were capable of pain. Recent arguments by Peter Carruthers3 and by Peter Harrison4 have resurrected a Cartesian attitude toward animal pain. If their positions are sound, we are mistaken in thinking that animals can feel their pains: and consequently we are also mistaken in thinking Ulat animals could possibly be the appropriate objects of our

Winter & Spring 1994 1 Is Animal Pain Conscious?

adaptivity of the "pain" of animals, Harrison argues, is mental state m is conscious if it causes a second-order thus fully explicable in terms of pain-behavior, taking belief in the existence of m. 8 Thus, a creature might evasive action with respect to harmful stimuli, without have a belief that plays a causal role in its behavior, the phenomenological of pain. but it is a conscious belief only if it also produces the Harrison further contends that the fact of neuro­ belief in the existence of the first-order belief. logical similarity between humans and animals does Carruthers' account, however, does not demand notforce the attribution of a genuine pain-state. Though higher-order beliefS in order to produce conscious many links between the and psychological states; but since conscious states must be available experience are fairly well established, Harrison notes for thought, every conscious state requires higher­ there is a plurality of cases that challenge any straight­ order intentional mentality. And Carruthers takes it as forward correspondence; so there's always room for axiomatic that animals could neither have beliefs or doubt. His own suggestion is that ofpain thoughts about their experience.9 is only properly attributable to rational agents: Since a conscious experience is one that can be thought about, and since it is implausible, according to ...while it is undeniable that animals Carruthers, to hold that animals can think about their noxious stimuli and react to them, these stimuli experience, it follows that they have no conscious only need be represented as unpleasant mental experience at all. There is, on this view, nothing that it states if they are to become the body's reasons is like to be a bat or any other nonhuman animal. in the context of other reasons. Only as various Carruthers provides additional support for Harrison's degrees of unpleasantness can they be taken controversial suggestion that only thinking beings can seriously as amongst reasons, and this is only be aware of their pains. necessary in the of a rational agent.s If all animal experience is unconscious, then, of course, animal pain is unconscious.lO The notion of The ability tofeel one's pain is tied up with the capacity unconscious pain is initially quite counterintuitive. to engage in practical reasoning. One must be able to Indeed consciousness seems to be central to our use pain as among the individual's reasons in deciding of experience generally. However, there what to do. Presumably, animals do not have the stuff of are common examples from human experience that seem rational agents, so they can't feel their pains on Harrison's to support it. For example, Rosenthal points out that view. To be able to feel a pain, apparently, the concept of we are often temporarily distracted from our headaches, pain must have a meaning within an individual's and so become at least momentarily unconscious of cognitive framework. If animals do not feel their pain, them.ll We don't say, in such cases, that we've had animal pain could be classified as "unconscious several distinct headaches throughout the day; rather, experience." Harrison refers to Carruthers to support the we seem to acknowledge that we can become plausibility of this controversial idea. temporarily unconscious of the headache pain.12 Carruthers' contention is that all animal experience And there are examples, as Carruthers is quick to is unconscious. While this is certainly a strongly point out, of perceptual behavior without the usual Cartesian-sounding thesis, it is still unlike Descartes attendant subjective qualities, such as human blind­ in that Carruthers does not deny mental states or sightedne~s.13 In such cases, individuals apparently are processes to nonhuman organisms.6 What Carruthers perceiving, but the seems best characterized denies is that animals can be reasonably said to be as unconscious. And, closer to home, there are examples conscious of the mental states that they have. Whereas ofpeople engaging in pain-behavior and later reporting Descartes took consciousness, or conscious thought, they felt no pain, as under the conditions of an intense as definitive of mental states, Carruthers recognizes battle. Pain-behavior, according to Carruthers, requires that many mental states are non-conscious. According perception, but perception need not be conscious: to him, a conscious state is simply a mental state that organisms can respond to perceptual cues in the is available for thought.7 This holds for beliefs as well environment without ever being aware that they are as for experience. responding to them. Carruthers' account is a variation of a standard One might that if an organism is responding characterization offered by David M. Armstrong: a perceptually to cues, then it must be conscious of the

