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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Conflicts in the Caucasus: History, Present, and Prospects for Resolution Special Issue Volume 6 Issue 2 2012

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Editorial Council

Eldar Chairman of the Editorial Council () ISMAILOV Tel/fax: (994 – 12) 497 12 22 E-mail: [email protected] Kenan Executive Secretary (Baku) ALLAHVERDIEV Tel: (994 – 12) 596 11 73 E-mail: [email protected] Azer represents the journal in () SAFAROV Tel: (7 – 495) 937 77 27 E-mail: [email protected] Nodar represents the journal in () KHADURI Tel: (995 – 32) 99 59 67 E-mail: [email protected] Ayca represents the journal in (Ankara) ERGUN Tel: (+90 – 312) 210 59 96 E-mail: [email protected]

Editorial Board

Nazim Editor-in-Chief (Azerbaijan) MUZAFFARLI Tel: (994 – 12) 510 32 52 E-mail: [email protected] (IMANOV)

Vladimer Deputy Editor-in-Chief (Georgia) PAPAVA Tel: (995 – 32) 24 35 55 E-mail: [email protected] Akif Deputy Editor-in-Chief (Azerbaijan) ABDULLAEV Tel: (994 – 12) 596 11 73 E-mail: [email protected] Volume 6 IssueMembers 2 2012 of Editorial Board: 3 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Zaza D.Sc. (History), Professor, Corresponding member of the Georgian National Academy ALEKSIDZE of Sciences, head of the scientific department of the Korneli Kekelidze Institute of Manuscripts (Georgia) Mustafa AYDIN Rector of Kadir Has (Turkey) Irina BABICH D.Sc. (History), Leading research associate of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Douglas Professor, Chair of Political Science Department, Providence College (U.S.A.) W. BLUM Svante Professor, Research Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Studies E. CORNELL Program, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS (U.S.A.) Parvin D.Sc. (History), Professor, (Azerbaijan) DARABADI Murad D.Sc. (Political Science), Editor-in-Chief, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal of ESENOV Social and Political Studies (Sweden) Jannatkhan Deputy Director, Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus (Azerbaijan) EYVAZOV Rauf Ph.D. (Psychology), Leading research associate of the Center for Strategic Studies GARAGOZOV under the President of the Azerbaijan Republic (Azerbaijan) Archil Ph.D. (Geography), Senior fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and GEGESHIDZE International Studies (Georgia) Elmir Director of the Department of Geoculture, Institute of Strategic Studies of the GULIEV Caucasus (Azerbaijan) Shamsaddin D.Sc.(Economy), Professor, Rector of the Azerbaijan State Economic University HAJIEV (Azerbaijan) Jamil HASANLI D.Sc. (History), Professor at (Azerbaijan) Stephen Professor, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Mount Holyoke College (U.S.A.) F. JONES Akira Ph.D., History of Central Asia & the Caucasus, Program Officer, The Sasakawa MATSUNAGA Peace Foundation (Japan) Roger Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University MCDERMOTT of Kent at Canterbury; Senior Research Fellow on Eurasian military affairs within the framework of the Eurasia Program of the Jamestown Foundation, Washington (U.K.) Roin D.Sc. (History), Professor, Academician of the Georgian National Academy of METREVELI Sciences, President of the National Committee of Georgian Historians (Georgia) Fuad Ph.D. (Economy), Counselor of the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the MURSHUDLI International Bank of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan) Michael Associate professor, Near Eastern Studies Department, Princeton University (U.S.A.) A. REYNOLDS Alexander Professor, President of Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies RONDELI (Georgia) Mehdi SANAIE Professor, Tehran University, Director, Center for Russian Studies () Avtandil D.Sc. (Economy), Professor, Tbilisi University of International Relations, Corresponding SILAGADZE member of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences (Georgia) S. Frederick Professor, Chairman, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS STARR (U.S.A.) James Professor, Director of the International and Regional Studies Program, Washington V. WERTSCH University in St. Louis (U.S.A.) Alla D.Sc. (History), Professor, head of the Mediterranean-Black Sea Center, Institute of YAZKOVA , Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Stanislav D.Sc. (Economy), Senior Researcher, Institute of World Economy and International ZHUKOV Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

The materials that appear in the journal do not necessarily reflect the Editorial Board and the Editors’ opinion

Editorial Office: THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION © The Caucasus & Globalization, 2012 98 Alovsat Guliyev, AZ1009 © CA&CC Press®, 2012 Baku, Azerbaijan © Institute of Strategic Studies of WEB: www.ca-c.org the Caucasus, 2012 4 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Volume 6 Issue 2 2012

Conflicts in the Caucasus: History, Present, and Prospects for Resolution Special Issue

CONTENTS

GEOPOLITICS

THE ARMENIAN-AZERI NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF Niyazi AZERBAIJAN’S MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX NIYAZOV 7

INFORMATION OPPOSITION Polina TO EXTREMISM AS ZETI, A WAY TO REDUCE TENSION Elena IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS ZHIRUKHINA 22

INDIVISIBLE SOVEREIGNTY: SETBACKS OF FEDERALISM Andrey IN THE CAUCASUS AND AROUND IT ZAKHAROV 30

THE CONFEDERATION OF THE MOUNTAIN PEOPLES OF THE CAUCASUS AND David THE CONFLICT OVER ABKHAZIA MATSABERIDZE 39

SEA POWER IN CAUCASIAN GEOPOLITICS: Parvin PAST AND PRESENT DARABADI 48 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 5 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

THE MAIN PARAMETERS OF Argun TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND BAªKAN, THE POST-2008 CENTRAL CAUCASUS Tanju TOSUN, Aydýn IBRAHIMOV 58

THE U.S.-IRI RELATIONS IN THE REGIONAL SECURITY Vladimir CONTEXT EVSEYEV 65

ON THE GEOPOLITICAL AND LEGAL FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI Fikret NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT SADYKHOV 74

PSEUDO CONFLICTS AND QUASI PEACEKEEPING Alexander IN THE CAUCASUS RUSETSKY 82

SECURITY THREATS AND DE-SECURITIZATION OF CONFLICTS George IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS TARKHAN-MOURAVI 89

GEO-ECONOMICS

CENTRAL ASIA AND AZERBAIJAN: Stanislav LONG-TERM ENERGY STRATEGIES ZHUKOV, Oksana REZNIKOVA 98

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF Amil THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS UNDER MAGERRAMOV, THE PRESSURE OF Hajiaga TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS RUSTAMBEKOV 127

GEOCULTURE

AZERBAIJAN: INDEPENDENCE AND THE RELIGIOUS PARADIGM. (THE ISLAMIC QUESTION AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF Teymur TWENTY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE) ATAEV 135 6 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

NATIONAL CULTURES IN THE Lyubov IN THE 19TH-EARLY 20TH CENTURIES SATUSHIEVA 146

GEOHISTORY

MONUMENTS OF MATERIAL CULTURE AND CONFLICTS IN THE CAUCASUS Rizvan (A FORTRESS OF IREVAN CASE-STUDY) HUSEYNOV 156

ANOTHER LOOK AT ONE OF THE FALSE HISTORICAL POSTULATES OF THE ABKHAZIAN SEPARATIST IDEOLOGY: ON THE QUESTION OF ABKHAZIA’S POLITICAL-STATE STATUS Zurab IN 1921-1931 PAPASKIRI 168 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 7 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOPOLITICS

Niyazi NIYAZOV

Ph.D. (Hist.), Associate Professor at the Chair of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University (St. Petersburg, the Russian Federation).

THE ARMENIAN-AZERI NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AZERBAIJAN’S MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Abstract

his article analyzes the influence of the lic. The analysis also examines the ways in T Armenian-Azeri Nagorno-Karabakh con- which Azerbaijan is cooperating with for- flict on the need to create and develop eign partners to manufacture different types military production in the Azerbaijan Repub- of modern weapons systems.

Introduction

When the collapsed, most experts, without conspiring, unanimously agreed that the downfall of the Soviet Union, a state with colossal military power, primarily occurred due to over- extension of its economy, the main resources of which were used to develop the Soviet military-in- dustrial complex. So it stands to reason that the states emerging from the ruins of the Soviet empire tried as best they could to choose an economic development model that placed the emphasis on en- hancement of the civil sector of the national economy. However, for various reasons, several countries of the post-Soviet expanse were again forced to spend enormous amounts of money on ensuring their military security. One of these countries was Azer- baijan, which was drawn against its will into a full-scale war with over Nagorno-Karabakh. 8 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Liberation of the Occupied Territories as a Driving Force behind the Establishment and Development of the Defense Complex of the Azerbaijan Republic

By the spring of 1994, Armenia’s armed formations had succeeded in occupying Nagorno-Ka- rabakh itself and seven districts of Azerbaijan adjacent to it. After entering a cease-fire agreement, Azerbaijan nurtured the fond hope that it would be able to settle the conflict and liberate the occupied territories within the framework of international law. However, this hope soon proved futile. So the country’s political and military leadership began restoring, or to be more precise, rebuilding its armed forces from scratch, the main objective of which was to prevent a further advance of Armenian troops into the interior of Azerbaijani territory, as well as to liberate the already occupied districts. It was this objective that decided what weapons systems the National Army of Azerbaijan (NAA) and other security and defense structures would need for maintaining the military security system. n The country’s armed forces were primarily in need of tanks, combat armored vehicles, anti-tank artillery systems, attack aviation, and attack helicopters. The purchase of these weapons systems was to have eliminated Armenia’s perceptible superiority in heavy arma- ments, owing to which it was able to achieve appreciable success at the first stage of the Karabakh conflict. n Second, the Azerbaijani army needed communication and fire control systems. n Third, it needed air defense means and aviation systems. n Fourth, it required the latest types of small arms and ammunition for them. As the conflict dragged on, the needed to purchase gun/missile sys- tems capable of destroying the enemy’s engineering and fortification works. This was because, since 1994, the Armenian side had begun building military-engineering structures on the external border of the occupied Azerbaijani territories for repelling an attack of the Azerbaijani army in the event hos- tilities resumed. Given its economic interests in the region, Azerbaijan could not ignore the needs of its navy either. However, determining the need for armaments did not guarantee that the NAA would actually acquire the necessary weapons systems. The main reason for this was that in the mid-1990s-beginning of the 2000s, Baku essentially did not have enough financial resources at its disposal for making mass purchases of heavy weapons systems. This was because the country’s economy was in a protracted crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and world oil prices at that time were extremely low. Of course, the Azerbaijani authorities understood that an efficient economic policy would help to deal with the crisis and that the growing need of the world economy for energy resources would boost a rise in oil prices and, consequently, an increase in the Azerbaijan Republic’s revenues. However, the fragile truce established on the front, along with Armenia’s superiority in heavy weap- ons, made it incumbent on the Azerbaijani authorities to find the resources needed to purchase various weapons systems immediately. The fact that in 1996, Russia provided Armenia with weapons worth $1 billion free of charge caused Azerbaijan to step up its efforts even more.1

1 In Russia itself, a special parliamentary commission led by Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee Lev Rokhlin was engaged in investigating this incident. However, after his tragic death in July 1998, the commission’s activi- ty was reduced to naught. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 9 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

So it is no accident that by the end of the 1990s politicians, military experts, and even econo- mists in Azerbaijan began talking about the need to create the country’s own military-industrial com- plex called upon to at least partially meet the demands of the NAA for weapons and particularly for ammunition. At this time, not one of the former Soviet countries, apart from Russia, , and partly , could boast of having its own military-industrial complex. There can be no doubt that almost all the Union republics still had enterprises that used to belong to the Soviet military-industrial com- plex. But to say that the aggregate of their production capacity automatically led to the formation of a military-industrial complex in the newly independent states is the same as claiming that a skeleton is the sum-total of its bones. The concept “military-industrial complex” was first used by Dwight Eisenhower on 17 January, 1961. In his television address to the nation, he said, “This conjunction of an immense military estab- lishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—econom- ic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal govern- ment. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. …In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwar- ranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.”2 This definition does not entirely apply to the Soviet military-industrial complex since the eco- nomic and political environment in which it functioned was slightly different. So we are inclined to think that the Soviet military-industrial complex was a specific conjunction of various branches of the national economy and party and government councils, the main objective of which was to develop and mass produce the weapons systems required by the army. The Soviet military-industrial complex was able to make use of the capabilities of many branches of the economy for its purposes, as well as the entire national economy in the event of a major war. When industrialization began in the Soviet Union, the country’s regions found themselves drawn into industrial production and internal division of labor. The only exception were the industrial districts and enterprises formed during the time of the Russian empire, one of which was the Baku industrial district. It is no secret that the value of the Baku industrial district lay in the fact that this was where most of the oil was produced to meet the needs of the Russian empire. So it is not surprising that Azerbaijan was one of the first territories of the former empire that the made it imper- ative to gain control over, and on 28 April, 1920 they achieved this goal by establishing Soviet power in Azerbaijan. Baku continued to be the main source of oil for the Soviet Union. By 1940, “the Baku oil indus- try supplied up to 80 percent of high-grade aviation gasoline, 90 percent of heavy benzene and kero- sene, and 96 percent of car-and-tractor oil of the total production of these products in the Soviet Un- ion.”3 At the turn of 1939-1940, the Anglo-French military and political command was even planning to make air strikes on Baku both to support the Finns in their opposition against the Soviet Union and to deprive , which was already fighting against the Western democracies, of a source of petroleum products.4 During World War II, establishing control over the Baku oil sources was one of the Wehrma- cht’s main strategic goals. However, the German advance into the interior of Soviet territory, includ- ing in the direction of the Caucasus, prompted both the transfer of several military enterprises from the western regions of the Soviet Union to the eastern and the transfer of a large number of local enter-

2 “Military-Industrial Complex Speech, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961,” available at [http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/ ~hst306/documents/indust.html]. 3 S. Knyazkov, “Stanet li Baku gorodom-geroem?” Krasnaia zvezda, 22 April, 2005. 4 See: See: A. Stepanov, “Anglo-frantsuzskie plany napadeniia na SSSR v 39-40 gg. Ugolok neba,” available at [http:www.airwar.ru/history/locwar/europe/eng-fr/eng-fr.html]. 10 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION prises to the manufacture of defense production. By the beginning of the winter of 1941, the manufac- ture of 50mm mortar launchers, hand-grenade casings, aerial bombs, mines, as well as the legendary Shpagin submachine guns (PPSh-41) had been established.5 The tempestuous development of military technology and the arms race that unfolded during the Cold War promoted a further increase in the importance of the Baku industrial district and particular- ly of Azerbaijan as a whole in the Soviet military-industrial complex. It was during these years that laser aiming devices, as well as various devices for military aviation and the navy were produced in the republic.6 When the Karabakh conflict began and the Soviet Union collapsed, the Azerbaijani enterprises of the former Soviet military-industrial complex were in dire straits. At first glance, this seems para- doxical, since popular opinion has it that wars help weapons manufacturers to thrive, while almost as soon as it gained its independence Azerbaijan found itself drawn into a bloody conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. However, as emphasized above, the main objective of the Soviet military-industrial complex, which also implies its enterprises in Azerbaijan, was to engage in mass production of the weapons systems required by the Soviet army. And the young, poorly trained and equipped Azerbaijani army of 1991-1993 mainly needed elementary types of weapons—submachine guns, armored vehicles, tanks, attack helicopters, and so on. And although the military electronics produced in Azerbaijan was an important component of different weapons systems, it could not in itself have a direct physical impact on the enemy. What is more, it should be kept in mind that the Soviet practice of training army personnel, particularly in the ground forces, did not envisage permanent use of the latest fire control and navigation systems. This was explained by the high cost of all the electronics installed in Soviet military hardware, which when it broke down caused all kinds of “headaches” for the soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army. Another important factor was that most Soviet officers were rather skep- tical of electronics that could break down at any moment both under the impact of the enemy’s elec- tronic warfare and due to its own unreliability. And they managed to pass on this attitude to the per- sonnel under their command. It stands to reason that the “ascetic” use of military electronics migrated from the Soviet Army to the National Army of Azerbaijan. The same thing also happened in the armed forces of other CIS countries. So the drop in demand for military electronics essentially put a stop to the operation of Azerbaijan’s military enterprises. This was also promoted by the breakdown in coop- erative ties with other enterprises of the former Soviet Union and the transfer to new forms of eco- nomic relations. Nevertheless, the Russian armed forces had a need for the military-technical devices produced in Azerbaijan, and on 25 December, 1993, the governments of the two countries entered an Agree- ment on Production and Scientific-Technical Cooperation of Enterprises of the Defense Industry to the mutual benefit of the sides. In particular, the sides agreed that “they will not sell or transfer to a third party, including foreign physical and legal entities and international organizations mutually obtained military production, scientific and technical information about it, or research results, or use know-how without preliminary mutual consent.”7 However, the sides were still not ready to pool forces to develop and produce “new types of weapons and military technology,”8 which found its way into Art 7 of the above-mentioned agreement.

5 See: S. Knyazkov, op. cit. 6 See: “Baku gotov vypustit voennuiu tekhniku sobstvennogo proizvodstva na rynok,” available at [http:www. izvestia.ru/news/16/news154911/index.html]. 7 Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and Government of the Azerbaijan Republic on Production and Scientific-Technical Cooperation of Enterprises of the Defense Industry, available in Russian at [http: www.novostroy.ru/law/direct.php?num=1019482&id=105&sort=num2&type=gov]. 8 Ibidem. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 11 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

By the end of the 1990s, restoration of industrial production began in Azerbaijan, as it also did in Russia. At essentially the same time, the price of raw hydrocarbons and weapons rose in the world markets. These two factors soon gave a powerful boost to the revival of Azerbaijan’s enterprises of the former Soviet military-industrial complex.

The Establishment and Special Features of the Development of the Military-Industrial Complex of the Azerbaijan Republic

After oil revenue began to steadily rise, Azerbaijan started modernizing and technically re- equipping its army, without hiding the fact that the main task of its armed forces was to liberate the occupied territories from Armenian troops and restore control over Nagorno-Karabakh. At essentially the same time, the Russian Federation began engaging in combat operations in the Northern Caucasus aimed at eradicating the separatist movement in Chechnia. Moscow’s use of force to restore its sovereignty in the Northern Caucasus was met with understanding in Baku. In addition, Azerbaijan began rendering Russia all the assistance it could in fighting the terrorist groups operating in the Northern Caucasus.9 During his visit to Baku in November 1999, Vice Premier Ilya Klebanov was assured by Azerbaijan Defense Minister Safar Abiev that Azerbaijan “will not permit penetration [of militants] into Chechnia and vice versa.” At the same time, the sides agreed “to step up joint efforts between the Russian and Azerbaijani military-industrial com- plexes” and the Russian vice premier stated that the military-industrial complex of Azerbaijan “has been kept in very good condition.”10 This statement cannot be put down to mere diplomatic etiquette. The fact that the production potential of Azerbaijan’s industrial enterprises was better preserved than in the Russian Federation was due to the entirely different way in which state property in the Azerbaijan Republic had been privatized. First, mass transfer of state property into private hands began in Azerbaijan much later, not until 1995, while second, privatization primarily affected commercial, light and agricultural enterprises, as well as the service sphere. Heavy industry enterprises, on the other hand, long remained under state control and although the delay in privatization cost Azerbaijan 62% of its GDP, according to some data,11 much to its own surprise, the country managed to preserve the capabilities of its defense fac- tories. However, at the turn of the 21st century, it was still too early to talk about Baku having a well- organized and efficient military-industrial complex. Still, one of the priority tasks for the Azerbaijani political leadership has been to establish its own military-industrial complex. In January 2001, the Milli Mejlis (parliament) of Azerbaijan came forward with an initiative to draw up a draft law On the Military Industry. Adoption and implementation of this document was to have created a legislative base for developing the military industry, as well as to have helped resolve the problem of unemployment in the country.

9 See: E.V. Bakhrevskiy, “20 let politicheskikh vzaimootnoshenii Rossii i Azerbaidzhana. Istoriia i osnovnye prob- lemy,” in: Rossiisko-azerbaidzhanskie otnosheniia za 20 let. Istoriia i perspektivy, Baku, 2011, p. 20. 10 “Rossiisko-azerbaidzhanskaia granitsa na troinom zamke,” available at [http:www.lenta.ru/vojna/1999/11/26/az- erbaijan/_Printed.htm]. 11 See: “Transformatsiia form sobstvennosti v Azerbaidzhane: itogi pervoi privatizatsii,” available at [http:www. mcds.ru/default.asp?Mode=Review&ID_L0=4&ID_L1=43&ID_L2=400&ID_L3=982&ID=&ID_Review=59407]. 12 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In the meantime, Russia continued to show an interest in acquiring the military-technical products it needed from Azerbaijan. And by the spring of 2002, Russian experts came to the con- clusion that “it would be beneficial for Russia to manufacture military products in cooperation with the CIS countries.” Head of the Department of Export Control and Cooperative Deliveries of the Russian Ministry of Industry and Science Vladimir Belukov informed the media of this, noting that the Azerbaijan Republic “is cooperatively delivering microcircuits, antenna filters, and air condi- tioners.”12 In turn, the Azerbaijan Republic was well aware of the extent to which agreements with the Russian Federation in joint military production could promote the development of the republic’s military-industrial complex. As a result, in September 2003, an agreement was signed between the governments of Russia and Azerbaijan On Preserving Specialization of Enterprises and Organiza- tions Participating in the Military Production.13 As Baku began spending large amounts of money on modernizing its armed forces, other CIS countries began showing an interest in mutually beneficial cooperation with Azerbaijan in the mili- tary-technical sphere, the Republic of Belarus being one of the first. In November 2004, an Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Belarus and the Azerbaijan Republic on Production and Scientific-Technical Cooperation of Enterprises and Organ- izations of the Defense Industry was signed,14 and a year later, when submitting the mentioned doc- ument to the parliament for ratification, Chairman of the State Military-Industrial Committee Nikolay Azamatov stated on behalf of the executive power of Belarus: “We have signed and begun executing a large number of contracts in modernization, major repair, and the delivery of spare parts that are not manufactured in Azerbaijan.”15 In addition to this, he noted “Belarus’ special interest in this agree- ment,”16 while the sides also held talks on restoring a tank repair factory in Azerbaijan and were will- ing to also enhance “cooperation on air defense systems and electronic warfare.”17 After forming a legal foundation for cooperation in the military-technical sphere, the sides be- gan establishing production and technological ties between the corresponding structures of Belarus and Azerbaijan. In July 2006, a delegation of the Ministry of the Defense Industry of the Azerbaijan Republic headed by Yaver Jamalov visited Minsk. This gave Azeri specialists a close look at the military-industrial complex of Belarus. By the spring of 2007, the sides no longer found it necessary to hide the fact that the “Ministry of the Defense Industry of Azerbaijan and the State Committee for the Military Industry of Belarus are planning to engage in cooperation.”18 The Azeri side was particularly interested in modernizing its air defense system in military- technical cooperation with Belarus. In 2005, Russian military specialists were inclined to evaluate this system as “very weak,” although they also declared that modernization of Azerbaijan’s air de- fense system would be carried out with the help of Russia and the U.S.19 In the fall of 2009, the public was informed that the OSA surface-to-air missile system had been modernized in Azerbaijan with the

12 “Rossii vygodno proizvodit promyshlennuiu produktsiiu v kooperatsii so stranami SNG, schitaiut v Minprom- nauki RF,” available at [http:www.mfit.ru/defensive/obzor/ob05-04-02-5.html]. 13 See: Agreement between the Governments of Russia and Azerbaijan On Preserving Specialization of Enterprises and Organizations Participating in the Manufacture of Military Products, available in Russian at [www.kremlin.ru/interdocs/ 2002/09/23/2123_type72066_30521.shtml]. 14 See: Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Belarus and the Azerbaijan Republic on Production and Scientific-Technical Cooperation of Enterprises and Organizations of the Defense Industry, available in Russian at [www.pravoby.info/megdoc/part0/megd0492.htm]. 15 Quoted from: Interfax, 5 October, 2005. 16 ITAR-TASS, 5 October, 2005. 17 Interfax, 5 October, 2005. 18 “Belorusskie spetsialisty pomogut v razvitii oboronnoi promyshlennosti Azerbaidzhana,” 30 March, 2007, avail- able at [http:bpla-news.ru/belorusskie-specialisty-pomogut-v-razvitii-oboronnoj-promyshlennosti-azerbajdzhana/]. 19 See: I. Plugatarev, “Baku i Erevan zapugivaiut drug druga,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 11 November, 2005, available at [http:www.ng.ru/nvo/2005-11-11/9_gonka.html]. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 13 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION assistance of Belarusian specialists. This promoted a 20% increase in the combat capabilities of the complexes. It was also reported that “the S-125 Pechora surface-to-air missile system is being modernized in the workshops of a local factory… The first vehicles will be ready for combat duty in Azerbaijan before the end of the year [2009].”20 In the fall of 2010, with reference to the Bela- rusian TV channel STV, the Azerbaijani news portal “1news.az” reported that modernization would increase the combat potential of the indicated air defense system by 70% and that Pechora was under- going enhancement at a specially built factory not far from Baku.21 Kiev could not help but notice that Baku was stepping up its cooperation with Moscow and Minsk with respect to development of Azerbaijan’s military production. As early as the 1990s, Ukraine was actively selling Azerbaijan all kinds of weapons systems, both those it inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union and those manufactured in the 1990s. But this country did not rush to establish cooperation with Azerbaijan in establishing its own military-industrial complex. This was possibly associated both with the Ukrainian side’s low assessment of the effectiveness of this cooper- ation and with fears that development of the Azerbaijani defense complex would deprive Kiev of a certain number of contracts from Baku. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s interest in close cooperation with Azerbaijan, both in petroleum prod- uct deliveries and in advancing its own technology onto foreign markets, prompted Kiev to intensify its interaction with Baku in military production. At the end of 2006, during his visit to Azerbaijan, the then Prime Minister of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich said that “Ukraine and Azerbaijan see great prospects for cooperation in the military- industrial complex and will implement several joint projects.”22 In April 2009, the sides signed a Protocol on Making Amendments to the Intergovernmental Agreement on Military-Technical Coop- eration of 24 March, 1997 in Baku aimed at promoting closer cooperation in the military sphere.23 This agreement helped to strengthen military cooperation between the sides, including in the production of various weapons systems. For example, in May 2011, Minister of the Defense Industry of the Azerbaijan Republic Yaver Jamalov talked of the sides’ willingness to begin joint production in Azerbaijan of guided Skif and Barier anti-tank missiles.24 The increase in the National Army of Azerbaijan’s need for military products of its own manu- facture, the establishment of mutually advantageous cooperation with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine in military security, and the continuing standoff in the war with Armenia due to the Armenian-Azeri Nagorno-Karabakh conflict led to institutionalization of the control system of Azerbaijan’s military- industrial complex. On 16 December, 2005 President Ilham Aliev’s order was publicized, which said that the Ministry of the Defense Industry was being established on the basis of the Azerbaijan Repub- lic Committee for Special Machine-Building and Conversion, which was earlier engaged in military production matters.25

20 “Belorussky voenprom proshel ispytania gorami,” available at [http://news.21.by/world/2009/10/19/ 386251.html]. 21 See: “Belarus modernizirovala raketnuiu sistemu ‘Pechora,’ sostoiashchuiu na vooruzhenii VS Azerbaidzhana,” available at [http:1news.az/politics/20101026111538921.html]. 22 “Pravitelstvennye delegatsii Ukrainiy i Azerbaidzhana rassmotreli sovmestnye proekty v voenno-promyshlen- nom komplekse,” Elektronni visti, available at [http:elvisti.com/node/63906]. 23 See: “V. Iushchenko i I. Aliev podpisali Plan meropriaty ukrainsko-azerbaidzhanskogo sotrudnichestva na 2009- 2010 gody,” available at [http:www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/13477.html?PrintVersion]. 24 See: “R. Suleimanov, Ministr: “Azerbaidjan i Ukraina budut sovmestno proizvodit upravliaemye protivotanko- vye rakety ‘Skif’ i ‘Barier,’” (Minister: “Azerbaijan and Ukraine will jointly produce controllable Skif and Barier anti- tank missiles), available at [http:ru.apa.az/news_%D0%9C%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80:_% C2%AB%D0%90%D0%B7%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B1%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%B4%D0%B6%D0%B0%D0%BD_%D0%B8_%D0%A3% D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0__193180.html]. 25 See: Order of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic on Creating a Ministry of the Defense Industry of the Az- erbaijan Republic, Ministry of the Defense Industry of the Azerbaijan Republic, available at [http:www.mdi.gov.az/?/ru/ content/392/]. 14 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Establishment of the new ministry was a logical step for the Azerbaijan Republic authorities in forming the country’s own defense complex. This was why Armenian authors’ claim that adoption of this decision was related to political opposition in the upper echelons of power in Azerbaijan looks strange.26 Institutionalization of the control system of the Azerbaijan Republic military-industrial com- plex aroused not only the interest of its traditional partners—Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine— in Azer- baijan’s military production, but also Iran’s. On 16 August, 2006, Ambassador of the Islamic Repub- lic of Iran to Azerbaijan Afshar Suleimani said that “the Iranian military industry is very developed. Iran can render Azerbaijan all kinds of assistance in creating its own military-industrial complex. Our countries could sign an agreement on cooperation in this sphere.”27 However, Baku was not very enthusiastic about this proposal. There were several reasons for this. n First, Azerbaijan was not very happy with Tehran’s position regarding settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Baku justifiably believed that were it not for Iran’s assistance to Armenia, Erevan would not have been able to meet the needs of its economy for oil, which would have had an impact on the ability of the Armenian army to keep part of Azerbaijani territory under its control. n Second, Baku was well aware that Tehran wanted to spread its influence to secular Azerbai- jan (North Azerbaijan) in order to protect itself from the growing nationalist movement in North Iran (South Azerbaijan). n Third, despite the statement of the Iranian ambassador, Iran’s military-industrial complex would most likely be unable to offer the Azerbaijan Republic any real assistance in setting up an integrated production cycle for any modern weapons system, since it was well known that Iran itself was purchasing the latest models of military technology and weapons abroad, pri- marily in Russia. n Fourth, Baku had to keep in mind that Iran was a target of criticism of the international com- munity due to its nuclear program and if international sanctions were introduced against this country, all the possible pluses in military cooperation with Iran could turn into a big minus. After the Ministry of the Defense Industry was established, formation of the national military-in- dustrial complex began to gain momentum in Azerbaijan itself. In the spring of 2007, information ap- peared that “a development program for the military-industrial complex will be drawn up in Azerbai- jan.”28 According to the reports from Baku, since its establishment, the Ministry of the Defense Industry had been engaged in studying the experience of Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and even Rumania with respect to setting up military production. Moreover, the information agency Day.az reported that a scientific research institute would be established in the ministry for drawing up a development program for the military-industrial complex.29 So formation of Azerbaijan’s military-industrial complex was also given a scientific boost. However, funds estimated at 300 million manats for launching operation of the defense enterprises were the driving force behind cranking up the military-industrial complex. There can be no doubt that the necessary means were allotted from Azerbaijan’s state treasury for this purpose. Direct evidence of this was the fact that Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliev took part in the opening of the Peyk (Satellite) plant on 21 December, 2007, which belonged to the Iqlim (Cli- mate) scientific-production association.

26 See: G. Melik-Shakhnazarian, “Oboronno-promyshlenny kompleks Azerbaidzhana ne sposoben pokryt potreb- nosti armii,” available at [www.regnum.ru/news/830210.html], 20 May, 2007. 27 “Tegeran gotov uchastvovat v sozdanii voenno-promyshlennogo kompleksa Azerbaidzhana,” available at [http:www.polpred.com/country/az/news.html?section=20&id=53418&type=paid&country=7]. 28 “V Azerbaidzhane budet razrabotana programma razvitiia voenno-promyshlennogo kompleksa,” available at [http:www.day.az/news/economy/75683.html]. 29 See: Ibidem. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 15 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Launching Peyk into military production was a significant event in the development of Azerbai- jan’s military-industrial complex, since the republic was able to find the funds to finish building the plant, the production of which was to meet the needs of the Soviet army. What is more, modernization of production led to “approximately 40% of all the enterprise’s equipment being replaced.”30 As early as the beginning of 2008, one of the Day.az information agency’s sources in the Azerbaijan govern- ment said that new military enterprises would begin operating in the republic at which “armored per- sonnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles, as well as small-caliber artillery mounts” would be manufactured. , Belarus, and possibly Turkey were named as partners in the production of these weapons systems.31 The increase in number of countries drawn into the production processes of Azerbaijan’s mili- tary-industrial complex led not only to setting up the manufacture of new product lines, but also helped to shape the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry’s new goal of making its debut in the world mar- kets, said Azerbaijani Minister of the Defense Industry Yaver Jamalov in February 2008.32 The fact that Azerbaijan’s military-industrial complex had achieved its first significant success in manufactur- ing defense production became known on 5 April, 2008 when Yaver Jamalov reported that “mass production of 29 types of weapons and ammunition” had been set up in 2007, whereby the inventory of military products comprised a total of 212 items.33 Two days later, the head of the Ministry of the Defense Industry declared that a modernization program had been prepared in the republic for 2008- 2011 for 53 facilities belonging to Azerbaijan’s military-industrial complex. It was also reported that “in 2008, 80 new products will be created and a product range of 44 defense items will be manufactured under the State Defense Contract Program. The Ministry of the Defense Industry is being issued 66,070 million manats from the country’s state budget this year. This money is to be used to purchase 128 items for processing centers and lathes, as well as to develop defense systems … ten types of modern technology will be bought in developed countries and 159 million manats will be issued for creating production areas for them under the Investment Program.”34 In so doing, the minister emphasized that “under the State Defense Contract Program, current and future programs have been drawn up for defense production … the needs of the Ministry of Defense and other defense and security structures for repair of small arms, military hardware, and other defense products are being studied.”35 At the same time, Baku understood that even when fully established, Azerbaijan’s military-in- dustrial complex would not be able to meet all the needs of its own army for heavy weapons, primarily for aviation and armored tank hardware. However, for this reason, just as before, large amounts of money would have to be spent on purchasing these weapons systems. Nevertheless, development of the defense complex remained in the center of the Azerbaijani leadership’s attention. On 26 June, 2008, speaking at a military parade dedicated to the 90th anniversary of the establishment of the Na- tional Army of Azerbaijan, President Ilham Aliev said, “We must create a powerful military-industri- al complex in the country as quickly as possible. We are already enjoying the first results of the efforts in this sphere. This shows that all the decisions made are being executed quickly and at a high level of expertise. However, at the moment we are buying a large amount of weapons, ammunition, military hardware, and combat airplanes abroad. This process is continuing and our cooperation with friendly

30 M. Novruzov, “Ilham Aliev posetil predpriiatia Ministerstva oboronnoi promyshlennosti,” available at [http: www.day.az/news/economy/102152.html]. 31 See: “V Azerbaidzhane nachnut rabotu novye voennye predpriiatia,” available at [http:www.day.az/news/economy/ 105647.html]. 32 See: “Azerbaidzhan planiruet v perspektive postavliat produktsiiu svoego voenno-promyshlennogo kompleksa na mirovoi rynok,” available at [http://www.day.az/news/economy/107697.html]. 33 See: “Azerbaidzhan na 55% povysil proizvodstvo produktsii oboronnogo, spetsialnogo i grazhdanskogo naznacheniia,” available at [http:www.day.az/news/economy/114661.html]. 34 “Chto ozhidaet oboronnuiu promyshlennost Azerbaidzhana,” Zerkalo, 26 July, 2008. 35 “V Azerbaidzhane podgotovlena programma po rekonstruktsii 53 ob’ektov voenno-promyshlennogo komplek- sa,” available at [http:www.day.az/news/economy/114661.html]. 16 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION countries in this area is getting stronger. But we want to ensure that most of the military hardware, weapons, and ammunition Azerbaijan needs is produced in Azerbaijan.”36 Development of the production capacities of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of the Defense Industry riv- eted the attention of nations that had stable political and economic interests in Azerbaijan to the re- public’s military-industrial complex even more. One of these nations, Turkey, began showing partic- ular interest by the summer of 2008. During his visit to Azerbaijan in June-July, Turkish Under-Sec- retary for Defense Murad Bayar openly stated that “in Azerbaijan, the military industry is a new branch. There are enterprises remaining from Soviet times at which certain products are manufac- tured… We will expand our ties with Azerbaijan. In the future, we will be able to manufacture corre- sponding products jointly with Azerbaijan based on its needs.”37 First of all, the Turkish official insistently offered services for modernizing the fire control sys- tems of Soviet-produced Azerbaijani armored vehicles, and also called for pooling efforts to develop and manufacture tanks and drones.38 It was after this visit that information appeared to the effect that “Baku and Ankara are planning to sign a memorandum and protocol on cooperation in the defense industry.”39 It should be noted that this agreement was a logical continuation of the Azeri-Turkish military cooperation that began in 1992.40 Intensive talks with the Turkish side on cooperation in military production were supplemented with specific projects. At the end of 2008, during his visit to Baku, Head of the International Cooper- ation Department of the Under-Secretariat of Defense Industries Lufti Varoðlu openly stated for the first time that, “the main goal of my visit is to expand and develop cooperation in military produc- tion,” adding that “today, the first steps have been taken toward cooperation between Turkish and Azeri enterprises operating in military production.”41 At that time, Lufti Varoðlu confirmed the information that “in March 2009 Rokestan and Iqlim would begin producing 107mm and 122mm multi-barreled missile launchers.”42 Moreover, the representative of the Turkish military industry stated that Turkey’s largest military cooperation ASELSAN had already begun installing the Vulcan fire control system on T-72 tanks of the Azer- baijani army. At the same time, he confessed that the desire of this company to participate in the new generation station project had still not found support with the Azerbaijan Ministry of De- fense. Nor could the sides come to terms on further joint modernization of the T-55 tanks removed from the arsenal of the NAA. On the other hand, according to the information of the high-ranking official from the Turkish defense department, the enterprises of his country were already success- fully cooperating with Azerbaijan in modernizing the fire control system for Soviet-manufactured BTR-60, BTR-70, and BTR-80 armored personnel carriers. With respect to the possibility of Azer- baijan participating in implementing the program for manufacturing the Turkish tank, Altai, which is a modernized version of the South Korean tank, XK2, Lufti Varoðlu deemed it necessary to note

