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The Four-Day War Has Diminished the Chances of Peace in Nagorno-Karabakh

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The Four-Day War Has Diminished the Chances of Peace in Nagorno-Karabakh In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2016, Baden-Baden 2017, pp. 111-123. Hans-Joachim Schmidt The Four-Day War Has Diminished the Chances of Peace in Nagorno-Karabakh Introduction The clashes in 2016 at the Nagorno-Karabakh line of contact1 demonstrated just how fragile the 1994 ceasefire has become in this unresolved territorial conflict. Though the question of who first initiated military activities is still disputed, it appears more likely that this limited offensive was launched by Azerbaijan.2 Why should Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, the powers that benefit from the status quo, risk such a war? It seems that, on the night of 1-2 April, a number of Azerbaijani brigades stationed near the line of contact at- tacked positions on Karabakh territory from several directions at once. The Karabakh Armenians and their Armenian backers were caught by surprise and only managed to repel the attack with great difficulty. Against the back- ground of Russia’s military involvement in Syria, the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and the deterioration of relations with NATO, the clash was far from convenient for the Kremlin, as it could rapidly destabilize the entire South Caucasus, dragging Moscow into a confrontation with Azerbaijan and Turkey. For that reason, Moscow, which enjoys good relations with both states, immediately began efforts at the highest level to end the conflict quickly. For the first time since the 1994-95 ceasefire, Nagorno-Karabakh had to accept the loss of a minor amount of territory to Azerbaijan, despite success- fully fending off the Azeri attack. This diminutive territorial gain was cele- brated throughout Azerbaijan as a first victory. Armenia, by contrast, experi- enced a series of disappointments in Russia and the Russia-led Collective Se- curity Treaty Organization (CSTO). Moscow was unwilling to explicitly name the original aggressor, and Russia and the other CSTO states provided Armenia with very little public support, whereas Azerbaijan was fully backed in public by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 1 The territory of Nagorno-Karabakh consists of the region of Nagorno-Karabakh itself and seven other surrounding regions. It is occupied by the self-defence forces of Nagorno- Karabakh and by Armenian forces. As Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding regions are officially part of Azerbaijan, this is not an internationally recognized border, and is thus referred to as the line of contact or line of engagement. 2 Cf. Thomas De Waal, Dangerous days in Karabakh, 2 April 2016, at: http://carnegie.ru/ commentary/2016/04/02/dangerous-days-in-karabakh/iwiu; Aleksandra Jarosiewicz/ Maciej Falkowski, The four-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh, in: OSW Newsletter, 6 April 2016, at: http://www.osw.waw.pl/print/24257. 111 In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2016, Baden-Baden 2017, pp. 111-123. Russia considered itself a mediating power and therefore refrained from public criticism of Azerbaijan.3 Russia’s President Vladimir Putin spoke with the presidents of both countries on the telephone and sent Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov – the two Russian politicians with the most experience of the region – to their capitals, seeking to bring an end to the dangerous hostilities as rapidly as possible. This led to the presidents of both countries sending the chiefs of their general staffs to Moscow, where on 5 April under Russian mediation, they agreed on a ceasefire based on the earlier ceasefires of 1994-1995. It entered into effect at noon. Thanks to its timely and decisive intervention, Russia had, for the time being, prevented another military conflict in Europe, thereby con- tributing to security in Europe as a whole. What Were the Causes of the War? But who really initiated this brief conflict? And what goals did they have in mind? There have been many rumours. Some have claimed that Russia was ultimately responsible, seeking to demonstrate its dominance in the region following its success in Syria while expanding its influence in the South Cau- casus.4 Others have alleged that Turkey and its power-hungry President Er- doğan were responsible, or even the USA, as a means to show Russia the limits of its power and to limit Putin’s influence in the region.5 Yet others have speculated that Azerbaijan believed the time had come to test its in- creased military strength against Nagorno-Karabakh and gauge the Russian reaction to an attack. After all, the Kremlin was tied up in simultaneous con- flicts in Ukraine and Syria, as well as its confrontation with NATO. There is little evidence to support the first thesis – that Russia was re- sponsible for the war.6 Moscow has good relations with both sides and pur- sues an official policy of balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It did not incite Baku to launch this attack, and is certainly unlikely to have encouraged Yerevan. On the contrary, prior to the war, both countries had complained to Moscow about outstanding arms deliveries.7 It is highly unlikely that the 3 Cf. Russia prepared to act as mediator in Karabakh conflict settlement – PM, TASS, 7 April 2016, at: http://tass.ru/en/politics/868118. 