Between the Species 2 Winter & Spring 1994 I

Is Animal PdinI Conscious?•

cues to which it is responding.14 Yet, it appears that humans respond unconsciously to perceptual cues regularly. Carruthers cites an example with which most T,tfitoria{ are undoubtedly acquainted: driving an automobile over a familiar route while thinking and even daydreaming about other things. IS It may be that one cannot even remember any of the details of the route just driven. But then it appears that there are good grounds for saying that one was unconscious of driving throughout this tri~ven though one must have responded to perceptual cues along the way. Substantially aided by a $1,000 grant from the The driving example describes a case ofuncolI1scious Animal Protection Institute suggested by beliefs and desires, not unconscious pain. Nevertheless, Cheryl Mouras, the first issue of Between the the point is that the notion ofan unconscious experience Species appeared as "1984 Winter 1985" at is familiar to us. Carruthers acknowledges that while it Thanksgiving, 1984. Steve and I wanted not to is part of the normal function of pain to "intrude upon have to produce a second issue almost immedi­ consciousness in order to produce evasive action," an ately after the first. Now it is Winter 1995. By unconscious pain could, in principle, produce the the calendar we have completed the first ten evasive action without any conscious quality or without years of publishing the journal. In fact, of any conscious desire for the cessation of the pain. course, readers will only recently have received If Carruthers and Harrison are right, then there is Volume 9 Number 4 (Fall, 1993). During most some merit in denying that animals can be the objects of the years of BTS, publication of the journal of moral concern.16 By most accounts, the moral has been late. And, at times, BTS has appeared standing of animals depends upon their being able to to be on the brink of cessation. have conscious experience, especially consciousness In late 1984 Steve bought a new ball for his of pain; for the explanation of why pain is generally dot-matrix printer, and dedicated part of his regarded as intrinsically bad is that the quality of the sabbatical year to typing out the articles that subjects' experience is aversive. On both Carruthers' would appear in BTS. These he would print out and Harrison's views, animal "experience" has no in three inch wide continuous columns, which subjective quality, so mere animal pain-behavior I would then cut with scissors and strip into should be no cause for moral concern. It might be pages, afterwards adding the graphicS and titles. asked whether unconscious pain may somehow serve I still do the graphics by hand, but for many as a suitable basis for moral sympathy. The answer years Rose Lemberg has done the formatting appears to be negative: pity is appropriate only when using PageMaker, and hers has at times been the object of pity has conscious states. Carruthers a Herculean task. Without her many, many makes this clear by imagining a case analogous to hours of work, it is certain that BTS could not blind-sightedness: have survived. Even so, there have been times when the Suppose that a particular subject, , is future of the journal was in doubt. At each such never conscious of any pains in her legs. But time, someone has stepped forward to save the when she suffers injury in that region, she day. Most recently, Professor Harlan Miller and displays much of normal pain behavior. Ifwe his assistants at Virginia Tech have made it jab pins into her feet, she tends to try very hard possible for us to get past the impasse that to make us stop, she grimaces and groans, and existed a year ago. Professor Miller now scans severe damage causes her to scream. But she many of the' manuscripts, spell-checking and proofing them also. Mter the first few years it sincerely declares that she feels nothing. I? (continued on page 80) Were this case actual, we would surely have grounds for moral pity even though Mary doesn't feel the pain.

Winter & Spring 1994 3 Between the Species Is Animal Pain Conscious?