36 Speech by , Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Ilham Aliev at a ceremo- nial military parade in Baku on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the National Army, available in Russian at [http:www.prezident.az/articles.php?item_id=20080627103314818&sec_id=11]. 37 “Armii Azerbaidzhana i Turtsii dolzhny byt osnashcheny odnim oruzhiem,” available at [http:www.milaz.info/ news.php?id=2570]. 38 See: Ibidem. 39 “Baku i Ankara planiruiut sotrudnichat v oboronnoi promyshlennosti,” Novaia gazeta, 21 July, 2007, available at [http:www.ng.ru/cis/2008-07-21/5_Azerbaidzhan.html]. 40 For more detail about the history of Azerbaijani-Turkish military cooperation, see: M.F. Öztarsu, “Military Rela- tions of Azerbaijan and Turkey,” available at [http:www.turkishforum.com/content/2008/11/24/military-relations-of- azerbaijan-and-turkey/]. 41 L. Varoðlu, “Gdldn il Azdrbaycan Türkiyd ild birgd hdrbi mdhsullar istehsal eddcdk” (Next year Azerbaijan and Turkey will Produce Joint Weapons), available at [http:www.milaz.info/news.php?id=3868]. 42 “Azerbaidzhan i Turtsiia budut proizvodit sovmestnoe vooruzhenie,” available at [http:www.day.az/news/econo- my/141759.html]. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 17 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION that this was a good idea, but it was up to the Azeri side to decide whether it wanted to join the project.43 At the end of 2008, Minister of the Defense Industry of the Azerbaijan Republic Yaver Jam- alov said that the country would also be ready to begin manufacturing “the first helicopters”44 in 2016. It is possible that use will once more be made of the experience and technology of the Turkish side, which in September 2009 also announced that it would begin manufacturing its own helicop- ters between 2009 and 2016, without excluding in so doing the possibility of cooperating with oth- er states.45 While augmenting the volumes of joint production with Turkey, Azerbaijan is not forgetting about the possibilities of its other allies, including Pakistan and Jordan. From the very beginning of military cooperation with these countries, Baku showed a great interest in Pakistan’s military technol- ogy. In 2006, the Pakistani side expressed its willingness both to sell Azerbaijan certain weapons systems and to set up joint manufacture of several types of weapons. This was announced by the then Pakistani Prime Minister Shovkat Aziz during a visit to Baku.46 In November 2008, Yaver Jamalov paid a visit to Pakistan, during which he met with “ministers of the defense industry and defense of Pakistan and other officials … of the defense industry.”47 Some time later, the head of the Ministry of the Defense Industry said the country was ready to manufacture aerial bombs based on Pakistani technology.48 In May 2009, with reference to the Azeri ANS Information Agency, the Regnum Information Agency reported that talks were going on be- tween the ministers of the defense industry of Azerbaijan and Pakistan on providing Azerbaijan with technology for the mass production of 85mm to 152mm-caliber ammunition to be used by tanks and artillery. It was also noted that the Azerbaijan Republic would receive licenses to produce 50, 100, 250, and 500 kg aerial bombs.49 At the beginning of March 2010, the Azeri media reported on Ilham Aliev’s participation in the opening ceremony of the country’s new or reconstructed military-industrial complex enterprises. A photo posted on the Azerbaijan president’s official website showed Ilham Aliev and Yaver Jamalov viewing samples of the products manufactured at one of country’s defense complex enterprises that clearly show an aerial bomb and air missile.50 Judging by everything, they were manufactured on the basis of Pakistani technology. In the fall of 2009, a Pakistani military delegation headed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of- Staff Committee of the Armed Forces of Pakistan General Tariq Majid arrived in the Azerbaijan cap- ital. In addition to meetings with the political and military leadership of Azerbaijan, the high-ranking Pakistani military official also visited the Ministry of the Defense Industry of the Azerbaijan Repub- lic. At the meeting, the sides exchanged opinions “about the further development of relations … in the defense industry.”51

43 See: L. Varoðlu, op. cit. 44 “Azerbaidzhan nameren nachat proizvodstvo bespilotnikov,” available at [http:lenta.ru/news/2008/12/24/drones/]. 45 See: U. Enginsoy, B. Bekdil, “Turkey Eyes Light Utility Helicopter Production,” available at [http:www. defensenews.com/story.php?i=4268573&c=EUR&s=TOP]. 46 See: J. Sumerenli, M. Mamedov, “Pakistan gotov predostavit Azerbaidzhanu voennuiu tekhniku v obmen na neft,” Zerkalo, 5 May, 2006. 47 “Zavershen vizit ministra oboronnoi promyshlennosti Azerbaidzhana v Pakistan,” available at [http:www. regnum.ru/news/1090853.html]. 48 See: “Azerbaidzhan nameren nachat proizvodstvo bespilotnikov.” 49 See: “Azerbaidzhan pristupaet k seriinomu proizvodstvu artilleriiskogo vooruzheniia,” available at [http:www. regnum.ru/news/1165617.html]. 50 See: “Prezident Ilham Aliev prinial uchastie v otkrytii novykh proizvodstvennykh uchastkov na predpriiatii ‘Ig- lim’ Proizvodstvennogo ob’edineniia ‘Sharg,’” available at [http:www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=2010030501393 4349&sec_id=20]. 51 “V Ministerstve oboronnoi promyshlennosti sostoialas vstrecha delegatsii Islamskoi Respubliki Pakistan,” avail- able at [http:www.mdi.gov.az/?/ru/news/view/37]. 18 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

A direct result of the cooperation between Azerbaijan and Jordan in military production was the start of mass assembly in Baku, at the Computer Plant, of Marauder and Matador armored vehicles withstanding high explosives that are a joint product of Jordan’s KADDB52 and South Africa’s Par- amount Group, which has the exclusive right to distribute these vehicles in the international market.53 This was why at the end of 2008, Yaver Jamalov announced the start of mass production of “armored hardware under a contract with South Africa,”54 and not with Jordan. The above-mentioned statement by the minister of the defense industry also mentioned that Azerbaijan would soon begin manufacturing drones. Although Yaver Jamalov “did not specify whether … the drones would be entirely of the country’s own development or whether foreign tech- nology would be used to manufacture them,”55 most military analysts agreed that the country would most likely make use of Israeli technology in the mass production of drones. At the end of June 2009, Israeli President Shimon Peres visited Azerbaijan. One of the members of the delegation he headed was Director-General of the Ministry of Defense of Pinchas Buchris. On 29 June, he and the Israeli experts accompanying him were welcomed by Yaver Jam- alov.56 A little later, the Azerbaijani Information Agency Milaz.info reported with reference to the Turkish press that after four years of talks Azerbaijan and Israel had signed an agreement that envis- aged the possibility of manufacturing military equipment in keeping with Israeli technology at the enterprises of the Azerbaijan Republic’s military-industrial complex.57 In September 2009, it became known that the Israeli concern Elbit Systems had opened its rep- resentative office in Azerbaijan. This information may not have drawn particular attention had it not been known that “two defense concerns—Israel Airspace Industries (IAI) and Elbit Systems—are manufacturing drones in Israel.”58 At that time, it was openly stated that Elbit Systems was working with the Ministry of the Defense Industry of Azerbaijan on a project for manufacturing drones.59 It was also noted that the manufacture not only of surveillance drones, but also of drones capable of carrying “small missiles” would be launched.60 At the end of 2009, Yaver Jamalov said that drones would begin being manufactured in 2010.61 With some delay compared with the scheduled date, on 3 March, 2011, the AZAD Systems Co. enterprise of the ªdrg Production Association of the Azerbai- jan Ministry of the Defense Industry, at which the manufacture of Israeli-developed drones began, opened in Baku.62 The Azerbaijan Ministry of the Defense Industry actively cooperated with Israeli defense enter- prises not only in the manufacture of aviation systems, but also of other types of weapons and military hardware. In September, when Elbit Systems opened its representative office in Baku, the Azeri me-

52 [http:kaddb.mil.jo/static/about1.shtm]. 53 See: S. Wei, “Proizvodstvo novykh bronirovannykh mashin,” available at [www.army-guide.com]. 54 “Azerbaijan nameren nachat proizdvodstvo bespilotnikov.” 55 Ibidem. 56 See: “V Ministerstve oboronnoi promyshlennosti sostoialas vstrecha,” available at [http:www.mdi.gov.az/?/ru/ news/view/33/]. 57 See: “Azdrbaycanla Ýsrail arasýnda hdrbi sahddd böyük razýlaþma gözldnilir” (A Major Agreement is Expected Between Azerbaijan and Israel), available at [http:www.milaz.info/news.php?id=9714]. 58 I. Konovalov, “Bespilotniki stolknuli izrailskie ministerstva. Minoborony i MID possorilis iz-za kontrakta dlia Rossii,” available at [http:vpk.name/news/23667_bespilotniki_stolknuli_izrailskie_ministerstva_minoboronyi_i_mid_possorilis_ izza_kontrakta_dlya_rossii.html]. 59 See: “Krupneishaia voennaia kompaniia Izrailia otkryla predstavitelstvo v Azerbaidzhane,” available at [http:ru.apa. az/news_Êðóïíåéøàÿ_âîåííàÿ_êîìïàíèÿ_Èçðàèëÿ__143983.html]. 60 See: “Azdrbaycan pilotsuz tdyyard istehsalýna baþlayýr” (Azerbaijan Begins Manufacturing Drones), available at [http:www.milaz.info/news.php?id=6753]. 61 See: “Azerbaidzhan naladit v 2010 godu proizvodstvo bespilotnykh letatelnykh apparatov,” available at [http: www.milaz.info/ru/news.php?id=13006]. 62 See: “A New Enterprise, AZAD Systems Co. of the ªdrg Production Association of the Azerbaijan Ministry of the Defense Industry, Goes into Operation,” available at [http:www.azerbaijan.az/portal/newsru.html?action=GetFullN ews&ldid=2005-07-26<id=21:42:12&ndid=2011-03-04&nid=4]. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 19 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION dia reported that the country “is holding talks with two Turkish and one Israeli company” on the joint production of armored vehicles. Admittedly, it was not clarified whether they would be new genera- tion combat vehicles or whether it was a matter of creating “full-tracked combat hardware, self-pro- pelled bridges, and armored combat freight hardware on the basis of T-54 and T-55 tanks removed from the arsenal.”63 So Azeri-Israeli cooperation in military production began to gain momentum, and at the begin- ning of 2010, it became known that a new agreement was to be entered between these countries64 that would promote expansion of military cooperation between the sides. And indeed, in 2012 an agree- ment was signed between Azerbaijan and Israel on deliveries of various weapons systems totalling more than $1.5 billion. It can be presumed that several types of hardware and weapons intended for the NAA were to be assembled on the basis of Israeli parts at enterprises of the Azerbaijan military- industrial complex. After the August events of 2008, Russia, which had stepped up its Caucasian foreign policy, also began to offer Azerbaijan closer cooperation in defense production. This is possibly why the Georgian information portal Gruziia Online, under the almost panic-striken heading “Russia Wants to Make Azerbaijan Militarily Dependent on It,” published information on 21 October, 2008 from the Doktrina Research Center, which in part said that during the meeting between Azeri and Russian Ministers of Defense Safar Abiev and Alexander Serdiukov, the Russian side suggested that Russian companies participate in Azerbaijan’s defense industry. Analysts of the Doktrina Center claimed that “Moscow believes that Russian companies should take active part in creating Azerbaijan’s military- industrial complex. Otherwise Western companies will come to the Azeri market and put an end to Azerbaijan’s military dependence on Russia.”65 Despite the slightly populist tone of this conclusion, it should be noted that it is largely true, however with the stipulation that not only Western countries are trying to penetrate the Azeri market of weapons and military production, but also arms manufacturers from the East European countries. From this viewpoint, it must be confessed that Russia already lags far behind Belarus and particularly Ukraine in the joint production of various weapons systems at the enterprises of Azerbaijan’s Minis- try of the Defense Industry. Admittedly, the Russian side still has one advantage, which is that the Russian Federation can offer Azerbaijan joint production of more up-to-date types of weapons than Belarus, Ukraine, and in part Turkey. Contemporary economic reality is such that Russia cannot ig- nore the fact that Azerbaijan, in contrast to many other countries interested in developing military- technical cooperation with Moscow, also has the financial possibilities for this. The increase in the production capacities of the Azerbaijani military-industrial complex has made it possible for it to begin manufacturing weapons systems based on its own developments. The large-caliber Istiqlal anti-material sniper rifle has become an indisputed leader among them.This rifle was first demonstrated at the ÝDEAS-2008 International Defense Exhibition held in the Pakistani city of Karachi. As was to be expected, the 14.5-mm sniper rifle capable of reaching a target 2,400 m away aroused great interest among military specialists.66 The rifle was next successfully demonstrated at the IDEF 2009 international exhibition of technology and production of the defense industry held in April 2009 in Istanbul. Before it opened, Azeri gunmakers also showed “optical targets, armored personnel carriers, automatic missile launchers, and electronic circuits of Azeri manufacture” in Tur-

63 “Azerbaidzhan, Turtsiia i Izrail naladiat sovmestnoe proizvodstvo bronemashin,” available at [http:news. bakililar.az/news_azerbayjan_turciya_i_25038.html]. 64 See: “Azdrbaycanla Ýsrail arasýnda hdrbi sahddd böyük razýlaþma gözldnilir” (A Major Agreement is to be Signed between Azerbaijan and Israel). 65 “Rossiia khochet postavit Azerbaidzhan v voennuiu zavisimost ot sebia,” Gruziia Online, available at [http: apsny.ge/news/1224649308.php]. 66 See: “Milli ‘Ýstiqlal’ snayper tüfdngi maraða sdbdb olur” (The Istiqlal Sniper Rifle Arouses Great Interest), avail- able at [http:www.milaz.info/news.php?id=4296]. 20 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION key.67 During the exhibition, enterprises of Bulgaria, Croatia, Turkey, Egypt, and the U.S. defense industry showed an interest in the products of the Azerbaijani military-industrial complex. “Talks were held [with the latter] on the purchase of certain types of production of the Azerbaijan defense industry.”68 It was in Istanbul that Azeri specialists first heard the opinion that predominated in the military circles of most countries of the world that the desirable caliber for heavy sniper rifles is 12.7 mm, since a larger caliber make this weapon difficult to handle on the battle field.69 Judging by everything, this was why the decision was made to manufacture the 12.7-mm version of the Istiglal sniper rifle.70 However, in so doing, the experience of its own Karabakh war, which at the beginning of 2010 assumed the nature of a protracted and positional conflict, prompted the Azeri side to reach an entirely different conclusion, specifically that the caliber of the sniper rifle should be increased. For this reason, Azerbaijan set to work manufacturing sniper rifles of 23mm and 30mm caliber in 2010-2011. This was reported by Minister of the Defense Industry Yaver Jamalov in an interview with the Lent.az Information Agency.71 The Azerbaijan military-industrial complex is successfully assimilating not only manufacture of large-caliber sniper rifles, but also new generation Ýnam, Zdfdr, and Zdfdr-K pistols. Information about the successful testing of the new pistols, which in terms of their performance characteristics are superior to Soviet-made TT and Makarov pistols, first appeared in October 2009. It was noted that “both pistols were manufactured jointly with the Turkish TÝSAÞ Company.”72 In mid-December 2009, Yaver Jamalov said that mass production of the new pistols had already begun, once more emphasizing that they meet NATO standards.73 In so doing, the minister also stressed the high quality of the products being manufactured. It is interesting that in March 2009, when the development plans of the Azerbaijani Ministry of the Defense Industry were essentially voiced for the first time, not a word was said about beginning mass production of large-caliber sniper rifles and pistols. On the contrary, more was said about the manufacture of “modern armored personnel carriers, various anti-tank mines, optical targets, aerial drill bombs, and so on.” It was also emphasized that the total range of products to be manufactured at the Ministry of the Defense Industry enterprises would comprise 435 items, and that 163 machine tools and technological equipment, as well as 5,000 different instruments had been purchased in Ger- many, the U.S., Switzerland, , , Ukraine, Turkey, , Russia, Belarus, and South Ko- rea for successful execution of the production plans.74 It is interesting that this information published in Russia’s Krasnaia zvezda was earlier published in the Azeri media too.75 In the fall of 2009, it became known that the Azeri Telemekhanika plant and the Turkish Com- pany of the Machine and Chemical Industry (MKEK) had set up joint manufacture of ammunition “for firearms.”76 While in December 2009, Yaver Jamalov said that Azerbaijan had “completed talks and entered an agreement with one of the Turkish companies on the sale by this company of 30 mil-

67 “Na vystavke v Stambule budut prodemonstrirovany snaiperskie vintovki i bronetekhnika azerbaidzhanskogo proizvodstva,” available at [http:www.milaz.info/news.php?id=4088]. 68 “Azerbaidzhan pristupaet k seriinomu proizvodstvu artilleriiskogo vooruzheniia.” 69 See: B. Kalinichev, “Krupnokalibernye snaiperskie vintovki VS zarubezhnykh stran,” Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrrenie, No. 11, 2005. 70 See: “Gotovitsia novaia versiia azerbaidzhanskoi snaiperskoi vintovki ‘Istiglal,’” available at [http:ru.apa.az/ news _144348.html]. 71 [http:www.lent.az/news.php?id=19291]. 72 V. Suleimanov, “Dva pisotleta azerbaidzhanskogo proizvodstva proshli uspeshnye ispytaniia,” available at [http: ru.apa.az/news_Äâà_ïèñòîëåòà_àçåðáàéäæàíñêîãî_ïðîèçâîäñòâà__144798.html]. 73 See: “Azdrbaycan dünyada dn böyükçaplý snayper istehsal eddcdk” (Azerbaijan will Manufacture the Largest- Caliber Sniper Rifle in the World), available at [http:www.lent.az/news.php?id=19291]. 74 See: “Azerbaidzhan. Vnimanie k oboronno-promyshlennomu kompleksu,” Krasnaia zvezda, 20 March, 2009. 75 [http:www.milaz.info/news.php?id=4665]. 76 R. Suleimanov, “Azerbaijan zakupit u Turtsii snaiperskie vintovki,” available at [http:ru.apa.az/news_Àçåðáàéäæàí_ çàêóïèò_ó_Òóðöèè__145358.html]. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 21 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION lion units of ammunition of 7.62-mm caliber.”77 It is difficult to say if the matter concerns the same company or different ones, but the information on the volume of this transaction shows the colossal production capacity of the enterprise manufacturing the ammunition, and this means that if hostilities are resumed in Karabakh, the National Army of Azerbaijan will not suffer from “bullet starvation,” as was the case in 1992-1994. At the very beginning of 2010, Yaver Jamalov said that in the coming year, the Ministry of the Defense Industry was planning to reconstruct “12 types of production branches,” as well as purchase “state-of-the-art equipment from several developed countries for manufacturing eight types of de- fense products.” It was also holding “talks on purchasing the latest equipment for setting up mass production of another five or six products.”78 Yaver Jamalov was encouraged in his endeavors by the fact that even in the conditions of the world crisis, the revenue of the department he heads remained very high in 2010 too. For example, as early as November 2009 it was known that the Ministry of Finance of Azerbaijan planned to allot “2,425,271 manats for applied research in defense and security and 2,384,763 manats for the Ministry of the Defense Industry under miscellaneous expenses.”79 More proof of the successful development of Azerbaijan’s military-industrial complex is the expansion of its territorial boundaries. There are plans to begin building new military enterprises in Ganja, Khachmas, and .80 It is obvious that formation of Azerbaijan’s military-industrial complex is drawing close to its logical conclusion, and in the near future it will begin mass production of a large number of diverse weapons systems and other defense production.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to note that for the moment the leading research centers engaged in the problems of international security, military-technical cooperation, and so on, do not deem it nec- essary to pay serious attention to the achievements of Azerbaijan’s military-industrial complex, al- though they do note the increase in Azerbaijan’s military spending.81 Azerbaijan’s clear achievements in establishing its own military-industrial complex have also become an example for neighboring states—Georgia and Armenia, which are also actively promul- gating their achievements in this sphere today. But in contrast to the Azeri side, these states do not have sufficient financial resources for organizing mass production of a large number of state-of-the- art military-technical products. For Azerbaijan, on the other hand, equipping its army with weapons systems manufactured by its own military-industrial complex will mean an increase in the combat capabilities of Azerbaijan’s armed forces and other defense and security structures, which all countries with political, economic, and military interests in the Caucasian region will have to reckon with.

77 “Minister of the Defense Industry: ‘In 2010 another 12 production shops will manufacture weapons,’” available at [http:www.milaz.info/ru/news.php?id=13000]. 78 “Azerbaidzhan vedet peregovory ob eksporte 27 vidov oboronnoi produktsii,” available at [http:www.day.az/news/ economy/188052.html]. 79 R. Suleimanov, “Representative of the Ministry of Finance: ‘In Azerbaijan’s state budget for 2010, defense ex- penses have not been cut back,’” available at [http:ru.apa.az/news_Ïðåäñòàâèòåëü_Ìèíèñòåðñòâà_ôèíàíñîâ:_«Â__ 146431.html]. 80 See: R. Suleimanov, “Azerbaijan will Buy Sniper Rifles from Turkey.” 81 See: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, available at [http:milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4]. 22 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Polina ZETI

Ph.D. (Political Science), Junior Fellow at the Department of Political Science and Conflict Management, Institute of Socioeconomic and Humanitarian Studies, Southern Scientific Center, Russian Academy of Sciences (Rostov-on-Don, the Russian Federation).

Elena ZHIRUKHINA

Ph.D. Candidate, Intern Researcher at the Laboratory of North Caucasian Affairs, Institute of Socioeconomic and Humanitarian Studies, Southern Scientific Center, Russian Academy of Sciences (Rostov-on-Don, the Russian Federation).

INFORMATION OPPOSITION TO EXTREMISM AS A WAY TO REDUCE TENSION IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS

Abstract

ussia’s southern regions have been changing the population’s awareness, as R the regular targets of extremism and well as programs that assist former terror- terrorism for more than one decade ists to adapt to a peaceful life are gradual- now, which is hampering the development ly forming the basis of a new comprehen- of the region’s economic potential and the sive approach to reduce tension in general overall integration processes. The need to by encouraging the government and ex- lower the extremely high level of the re- tremist groups to renounce their aggressive gion’s conflict potential, which is partially ideology. An intelligent information policy manifested in the activity of terrorist sabo- aimed at reducing tension and conflict po- tage groups, is prompting reconsideration tential in society and promulgating a posi- of the state strategy to combat extremism tive image of contemporary youth should and terrorism. The forceful approach, which be one of the key mechanisms in oppos- consists of physical elimination and crimi- ing extremism. Since society’s value sys- nal persecution of terrorists, is being sup- tem cannot be changed overnight, preven- plemented by active work with civil society tive initiatives take a while to bear fruit, and in particular with representatives of the although they have the ability to gradually risk group and individuals who are already penetrate to deeper levels of conscious- involved in the activity of extremist com- ness, which means they can form a basis munities. Preventive campaigns aimed at for stable development. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 23 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Introduction

In recent decades, the South of Russia has been a region of increased tension where various types of conflicts (from ethnic to secessionist) have been manifested. However, the activity of ter- rorist sabotage groups conducting an ongoing war with the state presents the greatest danger. It goes without saying that Russia is not among the three top world leaders in terms of intrastate ter- rorist tension—those places are held by , , and Pakistan, where 3,346, 2,687, and 1,332 terrorist acts were committed in 2010, respectively.1 Nevertheless, there is a permanently high threat to the lives and health of the population in the North Caucasian republics and to national security as a whole, since terrorist acts are also carried out far beyond the borders of the North Caucasian Federal District (NCFD). In 2010, 974 terrorist acts of sabotage were committed.2 This means the region can be qualified as an extremely dangerous territory in accordance with the inter- national security index.3 Despite the fact that in 2011 fewer violent acts took place in the Northern Caucasus—around 700, rebel groups are still active and not only threaten the development poten- tial of the region, but also the very existence of the local population. It is no secret that North Cau- casian terrorist sabotage groups cover a large part of their expenses by engaging in criminal activ- ity, that is, they are mainly self-financed and recruit local residents, particularly young people, into their ranks. So we think the possibility of using the extensive potential of information technology to reduce the popularity of extremist ideology and prevent local residents from being drawn into rebel groups to be an important area of research.

What Does “Extremism” Mean?

First, we must define extremism. There is no generally accepted definition of “extremism,” it de- pends on the sociopolitical conditions and is specified in correspondence with them. In Russia, “extrem- ism” is defined legislatively and comprises any act aimed at bringing about a forcible change in the foun- dations of the constitutional system, the abasement of national dignity, the propaganda and public show of Nazi attributes, the exercise of terrorist activity, and so on.4 Extremism primarily poses a threat to Russian statehood and its values in their constitutionally enforced form. Engaging in extremist activity is a crime that is prosecuted in accordance with the Russian Federation Criminal Code. It should also be noted that international lawyers are increasingly using the term “violent extremism,” which is an exces- sive form of extremism that employs terrorism as a way to achieve its aims. In this article, we will use the term “terrorism,” which is more traditional for the Russian legal sphere. The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism sets forth an approach that is closest to the Russian definition. Extremism is defined as an act aimed at seizing or keeping power through the use of violence or changing violently the constitutional regime of a State, as well as a violent encroachment upon public security, including organization, for the above purpos- es, of illegal armed formations and participation in them.5

1 See: U.S. State Department National Antiterrorist Center Database (The Worldwide Incident Tracking System— WITS). 2 Database of violent incidents drawn up within the framework of a project called Terrorism in the South of Russia Geographic Information System. 3 See: MAPLECROFT, available at [http://maplecroft.com/about/news/terrorism_index_2011.html]. 4 See: Federal Law No. 114-FZ On the Counteraction of Extremist Activity of 25 July, 2002 (with amendments of 27 July, 2006, 10 May, and 24 July, 2007, and 29 April, 2008), Art 1, see English translation at [http:// www.legislationline.org/documents/id/4368]. 5 See: The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, 15 June, 2001, Art 1, avail- able at [http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,ASIA,,,49f5d9f92,0.html]. 24 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

European international legal documents also recognize extremism as a threat to the constitution- al system, however the accent in placed on stability and security of social development. Resolution 1344 (2003) of the says that extremism, whatever its nature, is a form of political activity that overtly or covertly rejects the principles of parliamentary democracy, and very often bases its ideology and its political practices and conduct on intolerance, exclusion, xenophobia, anti- Semitism and ultra-nationalism.6 This phenomenon is clarified by exposing threats to stable social development within the framework of democratic regimes. n First, some extremist movements seek justification for their actions in . The danger of this current trend is twofold: on the one hand it fosters intolerance, religious fanaticism and fundamentalism, and on the other it leads to the isolation of entire religious communities for the sake of individuals who abuse the universal values of religion. n Second, it is both a direct threat because it jeopardizes the democratic constitutional order and freedoms, and an indirect threat because it can distort political life. Traditional political parties may be tempted to adopt the stance and the demagogic discourse specific to extremist parties in order to counter their increasing electoral popularity. Contemporary states see the main danger of extremism in its denial of the basic values and in- teraction rules that exist among the structural elements of the present political power system, regard- less of the circumstances that compel a social group to resort to radical measures. Extremism demonstrates the main symptoms of divergence from normal social development by engaging in violence or aggressive behavior toward certain groups of the population. The most active extremism may be manifested in a situation where the people have no trust in state power or consider the way it governs to be ineffective. Active extremism also spreads the belief in its impunity, which is very characteristic of the Northern Caucasus. Therefore, it is very important to cultivate positive social and cultural values at all levels of social life.

The Specifics of Extremism and Terrorism in the Northern Caucasus

In the Northern Caucasus per se, the situation is the most intense in Daghestan, Chechnia, Kab- ardino-Balkaria, and Ingushetia, whereby Karachaevo-Cherkessia, which was a center for spreading Salafism at the beginning of the 1990s, is a new potential bed of tension. On the whole, small, but frequent violent acts are characteristic of the North Caucasian republics: armed clashes, bombings, and gunfire aimed primarily against state representatives—employees of the defense and security departments and administrative structures. Fighters attack administrative buildings, private vehicles, and households. In 2010-2011, 453 defense and security employees and 53 government representa- tives were killed.7 More than 350 peaceful citizens were also killed, although these are usually inci- dental casualties that occur during attacks on state representatives. Tension continues to rise in Daghestan. The number of violent acts in 2011 (not counting coun- terterrorist operations) was higher than the same indices for 2010 (369 and 399, respectively).8 The number of armed clashes has doubled, exceeding the same indices in Chechnia, for which armed

6 See: Resolution 1344 (2003) Threat Posed to Democracy by Extremist Parties and Movements in Europe, availa- ble at[http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta03/eres1344.htm]. 7 See: Terrorism in the South of Russia Geographic Information System. 8 Ibidem. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 25 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION clashes have become characteristic in recent years. However, the rebel groups that employees of the law-enforcement bodies encounter when carrying out investigative measures in the territory of Dagh- estan are not that large and consist of 2-10 people. In 2010, only two instances of major armed clashes were registered, the number of militants in one of which topped 40 people. In 2011-2012, military aviation is being used more frequently to deal with rebel groups, especially in the mountain regions where access is limited, and joint operations are being launched to eliminate fighters in border areas. This makes it possible to disable groups of terrorists in a specific area and prevent them from disap- pearing across the border. The Chechen and Daghestani law-enforcement structures joined forces in a major operation in which 20 fighters were eliminated on the border of the Nozhai-Yurt District of Chechnia and the Kazbek District of Daghestan (13-17 February, 2012). The use of explosives is extremely widespread and the number of bombings is 2-3-fold higher in Daghestan than in other republics of the Northern Caucasus. Nevertheless, in 2011, terrorists began using firearms and cold weapons more frequently than explosives to carry out attacks. This is because laying bombs and working with explosives require additional skills, while firearms are more available in the republic. What is more, due to the increased security measures, transportation vehicles and suspicious individuals are monitored more closely, whereby the militants put up ac- tive resistance using firearms. On the whole, the level of attacks remains extremely high compared with other republics. Among the clergy, the imams of who oppose the spread of radical Islamic trends and theology teachers are the main targets, while in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic attacks are carried out on the representatives of all religious confessions. There has also been an increase in the number of victims among such groups of the population as businessmen (particular- ly the owners of food stores, bars, and hotels), folk healers who practice non-traditional medicine, and fortune-tellers. According to the official statements of extremists, these people are attacked because of their “sinful” activity. However, extremists may be carrying out this criminal activity as a way to finance themselves. As for attacks on trade centers, food stores, and bars, bombs are usu- ally laid so that the building and merchandise are not severely damaged (in the entrance for exam- ple), so are more of a scare tactic for the purpose of blackmail. However, the increasing number of murders of hunters and gamekeepers shows that militants and their bases are spreading to the wooded areas of the republic. On the whole, there was a decrease in tension in Chechnia in 2011. However, the number of major armed clashes remains high. They usually occur as the result of investigative measures or when checking information on the whereabouts of gangs received from local residents or previously de- tained militants. There are also planned operations, for example, the attack on the village of Tsentoroi (Khosi-Yurt in the Kurchaloy District of the Chechen Republic). A group of 30 fighters was found there, 12 of whom were killed. Six police employees were killed and 18 wounded. Seven locals were also injured. The situation in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic has remained tense over the past two years with a slight drop in violence in 2011. The number of bombings (90 in 2010 and 24 in 2011) has de- creased.9 In so doing, explosives are mainly used for targeted attacks on employees of the defense and security structures and government representatives (planting a bomb under a personal vehicle or blowing up private households). Militants are blowing themselves up more frequently because they do not know enough about security measures and how to handle explosives (they make and keep self- made bombs at home). Ingushetia is the only North Caucasian republic that has shown a sharp drop in tension in the last year (202 in 2010 and 108 in 2011),10 which largely happened owing to the increase in security meas- ures. A significant event was the operation on 28 March, 2011 to destroy a militant camp where sui- cide bombers were being trained. During air and land operations, 17 rebels were killed.

9 Ibidem. 10 Ibidem. 26 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

On the whole, religious extremism, which is clearly expressed in the inter-confessional conflict between Salafism and Sufism, and political extremism are characteristic of the Northern Caucasus. What is more, they are united by a common goal—erosion of the social structure; however, religious extremists strive to change the value system and interaction rules within Caucasian society, while political extremists are waging a struggle against state power with the prospect of withdrawing the North Caucasian republics from the federation. Imarat Kavkaz (the Caucasus Emirate), which oper- ates in Russian territory and is internationally recognized as a terrorist organization, can be called an embodiment of North Caucasian terrorism. In his official statements, its leader supports the protest movement in Russia against the ruling party and existing regime. For example, on the eve of the pres- idential election, he insistently discouraged voters from going to the polls. All the same, despite the increased security measures, the extremists managed to open fire on a polling station in the village of Oktyabrskoye in Daghestan (on 4 March, 2012). State representatives were declared to be the target of the attack, while victims among members of the population who express their disapproval of the ruling regime were to be avoided.11 However, these promises are unlikely to protect citizens from the possibility of another large-scale terrorist act like the explosion at Domodedovo Airport in January 2011, which killed 37 people and wounded another 173, or the double terrorist act in Makhachkala in September 2011, during which 61 people were wounded. The local population is tired of being in a constant state of war, which is causing a rise in protest moods and non-acceptance of the tense situation. The many-thousand meetings against the spread of terrorism and extremism in Ingushetia (Malgobek, Karabulak, and Orjonikidzevskaia in October 2010) are a good illustration of this. Nevertheless, the local population continues to join illegal armed groups of extremists. What is more, the Northern Caucasus is attracting radically thinking elements from neighboring states, particularly from the Central Asian countries. For ex- ample, in 2011, two militants, citizens of , were killed in Daghestan and eight were ar- rested. Why does this happen? Is this a manifestation of protest moods against the specifics of state governance in the Northern Caucasus or a way for criminal groups who use the ideology of jihad to legitimize blackmail and extortion in order to earn money? We can only presume that the authority of the power structures in the republics is indeed not high. Due to the extreme need to resolve secu- rity problems, the government often takes severe steps which can lead to unlawful action on the part of the defense and security structures. So the situation in the Northern Caucasus is exacerbated by kidnappings relating to the illegal arrests of gang members. Arrests and investigation measures are not carried out in compliance with the rules: the relatives of those arrested are not told the rea- son for the arrest or where their family members are being held, and the law-enforcement agencies often deny that any arrest has taken place at all. As a rule, suspects are kidnapped from their own homes or place of work by a group of people wearing masks and driving cars without license plates; the witnesses of such “arrests” are relatives, neighbors, and colleagues. Such kidnappings are most frequent in Chechnia, particularly in its central districts. According to human rights organizations, more than 2,000 people have been kidnapped in recent years. Around 1,500 people have disap- peared in Chechen territory. Kidnappings also occur in Ingushetia and Daghestan. The phenome- non has become so widespread that residents are ready to come out into the streets, confront the police, and openly declare the inefficient investigation of the disappearance of their relatives and acquaintances. At the end of March 2011, an unsanctioned spontaneous meeting against the disap- pearance of a resident of the village of Plievo was held in Nazran. The demonstrators blocked traf- fic on one of the central streets and clashed with the police (10 people were arrested).12 In Novem- ber of the same year, a meeting was held in Makhachkala under the slogan of “Muslims against

11 See: “Umarov prikazal boevikam bolshe ne ubivat mirnykh grazhdan,” available at [http://www.newsland.ru/ news/detail/id/881900/]. 12 See: “Evkurov raskritikoval nesanktsionirovannyy miting v Nazrani: propavshiy chelovek—ne povod vystupat,” available at [http://newsru.com/russia/24mar2011/evkurov.html]. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 27 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION torture and tyranny of the law-enforcement agencies.”13 The three thousand people who gathered on the central square demanded respect and protection of human rights on the part of the law-en- forcement structures, as well as more active investigation of the disappearance of the members of their families. So society is energetically reacting to the situation and the methods being used by the competent structures to resolve it.

Information Opposition to Extremism

The global spread of extremism and of terrorism as its radical manifestation constantly pro- vokes a response from states and civil society. The tough policy of governments toward people in- volved at different levels in illegal activity of this sort is drawing attention to extremists and advertiz- ing their behavior, thus intensifying the problem. Moreover, extremism is becoming popular among young people, who have become accustomed to violence. Around 30% of young people participating in the activity of rebel gangs are under the age of 25, while another 50% of rebels are no older than 35.14 Young people are brainwashed by the extremist material posted on the Internet and the ideolog- ical support rendered to interested individuals. So clamping down on manifestations of extremism and the spread of its ideology is one of the state’s most important tasks. Although extremism is tradi- tionally opposed by using force (direct elimination and criminal persecution of terrorists), in an infor- mation society, physically destroying rebels is no longer enough. Each terrorist killed is replaced by others from among their sympathizers. So forceful methods must be supplemented by preventive campaigns and adaptation programs as a way to reduce tension and encourage the government and extremist groups to gradually renounce their aggressive ideology. The aim of such programs is to reintegrate members of the risk group and people under arrest into society by encouraging them to renounce their extremist ideology and giving them certain social guarantees that allow them to be- come full-fledged members of society and law-abiding citizens once more. This new comprehensive approach should be based on using information technology and ensuring information security to op- pose extremism. An information policy that pursues targeted communicative-information acts aimed at ensur- ing the information and psychological security of citizens and the country should be the top priority of information security.15 An open contemporary society, which implies a transparent information system incorporating a variety of information sources, requires an integrating vector of social de- velopment that reflects the country’s national interests. Therefore, the state’s information policy must have an influence on people’s consciousness, psyche, behavior, and activity by providing information resources and meanings that are significant for the population in the interest of the state and civil society. In these conditions, the media assumes a greater role as the main channel of information having an impact on public consciousness. So a chain is formed: the state-media-col- lective consciousness, where interaction acquires the complicated nature of mass communication, while information processes in society are oriented toward expressing and protecting the rights of the individual, the interests of society, and the policy of the state.16 Particular attention must be

13 “Massovye aktsii protiv pokhishcheniia veruiushchikh v Dagestane nabiraiut oboroty,” available at [http:// kavkaz.ge/2011/11/25/massovye-akcii-protiv-poxishheniya-veruyushhix-v-dagestane-nabirayut-oboroty/]. 14 See: G.G. Matishov, I.V. Pashchenko, “Terrorizm kak glavnaia ugroza natsionalnoy bezopasnotsti na Iuge Ros- sii,” in: Prioritetnye napravleniia strategii natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, SKAGS, Rostov-on-Don, 2011, pp. 24-32. 15 See: V.D. Popov, Informatsiologiia i informatsionnaia politika, Moscow, 2001, p. 62. 16 See: Ibid., p. 65. 28 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION focused on ensuring information and psychological security and observing the state’s national in- terests in the information sphere as a strategic goal of the government’s information policy at the regional and federal levels.17 Projects have been implemented since 2010 within the framework of the general strategy of opposition to extremism in the Northern Caucasus based on several principles of restorative justice, in particular on efforts to rehabilitate the offender by reintegrating him into society with the help of psychological support and opportunities to obtain an and find a job. The first initiatives took the form of establishing commissions responsible for helping former extremists adapt to a peace- ful life. Such commissions exist in the territory of two Russian republics—Daghestan and Ingushetia. Daghestan was the first republic to begin implementing this project, where a commission was established in 2010 under the President of the Republic for rendering assistance in rehabilitating people who have decided to renounce their terrorist and extremist activity in the Republic of Dagh- estan (Decree of the President of the Republic of Daghestan of 2 November, 2010). The commis- sion is to become a mediator between the members of illegal extremist groups and the state. It should enjoy the population’s trust and be competent to guarantee security to those who make con- tact with participants in armed opposition groups. The commission has examined more than 50 cases, usually of the following nature: assisting mitigation of intercession measures for participa- tion in the activity of armed opposition groups in Daghestan; interceding on the part of people ar- rested on suspicion of participating in terrorism with the aim of helping them to obtain a (study the basics of in a madrasah); assisting the relatives of rebels to return home and freeing them from persecution measures carried out by the law-enforcement structures; peti- tioning to the leaders of the Federal Service for Execution of Punishment on cancelling decisions to send those accused of participating in armed occupation groups to serve their terms outside Dagh- estan. However, none of the commission’s decisions have legal force, rather they are of a recom- mendatory nature. Therefore a mechanism for granting amnesty to persons who have not directly participated in terrorist acts must be drawn up and adopted. So the next step in institutionalizing the commission’s work should be legislative enforcement of such commissions’ powers so that corre- sponding recommendations for the law-enforcement structures are of a legally competent nature. This is why the deputies of the National Assembly of Daghestan adopted a decision to submit a draft to the Russian Federation State Duma on amnesty for former extremists. The draft is largely based on the text of State Duma Resolution No. 3498-4 of 22 September, 2006 On the Amnesty of Persons who Committed Crimes during Counterterrorist Operations in the Territory of Russian Federation Constituents within the Southern Federal District18 with addition of Art 132 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation19 to the list of those not subject to amnesty. According to President of the Daghestani Guild of Lawyers, Lawyer Rasul Kadiev,20 the draft does not reflect the regional specifics of Daghestan and must be significantly revised. Special attention must also be given to the post-rehabilitation period in order to prevent recid- ivism, since it is always possible that the individual will return to criminal activity. A logical step in the commission’s development could be establishing a certain structure that would maintain contact with former extremists even after their official reintegration into society.

