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The Thing-In-Itself and Will in the Thought of Schopenhauer

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The Thing-In-Itself and Will in the Thought of Schopenhauer THE THING-IN-ITSELF AND WILL IN THE THOUGHT OF SCHOPENHAUER by Moira Nicholls, B. A. (Hons.) Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Tasmania May, 1995 This thesis contains no material that has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgment is made in the text of the thesis. This thesis may be made available for load and limited copying in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968. ABSTRACT The central claim of Schopenhauer's philosophy is that the thing-in-itself is will. After giving a brief overview of the way in which this claim has been interpreted by other commentators I argue that it has at least six possible interpretations. I assess the relative importance of each, both to Schopenhauer himself and to the commentator attempting to construct the most consistent account of Schopenhauees central doctrines. I argue that Interpretations 1 and 2, according to which the thing-in-itself is identical with the will or the will-to-live, are the most important to Schopenhauer, while Interpretation 3 is the most consistent with his other doctrines. According to Interpretation 3, while the thing-in-itself is will, it also has other aspects, and I argue that these other aspects are the objects of mystical awareness and salvation. According to Interpretation 4 the thing-in- itself is unknown but is called will in the qualified sense that the will stands nearest to the thing-in-itself, and according to Interpretation 5 the thing-in-itself is called will but only metaphorically; I argue that these two interpretations are less well supported than 1, 2 and 3. Finally, according to Interpretation 6, the will is the metaphysical but non-noumenal essence of the phenomenal world, and I argue that this is suggestive of a world-view that Schopenhauer might well have embraced had his thought continued to develop. Next, I turn to issues of justification. One, is Schopenhauer justified in claiming that there is a thing-in-itself and that it is will? Two, is he justified in claiming that we can have knowledge of the thing-in-itself and know it as will? Three, is he justified in using language to talk about the thing-in-itself and describe it as will? I argue that despite the inadequacies in Schopenhauer's own arguments, other arguments provide some measure of support for his claim that there is a thing-in-itself that we can know and describe as will. In Appendices 1, 2 and 3, I consider how the possibility arises of multiple interpretations of Schopenhauer's fundamental claim that the thing-in-itself is will, my discussion focussing on some of the influences of Kant and Eastern thought on his thinking, and some of the influences of Plato. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish first to acknowledge the generous assistance of my supervisor, Professor Frank White. His guidance has been invaluable in giving direction to my research, in providing constructive criticism of all my written work, and in facilitating opportunities for professional development. I am also most grateful for his unfailing patience, encouragement and friendship. I am indebted to Dr Edgar Sleinis, who has been a constant source of intellectual stimulation and encouragement and who provided many useful suggestions on the final draft. To Diane Boyle, my heartfelt thanks for her very supportive friendship, for computer training and for secretarial assistance. I am indebted to Dr Julian Young, Professor John Atwell, Dr Manfred Kleinschnieder and Dr Asim Roy for their generous contribution of ideas and constructive criticism. To Professor Bill Joske I owe thanks for his encouragement in getting me started and for his support throughout, and I am most grateful to Andrezej Kowaluk for his careful reading of the final draft. I am much indebted to Kylie McShane, Leila Shotton, Dr John Colman, Dr Vojislav Bozickovic, and Paul Simpson for their friendship and collegial support, and wish to thank Professor Selwyn Grave, Professor Michael Roe, Mrs Marjery Eagle and Dr Judy Sallis for their kindness and encouraging words. To Jan Halley, Rosemary Dobber, Lesley Gardner, Fiona Melling, Kathy Hawkes and Elizabeth and Keith Kennedy-Tyson I am very grateful for their much-valued companionship, laughter and good-will and I owe thanks to Dr Stefan Petrow for his encouragement and advice. To the library staff at the University of Tasmania I extend thanks for their cheerful assistance and professional service. Finally, and most importantly, I wish to acknowledge with immense gratitude the caring support and patience of my family. Without them, this thesis would not have been possible. vi To my parents vii TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1 