4 Cf. Jarosiewicz/Falkowski, cited above (Note 2); Wojciech Górecki, Nagorno-Karabakh: what is Russia up to? OSW Newsletter, 13 April 2016, at: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/ publikacje/analyses/2016-04-13/nagorno-karabakh-what-russia-to. 5 At least according to Prime Minister Medvedev, cf. Medvedev says aggravation of Kara- bakh conflict could be caused by external factors, TASS, 9 April 2016, at: http://tass.ru/ en/politics/868494. 6 Cf. Arzu Geybullayeva, De Waal: Kremlin ‘Not Primary Actor’ Behind Nagorno- Karabakh Conflict, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4 April 2016, at: http://www.rferl. org/a/russia-armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-de-waal-kremlin-not-primary- actor/27654309.html. 7 Azerbaijan appears to have deliberately omitted to pay bills due for Russian arms in order to express its dissatisfaction at the 200 million dollar loan that Russia had made to Arme- 112 In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2016, Baden-Baden 2017, pp. 111-123. military action was launched by Armenia, as the Armenians appear to have been genuinely surprised. While the war would have served to distract from the poor state of the country’s economy, a major military conflict would have been far too expensive for Armenia. Furthermore, if the political leadership had really prepared an attack, mobilizing the necessary reserves, it is unlikely that Armenia would have lost the territory that it did. In Armenia, criticism of Russia grew considerably as a result of the con- flict. There have been open calls for the country to recognize Nagorno-Kara- bakh and to leave the Russian-led military alliance.8 The Armenian leader- ship itself threatened in public to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh if Azerbaijan should launch a further attack.9 Furthermore, leading Armenian politicians have been increasingly vocal in criticizing Russian arms sales to Azerbaijan – not just internally but increasingly also in public. Was Turkey behind the Azerbaijani offensive? There is little evidence of this, either, even if Ankara would be interested in reducing Russian and Armenian influence in the South Caucasus. Nonetheless, Lavrov has con- demned Erdoğan’s open support for Azerbaijan as “unacceptable”.10 Ultim- ately, Turkey is also a member of the OSCE Minsk Group, which mediates between the conflict parties, and would therefore be obliged to show more restraint should hostilities break out. Erdoğan’s partisan support for one side would hardly convince the remaining members of the Minsk Group to in- clude Turkey as a mediating power in the future. The most likely thesis is that Azerbaijan itself was largely responsible for this short war, which it launched as a means of testing its recently ac- quired military capabilities against Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, while gauging Russia’s reaction, and simultaneously distracting the domestic population from the drastic decline in government revenue as a result of fall- ing gas and oil prices. The results were mixed. The four-day war showed that the military balance has not shifted significantly in Baku’s favour, even if Azerbaijan did make a few symbolic territorial gains. On the other hand, the first territorial gains since the 1990s show that the military balance could further develop in favour of Azerbaijan in the medium term, and this could nia in mid-2015 for the purchase of Russian weapons. In response, Russia stopped the ex- port of weapons to Baku. At the same time, Armenia complained about bureaucratic “de- lays” in the implementation of this arms loan deal, which the Russian government had an- nounced in early February 2016. Cf. Joshua Kucera, Azerbaijan Unable, Or Unwilling, To Pay For Russian Weapons: Reports, 3 March 2016, at: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/ 77646; and, e.g., Russian arms delivery to Armenia late “for unknown reasons” – MP, Pan Armenian Net, 11 April 2016, at: http://panarmenian.net/m/eng/news/210022. 8 Cf. Hrant Apovian, Bitter Lessons Learned: Aftermath of Azerbaijan’s Blitz Attack, Azbarez, 15 April 2016, at: http://asbarez.com/148859/bitter -lessons-learned-aftermath- of-azerbaijans-blitz-attack. 9 Armenian parliament turns down initiative to consider Karabakh recognition, TASS, 16 May 2016, at: http://tass.ru/en/world/876004. 10 Lavrov says Turkey's statements on Karabakh are calls for war, TASS, 22 April 2016, at: http://tass.ru/en/politics/871837. 113 In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2016, Baden-Baden 2017, pp. 111-123. soon encourage the regime to undertake a further war. This puts further pres- sure on Armenia’s political leadership. The security concerns of neighbouring countries in the region have grown as well.
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