DOCSLIB.ORG

Biocentrism in Environmental Ethics: Questions of Inherent Worth, Etiology, and Teleofunctional Interests David Lewis Rice III University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Biocentrism in Environmental Ethics: Questions of Inherent Worth, Etiology, and Teleofunctional Interests David Lewis Rice III University of Arkansas, Fayetteville University of Arkansas, Fayetteville ScholarWorks@UARK Theses and Dissertations 8-2016 Biocentrism in Environmental Ethics: Questions of Inherent Worth, Etiology, and Teleofunctional Interests David Lewis Rice III University of Arkansas, Fayetteville Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Rice, David Lewis III, "Biocentrism in Environmental Ethics: Questions of Inherent Worth, Etiology, and Teleofunctional Interests" (2016). Theses and Dissertations. 1650. http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/1650 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Biocentrism in Environmental Ethics: Questions of Inherent Worth, Etiology, and Teleofunctional Interests A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by David Rice Delta State University Bachelor of Science in Biology, 1994 Delta State University Master of Science in Natural Sciences in Biology, 1999 University of Mississippi Master of Arts in Philosophy, 2009 August 2016 University of Arkansas This dissertation is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council. ____________________________________ Dr. Richard Lee Dissertation Director ____________________________________ ____________________________________ Dr. Warren Herold Dr. Tom Senor Committee Member Committee Member Abstract Some biocentrists argue that all living things have "inherent worth". Anything that has inherent worth has interests that provide a reason for why all moral agents should care about it in and of itself. There are, however, some difficulties for biocentric individualist arguments which claim that all living things have inherent worth. Some biocentrists maintain that all living things have inherent worth and that artificial living things do not because the former, but not the latter, have interests by recourse to their natural selection etiology. Some also argue that synthetic forms of life do not have moral standing because they are "artificial" instead of "natural". However, there are good reasons to think that naturally-selected functions do not adequately define biocentric interests or that what is "natural" is not always of interest to the individual organism. A systems-based account of interests, on the other hand, attempts to solve the problem of harmful, selected functions by construing what is in a thing’s interests by recourse to whether it has highly integrated functions aimed at its self-maintenance. Cases of harmful selected functions are handled adequately, but unfortunately this account allows for the existence of non- sentient “instant organisms”, that have teleofunctional interests but that do not have teleofunctional interests that provide them direct moral standing. It also allows possible, future, designed entities to count as interest possessors. A systems-based account cannot provide guidance on what makes the teleofunctional interests of non-sentient beings morally considerable to the extent that they have direct moral standing. While rational agents and sentient beings have interests that provide them with direct moral standing regardless of their etiology, it does not appear that non-sentient living things also have interests that provide them with direct moral standing. Indirect moral standing is the only kind of moral standing that non-sentient living things can have. I argue that the non-design etiology of natural selection is incapable of guaranteeing indirect moral standing for non-sentient living things. If, on the other hand, all non-sentient living things were designed, then they would be guaranteed to have indirect moral standing. ©2016 by David Rice All Rights Reserved Acknowledgements I owe many thanks to my dissertation director, Dr. Richard Lee, who made helpful suggestions on the drafting of this dissertation. This dissertation would be substantially lacking without his contribution. Thanks also to my committee members Dr. Warren Herold and Dr. Tom Senor for their insights on the questions posed here. Dedication This dissertation is dedicated with the deepest of love to my mother, Shirley Gaston Rice. You are missed very much. Table of Contents Chapter One: An Introduction to Biocentrism and Inherent Worth ................................................1 I. "What is considered valuable?" ..............................................................................................2 II. "What kind of value do these things have?" .........................................................................6 III. A Discussion of Intrinsic Value ...........................................................................................9 IV. The Varieties of Intrinsic Value ........................................................................................13 V. Intrinsic Subjective Value ...................................................................................................15 VI. Intrinsic Objective Value ...................................................................................................17 VII. Inherent Worth .................................................................................................................18 