The End of the Second War: New ­realities in the South Jakob Hedenskog, Aron Lund and Johan Norberg

n 27 September 2020, war erupted between Nagorno-Karabakh with proper, will remain in O­Armenia and over the contested Armenian hands. ­Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and surrounding , The agreement also stipulated that 1,960 lightly armed which had been under Armenian occupation since the end Russian troops would deploy as peacekeepers along the of the original hostilities in 1994. new contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Over the course of a six-week war, Azerbaijan’s Corridor, with “90 armoured personal carriers, 380 units ­somewhat larger and significantly modern military of automobile and special equipment”. Per the terms of proved ­superior to the forces of Armenia and the self-­ the deal, the force will be deployed for five years but this declared, Armenian-backed Nagorno-Karabakh ­ can be prolonged for additional five-year periods with the (NKR), also known as Artsakh. Both armies have consent of the signatories. Separately, a land corridor is to origins, but Azerbaijan was able to deploy upgraded ­Soviet be established through Armenia to connect the Azerbaijani equipment and modern Turkish and Israeli weapons, inclu- exclave with the rest ding strike and reconnaissance drones and loitering muni- of Azerbaijan. It will be protected by the Border Guards of tions, which proved decisive. The combined Armenian and the Russian Federal Security Service, FSB. Nagorno-Karabakh forces generally had older equipment The 9 November statement does not address the sta- reinforced by a few modern systems, such as Russian-made tus of Nagorno-Karabakh nor does it create a path to a fi- Su-30SM fighters and Iskander operational-tactical surfa- nal resolution of the conflict. Since 1994, most attempts ce-to-surface missiles, though not in sufficient quantities. to resolve the conflict have been centred on the The tipping point of the war came on 8November, ­ when Group, established by the Organisation for Security and Azerbaijani troops recaptured the of , which ­Cooperation (OSCE) and co-chaired by , , is recognised for its historic significance toAzerbaijan, ­ and the . In 2007, the Minsk Group issued but also holds major military importance by overlooking six “Basic Principles,” known as the Principles ­Nagorno-Karabakh’s capital, , some ten kilo- (last modified in 2009), which were reluctantly accepted metres away. Armenian Prime Minister by both parties: later said that up to 25,000 Armenian and NKR soldi- • return of the surrounding Nagorno-­ ers east of Stepanakert could have been surrounded. On 9 Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; ­November, he accepted a Russian-brokered ceasefire by re- • an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing leasing a joint statement, effective from 10 November, with guarantees for security and self-governance; President Ilham of Azerbaijan and Russian President • a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; . , a major backer of ­Azerbaijan, was • future determination of the final legal status of not among the signatories but welcomed the deal. ­Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding ­expression of will; The 9 November agreement • the right of all internally displaced persons The 9 November statement left Azerbaijan in control and ­refugees to return to their former places of of a portion of Nagorno-Karabakh, including Shusha. ­residence; and It also forced Armenia to relinquish adjacent areas of • international security guarantees that would include­ ­Azerbaijani occupied in the , which had a peacekeeping operation. served as both a military buffer zone and a potential bar- one, three, and six have now been im- gaining chip. Of the Armenian-occupied territories outside plemented as an outcome of the conflict and the ceasefire ­Nagorno-Karabakh,only the , which links deal, which also reconfirms principle five. Principles two

FOI Memo: 7405 RUFS Briefing No. 49 Project No: A112001 December, 2020 Approved by: Mike Winnerstig Map: Per Wikström, FOI. and four were not reflected in the 9 November deal, which at the core of Armenia’s national narrative was a painful stopped short of addressing the ultimate core issue of the ­experience and has set off major unrest in the . conflict: the legal-political status of Nagorno-­Karabakh. The ministers of , defence, and economy all Rather than being solved, the conflict has re-frozen in a resigned in protest, while angry crowds attacked the parli- new shape. If it heats up again, it will be with new com- ament and government buildings in after the deal plexities in a changed geopolitical landscape. was announced. Several politicians, including opposition leader , were arrested on 11 November The path ahead for Armenia and Azerbaijan for fomenting these protests, but released after two days. In the absence of a political agreement, and given The prime minister has nonetheless remained committed ­Azerbaijan’s continued military superiority, Armenia may to the ceasefire deal, but his political survival is uncertain. have to live for the foreseeable future under the threat of Domestic spoilers may also seek to undermine implemen- renewed Azerbaijani offensives. Yet, the loss of large areas tation of the deal; one such hot could be the land