17 See: Problemy ustoychivogo razvitiia regiona: informatsionnaia bezopasnost polietnichnogo sotsiuma (na mate- rialakh Iuga Rossii), ed. by V.M. Iurchenko, Kuban State University, Krasnodar, 2011, pp. 215-216. 18 Postanovlenie Gosudarstvennoy Dumy ot 22 sentiabria 2006 goda No. 3498-4 GD “Ob obiavlenii amnistii v ot- noshenii lits, sovershivshikh prestupleniia v period provedeniia kontrterroristicheskikh operatsiy na territoriiakh subektov Rossiyskoy Federatsii, nakhodiashchikhsia v predelakh Iuzhnogo federalnogo okruga,” available at [http://www.rg.ru/ printable/2006/09/23/amnistia-dok.html]. 19 See: Art 132, “Nasilstvennye deystviia seksualnogo kharaktera,” available at [http://www.consultant.ru/popular/ ukrf/10_26.html#p1767]. 20 See: Rasul Kadiev: “‘Kadyrovskaia’ amnistiia ne spaset Daghestan,” available at [http://xn—c1adwdmv.xn— p1ai/news/1469137.html]. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 29 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Ingushetia borrowed Daghestan’s experience in September 2011 and a commission responsible for rehabilitating members of illegal armed formations is now officially functioning in the republic. The commission renders legal, psychological, and medical assistance to people who have decided to renounce their terrorist and extremist activity and helps them and the members of their families to make living arrangements right down to moving to a place of permanent residence outside the repub- lic. The commission operates according to the following scheme: contact is established with the former member of an armed opposition group personally or with his relatives (however, the rebel is required to appear in person at commission sittings where all the circumstances of his case are exam- ined). Surrender and assisting the investigation are considered mitigating circumstances and contrib- ute to a more lenient sentence, in certain cases right down to cessation of criminal persecution. If the militant’s guilt is proven in court, the commission will petition for the sentence to be served in the territory of the North Caucasian Federal District or the Southern Federal District. Moreover, the rebel’s relatives will be provided with financial aid on a one-time basis once a year to visit him regard- less of where he is serving his term. The commission’s activity is comprehensive, including examina- tion of statements by citizens on instances of the violation of human rights and compensation of prop- erty damage inflicted during the counterterrorist operation. In 2010-2011, more than 74 former rebels returned to a peaceful life. However, not much confidence is placed in the capabilities of these commissions, which is pri- marily associated with the crisis of trust in the activity of the state power structures. However, the work of the commissions should become instrumental in restoring balance in society and reducing tension in the region. Moreover, these initiatives should focus on cultivating a positive perception of their results in order to attract more people who wish to return to a peaceful life. This can be achieved with the help of constant information support that makes the work of the structure and the framework of its competence as transparent and understandable as possible, as well as by drawing more human rights activists and authoritative people into the efforts.

Conclusion

Every republic is resolving its security problems keeping in mind its own specifics. For exam- ple, Daghestan is planning to ensure security by raising the competence and qualifications of the de- fense and security structures, continuing to carry out programs that help rebels who have decided to renounce terrorist activity to adapt to a peaceful life, and establishing a religious dialog. To this end, the military presence is increasing in the republic and joint task forces are being formed with the spe- cific aim of opposing armed extremists. At the same time, Chechnia is increasing its control over the Internet as a measure to prevent the spread of extremist ideas and prohibiting radical Islamic trends in the republic’s territory. The local administrations are also taking responsibility for supporting young people and their families in order to ensure the timely prevention of extremist groups being replen- ished with new members. These measures should supplement the activity of the defense and security structures. The republic’s law-enforcement structures intend to increase their efforts to destroy the remains of illegal armed formations and step up preventive measures aimed at exposing their partic- ipants and accomplices. Chechnia has become the first republic in which subdivisions comprised largely of ethnic Chechens have been formed within the Ministry of Internal Affairs responsible for security of the republic’s government and carrying out counterterrorist operations. However, joint efforts are necessary for opposing extremism with the help of information tech- nology. One of the key mechanisms in opposing extremist ideology is an intelligent information pol- icy aimed at reducing tension and conflict potential in society and at promoting a positive image of contemporary youth. An important role in this process goes to stepping up efforts with national cent- ers and groups, religious organizations, and official and unofficial politically active associations and 30 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION to using all possible information mechanisms to prevent extremist ideas and teachings related both to the religious and to the ethnic factor from spreading among young people. It stands to reason that in contrast to the forceful method of opposing extremism, it will take a long time for preventive initiatives and control of the information sphere to reap results. Changes in values and perception occur gradually. Forming a culture of peace and non-acceptance of vio- lence is only possible in a society where problems are efficiently solved by methods other than force. The most important factor in this process is interaction between the state and organizations of a civil society.

Andrey ZAKHAROV

Ph.D. (Philos.), Assistant Professor at the Russian State Humanitarian University, Editor of Neprikosnovenny zapas: debaty o politike i kulture (Moscow, the Russian Federation).

INDIVISIBLE SOVEREIGNTY: SETBACKS OF FEDERALISM IN THE CAUCASUS AND AROUND IT

Abstract

he author takes an in-depth look at the ly independent states have poured a lot of T setbacks of the federalist experiments effort into consolidated nationality and re- across the post-Soviet expanse and jected federalism as a factor dangerous to concentrates on the Central Caucasus. He their statehood from the very beginning, in compares Russia’s experience of federalism Russia many viewed it as a handy instru- with the attempts to plant federative princi- ment of expansion to neighboring territories. ples in other Soviet successor-states. He is This explains its setback in the post-Soviet out to prove that post-Soviet federalism has expanse: some treat it as a dangerous rem- not freed itself from the Soviet nationalities edy to be avoided, while others are abus- policy that treated national sovereignty as ing it in a way that has little in common with an indivisible whole. While many of the new- its original purpose.

Introduction

In 1945, the Allies, confronted with the task of dealing with Germany’s postwar future, chose federalism because in 1949 the Constitutional process was supervised by America, where the federal Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 31 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION model enjoyed well-justified respect.1 Not only that: the French, the junior partners in the victorious coalition, insisted on a federation in the expectation that a federative Germany would be a weak state. This means that “the re-emergence of a federal state format occurred on the insistence of the Allied Powers. They perceived federalism as a suitable means to deconcentrate or disperse political pow- er.”2 In other words, federalism imposed on the defeated looked like a mechanism of regional secu- rity in the very heart of Europe; federalist order was equated with the loss of state power and perpet- uation of military weakness of those on whom the scheme was imposed.

Federalism as a Weakness

While watching the “soap opera” of Georgian federalization and being aware of the torturous paths of the federative idea in the Central Caucasus, we should bear in mind the story of the 1949 German Constitution. Today, many of those holding forth about the federative prescriptions to be accepted or rejected in the Caucasian context are proceeding from the assumption that federalism is a synonym of weakness. In the summer of 2009, during the mini-debates on a so-called federation of different levels, Georgian politicians dismissed a project (one of many similar projects), the author- ship of which was ascribed either to Russia or to Turkey, as a “plan to dismember Georgia.” The Vice President of the , who visited Georgia after the 2008 August war with Russia, failed to alleviate the Georgians’ fears. He called on Georgia “to keep the doors open to Abkhazians and South Ossetians so that they know they have other options besides the status quo” and recommended that it think about a federation for the country. In 1949, in his article “Zhiznennye osnovy federatsii” (The Vital Principles of Federation), Rus- sian philosopher Ivan Ilyin complained: “When we hear so-called intelligent suggestions, such as ‘Set up a federative republic in Russia by a referendum!’, we cannot help but ask ourselves whether this is a naïve or an ill-intentioned suggestion? What might be a boon for some nations could be a bane for Rus- sians.”3 Today, this thinker, who was convinced that transformation of the empire into a federation was pernicious for Russia, is very much respected in the Great Power-patriotic ranks of the Russian political elite that grew up on “resource imperialism.” Ivan Ilyin was convinced that federation spells dismember- ment and voluntary death of large, old, and multinational states. He wrote, for example, that “the feder- ative structure is practically unthinkable for states with a multitude of nationalities that have different languages, different blood kinships, and different .”4 He also pointed out, and rightly so, that a federation cannot be realized in conditions where legal consciousness is tenuous. These and other objections to a federation offered by this outstanding Russian conservative can, of course, be contested. Here, however, I am more interested in the fact that today politicians of the post-Soviet polyethnic states used and are still using similar arguments against the federative ap- proaches to inner and regional stabilization. Indeed, what has been put on the scales? On the one hand, it was repeatedly and convincingly demonstrated within the framework of comparative studies of empires that federalization is not mere- ly efficient, but also practically the only road leading from an empire to a democratic politia. The concepts of “imperial federation” and “imperial federalism” were put into scientific circulation quite

1 William Riker, however, believes that the Americans were guided not so much by political considerations as by “their provincial conviction that federalism was a ‘good thing’” (see: W.H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Signifi- cance, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1964, p. 37). 2 See: W. Swenden, Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe: A Comparative and Thematic Analysis, Pal- grave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2006, p. 27. 3 I.A. Ilyin, “Zhiznennye osnovy federatsii,” in: I.A. Ilyin, O griadushchey Rossii: izbrannye statyi, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1993, pp. 55-56. 4 Ibid., p. 57. 32 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION a long time ago and have been developing with good results ever since.5 By the beginning of decolo- nization, it had become more or less generally accepted that the multinational political aggregations knocked together by the Great European Powers that survived World War I could only hold their ground in the changing world if armed with federalist instruments. Late in the 1930s, Georgy Fedo- tov, a prominent supporter of federalism in the Russian emigrant community, wrote the following about the Bolshevik state: “The present Russian empire is and will remain a federation of free peo- ples. It will not survive otherwise. Russia’s unity would have been in danger if it acquired a purely Great Russian national power in the style and traditions of Alexander III. Russia’s grown-up and fully fledged nestlings will never reconcile themselves to that sort of Russia.”6 The geopolitical fact that most of the federative alliances in Europe appeared on the ruins of continental empires while the maritime colonial empires left behind a vast massive of Third World federations was not fortuitous. William Riker, a classic of federalist studies, pointed to this logic when he said that in the wake of World War II and collapse of colonial empires the world entered an era of federalist revolution.7 On the other hand, the post-Soviet democratic politicians who, in the Soviet past, furiously and with good reason, accused the Soviet Union of every imperial sin spent many years in preserving their countries as post-Soviet mini-empires which, not infrequently, reproduce worst Soviet practices when dealing with national or linguistic minorities. (Independent Georgia, which from the very be- ginning refused to leave its autonomies in peace, is a pertinent and most glaring example.) In fact, the federative principle of state structure was not used anywhere in the post-Soviet expanse. Russia was probably the only exception, where the compromise initiated by the asymmetrical federalism of the “wild 1990s” concluded by “the Russian revolution from the above” with “its native elites prevented or at least forestalled separatism (except in Chechnia), civil war, and even the dissolution of Russia during the communist regime’s demise.”8 The geography of post-Soviet ethnopolitical conflicts suggests that the main and most persistent seats of instability were an outcome of mishandled federalist patterns.9 It looks, at least in hindsight, that the federalist division of powers and competence would have been the best answer to the head- ache of unrecognized states, the product of political restructuring of the former Soviet Union. This preliminary conclusion poses at least two equally intriguing questions. n First, why did the post-Soviet elites fail practically everywhere to master the federalist in- struments? n Second, is it an overstatement to say that unlike its neighbors, Russia knows how cope with federalism?

Separated Governance versus Indivisible Sovereignty

When analyzing the cause of the systematic failures of all the federalist initiatives in the Central Caucasus, Bruno Coppieters pointed to the legacy of Soviet federalism and the way it interpreted

5 For more on the history of the terms, see: M. Burgess, The British Tradition of Federalism, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, Madison, 1995; V.V. Grudzinsky, Na povorote sudby: Velikaia Britania i imperskiy federalizm (posled- niaia tret XIX—pervaia chetvert XX vv.), Chelyabinsk State University Press, Chelyabinsk, 1996. 6 G.P. Fedotov, Zashchita Rossii. Statyi 1936-1940, Vol. IV, YMCA-PRESS, , 1988, p. 220. 7 See: W.H. Riker, op. cit. 8 G. Hahn, “Reforming the Federation,” in: Developments in Russian Politics, ed. by S. White, Z. Gitelman, R. Sakwa, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005, p. 152. 9 Rich factual material can be found in: S. Markedonov, Turbulentnaia Evrazia: mezhetnicheskie, grazhdanskie konflikty, ksenofobia v novykh nezavisimykh gosudarstvakh postsovetskogo prostranstva, Academia, Moscow, 2010. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 33 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION national problems. We all know that the Bolshevist project of social modernization stirred up ethnic consciousness while insisting on territorial arrangement of ethnicity. At the same time, the rigid po- litical nation/territory interconnection produced an unquestionable triumph of the legal principle of indivisibility of sovereignty, one of the cornerstones of Soviet constitutional law. Those Russian au- thors who cherish this tradition write: “Sovereignty is an element of the state’s legal capacity which gives the state all sorts of rights but which is not reduced to them. It cannot be divided or transferred, not because this is prohibited but because it is impossible. Unlike rights, legal capacity cannot be divided.”10 As soon as the Soviet Union left the stage, all local nationalisms, pampered and raised by Soviet power and determined to realize their statehood ambitions, vehemently insisted on their exclu- sive nature. Since the new states born by local nationalisms were extremely and obviously vulnerable, especially at the early stage of their existence, joint or divided sovereignty was seen as an unaccept- able option for them. This specificity is typical not only of the former Soviet Union but of the postco- lonial world as a whole. Here is what an Asian student of Asian federalism has to say: “In the first few decades following decolonization, states attempted to build unitary and homogenous nation-states. They distrusted and discouraged federalism and regarded it as an aberrant phenomenon.”11 In the Central Caucasus, likewise, “the principle of indivisible sovereignty is the last straw for all the weak states of the region whether internationally recognized or not.”12 The above is true of those nations that could profit from the dissolution of the Soviet Union by using the notorious right to self-determination. Clinging tightly to the sovereignty they unexpectedly found their hands on, the political leaders suspected federalism and its deconcentration of power of inadequate attention to independence associated with undivided sovereignty. The result could only be expected: “The vertical division of power among the bodies of state power did not look like a remedy to the state’s weakness.”13 Here is an important point: the federative idea looked suspicious not only to ethnic majorities which set down to the business of building up their own states, but also to numer- ous national minorities left without statehoods in the post-Soviet era. For the former federalism was an excessive alternative, while the latter regarded it as inadequately narrow; the reason, however, was the same: the doctrine presupposed a combination of self-administration and divided rule. This ex- plains why the rulers of all unrecognized states who challenged their newly born mini-empires con- sistently rejected federalism as the best option—they wanted unconditional and complete independ- ence—a tempting yet unassailable goal. Meanwhile, one of the essential prerequisites for forming a federative alliance is that the sides are willing to bind themselves by such a contract. Any federation is a voluntary structure based on the conscious and strong determination of the central and regional elites to enter into contractual rela- tions. This is even more important when the center and regions have distinct ethnic characteristics: a federalist alliance of ethnically homogenous elements differs greatly from a similar union among dif- ferent nationalities. Indeed, sovereignty concerns are dismissible in one case and move to the fore in the other. This means that the desire to join a federation expressed by ethnic elites (that have enjoyed or have come close to enjoying the advantages of the right of nations to self-determination) should be imperatively confirmed by the possibility of leaving the federation, something which they implicitly have in mind when signing the contract. What political aims do the national minorities have in mind within a federative union? As dis- tinct from an empire, a federation does not require that its members unconditionally accept the prior- ity of political loyalty over ethnic loyalty. This form of statehood, while limiting ethnic self-realiza-

10 A.V. Kiselvea, A.V. Nesterenko, Teoriia federalizma, MGU Press, Moscow, 2002, p. 101. 11 B. He, “Democratization and Federalization in Asia,” in: Federalism in Asia, ed. by B. He, B. Galligan, T. Inoguchi, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, 2007, p. 2. 12 B. Coppieters, Federalizm i konflikt na Kavkaze, Moscow Carnegie Center, Moscow, 2002, p. 36 (B. Coppieters, Federalism and Conflict in the Caucasus, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2001). 13 Ibid., p. 14. 34 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tion, does not presuppose that it is liquidated altogether. National self-identification is equally impor- tant for empires and for federations; there are no federations anywhere in the world with more or less numerically equal national or linguistic groups—it seems that Switzerland is the only or, at least, rare case. This means that, unlike ethnically homogenous federations, multinational federations have to identify the most adequate forms of self-expression that would permit ethnic minorities to easily fit the political, cultural, and economic context of the national majorities. This is one of the most chal- lenging structural tasks and the responsibility of the political leaders of the dominant nation. Georgy Fedotov referred to this in the Soviet political context: “While the national idea has not exhausted itself in Russian culture, in Russia’s present and future political life nationalism presents an obvious national danger. Russia is a state of peoples; the majority of them have awakened to national life for the first time, which makes their young pride very vulnerable… The victory of nationalist trends in Great Russia could simply destroy Russia.”14 This is as topical today as ever. In other words, the public space of a federative state should contain zones in which a minority would feel itself a majority and enjoy corresponding privileges. This is why the “nationalism of com- ponent parts,” “that is, the collective needs and requirements of the nation or nations that coexist within the large, overreaching political nationality of the federation taken as a whole,”15 is of funda- mental importance. In this context, the experience of the Russian Federation can hardly be described as successful or inspiring: the decade of the “vertical of power” dramatically and promptly narrowed down the scope of political self-expression of the ethnic groups living in the country. This (nearly) dampened the fairly limited enthusiasm over federative projects of any sort among the politicians and citizens of unrecognized republics seeking readjusted relations with their “smaller metropolitan states” who look at the Russian experience as maximally important.

Federalism with Russian Specifics

Here I will try to assess to what extent Russia’s consistent and praiseworthy loyalty to the letter of federalism helps it to maintain normal relations with its neighbors. Any student of compar- ative federalism cannot but be bewildered by the fact that Russia, no longer a federation, still calls itself the Russian Federation. Indeed, one can hardly argue with British academic Cameron Ross who has described Russia as “a federation without federalism.”16 It seems it would have been much easier to legalize the “vertical arrangement,” amend the Fundamental Law accordingly, and call the country a unitary state. Nothing is being done to follow this logic. The question is: Why? It seems that the metamorphoses of federalism of the last decades can supply an answer. Back in the mid- 1960s, William Riker pointed to a very interesting phenomenon: while the traditional colonial empires were dying out, federalism became the only political instrument of legal non-violent ac- quisition of new territories. In the world of triumphant political correctness, cynical seizure of oth- er people’s land is no longer acceptable. Federalism has become the only acceptable instrument of territorial expansion.17 In the case of Russia, the state preserves the federative shell to be able to efficiently regulate political processes in the so-called Near Abroad. This possibility was practically forgotten or, at least, used ad hoc in the Yeltsin era. The trend changed at the turn of the 2000s. The 2001 Federal

14 G.P. Fedotov, Tiazhba o Rossii. Sbornik statey (1933-1936), Vol. III, YMCA-PRESS, Paris, 1982, pp. 191-192. 15 M. Burgess, Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006, p. 108. 16 C. Ross, Federalism and Democratization in Russia, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2002, p. 7. 17 For more detail, see: A.A. Zakharov, Unitarnaia federatsia. Piat etiudov o rossiiskom federalizme, Moscow School of Political Studies, Moscow, 2008, pp. 113-139. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 35 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Law on the Order of Admittance to the Russian Federation and Formation within It of a New Sub- ject was a watershed in the foreign policy mission of Russian federalism. The new law regulated the way the composition of the Russian Federation changes if territories of a foreign state are joined to it. Today, this act requires conciliatory procedures that will involve the leaders of the country which, totally or partially, joins the Russian Federation. Significantly, the Russian “hawks” tried to revise the regulation (which they found pinching) during ’s first presidency to make it more “comfortable.” In 2005, the Rodina parliamentary faction suggested that the law acquire a regulation that the decision on joining Russia should belong to the people living in the territory of the possible subject, their will being expressed through a referendum. In other words, the authors of the amendment suggested that the State Duma should waive the treaties between Russia and other states for the sake of partial restoration of the Soviet Union. Andrey Saveliev, one of those who promoted the amendment, was very explicit: “Besides legal incontrovertibility there is also politi- cal expediency.”18 In 2005, the State Duma rejected the draft; today, there is no faction of this name in the lower chamber. In August 2008, however, the Russian press revived it—a sign that the trend is still alive. It seems that the Russian elite has achieved a latent political consensus: it has been agreed that an empire is a useful thing even if it has to carefully conceal its imperial nature by pretending to be something else. This explains the recent and unexpected virtual demand for the federative idea among the “oil and gas” supporters of the Great Power idea; they have convinced themselves that in the last ten years the Motherland has indeed been “rising from its knees.” The paradox is obvi- ous: today the democratic and liberal federative ideology is exploited in Russia to justify future Great Power expansion. Moreover, our federalism is still alive for the simple reason that the impe- rial dream is gaining momentum. There is another important reason: a “newcomer” finds it much easier to join a federative state (a unit which gives its parts a lot of self-administration and prioritizes or should prioritize persuasion rather than compulsion in relations between the center and the regions) than a unitary state. Indeed, the elites of a disappointed federation subject will find it much easier to minimize the effects of their miscalculation. A federation keeps the doors open or leaves them ajar for those who might want to beat a retreat. This is especially important in cases when the territory which joins a federation is open to outside threats while the political class is guided by short-term political survival expediency. Those who join an empire must take up arms to disentangle themselves from it: in natural conditions the imperial system offers no exit. On the other hand, in the past, federations either survived the loss of their constituents or essentially peacefully fell apart. The question of whether this interpretation of federalism can strengthen regional security and mutual understanding with the post-Soviet neighbors suggests an obvious answer. This is very sad: in the post-Soviet context, the peaceful, democratic, and consensual potential of federalism is not tapped by the sides related, in one way or another, to the federative idea. In the big and small wars which flared up within the former Soviet borders, “violence was cut short either by military victory or by mutual depletion of resources. The conflicting sides never tried to use the mechanisms of harmo- nization of interests based on mutual trust, democratization, and economic considerations.”19 Some of the “former Soviet subjects” are afraid of federalism as a source of disasters or even perdition. Other “former Soviet subjects” are prepared to accept it, albeit in a strange form: they turn it upside down to wield it as a weapon of potential expansion. Both versions—federalism as a persistent pho- bia, on the one hand, and imperial federalism, on the other—leave no opportunity for the federative model to heal opposition and confrontation, a task to which it is perfectly suited.

18 For more detail, see: E. Mikhaiylovskaia, “Fraktsia ‘Rodina’ v kontekste natsionalisticheskogo diskursa v Gos- udartvennoy Dume,” in: Russkiy natsionalizm: sotsialny i kulturny kontekst, Compiled by M. Laruel, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, Moscow, 2008, pp. 50-57. 19 S. Markedonov, op. cit., p. 126. 36 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION “Soviet, Therefore Excellent”

The above partly answers the question of why Russia outstripped all the other post-Soviet states in mastering the federalist implements indispensable to all divided societies. This was not intentional: legally, the R.S.F.S.R. was a federative alliance within the Soviet Union, another, albeit formal, fed- erative alliance. From the point of view of political practice, both alliances were constructions of an imperial type. They were multinational states with a clearly outlined—both ethnically and geograph- ically—imperial center and no less obvious imperial periphery. I have already written that an empire, which is multinational by definition, and a federation, which is multinational by the whim of fate, share an important typologically similar problem: both have to address, in one way or another, the task of harmonizing relations with ethnic minorities, that is, to seek for and find their own combina- tion of self-administration and divided governance. While the Soviet Federation, the home of a mul- titude of peoples and nationalities, having overtaxed its military and economic potential while com- peting with the West, failed to resolve the problem, the Russian Federation survived, for several rea- sons, even as a sovereign state. One has to agree with those who point to the fundamental similarity of the two federations with their center in Moscow: “Russia, the core of the U.S.S.R.’s ‘internal empire,’ mirrors its predecessor not only in its territorial, ethnic, and confessional incongruence, but also in its weakened asymmetri- cal ‘national-territorial’ administrative structure.”20 The mirrored image, however, is not totally faithful: with hardly 20 percent of non-Russians in the newly born Russian Federation against a prac- tically equal numbers of Russians and non-Russians in the Soviet Union on the eve of communist collapse, the ethnic proportions have obviously changed radically. The new ethnic context made it both easier and harder to harmonize national relations in new Russia. The strategy of cooperation and mutual concessions is inevitably enforced in personal and so- cial relations: the political actors involved regard this strategy as more rational and, therefore, more advantageous. In this sense, federalism is not a magnanimous concession but political decisions im- posed by circumstances. There is no doubt that the elites treat the very close demographic parity be- tween the imperial nation of the past and the ethnic minorities which cooperate with it as a serious argument in favor of a federation. In other words, the Bolsheviks who came to power in 1917 had no other option: they could hardly hail federalism as a bourgeois invention, yet without it the new mas- ters of the ethnic and linguistic patchwork called the Russian Empire could barely pacify the fringes and take a firm grip on the country. Throughout seven decades this choice, sustained by large-scale economic programs or rather bribery of the periphery elites, proved its viability. Was it taken into account by those who restored the Russian state on the ruins of the Soviet Union? President Yeltsin and the democratic leaders feared that the wave of disintegration would spill over the administrative borders into the R.S.F.S.R. This did not and could not happen, however the new Russian leaders used the Bolshevik remedy: “Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow” to forestall the threat of disintegration (even if mainly imagined) and then push it back beyond the horizons of the politically feasible. The republican elites busy digesting what they had swallowed never questioned the expediency of a federative union in Russia, even though central power was at its lowest. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, at the last stage of its existence, the leaders had no economic tidbits to pacify the republican elites. The medieval savagery of the two Chechen wars gradually convinced the leaders of the main Russian regions that haggling with Moscow was much safer and much more effective than open and defiant resistance. Having placed the stakes on federal- ism, they actively or even aggressively insisted on its principles and slogans, at least until Vladimir Putin came to power.

20 G. Hahn, op. cit., p. 148. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 37 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

It is much easier to extend concessions to a small and weak partner than to a big and powerful one. In the period after the Soviet Union’s disintegration and the emergence of the Russian Federa- tion, the nationalist-minded public and its political representatives started saying that the new coun- try, with less than one-fifth of national minorities within its borders, might be regarded as a monoeth- nic state. At first this looked like a slip of the tongue; later it was deliberately and frequently repeated. The skyrocketing oil and gas prices stirred up the national pride of the Great Russians and heated up patriotic sentiments: once more the was conscripted to state service. No longer concerned with a (potential) threat presented by the ethnic minorities, the political leaders of new Russia remained indifferent to the fact that the centralized and unitary (by design and in practice) country would continue to be called a federation. Concessions to a small fraction of citizens were easy and helped promote the federative idea. In other words, the Russian federative project was hardly a product of deliberate political action realized by the wise and far-sighted elite intent on building a radiant future for themselves and their voters. This design rooted in the Soviet past was realized spontaneously, developed by momentum, and responded to the changing situation. The country’s political leaders were not so much confronted with a choice between federalism and other forms of territorial organization as with the muted imperative to preserve it. The Russian Federation, the first post-Soviet federation, was a federation only by “birth right,” because of its genetic connection with the R.S.F.S.R. In this context, the Russian federal elite concluded a tacit agreement of sorts with the non-Russian repub- lican elites on preservation of the federative legal shell. One side was fully aware that in extreme situations it would not be able to keep those who wanted to leave within its orbit; the other side knew that even having pushed the situation to the extremes it would not be resolved enough to leave the federation once and for all. This was the fairly shaky balance of the Yeltsin era. The sudden interest in Russia’s natural resources, which coincided with the advent of a new leader to power, made it possible to readjust the principles of post-communist federative haggling. The readjusted principles did nothing for Russian federalism: it was transformed into a rather puzzling phenomenon with no federalism about it except the name. The federative political system functions differently in the conditions of plenty and scarcity. Modest incomes encourage civilian virtues typical of federalism because the elites of the state’s constituent parts have to coordinate their actions, while the state’s excessive income (especially if easily come by) adds efficiency to the non-competitive distribution of the raw material rent. This creates a vertical structure within which “the federal center not merely central- izes the federative system by radically narrowing down the sphere of regional autonomy, but doubts its existence.”21 While federalism is dying out inside Russia, the foreign policy dimension described above is gaining weight. “Resource imperialism” presupposes Russia’s political, economic, cultural, and mil- itary domination in the larger part of the post-Soviet world. In the absence of opposition inside the country, this course is not publicly discussed on the Russian political platforms; there is not a single chance that it could be contested in earnest. The weak statehoods of many of Russia’s neighbors and the conflict potential of the post-Soviet geopolitical space suggest that the expansionist potential of Russian federalism would some day no longer be on standby. It seems that South Ossetia, a tiny and unviable state unit with North Ossetia as its Russian “elder brother,” will be the first to test the model of expansion of Russia’s family of fraternal peoples. Of course, the present law does not allow a “newcomer” to be accepted without the consent of the Georgian authorities … but, n first, Georgia is a democratic country in which power changes, albeit not irreproachably, from time to time;

21 N.V. Pankevich, Modeli federativnogo ustroystva: zakonomernosti politicheskoy transformatsii, The Urals Branch of RAS, Ekaterinburg, 2008, p. 177. 38 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n second, the laws are written to be amended and perfected; n third, in 2008, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia, which means that it is no longer part of Georgia.

Conclusion: The Failed Mission

To sum up, the mission of federalism in the post-Soviet expanse, including Russia and the Cen- tral Caucasus, failed because its realization was undermined from different sides. n First, the Russian political class looked at federative statehood not so much as the result of consistent efforts to achieve an agreement among the elites, but as part of the legacy left by the sinking Soviet Union and disposed of it in a very original way. The authoritarian re- gime, a very natural decoration of sudden oil and gas prosperity, had no use for the contrac- tual, concessional, and civil potential of the federalist idea. It amazed many by its newly displayed interest in another hypostasis of federalism: an instrument of territorial expan- sion. It is not easy to think in imperial terms in the era of post-modernity; however this can be done with the help of the federative idea. Strictly speaking, today it is impossible to dream about territorial acquisitions (or restoration of lost land) outside a federation. If fed- eralism is practiced only for geopolitical considerations it loses its meaning to become an empty and artificial structure. For this reason the Russian Federation has next to nothing to add to the fairly rich experience of world federalism: this great principle was invented at one time for purposes that have nothing in common with its intended purposes in Putin’s Russia. n Second, Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors have no use for federalist projects, plans, and schemes. The value of sovereignty in this part of Eurasia has been seriously overestimated for two reasons: independence was suddenly acquired by politically unprepared nations and the newly born states underwent their development in the dark shade of a much too large, chronically unstable, and permanently frightening “fraternal” power. The dogma of indivis- ibility of sovereignty which the elites of the new nations extracted from Marxism-Leninism prevents any contemplation of divided governance, to say nothing of its practical implemen- tation. It was these sentiments that doomed the Commonwealth of Independent States to a miserable existence. For the same reason, in the two post-communist decades, none of the Soviet successor-states (with the exception of Russia) have accepted the federative structure; even the obvious candidates—Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—qualified to join the list of federative states preferred to keep away. In some cases, sovereignty was cherished above territorial integrity: the national political elites lauded this principle and brought it to the ex- treme when they, strange as it may seem, accepted without a murmur the readjusted borders of their own states. This could have been described as sheer craziness, yet this is political practice vehemently substantiated and supported. There is no way back: even if federalism were temporarily rejected, the breakaway territories cannot be restored. n Third, it was not only national groups which acquired statehood in the course of the great reorganization that rejected federalism. It was rejected even by those peoples that acquired no statehoods in the course of the Soviet Union’s disintegration. After 1991, having found themselves under the jurisdiction of nationally-oriented rulers who spared nothing to consol- idate their sickly newborn states and were not prepared to cede even the tiniest share of the newly acquired sovereignties, the “deprived nations” abandoned, after a while, the idealist Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 39 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

federalist projects. While watching the nationalist elites of their new countries gradually master the imperialist parlance in their dialog with the minorities, the smaller groups placed their stakes (where possible) not on the division of power within a common country but on political independence. They did not need federalism to realize this design.

David MATSABERIDZE

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (Tbilisi, Georgia).

THE CONFEDERATION OF THE MOUNTAIN PEOPLES OF THE CAUCASUS AND THE CONFLICT OVER ABKHAZIA

Abstract

his paper argues that the Confedera- the Confederation was motivated by the T tion of the Mountain Peoples turned political conjunctures generated by disso- the ethnic relations among the peo- lution of the Soviet Union and that the Ab- ples of the Caucasus into a zero-sum khazian secessionist, central Georgian, and game. Initiated as a platform for peaceful Russian authorities, as well as the leaders collaboration among the Caucasian peo- of the North Caucasian ethnic groups, used ples, the Confederation turned into a kind it to pursue their radically different [politi- of hub where ethnic claims and contradic- cal] interests. Hence, there are serious tions were played out among the various doubts about the prospect of the Confed- ethnic groups in general and between the eration forming a common platform for set- Georgians and the Abkhazians in particu- tling the conflict over Abkhazia and build- lar. This study claims that establishment of ing peace in the post-Soviet Caucasus.

Introduction

This paper deals with various aspects of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples that emerged at the end of the 1980s as a project for a future political entity within the Caucasus. It was designed to bring the peoples of the North Caucasian territorial-administrative units into a single political-governmental structure, attaching some other peoples of the Russian Federation (mainly Cossacks from the Kuban district) and incorporating some territories of the Republic of Georgia (Ab- 40 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION khazians, through incorporation of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, Shida Kartli, Racha, Svan- eti, and a portion of Samegrelo).1 An analysis of the popular speeches of that time by politicians from Georgia, Abkhazia, the Russian Federation, and the North Caucasian political units, as well as of the founding Declaration of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples, reveals that the new structure turned the ethnic relations among the targeted groups into a zero-sum game. Initiated as a platform for peaceful collaboration among the Caucasian peoples, the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples turned into a kind of hub where ethnic claims and contradictions were played out between the Geor- gians and the Abkhazians. Interestingly, the post-Soviet developments around Abkhazia have always gone beyond the framework of the so-called Georgian-Abkhazian confrontation due to the involvement of wider re- gional political entities. At different times, Abkhazia, as a political unit, was depicted either as part of wider regional political structures (the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples) or was seen as a member of non-materialized ideological inventions (the Caucasian House). Paradoxically, since the late 1980s, relations between Sukhumi and Tbilisi were frequently developed through this insti- tution. Nevertheless, it is hard to deny the negative role of the Russian Federation in the relations among the various units of the Confederation and the developments over Abkhazia. The logic of Russia’s involvement in this respect is summarized nicely by Gachechiladze, who rightly mentions that “Abkhazia has a definite advantage over the land-locked North Caucasus republics of the Rus- sian Federation.”2 The first part of this paper will discuss the emergence of the Confederation and its relation to the conflict over Abkhazia, while the second part will highlight the triangle of Georgian-Russian-Con- federation relations of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The conclusion will provide some justification for wider regional contextualization of the Abkhazian problem at different times, i.e. viewing it through the prism of the Confederation.

The Birth of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus

The idea for establishing the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus was born in the minds of the North Caucasian people who emigrated to Turkey in the middle of the 19th centu- ry. Their aim was to unify the small peoples of the Northern Caucasus into a common Circassian state, create a common language, and form a new territorial unit as the 16th Union Republic of the Soviet Union. Thus, there was a perceived need to bring all the mountain peoples together into a new state. This idea was voiced at the congress held in Sukhumi on 25 August, 1989, which established the Confederation as a political organization along with a defense committee and military units for pro- tection from the “empire.” It is obvious that the formation of a 16th Union republic was an adventurist move, evidently quite understandable to the Russian Federation. These developments were negative- ly assessed from the very beginning by President Gamsakhurdia, who called it another of the Krem- lin’s provocations in the Caucasus. The Caucasian peoples, he stated, “had the right to choose the path of their future development themselves, whereas the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples would be a structure imposed on them by the Russian Federation as another imperial mechanism to bring

1 See: “Separatists, Confederalists and their Supporters,” Sakartvelos Respublika, No. 171 (450), 5 September, 1992 (in Georgian). 2 R. Gachechiladze, “Geographical Background to a Settlement of the Conflict in Abkhazia,” in: Georgians and Abkhazians. The Search for a Peace Settlement, ed. by B. Coppieters, G. Nodia, Yu. Anchabadze, Vrije Universiteit, Brussels, 1998, p. 54, available at [http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/Georgians/], June 2011. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 41 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION them under its control.”3 For Gamsakhurdia, the “Assembly of the Mountain Peoples” was the echo of the so-called “North Caucasian Red Republic”4 of the 1920s, which “Chechnia withdrew from with the aim of creating its own republic.”5

Influence of the Confederation on the Conflict over Abkhazia

The Confederation of the Mountain Peoples, crystallized at the end of the 1980s, ultimately played a negative role in the Abkhazian developments in the early 1990s and arguably crushed any possibility of Caucasian unity due to its conflicting intervention in the relations between the different Caucasian peoples (the Georgians and Abkhazians, the Russians and Georgians, the Circassians and Russians, the Chechens and Georgians). Since the new institutional creation was heavily burdened by Soviet legacy, it became more engaged in struggling with the legacies of the past, rather than in planning and devising a future peaceful framework and a common platform for the Caucasian peoples. The main problem was that the Confederation negatively interfered with the vertical and horizontal division and subjugation of the regional autonomous and republican units. Besides, the pan-Caucasian project was not simply a matter of Caucasians per se; the Russian Federation was also extremely interested in it. In addition, the international marketing of pan-Caucasian projects, like the Caucasian House and the Peaceful Caucasus, further complicated the existing situation. In this respect, any sort of pan-Caucasian unity became an externally projected plan, rather than a scheme for internal consideration and regional consumption. That is, Soviet institutional legacies, ethnic policy, and the important geopolitical location of the region turned the possibility of implementing any pan-Caucasian project into a zero-sum game. Meanwhile, the failed opportunities of wider pan-Caucasian unification determined the failure of any peace project for Abkhazia emerging from pan-Caucasian institutional considerations. So, what was the role of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples in the conflict over Abkhaz- ia that erupted in the early 1990s? The course of developments has demonstrated the negative role played by the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus in post-Soviet Caucasian af- fairs in general, and in the Abkhazian developments of the early 1990s in particular. The first two assemblies of the Confederation were held in 1989 (the founding congress) and in 1990. During the meeting on 25-26 August, 1989, the Assembly of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus—AMPC (AGNK is the abbreviation in Russian—Assambleya Gorskikh Narodov Kavkaza) was formed. The AMPC’s Second Congress, held in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria, on 13-14 October, 1990, confirmed that “a period of practical work to implement a program for a new state structure for the Northern Caucasus and Abkhazia was on the way.”6 By 1-2 November, 1991, however, the third gathering of the representatives of the mountain peoples of the Caucasus, held in Sukhumi, had transformed the assembly into a confederation. Nevertheless, the Turkish people of the Northern Caucasus—the Balkarians, Karachays, Kumyks, and Nogays—refused to participate in the event, and the Laks even did not respond to the invitation.7

3 “To the Chechen Delegation, Participating in the Assembly of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus,” Sakartve- los Respublika, No. 171 (450), 5 September, 1992, p. 3. 4 Gamsakhurdia evidently meant the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The “North Caucasian Re- public,” which united several territories populated by mountain peoples, also existed, but only in 1918-1920, whereby it was in no way “red.” 5 “To the Chechen Delegation, Participating in the Assembly of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus.” 6 S. Lakoba, “Abkhazia, Georgia and the Caucasus Confederation,” in: Georgians and Abkhazians. The Search for a Peace Settlement, p. 102. 7 See: J. Oguz, “The Unity of the Peoples of the North Caucasus: Myth or Reality?” Bulletin of the Center of the Foreign Policy Study and Analyses (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia), No. 7 (16), 1999, p. 20 (in Georgian). 42 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

These assemblies were used by the delegates to voice their grievances against each other. The opening remarks of these assemblies already demonstrated the confrontational, rather than coopera- tive nature and spirit of the representatives of the Caucasian peoples. The first assembly was opened by Sergei Shamba, the leader of the Abkhazian National Movement—Aidgilara. According to Sham- ba, “the authoritarian-totalitarian regimes of the center have been substituted with new dictatorial regimes of the newly independent republics,”8 and since the Abkhazians felt this aggression, the Confederation was a form of response to this. The leader of the Democratic Party of Abkhazia, Guram Gumba, stated that “the Northern Caucasus is a colony of Russia, whereas Abkhazia is a colony of Georgia.” Abkhazian scientist Ermolai Jinjolia stressed that the “Abkhazia should be granted the sta- tus of an occupied country.” The spirit of the assembly was more pro-North Caucasian, stressing the need for common and joint action of all the North Caucasian peoples. Head of the Assembly of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus Musa Shanibov said: “If Russia were to declare war on Chechnia, the entire world would come to its assistance and it (the world) would prevent the defeat of the Cau- casian people as a result of the Russian-.”9 In sum, the very first meetings of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples and declarations of their participants demonstrated that the new organization had become not a platform of dialog, but rather a new arena of contestation. Thus, the CMP became an additional irritant contributing to the confrontation between different groups in the Caucasus. The Confederation spoke out with particular vehemence against the local authorities in Tbilisi when its president, Shanibov, condemned Georgia for violating the rights of the minorities residing in its territory. Shanibov expressed his condolences regarding the tragedy of 9 April, 1989, although he stressed that subjugation and humiliation of the Ossetians by the Georgians would be unacceptable. The Caucasian Confederation, he stated, was in favor of creating “joint defense forces of the Cauca- sian peoples, which would be deployed in South Ossetia to stop the war in the region.”10 In his concluding statement, Shanibov mentioned that the position of the Confederation would be determined by the actions and attitudes of the Georgians toward the Abkhazians. Nevertheless, the delegates jointly condemned the Russian government for its “anti-Caucasian policy,” which had anti- Communist, anti-Bolshevik, and anti-czarist overtones. Thus, the ambiguity of the future role of the Confederation was already expressed by the leaders of the newly created organization, although later the secessionist-minded Abkhazians regarded it as a new institution for voicing their grievances and claims against independent Georgia.

