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Home , Karen Karapetyan, Mikayel Minasyan, Nikol Pashinyan, Politics of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan

Defeat of in the Second Karabakh war Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The second Karabakh war ended with catastrophic implications for Armenia. One late November 9, 2020 Armenian Prime Minister signed a trilateral statement with Russian and Azerbaijani Presidents, which was de facto a full capitulation of Armenia1. As a result of the war, Nagorno Karabakh has lost about 9000 square km of land from the original 12450 square km, the total number of casualties is probably more than 4000 dead and 8000 wounded. Nagorno Karabakh was transformed into the Russian protectorate with the deployment of up to 2000 Russian peacekeepers. As of now, we may compare Nagorno Karabakh's status with Transnistria, or Donetsk and Lugansk People’s , which are another non recognized Republics in the former Soviet space with Russian troops deployed there. It should be noted that the agreement signed by the Armenian Prime Minister was the worst option in comparison with all suggestions offered to the conflict sides since the end of the first Karabakh war in May 1994. Nagorno Karabakh lost not only all seven regions adjacent to the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous oblast but also 40 percent of NKAO itself. Meanwhile, there are no provisions regarding the status of Nagorno Karabakh, as well as no mechanisms were elaborated on the determination of that status in the future. Thus, the November 9, 2020 agreement is much worse for Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh than the deal offered to Armenia in December 1997, the agreement discussed during the 2001 Key West negotiations, the document of June 2011, and Lavrov plan put forward by in 2014. The domestic political context in Armenia

To better understand what happened and why in Karabakh we should go back to the so-called April 2018 “Velvet revolution” in Armenia2. The mass street protests forced to resign from Prime Minister’s position, which he took after serving two terms as President in April 2008 – April 2018. Initially, the "Velvet revolution” was perceived as a significant victory of democracy in the Post-Soviet World.

1 Statement by President of the Republic of , Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and President of the Russian Federation, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384,

2 He Was a Protester a Month Ago. Now, Nikol Pashinyan Leads Armenia, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/europe/armenia-nikol-pashinyan-prime-minister.html.

However, immediately after these events doubts have been raised about the core reasons for the transfer of power to Nikol Pashinyan. First of all, it should be noted that Russia was not happy with President Serzh Sargsyan’s foreign policy (Armenia was close to signing an Association Agreement with EU in Autumn 2013, and this was prevented only by the last-minute efforts of Russia, has launched strong cooperation with NATO to reform its defense system, including defense education, and many anti-Russian forces, including NGOs and media platforms were freely operating in Armenia) and would like to replace him with a more reliable partner in April 2018. In September 2016 Serzh Sargsyan appointed as Prime Minister of Armenia. At that time Karapetyan was holding high-level positions in Gazprom, was in friendly relations with key Russian Armenian oligarchs, and was widely perceived as a Russia approved candidate for the Prime Minister position after the end of Serzh Sargsyan’s second presidential term in April 2018 and the transformation of Armenia into the .

However, in March 2018 Serzh Sargsyan stated his intention to be elected as Prime Minister, thus breaking his public promise not to do that. This step by Serzh Sargsyan triggered widespread resentment in Armenian society, which was tired of the corrupt and clan-based rule of Serzh Sargsyan. Opposition MP Nikol Pashinyan had successfully exploited these feelings of the population and launched a protest movement. However, quite strangely, there was no active resistance by state apparatus and in particular by law enforcement bodies against Nikol Pashinyan. The absence of strong reaction from the state apparatus has galvanized the society and has brought up to a hundred thousand people into downtown Yerevan demanding Serzh Sargsyan’s resignation under the “Make a step, reject Serzh” slogan.