THE TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S CLAIM THAT THE THING-IN-ITSELF IS WILL 4 CHAPTER 2 MULTIPLE INTERPRETATIONS OF SCHOPENHAUER'S CLAIM THAT THE THING-IN-ITSELF IS WILL 31 CHAPTER 3 YOUNG'S INTERPRETATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S CLAIM THAT THE THING-IN-ITSELF IS WILL 67 CHAPTER 4 FREEDOM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 91 CHAPTER 5 MORALITY 127 CHAPTER 6 FURTHER ARGUMENTS 152 CHAPTER 7 THE ROLE OF FEELING 186 CHAPTER 8 KNOWING IN PRINCIPLE 206 CHAPTER 9 LANGUAGE AND CONCEPTS 230 via CONCLUSION 253 APPENDICES 254 APPENDIX 1: KANT 256 APPENDIX 2: PLATO 271 APPENDIX 3: EASTERN THOUGHT 294 SOURCES CONSULTED 336 ix ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES WORKS BY SCHOPENHAUER BM On the Basis of Morality FFR The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason FW On the Freedom of the Will MSR Manuscript Remains in Four Volumes PP Parerga and Paralipomena WN On the Will in Nature WWI The World as Will and Idea WWR The World as Will and Representation References are given as follows: work—page number of English text translation—(page number of German text). For example: WWR 1, 110(155). For all references of this type the first mentioned number refers to a page in the relevant English translation. The number in brackets refers either to a page in the relevant volume of the ,edition by Diogenes or to a page in the relevant volume of the Nachlqfl (see Sources Consulted for details of texts). WORKS BY ICANT CPR Critique of Pure Reason. References are by standard A and B marginal numbers, indicating page numbers of 1st (1781) and 2nd (1787) editions, followed by page number of English text translation. CPracR Critique of Practical Reason GM Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals Prol. Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics INTRODUCTION THE APPROACH In this thesis I examine the fundamental claim of Schopenhauer's philosophy that the thing-in-itself is will. I assess this claim within the context of Schopenhauer's central metaphysical, epistemological and conceptual doctrines, and within the broader framework constituted by the main influences on his thinking. In the preface to the first edition of Schopenhauer's main work The World as Will and Representation he says that his philosophy is the unfolding of a single thought. His work, he says, should be seen as an organic whole in which every part supports the whole just as much as it is supported by the whole. He also insists that an understanding of his thought requires an acquaintance with all of the following: his earliest work, The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Kant's philosophy, the works of Plato and the teachings of the Vedas. My objective is thus five-fold. First, to analyse the texts of Schopenhauer to establish what he himself asserts concerning the relationship that exists between the thing-in-itself and will; second, to assess the coherence of his various claims with his central metaphysical, epistemological and conceptual doctrines; third, to assess his justification for claiming that there is a thing-in- itself that we can know and describe as will; fourth, to consider ways in which such claims might be justified even if Schopenhauer's own attempts to do so are not adequate; and finally to propose ways in which the influence of Kant, Eastern thought and Plato shows itself in Schopenhauer's philosophy, particularly in relation to what he asserts about the thing-in-itself and will. The thesis is written in the broad tradition of analytic philosophy. I have made some use of secondary sources in German, but most of the secondary literature that I refer to is in English. However, all references to primary sources are cross-referenced to the German texts. SCHOPENHAUER'S STATUS AS A PHILOSOPHER Since the early part of this century a prevalent attitude to Schopenhauer has been to see him as a peripheral figure in the history of philosophy. It is therefore vital at the outset to explain why I reject this view. The last 20 years has witnessed a marked revival of interest in Schopenhauer's philosophy in the English-speaking world, with the publication of at least twelve new monographs, and numerous articles. This follows a period of relative neglect in which his status as a philosopher was under threat. In part, this attitude reflected the general disdain for speculative metaphysics that characterised much of the first half of twentieth century philosophical thought. In part, it can be attributed to Schopenhauer's style; for it is a literary and often flamboyant style with numerous references to diverse topics, both philosophical and non-philosophical. Hence, he has often been seen as a person with considerable literary skill and an original mind, but as one who does not quite measure up as a philosopher.
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