The tragedy of this situation would only seem slightly II. mitigated by the absence of conscious pain. But as Carruthers urges, While Carruthers and Harrison may draw appropriate moral conclusions, they draw them from erroneous We might perhaps feel sympathy for her premises.2o Their arguments depend largely upon general condition, since it is in many ways a moving from the conceivability of some unconscious disturbing situation in which to find oneself. pain to the claim that animal pain in general must be But we should not feel sympathy on specific unconscious. But the mere possibility that we can occasions of injury, since it is clear that she account for some pain as a type of unconscious does not suffer. Not being conscious of any perception is not sufficient to establish that animal pain pain, her mental state is not an appropriate is most plausibly interpreted in this way. object of moral concern. IS The strategy employed by Harrison was to take up the considerations in favor of animal pain one by one Carruthers' goes on to point out that the fact that and show that none implies that animals really feel their Mary's "" is an indirect consequence of her pains. While none of the arguments individually injury: many of her desires, including the desire to walk establishes that animals have pain, cumulatively they freely, would be frustrated. So, Mary is unhappy, and provide very strong support for the thesis. In a criminal her unhappiness is appropriate for our moral concern. investigation, no single piece of evidence typically But Mary's unhappiness is caused by her being established the guilt of the accused, but the combined conscious of her situation. If my car is similarly force of evidence may well remove any reasonable inoperable, pity would be misdirected at it (though it doubt. Similarly, behavioral and neurological evidence might well be directed at me) because the car is not together with arguments from evolution are sufficiently conscious of its condition: the car's condition would persuasive to remove all reasonable doubt with regard not cause a frustration of any of its desires, since it has to the conscious pain ofanimals.21 none. On Carruthers' account of consciousness, It is difficult to imagine pain having the survival conscious states, whether of pain or anything else, are value that it has for organisms if they were always supposed to be impossible for animals. And moral pity unconscious of their pain. Carruthers himself acknow­ cannot sensibly be directed towards individuals lacking ledges, part ofthe normal functional role ofpain is that consciousness. Thus, while moral pity may be "it gives rise to a conscious desire that the pain should appropriate for Mary (since she is conscious of her cease."22 Perhaps it's conceptually possible that pain plight), such pity is not appropriate for a similarly could exist without this particular causal function, but situated non-eonscious creature. it seemsprimafacie unlikely that this could be the nonn, On both Carruthers' and Harrison's accounts then, given the functional role tllat pain has for survival.23 it is the capacity for thought that provides the sole The process of conditioning is utterly mysterious unless basis for a creature's faIling within the scope of it is presupposed that stimuli can be felt. Indeed, it's morality: a creature counts morally only if it is hard to make sense of Harrison's acknowledgment that conscious, and it is conscious only if it can engage in animals "sense noxious stimuli" [my emphasis], if they thought. And animals cannot think. Since they cannot don't feel. What is this "sensing"? While pain behavior think, their pain must be of the unconscious variety. without the attendant consciousness of the pain is clearly Buta creature's unconscious pain is ofmoral relevance imaginable, and in unusual cases has even occurred, the only if, like Mary, the creature has conscious desires evidence suggests that such cases m~st be exceptional. not to be in whatever state it is in. The reason that Indeed the examples used to motivate the case for only conscious pain is morally relevant is that it has a human unconscious perception typically involve the use quality that individuals generally desire to cease: when of other conscious states. For example, once one has we are in pain, we generally seek relief. But learned to drive and has become acquainted with a unconscious pain has no quality whatsoever. And if a particular route (note that such creature is not aware of its situation or aware of its seem to require the conscious of the agent), pain, it's hard to see how one could owe any direct one can begin to daydream, solve logic problems, or obligation to that creature. 19 engage in other mental projects while one drives. Most

Between the Species 4 Winter & Spring 1994 Is Animal Pain Conscious?

human beings are smart enough to carry on tllis sort of III. task wimout paying much aUention. Preswnably, a less illlellectually advanced individual must pay full What I've tried to show so far is first, mat me cumulative attention to complete tlle job successfully. "Unconscious" argument in favor of conscious animal pain is stronger behavior appears to be more of a case of intelligent tllan eitller Harrison or Carrumers allow, and second, cognitive economy within the stream of conscious tllat many cases of apparent unconscious experience experiences. Because he does not recognize this, (including pain) are beuerdescribed as wimin me stream Carrumers confuses being conscious of someming witll of consciousness. However mese considerations do not paying attention to sometlling of which one is already address the central contention that any sort of conscious. The capabiIily not to take note of one's consciousness, including consciousness of pain, must perceptual experience seems to be best understood as involve me capacity to mink, a capacity animals are the capacity to shift attention from perceptual said to lack. In mis section I evaluate this claim. experience to other matters. Unconscious behavior Recall Harrison's view that since mey can't think, merefore, is for me most part a mauer ofdiverting one's animals can't use pain as a reason in deciding what to attention from certain conscious experiences and do. Harrison concentrates on cases in which humans focusing on omers. When I walk around tlle campus bear pain for orner (more heroic) purposes and suggests where I work, I am conscious of many sorts of tllings, tllat if animals can't bear pain for orner purposes men but I focus my attention on just a few. It would just be mey don't feel pain at all. But even if animals could wrong to say mat I am unconscious of tllOse things to not bear pain for orner purposes, it would not follow which I don't focus my attention. My contention men tllat tlley do not feel meir pains. There's someming very is mat many of the alleged cases of "unconscious odd about saying mat me ability to feel pain depends perception" could and should be similarly characterized upon one's ability to count pain as a reason. Indeed the as conscious after all. decision to bear pain presupposes mat one is conscious Related considerations hold for alleged instances of of pain, but it's hard to see how me consciousness of unconscious pain. Consider me headache example. My pain presupposes any decisions at all. And me fact is attention may well be directed away from my headache, that innumerable tests demonstrate mat animals will but my headache need not be described as an instance undergo painful stimuli to receive a desired reward. If of "unconscious pain" during these momentary a creature is initially shocked when auempting to take distractions. Some might object that this is mere me food pellet and so refuses me next pellet mat is quibbling about how phenomena like me headache offered, why not say tllat it counts pain as a reason ought to be described.24 But even if me headache should against retrieving the food pellet? Similarly, if il count as unconscious pain, a headache that never eventually retrieves the food pellet anyway, hasn't it impinged on consciousness would be no headache at all. born me pain for anomer purpose, just as humans do? The behaviors associated WillI having headaches would Perhaps a stimulus-response story can be told about such be utterly senseless unless mere is conscious pain. People cases that does not involve the attribution of any typically do not continue to engage in pain-behavior while conscious states, though I think il's doubtful; but mey are unconscious of or distracted from their pain. analogous stories can be told about the human cases as And I see no reason why nonhuman animal experience well. Skepticism about me subjective states ofothers is need be any different than ours in this respect. The not limited by species. Humans are surely capable of aversive subjective quality of pain is, after all, part of reasoning wim respect to pain and many orner things the functional role that pain plays. 11lis phenomenal in ways unavailable to most orner animals. But, even if quality provides me motivation to move away from humans are "beuer" minkel'S in this sense, it doesn't dangerous stimuli. Consequently, while Harrison is follow mat animals can't think at all. correct in observing that it is the behavior of the Carrumers' account of conscious mentality was organism that contributes to survival, rather tllClll its supposed to render unlikely. It's subjective states, it is normally difficult to account for tempting to maintain mat if a meory of consciousness pain-behavior in tlle absence of the experience of pain. implies something we know to be false-we know In general, so-called unconscious pain is intelligible animals are sometimes conscious of their pains-then only in contexts where conscious pain can take place. we have a good reason to reject that theory.25 But as far