Abkhazian Secessionism and the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples

The Confederation became angrier and more aggressive as the situation in Abkhazia deteriorat- ed. Following the different rounds of negotiations between Moscow and Tbilisi over Abkhazian de- velopments, President of the Confederation Musa Shanibov stressed that if Russia chose peaceful negotiations with Tbilisi, it would complicate the existing situation in the North Caucasian republics. This statement was followed by a round of negotiations on Abkhazia held in Sochi in 1993.11 It

8 “Assembly of Mountain Peoples in Sokhumi,” Afkhazetis Khma, No. 178 (13544), 7 November, 1991 (in Geor- gian). 9 Ibidem. 10 Ibidem. 11 See: “Radio of Gudauta on the Georgian-Russian Meeting in Sochi,” Sakartvelos Respublika, No. 76 (620), 14 April, 1993. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 43 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION should be mentioned, however, that the Northern Caucasus was not unilateral in its approach. Colonel V.P. Gromov, Ataman of the Cossacks of Kuban, stressed in a letter sent to the then Chairman of the Parliament Shevardnadze: “The Cossacks of Kuban will not intervene in Abkhazian affairs and the military units of Cossacks have never been and will not be sent to the region.”12 Nevertheless, statements like this were rare, and the Confederation mostly maintained its ag- gressive policy toward Georgia. On 9 February, 1993, the Novosti TV program quoted Nezavisi- maia gazeta as saying that “the Confederation of the Caucasian Peoples was forming military units from representatives of the North Caucasians, Cossacks, and Circassians of Turkey, , and Jordan, who would cross the Russian-Georgian border with the aim of joining the Abkhazian irreg- ulars.”13 The Confederation’s involvement in Abkhazian affairs became even more apparent by late October 1993. On 26 October, 1993, a session of the Parliament of the Confederation was held in Sukhumi with the participation of delegations from North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Karachaevo-Cherkes- sia, Daghestan, and Kabardia. The delegates from these republics confirmed their support of the sep- aratist Abkhazians and drafted a special address to Russia, demanding an end to the economic block- ade of the region.14 It is hardly imaginable that the decision on deploying the Confederation’s military units in the territory of Abkhazia was made without the blessing of the Russian Federation. Following this decision, representatives of the Confederation arrived in Zugdidi to support Gamsakhurdia and his followers. According to the Georgian government, “the move was aimed at imposing control over part of the territory of the sovereign republic, and Sukhumi was targeted as the headquarters of the Confederation.”15 However, the Georgian government expressed its hopes that the Russian Federa- tion would take adequate measures to withstand illegal and provocative action in the territory of Abkhazia since this move would entail the possibility of re-escalation of the conflict.16 I would argue that there might have been another motive in the desire of the Abkhazians to seek links with the North Caucasians under the strained relations with the central authorities of Tbilisi: “Pragmatic considera- tions have to take precedence over a sentimental vision of pan-Caucasian ethnic solidarity. This means that as long as the confrontation with Georgia continues, the Abkhazians will have no allies to rely on besides Russia.”17 Following the eruption of military clashes in Abkhazia, the President of the Confederation and the Head of the Parliament of the Confederation issued a special decree on mobilization of the military forces of the Confederation, according to which all the headquarters of the Confederation should ensure military resistance against the aggressors and be urgently deployed in the territory of Abkhazia. To this end, they should try their best to enter the territory of Abkhazia by any means; the capital city—Tbilisi—should be declared a zone of disaster and terrorist attacks should be launched there; all ethnic Georgians in the territory of the Confederation should be considered hostages; and mobilization should be implemented until 24:00 on 22 August, 1992.18 De Waal claims that the support provided by the several hundred volunteer soldiers from the Northern Cau-

12 “Cossacks Would not Take Part in the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict—To the Head of the Parliament of Geor- gia—Eduard Shevardnadze,” Sakartvelos Respublika, No. 43 (587), 5 March, 1993, p. 1. 13 “Declaration of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of Georgia,” Sakartvelos Respublika, No. 29 (273), 13 Febru- ary, 1993, p. 1. 14 See: “Comment of the Press-Speaker of the ,” Sakartvelos Respublika, No. 235 (763), 29 October, 1993, p. 1. 15 “Declaration of the Government of the Republic of Georgia,” Sakartvelos Respublica, No. 236 (764), 30 Octo- ber, 1993, p. 1. 16 See: “Appeal to the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Eltsin,” Sakartvelos Respublika, No. 238 (766), 3 November, 1993, p. 2. 17 G. Nodia, “The Conflict in Abkhazia: National Projects and Political Circumstances,” in: Georgians and Abkhaz- ians. The Search for a Peace Settlement, p. 20. 18 See: “The Creation of the Confederation was Aimed at Dissolution of the State Integrity of Georgia and Captur- ing its Historically Undivided Land—Abkhazia,” Sakartvelos Respublika, No. 161 (440), 25 August, 1992, p. 1. 44 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION casus was an important factor in the Abkhaz victory: “They were inspired by the new idea of a Confederation of the Mountain Peoples bringing independence to the numerically small peoples of the Caucasus.”19 Nevertheless, the figure of Basaev and his transformation from number one sup- porter of the Abkhazian people to number one terrorist of the Russian Federation speaks volumes about the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples as an independent actor in the post-Soviet develop- ments over the Caucasus in general, and in Abkhazia in particular. The vice-head of the Abkhazian National Movement Aidgilara mentioned that “the Geor- gians have wonderful traditions and a great culture, and the country (Georgia) really has the chance to become the leader of the liberation movement of the Caucasian peoples.”20 It was also men- tioned, however, that Georgia lost this chance at some point in the course of the developments. In addition, there was not a common agreement among the members of the Confederation over the issue of Georgia. Lioma Usmanov, a member of the united congress of the Chechen people, men- tioned that it was “hard to imagine a Caucasian Confederation without Georgia,” while Davit Pai- chadze called for unification of the democratic forces of the Caucasus.21 The ambiguity over the future vision of the emerging structure contributed to its disordered and negative role in the trans- formation of the post-Soviet Caucasus. The attempts to bring Abkhazia into the Confederation were denounced by part of Abkhazian society. The Appeal to the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus stressed that no referendum had been held on the issue of Abkhazia entering the Confederation; moreover, 90 percent of the Christian population of Abkhazia did not have any desire to do so.22 Davit Dolbadze of the Sukhumi branch of Tbilisi State University wrote that the question of whether or not the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic would join the Confederation should be decided jointly by all the peoples of Abkhazia. The statement rejected the possibility of Confederation acceding on religious grounds, stressing that “the unity of the peoples in the Confederation is based on the Islamic religion, whereas the majority of Abkhazians (90 percent) practice the Christian faith.”23 The announcement called for reaching common ground on the matter of ethnic Abkhazians and Georgians, whereby a solution to the problem would contribute to reconciliation of the two ethnic groups, rather than making their re- lations even more conflict-prone. It should be mentioned that in the midst of building a common (North) Caucasian platform out of the territorial administrative units of the Northern Caucasus only Chechnia’s position over the developments in Abkhazia was ambiguous. According to the Chechen- press Agency, “any Chechen fighting on the side of the Abkhazians will be considered an enemy of the Chechen people and a traitor of the interests of Chechens.”24 Meanwhile, Commander of the mil- itary units of the Confederation of the Caucasian Peoples Shamil Basaev mentioned that “if there is a war between the Georgians and the Abkhazians and the Abkhazians are under severe pressure, the Chechens will support the Abkhazians. Whereas if a war between Russia and Georgia is launched, Chechen volunteers will support Georgia.”25 Oguz rightly mentions that the Confederation became another irritant in the developments over Abkhazia. He claims that “the Chechens saw the organization as an instrument in the fight for inde- pendence, whereas the leadership of the Confederation deemed it to be a forum of regional collabora- tion and cooperation.”26 Thus, it is not surprising that the position of the Confederation regarding the three conflicts of the Caucasus, over Abkhazia, in Ingush-Ossetia, and in Chechnia, was radically

19 T. De Waal, The Caucasus—An Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2010. 20 “Assembly of the Mountain Peoples in Sukhumi.” 21 See: Ibidem. 22 See: “Appeal to the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus,” Afkhazetis Khma, No. 198 (13687), 2 July, 1992, p. 1. 23 “It’s Time to Sound the Alarm,” Afkhazetis Khma, 17 June, 1993. 24 “Reaction of Grozny on the Abkhazian Developments,” Sakartvelos Respublika, No. 56 (560), 19 March, 1993. 25 Ibidem. 26 J. Oguz, op. cit., p. 21. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 45 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION different. Oguz is right when arguing that since all the actors proposed their vision and future politi- cal-institutional structure of the CMP, it could have never been transformed into a framework for peace for the conflicting peoples of the Caucasus.

The Triangle of Georgian-Russian-Confederation Relations

The central Russian authorities issued a special announcement advising the peoples of the Northern Caucasus not to intervene and destabilize the situation in the Caucasus through their arbi- trary decisions.27 The statement of the Russian Ministry of Justice stressed that the activities of the Confederation violated the Constitution of the Russian Federation and denounced the decision of the Confederation to send military units comprised of volunteers to Abkhazia to fight against the military units of the central Georgian authorities.28 As time passed, suspicions of the involvement of military units of the Confederation in the internal affairs of Georgia through its actions in Abkhazia gradually increased. “The presence of paramilitary units of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples wors- ened the situation in Abkhazia,” the Georgian delegation stated at a meeting of the Inspective Com- mission for the Situation in Abkhazia. “Particular terrorist acts were organized in the territory of Georgia at the behest of the head of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples,”29 the Georgian del- egation claimed. Head of the Georgian State Council Eduard Shevardnadze wrote a special letter to President of the Russian Federation on the attitude of the local Cossacks toward the Abkhazian is- sue. According to the opinion of the majority of Cossacks residing in Abkhazia, “the local sociopoliti- cal developments in Abkhazia are the internal affair of Georgia, of which Abkhazia forms a part, and interference in the internal affairs of the Georgian state might seriously worsen the situation on ground.”30 During a press conference on 7 October, 1992, Shevardnadze pointed to the threat to Geor- gia’s territorial integrity from separatists “supported by the Confederation of the North Caucasian Peoples, which, in essence, is a terrorist organization, as well as on the part of the various factions of the Parliament of the Russian Federation.”31 Evidently, Shevardnadze had already understood the possible negative influence of the Confed- eration on the developments in Abkhazia. Obviously, the Russian Federation did not sanction or ac- cept the formation of any kind of political organization or new institution in its territory in general, or in one of its most vulnerable parts—the Northern Caucasus—in particular, beyond its control. In ad- dition, an experienced politician like Eduard Shevardnadze would easily sense the possible outcomes of the emerging developments in the Northern Caucasus for Georgia. The Georgian politicians were heavily criticized on the anniversary of the deportation of the Cau- casian peoples to Turkey at a rally in the republican stadium of Sukhumi. A speech was delivered by Vladislav Ardzinba, followed by M. Elmesov, representative of the Kabardian people, A. Dakanov, representative of the Shapsug people, S. Dakaev, state artist of the Chechen people, as well as by

27 See: “This was Yesterday…” Sakartvelos Respublika, No. 158 (437), 20 August, 1992, p. 2. 28 See: Ibid., p. 1. 29 “15 September in Sochi,” Sakartvelos Respublika, No. 181 (460), 17 September, 1992. 30 “Head of the State Council of Georgia, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze to the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris Yeltsin,” Sakartvelos Respublika, No. 120 (399), 3 July, 1992. 31 “Press Conference of Eduard Shevardnadze,” Sakartvelos Respublika, No. 204 (483), 7 October, 1992. 46 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Abkhazians living abroad, E. Kvadzba and E. Ashuba. After the meeting, the participants left for the coast to see the place where the monument to the muhajirs was to be erected.32 This event signaled the involvement of the Confederation in Abkhazian developments through the cultural realm as well. During the Second International Festival of Adighe Culture in Sukhumi, a green (Muslim) flag was flown from the building of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia. The event was attended by representatives of all Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus. At the end, a special deci- sion was made to build a in south-west Sukhumi.33 These two events could be considered as attempts by the secessionist-minded Abkhazian elite to find allies for the future building of independ- ent Abkhazia. Nevertheless, as hard as it is to claim the political independence of the Confederation from Russia, it is just as hard to imagine these two events occurring without the blessing of Moscow. Equally, the Abkhazians were unlikely to find any other “new partner” than Moscow. As time passed, representatives of the Confederation continued to interfere in the internal affairs of Georgia. Vice- President of the Confederation Isa Arsamikov pointed out the occupation of Abkhazia by Georgian military units and called for peace and brotherhood between the two peoples. Nevertheless, parallel to his statement, a military clash took place in the region of Ochamchira between the Georgian military and paramilitary divisions of the Confederation.34 There is some evidence to support the anti-Georgian mindset of representatives of the Con- federation. In her article published in Nezavisimaia gazeta on 28 May, 1992, Liana Minasian wrote that the leaders of so-called South Ossetia were ready to collaborate with all forces due to the late responses of the Russian Federation. Such assistance was offered by representatives of the North Caucasian Confederation. The same anti-Georgian stance was taken by the newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta (19 June, 1992), which published an article by Andranik Migranian (the then Head of the Center for Studying the CIS Social and Political Problems and Inter-State Relations, Institute of Inter- national Economic and Political Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences) stating that in the Southern Caucasus a group of states was waging war against Georgia. States like South Ossetia and North Ossetia were among them and, over time, the North Caucasians would fight against Georgia on the side of Ossetians. Migranian was even annoyed that the leadership of the Russian Federation had not noticed in time the aspirations of the South Ossetian people to join the Russian Federation. Moreover, according to Migranian, if Russia supported Georgia, South Ossetia would be unable to withstand the abuses of the Russian Federation, since the internal political situation in the country put Georgia in an unfavorable position.

Confederation as a Peace Project?

After the end of the hot phase of the conflict in 1993, the idea of confederation transformed into a peace project for resolving the Abkhazian problem. In the late 1990s, a famous representative of the Abkhazian elite, Stanislav Lakoba, proposed a vision of a future pan-Caucasian confedera- tion bringing the Northern and Southern Caucasus together. According to Lakoba, the Caucasian autonomous republics and oblasts should declare themselves sovereign states, and later on a new alliance could be formed based on this self-assertion. This new union—a Caucasus Confedera- tion—would unite Chechnia, Daghestan, Georgia, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Kabardia, Karachaevo-

32 See: “A Rally in Sukhumi,” Sakartvelos Respublika, No. 96 (375), 3 June, 1992, p. 1. 33 See: “A Green Flag over Sukhumi,” Sakartvelos Respublika, No. 139 (418), 28 July, 1992. 34 See: “My Name is Karkarashvili, You Can’t Defeat Me,” Sakartvelos Respublika, No. 201 (480), 3 October, 1992, p. 2. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 47 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Balkaria, Abkhazia, and Adigey, all of them to be joined as equal members.35 Lakoba insisted that this relationship would solve the main problem: the peoples of the region (Georgians and Abkhaz- ians as well) “will be both together and apart at the same time in their mutual relations; with time, the Caucasus Confederation will transform itself into a federation, but this will occur peacefully and painlessly.”36 In this respect, the new structure of the Confederation was a good point for the Abkhazian claims vis-à-vis the Republic of Georgia. In essence, it would continue the previous line of the Confederation toward the conflict over Abkhazia, which, when the war started, came to the aid of the Abkhazian military units by sending organized groups of soldiers to support Abkhazian cause and fight for independence.

Conclusion

The ambiguous position of the Confederation and the internal clashes between the various ter- ritorial-administrative units of the Northern Caucasus made the role of the Confederation particularly alarming and negative in the developments over Abkhazia during the early 1990s. There was no uni- fied position among the member units of the Confederation, while the various territorial-administra- tive entities launched their own action plans vis-à-vis Georgia in general, and Abkhazia in particular. Oguz gives a good summary of why the Confederation failed as a political project for uniting the Caucasus: n firstly, it did not manage to unite all the peoples of the Caucasus, n secondly, the Adighes and other ethnic groups were in confrontation over the leading posi- tions in the new union; n and thirdly, the Karachais and Balkarians created the Assembly of the Turkish People sepa- rately, which gained the support of Chechnia and Azerbaijan.37 An analysis of the wider framework of the post-Soviet confrontation over Abkhazia, i.e. its contextualization in the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples, has demonstrated that this regional institutional structure had a negative impact on the post-Soviet developments over Abkhazia. Ulti- mately, the creation or formulation of the CMP was conditioned by the political conjunctures of a particular period in post-Soviet development and was heavily dependent not only on the regional actors, but also on external players who were interested either in ensuring stability or in causing insta- bility in the region. At the same time, the central government of Georgia, the local authorities of Abkhazia, the various units of the North Caucasus, and the Russian Federation all had different ideas of the Confederation as an institution. Hence, there are serious doubts about the prospect of the Con- federation of the Mountain Peoples forming a common platform for settling the conflict over Abkhaz- ia and building peace in the post-Soviet Caucasus.

35 See: S. Lakoba, op. cit., pp. 102-103. 36 Ibid, p. 103. 37 See: J. Oguz, op. cit., pp. 20-26. 48 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Parvin DARABADI

D.Sc. (Hist.), Professor at the Department of International Relations, Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

SEA POWER IN CAUCASIAN GEOPOLITICS: PAST AND PRESENT

Abstract

he author relies on theoretical con Caspian Caucasian coast, especially in times T structs of the classics of geopolitics to of crises, was one of the main factors in trace how sea power has affected Cau- the geopolitical struggle over the Caucasus. casian geopolitics in the last three centu- The author pays particular attention to the ries. He identifies the main stages in the naval games now underway in the Caspian struggle of the Great Powers for control over and the Black Sea and points out that only the Black Sea-Caucasian-Caspian geopolit- sustainable west (Black Sea)-east (the Cas- ical expanse in the 18th-19th centuries and pian) naval envelopment will permit the main during World Wars I and II. He concludes geopolitical players in rivalry on the world that the presence of real sea power strong arena today to gain complete geostrategic enough to control the Black Sea and the control over the Caucasus.

Introduction

The Sea Power conception American Admiral Alfred Mahan formulated at the turn of the 20th century as one of the fundamental laws of classical geopolitics includes three key components: the navy (N) + merchant marine (MM) + naval bases (NB); he theoretically substantiated the decisive role of sea power in the fates of countries and peoples, as well as entire regions and continents.1 Its military-strategic value was fully confirmed during World War I (1914-1918) and especially World War II (1939-1945), which shook the world in the first half of the 20th century. During the Cold War, which went on unabated for 40 years (1947-1991), the West finally defeated the Soviet Union with the help of the anaconda strategy. However, the sea power concept is still viable in the 21st century: military-technical progress has turned the navy into a decisive factor of geopolitical ri- valry over redivision of the world. Halford Mackinder, one of the classics of geopolitics of the first half of the 20th century, wrote in his The Geographical Pivot of History published in 1904 that the region which he called the Land of Five Seas (squeezed between the Caspian, Black, Mediterranean, and Red seas and the Persian Gulf) was of geopolitical functional importance. In the early 20th century, the British geographer predicted that “the Caucasus and Caspian should be considered as elements of a broader policy.”2

1 See: Yu.V. Tikhonravov, Geopolitika, Biznes-shkola Intel-Sintez Co. Ltd, Moscow, 1998, p. 100. 2 Quoted from: F. Vielmini, “The Influence of Mackinder’s Theory on Current U.S. Deployment in Eurasia: Prob- lems and Perspectives,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (34), 2005, p. 60. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 49 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Throughout the last three centuries, the historical destinies of the Caucasus were and remain intimately connected with the geopolitical processes unfolding in three adjacent seas—the Black, Azov, and Caspian. It is not surprising that Karl Haushofer, classic of German geopolitics, included the Caucasus in the world map of “fighting zones along continents’ borders” together with the “his- torical zones of struggle” (the Bosporus, Gibraltar, and Suez zone, as well as other conflict-prone zones of the first half of the 20th century) in which sea power was one of the key military-strategic factors.3

Confrontation among the Sea Powers of the Great Powers in the Black Sea-Caucasian-Caspian Expanse in the 18th-20th Centuries

The Black Sea-Caucasian-Caspian expanse acquired special geopolitical importance as one of the key targets of international rivalry in the 18th century. This was when the region transformed from an arena of uncompromising geopolitical contest in the to become an orbit into which Russia, Britain, and , along with the Ottoman Empire and Persia, became increasingly drawn. It was also a time when the sea power factor came to the fore in the geopolitical games Russia and Britain were playing in the Caucasus as absolutely indispensable for control over this part of the world. On the whole, the fact that Peter the Great created a military-naval toehold in the Caspian—the results of his Persian campaign of 1722-1723 when the Russian army captured , Baku, and the Caspian Iranian coast—meant that the Russian emperor nurtured ambitious plans of marching on . Together with many other rulers, he obviously fell victim to the so-called Indian syndrome. At the same time, the Russian Empire did not let other traditional geopolitical goals out of its sight: hoist- ing the Orthodox banner over Constantinople and gaining access to the “warm seas.” It was under Peter the Great that the Russian state revised its foreign policy priorities: it moved away from its domestic worries to formulate new typically imperial geopolitical tasks in the north— in the Baltic and in the south—in the Black and Azov seas, the Caucasus, and the Caspian. The foundations of Russia’s imperial policies of the 18th-19th centuries were laid down under Peter the Great; this was the time that it formulated its geopolitical goals in the new, southerly direc- tion4 unattainable without complete control over the Caucasus and the Black, Azov, and basins. After squeezing Britain, its main rival, out of the Caspian basin in the first decades of the 18th century, Russia consolidated its position in the region. Throughout the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire, another actor involved in the geopolitical games around the Caspian, was too busy fighting Russia in the Black Sea basin and the Balkans to realize its ambitions in the Caucasus. In the 18th century, the Black Sea basin became a source of very serious conflicts in European politics. Struggle over the Black Sea was one of the central elements of the rivalry between the Otto- man and Russian empires in the 18th century. In the 19th century, France and Britain joined the fra- cas. Russia defeated Turkey in several wars: it relied on its powerful Black Sea Navy built up by Catherine the Great to celebrate several strategically important victories. Under the Treaty of Ku- chuk-Kainarji of 1774, which ended the war of 1768-1774, Russia gained an outlet to the Black Sea.

3 See: K. Haushofer, “Granitsy v ikh geograficheskom i politicheskom znachenii” (Grenzen in ihrer geogra- phischen und politischen Bedeutung),” in: O geopolitike, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 2001, p. 127. 4 See: E.V. Anisimov, “Petr I: rozhdenie imperii,” Voprosy istorii, No. 7, 1989, p. 20. 50 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Control over the Crimea and the newly-founded navy base in Sevastopol were two gains of immense military-strategic importance. In 1783, Russia laid the foundation of its Black Sea Navy, which proved its value in the Russo-Turkish wars of 1787-1791 and 1806-1812. Meanwhile, the early 19th century marked another stage in the struggle between Russia and Britain for military and strategic control over the Central Caucasus and the Caspian and Black Sea basins. During the Russo-Persian wars of 1804-1813 and 1826-1828, the Russian Caspian military flotilla, the only real sea power in the Caspian, played an important role (along with the land forces) in establishing Russian control over the western and southern Caspian coasts. After advancing to the western and southwestern Caspian coasts, Russia acquired a considera- ble military-strategic advantage and a toehold from which it could move further southward; these gains sealed the Caspian off to keep Britain away from the Central Caucasus and Central Asia. It is not surprising that, when readying for the war against Persia, Alexander I paid special attention to the western Caspian area and Baku as the best Caspian port. The imperial rescript of 12 September, 1801 addressed to Lieutenant-General Knorring, who commanded the troops in the Caucasus, pointed out that this port and the entire western stretch of the Caspian coast should be occupied in order to facil- itate deliveries to the Russian troops in the Central Caucasus “from Astrakhan by sea rather than by the very difficult route across the Caucasian mountains.”5 Russia’s military achievements in the Central Caucasus and Caspian were registered by the Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchay (1828) treaties, which granted Russia the exclusive right to station its military fleet in the Caspian. The consequence of this cannot be overestimated.6 In this way, Russia secured one of its most ambitious aims: unrivalled domination in the Cauca- sus and on the western coast of the world’s largest inland sea. After the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-1829, Russia advanced to the eastern Black Sea coast. Under the Peace Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, Russia acquired the Caucasian Black Sea coast (up to the areas north of Batum). Russia lost the Crimean War of 1853-1856 under the pressure of the numerically and, most important, technically superior British-French-Turkish Navy, which used steamships; Sevastopol, its main Black Sea naval base, collapsed.7 Later, in 1877-1878 during another successful war on Turkey, Russia captured Batum and final- ly established its domination in the eastern part of the Black Sea. In the 20th century, the Caucasus became one of the major geostrategic centers that played an important role in both world wars and in the military-political developments in the Middle East. Early in the 20th century, Russia and the Ottoman Empire were equally aware of the military- strategic importance of the Black Sea. It was the defeats of their Black Sea navies during World War I that accelerated their disintegration. In 1918-1920, when Soviet Russia and the Entente opposed one another in the Caucasian theat- er, the naval war in the Black and Caspian seas played an important role; in 1918 the Black Sea Navy was sunk, which allowed the Allies to establish their control over the Caucasian Black Sea coast and occupy Batum. In fact, control over the Central Caucasus and the oil reserves of Baku and the Caspian were one of Britain’s traditional priorities in the Middle East and perfectly fitted its main geopolitical concep- tion related to Eurasia. In 1919, Halford Mackinder, who represented the British command in the South of Russia, insisted that his country should “secure a position in the Caspian Sea.”8 On the whole, Lord Curzon’s well-known geopolitical plan envisaged a chain of buffer states stretching from India’s northern borders to the Mediterranean to protect the “jewel of the British

5 P.G. Butkov, Materialy dlia novoy istorii Kavkaza s 1722 po 1803 gg., Part II, St. Petersburg, 1869, p. 504. 6 See: Pod stiagom Rossii: Sbornik arkhivnykh dokumentov, Russkaya kniga, Moscow, 1992, p. 318. 7 See: “Rossia-Turtsia. Russko-Turetskie voyny XVII-XIXvv.,” available at [allturkey.narod.ru/turkharb.htm]. 8 Quoted from: F. Vielmini, op. cit. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 51 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION crown” and facilitate communication between the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand.9 This would have made the Caspian, which occupied a special place in the Russian Empire’s military-strategic plans, the central link in the chain.10 It stands to reason that generals Dunsterville and Malleson, who headed military expeditions, were ordered to occupy Anzali, Baku, and Krasnovodsk (now Turkmen- bashi) and capture the Caspian Navy.11 This would have given the Brits a chance to establish their complete domination over the Cas- pian with ensuing military-strategic advantages. Meanwhile, during 1918 and 1919, the Soviet government and the Navy commanders were fe- verishly building up Russia’s naval capabilities in the Caspian,12 which allowed the Soviet Navy to carry out several successful operations and landings in the Caspian. On 28 April, 1920, the vanguard units of the 11th Red Army occupied Baku, known as the “eastern naval gates of the Central Cauca- sus;” several days later, on 1 May, ships of the Volga-Caspian Flotilla entered Baku Bay; on 18 May, Soviet troops captured Anzali after a successful landing operation. The British were pushed back into Iran, while the Caspian once more became a “Russian lake.” Early in July 1920, the British had to pull out of Batum, the western military naval gates of the Central Caucasus; in November 1920, Armenia became Soviet; in February 1921, Soviet power was established in Georgia. Soviet Russia, which relied on its armed forces—the Red Army and the Navy, established con- trol over the Central Caucasus and its main Black Sea and Caspian ports. During World War II, directives of the German OKW (particularly Directive No. 45 of 23 July, 1942, which was a continuation of Operation Braunschweig) entrusted Army Group A with the task of capturing Stalingrad and later Astrakhan, one of the largest Caspian ports, as well as of capturing the Caucasus, the Grozny and Baku oil areas in particular, in Operation Edelweiss. As soon as the main mobile forces of Army Group A had moved far enough into the Caucasus, the 11th Army of Erich Manstein, after capturing Sevastopol, was expected to navigate, with the direct support of the German naval forces, the Kerch Strait to occupy the eastern (Caucasian) coast. The German naval forces had to fight the Soviet Black Sea Fleet on the Caucasian coast, as well as take measures to use in the Caspian “light ships of the naval forces to fight at the enemy’s marine communications (oil transports and communication with the Anglo-Saxons in Iran).”13 The Germans had to rely on naval forces because the Luftwaffe was unable to fully cope with the task owing to the fairly effective Soviet air defenses and the operations of the Caspian Flotilla. On the whole, after severing the Astrakhan-Baku Caspian communication line, the Germans tried, n first, to weaken the defenses of the Caspian ports, n second, to interfere with large-scale transportation of oil and oil products from Baku to As- trakhan and Krasnovodsk and, n third, to cut down deliveries from the Persian Gulf across Iran and the Caspian of large batch- es of weapons and foodstuffs under the lend-lease agreement. Meanwhile, from the very beginning, the Caspian Flotilla successfully coped with its task of, n first, preventing enemy landings and penetration of enemy naval forces into the Caspian;

9 See: Ya.L. Mikhaylov, “K voprosu o podgotovke angliyskoy interventsii v Azerbaidzhane v 1919 godu,” Izvestia AN Azerb. SSR. Seria istorii, filosofii i prava, No. 2, 1979, p. 32. 10 See: The Times, 29 September, 1918; S.V. Lavrov, “Politika Anglii na Kavkaze i Sredney Azii v 1917-1921 godakh,” Voprosy istorii, No. 5, 1979, p. 83. 11 See: L.I. Miroshnikov, Angliyskaia ekspansiia v Irane. 1914-1920 gody, Moscow, 1961, pp. 114-115. 12 See: Voennye moriaki v borbe za vlast Sovetov v Baku i Prikaspii, Elm Publishers, Baku, 1971, p. 355. 13 V.I. Dashichev, Bankrotstvo strategii germanskogo fashizma. Istoricheskie ocherki. Dokumenty i materialy, Vol. 2, Moscow 1973, p. 327. 52 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n second, protecting marine communications and transportation of oil and oil products in par- ticular and lend-lease deliveries; n and, third, guarding the coast and the main Caspian ports, particularly Baku.14 In August 1941, the Flotilla played an important role in moving Soviet landing forces to the Ira- nian Caspian coast; this was the first large-scale landing operation of the Red Army and the Navy dur- ing the war.15 On the whole, fighting in the Caspian was very specific: in the absence of an enemy fleet, the Flotilla had to rebuff the Luftwaffe, which tried (and never completely succeeded) to disrupt commu- nications using bombs and bottom mines. Events were much more dramatic in the Black Sea, its important features being as follows: lim- ited size, which made it easier to deploy naval operational forces and organize their interaction; the central location of the Crimean Peninsula, which made it possible to use its military bases and air- fields; deep waters (with the exception of the sea’s shallower northwestern part); poorly indented coastline; small distances between the ports of the western coast; and fairly favorable meteorological and navigational-hydrographic conditions, which permitted all-year-round operations of all naval forces. The German command expected to destroy or at least incapacitate the main forces of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet from the air and block off the rest in the bases in order to capture them from land. In the event of war, the Black Sea Fleet, in turn, would have to launch active mine-laying and submarine operations to keep the enemy out of the Black Sea and prevent landings of German troops and movement of enemy troops and military cargoes to the ports of Rumania and Bulgaria (Germa- ny’s allies) and neutral Turkey. It would also have to cooperate with the offensive operations of the maritime flank of land forces and guard the Soviet marine communications.16 The Soviet Azov Flo- tilla was to operate in close communication with the land forces of the Red Army, maintain marine communications, and prevent enemy landings. By the beginning of the war there was a ramified system of naval bases (Sevastopol as the main base and the bases in Odessa, Nikolaev, Novorossiysk, , and Poti) with one bad flaw, which aggravated the situation as soon as the war began: there were no strongpoints along the poor- ly indented Caucasian coast. The failures of the first months taught the Soviet command to use the already functioning and set up new naval strongpoints in the Caucasus.17 In 1941-1942, the hardest period of war, the Black Sea Navy was actively involved, together with land forces, in defending Odessa and especially Sevastopol. Germany started the war without a Black Sea fleet of its own in the expectation of using the Rumanian fleet deployed in Constanþa and Sulina, which was by far inferior to the Soviet Navy. In 1941, the Azov Flotilla, in turn, joined forces with the land troops and the Black Sea naval forces to thwart the OKW plans to force the Kerch Strait, as well the Germans’ initial plans to use the troops that had already moved into the Crimea to launch offensive operations on Tuapse and Novo- rossiysk. Enemy naval communication and transportation of military cargoes to the troops that had reached the Azov coast were effectively disrupted: transportation means left moored in the Azov ports were destroyed, mines were laid on a large scale, and port and military equipment was damaged to prevent its use by the enemy. To relieve the German pressure on the Caucasus, the ships of the Azov Flotilla were removed to the Black Sea.18

14 See: N. Kadurin, “Zashchita Kaspiyskoy flotiliey morskikh perevozok,” Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, No. 4, 1978, pp. 43-44. 15 See: N.A. Aliev, Voenno-morskaia istoria Azerbaidzhana, Elm Publishers, Baku, 2002, p. 194. 16 See: “Chernomorsky flot SSSR v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne,” available at [otvoyna.ru/chfsssr.htm]. 17 See: Ibidem. 18 See: S.G. Gorshkov, Na iuzhnom primorskom flange, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1989, available at [http:// militera.lib.ru/h/gorshkov_sg/index.html]. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 53 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In 1941-1942, the Soviet navy and army held Novorossiysk and Poti, two large naval bases of immense strategic importance on the Black Sea coast. This kept Turkey away from the war in the Caucasus: it had planned to join the Germans as soon as the Soviet Union was defeated at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus. During the next couple of years, in 1942 and 1943, the German command strengthened its Black Sea naval group and started using the occupied airfields in the Crimea and the Northern Caucasus; the Soviet Black Sea Navy was weakened by considerable losses in the previous period of fierce fighting; both sides cut back their air forces involved in naval operations.19 In 1942-1943, the Black Sea Navy and the Azov Flotilla were involved in the battle of the Cau- casus. Submarines from Batumi and Poti covered distances of 600 miles to disrupt enemy communi- cations, while surface ships, aviation, and Marine Corps were fighting for Novorossiysk and at Tu- apse. Several successful landings, at Novorossiysk in particular, helped the Soviet Army defend the Northern Caucasus and, later, drive the enemy away from the Caucasian Black Sea coast. By 1944, the Soviet Navy had restored its control over the Black Sea. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and Turkey (which controlled the Black Sea Straits and protected NATO’s southern flank) built up their naval capabilities in the Black Sea.

Naval Games in the Caspian and the Black Sea Today

In 1991, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the new independent states in the post-Soviet expanse radically changed the military-strategic situation in the Black Sea and Caspian basins. Today, there are many more world and regional rivals operating in the area; there is also any number of hitherto unknown problems created by the rapidly changing geopolitical situation in the Greater Middle East. Demilitarization of the Caspian region and delimitation of the water area are two extremely important problems directly related to the region’s present and future. The fairly sharp disagreements among several of the Caspian states on the delimitation issue are whipping up an arms race; all the Caspian states are busy setting up new naval infrastructures,20 which is destabilizing the situation with very unpredictable repercussions. Russia’s direct military presence in the Caspian was reflected in the Fundamentals of Policy of the Russian Federation in the Military Naval Sphere until the Year 2010, which the RF president enacted by his decree of 4 March, 2000. It stresses that the country needs a qualitatively new navy as an important military-political component indispensable for “the freedom of action of the RF in the Black and Caspian seas.”21 From the very beginning of his first presidential term Vladimir Putin worked toward augment- ing Russia’s geopolitical role in the Caspian, which Russian experts dubbed Putin’s “strategic Cas- pian initiative.”22 Russia’s role and place in the region, the principles on which it is prepared to coop- erate with its Caspian neighbors, and the main landmarks have been clarified.

