The End of the Second Karabakh War: New Realities in the South Caucasus Jakob Hedenskog, Aron Lund and Johan Norberg
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The End of the Second Karabakh War: New realities in the South Caucasus Jakob Hedenskog, Aron Lund and Johan Norberg n 27 September 2020, war erupted between Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia proper, will remain in O Armenia and Azerbaijan over the contested Armenian hands. Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and surrounding regions, The agreement also stipulated that 1,960 lightly armed which had been under Armenian occupation since the end Russian troops would deploy as peacekeepers along the of the original hostilities in 1994. new contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Lachin Over the course of a six-week war, Azerbaijan’s Corridor, with “90 armoured personal carriers, 380 units somewhat larger and significantly more modern military of automobile and special equipment”. Per the terms of proved superior to the forces of Armenia and the self- the deal, the force will be deployed for five years but this declared, Armenian-backed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic can be prolonged for additional five-year periods with the (NKR), also known as Artsakh. Both armies have Soviet consent of the signatories. Separately, a land corridor is to origins, but Azerbaijan was able to deploy upgraded Soviet be established through Armenia to connect the Azerbaijani equipment and modern Turkish and Israeli weapons, inclu- Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic exclave with the rest ding strike and reconnaissance drones and loitering muni- of Azerbaijan. It will be protected by the Border Guards of tions, which proved decisive. The combined Armenian and the Russian Federal Security Service, FSB. Nagorno-Karabakh forces generally had older equipment The 9 November statement does not address the sta- reinforced by a few modern systems, such as Russian-made tus of Nagorno-Karabakh nor does it create a path to a fi- Su-30SM fighters and Iskander operational-tactical surfa- nal resolution of the conflict. Since 1994, most attempts ce-to-surface missiles, though not in sufficient quantities. to resolve the conflict have been centred on the Minsk The tipping point of the war came on 8November, when Group, established by the Organisation for Security and Azerbaijani troops recaptured the town of Shusha, which Cooperation (OSCE) and co-chaired by Russia, France, is recognised for its historic significance toAzerbaijan, and the United States. In 2007, the Minsk Group issued but also holds major military importance by overlooking six “Basic Principles,” known as the Madrid Principles Nagorno-Karabakh’s capital, Stepanakert, some ten kilo- (last modified in 2009), which were reluctantly accepted metres away. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan by both parties: later said that up to 25,000 Armenian and NKR soldi- • return of the territories surrounding Nagorno- ers east of Stepanakert could have been surrounded. On 9 Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; November, he accepted a Russian-brokered ceasefire by re- • an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing leasing a joint statement, effective from 10 November, with guarantees for security and self-governance; President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Russian President • a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; Vladimir Putin. Turkey, a major backer of Azerbaijan, was • future determination of the final legal status of not among the signatories but welcomed the deal. Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will; The 9 November agreement • the right of all internally displaced persons The 9 November statement left Azerbaijan in control and refugees to return to their former places of of a portion of Nagorno-Karabakh, including Shusha. residence; and It also forced Armenia to relinquish adjacent areas of • international security guarantees that would include Azerbaijani territory occupied in the 1990s, which had a peacekeeping operation. served as both a military buffer zone and a potential bar- Madrid Principles one, three, and six have now been im- gaining chip. Of the Armenian-occupied territories outside plemented as an outcome of the conflict and the ceasefire Nagorno-Karabakh,only the Lachin Corridor, which links deal, which also reconfirms principle five. Principles two FOI Memo: 7405 RUFS Briefing No. 49 Project No: A112001 December, 2020 Approved by: Mike Winnerstig Map: Per Wikström, FOI. and four were not reflected in the 9 November deal, which at the core of Armenia’s national narrative was a painful stopped short of addressing the ultimate core issue of the experience and has set off major unrest in the country. conflict: the legal-political status of Nagorno- Karabakh. The ministers of foreign affairs, defence, and economy all Rather than being solved, the conflict has re-frozen in a resigned in protest, while angry crowds attacked the parli- new shape. If it heats up again, it will be with new com- ament and government buildings in Yerevan after the deal plexities in a changed geopolitical landscape. was