Winter & Spring 1994 5 Between the Species Is Animal Pain Conscious?

as I can tell, there's no such implication in Carruthers' animals, but their arguments fall short of showing that own account ofconsciousness: there's no argument for animal pain is not conscious. In spite of tile recent the implausibility of animals thinking about their Cartesian revival, animals remain appropriate objects experience.26 Perhaps Carruthers takes this to be for moral concern and sympathy. implausible because he has an overly intellectualized notion of just what it is for a creature to think. If we Notes suppose it's true that higher-order mental states are 1 Richard Sergeant, The Spectrum ofPain (London: Hart­ necessary to explain how some states can be conscious, Davis, 1969), p. 72. whether we call such higher order states thoughts or beliefs or something else, it is clear that not much 2 Gareth Matthews, "Animals and the Unity of mentality is required for an organism to be conscious ," Philosophy 53 (1978), pp. 437-453. 27 of its sense-experiences. That is, a second-order 3 Peter Carruthers, "Brute Experience," The Journal of mental state need not involve much cognitive Philosophy 86 (1989), pp. 435-451. complexity. There is no non-question-begging way to 4 Peter Harrison, "Do Animals Feel Pain?" Philosophy claim that since consciousness necessitates higher-order 66 (1991), pp. 25-40. states, animals cannot be conscious.28 Ifthe best theory of consciousness says that consciousness must involve 5 Ibid., p. 37. second-order mental states, and the best evidence 6 Harrison follows Descartes on this point holding that indicates that animals are conscious, then animals must mental states must be conscious. be capable of at least some higher-order mental states, however modest these may be. 7 Carruthers acknowledges a debt to Dennett's "Toward a Carruthers shares a widely held philosophical Cognitive Theory of Consciousness" in Brainstorms opinion that the capacity to think is dependent upon (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, 1978). Some features of the theory are similar also to David Rosenthal's "Two the capacity to use .29 This is why we are to Kinds of Consciousness" in The Nature of Mind (Oxford: believe Mary when she tells us that she feels no pain Oxford University Press, 1991) and Peter Smith and O. R. while she engages in pain-behavior. But Mary's case Jones The (New York: Cambridge presents us with conflicting evidence as to Mary's University Press, 1986). sentient states, linguistic behavior and non-linguistic pain behavior, and so it's not easy to decide whether to 8 D. M. Armstrong, The Materialist Theory of the Mind. (London: Route1edge, 1968). believe that Mary is in pain. She tells us that she is not, but perhaps her agony has confused her speech. 9 Carruthers believes that his account is an improvement Carruthers assumes that we should believe her words over Armstrong inasmuch as there are instances of the and not her behavior. I see no reason to accept Illis conscious belief thatp that do not activate second-order belief assumption. And in the case of creatures without that one believes p. Each instance of consciousness need not involve a belief that one is conscious. Also, the objects of language, we don't have to decide between competing conscious beliefs are not so much one's inner states; instead evidence in this way. We don't have pain behavior conscious beliefs are directed toward the world. Carruthers' indicating one thing and linguistic behavior indicating criticisms of Armstrong may be off-target. While it may be another. In the absence, therefore, of evidence to Ille more precise to explain conscious states in terms of higher­ contrary, the attribution of conscious pain to animals order thoughts, rather than beliefs, one need not assume that engaging in pain-behavior is nonnally well-warranted. the higher-order thought are themselves conscious (otherwise Indeed, in many instances of conflict, behavioral an infinite regress results). See Rosenthal, op. cit. evidence could outweigh linguistic. Suppose Mary tells 10 Against the contention that experience presupposes you "I am in pain," but exhibits no olller behavioral consciousness, Carruthers describes examples (discussed evidences of pain. The absence of the behavioral below) of non-conscious behavior that should be classified evidence might, no doubt, lead us to doubt her words. as experience since the behavior involved all sorts of But the writhing and screams of a one-year old child, psychological states. For related arguments, see Norton Nelkin or a Iamb, is evidence only a philosopher could ignore. "Unconscious Sensations," Philosophical Psychology 2 Carruthers and HalTison have correctly recognized the (1989), pp. 129-141. centrality of conscious pain for Ille moral status of 11 Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 472.