19 See: “Chernomorsky flot SSSR v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne.” 20 See: R.F. Mamedov, Mezhdunarodno-pravovoy status Kaspiyskogo moria: vchera, segodnia, zavtra, Azerneshr, Baku, 2006, p. 367. 21 Morskoy sbornik, No. 4, 2006, p. 8. 22 A. Magomedov, “The Struggle for Caspian Oil and Caspian Transit: Geopolitical Regional Dimensions,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (31), 2005, p. 89. 54 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The failure of the Ashghabad Summit of the Heads of the Caspian States in April 2002 gave Russia an opportunity to demonstrate its naval capabilities. The next day, President Putin ordered for large-scale naval military exercises to be conducted in August 2002 to demonstrate to the Caspian states that Russia is still the strongest naval power in the region even if it is relatively weak econom- ically; its military might can be described as considerable even in the international context. It should be said that the naval exercises in the Caspian had no precedence either in Soviet or in recent Russian history. Units of the North Caucasian Military District, the 4th Army of the Air Force, and warships of the Caspian Flotilla (60 ships of various classes, 30 aircraft and helicopters, and about 10 thousand servicemen) cooperated with units of the Navy and Air Force of Azerbaijan and Kazakh- stan; Iran and , two other littoral states, declined Russia’s invitation. The August 2002 large-scale military exercises demonstrated that Russia is still the dominant military-political force in the Caspian. Recently Russia has further strengthened its Caspian Flotilla. Tehran regarded the 2002 naval exercises as a warning to the U.S. and NATO, which obviously want to gain a toehold in the region, rather than to Iran. The Iranian military started talking about “pooling efforts to keep third countries out of the region.”23 Late in September 2004, Iran reciprocated with “maneuvers by the Iranian Navy’s Fourth Dis- trict forces at the Bandar-e-Anzali port in Caspian waters near the coast of the Gilan Province (north- east of the country).”24 On the whole, in recent years, “the IRI has deployed a full-fledged squadron in its sector of the Caspian, the core of which is made up of missile carrying, antisubmarine, and amphibious assault ships, as well as minesweepers, PT boats, and naval aviation.”25 The Foreign Ministry of Turkmenistan issued a special statement to point out that, as a neutral state, the country “does not take part and will not take part in any military exercises in the Caspian either as a participant or observer.”26 Meanwhile, in 2002-2003 Turkmenistan started building up its naval forces in the Caspian.27 Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, likewise, began pouring considerable efforts into their naval forces. Early in the 21st century, the events of 9/11 in particular urged the United States and NATO to spread their military and political control to geostrategically important regions under the plausible pretext of a “counterterrorist struggle.” The Greater Middle East (North Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, that is, a vast geopolitical area stretching from Morocco to Pakistan) was the pivot of these efforts.28 In 2003, while America was drawing up a plan for military action against Iran, the Pentagon drafted a plan to set up a Caspian Guard and a system of military bases in the Caspian basin to ensure security.29 The program envisaged integrated control in the air, at sea, and along the ground and Kazakhstan. The plan also included special units and the police to promptly respond to terrorist attacks on oil pipelines and to other extreme situations in the Caspian countries30; “it was intended to invest $135 million in the next six years in the Caspian Guard (two brigades set up to guard the Baku-Tbilisi- pipeline).”31 The Caspian Guard was planned as

23 Izvestia, 12 August, 2002. 24 R. Mamedov, “Military-Political Activity in the Caspian in the Post-Soviet Period (Legal Aspects),” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (46), 2007, p. 83. 25 Ibidem. 26 Kommersant, 12 August, 2002. 27 See: R. Orudzhev, “Turkmenbashi razvorachivaet gonku vooruzheniy. Nagnetanie situatsii v regione budet pro- dolzhatsia,” Ekho (Baku), 30 November, 2004. 28 See: Ekho, 28 February, 2004. 29 Ekho, 14 April, 2005. 30 See: Ibidem. 31 A. Magomedov, “The Conflict in South Ossetia and the Frontiers of Struggle for the Greater Caspian’s Energy Resources,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 2 (56), 2009, p. 39. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 55 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

“an international military grouping comprising 120,000 servicemen from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.”32 At congress hearings, General James Jones, Commander, United States European Command (COMUSEUCOM), testified to the fact that Washington had made immense progress in 2004 toward developing and implementing the Caspian Guard project.33 Since 2005, the United States has never abandoned its efforts to implement the Caspian Guard project in Azerbaijan. Convinced that Washington’s intention to establish its military presence in the Caspian region threatened their defense interests, Moscow and Tehran were very negative about it. In 2003, however, Russia initiated a five-side Caspian naval cooperation task group (CASFORE) patterned on BLACKSEAFOR in the Black Sea comprising of fleets of the Caspian countries. The project was never implemented because some of the littoral states found it hard to trust their neighbors. The Caspian states’ concern that their territories might be used by third countries in the event of large-scale conflicts was registered in the Final Document of the Second Summit of the Caspian States signed in Tehran on 16 October, 2007. The document summed up Vladimir Putin’s comment saying that “under no circumstances should the littoral states allow the use of their territories by other countries to launch aggression or other military action against any of the member states.”34 The viewpoints of the littoral states, however, are not identical. Russia is convinced that demil- itarization of the Caspian can hardly be justified in the present conditions, however it is against exces- sive military potential of any of the Caspian states. It has become obvious that further militarization and the region’s vague legal status can poten- tially lead to military-political conflicts among the littoral states; this makes regional security mech- anisms imperative. The question is whether all the Caspian states want demilitarization? And can the five littoral states achieve an agreement on delimitation of the Caspian water area? In the final anal- ysis, demilitarization will deprive the states of their naval forces, which will leave the coastal areas undefended. In the Black Sea area, the Soviet Union, a superpower of the Cold War period, insisted that the sea should be closed to warships of all countries except those of the littoral states. At that time, the Black Sea coast belonged to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty Organization allies (Rumania and Bulgaria), Turkey, a NATO member integrated into the Western world, being the only exception. This made the Black Sea, geographically a semi-closed sea, a sealed-off sea. The geopolitical and geostrategic balance in the region collapsed together with the Soviet Un- ion. Bulgaria and Rumania, members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and former socialist coun- tries, joined the European Union and NATO. Ukraine and Georgia, which look toward the West, became littoral states. Russia, on the other hand, divided the Black Sea Fleet with Ukraine and lost Sevastopol, its Black Sea naval base. Its geopolitical domination in the Black Sea came to an end; its naval might was considerably weakened. Today, the geopolitical situation in the Black Sea area is obviously conflict-prone with no obvi- ous way out of the trap. In the post-Soviet decades, the Black Sea basin, a fairly peaceful Cold War geopolitical periphery, developed into a crossroads of vehement contradictions and geopolitical rival- ry. It gradually became a seat of conflict and multisided competition among the littoral states, as well as among the European and world powers. In August 2008, the geopolitical tension reached its peak: the Russian-Georgian conflict brought the American and Russian fleets dangerously close.35

32 R. Mamedov, “Military-Political Activity…,” p. 84. 33 See: M. Chernov, “Kaspiyskoe more stanet amerikanskim,” RBC daily: ÏÎËÈÒÈÊÀ, available at [http://www. rbcdaily.ru/policy/index.shtml. 2005/04/14/201377/], 30 April, 2005. 34 Quoted from: A. Lukoianov, “The Tehran Summit, or the Russian President’s Visit to Iran,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (49), 2008, p. 73. 35 See: A. Yazkova, “Mesto i rol Ukrainy v Chernomorskom regione,” in: Materialy kruglogo stola Tsentra Ra- zumkova: “Chernomorskiy region: evoliutsia geopoliticheskogo izmereniia,” 13 January, 2012, Natsionalnaya bezopas- nost i oborona, No. 4-5, 2011, pp. 122-123, available at [blackseanews.net/tag/]. 56 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

On the whole, for many years Washington preferred to follow the Cold War strategies to squeeze Russia out of the Black Sea geopolitical expanse. Today, the numerous domestic and inter- national conflicts are doing nothing to defuse the geopolitical tension; this means that external forces, the U.S. and NATO in particular, might move in to pursue their geostrategic aims. The world economic crisis and the developments in the Arab Mediterranean countries (tied to the Euro- pean Union by numerous historical and economic threads, the reason why it intends to extend much stronger support to them) have slowed down the talks on European integration of the post-Soviet littoral states.36 In the last twenty years, the Black Sea region has degenerated into an area of investment risks, obsolete infrastructure, domestic and interstate armed conflicts, inefficient regional organizations and regimes, drug trafficking, illegal migration, personal and state insecurity, inefficient power con- sumption, ecological threats, and low level of integration into globalization.37 Recently, the geostrategic value of the Black Sea region has been increased by the region’s ge- ographic proximity to the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central Asia. In the second decade of the 21st century, it has become absolutely clear that the region is an arena of geopolitical rivalry among three key international actors: the European Union (brought into the region by Bulgaria and Rumania) with economic interests; Russia with its traditional inter- ests in the Black Sea-Caucasian-Caspian geopolitical expanse; and Turkey, which is building up its naval presence in the sea and its influence in the Central Caucasus. The Justice and Development Party, which came to power in Turkey in 2002, is seeking more independence on the international scene, which is confirmed by its obvious desire to increase its military-political presence in the Black Sea. Recent modernization transformed the main Turkish naval base in Geljuk into an operational strategic hub in the Black Sea even though Ankara is carefully avoiding military-political and mili- tary-technical complications with Moscow, Brussels, and Washington. It seems that Turkey intends to rely on the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits and its constantly strengthening navy to increase its influence in the Black Sea littoral states in an effort to push Russia away from the sea’s northern shores and the Central Caucasus using all the means—economic, polit- ical and diplomatic—at its disposal.38 The Russian Federation has acquired a special role in the Black Sea basin, where it obviously intends to compete with the European Union. This differs greatly from Russia’s position in the Baltic, where Moscow has accepted Western approaches to the regional problems and acts as one of the EU partners.39 NATO and the United States as its main partner are not alien to efforts to play more impor- tant roles in the Black Sea, as was demonstrated, albeit unsuccessfully, in August 2008. Today, the EU relies on different formats in the region: the Black Sea Synergy Initiative (2008), the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (since 2008), the Eastern Partnership (2009), the Black Sea Forum (2006), and the European Neighborhood Policy for Partnership and Dialog (2004).40 Today, there are different security formats and mechanisms functioning in the Black Sea, the most important of them being the Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea signed in 2002 by all the littoral states and the BLACKSEAFOR agree-

36 See: A. Yazkova, op. cit. 37 See: Chernomorskiy region: geopoliticheskaia dilemma ili vysokoprioritetnoe prostranstvo? Round table analyti- cal materials, Odessa, 25 May, 2011. The Round Table was held within the framework of the Kiev Security Forum and prepared by the Otkroy Ukrainu Foundation, Kiev, 2011, available at [blackseanews.net/tag/]. 38 See: M. Irinin, “Mezhdu dvumia farvaterami. Turtsiia sozdaet flot budushchego dlia gospodstva v Chernom more,” available at [blackseanews.net/tag/], 3 November, 2010; F. Ozbay, “Chernomorskiy faktor v Turetsko-rossiiskikh otnosheniiakh,” available at [blackseanews.net/tag/], 29 January, 2011. 39 See: Chernomorskiy region: geopoliticheskaia dilemma ili vysokoprioritetnoe prostranstvo? 40 See: Ibidem. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 57 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ment they signed in 2001. In August 2008, however, they failed to prevent or cut short the develop- ments in the sea; they obviously cannot guarantee security in future. At that time, the Russian Black Sea Fleet (considerably weakened because it had been divided with Ukraine) was very active on the Georgian coast, which revealed the true state of affairs in this theater. Today, the interests of the four main geopolitical players—the EU and its neighborhood policy, the U.S., which is seeking access to the Eurasian geopolitical expanse, the Russian Federation, which went over to the strategic defense, and Turkey with regional interests of its own—have crossed in the Black Sea. The events of recent decades have shown that their geopolitical interests are not identical, which means that in the event of another crisis the military-political situation in the Central Caucasus might spread across the entire region.

Conclusion

The events of the last three decades in the Black Sea area and the Caspian demonstrated that the presence of real sea power strong enough to control the Black Sea and the Caspian Caucasian coast in times of crises was one of the main factors in the geopolitical struggle for the Caucasus, while geos- trategic control over the Caucasus depends on sustainable west (Black Sea)-east (the Caspian) naval envelopment. On the whole, the Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian geopolitical expanse interpreted within clas- sical geopolitics as “‘Land’ (the Russian Empire-Soviet Union-Russia) should become part of the sphere of continental influence. ‘Sea’ (the U.S., NATO) should serve as a toehold for further ex- pansion inland with the aim of establishing its geostrategic and geo-economic domination over Eurasia.”41 This explains why the region has been and remains an arena of latent and even open geopolitical confrontation and fierce rivalry among the Western powers (the U.S., UK, and Germany), on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, which makes the people living on these shores hostages of the poten- tial developments. There is an obvious correlation between the outburst of ethnopolitical and ethnote- rritorial conflicts in the Caucasus and another round of bitter geopolitical rivalry of the Great Powers in the region. This has been confirmed by all sorts of conflicts in the Caucasus in the early 20th and early 21st centuries. So far, the latent crises in the Caspian and the Black Sea have not acquired a military-political dimension; however the dramatic developments in the Greater Middle East will inevitably affect the Caucasus. The stiff geopolitical rivalry between the emerging geostrategic centers (with active involvement of sea power) might turn the vast Black Sea-Caucasian-Caspian area into one of the main fronts of the theater of war in the Atlantic-Eurasian geopolitical confrontation of the 21st century against the background of the rapidly deteriorating military-political situation in the Great- er Middle East.

41 I. Dobaev, A. Dugin, “Geopolitical Transformations in the Caucasian-Caspian Region,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (35), 2005, p. 75. 58 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Argun BAªKAN

D.Sc., Research Assistant, Department of International Relations, Ege University (Ýzmir, Turkey).

Tanju TOSUN

D.Sc., Professor, Head of the Department of International Relations, Ege University (Ýzmir, Turkey).

Aydýn IBRAHIMOV

D.Sc., Professor, Department of Geography, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University (Çanakkale, Turkey).

THE MAIN PARAMETERS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POST-2008 CENTRAL CAUCASUS

Abstract

urkey is obliged to maintain a dynam- 2008 engagement in the Central Caucasus T ic foreign policy in the Central Cau- and concludes that Turkey achieved mixed casus for a variety of historical, eth- outcomes as a result of its efforts. The nocultural, and geopolitical reasons. This complexity of the regional interests and fact is underlined by the 2008 South Os- clashes are beyond Turkey’s individual ca- setia War. Formulation of Turkey’s foreign pacity to manage regional crisis situations. policy is based on several factors, includ- Turkey is required to cooperate with the ing Turkey’s wider relations with the West, West and Moscow to achieve substantial the Russian Federation, and the Middle results. In addition, local dynamics will con- East. This article examines Turkey’s post- tinue to play their autonomous role.

Introduction

Despite the fact Turkey is not a direct party to any of the conflicts in the Central Caucasus, it cannot remain indifferent to the developments in the region for various historical, ethnocultural, and geopolitical reasons. This concise study examines some of the major causes and aspects of Turkey’s engagement in the Central Caucasus with regard to the general driving forces behind Turkey’s foreign policy. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 59 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n Firstly, the main parameters of Turkey’s foreign policy will be introduced. n Secondly, the Russian and Georgian vectors of Turkey’s foreign policy in the region will be discussed. n Thirdly, the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement process will be examined with references to Turkey’s proposal for a Peace and Stability Pact in the Central Caucasus. n And finally, the paper will conclude with a general assessment of the topic and a brief review of the major possible developments and dynamics ahead.

The Main Vectors of Turkey’s Foreign Policy

To explain Turkey’s foreign policy in the Central Caucasus, it would be helpful to keep some prominent determinants of Turkey’s general foreign policy in mind. Apart from the domestic varia- bles, generally speaking, Turkey’s contemporary policy has at least three major vectors: the West (the U.S. and the EU), the Russian Federation/former Soviet Union area, and the Middle East. To under- stand Turkey’s complex engagement in the Central Caucasus, first we need to take a look at Turkey’s critical bilateral foreign relations with the West and the Russian Federation. Details of the rising Middle Eastern dimension in Turkey’s contemporary policy and the somewhat secondary (although also important) interconnection between the Middle Eastern and Central Caucasian vectors of Turk- ish foreign policy are beyond the scope of this article. Frankly speaking, the Turkish and Middle Eastern leaders seem to rarely, if ever, talk about what is going on in Turkey’s Central Caucasian pol- icy, unlike their inclination to be more voluble in the Turkish-Western or Turkish-Russian talks. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that Middle Eastern issues (especially those related to Iran-Azeri- Armenian relations) are not entirely isolated factors if we are to adopt a wider view of Turkey’s for- eign policy. It is just that Middle Eastern issues play a more indirect role in the Central Caucasian vector of Turkey’s foreign policy.

Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Western Relations

The disintegration of the U.S.S.R. meant new prospects and new risks for Turkey’s foreign policy in its Eastern neighborhood. The Turkish leadership pragmatically perceived this new situa- tion as a way to improve Turkey’s international prestige. Nonetheless, just as in the Cold War era, Moscow remained a key factor to be reckoned with in Turkey’s Central Caucasian policy. Turkish- Russian relations gradually evolved from being conflict-prone to becoming more coherent, especially in the last decade, mainly thanks to the rising importance of the Russian Federation as one of Turkey’s major energy suppliers.1 This slow and uneasy transformation took place despite the original and still hard-dying prefer- ences of Turkey and the West regarding the fate of the Central Asian and Central Caucasian energy resources and the transnational energy delivery infrastructures in the region (e.g. the Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan pipeline and the Nabucco project). A second accompanying variable was the new Turkish-

1 See: R. Weitz, Global Security Watch: Russia—A Reference Handbook, Praeger Security International, Westport, CT, 2009, p. 107. 60 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Russian consensus to leave aside the Chechen and Kurdish cards in their mutual relations. Turkey gradually developed a kind of win-win policy vis-à-vis the Russian Federation beginning from the last days of the then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s coalition government, as reflected by the activism of the then Foreign Affairs Minister Ismail Cem and the early days of the ruling Justice and Develop- ment Party (AK Party).2 Indeed, Ahmet Davutoglu, long time Foreign Affairs Minister of the Justice and Develop- ment Party, was the one who actually provided a comprehensive intellectual and political road map for the new era in a way that was largely unprecedented in conventional Turkish politics. Having an academic and intellectual background, Davutoglu introduced key concepts like “strategic depth” and “zero problem policy” with neighboring countries into his analysis and making of Turkish policy.3 So, as noted above, Turkish-Russian relations have been enjoying an unprecedented upward trend in the last decade with promising implications for Turkey’s foreign policy in the Central Cauca- sus. But this does not necessarily mean that omnipresent Russophilia has come home to roost in Tur- key. On the contrary, the Russian Federation is far from being the dominant factor that influences Turkey’s Central Caucasus and wider former Soviet area policy. Indeed, Turkish-American relations and, to a lesser extent, Turkish-EU relations, have strong repercussions in this policy domain. The Western vector has long been the primary driving force behind Turkish policy in a way that overshad- ows the Russian and Middle Eastern vectors in the general sense. In contemporary international politics, it is common knowledge that Western and Russian inter- ests and perceptions do not readily end up in a harmonious “win-win” sum even though things are not as acute as they were during the openly “win-lose” days of the Cold War era. Besides, there are also evident drifts within the West especially regarding the formulation of the “right” Western approach to the Middle Eastern issues, particularly those relating to Iraq.4 Of course, all these matters deserve to be elaborated in greater depth in their own right. For the purposes of this article, we will briefly note that these challenging aspects of Western-Russian and intra-Western relations have their inevitable implications for Turkey’s foreign policy. Given this context, it is not surprising to see some international comments and analyses which question the side Turkey is on.5 Is Turkey moving closer to the Russian Federation and the Middle East and deliberately loosening its ties with the West? Without going into much detail for the rea- sons stated above, we adhere to the answer that Turkey’s overall engagement is still with the West (first the U.S. and then the EU), whereas Turkish-Russian relations are more important than ever before regarding the Caucasus, Black Sea, and energy-related issues with wider repercussions for Central Asia. Incidentally, this applies to Middle Eastern affairs too. It is also worth adding that Turkey would like to have as much room to maneuver vis-à-vis the West and the Russian Federa- tion as possible without, however, completely upsetting the overall balance in its relations with them. So, having provided this necessary general framework of Turkey’s foreign policy, we can proceed to the specifics of Turkey’s policy regarding the Central Caucasus in the light of the re- gional conflicts.

2 See: T. Aybak, “Russia and Turkey: An Ascendant Strategic Partnership in the Black Sea Neighbourhood,” in: The Black Sea Region and EU policy: The Challenge of Divergent Agendas, ed. by K. Henderson, C. Weaver, Ashgate, Burlington, VT, 2010, pp. 107-118. 3 See, for instance, Davutoglu’s magnum opus: A. Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararasý Konu- mu, Küre Yayýnlarý, Ýstanbul, 2001. 4 See: S.A. Kashmeri, America and Europe after 9/11 and Iraq: The Great Divide, Praeger Security International, Westport, Conn., 2007. 5 See, for example: S. Cagaptay, “Is Turkey Leaving the West?” Foreign Affairs, Online Article, 26 October, 2009, available at [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65661/soner-cagaptay/is-turkey-leaving-the-west], 7 Novem- ber, 2009. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 61 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Implications of the 2008 South Ossetia War

The 2008 South Ossetia War is a major factor explaining Turkey’s increased diplomatic in- volvement in the region, even though these dynamics have lost much of their power over the last one or two years due to the complications of the Turkish-Armenian-Azeri triangle and the relative mili- tary stability after 2008. Moreover, Turkey has been spending much of its foreign policy energy on Middle Eastern issues recently. A second explanation of Turkey’s regional dynamism is the country’s worries about America’s loss of interest in the Central Caucasus after the war, particularly in the Obama era. This trend is reflected, first, by the frozen NATO accession process of Ukraine and Geor- gia and, second, by America’s hesitation to help Georgia recover its military capabilities damaged by the war.6 So it appears that even though Turkey would be glad to have room to maneuver vis-à-vis the West whenever necessary, it does not seem to be ready or willing to handle America’s (partial) with- drawal from the region. This fact is underlined by the military non-presence of the EU anywhere near the Central Caucasus. The Turkish leadership may be thinking that such a vacuum will not readily serve the delicate balance in the Turkish-Western-Russian triangle. Post-2008 Turkish foreign policy has been paying special attention to fixing the long- time problematic relations with Armenia as the weakest link in Turkey’s Central Caucasian policy. More- over, Turkish-Georgian and Turkish-Azeri relations were already stable enough in their own right. In actual fact, Turkey’s new approach toward Armenia was not an entirely new initiative; Turkey had undertaken earlier steps in the 1990s, which were soon blocked by the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkish-Armenian relations completely deteriorated after Turkey closed the Turkish-Armenian border in 1993 as a solidarity gesture toward Azerbaijan.7 The Armeni- an genocide problem and the lobbying pressure of the Armenian diaspora on the Western and Arme- nian governments made their negative contribution to the situation. Given this problematic background, the Justice and Development Party took the liberty to use the 2008 South Ossetia War as a legitimate opportunity to normalize relations with Armenia. Further- more, Turkish-Armenian relations were of critical importance not only within the Central Caucasian context, but also in Turkish-American and Turkish-EU relations due to the fact that the Western gov- ernments were directly engaged in the international debate on the Armenian genocide issue. Naturally enough, however, Turkey was completely against the Armenian genocide allegations. Another press- ing factor was Turkish-Azeri relations, which almost solely determined the disappointing fate of the post-2008 Turkish-Armenian talks. Turkish President Abdullah Gül paid a momentous visit to Erevan in September 2008 to watch a Turkish-Armenian football match in the company of Armenian President Serzh Sargsian. Gül’s visit to Armenia was a historic turning point in the promising dialog process between Turkey and Arme- nia.8 The visit opened the way to a busy tour of diplomacy, the objective of which was to normalize mutual affairs. This ambitious diplomatic endeavor led to the mutual talks held in Zurich in 2009. As a result of the Zurich talks, Turkey and Armenia signed two joint protocols to establish diplomatic relations and create an environment of broader regional partnership.9 However, the endeavor to stabilize relations with Armenia resulted in severe problems in Tur- key’s normally good relations with Azerbaijan. The Azeri leadership was worried that rapprochement

6 See: F.S. Larrabee, “Turkey’s Eurasian Agenda,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2011, pp. 106-107. 7 See: M. Aydýn, “Changing Dynamics of Turkish Foreign and Security Policies in the Caucasus,” in: Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus: Regional Conflicts and Transformation, ed. by A. Jafalian, Ashgate, Burlington, VT, 2011, pp. 123-124. 8 See: “Turkish-Armenian Relations: Football Diplomacy. It May Take a Long Time to Restore Relations between Two Old Enemies,” The Economist, 3 September, 2009. 9 See: “Armenia and Turkey Normalize Ties,” BBC, 10 October, 2009. 62 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION in Turkish-Armenian relations would diminish Armenia’s compliance to make compromises in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The promising rapprochement with Armenia rapidly turned into a trou- blesome question in Turkey’s domestic policy due to the negative attitude of the opposition parties in Turkey as they moved to take advantage of Azerbaijan’s displeasure by severely criticizing the Jus- tice and Development Party’s government for turning its back on Azerbaijan. In order to avoid a severe split in mutual relations with Azerbaijan, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoðan guaranteed Azerbaijan that relations with Armenia could not be stabilized without parallel progress toward settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This turn in Turkish foreign policy openly established a clearly official, although one-sided, connection between the normalization process in Turkish-Armenian relations and the achievement of a solution in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This new Turkish attitude essentially changed the whole route of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, and evidently not too successfully. Armenia firmly rebuffed any official connection between stabilizing relations with Turkey and resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan, asserting that these were two unrelated matters. Armenian politicians stated that the protocols signed in Zurich on 10 October, 2009 made no references to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. So Armenia viewed the connection with settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as an indication that Turkey had been moving in an insincere manner from the very beginning. Consequently, the process of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement came to a standstill and soon began to collapse. When the Turkish Parliament did not approve the Zurich Proto- cols as a requirement for their entry into force, Armenia shelved its diplomacy to hold talks with Turkey by the end of April 2010.10

Lessons of the Post-2008 Process

On second thought, Turkey seems to have come across some bottlenecks that undermined the attempt to stabilize relations with Armenia even though there was a serious level of enthusiasm in Ankara. The Turkish government was forced to revise its position due to the Azeri response and its power to encourage the Turkish opposition parties to start a successful protest campaign against the Turkish-Armenian negotiation process and the Zurich Protocols. Due to the ruthless and competent performance of the Turkish opposition parties, the Justice and Development Party’s government was compelled to officially relate the rapprochement process to settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. It comes as no surprise that this attitude aggravated the Turkish-Armenian negotiation proc- ess since it was obvious from the very beginning that Erevan would not approve the establishment of any connection between the two matters. Given the protests of Azerbaijan and the Turkish opposition parties, the Turkish government could not sufficiently tackle the capability of the Armenian diaspora to orchestrate the mainly anti- Turkish domestic opposition groups in Armenia in order to manipulate and essentially sabotage rap- prochement in Turkish-Armenian relations. It is widely accepted that Erevan and the Armenian di- aspora do not always share ideas on the formulation of Armenia’s foreign policy toward Turkey. However, it was seen that the Armenian government had very little willingness and capacity to follow its own policy line. This was largely, if not totally, a result of Armenia’s deeply troubled financial circumstances and political isolation from its neighbors, Turkey and Azerbaijan, and even, Georgia and Iran. Thus, the Armenian government has been relying on the political and economic support of

10 See: S. Markedonov, “Unfreezing Conflict in South Ossetia: Regional and International Implications,” in: Reas- sessing Security in the South Caucasus: Regional Conflicts and Transformation, pp. 36-37. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 63 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the Armenian diaspora to a great extent. This dependence enables the diaspora to exert substantial power over Armenia’s more or less flexible domestic and foreign policy steps.11 The Russian vector of Turkey’s foreign policy did not really appear useful in the Turkish gov- ernment’s plans to manage the crisis between Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Turkey reasonably expected that the development of Turkish-Russian relations would induce a significant Russian con- tribution to the improvement of Turkish-Armenian relations. However, even though the Kremlin did not actually contest rapprochement in Turkish-Armenian relations, it did very little to actually per- suade Erevan to show flexibility in settling the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute in parallel with the Turk- ish-Armenian talks. Instead, the Kremlin seems to have moved in a more pro-status quo manner re- garding the fate of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The Russian Federation and Armenia took further steps to advance their de facto military alliance in the Central Caucasus. The Russian Federation gave Armenia additional security guarantees in the process as a result of the new Russian-Armenian agree- ment signed during Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s visit to Erevan in 2010. The 2010 Russian-Armenian military cooperation treaty gave the Russian Federation the oppor- tunity to maintain its military base in Gumri for another 24 years. Moreover, the Russian Federation made a more comprehensive promise to secure Armenia’s territorial integrity not only vis-à-vis Az- erbaijan as before, but also with respect to Turkey and Iran. Paradoxically, the context also enabled the Russian Federation to take advantage of Azerbaijan’s disillusionment with the Turkish-Armenian diplomacy process. The Russian Federation managed to create pro-Russian sympathy in Baku at the same time. Interestingly enough, the renewed Russian-Armenian military cooperation implied that Azerbaijan had been warned against using any kind of military force against Armenia to impose some kind of settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Needless to say, the new military treaty also increased Armenia’s dependence on the Russian Federation.12 The short-term result was consolida- tion of the mainly pro-status quo Russian-Armenian-Azeri relations at the expense of a Russian- backed Turkish-Armenian (and Azeri) resolution process regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and wider Turkish-Armenian relations. Given the difficulties that appeared in Erevan, Baku, and Moscow, the Turkish initiative to find a balance between Turkish-Armenian and Turkish-Azeri relations in the post-South Ossetia War era failed to fulfill the expectations. The Turkish-Armenian rapprochement process entered a new and apparently lengthy stalemate process, which also happened in the 1990s for almost the same reasons. There seems to be a more dramatic climate of distrust and disappointment among the parties regarding the issue. Domestic political processes in Turkey and Armenia are also far from encouraging new initiatives in the foreseeable future. Turkey’s post-2008 efforts to fix relations with Armenia were part of Turkey’s wider proposal for a Caucasus platform of cooperation and stability. Despite being a grand step toward regional peace in the Central Caucasus, the platform proposal came up against more than one obstacle. Georgia did not show substantive sympathy for the platform idea as it provided a legitimate space for the con- tinuation of Russia’s involvement in Central Caucasian politics. As discussed above, the Turkish-Ar- menian-Azeri disagreement over the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute had a negative effect on the suc- cess of the otherwise promising Zurich Protocols. Additionally, Russia’s engagement in the platform was not really supportive enough to resolve the Turkish-Armenian-Azeri quagmire in the post-Zurich period. To worsen the likelihood of success of the platform proposal, American and EU involvement in the process were not directly mentioned in the plan.13 However, this last factor was a result of

11 See: T. De Waal, “Stuck in 1915: How Turkey and Armenia Blew Their Big Chance at Peace,” Foreign Policy, Online, 15 April, 2010, available at [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/15/stuck_in_1915], 7 May, 2010; B. Gultekin-Punsmann, “Azerbaijan in the Changing Status Quo: Adaptation Strategies,” in: Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus: Regional Conflicts and Transformation, pp. 75-90. 12 See: F.S. Larrabee, op. cit., p. 109. 13 See: Ibid., p. 110. 64 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Turkey’s deliberate attempts to appease the Russian Federation within a more localized regional framework that did not readily impose Western involvement vis-à-vis the Russian Federation in the Central Caucasus. Indeed, it would probably be misleading to think that Turkey moved as a hasty free rider by totally ignoring Western perceptions on the matter. Turkey was otherwise more than willing to continue the whole process on a multilateral level, as seen in the case of the Zurich Protocols open- ly backed by the West and the Russian Federation in the past. Nonetheless, there were also other obstacles preventing the success of the platform proposal. Due to Turkey’s non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, these new entities were practically excluded from the picture despite their official recognition by the Russian Federation and some other countries. Turkey’s reservations about Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not result directly from any anti-Turkish characteristic of these entities. On the contrary, Abkhazia in particular has long been willing to advance its contacts with Ankara and the North Caucasian diaspora in Turkey. However, understandably, Turkey had worries about the indirect pro-secessionist implications of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia cases for the Kurdish problem and the PKK terror in Turkey. This was the case even though the North Caucasian diaspora in Turkey has been frequently lobbying in Ankara to create more visible official sympathy and hopefully recognition for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.14 Another reason was Turkey’s political and military support of Tbilisi in line with America’s support of Georgia in this country’s (currently frozen) NATO accession process. Furthermore, the fate of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, one of Turkey’s major energy import channels, was de- pendent on the future of Georgia’s geopolitical stability. In sum, there were too many contradictions and challenges at the domestic, regional, and international level for Turkey to promote a post-2008 stability framework in the Central Caucasus, despite the good intentions and initially promising, albe- it partial, success (i.e. Zurich Protocols) of Turkish diplomacy.

Conclusion

This article aimed to examine Turkey’s Central Caucasian policy within the framework of the main parameters of Turkey’s foreign policy. In general, Turkey’s foreign policy is formulated on the complex and ever-changing interaction among at least three major vectors: the West, Russian Feder- ation/former Soviet area, and the Middle East. Of course, domestic political dynamics and ideological preferences play their essential roles if we are to adopt a wider view. The Western and former Soviet (mainly the Russian Federation) vectors have a higher level of influence when explaining Turkey’s post-2008 engagement in the Central Caucasian region. To put it briefly, Turkey’s reaction to the 2008 South Ossetia War was an uneasy mix of balancing Western and Russian concerns and, more importantly, promoting a regional peace and stability pact in the region. Given these parameters and rather challenging objectives of Turkey’s foreign policy, we can conclude that Turkey has achieved mixed yet unsatisfactory success, at least for the time being, main- ly due to factors that turned out to be well beyond Turkey’s capacity to orchestrate the situation as a regional power. On the plus side, Turkey preserved the main balance in its relations with the West, the Russian Federation, and Georgia. But on the other hand, ambitious and promising Turkish-Armenian rapprochement failed to fulfill its potential despite the initial success shown by the Zurich Protocols. A major weakness of the process was the absence of the Azerbaijan factor in the equation. When Azeri considerations came into play in line with strong domestic criticism in Turkey, Turkish-Arme- nian relations entered a new stalemate. Armenia’s domestic opposition and the unsupportive attitude

14 See: G. Winrow, “Turkey, Russia and the Caucasus: Common and Diverging Interests,” Briefing Paper, Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House, London, UK, pp. 7, 13-14. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 65 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of the Armenian diaspora also hindered the process. Another flaw of the platform proposal was its negligence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. So finally, one wonders how much Turkey could actually achieve given the multitude of con- flicting interests and variables to be managed in the region? Post-2008 experience shows us that Tur- key has a very promising, yet equally difficult neighborhood in its east (as well as south by the way). Even though Turkey has an emerging regional power profile, it has to deal with issues that go beyond its individual capacity. Currently, Turkish-Armenian relations are de facto frozen and the Caucasus stability pact has been shelved. However, the regional conflicts in the Central Caucasus are not over and it is not unreasonable to think that they could make an armed return to the international agenda in the future, which is exactly what happened in the 2008 South Ossetia War. Turkey essentially needs to be ready for such developments. Turkey is obliged to obtain the support of both the West and the Russian Federation to take substantial steps in the region. However, Turkey and the wider world also have to live with the fact that development of events in the Central Caucasus will continue to be mainly determined by the actual interaction among the local actors, i.e. the Armenians, Azeris, Geor- gians, Abkhazians, and South Ossetians, in situ.

Vladimir EVSEYEV

Ph.D. (Technical Sciences), Senior Fellow at the Center for Social and Political Studies (Moscow, the Russian Federation).

THE U.S.-IRI RELATIONS IN THE REGIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT

Abstract

he author concentrates on American- nian and Armenian cooperation; the problems T Iranian relations during the Obama in the relations between Baku and Tehran; presidency and their impact on securi- and the future of Iranian-Georgian relations. ty in the Central Caucasus; he also closely He demonstrates that Iran has failed examines Iran’s bilateral relations with Azer- to extend its influence in the Central Cau- baijan, Armenia, and Georgia in the econom- casus, so has fallen short of a status equal ic, political, and military spheres. to that of Russia and Turkey; however, it He reveals that the intensity of the managed to prevent becoming isolated from American-Iranian confrontation and the re- the north. He reveals that Georgia and gional security level are two sides of the Azerbaijan run the risk of being drawn into same coin. This conclusion is based on the an armed conflict between the U.S. and author’s analysis of the current state of and Iran, which means that the Central Cauca- the future prospects for the Iranian nuclear sian countries should avoid allied relations file; the achievements and limitations of Ira- with any of the conflicting sides. 66 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Introduction

During the last few decades, the United States has been concentrating on the Central Caucasus,1 a bridge of sorts between Europe and Central Asia (a veritable treasure-trove of natural riches), and the rapidly destabilizing Middle East. Fully aware of the transportation value of the sub-region, the Americans have been building up their influence by skillfully playing on the contradictions between the Central Caucasian states and the Russian Federation, as well as those among the Central Cauca- sian states themselves. Today, the U.S. has become the main extra-regional force and cannot be treat- ed lightly. Although it has managed to reduce Moscow’s influence in the sub-region, the U.S. has been unable to push it out altogether. In the 1990s, Ankara was actively used as a vehicle for promot- ing American interests in the region. Turkey itself tried to dominate in the sub-region, but its limited resources and internal contradictions proved too high a barrier (today Israel has been assigned the role of America’s agent). The Islamic Republic of Iran demonstrated no mean skill when tapping the advantages of the Soviet Union’s disintegration: it actively built up its presence in the Central Caucasus. For geopolit- ical and also historical, cultural, and religious reasons, it first turned its attention to the Azerbaijan Republic, however the Azeri elite, under the strong influence of Turkey, vehemently resisted the Ira- nian zeal. The tragedy of Nagorno-Karabakh pushed Baku even further from Tehran. It failed to be- come an intermediary between the warring sides and later moved closer to Armenia, one of the two conflicting countries. This added strain to bilateral relations, which remain as tense as ever today. In view of the above, the Iranian leaders promptly moved toward closer economic relations with Armenia; there is information that Erevan and Tehran entered a confidential agreement on mutual assistance in the event of aggression against one of the sides. The already functioning transportation corridor (highways and a gas pipeline) alleviated Armenia’s economic blockade (the bulk of goods is delivered across Georgia); there are plans to add a railway and an oil pipeline to the already existing transportation facilities. Recently, Iran and Georgia stepped up their cooperation and even introduced a visa-free regime on their borders. Washington is worried: the Iranians are making skillful use of the fact that the Americans, bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq, have diverted their attention to the Middle East and pushed the Central Caucasus to the margins. Eleventh-hour corrections to U.S. foreign policy changed nothing. It proved impossible to isolate the IRI from the north, mainly because of the still pending conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. If the Iranian nuclear crisis deepens and develops into an armed clash, Washington will be confronted with new problems. The Central Caucasus will be in even greater danger: it has several zones of tension in its own territory (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Osse- tia, and Abkhazia). A long war with Iran (an alternative that cannot be excluded if the U.S. decides to use force to close the Iranian nuclear file or is prompted to do this by Israel’s air strikes) will inevitably draw the neighboring states into the instability zone. In the West, however, this prospect is not seriously considered, which threatens, at least, the oil and gas transportation routes across the Central Caucasus.

American-Iranian Relations under the Obama Administration

After coming to power early in 2009, the new U.S. administration headed for better relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In May, President Obama informed Iran that by the end of 2009 he

1 Here and elsewhere the Central Caucasus is referred to Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 67 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION would like to detect some progress in curtailment of the uranium enrichment program; he was not specific—no deadlines were set. At the same time, the American president was obviously prepared to take measures, up to and including sanctions, if it turned out that Iran remained deaf to the calls of the international community.2 The American administration used the time left until the presidential scheduled for June 2009 to gather information in order to readjust its foreign policy course accordingly. This was a logical step: the U.S. Senate was still discussing the key figures to be appointed to the U.S. Department of State; on the other hand, the elections in Iran could have replaced Mahmud Ahmadine- jad with Mir-Hossein Mousavi. If elected, the latter would not have been able to stop the nuclear pro- gram, but he could have retreated from certain positions. The election results produced a contradicto- ry effect: on the one hand, they bared a split of sorts among the Iranian elite (which meant that the conservatives were no longer omnipotent). On the other, the doctored results sent a wave of popular indignation through the country’s largest cities. Washington’s comments were restrained, but the American leaders condemned the undemocratic nature of the June elections. In September 2009, Tehran revealed that a third uranium enrichment plant was being built at Fordu near the Shi‘a holy city of Qom—this did nothing to improve the relations between the two countries. Since the Additional Protocol of 1997 to the Safeguards Agreement had expired, the states were no longer duty bound to inform the Agency well in advance of the construction of nuclear facil- ities, or of considerable amounts of low-enriched uranium (LEU) stored in the territories and of the developed uranium enrichment infrastructure. This fed suspicions that the Iranian nuclear program was not as peaceful as Iran claimed it to be. It was thought that October 2009 brought a U-turn in the development of the Iranian nuclear crisis: the U.N. SC permanent members, Germany and the IRI, met for the first time; IAEA inspec- tors could visit the new nuclear facility in Fordu, while Tehran formally agreed to send out 80% of its LEU to obtain nuclear fuel for Tehran’s research reactor. Later, however, the top figures in Iran’s executive and legislative power branches retreated. Washington’s response was predictable: new international sanctions. On 9 June, 2010, the U.N. SC passed Resolution 19293; it was the sixth resolution on the Iranian nuclear file and the fourth that introduced political, financial, and eco- nomic sanctions against the IRI. Later, the U.S. continued the Iranian policy started by President George W. Bush, viz. gradually toughening sanctions. Since the U.N. SC did not support this course, the U.S. and its allies introduced unilateral sanctions. Tehran’s hardly consistent position, which it demonstrated at the talks in Istan- bul late in January 2011,4 only encouraged this. In the spring of 2012, the situation with the Iranian nuclear file changed radically. n First, conservatives who supported , the country’s spiritual leader, carried the parliamentary elections with over 60% of the votes.5 The spiritual leader became even more active. In mid-April 2012, during another round of talks in Istanbul on settlement of the Ira- nian nuclear crisis, Tehran agreed to limit the uranium enrichment process (the enrichment from 3.5 to 19.8% for U-235). It would have been much wiser to suspend the process: a coun- try that has accumulated 110 kg of nuclear material, enough to keep Tehran’s research reac- tor busy for the next 20 years, hardly needs more uranium enriched to 19.8%. This step, how- ever, showed that Tehran was ready for a compromise.