VIII. Clarifying the Definition of Inherent Worth ...................................................................26 IX. "From where does such value come?" ...............................................................................34 X. The Aim of this Dissertation ...............................................................................................35 Chapter Two: A Natural Selection Etiological Account of Biological Interests ...........................40 I. Background Information Relevant to Biocentric Individualism ..........................................41 II. Gary Varner’s Natural Selection Etiological Account of Interests .....................................46 III. The Importance of Etiology to Varner’s View ..................................................................50 IV. A Survey of Etiological Accounts of Living Organisms ...................................................58 V. Non-etiological Account of Interests ..................................................................................65 VI. Craig Delancey’s Criticism of Varner’s Etiological Account of Biological Functions ....66 VII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................75 Chapter Three: The Systems-based Account and a Definition of Interests ...................................77 I. Delancey's Systems-Based Account of Interests ..................................................................79 II. Further Clarification on the Definition of Interests .............................................................85 III. Artifact Inclusion ...............................................................................................................97 IV. Replacing the term "Biological Functions" and "Biological Interests" with "Teleofunctions" and "Teleofunctional Interests" ...........................................................102 V. Criticisms of a Systems-based View and Some Responses ..............................................104 VI. Criticisms of, and Responses to, "Artifact Interests".......................................................124 VII. The Status of Synthetic Life Research ...........................................................................141 VIII. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................145 Chapter Four: The Moral Considerability of Interests .................................................................147 I. Granting Morally Considerable Interests to Conscious Agents and Sentient Beings ........152 II. A Sufficient Condition for Having a Morally Considerable, Teleofunctional Interest .....155 III.A Necessary Condition for Having a Goal of One's Own ................................................166 IV. Can a Systems-based Account be used to Reliably Establish the Existence of Morally Considerable Teleofunctional Interests for Non-Sentient Beings? ..................................178 V. Can "Instant, Non-Sentient Beings" have Morally Considerable Teleofunctional Interests? ..........................................................................................................................183 VI. Can Non-Sentient Beings produced by an Agent-Selection, Non-Design Etiology have Morally Considerable Teleofunctional Interests? ............................................................183 VII. Naturally Selected, Proper Functions and Goals of One's Own .....................................188 VIII. Natural Selection and Aristotelianism ..........................................................................198 IX. Can Genes have Goals of Their Own? ............................................................................228 X. Is This the End for a Biocentrism Based on Natural Selection? .......................................233 XI. Why All Non-sentient Living Things Do Not Have a Good of Their Own ....................234 XII. Some Clarification on Morally Considerable Interests and Moral Standing .................238
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Journal of Animal Law Received Generous Support from the Animal Legal Defense Fund and the Michigan State University College of Law
    JOURNAL OF ANIMAL LAW Michigan State University College of Law APRIL 2009 Volume V J O U R N A L O F A N I M A L L A W Vol. V 2009 EDITORIAL BOARD 2008-2009 Editor-in-Chief ANN A BA UMGR A S Managing Editor JENNIFER BUNKER Articles Editor RA CHEL KRISTOL Executive Editor BRITT A NY PEET Notes & Comments Editor JA NE LI Business Editor MEREDITH SH A R P Associate Editors Tabb Y MCLA IN AKISH A TOWNSEND KA TE KUNK A MA RI A GL A NCY ERIC A ARMSTRONG Faculty Advisor DA VID FA VRE J O U R N A L O F A N I M A L L A W Vol. V 2009 Pee R RE VI E W COMMITT ee 2008-2009 TA IMIE L. BRY A NT DA VID CA SSUTO DA VID FA VRE , CH A IR RE B ECC A J. HUSS PETER SA NKOFF STEVEN M. WISE The Journal of Animal Law received generous support from the Animal Legal Defense Fund and the Michigan State University College of Law. Without their generous support, the Journal would not have been able to publish and host its second speaker series. The Journal also is funded by subscription revenues. Subscription requests and article submissions may be sent to: Professor Favre, Journal of Animal Law, Michigan State University College of Law, 368 Law College Building, East Lansing MI 48824. The Journal of Animal Law is published annually by law students at ABA accredited law schools. Membership is open to any law student attending an ABA accredited law college.
