University of Arkansas, Fayetteville ScholarWorks@UARK Theses and Dissertations 8-2016 Biocentrism in Environmental Ethics: Questions of Inherent Worth, Etiology, and Teleofunctional Interests David Lewis Rice III University of Arkansas, Fayetteville Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Rice, David Lewis III, "Biocentrism in Environmental Ethics: Questions of Inherent Worth, Etiology, and Teleofunctional Interests" (2016). Theses and Dissertations. 1650. http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/1650 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Biocentrism in Environmental Ethics: Questions of Inherent Worth, Etiology, and Teleofunctional Interests A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by David Rice Delta State University Bachelor of Science in Biology, 1994 Delta State University Master of Science in Natural Sciences in Biology, 1999 University of Mississippi Master of Arts in Philosophy, 2009 August 2016 University of Arkansas This dissertation is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council. ____________________________________ Dr. Richard Lee Dissertation Director ____________________________________ ____________________________________ Dr. Warren Herold Dr. Tom Senor Committee Member Committee Member Abstract Some biocentrists argue that all living things have "inherent worth". Anything that has inherent worth has interests that provide a reason for why all moral agents should care about it in and of itself. There are, however, some difficulties for biocentric individualist arguments which claim that all living things have inherent worth. Some biocentrists maintain that all living things have inherent worth and that artificial living things do not because the former, but not the latter, have interests by recourse to their natural selection etiology. Some also argue that synthetic forms of life do not have moral standing because they are "artificial" instead of "natural". However, there are good reasons to think that naturally-selected functions do not adequately define biocentric interests or that what is "natural" is not always of interest to the individual organism. A systems-based account of interests, on the other hand, attempts to solve the problem of harmful, selected functions by construing what is in a thing’s interests by recourse to whether it has highly integrated functions aimed at its self-maintenance. Cases of harmful selected functions are handled adequately, but unfortunately this account allows for the existence of non- sentient “instant organisms”, that have teleofunctional interests but that do not have teleofunctional interests that provide them direct moral standing. It also allows possible, future, designed entities to count as interest possessors. A systems-based account cannot provide guidance on what makes the teleofunctional interests of non-sentient beings morally considerable to the extent that they have direct moral standing. While rational agents and sentient beings have interests that provide them with direct moral standing regardless of their etiology, it does not appear that non-sentient living things also have interests that provide them with direct moral standing. Indirect moral standing is the only kind of moral standing that non-sentient living things can have. I argue that the non-design etiology of natural selection is incapable of guaranteeing indirect moral standing for non-sentient living things. If, on the other hand, all non-sentient living things were designed, then they would be guaranteed to have indirect moral standing. ©2016 by David Rice All Rights Reserved Acknowledgements I owe many thanks to my dissertation director, Dr. Richard Lee, who made helpful suggestions on the drafting of this dissertation. This dissertation would be substantially lacking without his contribution. Thanks also to my committee members Dr. Warren Herold and Dr. Tom Senor for their insights on the questions posed here. Dedication This dissertation is dedicated with the deepest of love to my mother, Shirley Gaston Rice. You are missed very much. Table of Contents Chapter One: An Introduction to Biocentrism and Inherent Worth ................................................1 I. "What is considered valuable?" ..............................................................................................2 II. "What kind of value do these things have?" .........................................................................6 III. A Discussion of Intrinsic Value ...........................................................................................9 IV. The Varieties of Intrinsic Value ........................................................................................13 V. Intrinsic Subjective Value ...................................................................................................15 VI. Intrinsic Objective Value ...................................................................................................17 VII. Inherent Worth .................................................................................................................18 VIII. Clarifying the Definition of Inherent Worth ...................................................................26 IX. "From where does such value come?" ...............................................................................34 X. The Aim of this Dissertation ...............................................................................................35 Chapter Two: A Natural Selection Etiological Account of Biological Interests ...........................40 I. Background Information Relevant to Biocentric Individualism ..........................................41 II. Gary Varner’s Natural Selection Etiological Account of Interests .....................................46 III. The Importance of Etiology to Varner’s View ..................................................................50 IV. A Survey of Etiological Accounts of Living Organisms ...................................................58 V. Non-etiological Account of Interests ..................................................................................65 VI. Craig Delancey’s Criticism of Varner’s Etiological Account of Biological Functions ....66 VII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................75 Chapter Three: The Systems-based Account and a Definition of Interests ...................................77 I. Delancey's Systems-Based Account of Interests ..................................................................79 II. Further Clarification on the Definition of Interests .............................................................85 III. Artifact Inclusion ...............................................................................................................97 IV. Replacing the term "Biological Functions" and "Biological Interests" with "Teleofunctions" and "Teleofunctional Interests" ...........................................................102 V. Criticisms of a Systems-based View and Some Responses ..............................................104 VI. Criticisms of, and Responses to, "Artifact Interests".......................................................124 VII. The Status of Synthetic Life Research ...........................................................................141 VIII. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................145 Chapter Four: The Moral Considerability of Interests .................................................................147 I. Granting Morally Considerable Interests to Conscious Agents and Sentient Beings ........152 II. A Sufficient Condition for Having a Morally Considerable, Teleofunctional Interest .....155 III.A Necessary Condition for Having a Goal of One's Own ................................................166 IV. Can a Systems-based Account be used to Reliably Establish the Existence of Morally Considerable Teleofunctional Interests for Non-Sentient Beings? ..................................178 V. Can "Instant, Non-Sentient Beings" have Morally Considerable Teleofunctional Interests? ..........................................................................................................................183 VI. Can Non-Sentient Beings produced by an Agent-Selection, Non-Design Etiology have Morally Considerable Teleofunctional Interests? ............................................................183 VII. Naturally Selected, Proper Functions and Goals of One's Own .....................................188 VIII. Natural Selection and Aristotelianism ..........................................................................198 IX. Can Genes have Goals of Their Own? ............................................................................228 X. Is This the End for a Biocentrism Based on Natural Selection? .......................................233 XI. Why All Non-sentient Living Things Do Not Have a Good of Their Own ....................234 XII. Some Clarification on Morally Considerable Interests and Moral Standing .................238