Some experts argued that Pashinyan’s movement was organized and supported by Karen Karapetyan, who was unhappy with Serzh Sargsyan's decision to run for Prime Minister position. Thus, Karen Karapetyan was behind Pashinyan’s movement to force Serzh Sargsyan’s resignation and to be elected as Prime Minister afterward. According to this narrative, Pashinyan agreed to Karapetyan’s conditions, but after forcing Serzh Sargsyan out, and feeling the support of the society, Pashinyan decided to eliminate also Karen Karapetyan and take the power. However, given the absence of tough actions against the Pashinyan movement by law enforcement agencies which were under Serzh Sargsyan’s direct control, most probably Pashinyan’s movement was organized and supported by Serzh Sargsyan. Given Russian support to Karen Karapetyan, Sargsyan thought that the only reliable way to prevent Karapetyan’s election as Prime Minister was not Sargsyan’s election, which would be a too obvious step against Russia, but to organize “a revolution” and bring new figure thus catching Russia by surprise. Serzh Sargsyan was well aware that if Karapetyan takes the power, it would be very difficult to force him out, while the unexperienced Pashinyan with no capable team would be an easy target to retake power if not directly by Serzh Sargsyan, but by his son-in-law , who had enormous influence over Armenian domestic politics and media after 2008 and who was serving as Armenia’s ambassador in the Vatican. Thus, Pashinyan was perceived by Serzh Sargsyan as the best candidate for the interim leader in a transition of power from Serzh Sargsyan to Mikayel Minasyan. The role of Karabakh conflict in the domestic Since the end of the First Karabakh war in May 1994 the Karabakh issue and the fate of the security zone (7 regions adjacent to the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, which have been taken by Armenian forces) has been the cornerstone of Armenian domestic politics. All Armenian leaders were quite aware that any negotiated settlement will entail the return of this security zone (besides the connecting Armenia with Karabakh). The main idea was to trade the return of these territories with the status of Nagorno Karabakh (either independence or unification with Armenia). However, this idea was never circulated publicly to avoid the danger of being depicted as a traitor and “Land giver”.

Thus, eventually, the perception among Armenian society was changed, the security zone started to be called “liberated territories” and in 2006 Nagorno Karabakh Republic adopted a constitution declaring all territories under its control as an inextricable part of Karabakh. From 2006 any public discourse regarding the possible swap of territories in Karabakh has been perceived in the society as treason and all started to speak about the necessity to protect the territorial integrity of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. Meanwhile, all settlement options suggested by the OSCE Minsk Group envisaged the return of at least 6 from 7 adjacent territories to Azerbaijan. Thus, there was a growing gap between what was presented to society and what was discussed behind the closed-door negotiations. The atmosphere was created in which any political leader who would sign an agreement to return territories to Azerbaijan would be perceived as a traitor. Thus, the key task of the leaders of Armenia was to keep the status quo to avoid the possible dangerous decisions and to put the responsibility on the shoulders of the upcoming leader. Meanwhile, the status quo was kept mainly due to the global and regional security dynamics, which started to be changed in the late 2000s. The April 2016 “Four-day” war was the first sign that the status quo was unsustainable, and it was going to be changed either by agreement or by war. Serzh Sargsyan was well aware of this dynamic and was interested to see the change of the status quo neither under his nor his son – in – law rule. In this context, the “Velvet revolution” and the emergence of the new “Interim leader” could be a good opportunity to avoid the responsibilities to change the status quo. Nikol Pahinyan’s policy on NK

The main word characterizing Pashinyan’s policy on NK is inconsistency. Immediately after his election, Pashinyan stated that the Nagorno Karabakh Republic should be returned to the negotiation table to restore the trilateral format3. This idea was flatly rejected by Azerbaijan. In

3 Pashinyan Reiterates Importance of Artsakh’s Participation in Peace Negotiations during Visit, https://armenianweekly.com/2018/05/09/pashinyan-reiterates-importance-of-artsakhs-participation/ late September 2018, Pashinyan made a deal with Aliyev to decrease the tensions along the line of contact and Armenia – Azerbaijan international border, and to establish a direct hotline between militaries. Most probably, he also promised President Aliyev to be more flexible during Karabakh negotiations after snap Parliamentary scheduled for December 2018. After Pashinyan’s “My step” coalition received a two-third majority in Parliament, negotiations have been activated between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, starting from Summer 2019 Pashinyan significantly hardened his position and in August 2019 during the rally in Nagorno Karabakh capital Stepanakert stated that “Karabakh is Armenia. Full stop”4. Azerbaijan immediately used this statement as a “casus belli” arguing that Armenia has abandoned the negotiations and Azerbaijan has no other way than to start the war to solve the Karabakh conflict.