    [Show full text]
  • Theoretical Models of Consciousness: a Scoping Review
    brain sciences Review Theoretical Models of Consciousness: A Scoping Review Davide Sattin 1,2,*, Francesca Giulia Magnani 1, Laura Bartesaghi 1, Milena Caputo 1, Andrea Veronica Fittipaldo 3, Martina Cacciatore 1, Mario Picozzi 4 and Matilde Leonardi 1 1 Neurology, Public Health, Disability Unit—Scientific Department, Fondazione IRCCS Istituto Neurologico Carlo Besta, 20133 Milan, Italy; [email protected] (F.G.M.); [email protected] (L.B.); [email protected] (M.C.); [email protected] (M.C.); [email protected] (M.L.) 2 Experimental Medicine and Medical Humanities-PhD Program, Biotechnology and Life Sciences Department and Center for Clinical Ethics, Insubria University, 21100 Varese, Italy 3 Oncology Department, Mario Negri Institute for Pharmacological Research IRCCS, 20156 Milan, Italy; veronicaandrea.fi[email protected] 4 Center for Clinical Ethics, Biotechnology and Life Sciences Department, Insubria University, 21100 Varese, Italy; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +39-02-2394-2709 Abstract: The amount of knowledge on human consciousness has created a multitude of viewpoints and it is difficult to compare and synthesize all the recent scientific perspectives. Indeed, there are many definitions of consciousness and multiple approaches to study the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Therefore, the main aim of this article is to collect data on the various theories of consciousness published between 2007–2017 and to synthesize them to provide a general overview of this topic. To describe each theory, we developed a thematic grid called the dimensional model, which qualitatively and quantitatively analyzes how each article, related to one specific theory, debates/analyzes a specific issue.
    [Show full text]
  • A Modular Approach to Integrating Multiple Data Sources Into Real-Time Clinical Prediction for Pediatric Diarrhea
    RESEARCH ARTICLE A modular approach to integrating multiple data sources into real-time clinical prediction for pediatric diarrhea Ben J Brintz1,2*, Benjamin Haaland3, Joel Howard4, Dennis L Chao5, Joshua L Proctor5, Ashraful I Khan6, Sharia M Ahmed2, Lindsay T Keegan1, Tom Greene1, Adama Mamby Keita7, Karen L Kotloff8, James A Platts-Mills9, Eric J Nelson10,11, Adam C Levine12, Andrew T Pavia4, Daniel T Leung2,13* 1Division of Epidemiology, Department of Internal Medicine, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, United States; 2Division of Infectious Diseases, Department of Internal Medicine, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, United States; 3Population Health Sciences, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, United States; 4Division of Pediatric Infectious Diseases, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, United States; 5Institute of Disease Modeling, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Seattle, United States; 6International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh, Dhaka, Bangladesh; 7Centre Pour le De´veloppement des Vaccins-Mali, Bamako, Mali; 8Division of Infectious Disease and Tropical Pediatrics, University of Maryland, Baltimore, United States; 9Division of Infectious Diseases and International Health, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, United States; 10Departments of Pediatrics, University of Florida, Gainesville, United States; 11Departments of Environmental and Global Health, University of Florida, Gainesville, United States; 12Department of Emergency Medicine, Brown University, Providence, United States; 13Division of Microbiology and Immunology, Department of Internal Medicine, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, United States *For correspondence: [email protected] (BJB); [email protected] (DTL) Abstract Traditional clinical prediction models focus on parameters of the individual patient. For infectious diseases, sources external to the patient, including characteristics of prior patients and Competing interests: The authors declare that no seasonal factors, may improve predictive performance.
    [Show full text]
  • Rolston on Animals, Ethics, and the Factory Farm
    [Expositions 6.1 (2012) 29–40] Expositions (online) ISSN: 1747–5376 Unnaturally Cruel: Rolston on Animals, Ethics, and the Factory Farm CHRISTIAN DIEHM University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point In 2010, over nine billion animals were killed in the United States for human consumption. This included nearly 1 million calves, 2.5 million sheep and lambs, 34 million cattle, 110 million hogs, 242 million turkeys, and well over 8.7 billion chickens (USDA 2011a; 2011b). Though hundreds of slaughterhouses actively contributed to these totals, more than half of the cattle just mentioned were killed at just fourteen plants. A slightly greater percentage of hogs was killed at only twelve (USDA 2011a). Chickens were processed in a total of three hundred and ten federally inspected facilities (USDA 2011b), which means that if every facility operated at the same capacity, each would have slaughtered over fifty-three birds per minute (nearly one per second) in every minute of every day, adding up to more than twenty-eight million apiece over the course of twelve months.1 Incredible as these figures may seem, 2010 was an average year for agricultural animals. Indeed, for nearly a decade now the total number of birds and mammals killed annually in the US has come in at or above the nine billion mark, and such enormous totals are possible only by virtue of the existence of an equally enormous network of industrialized agricultural suppliers. These high-volume farming operations – dubbed “factory farms” by the general public, or “Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs)” by state and federal agencies – are defined by the ways in which they restrict animals’ movements and behaviors, locate more and more bodies in less and less space, and increasingly mechanize many aspects of traditional husbandry.