Between the Species 6 Winter & Spring 1994 Is Animal Pain Conscious?

12 See also Searle's discussion in his 171e Rediscovery of desire whether tiJat desire is conscious or not. I agree witiJ the Mind (Cambridge, MA: M.LT. Press 1992), pp. 164-167. Rosenthal, op. cit.. tiJat the requirements for conscious sensory states are much less stiff than those for intentional ones. 13 The phenomena of blind-sightedness occurs when individuals have a damaged visual or striate cortex. In tests, 24 See Searle, op. cit., pp. 164-167. such subjects have been able to cOITectly guess the objects placed before the affected eye, while reporting that they cannot 25 It may be a mistake to analyze consciousness in terms see the objects. See Weiskrantz "Varieties of Residual of other non-conscious mental states in this way. While Experience," Quarterly Journal ofExperimental Psychology Descartes wrongly excluded the possibility that there are 32 (1980), pp. 365-386, and Natsoulas "Conscious Perception unconscious mental states, consciousness is central in our and the Paradox ofBlindsight," in G. Underwood, ed., Aspects understanding of mentality. A better account might start with ofConsciousness. (London: Academic Press, 1982). conscious states and analyze non-conscious states in terms of the conscious ones. See Searle, op. cit.. 14 The blindsighted person does, after all, COITectly "guess" the objects placed before the blinded eye. It might be argued 26 Indeed, Armstrong holds that animal perception does that this indicates at least some low-level consciousness of imply animal belief. See Armstrong Belief, Truth and what is perceived. Knowledge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973), chapters 1-3. 15 Carruthers, op. cit., pp. 258-259. 27 See Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 472. 16 Both Carruthers and Harrison take their arguments as effectively blocking efforts by philosophers defending animal 28 An important feature of Rosenthal's account is tiJat a rights or liberation. Both take to task for the scant mental state m is conscious only if it gives rise to state m'. attention he gives to a defense of animal consciousness in But this does not require that m' is conscious as well. (New York: Avon Books, 1975) and CalTuthers mistakenly assumes that the higher-order states Practical Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, must be conscious. Not only is there no need for the higher 1979). No doubt Singer, like most of us, thought that the thesis state to be conscious, it is necessary that at least some higher­ that animals feel their pains requires very little defense. Still, order states are nonconscious (on pain of infinite regress if neither Carruthers nor HalTison seem aware of the lengthier higher-order states). defense of animal consciousness offered by in 29 Compare Davidson's "Thought and Talk," in Inquires (Berkeley: University of California Press, Into Truth and Intelpretation (New York, Oxford, 1984) as 1983). well as Malcolm's 'Thoughtless Brutes," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 46 17 Carruthers, op. cit., p. 267. (1973), pp. 5-19). Carruthers position is that the relationship 18 Ibid., p. 267. between consciousness and language is contingent.

19 In spite of these surprising claims, both CalTuthers and Harrison avoid the charge of . They recognize that infants are, according to their arguments, exempt from conscious pain, and are consequently excluded from any direct moral concern inasmuch as our obligations to them depend upon their present sentient states.

20 But see Jamieson and Bekoff, "Carruthers on Nonconscious Experience," Analysis 52.1 (1992), pp. 26-27 for an argument that moral standing need not depend on conscious experiences. My view on consciousness and moral standing is closer to CarrutiJers' .

21 This point is forcefully urged by House, "HalTison on Animal Pain," Philosophy 66 (1991), pp. 366-379.

22 Carruthers, op. cit., p. 267n.

23 More precisely, the desire caused by the pain state need not (but can) be conscious, but I contend that the pain state itselfmust be conscious in order to bring about the appropriate

Winter & Spring 1994 7 Between the Species