FOI — 2 — Tel: +46 8 5550 3000 Swedish Defence Research Agency www.foi.se SE-164 90 ­corridor that will link Nakhchivan to mainland Azerbaijan­ sole obligation is to defend Armenia against attacks on via Armenia. its sovereign territory. In other words, Armenia could not For Azerbaijan, the war was a major success. Since ­expect support in Nagorno-Karabakh nor in other occu- 9 ­November, Aliyev has mocked Pashinyan, while war- pied ­Azerbaijani territories. ning that Armenia must not drag its feet nor pre- vent displaced from returning. As long Russia’s new military posture as withdrawals continue according to plan, ’s Already before the second Karabakh War, Russia had main priority may be to promote Turkish invol- three military bases in the : the 102nd military vement as a hedge against Russian dominance. base in ­ in western Armenia and two bases in ­Russian-backed breakaway regions of : the 4th in A diplomatic victory for Russia and the 7th in . These bases are Having ensured a political outcome in line with its long- combined-arms brigade-size units, which, in theory, jointly term interests, can claim a diplomatic success that constitute the core of an army corps, although no such helps cement Russia’s predominant position in the South command structure is apparent. Caucasus. Following the 9 November deal, Russia now also Notably, the 9 November agreement makes no reference has peacekeepers on the ground in Nagorno-Karabakh, to either the OSCE Minsk Group or Turkey, underlining ­something it has sought since 1994. In fact, Russia has Russia’s dominant role in an it considers within its not had a military presence in Azerbaijan since the clo- ­exclusive zone of interest. sure of the Soviet-era , in 2012. Both Although Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic ­Armenia and Azerbaijan previously rejected the deploy- Treaty Organization, Russia may countenance a role for ment of ­Russian peacekeepers, and Moscow, Washington, given its involvement as a partner of Azerbaijan and were formerly in general agreement that any mo- and the recent history of transactional Russian-Turkish nitoring or peacekeeping group should be drawn from the deal-making, including in and . However, alt- OCSE states, but not from the Minsk Group’s co-chairs hough Turkey may eventually be offered a junior part- nor a neighbour of Armenia and Azerbaijan. That formula, nership in the Nagorno-Karabakh arrangements, the which excluded Russia, no longer applies. United States and the are sidelined. The Russian peacekeepers were initially dispatched to ­Moreover, there has been no fundamental change to the Nagorno-Karabakh from the 102nd military base and have state of that helps Russia exert influence since been complemented by forces from Russia. The pea- over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the Russian pea- cekeeping force has thus increased Russia’s military foot- cekeeping mission is likely to ensure Moscow’s continued print in the region and added to Moscow’s ability to deal centrality. with small-scale crises or the initial phases of a local war. It Given these achievements and the fact that Russia is important, not primarily for its lightly armed soldiers, has staked its credibility on the 9 November agreement, but for the establishment of a new Russian geographical ­Moscow must be wary of turmoil in Armenia, in so far as foothold and the deployment of command and control it compromises the implementation of the deal. However, structures and support resources, including helicopters. Moscow would not necessarily be displeased if Pashinyan However, it is not without risks. Should tensions in this were edged out of power. Russian trust in the Armenian volatile region rise to the point where Turkey or are prime minister, who gained power through a 2018 popu- drawn into a wider conflict, Russia’s foothold may prove lar uprising, is very low. tenuous. Russian access to the South Caucasus is naturally Despite the new presence of peacekeepers, it rema- limited by , since military movements across ins unclear to what extent Armenia can rely on Russian the must primarily pass protection. Russia had previously extended defensive via three land corridors: along the Black or ­guarantees to Armenia through a 1997 bilateral agreement , or across the mountains via the Georgia Military as well as its membership in the multilateral Collective Road. Only the bases in Georgia are reachable overland ­Security Treaty Organisation, but neither proved to be of from Russia, and none of these three routes extends to the significance during the recent fighting. Instead of inter- 102nd military base in Armenia nor to the peacekeeping vening in ­Armenia’s defence, Putin stressed that Russia’s force in Nagorno-Karabakh. In practice, therefore, Russia­