    [Show full text]
  • How Can We Solve the Meta-Problem of Consciousness?
    How Can We Solve the Meta-Problem of Consciousness? David J. Chalmers I am grateful to the authors of the 39 commentaries on my article “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. I learned a great deal from reading them and from thinking about how to reply.1 The commentaries divide fairly nearly into about three groups. About half of them discuss po- tential solutions to the meta-problem. About a quarter of them discuss the question of whether in- tuitions about consciousness are universal, widespred, or culturally local. About a quarter discuss illusionism about consciousness and especially debunking arguments that move from a solution to the meta-problem to illusionism. Some commentaries fit into more than one group and some do not fit perfectly into any, but with some stretching this provides a natural way to divide them. As a result, I have divided my reply into three parts, each of which can stand alone. This first part is “How can We Solve the Meta-Problem of Conscousness?”. The other two parts are “Is the Hard Problem of Consciousness Universal?” and “Debunking Arguments for Illusionism about Consciousness”. How can we solve the meta-problem? As a reminder, the meta-problem is the problem of explaining our problem intuitions about consciousness, including the intuition that consciousness poses a hard problem and related explanatory and metaphysical intuitions, among others. One constraint is to explain the intuitions in topic-neutral terms (for example, physical, computational, structural, or evolutionary term) that do not make explicit appeal to consciousness in the explana- tion. In the target article, I canvassed about 15 potential solutions to the meta-problem.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction: the Emerging Alliance of World Religions and Ecology
    Emerging Alliance of World Religions and Ecology 1 Mary Evelyn Tucker and John A. Grim Introduction: The Emerging Alliance of World Religions and Ecology HIS ISSUE OF DÆDALUS brings together for the first time diverse perspectives from the world’s religious traditions T regarding attitudes toward nature with reflections from the fields of science, public policy, and ethics. The scholars of religion in this volume identify symbolic, scriptural, and ethical dimensions within particular religions in their relations with the natural world. They examine these dimensions both historically and in response to contemporary environmental problems. Our Dædalus planning conference in October of 1999 fo- cused on climate change as a planetary environmental con- cern.1 As Bill McKibben alerted us more than a decade ago, global warming may well be signaling “the end of nature” as we have come to know it.2 It may prove to be one of our most challenging issues in the century ahead, certainly one that will need the involvement of the world’s religions in addressing its causes and alleviating its symptoms. The State of the World 2000 report cites climate change (along with population) as the critical challenge of the new century. It notes that in solving this problem, “all of society’s institutions—from organized re- ligion to corporations—have a role to play.”3 That religions have a role to play along with other institutions and academic disciplines is also the premise of this issue of Dædalus. The call for the involvement of religion begins with the lead essays by a scientist, a policy expert, and an ethicist.