2 See: “Obama i Netanyahu obsudili iadernuiu problemu Irana,” Vesti.RU, 18 May, 2009, available at [http://www. vesti.ru/doc.html?id=285936&tid=51134]. 3 See: Resolution 1929 (2010) adopted by the U.N. Security Council on 9 June, 2010, available at [http://daccess- dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/396/79/PDF/N1039679.pdf?OpenElement]. 4 See: “Peregovory po iadernoy programme Irana provalilis,” RBK, 22 January, 2011, available at [http:// top.rbc.ru/politics/22/01/2011/531860.shtml]. 5 See: E.V. Dunaeva, “Itogi parlamentskikh voborov v IRI,” Institute of the Middle East, 16 March, 2012, available at [http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2012/16-03-12a.htm]. 68 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n Second, the European countries realized that the tight financial and economic sanctions Brussels had introduced in January 2012 had gone too far. Indeed, even a partial embargo on oil deliveries (a complete embargo came into force from 1 July, 2012) put oil refineries geared toward heavy Iran oil in a quandary; Greece, on the brink of an economic precipice (it imported 35% of crude oil from Iran), was hit more than the others. n Third, Washington remained lukewarm to all calls to use force against Iran; the Americans did their best to dissuade the Israelis from this step: they helped Tel Aviv set up a multi-lay- ered ABM system. Washington was not seeking peace—it was worried about the need to pull its troops out of Afghanistan and the heavy burden of the military budget, which needed con- siderable trimming. Much depends on the next round of talks on the Iranian nuclear file. If the talks between Iran and IAEA move forward and if the EU reciprocates with somewhat alleviated financial and economic sanctions, the slide toward a full-scale nuclear crisis might be slowed down—otherwise the world will come dangerously close to the line beyond which the talks about the use of force will be the only option. Israel does not need an armed conflict with the IRI: irrespective of the results, Israel has much to lose; if Iran crosses the “red line,” that is, carries out nuclear tests, Israel will probably strike back. America will have to close ranks with Israel. This is very, very real. Iran will respond by stirring up trouble in the neighboring states, which will inevitably draw the Central Caucasus into an armed American-Iranian confrontation. This means that regional security depends on the relations between the U.S. and IRI and that the Central Caucasus will be the place where their interests meet. Let’s take a closer look at this situation.

Strong Relations between Armenia and Iran

Today the relations between the two countries are going ahead without a hitch. Late in 2008, Armenia started receiving Iranian gas via the Tabriz-Megri-Kajaran-Ararat pipeline with an annual carrying capacity of up to 2.6 billion cu m; Armenia pays with electricity. The total cost of the project (Russia’s Gazprom was also involved) was $250 million.6 Earlier Armenia had to rely on Russian gas delivered across Georgia. Two high-voltage power lines already connect the two countries used to move electricity in one direction or the other depending on the season. Another power transmission line of 400 kV costing a total of about €100 million is planned. Two more highways will be added to the existing one; there is an agreement on building a rail- way between Iran and Armenia. According to the preliminary estimate, it will cost about $1.8 billion: Iran will invest $1.4 billion, while Russian Railways Ltd. will supply the rest. The project will be realized in five years. There is an agreement that Gazprom will be involved in building an Iranian-Armenian petrole- um products pipeline and a liquid fuel terminal with a capacity of up to 1.5 million tons, two corner- stones of Armenia’s energy security. The Megri hydropower station will be built within the frame- work of bilateral cooperation. These projects will cost about $500 million.

6 See: L. Ovanisian, “Zaversheno stroitelstvo vtorogo uchastka gazoprovoda Iran-Armenia,” Kavkazskiy uzel, 2 De- cember, 2008, available at [http://krasnodar.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/144850]. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 69 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Between 2007 and 2011, trade turnover between the two countries increased from $180 to $323 million7 (Erevan is Iran’s fourth largest trade partner). These positive shifts went on in the con- text of international and unilateral sanctions against Tehran. In an effort to consolidate its political and economic position in Armenia, Iran repeatedly of- fered to sell Armenia small arms and ammunition, mortars, missile systems of volley fire, equipment, etc. So far, their military-technical cooperation remains limited to supplies of Iranian kits and food- stuffs of extended storage for the Armenian armed forces. There is information that the sides signed an agreement on cooperation under which the IRI will protect the Armenian rear in the event of war, while Erevan will prevent a blockade of Iranian terri- tory and strikes on Iran from the north. Whether the treaty can be realized, especially in the event of an American-Iranian conflict, remains to be seen: Erevan cherishes its relations with Washington and does not exclude NATO membership for Armenia. This explains why, despite its CSTO membership, Armenia has been closely cooperating with NATO within the Partnership for Peace program since 1994 and cooperating within the Individual Partnership Action Plan since 2005. Until October 2008, the Armenian military were involved in the peacekeeping operation as part of the coalition forces in Iraq; now they serve in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The Armenian leaders are fully aware that support of the Iranian regime in any form will in- evitably worsen its country’s relations with the West and dramatically cut down on financial aid from the Armenian diasporas, in France and the United States in particular. On the other hand, the Armenians take into account the positive role Iran has been playing in settling the armed Karabakh conflict. This means that Iran and the United States are carefully avoiding direct confrontation in Ar- menia. Fully aware of the problems Armenia has to cope with in power production, Washington does not object to its cooperation with Tehran. The Americans, however, are going to all lengths to prevent military-technical cooperation between the two countries and are trying to keep Tehran as far away as possible from the Karabakh settlement. The United States will become even more ac- tive if a war with Iran begins and will stem all attempts to help Iran, while never attempting to draw Armenia into the clash.

Iran and Azerbaijan: Far from Easy Relations

Immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Tehran tried to spread its influence to the Azerbaijan Republic: it facilitated the visa regime, opened direct air flights and bus routes be- tween the Azeri and Azerbaijan’s neighboring regions, and sanctioned bilateral contacts at the local level in trade, education, scientific research, and economic cooperation. Iran helped Azerbaijan join all sorts of regional structures, extended economic and humanitarian aid, and tried its hand at Karabakh mediation. Until 1994, the two countries had been developing good-neigh- borly, constructive, and mutually advantageous relations. Concerned about a possible flare-up of Azeri separatism in its territory, Iran refused to let in Azeri refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh and the neighboring districts, however it never prevented their transit across its territory. Later, contradictions began piling up in Iranian-Azeri relations, which could have caused a deep political crisis. The reasons for this were as follows:

7 See: “Armyano-iransky tovarooborot za pyat let vyros pochti vdvoe do 323 mln dollarov,” Novosti-Armenia, 25 April, 2012, available at [http://www.newsarmenia.ru/economy/20120425/42650150.html]. 70 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

(1) Tehran was very irritated by Baku’s decision to change the route of the Baku-Tbilisi-Cey- han oil pipeline. The initial economically much more rational variant via Iran had been re- routed under American pressure and due to several other reasons, which cooled Iranian- Azeri relations. (2) In November 1994, Azerbaijan agreed to sell the Iranian National Oil Company 25% of the shares of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company; several months later, un- der American pressure, it retreated from its decision. Ten percent in the off-shore gas condensate field Shah Deniz offered as a reconciliatory gesture did nothing to stem the mounting tension in the two countries’ bilateral relations. Iran tried to prevent construc- tion of export oil pipelines from Azerbaijan and its exploration and exploitation work in the Caspian. This did nothing to interfere with construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline widely supported by the West, but showed Iran that it needed its own export pipelines for Caspian oil and gas. Today, one of the transit routes of Turkmen gas passes through Iranian territory. (3) The relations between Azerbaijan and the United States were becoming rapidly stronger, which potentially threatened the national interests of Iran in the Caspian in particular. Te- hran responded by establishing closer relations with Erevan, but at the official level Iran still condemns Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan. In 1997, the two countries began restoring their partnership ties; this became especially obvious when Mohammad Khatami, elected , opted for a more balanced foreign policy in the Central Caucasus and concentrated on energy production and transportation.8 Disagreements, how- ever, remained. In 2002, bilateral political cooperation received a new lease on life from President of Azerbaijan Republic Heydar Aliev’s official visit to Iran: the two countries revived the dialog on the status of the Caspian, one of the most sensitive issues in their relations. At the same time, they signed several doc- uments on cooperation in road building, customs control, transport and communications, culture, and . In the summer of 2003, the new level of mutual understanding helped the two countries to settle a potential conflict that could have been caused when an Iranian warplane violated the state border of the Azerbaijan Republic. In January 2005, the first visit to the IRI of new President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev helped to develop the bilateral dialog further. This visit produced a joint political statement and bilateral agreements on joining the railways of the two countries and building the Baku-Astara highway and a hydropower station on the borderline River Arax. Azerbaijan opened its consulate-general in Tabriz. From that time on, bilateral economic cooperation in power production, trade, agriculture, and industry has been going smoothly ahead. In the winter, Azerbaijan sells natural gas to the northern provinces of Iran; in the summer, it supplies them with electricity. Iran and Azerbaijan are cooperat- ing in border and coastal control and exchange of prisoners, as well as fighting drug trafficking. Economic cooperation potential remains untapped: in 2009 it barely reached $550 million9; the situation will not improve any time soon because Baku is seeking as much independence from its southern neighbor as possible. This was amply confirmed in the summer of 2010 when a treaty on gas supplies to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (part of Azerbaijan separated from it by a stretch of Armenian territory.—Ed.) discontinued Iranian supplies in favor of moving Azeri gas via Turkey.

8 See: A.M. Vartanian, “Irano-azerbaidzhanskie otnosheniia: dialog s peremennym uspekhom,” Institute of the Middle East, 27 March, 2006, available at [http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2006/27-03-06c.htm]. 9 See: “Azerbaidzhan i Iran zhelaiut dovesti tovarooborot do $1 mlrd,” Vestnik Kavkaza, 14 December, 2099, available at [http://www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/politika/diplomatia/12915.html]. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 71 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The considerably better relations between the two countries are still burdened with certain neg- ative factors. n First, Tehran’s continued active cooperation with Erevan is creating a breach in the transport blockade of Armenian territory and taking the edge off the Karabakh settlement. n Second, the rights of the huge Azeri population (no less than 20 million, or over 25 percent of the total population) of Iran are consistently infringed upon. n Third, the Azerbaijan Republic maintains close relations with the United States, Iran’s main external foe, which is causing friction in relations between Iran and Azerbaijan on the ques- tion of stationing American military in the Central Caucasus. Late in April 2009, General Duncan McNabb, Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command, visited Baku to famil- iarize himself with the local road and transport communications: since the spring of 2006 so- called “temporarily stationed mobile forces” (between 750 to 1,300 American soldiers and officers) have been stationed at the former Soviet military bases of Kurdamir, Nasosnaya and Gulli. Officially, the military, the numerical strength of which might be at least doubled, are stationed to protect the Azeri-Georgian stretch of the BTC; in actual fact, however, they can be used for other purposes, including a war with Iran. n Fourth, Azerbaijan is developing relations with Israel, Iran’s regional rival; Tehran is re- sponding painfully to the process. Suffice it to say that in April 2010, the Iranian Majlis dis- cussed a report on Israel’s penetration into the Central Caucasus. In February 2012, a weap- ons contract totaling $1.6 billion that Azerbaijan signed with the Ministry of Defense of Is- rael caused even more worries in Tehran. n Fifth, in the spring of 2007, Baku joined the U.N. anti-Iranian sanctions; Azerbaijan used vi- olation by Iranian military helicopters of its air space in February 2007 as a pretext. n Sixth, the still unresolved status of the Caspian makes it much harder to exploit its resources; the status has not been resolved because Tehran refuses to compromise; this situation is fraught with confrontation. n Seventh, the IRI and the Azerbaijan Republic, as two oil-and-gas exporter and transit coun- tries, are competing in the European market. In particular, if Iran joins Nabucco, Azerbaijan will lose a large share of its gas transit. On the other hand, the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline along the bottom of the Caspian Sea will reduce the volume of Iranian gas moved to Eu- rope, while a Trans-Afghan gas pipeline might make the Peace gas pipeline (Iran-Pakistan- India) superfluous. Recently, relations between the two countries deteriorated. In October 2011, a conference was held in the Iranian city of Qom on “Support the Iranian Renaissance in the Azerbaijan Republic and Condemn Islamophobia” attended by students and clergy from many Islamic countries. The confer- ence chairman Ayatullah Muhammad Bagir Tahriri spared no biting words to criticize Baku for the arrest of the leaders of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, called on the Azeris to engage in mass rebel- lion, and condemned the ban on at secondary schools.10 The Republic of Azerbaijan took this as interference in its domestic affairs, particularly since the activity of the mentioned party, which many in Baku consider to be a tool of Iranian influence, is officially banned. In the latter half of January 2012, attacks on Israeli properties in Azerbaijan, as well as on Israeli Ambassador to Baku Michael Lotem, were thwarted. According to the available facts, the Iranian special services were directly involved.11 It is believed that these plans could have been triggered by

10 See: O. Sattarov, “Irano-azerbaidzhanskie otnosheniia prodolzhaet ‘triastu’,” Vestnik Kavkaza, 2 November, 2011, available at [http://vestikavkaza.ru/analytics/politika/45610.html?date=01%2F17%2F2012+01%3A05%3A31]. 11 See: “V Azerbaidzhane predotvrashcheno pokushenie na posla Israelia,” MediaInternationalGroup, 25 January, 2012, available at [http://www.mignews.com/news/disasters/world/250112_24258_56246.html]. 72 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the murder of Iranian nuclear scientist Mostafa Roshan. Tehran is convinced that Azerbaijan cooper- ated with Israeli intelligence and helped it to set up the secret service network that was responsible for the killing. The Azeri ambassador to Iran received a corresponding note, while the Foreign Ministry of the Azerbaijan Republic refuted all accusations. Late in March 2012, Tehran was deeply concerned about the information published by the For- eign Policy journal that the territory of Azerbaijan might be used by Israel to strike at Iranian nuclear facilities. The author surmised, in particular, that, after striking, Israeli planes could land in Azerba- ijan; he also wrote that there were plans to station search and rescue groups of the Israel Army Mili- tary Defense Forces in Azerbaijan.12 Baku refuted this, but was not totally convincing. In Azerbaijan, the U.S. and IRI remain rivals; the United States is skillfully using the serious problems between Azerbaijan and Iran to draw the former into its sphere of influence. Washington has drawn Israel into the process as an instrument of America’s national interests. The use of force against Iran will place Azerbaijan in a tight corner: it will have to choose between supporting Israel (the U.S.) indirectly in view of possible retaliation from Iran or trying to remain neutral, thus endan- gering its relations with the West. The second option looks preferable given the possibility of a large influx of refugees from its southern neighbor.

Iran and Georgia are Drawing Closer

On 3 November, 2010, Iran and Georgia signed an agreement on a visa-free regime, which came into force on 26 January, 2011.13 Citizens of both countries can stay in the territory of the other coun- try for 45 days without visas. The IRI opened its consulate-general in Batumi and direct flights be- tween Tbilisi and Tehran were resumed after a 10-year interval. Georgia did this not only because the number of Iranian tourists has increased 2.5-fold and not because Tbilisi was looking forward to large investments, but because Iran refused to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, relations between the Russian Federation and Iran have cooled, and there are at least 300 thousand Georgians living in Iran. The Iranian side is trying to forestall its mounting political and economic isolation, expand its influence in the Central Caucasus, and prevent an American airstrike from this direction. Trade is still fairly slack: Iran accounts for less that 1% of Georgia’s total imports, which ex- plains the fairly wobbly bilateral relations. The absence of common borders and the hard-to-over- come cultural, linguistic, and religious differences do not add stability to the relations between the two countries. The United States, the military, political, and financial pillar of the Georgian establish- ment, does not hesitate to slow down these developments. Iranian-Georgian relations have been further worsened by transit across Georgia and Azerbai- jan of weapons and other cargoes to Afghanistan and back. In view of transshipment across the Cas- pian and given the existence of other much more comfortable routes, this route is of secondary impor- tance. Since April 2010, America has been moving non-military cargoes to Afghanistan across Rus- sia; shipment from Riga in the Baltics across Russia and Kazakhstan to Termez on the Uzbek-Afghan border takes nine days. Today, America moves up to 20 percent of its non-military cargoes along this safe route.

12 See: M. Perry, “Israel’s Secret Staging Ground,” Foreign Policy Journal, 29 March, 2012. 13 See: “MID Gruzii: Tbilisi ne skryvaet svoi otnosheniia s Iranom,” Rosbalt, 24 April, 2012, available at [http:// www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/2012/04/24/973422.html]. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 73 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

There is an agreement on moving American troops and military cargoes (up to 4.5 thousand flights a year) to Afghanistan and back by air across Russian air space; this will save Washington $133 million. Not yet fully tapped, it serves as an important addition to the other transport corri- dors. An agreement with NATO on the transit of non-military cargoes back from Afghanistan is being discussed. It will combine air and land movement of cargoes via Ulyanovsk. This became indispensable because of the pullout, which should be complete by 2014, because railway transit across is fairly limited, and because of the continued uncertainty of shipping cargoes across Pakistan.14 The Defense Ministry of Russia warned that the cargoes would be subject to customs inspection. The administration of the Ulyanovsk Region has already calculated that this will bring about $800 million into the regional budget and will create up to 2 thousand new jobs.15 This might change if a war with Iran starts in earnest. The transport corridor that has been al- ready set up in the Central Caucasus will provide rear support for the American troops brought to Georgia and Azerbaijan. This explains Tehran’s close attention and painful response to all of Amer- ica’s attempts to set up corresponding infrastructure on the Iranian borders. This means that Iranian-Georgian rapprochement is of a temporary nature; it is caused by Tehran’s attempts to avoid isolation from the north. Tbilisi, in turn, is trying to use the periodical disagreements between Russia (the West) and Iran in its own interests. In February 2012, Tbili- si’s balanced response to the terrorist act against an Israeli diplomat, of which Tel Aviv accused the Iranian special services, meant that Georgian leaders preferred to keep partner relations with Tehran. On the whole, however, Georgia is following the United States’ foreign policy, which means there is a high enough risk that it will be involved in an armed conflict with Iran on the side of the West.

Conclusion

The Central Caucasus is turning more and more obviously into a place where the interests of the United States and Iran cross, which negatively affects regional security in view of the high level of confrontation between the two states and might develop into an armed conflict. There is still time to check escalation, which requires the concerted efforts of all the interested countries potentially able to carry weight with the conflicting sides. Russia plays a special role; it needs a peaceful resolution to the nuclear crisis because of the very complicated situation in the Northern Caucasus, the high degree of its involvement in all the regional conflicts, and its unwillingness to have another nuclear power on its borders. For historical, cultural, political, and economic reasons, Iran, even with the Soviet Union re- moved from the stage, has failed to spread its influence far and wide in the Central Caucasus and acquire a status equal to that of Russia or Turkey. This happened for the following reasons: —serious confrontation with the West, which invited international and unilateral sanctions; this has created conditions hardly conducive to economic and political cooperation between Iran and the countries of the neighboring sub-region;

14 On 25 November, 2011 American helicopters mistakenly bombed and destroyed the Volcano outpost of the Pa- kistani army wounding 15 and killing 24 (later the figure of 27 killed was quoted) Pakistani servicemen; the transit of American cargos for the troops stationed in Afghanistan was stopped. 15 See: “Voennoy bazy i personala NATO v Ulyanovske ne budet,” Stroi Terminal, 2012, available at [http:// stroyterminal.blogspot.com/2012/03/blog-post_19.html]. 74 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

—the absence of allies (relations with Armenia serve Erevan’s short-term interests because in the military-political sphere it looks toward Moscow and partly toward Washington); —accelerated development of the Iranian nuclear and missile programs; in view of its aggres- sive foreign policy and the absence of a regional ABM system, this cannot but cause justified concerns in the Central Caucasus; —Iran’s rigid and unsubstantiated position on the status of the Caspian. Still, the IRI has prevented itself from becoming isolated from the north and even developed partner relations not only with economically-blockaded Armenia, but also with Georgia, America’s closest partner in the Central Caucasus. Its relations with Azerbaijan, which is much closer to Iran in many respects than the other two Central Caucasian countries, leave much to be desired, however the two countries have so far avoided direct confrontation despite the hectic activities of the West and Israel. Tehran and Washington will go on building up their presence in the Central Caucasus through the mutual containment policy. They will not become allies with any of the local states any time soon. This balance should be preserved to minimize the negative repercussions of a possible armed conflict between America and Iran.

Fikret SADYKHOV

Professor at Western University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

ON THE GEOPOLITICAL AND LEGAL FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

Abstract

his article discusses the geopolitical nomic processes in the two countries, as T aspects of the Armenian-Azerbaijani well as on the actual conditions that have Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its de- developed in the region. The author ana- structive consequences for the region as a lyzes all the factors threatening peace and whole and for Armenia in particular. It ex- stability throughout the Caucasus and takes amines the origins and reasons for the a look at the diplomatic efforts the Azerba- many years of opposition, as well as the ijan Republic has been exerting to settle attempts the sides are making to reach a the conflict by peaceful means, as well as viable compromise. Particular focus is the mediating activity of the Co-Chair coun- placed on comparing the social and eco- tries of the OSCE Minsk Group. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 75 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Introduction

There can be no doubt that most of Azerbaijan’s diplomatic efforts today are directed toward finding ways to settle the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This stands to reason since restoration of the country’s territorial integrity is the main priority and key task of the Azerba- ijan Republic’s foreign policy. The conflict has graphically demonstrated the destructive consequenc- es of the inadequate diplomatic steps taken by the leading states, their open reluctance to have any real influence on promoting fair settlement of the conflict, and their inconsistency in implementing the decisions of international organizations.1 Today some analysts think that the conflict is playing a pivotal role in the new geopolitics in Eurasia and is posing a growing threat to regional security and stability throughout the entire Cauca- sus and Middle East.2 Furthermore, people are beginning to wonder just who has benefited from the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and what has ultimately been gained by the two opposing sides: Ar- menia beleaguered with social and economic problems and an unrecognized separatist formation, on the one side, and Azerbaijan recognized within its territorial borders, gaining in economic weight, and strengthening its defense potential, on the other.

The Price of Enlarging the Country’s Living Space

Armenia appears to be the winning side in the conflict. Indeed, it controls Nagorno-Karabakh, occupies 20% of Azerbaijani territory, and enjoys moral, political, and financial support from certain circles in the leading states. But this has led Armenia into an impasse from which there seems to be no way out. The ad- vantages gained in the war are not creating advantages at the negotiation table. Moreover, Armenia is missing one chance after another to achieve a real compromise. Azerbaijan’s territorial and hu- man losses do not compare with what the Armenians have lost. In the mid-1980s, there were around 350,000 Armenians living in Azerbaijan, and this is not counting the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. More than half of them lived in Baku. Now the Armenians who have left Azer- baijan only have their ideological and political leaders, as well as the “false historians,” to thank for the situation that has developed. These people have paid too high a price for the outcome of the conflict. They have irreversibly lost the invaluable economic, administrative, cultural, and status positions they once held in Azerbaijan. Now even the most prosperous and successful are for the most part eking out a pitiful existence in Armenia, Russia, Ukraine, and the West. As for Nagorno-Karabakh itself, at least one third of the Armenian citizens who lived there have also left. So the total number of Armenians who have departed Azerbaijan amounts to more than 400,000 people. But this is not all. The backsliding of the former Armenian S.S.R. into pover- ty, hardship, desertion from the army, and the general socioeconomic and psychological crisis have forced a large number of its own residents to leave Armenia.3 Unemployment reigns in the country amid growing external debt.4 According to the official data of Armenia itself, the number of em-

1 See: “Azerbaidzhan: novaia diplomatiia,” available at [http://www.oqoniok.com/archive]. 2 See: S.E. Cornell, The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Report No. 46, Department of East European Studies, Uppsa- la University, Uppsala, 1999, available at [http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/1999_NK_Book.pdf]. 3 See: A. Goryanin, A. Sevastyanov, Russkomu ob Azerbaidzhane i azerbaidzhantsakh, Moscow, 2009, p. 94. 4 See: “M. Hancock, member of the PACE Monitoring Committee and Committee on Political Affairs (Great Brit- ain): ‘I do not like criticism of Azerbaijan,’” available at [http://www.today.az/news/politics/64470.html], 19 March, 2010. 76 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ployed in the country has dropped from 1,400,000 in 2001 to 1,200,000 in 2007. Whereas in 2001, 42% of the employed population worked in industry; in 2007, this index dropped to 16%. Such is reality. According to The CIA World Factbook—2008, 2,967,000 people live in Armenia, while some experts put the country’s population at no more than 2,400,000. Extrapolation of the dynamics of the size of the population, birth rate, and natural growth in the 1980s shows that if it had not been for the events of the past twenty years, Armenia would now boast a population of at least 4,000,000. For such a small republic as Armenia, this difference of 1.6 million is essentially catastrophic. The nation is not large enough to develop its culture, information environment, literature, education, and science. This is particularly true since the intelligentsia and number of economically and socially active residents, especially young people, are continuing to decline. According to a Gallup poll, as of July 2008, 23% of the country’s residents were ready to leave Armenia. This is what Armenia has acquired from the political shortsightedness of its leaders and their disregard for the objectively developing reality in the region. British journalist Thomas de Waal cites the words the then Defense Minister and now Presi- dent of Armenia Serge Sargsyan said to him on 15 December, 2000 in his book on the Karabakh conflict called Black Garden: “The most important thing is not the territory. It’s that one ethnic group is left in Armenia. In Vardenis and other regions, the used to be 70 percent of the population. Our cultures are not compatible. We can live side by side but not within each oth- er… There are very few of us.”5 Judging by everything, Armenians themselves are becoming fewer and fewer in Armenia. This is the price Armenia is paying for its long years of efforts aimed at enlarging its living space, supporting separatism, and making territorial claims on Azerbaijan.

Vague Analogies and Ideological Myths

We will remind you that Azerbaijan’s economic boom continues its uninterrupted and dynamic advance against this dramatic Armenian background. It is enough to note that between 1996 and 2006 alone GDP growth amounted to 13.6% a year. However this growth continued even after 2006. In 2007, Azerbaijan’s GDP rose another 23.4%, while per capita GDP reached $7,700. The results of January-April 2010 also indicate significant growth in Azerbaijan’s GDP. During this period, this index reached 13 billion manats. According to the country’s State Statistics Board, this is 5% higher than the GDP volume for the same period in 2009. At this time, the production vol- ume in the oil industry increased by 4.9% and in the non-petroleum sector by 5%.6 According to many foreign experts, if it keeps up the same pace, Azerbaijan could reach the level of the most devel- oped countries of the world in terms of this index by the end of this decade. The longstanding opposition that is now called the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict essentially boils down to Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani territory and open support by the aggressor of the separatist formation in Nagorno-Karabakh. This aggression has led to Azerbaijan losing 20% of its land and acquiring one million refugees and migrants. All of this could not help but have an impact on the overall situation in the Central Caucasus, which remains unstable, while from the geopolitical viewpoint it is tense and to some extent explosive.7

5 Th. De Waal, Black Garden, New York University Press, New York, London, 2003, p. 273. 6 See: “Goskomstat Azerbaidzhanskoi Respubliki. VVP Azerbaidzhana,” 1news.az, 17 May, 2010. 7 See: “Glava tsentra strategicheskikh issledovanii Azerbaidzhana: ‘Situatsiia na Iuzhnom Kavkaze ostaetsia vzry- voopasnoi,’” day.az, 20 April, 2010. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 77 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Furthermore, the main threat to security and stability in the region is that peaceful settlement of the conflict has still not been reached, which poses a serious threat not only to the countries of the region, but also to the international community as a whole. The Armenian side likes to resort to vague historical analogies and ideological myths, as well as make excursions into the distant past, in so doing presenting unsubstantiated arguments and flimsy references that smack of barefaced extrava- ganza. Unfortunately, such fabrications are also supported by some Russian experts when evaluating the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh. One of them, a certain A. Areshev, claims that at the begin- ning of the 1990s during adoption of the legislative acts on country’s state independence, Azerbaijan “did not take into account the opinions of the autonomous formations and compactly residing national groups, which is a recognized worldwide practice!?”8 This gives rise to the legitimate question of where does the author put the 30% of Azeris living in Nagorno-Karabakh, the opinion of whom was not only not taken into account at the beginning of the campaign launched by the (Reunion) initiative in 1988, but who were also subjected to ethnic cleansing and turned into displaced persons in their own country? Moreover, what does the Russian expert mean when he refers to so-called worldwide practice? I am convinced that today we need an approach based not on virtual and unsubstantiated state- ments of certain experts, but on political and international legal assessments that take into account the current geopolitical features of the region and offer specific ways to extricate the country from the situation that has developed.

The Legal Aspect and Political Approaches

Azerbaijan is extremely pragmatic when assessing the situation and insists on conflict settle- ment based on respect for the territorial integrity and inviolability of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders, as well as on peaceful coexistence of the Armenian and Azeri communities of Nagorno-Karabakh. To this end, Azerbaijan demands withdrawal of Armenian forces from the oc- cupied Azerbaijani territories and the return of internally displaced persons to their native lands.9 Furthermore, Nagorno-Karabakh could be granted a temporary intermediate status. This position is entirely reasonable, very precisely expressed, and, most important, is not disputed by the world community. Armenian experts often refer to the Meyendorff Declaration signed by the presidents of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia on 2 November, 2008 in Moscow and remind Azerbaijan of the importance of continuing the negotiation process in order to further elaborate the fundamental principles of polit- ical settlement.10 But is anyone in Azerbaijan really against this? It all boils down to just how much more time this will take. Talks have been going on for almost two decades now, while other docu- ments that are much more important for our country are being overlooked. Azerbaijan has four U.N. Security Council resolutions of 1993 (Nos. 822, 853, 874, and 884) in its favor that call for the imme- diate and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian armed formations from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. As for the applicability of the right of the people to self-determination in the context of separation during settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan also has a statement in its favor made by the then OSCE chairman at the end of this organization’s summit held in Lisbon in

8 A. Areshev, “Karabakhskii konflikt: istoricheskie i politiko-pravovye aspekty,” in: Maiendorfskaia deklaratsiia, 2 noiabria 2008 goda i situatsiia vokrug Nagornogo Karabakha, Russkaia panorama, Moscow, 2009, p. 98. 9 For more detail on the position of the Azerbaijani side on settlement of the conflict, see the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic, available at [http://mfa.gov.az/eng]. 10 See: Maiendorfskaia deklaratsiia 2 noiabria 2008 goda i situatsiia vokrug Nagornogo Karabakha, p. 12. 78 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

1996.11 The statement set forth three principles that should form part of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They are as follows: “—territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic; “—legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in an agreement based on self-determination which confers on Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan; “—guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population, including mutual ob- ligations to ensure compliance by all the Parties with the provisions of the settlement.”12 These principles were supported by all the summit’s participating states, apart from Armenia, and this statement was annexed to the documents of the Lisbon summit. So the Armenian side again demonstrated that the opinion of the world community does not coincide with its own understanding and interpretation of the principles and regulations of international law. One of the most important achievements of Azerbaijan’s membership in the Council of Europe was the adoption of a separate resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh in 2005. The resolution adopted as No. 1416 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is of enduring significance for Azerbaijan.13 It is enough to cite the first point set forth in this document, which reads as follows: “Considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan are still occupied by Armenian forces, and separa- tist forces are still in control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.”14 Of course, this document could have been formulated even more precisely and clearly. But even as it stands, its adoption was a significant diplomatic victory for Azerbaijan and official recognition of its territorial integrity. Moreover, despite Armenia’s desperate attempts to prevent this, a corre- sponding subcommittee was formed in PACE to monitor execution of Resolution 1416 at one time and co-speakers were even appointed.15 On the diplomatic front, official Baku continued to work actively both with the leading world players and with influential international structures. It is enough to mention the adoption of the March resolution of 2008 by the U.N. General Assembly confirming Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Most important is that Azerbaijan’s consistent policy has led to most members of the international commu- nity, including the Co-Chair countries of the OSCE Minsk Group, understanding the need for taking Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity into account as the main principle in settlement of the Nagorno-Ka- rabakh conflict. Resolution 2216 of the European Parliament adopted on 20 May, 2011 can also be considered a serious document in Azerbaijan’s favor. It expresses concern about militarization of the region and is in favor of unequivocal withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from all the occupied territo- ries of Azerbaijan.16 The opinion of the European Parliament deputies and resolution they adopted confirm again the legitimacy of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and the absurdity of Armenia’s claims to our country.17 Erevan’s reaction seemed rather hysterical, even though the resolution reflected the actual state of affairs in the Central Caucasus, that is, a reality that does not suit Erevan

11 See: T. Musaev, “Pravovye aspekty nagorno-karabakhskogo konflikta”, available at [karabakh-doc.azerale.info/ ru/law/law001.htm]. 12 OSCE DOC.S/1/96, p. 15, available at [http://www.osce.org/mc/39539?download=true]. 13 See: “Rezoliutsiia PACE po Karabakhu: chto dalshe?” BBC Russian.com, 4 February, 2005. 14 Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1416 (2005), The Conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference, Point 1, available at [http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ ta05/eres1416.htm]. 15 See: “Predstavitel delegatsii Azerbaidzhana v PASE ukazal prichiny nedovolstva armianskikh politikov,” 1 news.az, Baku, 19 May, 2010. 16 See: “Evroparlament prizval Armeniiu vyvesti voiska iz Karabakha,” Ekho, Social-Political Review, 21 May, 2010. 17 See: “Territorialnaia tselostnost Azerbaidzhana podtverzhdena,” Trend.Az, 21 May, 2010. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 79 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION in the slightest.18 If Armenia considers itself a civilized member of the international community, it should immediately meet the demands of the European Parliament and withdraw from the Azerbaija- ni territories it has occupied. And, finally, three important resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh were adopted on 19 May, 2010 in Dushanbe at the 37th session of the ministers of foreign affairs of the member states of the Organ- ization of the Islamic Conference.19 n The first resolution is political, according to which Armenia is called an aggressor. n The second examines the issue of rendering financial and economic assistance to the victims of the Armenian aggression. n And the third condemns the destruction of historical Islamic monuments on Azerbaijani ter- ritory as a result of the Armenian aggression. It takes little imagination to understand what the Armenian side would do, which continues with paranoiac obstinacy to insist on the events of one hundred years ago being called “genocide,” if it had even the most recent resolutions and decisions of such important and prestigious international organ- izations to support it.

Pragmatism and Demonstration of Strategic Patience

Has the above-mentioned negotiation process withdrawn from its impasse and come closer to a fair solution to the long years of conflict? Unfortunately, it has not. The unconstructive political course steered by the Armenian leadership deprived of elementary logic and flexibility and blinkered by ideological myths, as well as the speculative policy of the leading states that is encouraging this country’s whims have been making it impossible to achieve progress in this matter for almost 20 years now. Moreover, as for the resolutions and decisions adopted by international organizations in Azer- baijan’s favor, foreign experts often voice the opinion that none of them have binding force, are advi- sory in nature, and are unlikely to be put into practice.20 That is, some analysts are a priori resorting to different forms of verbal hairsplitting proving the unacceptability of this development of the situ- ation instead of objectively assessing the circumstances and supporting the position of the world com- munity, as though worried that Armenia will have to liberate the territory it has occupied. Something else is also clear. The leading states are in favor of implementing any resolution adopted at the level of international organizations. Is it not obvious that precisely they have a deter- mining role in putting these decisions into practice? The events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now in Iran are vivid proof of this. Armenia’s reaction to resolution 2216 on the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied Azerbaijani territories adopted by the European Parliament on 20 May, 2010 also seems rather pecu- liar. It turns out that according to the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “the resolution does not correspond either to the , or to the statement in L’Aquila, or to the Moscow (Mey- endorff) Declaration”!?21 And this is the official viewpoint of a country that is neither fulfilling any

18 See: Politog F. Sadykhov: “Reaktsiia Erevana okazalas dostatochno isterichnoi,” available at [day.az/new/poli- tics/210963.html], 25 May, 2010. 19 See: “OIC priniala tri rezoliutsii po Nagornomu Karabakhu,” available at [www.azer.az/news], 20 May, 2010. 20 See: M. Emerson, “Expert: European Parliament’s Resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh Process Not To Affect Course of Negotiations,” available at [http://m.trend.az/en/news/politics/1692051.html], 21 May, 2010. 21 “Armeniia raskritikovala rezoliutsiiu Evroparlamenta po Iuzhnomu Kavkazu,” available at [rambler.ru], 20 May, 2010. 80 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of the resolutions offered by international organizations, nor is responding to the renewed Madrid Principles proposed by the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group as early as January 2010. Unfortunately it must also be stated that the activity of the OSCE Minsk Group, which has been carrying out mediating functions since 1992, paying shuttle visits to the region, and making proposals that are absolutely unacceptable to Azerbaijan with enviable persistence, leaves some- thing to be desired. In my view, the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group have been doing everything to draw the conflict out for as long as possible. Most ludicrous and unrealistic was the OSCE Minsk Group’s proposal in November 1998 on the establishment of a unified state, according to which Nagorno-Karabakh would become a state and territorial entity in the form of a republic and estab- lish a union state with Azerbaijan?!22 Then, as early as 2001, attempts were made to impose the so-called Paris and then Key West principles on Azerbaijan, which boiled down to joining Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia and bargain- ing over the status of the transit transportation corridor from mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan through Meghri. It goes without saying that Azerbaijan entirely rejected all these proposals. Never- theless, Azerbaijan, remaining loyal to the agreements signed earlier and adhering to the regulations of international law as a civil actor in international relations, has been participating in the negotiation process for almost two decades and periodically meeting with the Armenian leaders under the medi- ation of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. Furthermore, Azerbaijan has always been constructive, upheld a pragmatic position, and dem- onstrated strategic patience.23 But a situation of “neither peace, nor war” is significantly complicating circumstances in the region and cannot last forever. Azerbaijan will not tolerate occupation of its ter- ritory and Armenia’s absurd and unsubstantiated claims endlessly. Unfortunately, the mediators from the OSCE Minsk Group are doing nothing more than maintaining the semblance of a dialog. The impression is created that the Co-Chairs are not only unconcerned about reaching a fair settlement of the conflict, but are also openly encouraging the irrepressible ambitions of the Armenian side. Official Baku has repeatedly stated that it supports gradual settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, since it understands that all the problems which have accumulated over long years cannot be resolved in one fell swoop.24 It is also known that the so-called Prague Process was launched six years ago, which resulted in validation of the Madrid Principles in 2007. For the next two years, meetings of the presidents and heads of the foreign affairs ministry were held and the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group made intensive visits to the region, all of which resulted in the sides being offered a renewed version of the Madrid Principles. In contrast to Armenia, Azerbaijan adopted this document, albeit with some reservations, and believes that it offers opportunities for signing a more extensive document in the future.25 This in- dicates that official Baku will continue to choose a peaceful, diplomatic path for resolving the prob- lem and strictly adhere to it. If Armenia gradually begins to withdraw its troops from the occupied Azerbaijani territories, this will open up broad opportunities for the entire region, both from the economic viewpoint and with respect to security and stability. Can official Erevan offer the Arme- nians of Karabakh something specific, other than fairy tales about independence? I do not think so. “They have proven hostages of the Armenian leadership and warlords in Karabakh. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, is asking them to be part of the process of economic development and infrastructure transformation.”26

22 See: “Wikipedia, Karabakhskiy konflikt, poslevoennyy period,” available at [http://ru.wikipedia.orq/wiki]. 23 See: “Samoopredelenie Karabakha vozmozhno iskliuchitelno v ramkakh territorialnoi tselostnosti Azerbaidzha- na,” available at [http://ru.apa.az/news 163357 html], 20 May, 2010. 24 See: “E. Mamedyarov: ‘Azerbaidzhan podderzhivaet poetapnyi protsess,’” trend.news, 15 March, 2010. 25 See: Ibidem. 26 “E. Aslanov: ‘Armiane Karabakha okazalis zalozhnikami rukovodstva Armenii i polevykh komandirov v Kara- bakhe,’” available at [ru.trend.az/news/karabakh/1647652.html], 2 March, 2010. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 81 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

It should also be emphasized that Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity will never become a topic of discussion, never mind of any compromises. Our position relies both on the regulations of interna- tional law and on historical justice and real logic. Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity must be restored.27 We would do well to recall that at the end of 2009 Armenia also signed a document adopted at a meeting of the OSCE Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs that called for resolving the problem only within the framework of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, showing that Armenia recognized this possibility.28 Azerbaijan thought the joint statement on Nagorno-Karabakh made by the presidents of the U.S., Russia, and France in Toronto at the G-8 summit in June 2010 to be important. The statement emphasized once more the need to liberate the occupied Azerbaijani territories and grant Nagorno- Karabakh an intermediate status that guarantees security and self-government. The statement itself emphasized again the attitude of these nations to the problem of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, to the fact that it is inviolable, and there should be no doubts in anyone’s mind about this. But this is not enough for Azerbaijan, which is used to numerous resolutions, decisions, and state- ments. These statements must be put into practice in order for Azerbaijan’s territory to be ultimately liberated. Everyone is well aware that Azerbaijan will never agree to occupation of its land. Further- more, everything must be done to render Azerbaijan the necessary assistance and put significant pres- sure on Armenia to liberate this territory and not indulge in the whims of the aggressor state.