FOI — 3 — Tel: +46 8 5550 3000 Swedish Defence Research Agency www.foi.se SE-164 90 Stockholm will need either Georgia, Iran, or Azerbaijan to open their the war was a military victory for the ­Turkish-backed territories and air space to supplies, personnel rotations, side and has led, among other things, to the promise of a and potential reinforcements. Given that air and land land corridor connecting Turkey and Azerbaijan through transports are vulnerable to both political and military ad- ­Nakhchivan, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has since versarial measures, Russian forces are, in some scenarios, voiced some frustration. Ankara claims that its military is at risk of being isolated. set to operate alongside Russia in a “peacekeeping center” The Greater Caucasus Range may also limit air ope- that, per the statement, is to “exercise control over the cea- rations from Russia, by obstructing radar coverage and sefire.” However, the text says nothing about Turkish parti- increasing flight times to areas of operations. However, cipation. Through November, Russian and Turkish leaders the Russian Black Sea Fleet and could continued to haggle over how to interpret the ceasefire and ­probably support any Russian operations along the coasts, unpublished bilateral agreements. While the dispute re- offering both some air radar coverage and long-range fire mained unresolved at the time of writing, Russia appears support in the form of cruise missiles. to have offered Turkey some participation in a monitoring center of unclear relevance, while continuing to resist di- A Turkish quest for influence rect Turkish influence over the new conflict arrangements. Turkey’s exceptionally close relationship to Azerbaijan is built on mutually reinforcing strategic, economic, and Conclusions ­Turkic ethno-cultural links, epitomised by the popular The second Nagorno-Karabakh war was fought between slogan “one nation, two states”. Turkey has long assisted two Soviet-style forces, not too different in size, but one Azerbaijan’s military, both in the form of military aid and of them significantly more modernised. Azerbaijan’s mo- for more self-interested reasons: to counter their common dern weaponry appears to have been decisive in securing enemy, Armenia, while also locking in a receptive market an Armenian­ defeat, although the Russian-brokered 9 for Turkey’s growing military industry. In 2010, Baku and November agreement effectively re-froze the conflict in Ankara signed a mutual defence agreement. ­five-year instalments, rather than ending it. Early signs of a stepped-up Turkish role in the For Armenia, the war was a clear defeat, and Yerevan’s ­Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were on display in July 2020, ability to implement the agreement may be diminished by when Ankara reacted with unusual vehemence to a round political turbulence. For Azerbaijan, by contrast, the war of Armenian-Azerbaijani fighting that, in retrospect, was a victory that allowed the country to retake significant­ ­foreshadowed the recent war. Ankara vowed to fast-track territory and may help resolve a longstanding displace- the delivery of Turkish-manufactured drones to Azerbaijan, ment crisis, while Baku retains the upper hand militarily. which later played a significant role in Azerbaijan’s victory. However, both Azerbaijan and Armenia now have to con- Turkey also appears to have taken part in planning and tend with the direct involvement of Russian peacekeepers, preparing for the 27 September fighting. Indeed, multiple something they were previously unwilling to permit. sources have reported that Turkey had already begun to For Russia, the continuation of a frozen conflict offers ­recruit Syrian rebel fighters to fight in Nagorno-Karabakh political benefits and creates a platform for a peacekeeping in early September. Although these militia fighters must mission that Moscow has long sought. The agreement also have been of limited importance in what was, after all, a serves Russia’s interests in other ways, notably by sidelining war between two conventional armies, the Syrians may Western influence via the OSCE Minsk Group in the con- have been deployed for reasons of deniability or as a low- flict resolution. The impact on Russian-Turkish relations cost support element for drone operators and other ­Turkish is less clear, except in that Nagorno-Karabakh now serves staff. It is worth noting that Turkey previously used simi- as yet another unresolved conflict where Moscow and lar tactics in Syria and Libya, including combined deploy- ­Ankara may interface, either as rivals or partners. ments of Syrian fighters and Turkish drones. Although

Jakob Hedenskog and Johan Norberg are Deputy Research Directors at FOI’s Russia and Studies Programme, www.foi.se/russia. Aron Lund is an Analyst at FOI’s and Programme, www.foi.se/asia.

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