    [Show full text]
  • Attfield, Robin, "Sylvan, Fox and Deep Ecology: a View from the Continental Shelf." Environmental Values 2, No
    The White Horse Press Full citation: Attfield, Robin, "Sylvan, Fox and Deep Ecology: A View from the Continental Shelf." Environmental Values 2, no. 1, (1993): 21-32. http://www.environmentandsociety.org/node/5486 Rights: All rights reserved. © The White Horse Press 1993. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism or review, no part of this article may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, including photocopying or recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the publishers. For further information please see http://www.whpress.co.uk. Sylvan, Fox and Deep Ecology: A View from the Continental Shelf ROBIN ATTFIELD School of English Studies, Journalism and Philosophy University of Wales College of Cardiff PO Box 94, Cardiff CF1 3XB, UK ABSTRACT: Both Richard Sylvan’s trenchant critique of Deep Ecology and Warwick Fox’s illuminating reinterpretation and defence are presented and appraised. Besides throwing light on the nature and the prospects of the defence of Deep Ecology and of its diverse axiological, epistemological and metaphysi- cal strands, the appraisal discloses the range of normative positions open to those who reject anthropocentrism, of which Deep Ecology is no more than one (and, if Fox’s account of its nature is right, may not be one at all). A position intermediate between Deep Ecology and anthropocentrism is advocated, which has been called by Wayne Sumner “middle-depth environmentalism – a kind of continental shelf between the shallow and deep extremes”. KEYWORDS: Deep Ecology, impartiality, value-theory, identification, self- realization, biocentrism My aim is to discuss and sift a key moment in the debate concerning the nature and merits of Deep Ecology.
    [Show full text]
  • Metaphilosophy of Consciousness Studies
    Part Three Metaphilosophy of Consciousness Studies Bloomsbury companion to the philosophy of consciousness.indb 185 24-08-2017 15:48:52 Bloomsbury companion to the philosophy of consciousness.indb 186 24-08-2017 15:48:52 11 Understanding Consciousness by Building It Michael Graziano and Taylor W. Webb 1 Introduction In this chapter we consider how to build a machine that has subjective awareness. The design is based on the recently proposed attention schema theory (Graziano 2013, 2014; Graziano and Kastner 2011; Graziano and Webb 2014; Kelly et al. 2014; Webb and Graziano 2015; Webb, Kean and Graziano 2016). This hypothetical building project serves as a way to introduce the theory in a step-by-step manner and contrast it with other brain-based theories of consciousness. At the same time, this chapter is more than a thought experiment. We suggest that the machine could actually be built and we encourage artificial intelligence experts to try. Figure 11.1 frames the challenge. The machine has eyes that take in visual input (an apple in this example) and pass information to a computer brain. Our task is to build the machine such that it has a subjective visual awareness of the apple in the same sense that humans describe subjective visual awareness. Exactly what is meant by subjective awareness is not a priori clear. Most people have an intuitive notion that is probably not easily put into words. One goal of this building project is to see if a clearer definition of subjective awareness emerges from the constrained process of trying to build it.
    [Show full text]
  • Psychological Arguments for Free Will DISSERTATION Presented In
    Psychological Arguments for Free Will DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Andrew Kissel Graduate Program in Philosophy The Ohio State University 2017 Dissertation Committee: Richard Samuels, Advisor Declan Smithies Abraham Roth Copyrighted by Andrew Kissel 2017 Abstract It is a widespread platitude among many philosophers that, regardless of whether we actually have free will, it certainly appears to us that we are free. Among libertarian philosophers, this platitude is sometimes deployed in the context of psychological arguments for free will. These arguments are united under the idea that widespread claims of the form, “It appears to me that I am free,” on some understanding of appears, justify thinking that we are probably free in the libertarian sense. According to these kinds of arguments, the existence of free will is supposed to, in some sense, “fall out” of widely accessible psychological states. While there is a long history of thinking that widespread psychological states support libertarianism, the arguments are often lurking in the background rather than presented at face value. This dissertation consists of three free-standing papers, each of which is motivated by taking seriously psychological arguments for free will. The dissertation opens with an introduction that presents a framework for mapping extant psychological arguments for free will. In the first paper, I argue that psychological arguments relying on widespread belief in free will, combined with doxastic conservative principles, are likely to fail. In the second paper, I argue that psychological arguments involving an inference to the best explanation of widespread appearances of freedom put pressure on non-libertarians to provide an adequate alternative explanation.
