A Defense of a Sentiocentric Approach to Environmental Ethics
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University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 8-2012 Minding Nature: A Defense of a Sentiocentric Approach to Environmental Ethics Joel P. MacClellan University of Tennessee, Knoxville, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation MacClellan, Joel P., "Minding Nature: A Defense of a Sentiocentric Approach to Environmental Ethics. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2012. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/1433 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Joel P. MacClellan entitled "Minding Nature: A Defense of a Sentiocentric Approach to Environmental Ethics." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Philosophy. John Nolt, Major Professor We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: Jon Garthoff, David Reidy, Dan Simberloff Accepted for the Council: Carolyn R. Hodges Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School (Original signatures are on file with official studentecor r ds.) MINDING NATURE: A DEFENSE OF A SENTIOCENTRIC APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS A Dissertation Presented for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree The University of Tennessee, Knoxville Joel Patrick MacClellan August 2012 ii The sedge is wither’d from the lake, And no birds sing. – John Keats La Belle Dame Sans Merci, 1819 Copyright © 2012 by Joel Patrick MacClellan All rights reserved iii DEDICATION This work is dedicated to my mother, Judith Ann Ohlinger, for her unconditional love and for teaching me most things worth knowing and giving me the tools and space to pursue the rest; my wife, Stephanie Ivis MacClellan, for her love, support, and sacrifice; and my nephew, Michael Ryan Tople (January 18 - May 17, 2011), who left us far too soon. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First, I would like to extend my utmost gratitude to my dissertation director, John Nolt. From our first correspondence before I had even entered the Ph.D. program at the University of Tennessee, through four graduate courses, one independent study, and a paper for my comprehensive portfolio examination, to my dissertation, John has been a steady supporter, critic, colleague, and eventually, friend. John’s commitment, as evinced by our innumerable weekly meetings and countless comments on countless drafts, went above the call of duty. Without John’s direction, this work would not be half of what it is. Thank you so much, John! Next, my thanks go out to the other members of my dissertation committee. As a recent addition to the faculty of the Department of Philosophy, Jon Garthoff provided a fresh and helpful perspective on a work already in progress as well as timely and useful career advice for the job market. My only regret is that Jon did not come to UT sooner, as I would surely have benefited from his tutelage in theoretical moral philosophy courses and elsewhere! Thanks too to David Reidy for his guidance over the years and critique of some aspects of the dissertation. Lastly, thanks to Dan Simberloff of UT’s Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology for his comments on chapter drafts, thoughtful questions, and for keeping me honest about biology! I would also like to acknowledge other members of UT faculty and staff. I am indebted to Glenn Graber, John Hardwig, and Annette Mendola for their instruction and leadership in practical ethics. I learned a great deal from you through coursework, the clinical ethics practicum, and as a graduate assistant. Thanks also to Clerk Shaw for his help preparing me and my dossier for the job market. His deftness and concision as an editor are apparent in chapter abstracts below. I am grateful to Susan Williams of the Department of Philosophy’s administrative staff for her support and consolation through the highs and lows of my time at UT; she is the “Alabamanian” mother I never had. ¡Echa pa’delante! Finally and more broadly, I would like to thank the many graduate students and other philosophy faculty at UT for the conversations we had over the years both in the classrooms and beyond which have shaped my thinking. Thanks to attendees of the “Animal Ethics: Ignored Perspectives” conference at Colorado State University and commentator Paul Haught of Christian Brothers University at the International Society for Environmental Ethics’ 2011 APA-Eastern session for helpful feedback on some of the ideas present in Chapter 2. Thanks for critical feedback on earlier drafts of Chapter 4 to attendees of ISEE’s APA-Pacific session and those present at the North Carolina Philosophical Society’s meeting at Elon University and to attendees of “Minding Animals Conference 2” at Utrecht University in the Netherlands, all in 2012. Finally, thanks to Dale Jamieson of New York University for fruitful comments on those early manuscripts. Looking further back, I would like to thank Eric Sotnak and Howard Ducharme of the University of Akron. I appreciate their mentoring and encouragement in my undergraduate studies. Thanks also to Mr. Buchanan, Ms. Mogen, and Ms. Shriber at Firestone High School. They encouraged creativity, respect for intellectual history, and appreciation for biology, respectively, for which I am more greatly indebted than I knew or expressed at that time. v ABSTRACT Environmental philosophers allege that philosophical views supporting the animal liberation movement are theoretically and pragmatically inconsistent with environmentalism. While some animal ethicists argue that we ought to intervene extensively in nature such as the prevention of predation, these views take controversial positions in value theory and normative theory: (i) hedonism as a value theory, and (ii) a view of normativity which places the good before the right, e.g. maximizing utilitarianism, or a rights theory that includes strong positive rights, i.e. animals are entitled to a certain level of welfare or protection from harm. Importantly, environmental philosophers’ critiques mistakenly assume that sentience-based ethics must take these forms. I argue that there are least two angles for progress and reconciliation: (i) countenance values other than pleasure and the absence of pain, such as the value of “free” beings, come what may, or (ii) embrace a view of normativity where, unlike utilitarianism, the right is prior to the good, constraining the scope of obligation from the outset. Together or individually, these angles give shape to a workspace of animal ethical theories amenable to environmentalism. In short, I argue that a sentience-centered notion of moral considerability is correct, that several plausible views about the good and its relation to the right compatible with sentiocentrism can reconcile animal ethics with environmental ethics, and that a sentiocentric ethic constitutes an adequate environmental ethic. If this argumentative arc is on track, it provides a broad justification for the core goals of environmentalism and promises greater consilience between considered judgments about the value of wild animals and the rest of nature. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Dedication ................................................................................................................................................................... iii Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................................... iv Abstract .......................................................................................................................................................................... v Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1 1 - Lay of the Land: Context, Controversy, and Consistency .................................................... 8 Abstract ............................................................................................................................................................... 9 1.1 - Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 10 1.2 - The Speciation of Animal and Environmental Ethics .................................................................... 10 1.3 - On Aims and the Idea of a “Workspace” .............................................................................................. 15 1.4 - Consistency ....................................................................................................................................................... 17 (In)consistency Arguments ..................................................................................................................... 18 Allegations of Inconsistency .................................................................................................................... 19 1.5 - On the Meaning of