Conclusion

Armenia’s position shows that the Armenian side does not want peace, is striving to maintain the existing status quo, does not want to withdraw from the Azerbaijani territory it has seized, is com- plicating the negotiation process, and is doing everything it can to ensure things stay this way. Official Baku has repeatedly announced that it will participate in talks as long as real results are forthcoming. The Azerbaijani side has always demonstrated and is still demonstrating an extremely constructive approach. The greatest compromise is that Azerbaijan has been committed to the peace process throughout the almost twenty years its territory has been occupied. It is also true that no other issue in the region can be resolved without settlement of the Arme- nian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. And this is not because Azerbaijan will impede this, it is just that the conflict is having the gravest negative influence on the processes going on in the region. No regional initiative or event will be possible without resolution of this problem, particularly with- out the participation of Azerbaijan. Such is the geopolitical reality in which Azerbaijan has played an exclusive role in creating, and disregarding it is the height of blatant folly. The policy Azerbaijan has been conducting in recent years, its stronger position in the region, its efforts to build a potent state, its economic opportunities, and reinforcement of its defense position have significantly strengthened Azerbaijan, making it not only a key regional player, but also an important strategic partner for many leading world nations. Today, this is the reality that Armenia and those powers so solicitously caring for its prosperity should ultimately acknowledge.

27 See: Speech of President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev at a meeting of the Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Defense on army-building, available at [http://www.aze.az/news 35183 html], 24 April, 2010. 28 See: R. Mekhtiev, “Svoboda natsii, samoopredelenie vozmozhno tolko pri territorialnoi tselostnosti strany,” available at [http://xronika.az/wain/9773], 22 January, 2010. 82 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Alexander RUSETSKY

Director of the South Caucasian Institute of Regional Security; Professor at the Caucasian International University (Tbilisi, Georgia).

PSEUDO CONFLICTS AND QUASI PEACEKEEPING IN THE CAUCASUS

Abstract

n the Caucasus, peacekeeping is not As distinct from other experts, I discuss I what it pretends to be: it is an imitation four parallel processes: Conflict, Pseudo of genuine peacekeeping and a threat Conflict, Peacekeeping, Quasi Peacekeeping. to strategic stability not only in the zones There are no international institutions of armed conflicts, but also throughout the that offer adequate and reliable assess- region as a whole. ments of the problems obvious in the con- Not infrequently, analysts and politi- flict/peacekeeping sphere or of the proc- cians attach the wrong tags to the existing esses unfolding in connection with these conflicts and use the wrong descriptions. problems. This ends in intentionally or unintentionally I suggest that the international com- warped peacekeeping that sucks in billions munity set up an Integrated System of Di- of dollars to no visible effect. Here I have agnostics and Assessment of Conflicts, introduced two concepts: pseudo conflict Pseudo Conflicts, Peacekeeping, and Quasi and quasi peacekeeping. Peacekeeping (ISDA).

Introduction

My twenty-two years of researching armed conflicts have upturned at least some of the patterns I used to apply when reflecting on, assessing, and contributing to their resolution. We have raised a new generation of people and organizations that look at conflict settlement as a source of dividend: we use these conflicts as a means of subsistence. Not infrequently, opposition parties are guilty of similar behavior: they make a lot of noise when claiming power, but they shun the social responsibil- ity that comes with it. They do not need power; they cannot rule the state. They merely want to remain in opposition, occupy a cozy niche, and live on their status as an oppositional force. International organizations, state structures, civil society institutions, and even businesses have already accommodated themselves to this state of affairs. We have proven to be too egocentric to formulate a mutually acceptable strategy of a common world; therefore, while pretending to settle conflicts, we merely attend to them. It is impossible to create an atmosphere of worldwide confidence in a world that is steeped in ubiquitous lies. It is impossible to work together toward a peacekeeping process and a common sys- tem of regional security based, in a very natural way, on the conception of a Common Economic Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 83 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Space in which all regional players (irrespective of their size) and non-regional players (for the simple reason that we have to take geopolitical reality into account) should be involved. If we fail to readjust this paradigm, conflicts will become exacerbated; many will use this as an opportunity to earn more—geopolitical gamblers will not miss this chance. I do hope that those who have come to the conference do not belong to this category; I do hope that they can potentially launch a new peacekeeping process geared toward an atmosphere of trust and confidence, without which no progress in the peace process can be achieved.

Pseudo Conflicts

I have already pointed out that inadequate interpretation of the content of a conflict and the so- cial factors involved in it is the main, or even fundamental, reason why conflict settlement does not yield the desired results. Most of the conflicts that developed into armed clashes in the former Soviet Union are too com- plicated and too multifaceted to be defined by just one element. When this is done, the ensuing overly primitive interpretation makes the conflict a pseudo conflict. This means that decentration of our thinking is absolutely indispensable; we should seek other sources of energy to adequately perceive and describe the conflict. In fact, an inadequate picture of a conflict might emerge both out of deliberate or spontaneous descriptions: in any case, professional manipulations and/or spontaneous actions create a pseudo conflict. Late in the 1980s, the far from simple conflicts in the Caucasus were deliberately described as ethnic (centering on the ethnic component); later they became known as ethnopolitical or political- ethnic. Some experts, however, continued to insist that there was no ethnic component in these con- flicts and that they were interstate conflicts (a different type of centering). This muddled the true picture and allowed the conflicting sides to remain anonymous. By pre- senting the conflict as a squabble among local “tribes,” the main players posed as mediators; and the international community continued pouring billions into these lies. What a paradox. This is the simplest way to deal with a conflict: manipulating two sides is much easier than five or six. It is much easier to organize talks on one subject only; the process can be extended ad infinitum to become a black hole that swallows up human, material, and time resources.

Quasi Peacekeeping

Quasi Peacekeeping is a political process mistaken for peacekeeping.

Today, so-called peacekeeping is in crisis, which is not such a bad thing, because what was tak- en for peacekeeping was not peacekeeping at all: even if it did have something to do with peace, it did nothing to keep it. Sometimes treatment does nothing to cure the patient despite the huge efforts and large sums poured into the process. The illness is merely aggravated—a typical case of post-Soviet medicine: the doctors pump the patient and his relatives dry; rich and stupidly trusting relatives leave the patient no chance. This is not medicine—this is dirty business which has nothing in common with 84 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION human morals. These cases call for revision; all diagnoses should be carefully checked and a fresh integrated approach recommended. The situation is ripe, yet revision is unwelcome. The “doctors” and “nurses” at all levels have accommodated themselves to the situation: they like their niche and their income too much to part with them. They are in a panic or even in a great panic. Indeed, billions of dollars have been poured and are still being poured into this huge post-Soviet “peacekeeping hos- pital” which has already crippled and continues to cripple millions of lives. The “doctors” and “nurs- es” will fight until the bitter end, yet there is no other option: this should be changed; new strategic landmarks should be identified. What happened in August 2008 confirmed that continued escalation is inevitable if the situation is not transferred to a new stage according to an adequate pattern based on an in-depth analysis.

Quasi Peacekeeping in the Caucasus

Early in the 1990s, a quasi peacekeeping process was created with the single aim of subordinat- ing conflicts to the Kremlin’s complete control rather than settling it. Most experts and analysts say that the conflicts have been put into prolonged storage or “frozen.” This is arguable, since although the fighting may have stopped, the conflict’s political and other components remain smoldering. In fact, international organizations, the U.N. in particular, connived with “freezing” the peacekeeping process rather than the conflict itself; as a result peacekeeping became an imitation. Until recently, the quasi peacekeeping process has been proceeding in several negotiation for- mats, none of which have led to settlement, but have preserved the conflict at the stage the Russian Federation, as the main character in the unfolding drama, found most to its liking. In fact, these formats allowed the Russian Federation to win time and consolidate its position in the Central Caucasus. Fully aware that its military presence in the region was unattainable through military bases in Georgia and was greatly complicated by geopolitical factors, such as NATO’s marginal presence in Georgian territory, Moscow helped to set up ethnoseparatist regimes of an ethnocratic nature run by local people in close cooperation with citizens of the Russian Federation, nearly all of them being officers or retired officers of the defense and security structures. While the conflicts in Abkhazia and the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region remained “frozen,” Russia, acting on its own and never bothering to reach an agreement with the government of Georgia, illegally distributed Russian passports in both territories. It expanded the zone of its de facto jurisdiction to the territory of its neighbors, which was the first step toward their occupation. Owing to the blunders of the Georgian leaders and complete impotence of international struc- tures, Russia de facto established itself in these territories with the help of the August 2008 military campaign and recognition of the independence of the two separatist regimes. We have to admit that Russia’s aggressive mood was a response to NATO’s enlargement toward its borders. This was what Russian experts said to justify Moscow’s actions. This means that the clash of interests between the RF and NATO caused millions of human tragedies in the Caucasus; unable to unite, the local people became puppets handled by geopolitical puppeteers.

The Structure of Quasi Peacekeeping

The negotiation formats in the context of quasi peacekeeping cannot reveal the true picture: the structure of the negotiation process is incongruent to the conflict’s structure. It can, however, be Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 85 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION congruent to the structure of a pseudo conflict. For example, the interests of the two parts of Abkhaz- ian society divided by the war were not equally represented at the talks. The separatists directly in- volved in the conflict were fully represented, while the unionists, the people who lived in Abkhazia and wanted to remain part of Georgia, were not represented despite the fact that there were strong social institutions able to represent their interests at the official and non-official levels. The Geneva format has to some extent remedied the disparity: today both parts of the divided society are repre- sented by experts. Let me plainly say that this means political discrimination against the larger part of the Abkhaz- ian population. (Abkhazia is not Kosovo, in which the non-separatist community of the Kosovo Serbs comprises less than 10% today—in Abkhazia, the non-separatists (not counting the huge number of forced migrants) comprise at least 30%.) The format of the talks on the South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region issue was hilarious. Georgia was one of the sides sitting opposite three partners—the separatists of so-called South Ossetia, North Ossetia-Alania (which is a constituent of the Russian Federation), and the Russian Federation itself. Could this hyper asymmetric format really produce adequate results? The answer is “No.” It was a mockery of peacekeeping which hurt the feelings of those who survived and betrayed the memory of thousands of those who died in the clashes. Why not invite representatives of the society disunited by war (those of pro-Georgian orienta- tion opposed to separation) to the negotiation table? Indeed, why does one part of society have the right to state and defend its rights while the other is deprived of it? Why are direct peace talks not arranged between them? Why was North Ossetia-Alania represented at the talks even though it, thank God, remained unscathed, while the powers of Shida-Kartli (a Georgian administrative unit of the same status), to which the violence had spread, was not represented? This is by far a complete list of the questions that invite a succinct answer—it is a travesty of international justice.

Peacekeeping as Quasi Peacekeeping

These and similar conflicts remain unsettled mainly because what we call peacekeeping, with- out batting an eyelid, is not peacekeeping at all. A careful analysis suggests an unpleasant conclusion: there is no efficient system for monitoring and evaluating conflicts and the corresponding “peace- keeping” processes. The NGOs and state and international organizations drawn into conflicts, and what passes for peacekeeping, blunder at every step. Academics, analysts, and decision-makers act uncoordinatedly, while their professional level and awareness of social responsibility leave much to be desired. They find themselves in the midst of the fighting and have to take sides, thus adding fuel to the fire rather than extinguishing it by siding with the peacekeepers.

Sham Mediation

This process is rooted in the interests of the key political players who distribute the roles and write the rules. This might create a conflict of interests. Indeed, why does one of the interested sides assume the role of a mediator? Why do international organizations responsible for peace and security on the planet look in the opposite direction? Why does civil society (peacekeeping and human rights structures) remain indifferent to this? Why is this problem practically ignored by analysts and the intellectual elite? 86 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Ideological Aspects of Quasi Peacekeeping

An ideological conflict is rooted in psychological factors. This is a conflict between different perceptions of an existing armed conflict and between its different interpretations. Here is my analysis of the deep-rooted variance between the two main perceptions of this con- flict. n First, “ethnocentric,” which is successfully initiated by the Russian diplomatic school at the international level; it dominates it and is actively supported by experts in Georgia and the West. This makes ethnic groups the sides both in a conflict and the “peacekeeping” proc- ess—Ossetians and Georgians in our case. n Second, “democratic,” which is presented here. Those who support it regard the people who live in these territories as a divided society, the dividing line not necessarily following ethnic borders. This means that we are dealing not with an ethnic conflict, but with an ideological conflict between secessionists and unionists. Those who side with this approach admit that there is an ethnic dimension as well and that no conflict with many component parts can or should be reduced to one of them. They look at the conflict in its entirety; today few states or public figures are prepared to exercise this approach. This is a deeply rooted psychological conflict with ideological overtones. This definition relates to the Tskhinvali conflict and the approach to many other and far from simple conflicts.

The Economic Aspect of Quasi Peacekeeping

Quasi peacekeeping perpetuates conflicts and breeds nihilism: have you ever seen a settled con- flict? No one expects fairness; people prefer to adjust to the conflict. This happens all over the world. The conflict creates a breeding ground and new jobs for those who are directly involved in it and those who pretend, or even believe, that they are serving the peacekeeping cause. Both groups have economic interests. The U.N., EU, OSCE, and other international structures are lavish with dollars and euros when it comes to funding quasi peacekeeping. We cannot say that these billions are “nobody’s money”—they are the money paid in taxes all over the world. One wonders why these processes remain ineffective? Why do the taxpayers, the indirect victims of the same conflicts, keep their negative opinion to themselves? This is not only an economic, but also a humanitarian aspect of the problem. The money squandered on quasi peacekeeping could be more rationally used to achieve genuine settlement, pay for post-conflict rehabilitation, and address the social problems of the or- dinary people. Today the “collective we” perpetuate conflicts and the accompanying “peacekeeping process- es” because they have become part of our lives. We “freeze” them in the same way we freeze food- stuffs to consume them at leisure. We need these processes because they bring money. Some people smuggle weapons and drugs; others serve in peacekeeping contingents; still others travel from one conference to another, write academic papers, etc. Any conflict has a huge economic potential, which explains why panic is immediately stirred up when anyone dares to doubt the course of peacekeeping and the peacekeeping formats. The reason is clear: 600 people lost their (good) jobs when the OSCE office in Tbilisi was closed down. An additional $15,000,000 (!!!) was allotted to close down the mission of the U.N. military observers for 6 months. Approximately the same sum has been spent on people’s diplomacy in the last twenty years. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 87 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In December 2008, the European Union allocated €1.6 million to the Heidi Tagliavini group to obtain, in seven months, an (inadequate) assessment of the 20-year-old armed conflict. Sober-minded people are shocked: these figures should be carefully analyzed; the situation, meanwhile, was as- sessed by the same people who had been involved in developing the conflict. The economic aspect of the four processes should be thoroughly studied. I will not be surprised if real peacekeeping proves to be cheaper by an order than quasi peacekeeping. Here is another side of the same problem: the damage inflicted by the conflict and pseudo con- flict (its budget includes the money wasted on quasi peacekeeping). We need to know these details to identify the sides that should compensate for the losses or, at least, be recognized as morally responsible.

An Algorithm of Accession to Conflict Settlement

Quasi peacekeeping is as dangerous as the conflict itself. As a product of conflict and pseudo conflict, it creates a second “security belt” to push the conflict in the desired direction. (Pseudo con- flict is the first “security belt.”) This means that before we realize we are dealing with a pseudo conflict, we must see that quasi peacekeeping exists, then only at the next stage will we be able to get rid of the pseudo conflict im- posed on us to screen the real conflict. We must consistently peel back the layers of the pseudo con- flict to get to the core. The Georgian-Russian war of August 2008 and the subsequent events proved once more that negotiations at the official and non-official levels geared toward the interests of the main political players were hardly sound. The divided societies in Georgian territory have opposite opinions about conflict settlement; nothing was done to produce a general sociopolitical assessment of the conflicts and the correspond- ing peacekeeping processes. None of the documents registered the main groups—the victims of the conflicts (the decision of the Georgian parliament of 17 April, 1996 being the only exception), which means that they were excluded from the talks and their interests ignored. For many years, contacts between the analytical communities of the conflicting sides directly or indirectly related to the conflict remained practically ignored despite the numerous peacekeeping and humanitarian initiatives. International experts have produced heaps of declarations, conceptions, and road maps, none of them profiting from the opinion of the local analytical elite. This raises doubts about the legitimacy of these documents and about their viability and sustainability. It seems that the analysts of the suffering societies are excluded from assessing the situation and are not invited to offer their opinion. Why? Real peacekeeping should rely on documents drawn up by analysts representing the conflicting sides and independent experts; they should work together to cre- ate sustainable documents. This was what guided the SCIRS when it suggested that a mixed analytical expert group should be set up (to represent society divided by the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts). Its members are expected to analyze the situation, provide the conflicts’ general assessment, and look into the problems and prospects of peacekeeping. The SCRIS is currently engaged in elaborating the Integrated System of Diagnostics and As- sessments of Conflicts, Pseudo Conflicts, Peacekeeping, and Quasi Peacekeeping processes, its main aims being: n Comprehensive study of the factors which create and fan the Caucasian conflicts, as well as factors interfering with correct and effective organization of peacekeeping. 88 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n Creation of an efficient “integrated system of diagnostics and assessment” to spot the dis- crepancies between the conflict’s structure and dynamics and the structure and dynamics of conflict management. n Encouragement of closer contacts between the academic community and decision-makers with greater involvement of academics in the process. The integrated system of diagnostics is geared toward the following tasks. 1. Stock-taking and mapping of the Central Caucasian conflicts and identifying their types. 2. Investigating and stock-taking of the projects, programs, and ideas being currently imple- mented to settle or transform these conflicts; creating a data base of publications and analyt- ical and scientific works. 3. Studying the mechanism for drafting decisions related to conflict management and their im- plementation at the level of NGOs, private, state, and international organizations; conducting an analysis of the system of process management. 4. Developing a system of observation, monitoring, analysis, and evaluation of conflicts and accompanying peacekeeping processes (case studies of the regional armed conflicts). 5. Elaborating a system designed to affect decision-making in relation to conflict management and peacekeeping. 6. Elaborating an efficient mechanism for implementing scientific achievements in this sphere which use the latest technology. 7. Encouraging international cooperation in various dimensions as a potential conducive to a new security system in the Caucasus (and Georgia in particular); I have in mind the Black Sea-Caspian, Black Sea-Baltic, Black-Sea-Mediterranean, and other dimensions. This project is one of the products of the wide-scale research efforts within the Lane Kirkland Scholarship Program funded by the IPN of the Polish Academy of Sciences. This system of observation and assessment will make the processes more transparent, increase the diagnostic potential, and add to the efficiency of prevention, transformation, and settlement, as well as post-conflict rehabilitation.

Conclusion

This is a real attempt to change the process and create new possibilities for cooperation among experts working on Caucasian problems. The article enumerates innovational approaches to the analysis of conflicts and the accompany- ing processes of pseudo conflicts, quasi peacekeeping, and peacekeeping. We should pay more attention to the institutional initiative to set up an international organiza- tion that would rely on an Integrated System of Diagnostics and Assessment of Conflicts, Pseudo Conflicts, Peacekeeping, and Quasi Peacekeeping processes (ISDA). I would be grateful for any critical comments from my esteemed colleagues for improving the methods described here. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 89 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

George TARKHAN-MOURAVI

Co-Director of the Institute for Policy Studies (Tbilisi, Georgia).

SECURITY THREATS AND DE-SECURITIZATION OF CONFLICTS IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS

Abstract

his paper considers the prospects for the conflicts, (de)securitization, inter/intra- T and factors of conflict transformation community dialog, and national projects as in the Central Caucasus. It discusses the key factors influencing the prospects such issues as the psycho-social roots of for conflict transformation.

Introduction

The violent ethnoterritorial conflicts in the Central Caucasus1 are among the most unfortunate and distressing developments of the late Soviet and post-Soviet period. Apart from the many casual- ties, destroyed families, mass displacement, and ruined economy, these conflicts continue to pose the biggest threat to peace and prosperity in the region, while peaceful resolution of the conflicts remains a formidable challenge for those state actors who suffer from this ongoing no war/no peace situation and seek resolution or at least some improvement. However, there are actors and factors, both internal and external, that work toward preserving the status quo and toward further fragmentation of the re- gion into opposing and irreconcilable entities. Since the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war and Russia’s (as well as a few other remote states’ and statelets’) recognition of Abkhazia and South Os- setia, the situation has stabilized, on the one hand, while solutions are now even more remote than before, on the other. However, we live today in situation that is full of unpredictable possibilities and mixed threats and opportunities that may change the region (and the world) in the mid-term perspective. It would be useful to consider the main threats to stability in the region, noting at the same time that some of the threats are paradoxically combined with opportunities and possibilities.

Security Threats and Related Processes

In the short term, the biggest threats to regional security are Russia’s possible intervention in Georgia, the probability of which rose after Putin returned to Russia’s helm as full-fledged president

1 With the author’s consent, the term “the Central Caucasus” is used in this article instead of the widely-used term “the Southern Caucasus” (for more detail, see: E. Ismailov, “New Regionalism in the Caucasus: A Conceptual Approach,” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 1 (1), 2006). 90 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and may rise further after the Winter in Sochi in 2014, or in the wake of possible uncontrolled resumption of hostilities over Nagorno-Karabakh, in spite of the evident unwillingness of any of the sides to restart a conflict that cannot produce any positive results for anyone. Another factor that may have an impact on regional security in the short term is possible military action (by Israel and/or the U.S.) against Iran’s nuclear facilities, which will trigger a dangerous reaction and possible repercussions for the whole of Iran’s neighborhood. However, there are also emerging mid-term threats that need time to grow and develop, such as Russia’s failure to pacify the Northern Caucasus, which is currently facing an emerging spiral of destabilization. The real risk is related to the possibility of the instability spreading further to the south and involving both Georgia and Azerbaijan. However, both Russia’s withdrawal from the re- gion and extensive military action not only entail additional risks for the Central Caucasus, but also the possibility that the Russian leadership will become more motivated to improve relations with its southern neighbors, Georgia in particular. Such scenarios are also linked to the additional risk of radical Islam gaining a stronger foothold in the region, whereby this could apply to both the North- ern and Central Caucasus (Azerbaijan and to some extent Georgia). The situation in Iran may also develop in a dangerous direction, whether with regard to the growing tension with Azerbaijan over Caspian oil, its military cooperation with Israel, and the threat of the greater Azerbaijan project, or simply due to the existence of nuclear weapons in the neighborhood that may also trigger a nuclear arms race in the Greater Middle East. And of course we should not forget the non-traditional secu- rity threats that are growing in significance, such as international terrorism, cyber warfare, and, according to astonishing recent revelations by Russia’s leadership, even prohibited biological weapons.2 All of the above processes and threats will have an imminent impact on the state of the existing conflicts in the Central Caucasus, not necessarily triggering a renewal in hostilities, but either height- ening tension or, in some scenarios, making the parties in the conflict more eager to seek a compro- mise. In order to better understand the possible developments, it is worth briefly considering at least some of the processes taking place in and around the Central Caucasus. Although the detailed direc- tions, time frames, and immediate outcomes of these processes remain dependent on a horde of differ- ent internal and external variables, still it is possible to consider the most important trends and possi- bilities. It is also worth adding that the increasing geopolitical importance of the Central Caucasus may generate elevated risks. One of the key processes may be the imminent democratization of political life in all the Central Caucasian states. After initial democratization during the early post-independence period when cer- tain tendencies developed toward authoritarianism (although to different degrees in each of the Cen- tral Caucasian states), there are now signs that all three countries will follow the global trend toward greater maturity of society and more democracy. This is linked to the increasing attraction of Western models of governance and the prospects for more integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, augment- ed by U.S. and EU polices in this area and respective “soft power.” While in Georgia and Azerbaijan such tendencies are relatively explicit, Armenian society considers itself part of Western civilization, while the speed of its gradual shift toward the West is dependent on its relations with Turkey and Russia’s potentially waning relative influence. One of the important processes taking place in those conflicts where Russia’s involvement is crucial is the gradual weakening of the siege psychology among the population due to guaranteed

2 For example, on 22 March, 2012 Russian Defence Minister Serdyukov declared in the presence of prime minister and president-elect Putin his agency’s intention to develop “genetic weapons” among other non-traditional armaments, this being in striking contradiction to The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (which, ironically, entered into force around the same date—37 years ago, on 26 March, 1975) (see: “V.V. Putin provel soveshchanie po realizatsii zadach, postavlen- nykh v ego predvybornykh statiakh v kachestve kandidata na post Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” 22 March, 2012, available at [http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/18490/]). Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 91 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Russian protection, on the one hand, and growing irritation with Russia itself, which is demanding more and more concessions (especially in asset-rich Abkhazia) and intervening in all areas of po- litical and economic life, on the other. Some signs of such irritation can be seen in the failure at the elections both in Abkhazia and South Ossetia of all the presidential candidates nominated by the Russian government (Shamba, Bibilov, and Medoev). There was an even stronger public reaction in Abkhazia to Russia’s demands to transfer it property rights to the most valuable health resorts and other assets, to move the border south so that Russia could incorporate territories such as the Aibga settlement, and to close the Russian military health resort, which would lead to mass unem- ployment. Other powerful irritants include different interpretations of history, specifically Russia’s role in the eviction of the Abkhazian and Circassian muhajirs, or statements by Russian officials and pro-government journalists about Russian-Abkhazian problems (deprivation of Russian citi- zens of property rights, corruption and criminality, etc.). While protests are more muted in South Ossetia, there are already indications that dissatisfaction with Russia’s de facto rule there is caus- ing disappointment and frustration. The last blow was dealt by the appointment of Russian “special representatives” to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, notorious Krasnodar governor Tkachev and North Ossetian leader Mamsurov, respectively, which was considered a mock to the presumed sovereign- ty of the two territories. Still another important development relates to what is happening in Russia itself and its rela- tions with other big actors—the U.S., China, the EU, and India. Much will depend on what happens in the Russian economy and society in the next couple of decades, particularly with respect to demo- graphic degradation,3 social unrest caused by the frustrated middle class,4 and the imminent increase in unrest in the Northern Caucasus.5 As already noted above, the Northern Caucasus is also a strong factor of unpredictability, not in the sense of what will happen, but rather—when. And of course, still another important factor of relative unpredictability is the notoriously volatile oil prices that have an enormous impact on the economic and therefore also social situation in Russia, since its economy is increasingly dependent on the export of raw materials. However, apart from the internal problems that Russia may experience in the years to come, tension is emerging in its relations with other countries. Many experts are pessimistic about the future of the “reset” in relations between Russia and the U.S./ NATO, particularly in light of the disagreements over European that led to worrying Russian threats to move tactical missiles to Kaliningrad along with other actions that cause serious concern in the West. Still another unknown is Russia’s future relations with its southeastern neigh- bor—China, which, notwithstanding the claims of mutual friendliness, represents a looming threat to Russia’s geopolitical influence and even security, even after Russia ceded the disputed territories (a total of 337 square kilometers along the Russian-Chinese border) back in 2005.6 Much has been said about the possible risks to Central Caucasian security related to the possible military action by Israel and/or the U.S. against Iran’s nuclear facilities. These threats may be created

3 “Since 1992, Russia’s human numbers have been progressively dwindling. This slow motion process now taking place in the country carries with it grim and potentially disastrous implications that threaten to recast the contours of life and society in Russia, to diminish the prospects for Russian economic development, and to affect Russia’s potential influ- ence on the world stage in the years ahead” (N. Eberstadt, “Drunken Nation: Russia’s Depopulation Bomb,” World Af- fairs, Spring 2009) (see also: N. Eberstadt, Russia’s Peacetime Demographic Crisis: Dimensions, Causes, Implications, The National Bureau of Asian Research, May 2010; St. Sievert, S. Zakharov, and R. Klingholz, The Waning World Pow- er, Das Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung, 2011). 4 See: L. Ovcharova, “Russia’s Middle Class at the Centre or on the Periphery of Russian Politics,” ISS, 16 Febru- ary, 2012, available at [http://www.iss.europa.eu/fr/publications/detail-page/article/-middle-class-at-the-centre-or- on-the-periphery-of-russian-politics/]; C. Rice, “The Promise of Russia’s Urban Middle Class,” Washington Post, 9 March, 2012, available at [http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-russias-urban-middle-class-can-bring-an-end- to-putinism/2012/03/08/gIQA1FL1zR_story.html]. 5 See, e.g.: A.C. Kuchins, M. Malarkey, S. Markedonov, “The North Caucasus: Russia’s Volatile Frontier,” CSIS, March 2011, available at [http://csis.org/files/publication/110321_Kuchins_NorthCaucasus_WEB.pdf]. 6 [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=30445]. 92 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION not simply by the massive flows of refugees across borders that could destabilize the region, but might be related more seriously to Iran’s actions against those states that are supportive of Western allies and Israel, particularly Azerbaijan and Georgia. The worsening of Iran-Azerbaijan relations found its recent expression in strengthened Azerbaijani-Israeli military cooperation, trade in armaments, and especially the latest news of Israelis gaining access to military airfields in Azerbaijan.7

Roots of the Conflicts

The processes briefly outlined above are having a profound influence on security in the Central Caucasus, a region that can justifiably be considered a “regional security complex” due to the interde- pendence among security, the economy, and politics in each of the three Central Caucasian states. It is therefore not surprising that these processes will have an even more profound impact on develop- ments with respect to the three suspended conflicts—Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Osse- tia. Indeed, it is against the above-described background that the Central Caucasian conflicts exist and change, even although they may sometimes be labeled as frozen. In order to better understand the direction of change, first let us discuss the key roots of these violent conflicts. Violence here has been generated, managed, exploited, and ultimately suspended in ethnopolitical antagonism, but not without external manipulation. However, the conflicts are devel- oping and changing gradually and over time it may become even more difficult to withdraw the soci- eties out of their state of conflict and set them on the road to peace. Now, if we try to approximately describe the key causes of the conflicts in the region, we can assume that there are three main factors leading to conflict. These are fear, resentment, and hope. Let us try to consider these phenomena in more detail. When talking about fear, it is not necessarily the fear of physical threat, although this should not be excluded either, and indeed security and safety are often the key issues at stake. Still, in some con- flicts it may also be the fear of becoming irrelevant in one’s own land, becoming extinct as a nation, losing group/ethnic identity and political power, undergoing demographic decline, or losing control over resources/land. The history, or the memory, of past repression and violence creates especially fertile ground for fear—these events could happen again, or be even worse. The situation of chaos and unpredictability is particularly conducive to the emergence of various fears, which can also be easily manipulated by the leaders. As Lederach noted almost two decades ago: “Where there is deep, long- term fear and direct experiences of violence that sustain an image of the enemy, people are extremely vulnerable and easily manipulated. The fears in sub-group identities are often created, reinforced and used by leaders to solidify their position and the internal cohesion of the groups behind them. Deep polarization and sharp divisions are, in fact, functional for increasing cohesion, reducing ambiguity, and decreasing internal criticisms of leaders.”8 However, the memory of past grievances is causing not only fear, but also another rather strong feeling, that of resentment.9 Communities may develop such mutual resentment and enemy images

7 See: “Izrail poluchil dostup k azerbaydzhanskim aerodromam,” Lenta.ru, 29 March, 2012, available at [http:// lenta.ru/news/2012/03/29/access/]. 8 J.P. Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, United States Institute for Peace, Washington D.C., 1997. 9 About the related term—ressentiment, coined initially by Nietzsche in his Genealogy of Morals (1887) and later developed by Max Scheler (Ressentiment, 1912), Liah Greenfield and Daniel Chirot write: “Ressentiment refers to a psy- chological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility to act them out, which in many cases leads to the ‘transvaluation of values’” (L. Greenfeld, D. Chirot, “Nationalism and Aggression,” Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No. 1, February 1994, p. 84). Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 93 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION due to the feeling of historical injustice, betrayal, repression, and victimization that this, while it may have certain justification in history, is frequently manipulated by nationalist or populist leaders in order to mobilize support for themselves or their political agenda. Resentment and fear are also relat- ed to other feelings—desire of revenge and mistrust. Indeed, absence of trust clearly has a pivotal role to play not only in the emergence of a violent conflict, but is also the biggest obstacle to attempts to achieve its mitigation. As Lederach wrote: “Roots [of conflict lie] in long-standing distrust, fear, and paranoia, which are reinforced by the immediate experience of violence, division, and atrocities. This experience, in turn, further exacerbates the hatred and fear that are fuelling the conflict.”10 Finally, and somewhat paradoxically, hope is another strong mover in a conflict. Hope of achieving the desired goals (be they political dominance, secession, autonomy, or territory) is fre- quently coupled with the belief that “now” is the right moment to start a conflict, or expand it in a certain direction, otherwise the window of opportunity may close. And again, chaos and unpredicta- bility are conducive to developing such hopes, sometimes illusionary, and it is not accidental that all the Caucasian conflicts exploded when the constricting, although order-maintaining, Soviet authority weakened and then disappeared, opening up such perceived windows of opportunity to almost all consolidated population groups. However, in order to feel hope, leaders need to offer the communi- ties that they try to mobilize if not elaborated national projects (secession/sovereignty or irredentism, in the case of the Central Caucasus), then at least some short-term but attractive goals of military or political victory. Hope, one has to admit, plays its role not only when a conflict is starting, but usually it is the hope, or illusion, that time is working for the benefit of one or another party that leads to pro- crastination of any steps toward conflict resolution.

Ways of Conflict Transformation

If it is true that the internal factors of conflicts are related to such psychological phenomena in mass consciousness as fear, resentment, and hope, it is working with these emotional phenomena and related indoctrinations that may make it possible, if not to resolve the conflicts, at least to guide them in a more manageable and positive direction. Or, alternatively, when leverage is limited, it may ap- pear possible by observing public attitudes and values within this emotional scheme to predict the direction of transformation. However, that would mean looking at some crucial components that contribute to such change. These are national projects/nationalist ideologies; the perception of security and threats; the level of inter-community communication and trust; mechanisms and intensity of external manipulations; and more maturity and realism in interpreting processes and events. Let us briefly review these dimen- sions of conflict transformation. National projects both of secessionist territories and the Central Caucasian states are still influ- enced by the legacy of the nationalist concepts of late and the early 1990s, which, in turn, are modeled by collectivistic ethno-nationalism, as Liah Greenfield and Daniel Chirot have formulat- ed it, and so are especially conducive to demonizing the enemy.11 Therefore the opposing processes that may reduce tension between the sides are aimed at replacing collectivistic ethno-nationalism with individualistic civic nationalism/patriotism, while raising public awareness about reality and one another would lead to de-demonizing of the “other.”