    [Show full text]
  • INTENTIONALITY Past and Future VIBS
    INTENTIONALITY Past and Future VIBS Volume 173 Robert Ginsberg Founding Editor Peter A. Redpath Executive Editor Associate Editors G. John M. Abbarno Matti Häyry Mary-Rose Barral Steven V. Hicks Gerhold K. Becker Richard T. Hull Raymond Angelo Belliotti Mark Letteri Kenneth A. Bryson Vincent L. Luizzi C. Stephen Byrum Alan Milchman H. G. Callaway George David Miller Robert A. Delfino Alan Rosenberg Rem B. Edwards Arleen L. F. Salles Andrew Fitz-Gibbon John R. Shook Francesc Forn i Argimon Eddy Souffrant William Gay Tuija Takala Dane R. Gordon Anne Waters J. Everet Green John R. Welch Heta Aleksandra Gylling Thomas F. Woods a volume in Cognitive Science CS Francesc Forn i Argimon, Editor INTENTIONALITY Past and Future Edited by Gábor Forrai and George Kampis Amsterdam - New York, NY 2005 Cover Design: Studio Pollmann The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents - Requirements for permanence”. ISBN: 90-420-1817-8 ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2005 Printed in the Netherlands CONTENTS Preface vii List of Abbreviations ix ONE The Necessity and Nature of Mental Content 1 LAIRD ADDIS TWO Reading Brentano on the Intentionality of the Mental 15 PHILIP J. BARTOK THREE Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality 25 WILLIAM FISH FOUR Lockean Ideas as Intentional Contents 37 GÁBOR FORRAI FIVE Normativity and Mental Content 51 JUSSI HAUKIOJA SIX The Ontological and Intentional Status of Fregean Senses: An Early Account of External Content 63 GREG JESSON
    [Show full text]
  • JAGE-691 Fish Cognition and Consciousness Colin Allen [email protected] Phone
    JAGE-691 Fish Cognition and Consciousness Colin Allen [email protected] phone: +1-812-606-0881 fax: +1-812-855-3631 Program in Cognitive Science and Department of History and Philosophy of Science Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA ABSTRACT. Questions about fish consciousness and cognition are receiving increasing attention. In this paper, I explain why one must be careful to avoid drawing conclusions too hastily about this hugely di- verse set of species. Keywords. Fish, learning, cognition, consciousness 1. Introduction to the controversy The cognitive and mental capacities of fish are a current topic of scientific controversy, and consciousness is the most contentious of topics. In a recent review article, Michel Cabanac and coauthors (Cabanac et al. 2009) argue that consciousness did not emerge until the early Amniota, the group of species that includes mammals, birds, and "reptiles.” The latter term is in scare quotes because biologists consider it a paraphy- letic group (i.e., a group that contains just a subset of the descendants of its common ancestor) that is im- proper for classification purposes due to its exclusion of the birds, which descended from the saurians. Amniotes are characterized by an embryonic membrane that makes terrestrial reproduction feasible. The amphibians, lacking this adaptation, are constrained to place their eggs in an aqueous environment for proper development. These biological details are important because of the nature of some of the evidence that Cabanac et al. bring to bear on the question of consciousness in fish – evidence that I shall maintain seems skewed towards other adaptations that have to do with terrestrial life.
    [Show full text]
  • Red Biocentrism for the Anthropocene
    Red Biocentrism for the Anthropocene Abstract If the dawn of the Anthropocene heralds the collapse of the natural and social sciences into a single geostory, then why not also a radical synthesis of the anthropocentrism of Marxist theorising with the biocentrism of Deep Ecology? This article proposes just such a unification for theorising education. Firstly, those on the educational left who wish to develop a fundamental unity between red and green should perhaps unearth the roots of Deep Ecological thinking and delve into the long and manifold history of socialist movements with the aim of identifying where, between the deep red and deep green, might lie some shared origins in common ground. The flawed but nevertheless distinctive monism of the first philosopher of Marxism, Joseph Dietzgen offers a philosophy which both prefigures the cosmology of Deep Ecology and suggests means of reconciling the narrative of human toil and ‘progress’ with that of human ‘nestedness’. The task facing the socialist looking to explore such a possibility needs to be located principally at the level of ‘cosmic’, rather than ‘social’ ontology, and this article sketches the outlines of such a unity project. Secondly, from this synthesis flows a set of implications for education and human growth. As the article explains, themes such as alienation and subjectification which cross- pollinate the theoretical perspectives might serve as central motifs in a red biocentric educational project fit for the Anthropocene. It is not solely environmental education, but approaches to education more broadly that require reconceptualisation for the Anthropocene. Keywords: Marxism, biocentrism, Anthropocene, Eros, Deep Ecology, pedagogy Introduction A spectre still haunts Europe.
    [Show full text]