Meanwhile, the Armenian Ministry of Defense publicly stated about its new “pre-emptive strike doctrine” arguing that if Azerbaijan starts the war, Armenia will relocate hostilities into Azerbaijani territory, Azerbaijan’s army will be defeated and Armenia and Karabakh will liberate mote territories5. It’s difficult to provide a clear explanation for these statements of Pashinyan and the Ministry of Defense. Pashinyan might seek to prove the Armenian society that he was not the traitor, or he thought that after fomenting his power in Armenia, he might simply break the promises given to Azerbaijan and the international community regarding the settlement of Karabakh conflict. The culmination came in April 2020, when Armenia officially rejected the Russian “Lavrov plan”, and stated that all settlement options discussed before April 2018 were unacceptable for Armenian authorities, even though Russia warned Armenia of an upcoming big war. Thus, after April 2020 it was clear that war was coming. Regional geopolitics of the war Russia was always seeking to deploy Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno Karabakh, thus establishing a de facto military base in Azerbaijan. Lavrov's plan key idea was the return of adjacent territories to Azerbaijan (in 5+2 formula, five regions immediately and other two within a year), deployment of Russian peacekeepers along the new line of contact, and continuation of negotiations for the determination of the final status of Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia rejected this plan twice – in October 2016 and April 2020, while Azerbaijan was also unhappy to see the

4 Pashinyan calls for unification between Armenia and Karabakh, https://eurasianet.org/pashinyan-calls-for- unification-between-armenia-and-karabakh.

5 Rationalizing the Tonoyan Doctrine: Armenia’s Active Deterrence Strategy, https://jamestown.org/program/rationalizing-the-tonoyan-doctrine-armenias-active-deterrence-strategy/

Russian base in its territory. Meanwhile, Russia also would like to settle the Karabakh conflict alone, without involving the US and and thus restricting Western influence in the region. ’s key goal was to strengthen its positions in Azerbaijan and, probably to transform Armenia and Azerbaijan into another zone of Russia - Turkey's joint influence. During the first days of the war Turkish authorities publicly stated that they would like to solve the Karabakh conflict solely with Russia using the “Idlib model”6. Thus, most probably the new war in Karabakh was a result of some sort of Russia – Turkey understanding. Russia allowed Turkey to significantly strengthen the Azerbaijani army and to inflict high damage on Armenia and Karabakh, while Turkey convinced Azerbaijan to accept Russian peacekeepers. Another aspect of the current Karabakh war was significant tensions in Armenia – Russia relations after the “Velvet revolution”. Deliberately or not, but Pashinyan made several anti- Russia steps - the arrest and criminal investigation against incumbent CSTO Secretary – General Yuri Khachaturov, the arrest of Armenian second President who had a personal friendship with Russian President Putin, the launch of criminal investigations against the key Russian companies working in Armenia. Most probably, the most irritating steps were the appointment of Armen Grigoryan as a secretary of Armenia’s Security Council (Grigoryan was working in Transparency International Armenia) who was famous for its anti-Russian and anti-Putin positions, as well as the appointment of 29 years old Argishti Kyaramyan as the director of Armenian National Security Service in June 2020, who was fired during the new Karabakh war. Thus, Armenia approached the war with significantly weakened positions – tricky relations with its only ally Russia, rejection of Minsk Group, and Russia’s offers on settlement and the tacit agreement between Russia and Turkey to settle the conflict through the war. Given the election mess in the US and the EU’s focus on Brexit and COVID-related crisis, the timing of the war was very convenient for not allowing any active involvement of the US or EU. During the first half of the war until mid-October 2020, Russia offered Armenia to accept Lavrov plan and at least keep the whole territory of former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast under its control, but these offers were rejected by Prime Minister Pashinyan, who apparently was hoping to change the course of the war. However, since the end of October 2020, it was obvious that Armenia was losing the war, and that parts of NKAO itself have been invaded by Azerbaijan. On November 7 Shushi, the second biggest city of Karabakh and the cultural center of fell and this event forced Armenia to sign capitulation and accept the loss of not only adjacent territories but approximately 40 percent of NKAO itself. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan

6 Erdogan's victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Erdogan%27s-victory-in-Nagorno- Karabakh-51555.html.

agreed to the deployment of up to 2000 Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh for an initial five-year period. Thus, we may argue that the big winners of the second Karabakh war were Azerbaijan, (who gained 9000 square km of land) and Russia who established the fourth military base in the South Caucasus (alongside Armenia, Abkhazia, and ) and the first in Azerbaijan since the closure of Gabala radio location station in 2012. Turkey has significantly increased its influence in the region and will be a part of Russia – Turkey joint coordinating center to monitor the ceasefire and peacekeeping operations in Karabakh. The main loser is Armenia and Karabakh. Karabakh lost significant portions of territories, including 135 km long border with , and was transformed into a Russian protectorate with unclear status and future. Armenia was humiliated and was thrown into a political and economic crisis. According to initial assessments, the lost territories with their infrastructure may cots up to 10 billion USD, plus the costs of refugees and reconstruction of those parts of Karabakh currently under the control of Russian peacekeepers.