announced. Several politicians, including opposition leader Gagik Tsarukyan, were arrested on 11 November The path ahead for Armenia and Azerbaijan for fomenting these protests, but released after two days. In the absence of a political agreement, and given The prime minister has nonetheless remained committed Azerbaijan’s continued military superiority, Armenia may to the ceasefire deal, but his political survival is uncertain. have to live for the foreseeable future under the threat of Domestic spoilers may also seek to undermine implemen- renewed Azerbaijani offensives. Yet, the loss of large areas tation of the deal; one such hot spot could be the land FOI — 2 — Tel: +46 8 5550 3000 Swedish Defence Research Agency www.foi.se SE-164 90 Stockholm corridor that will link Nakhchivan to mainland Azerbaijan sole obligation is to defend Armenia against attacks on via Armenia. its sovereign territory. In other words, Armenia could not For Azerbaijan, the war was a major success. Since expect support in Nagorno-Karabakh nor in other occu- 9 November, Aliyev has mocked Pashinyan, while war- pied Azerbaijani territories. ning that Armenia must not drag its feet nor pre- vent displaced Azerbaijanis from returning. As long Russia’s new military posture as withdrawals continue according to plan, Baku’s Already before the second Karabakh War, Russia had main priority may be to promote Turkish invol- three military bases in the region: the 102nd military vement as a hedge against Russian dominance. base in Gyumri in western Armenia and two bases in Russian-backed breakaway regions of Georgia: the 4th in A diplomatic victory for Russia South Ossetia and the 7th in Abkhazia. These bases are Having ensured a political outcome in line with its long- combined-arms brigade-size units, which, in theory, jointly term interests, Moscow can claim a diplomatic success that constitute the core of an army corps, although no such helps cement Russia’s predominant position in the South command structure is apparent. Caucasus. Following the 9 November deal, Russia now also Notably, the 9 November agreement makes no reference has peacekeepers on the ground in Nagorno-Karabakh, to either the OSCE Minsk Group or Turkey, underlining something it has sought since 1994. In fact, Russia has Russia’s dominant role in an area it considers within its not had a military presence in Azerbaijan since the clo- exclusive zone of interest. sure of the Soviet-era Gabala radar station, in 2012. Both Although Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Armenia and Azerbaijan previously rejected the deploy- Treaty Organization, Russia may countenance a role for ment of Russian peacekeepers, and Moscow, Washington, Ankara given its involvement as a partner of Azerbaijan and Paris were formerly in general agreement that any mo- and the recent history of transactional Russian-Turkish nitoring or peacekeeping group should be drawn from the deal-making, including in Syria and Libya. However, alt- OCSE states, but not from the Minsk Group’s co-chairs hough Turkey may eventually be offered a junior part- nor a neighbour of Armenia and Azerbaijan. That formula, nership in the Nagorno-Karabakh arrangements, the which excluded Russia, no longer applies. United States and the European Union are sidelined. The Russian peacekeepers were initially dispatched to Moreover, there has been no fundamental change to the Nagorno-Karabakh from the 102nd military base and have state of frozen conflict that helps Russia exert influence since been complemented by forces from Russia. The pea- over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the Russian pea- cekeeping force has thus increased Russia’s military foot- cekeeping mission is likely to ensure Moscow’s continued print in the region and added to Moscow’s ability to deal centrality. with small-scale crises or the initial phases of a local war. It Given these achievements and the fact that Russia is important, not primarily for its lightly armed soldiers, has staked its credibility on the 9 November agreement, but for the establishment of a new Russian geographical Moscow must be wary of turmoil in Armenia, in so far as foothold and the deployment of command and control it compromises the implementation of the deal. However, structures and support resources, including helicopters. Moscow would not necessarily be displeased if Pashinyan However, it is not without risks. Should tensions in this were edged out of power. Russian trust in the Armenian volatile region rise to the point where Turkey or Iran are prime minister, who gained power through a 2018 popu- drawn into a wider conflict, Russia’s foothold may prove lar uprising, is very low. tenuous. Russian access to the South Caucasus is naturally Despite the new presence of peacekeepers, it rema- limited by geography, since military movements across ins unclear to what extent Armenia can rely on Russian the Greater Caucasus mountain range must primarily pass protection. Russia had previously extended defensive via three land corridors: along the Black or Caspian Sea guarantees to Armenia through a 1997 bilateral agreement coasts, or across the mountains via the Georgia Military as well as its membership in the multilateral Collective Road.