10 J.P. Lederach, op. cit. 11 “The very definitions of ethnic nations presuppose a double standard of moral (or humane, decent, etc.) conduct. The tendency to ‘demonize’ the enemy population, considered to be a necessary condition for ‘crimes against humanity,’ is built-in to ethnic nationalism, for enemy populations within them are not necessarily defined as humanity to begin with” (L. Greenfeld, D. Chirot, op. cit.). 94 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Another related phenomenon that contributes to seeing the world in a somewhat immature way in black and white colors is what prominent psychologist Vamik Volkan labeled as “group regres- sion,” analogous to the Freudian regression concept. He not only stressed the role of a charismatic (or other) leader in the formation of national consciousness, but also the impact of a deep (and prolonged) social crisis on the ways society reacts to the challenges of state-building, as well as on the actual process of a nationalist discourse. Both these factors play an important role in the political life of the Central Caucasian societies. Volkan writes: “Large-group regression after a society has faced a mas- sive trauma—involving drastic losses of life, property, or prestige, and/or humiliation by another group—reflects the efforts of a group and its leader to maintain, protect, modify, or repair their shared group identity... In general, I regard well-functioning democratic societies as non-regressed and total- itarian societies as regressed. However, societal regression can occur in democratic societies as well—for instance, after massive trauma or humiliation, or under regressed, excessively paranoid leaders...”12 As noted above, antagonism between communities is also rooted in fear, which, in turn, is root- ed in seeing the world and developments as full of threats and dangers, when any event is regarded with suspicion as endangering security. For example, a well-known journalist and blogger Michael Vail writes the following about Abkhazian society: “…watching [the] behavior of the active part of Abkhazian society in the global network one unwittingly comes to a conclusion that they all still live in fear. And this fear is caused by various factors. Some are afraid of Georgians, some—[of the] Rus- sian security services, some—of their own compatriots... Living in fear has become [the] normal state of Abkhazian society.”13 Vail’s forecast is rather pessimistic: “As time passes, the situation changes, but reasons to be afraid do not become less. And the more Moscow extends its paws into Abkhazia, the more that fear will intensify. Fear of one that just yesterday was considered to be a friend and hourly is becoming the most hated enemy. And fear even to admit all this. And at that time a saying comes to mind—‘waiting for death is worse than death itself’ and this exactly describes the current state of the Abkhazian so- ciety.”14 However, at least in the case of Abkhazia, while there are emerging new reasons for fear—that long-cherished sovereignty and ethnic dominance may remain an illusion, there are other factors that weaken siege mentality and fear as security concerns becoming less relevant due to military protec- tion by Russia. Similar developments are taking place in South Ossetia, even though Nagorno-Kara- bakh may still be demonstrating the contrary. The terms “securitization/desecuritization of the level of tension existing in relations” and “se- curity”—in the sense in which the latter is related to the securitization/desecuritization phenome- non—are borrowed from the conceptual toolkit of the so-called Copenhagen School of Security Stud- ies.15 According to this perspective, security is a socially constructed, inter-subjective, and self-refer- ential practice as it emerges “not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such.”16 Still, security is not just a social construct, such as e.g. ethnicity or identity in general. Indeed, there is a component of social construction that contributes to perceived security, and there is an ever-

12 V.D. Volkan, “Large-Group Identity: Border Psychology and Related Social Phenomena,” Man and Human In- teraction, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2003, pp. 49-76 (see also his: “September 11 and Societal Segression,” Man and Human Inter- action, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2001, pp. 196-216; “Ethnonationalistic Rituals: An Introduction,” Mind and Human Interaction, No. 4, 1992, pp. 3-19). 13 M. Vail, “Moscow Abolished ‘Independence’ of Abkhazia,” StratRisks, 20 March, 2012, available at [http:// stratrisks.com/geostrat/4776]. 14 Ibidem. 15 See: B. Buzan, O. Wæver, and J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 16 Ibidem. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 95 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION present objective component of security, which can be assessed and at least theoretically considered as measurable. Security, as perceived by the members of a group/community, is rooted in the results of information about possible security threats and risks, which may be an understatement or an exag- geration of real, objective security—which can be expressed in the probability or risk of the realiza- tion of respective threats. Thus, while security to a great extent is a social construct as it emerges when an issue is presented (fully justifiably or not) as posing an existential threat to a designated “referent object” (traditionally the state, but also an institution or a community), justifying the use of extraor- dinary measures to handle it, legitimizing the use of force and other means are only legitimate when dealing with “security matters.” According to this logic, securitization of an issue implies moving it into the area of thinking and planning appropriate when dealing with existential threats. Consequent- ly, de-securitization takes place when a particular issue is removed from the security agenda, because it is no longer defined in security terms, and the use of extraordinary means, perceived as legitimate, is abandoned. Post-conflict societies are strongly securitized not only in terms of issues, such as political sta- tus, deported populations, or military threats, but also in terms of relationships between groups, or between victims and perpetrators. However, when a conflict is suspended or frozen, possibilities rath- er than actualities start to dominate the political security imagination and planning, and frequently issues become unnecessarily securitized, with respective implications—fear, irrational hostility, au- thoritarianism, and growing antagonism. Realistic assessment and analysis of threats, awareness, openness, and public debate may lead to de-securitization of a conflict. Equally, reduced existential threats, when realistically interpreted, will do the same. If the security situation in at least some of the Central Caucasian conflicts has changed, as argued above, Russian security guarantees in Abkhazia and South Ossetia may indeed lead to the waning of the siege mentality among the population and eventually to actual de-securitization of the conflicts. The same may happen in Karabakh, provided the international community finds an acceptable model of international peacekeeping. Therefore, democratization and maturing of society that lead to more public debate and openness, as well as re- spect of human rights, the rule of law, individual liberties, and political pluralism, will necessarily cause a certain amount of de-securitization of a conflict, thus facilitating communication and building mutual trust. However, after a violent conflict has developed, as it has in the Central Caucasus, its perpetua- tion in suspended or frozen form and its further dynamics continue to involve all the above factors, although their relative and absolute intensity or even object may gradually change, leading to trans- formation of the conflict. Indeed, the Central Caucasian conflicts may require more than de-securiti- zation, reframing of positions, and the identification of positive outcomes—insofar as the national projects of the parties in conflict are incongruent, and their positions irreconcilable. The very struc- ture of the parties and their relations are currently embedded in a pattern of conflict that extends be- yond security concerns. Conflict transformation should therefore become a process of engaging in and transforming relations, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of mutual hostility and an uncompromising stance. Although the common approach to conflict resolution rightfully focuses on state or para-state actors, both national and international, as well as intergovernmental organizations and coalitions, the role of non-state actors should not be underestimated, although their work is often slow and less vis- ible. As mentioned above, effective conflict transformation requires a heightened level of inter-com- munity communication and trust. As soon as de-securitization of relations takes place, new possibil- ities emerge for intensifying inter-community communication. Of course, there are traditional chan- nels of informal communication facilitated by civil society and INGO actors, but as a rule this in- volves a very limited number of civil activists and the impact, however important, is rather slow, competing with other processes that may have a shorter characteristic time cycle. Still, civil society actors are occupying an increasingly central place in view of the high degree of complexity of the Central Caucasian conflicts, when governments do not show much innovation or willingness to com- 96 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION promise and have become key players in promoting human rights and respect for minorities, generat- ing an intercommunity dialog, and searching for new solutions. At the same time, we should keep in mind that civil society agents are not detached from the specific contexts in which they act, and their involvement is not always effective or even positive. One of the key concepts relevant to reestablishing communication and trust between communi- ties is social capital or, more specifically, what is called “bridging social capital.” The lack of trust that is endemic within the conflict environment enables the perversion of social capital leading to an increased breakdown in social cohesion. Social capital is instrumental, indeed essential, for managing the tension that arises between communities, while if such bridging social capital is non-existent, along with overly strong bonding social capital within antagonistic groups, the proclivity for violent conflict is increased, and its transformation hindered.17 Again, there is a certain difference between the three Central Caucasian conflicts in that in the case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia this bridging social capital is much stronger than in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and is based not simply on the existing kinship networks, but also on personal ties and positive memories. It is exciting to observe the increasing importance of new channels of inter-community communication, involving mostly young people, which are web-based social networks that are becoming strong agents of conflict trans- formation. Communication between communities is important, but equally important is public debate on conflict-related issues within communities that contributes to more maturity of broadly understood (civil) realism in interpreting processes and events, the limitations of the existing approaches, and promises of alternative paths. Public debate gives people a tool for interpreting and reacting to reality; it is an important device in transforming perceptions, behavior, and social constructs, political ac- tions, attitudes, and values, thus creating strong conditions for influencing the perceived and then created new reality. In the Central Caucasian conflicts, as elsewhere, the protagonists are driven by rival visions of the past, and both the inter-communal dialog and intra-communal debate are major tools designed to bring positions closer together. In the protracted conflicts between the parties in the Central Caucasus, historians and other scholars themselves are acting as combatants, interpreting and manipulating the facts to make them fit their world vision. Therefore, public debate about the past, and particularly about one’s own mistakes and misdeeds, constitutes an important part of the con- struction and reconstruction of discourses that may lead to conflict transformation. However, it is not only the debate about the past that is important, rather the debate about the future and about possible common interests and shared goals, which are the key for reconciling national projects and visions. In the case of the Central Caucasus, this may appear as integration into the Western civilizational area. One more important aspect of conflict transformation, although also the least predictable, is the role of external powers. As this issue may require a separate discussion and lengthy analysis, it can be assumed that while some external powers are exerting significant efforts to maintain the status quo (as for example in the case of the current Russian leadership), others are trying to contribute more con- structively, applying mainly soft power, to channel conflicts in a more positive direction. While it is difficult to talk of specific time frames, the general logic of geopolitical dynamics creates moderate optimism that constructive approaches will gradually gain more leverage.

Conclusion

Summing up the above, we can conclude that while there is little probability that the three open Central Caucasian conflicts will be resolved any time soon, the process of conflict transformation is

17 See: R. Bowd, “Burning the Bridges and Breaking the Bonds: Social Capital and its Transformative Influence in Relation to Violent Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011, pp. 37-62. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 97 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ongoing, even though the direction of this transformation may change depending on the circumstanc- es, and certain factors of this transformation need to be kept in mind. Among the most important as- pects of this transformation are such processes as de-securitization and softening of the enemy image and resentment between parties; carrying out reality checks, admitting past mistakes, and promoting a public debate over conflicts; reconsidering national projects keeping in mind the emerging reality and trends; searching and finding areas for cooperation and positive sum game between parties; and strengthening existing bridges and communication between communities. 98 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEO- ECONOMICS

Stanislav ZHUKOV

D.Sc. (Econ.), Senior Researcher, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, the Russian Federation).

Oksana REZNIKOVA

Ph.D. (Hist.), Researcher, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, the Russian Federation).

CENTRAL ASIA AND AZERBAIJAN: LONG-TERM ENERGY STRATEGIES

Abstract

his article looks at the current state of tries of Central Asia and Azerbaijan and gives T and prospects for development of the forecasts of the possibilities of implementing energy sector in the post-Soviet coun- long-term energy projects in these regions.

Introduction

Development of the energy sector in the five post-Soviet Central Asian countries and Azerbai- jan is defined by two main factors. On the one hand, some countries of the region—Azerbaijan, Ka- zakhstan, and Turkmenistan—possess large reserves of commercial oil and gas. Uzbekistan and es- Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 99 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION pecially Kazakhstan also have large reserves of natural uranium. Relying on their rich energy re- sources, these three countries have set themselves up in the international division of labor as energy exporters. On the other hand, the energy sector in all the post-Soviet republics retains several char- acteristic features inherited from the Soviet past. No or very few large investments have been made in modernizing the production sector, transportation, and transport infrastructure, or the housing sector in the past twenty years, so everywhere the energy-output ratio of production and consump- tion remains high.

Special Features of the Energy Sector

Differentiation of the Region’s Countries in Terms of Energy Potential

In terms of their energy potential, the five Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan can be divid- ed into two groups. The first group, comprising Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, possess- es large reserves of global oil and natural gas. The second group consists of and Tajikistan, which do not have any significant reserves of hydrocarbon. Uzbekistan, which has suffi- ciently large reserves of natural gas and natural uranium, occupies an intermediate position between these two groups of countries. Local gas deposits are small and cannot be efficiently reoriented to- ward export, so most of the gas produced in this country is consumed in the domestic market. In terms of oil reserves, Kazakhstan ranks 11th and Azerbaijan 19th in the world (see Table 1). In terms of current production, Kazakhstan is among the top twenty and Azerbaijan among the top

Table 1

The Central Asian Countries and Azerbaijan: Ranking in World Production and Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas

Production in 2009 Reserves as of 1 January, 2011

Oil Natural gas Oil Natural gas

% Score % Score % Score % Score

Kazakhstan 2.0 16 1.1 24 2.0 11 1.3 15

Kyrgyzstan — — — —

Tajikistan — — — —

Turkmenistan 0.3 40 1.2 23 0.04 46-48 4.0 5

Uzbekistan 0.1 46 2.2 11 0.04 49 1.0 19

CA-5 2.4 4.5 2.1 6.3

Azerbaijan 1.3 21 0.5 32 0.5 19 0.45 26

Caspian-4 3.7 5.0 2.6 6.75

S o u r c e: Calculated and compiled according to Oil & Gas Journal, 6 December, 2010, pp. 48-49. 100 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 2

World Coal Reserves by Country in 2008, % of Total Reserves

Bituminous Coal Total and Anthracite

U.S. 27.6 U.S. 26.8

Russia 18.2 PRC 15.4

PRC 13.3 India 13.9

Australia 8.9 Russia 12.1

India 7.0 Australia 9.2

Ukraine 3.9 South Africa 7.5

Kazakhstan 3.9 Kazakhstan 5.3

South Africa 3.5 Ukraine 3.8

Other countries 13.6 Other countries 6.1

S o u r c e: Calculated according to 2010 Survey of Energy Resources, World Energy Council, 2010, pp. 10-12. thirty largest oil producers. In terms of natural gas reserves, Turkmenistan ranks fifth in the world, only lagging behind Russia, Iran, Qatar, and . However, it is very likely that natural gas reserves in this republic are even larger than follows from the available international estimates. Rel- atively recently a new giant field, Iuzhny Yolotan-Osman was discovered there, the reserves of which the British consulting company Gaffney, Cline & Associates assessed at 4-14 trillion cu m in 2008.

Figure 1

Identified World Reserves of Uranium by Country, % of Total Reserves at the Beginning of 2009

Namibia 4.5 4.4 South Africa 4.7 Nigeria 4.4 Ukraine 3.5 PRC 2.7 U.S. 7.5 Uzbekistan 1.8 Canada 8.6 Jordan 1.8

Russia 9.0 India 1.3 0.8

Other countries 5.2 Kazakhstan 13.2

Australia 26.6 Other countries 13.6

S o u r c e: 2010 Survey of Energy Resources, World Energy Council, 2010, p. 209. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 101 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

After carrying out additional drilling and three-dimensional seismic research of the Yolotan-Osman group of fields in November 2010, the Turkmengeologia State Company raised the estimate of its reserves to 21 trillion cu m.1 The reserves in the Turkmen part of the Caspian Sea, where America’s Chevron and ConocoPhillips oil and gas companies are beginning geological exploration, could reach 6 trillion cu m of natural gas. In terms of coal reserves, Kazakhstan ranks seventh (see Table 2) and Uzbekistan 16th in the world. In terms of identified uranium reserves, Kazakhstan ranks second in the world after Australia (see Fig. 1). Approximately 70% of Kazakhstan’s uranium reserves can be extracted by means of underground leaching, the cheapest and most environmentally friendly method.2 Uzbekistan ranks twelfth on the list of countries with the largest uranium reserves. Unequal endowment with energy resources also predetermines the differences in energy con- sumption structure.

Structure of Energy Resource Consumption

The structure of primary energy consumption is the most diversified in Kazakhstan (see Table 3). Coal (43% of the total demand for primary energy resources in 2008) accounts for about half of the total energy consumption in this country. In so doing, the contribution of this mineral fuel to the en- ergy balance is gradually decreasing. Natural gas accounts for around 40% of energy consumption and oil for 17%. All in all, coal, oil, and gas provide 98% of Kazakhstan’s energy needs.

Table 3

Structure of Primary Energy Resource Consumption in the Central Asian Countries and Azerbaijan, % Tajikistan Azerbaijan Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan

On average for 2000-2008

Coal 0 51 20 2 0 2

Oil 36 19 20 16 26 12

Natural gas 62 28 24 24 74 84

Hydropower 2 1 36 58 0 1

Other 0 1 0001

1 See: “Review of the Russian and CIS Markets,” Platts, Issue 7, November 2010. 2 See: E. Butyrina, “‘Kazatomprom’ nameren do 2050 goda dobyt okolo 1,200 tys. t urana,” Panorama, No. 22, 9 June, 2006; “Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan,” available at [http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf89.html]. 102 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 3 (continued) Tajikistan Azerbaijan Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan

Share of net import in consumption, % –140 –111 52 38 –252 –15

Share of hydropower in electricity generation, % 10 12 86 99 0 16

2008

Coal 0 43 19 4 0 2

Oil 31 17 29 21 28 9

Natural gas 68 39 22 18 73 86

Hydropower 1 1 31 55 0 2

Other 0 0 0 3* 0 0

Share of net import in consumption, % –333 –109 73 41 –265 –23

Share of hydropower in electricity generation, % 9 9 90 98 0 23

* Including direct import of electricity.

S o u r c e: Calculated on the basis of International Energy Agency data.

Hydrocarbons hold absolute domination in the energy consumption of Azerbaijan and Turk- menistan. Whereas natural gas is fuel number one in both countries, coal is hardly used at all. Low development of new renewable sources of energy aside, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have a more developed energy consumption structure than many developed countries. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan rely primarily on hydropower, whereby this sector accounts for more than 90% of electricity generation. Four states—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and to a much lesser extent Uzbekistan— are net energy exporters. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan cover 43% and 41% of their energy resources by means of import, respectively. In so doing, it should be kept in mind that most of the oil and petroleum products imported by Kyrgyzstan are re-exported to China. Whereas these countries greatly differ from each other in terms of endowment and consumption structure of energy resources, they are much closer in terms of rate of energy consumption.

World Leaders in Energy Efficiency

The Central Asian countries, particularly Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, are among the world leaders in terms of energy resource consumption per unit of GDP (see Table 4). The Soviet econo- Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 103 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION my in its time and the post-Soviet expanse in recent years were not part of the global drop in the energy-output ratio of production. Of course, it may be thought that energy resource availability is the competitive advantage. However, the trend toward introducing energy-saving technology initi- ated by the 1973 oil crisis continues to gain momentum. Whereby during times of high (compared to long-term average) prices for energy resources, the transfer to energy-saving technology only accelerates.

Table 4

Ranking of the Post-Soviet Countries in the Global Rating of GDP Energy-Output Ratio

According According to the Exchange to Purchasing

Rates and Conditions Power Parity in 2000 in 2005

1990 2000 2007 1990 2000 2007

Turkmenistan 1 1 5 Turkmenistan 2 2 3

Kyrgyzstan 2 16 14 Uzbekistan 3 3 2

Ukraine 3 2 2 Azerbaijan 6 8 59

Uzbekistan 4 3 4 Armenia 7 36 66

Belarus 6 13 19 Kyrgyzstan 10 27 25

Azerbaijan 7 12 41 Belarus 11 20 28

Kazakhstan 8 9 6 Kazakhstan 12 12 10

Armenia 9 32 46 Ukraine 14 6 8

Moldova 10 8 9 Moldova 15 17 17

Tajikistan 11 5 5 Russia 21 15 20

Russia 15 6 11 Georgia 26 42 68

Georgia 27 36 48 Tajikistan 32 18 18

S o u r c e: Calculated according to World Development Indicators 2010.

According to the data for 2007, all the post-Soviet economies, apart from Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, ranked among the top twenty countries with the highest energy resource consumption per unit of gross domestic product according to the exchange rate in 2000. When using GDP purchas- ing power parity indices for the national currencies, the picture did not essentially change. Turkmen- istan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan remain among the highest energy-con- suming economies of the world. This means that economic growth in these countries is closely correlated with the amount of energy resource consumption. To prove this thesis, it is enough to look at graphs 1 and 2, for example, which show that the growth curves of GDP and energy consumption in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan largely coincide. Moreover, the data in graphs 1 and 2 make it possible to conclude that the electricity intensity of GDP in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan did not drop before 2007/2008, rather it grew. The Soviet energy 104 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Graph 1

Tajikistan: GDP and Energy Consumption Dynamics, Indices for 1990 Taken as 100

100 80 60 40 20 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

PER* consumption Electricity consumption GDP

* Primary energy resources.

S o u r c e s: Calculated and compiled on the basis of International Energy Agency data and national statistics.

Graph 2

Kyrgyzstan: GDP and Energy Consumption Dynamics, Indices for 1990 Taken as 100

120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

PER* consumption Electricity consumption GDP

* Primary energy resources.

S o u r c e s: Calculated and compiled on the basis of International Energy Agency data and national statistics. inheritance allowed these countries (like all the other post-Soviet republics) to avoid complete eco- nomic and social collapse and even maintain positive growth rates in the 2000s. We will return again to this situation. Here it is important to state that it is extremely difficult to make a forecast of the future consumption and production of energy resources for Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 105 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n First, this is because oil and gas production is not determined by the development of internal conditions, but by demand in the foreign markets, the inflow of foreign investments, and the political stability of the region. n Second, in our opinion, the economic and energy transition period in post-Soviet states, par- ticularly in the poorest republics that do not have their own hydrocarbon reserves, is still not over. The energy industry inherited from the Soviet Union is close to total dilapidation. And third, the prospects for economic development of the countries being examined are extremely uncertain. These circumstances make it expedient to analyze the prospects for internal and external de- mand for energy resources separately.

Forecast of Internal Demand for Energy Resources

Keeping in mind that internal demand for energy is dictated by economic growth, let us begin with a forecast of the development rates of the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan. Table 5 sum- marizes the forecasts we already know with respect to long-term GDP growth in the countries being examined. The estimates of Poncet and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) are made on the basis of production function within the framework of neoclassical ideas of the driving forces and limitations of economic growth. The estimates of Felipe, Kumar, and Abdon are mainly based on modeling the export capabilities of developing countries at different levels of development in the processing indus- try sector. Table 5

Forecasts of Average Annual GDP Growth Rates in 2011-2030, %

Poncet, 2006 ADB, 2009** Felipe, Kumar, Abdon, 2010

Kazakhstan 4.7 3.8 –0.05-0.8

Kyrgyzstan 3.6* 3.2 0.7-3.0

Tajikistan 5.6* 3.8 2.5-3.3

Turkmenistan 0.9* 6.9 1.2-2.0

Uzbekistan 4.8 4.9 2.5-3.5

Azerbaijan 3.0 8.6 0.6-1.2

* 2005-2020. ** 2005-2030.

S o u r c e s: S. Poncet, “The Long Term Growth Prospects of the World Economy: Horizon 2050,” CEPII Working Paper, No. 2006, 16 October, 2006; Energy Outlook for Asia and the Pacific, Asian Development Bank, October 2009; J. Felipe, U. Kumar, A. Abdon, Using Capabilities to Project Growth 2010-2030, Asian Development Bank, 28 June, 2010.

The variance in the estimates, particularly with respect to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turk- menistan, is impressive. On the whole, we do not think that either the neoclassical paradigm of fore- 106 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION casting, or the method offered by Felipe, Kumar, and Abdon is suitable for forecasting long-term growth in raw material economies. It is currently impossible to build an econometrically satisfying model of demand for energy resources depending on the dynamics of economic development of the post-Soviet republics in the same way as it is done with respect to established developed and develop- ing countries. Table 6

Forecast of the Demand for Primary Energy Resources in the Central Asian Countries and Azerbaijan

Forecast

International Energy Authors Agency Consumption in 2008, GDP GDP PER PER Actual, growth growth consumption consumption million toe rates, rates, in 2030, in 2030, 2009-2030, 2011-2030, million toe million toe % %

Kazakhstan 4.1 104.1 4.0 100 71

Kyrgyzstan * * 3.0 4 2.9

Tajikistan * * 3.0 4 2.5

Turkmenistan 5.4 35.6 6.0 25 18.8

Uzbekistan 4.3 67.2 3.5 75 50.5

CA-5 208 145.7

Azerbaijan 2.8 17.3 4.0 17 13.4

6 countries 225 159.1

* Estimates are not given separately for these countries.

S o u r c e s: Calculated and compiled on the basis of World Energy Outlook 2010, International Energy Agency data; and authors’ estimates.

Relying on simple interdependencies between macroeconomic aggregates, taking into account the dynamics and structure of economic growth of the six countries over the past fifty years, as well as on an in-depth analysis of the factors of their economic growth,3 and our own experts’ estimates,

3 An in-depth analysis of the economic growth of the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan is given in the following works: S. Zhukov, O. Reznikova, “Tsentral’naia Azia v mirovoi politike i ekonomike,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunar- odnye otnoshenia, No. 12, 1994; S. Zhukov, “Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan i Uzbekistan v sotsialno-ekonomicheskikh struk- turakh sovremennogo mira,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, No. 3, 1997; S. Zhukov, O. Reznikova, “Rossia-Tsentral’naia Azia: novaia model ekonomicheskogo vzaimodeistviia,” in: Rossia i Iug: vozmozhnosti i predely vzaimodeistviia, Finstaninform Publishers, Moscow, 1996; S. Zhukov, O. Reznikova, Tsentral’naia Azia v sotsialno-eko- nomicheskikh strukturakh sovremennogo mira, Moscow Public Scientific Fund, Moscow, 2001; O. Reznikova, “Per- spektivy pritoka priamykh inostrannykh investitsii v ekonomiku gosudarstv Tsetnral’noi Azii i Kavkaza,” Tsentral’naia Azia i Kavkaz. Nasushchye problemy 2003, TOO “East Point,” Almaty, 2003; S. Zhukov, O. Reznikova, “Tsentral’naia Azia i Iuzhny Kavkaz v mirovoi ekonomike,” in: Meniaiushchyisia mir i Rossia, The Institute of World Economy and In- Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 107 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION we think that in 2011-2030 Turkmenistan will demonstrate the highest average annual GDP growth rates at a level of 6%. It will be followed by Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan with 4% each. The average annual growth rates of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, on the other hand, will be no higher than 3%. On the whole, our estimates, with the exception of Azerbaijan, are close to the estimates of the Interna- tional Energy Agency (IEA). We believe that the IEA underestimates the economic growth potential of this country, which is not limited to the oil and gas sector. Azerbaijan’s agrarian sector, for exam- ple, has good growth potential. We also believe that economic growth in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan will be less energy-intensive than the IEA predicts, mainly because this growth will rely not on an increase in domestic demand, but largely on export demand. At the same time, we do not think that Uzbekistan will be able to lower the GDP energy-output ratio to the extent the International Energy Agency pre- dicts. Due to the large absolute dimensions of the economy, Kazakhstan will account for 44% of the entire increase in consumption of the six countries being examined, Uzbekistan 37%, and Turkmen- istan 9%. Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan will account for 5%, 1.7%, and 2.3% of the increase in consumption (calculated according to the data of Table 6), respectively. An extremely important question is whether the states being analyzed are capable of producing the amount of energy resources necessary for maintaining the predicted economic growth rates. Whereas there is no doubt that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan can cope with this task, the same cannot be said of Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan.

The “Failed” Unstable States of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

The low economic development rates in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are caused among other things by the fact that they do not have their own hydrocarbon resources. It is mainly for this reason that both republics joined the ranks of the least developed countries of the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It comes as no surprise that both countries are relating their energy future to the development of hydropower, which dominates in their energy balances (see Table 3 above). For example, in Tajikistan, the electricity production potential based on hydropower resources is estimated at 264 Terawatt/h a year, of which about only 6% are used.4 For the past two decades, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have been constantly putting forward mass construction plans for large hydropower facil- ities in order to meet their domestic demand and export of electricity to neighboring countries. Infor- mation on the largest hydropower projects the two Central Asian republics would like to implement is summarized in Table 7. Kyrgyzstan is counting on building new hydropower stations with a total capacity of 5,667 megawatts, which will require $7.6 billion. For Tajikistan, the respective indices amount to 5,344 megawatts and $9.5 billion.5 ternational Relations, Moscow, 2004; S. Zhukov, O. Reznikova, “Ekonomicheskie vzaimosviazi na postsovetskom pros- transtve,” Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 8, 2007; O. Reznikova, “Mirovoi opyt regulirovaniia trudovoi migratsii: uroki dlia Rossii,” in: Migratsionnye protsessy v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh Azii i Afriki: osnovye problemy, The Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow, 2008; S. Zhukov, O. Reznikova, Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kitai: eko- nomicheskoe vzaimodeistvie v usloviiakh globalizatsii, The Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Mos- cow, 2009. 4 See: Survey of Energy Resources, World Energy Council, 2007, p. 310. 5 Calculated according to: Energy Demand/Supply Balance and Infrastructure Constrains Diagnostic Study, Asian Development Bank, October 2010, pp. 31-32. 108 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 7

New Large Projects Designated in the Hydropower Industry of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

Estimated Electricity Capacity, Project Put into Project Production, Investor MW Cost, Operation GWh/year $m

Tajikistan

Sangtuda-1 670 2,700 670 Russia 2009

Sangtuda-2 220 1,000 220 Iran ?

Rongun 3,600 13,000 2,200 ?

Nurabad-1 350 650 PRC ?

Kyrgyzstan

Kambarata-1 1,900 2,000 Russia ?

Kambarata-2 400 400 Russia partially implemented

Kokemeren-1 360 ?

Kokemeren-2 912 ?

S o u r c e s: Electricity in Central Asia. Market and Investment Opportunity Report, World Energy Council, July 2007; business periodicals of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; world business periodicals.

Despite their popularity,6 these plans are not economically feasible. In addition to their obvious non-commercial nature, their implementation is also complicated by two factors. n First, neither Kyrgyzstan, nor Tajikistan have their own financial resources or enough qual- ified personnel to implement them. New hydropower stations can only be built using external resources. Both republics belong to the group of so-called failed states. Despite the two dec- ades of independent development, stable state formations have not emerged, nor have proto- types of the national economy been created. Economic and political life in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is largely based on servicing statistically unregistered Chinese exports to Russia and Kazakhstan, remittances of work migrants from the most successful post-Soviet repub- lics, and integration into the global networks of drug trade and transportation. In our view, the large-scale projects planned in the Central Asian hydropower industry can only be imple- mented by external donors guided not by economic, but by various political interests. So if they cannot attract external resources into the hydropower projects, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan can expect another bout of socioeconomic degradation. n Second, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are situated on the upper reaches of mountain rivers that supply the entire Central Asian region with water resources. The countries lower down the rivers, Kazakhstan and particularly Uzbekistan, use the water of the cross-border rivers for

6 See, for example: Tajikistan. In-Depth Review of the Investment Climate and Market Structure in the Energy Sec- tor, Energy Charter Secretariat, Brussels, 2010. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 109 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

irrigational farming. The accumulation of large amounts of water in artificial reservoirs for electricity generation is creating problems for the agrarian countries. The contradictions re- garding use of regional hydropower resources have become particularly acute in the relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In Soviet times, the development of the hydropower industry and irrigational farming was part and parcel of a unified system. In the republics of Central Asia and the south of Kazakhstan, a unified integra- tion energy-water complex was created that was managed from a single center in Uzbekistan. The system made it possible to balance out the seasonal fluctuations in demand for electricity and irrigation water re- quirements with the fluctuations in water resources in the mountain rivers. In the winter, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan accumulated water in their reservoirs and received electricity and energy resources (coal and natural gas) from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In the summer, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan sent water to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for irrigational farming. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also supplied their neighbors with hydropower they produced over and above their domestic needs.7 At present, there is no single political and economic center in Central Asia, while the interests of the independent states, in- cluding in the energy industry, are frequently of a mutually exclusive nature. Summing up, it can be claimed that without investments, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will most likely encounter uncontrollable degradation of the energy capacities inherited from the Soviet past in the next two decades. The scenario of modest economic growth and gradual increase in domestic demand for energy resources, the basic parameters of which are summarized in Table 6, can be real- ized only if significant investments are made in the Kyrgyz and Tajik energy sectors. The prospects for development in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan with their rich endowments of oil and natural gas look much more promising. Let us begin with oil.

Oil Production and Export Forecast until 2030

Any significant increase in the production and export of oil among the Caspian countries can only be expected in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

Kazakhstan

In 2010, Kazakhstan produced 79.5 million tonnes of oil, 90% of which was exported. The plans for increasing oil production are related to export, whereby the stakes are placed on three large fields—Tengiz (including Korolevskoe), Karachaganak, and Kashagan (see Table 8). According to the IEA forecast, by 2030 oil production in Kazakhstan will almost double com- pared to today’s level and reach 195 million tonnes, whereby Kashagan will provide most of the in- crease (see Table 9). This is the largest hydrocarbon field discovered in the last thirty years and the largest offshore field in the world. We believe that the scenario of production growth presented by the International Energy Agen- cy is extremely optimistic. This conclusion is justified by the far-from-easy development history of the Kashagan field.8

7 Functioning of the unified Soviet hydropower system in Central Asia and Kazakhstan is examined in detail in: S. Zhukov, O. Reznikova, Tsentral’naia Azia v sotsialno-ekonomicheskikh strukturakh… pp. 247-249, 257-263. 8 A large number of articles in the Kazakhstan business periodicals examine the history of the development of the Kashagan project. In addition to everything else, this chapter relies on a series of articles by U. Kozhantaeva in Delovaia nedelia (Almaty) and E. Butyrina in Panorama (Almaty). 110 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 8

Kazakhstan’s Three Major Oil Fields: Recoverable Hydrocarbon Reserves

Forecast Reserves

Tengiz and Korolevskoe Oil and condensate: 750-1,125 million tonnes

Kashagan Oil and condensate: 1,475 million tonnes of oil Gas: more than 880 billion cu m

Karachaganak Oil and condensate: more than 1.2 billion tonnes Gas: more than 1.3 trillion cu m

S o u r c e s: Data of KazMunaiGaz and business periodicals of Kazakhstan.

Table 9

Oil Production Forecasts for Kazakhstan until 2030, million tonnes

2005 2009 2015 2020 2030 Actual Actual

Ministry of Oil and Gas

Total 61.5 76.5 95 — —

TengizChevroil 13.6 22.5 30* ——

Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. 10.3 11.9 15* ——

Kashagan — — 10* ——

KazMunaiGaz 9.4 8.9 7* ——

SNPSAktobemunaigaz 5.8 6.0 5* ——

Mangistaumunaigaz 5.7 5.7 5* ——

Rest 16.7 21.5 23* ——

International Energy Agency**

Total 61.5 76.5 100 140 195

TengizChevroil 13.6 22.5 27 28 43

Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. 10.3 11.9 15 17 12

Kashagan — — 15 55-60 75

Rest 37.6 42.1 43 35-40 65

Authors

Total 61.5 76.5 85 100 130 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 111 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 9 (continued)

2005 2009 2015 2020 2030 Actual Actual

TengizChevroil 13.6 22.5 30 30 43

Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. 10.3 11.9 15 17 12

Kashagan — — — 10 30

Rest 37.6 42.1 40 43 45

* The data broken down into companies are authors’ estimates based on the official fore- cast of total production. ** IEA indices in million barrels a day have been recalculated as million tonnes a year.

S o u r c e s: Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2011-2015, Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan; World Energy Outlook 2010, International Energy Agency; and authors’ estimates.

The original production sharing agreement for Kashagan was signed in 1997 for 37 years. There were plans for the field to begin producing oil as early as 2005. In 2004, putting the field into opera- tion was postponed until 2008 with the consent of the Kazakhstan government, which received a late charge of $150 million. The program of February 2004 presumed that by 2008 production would reach 3.7 million tonnes, while peak production in 2016 would amount to 60 million tonnes. The total spending on putting the field into operation was raised to $29 billion, $10 billion of which would be spent on the first development phase. In 2005, launching of the field into operation was again postponed until 2010, while the inter- mediate programs for 2005-2006 raised the outlays for developing Kashagan first to $50 and then to $57 billion. The 2007 program raised the field’s development cost to $136 billion. In August 2007, the Kazakhstan government announced a three-month moratorium on the project. At the end of 2008, a new program was adopted for developing Kashagan, the first phase of which was esti- mated at $31 billion. The program essentially changed the field development plans. Responsibility for the project was passed from one company—Italy’s ENI—to three companies at once: Royal Dutch Shell became responsible for all offshore works, Total concentrated on gas refinery, and ENI dealt with building offshore infrastructure. Along with restructuring of the field development programs, Kazakhstan managed to increase its share in the international consortium for Kashagan from zero to 16.81% (see Table 10). The internal Kazakhstan debate on launching Kashagan essentially boiled down to discussing questions such as what amount of investments would be needed to develop the field and how justi- fied were the investment plans of foreign developers of the field. But the main questions should have been: what are the economic, financial, and environmental risks of developing Kashagan? And do the oil companies have development technology that meets the field’s difficult specifica- tions? The thing is that such specific field characteristics as high oil temperatures of 100-120oC, extreme pressure in the seams, high content of sulphur and other chemically active substances, in- cluding mercaptans, and significant fluctuation in summer and winter temperatures in the field zone make it extremely difficult to develop. What is more, the field is in an offshore zone, which raises the risks even more. 112 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 10

Percentage of Shareholders in the International Consortium for Developing Kashagan, %

1997 2005 2009

Agip-ENI 18.52 18.52 16.81

British Gas 8.332 — —

ExxonMobil 18.52 18.52 16.81

Royal Dutch Shell 18.52 18.52 16.81

Total 18.52 18.52 16.81

ConocoPhillips 9.26 9.26 8.40

Inpex 8.33 8.33 7.56*

KazMunaiGaz — 8.33 16.81**

* Announced its intention to sell its share in the project. ** Kazakhstan paid $1.78 billion to raise its share.

S o u r c e s: business periodicals of Kazakhstan.

A separate question is raised by the transfer from a consortium with one executive operator to essentially a triple structure of consortium management. Who will ensure coordination of the work of such major companies used to working independently as Royal Dutch Shell, Total, and ENI and how, and won’t the transfer to a triple management structure essentially divide Kashagan into three inde- pendent projects? Who will ultimately be responsible for possible failure of the new program if it happens? And there are many more such questions. In May 2011, Kazakhstan announced a halt to the second phase of work on Kashagan. The rea- son for this next holdup is the inability of the consortium participants to precisely determine the pro- duction volume at the second development phase or the amounts of necessary investments.9 Serious contradictions between Kazakhstan, on the one hand, and the foreign shareholders, on the other, also exist under the Karachaganak project, which by 2015 should reach a production level of 15 million tonnes. The Kazakhstan government is striving to raise control over the outlays of the foreign companies when implementing the third phase of the project and is ready to freeze it if a con- sensus is not reached with the investors. In 2010, the production of hydrocarbons at Karachaganak dropped by 4% compared to the previous year, that is, to 133.7 million barrels.10 The prospects for raising production at the Tengiz and Korolevskoe fields are more definite. At the end of 2010, a decision was made to double the throughput capacity of the Caspian Pipeline Con- sortium (CPC) from 28.2 to 67 million tonnes a year, of which the quota for Kazakh oil would amount to 52.5 million tonnes. The CPC will make it possible to transport Kazakh oil to the European markets through a Russian port close to Novorossiysk on the Black Sea.11 Keeping in mind the noted difficulties, even a production level of 130 million tonnes in 2030 (see Table 9) may prove too optimistic. It is possible that actual oil production in the country will be

9 See: “Kazakhstan Freezes Second Phase at Kashagan,” International Oil Daily, 26 May, 2011. 10 See: “Kazakhstan Set to Freeze Major Gas Project, Minister Says,” Reuters, 18 May, 2011. 11 See: “CPC Expansion Gives Producers New Options,” Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, Vol. L, No. 1, 10 January, 2011; Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Results of the strategic development of the oil and gas in- dustry for 2010 and plans for 2011. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 113 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION no higher than 110 million tonnes. In any case, foreign investors will have a decisive influence on the rate of increase in oil production in Kazakhstan. In the 1990s, Kazakhstan proved to be the most val- uable find for the leading international oil and gas concerns. The stunning speed with which the So- viet Union and Soviet economy collapsed and the economic chaos that accompanied it made it possi- ble for them to enter agreements with the republic on unprecedented advantageous conditions for themselves. It is foreign companies that essentially control the development of Kazakhstan’s largest fields. In turn, investment decisions of the American and European companies producing Kazakh oil will be determined by the global demand for oil.

Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan

It is easier to assess the prospects for increased oil production in Azerbaijan. In 2010, 51 million tonnes of oil were produced there, the Azerbaijan International Operating Company AIOC account- ing for 85% of this total (graph 3). And although in the past few years production lags a little behind the original schedule, it is almost certain that by 2020 Azerbaijan will be producing around 60 million tons of oil. Then as the reserves of the Azeri-Gunashli-Chirag group of fields developed by AIOC become exhausted, oil production will begin to drop and by 2030 will be no higher than 45-50 million tonnes. Graph 3

Azerbaijan: Oil Production Dynamics in 1997-2010, million tonnes

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Total AIOC AIOC forecast for 2002

S o u r c e s: Compiled and calculated according to the data of the Azerbaijan State Statistics Board; business periodicals of Azerbaijan.

In Turkmenistan, oil production amounts to approximately 10 million tonnes, almost half of which is exported. No significant increase in oil production is expected in this country in the period being forecast.

Oil Export

An evaluation of the potential amounts of oil export from the Central Asian countries and Az- erbaijan is presented in Table 11. We think that in the most favorable circumstances, the total oil 114 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION export of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan will amount to 160 million tonnes in 2030, which is more than 30% lower than the estimates of the International Energy Agency.

Table 11

Estimates of Oil Export from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan until 2030, million tonnes

2009 2015 2020 2030 Actual

Kazakhstan

Ministry of Oil and Gas 68 84 — —

International Energy Agency* 68 84 123 178

Authors 68 75 85 115

Azerbaijan

International Energy Agency* 48 61 59 48

Authors 48 50 50 40

Turkmenistan

International Energy Agency* 4.5 7.5 7 5.5

Authors 4.5 5 5 5

All Three Countries

International Energy Agency* 120.5 152.5 189 231.5

Authors 120.5 130 140 160

* Net export.

S o u r c e s: Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2011-2015, Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan; World Energy Outlook 2010, International Energy Agency; and authors’ estimates.

The plans for increasing natural gas production are related primarily to the export markets.

Gas Production and Export Forecast until 2030

The statistics for the production, consumption, and export of natural gas in the post-Soviet republics are not sufficiently transparent and rather confused. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan mainly produce associated gas with unstable properties. Most of it is pumped back into the seam, and the rest is subjected to additional refining before it goes to the final consumer. For this and other rea- sons, there are great differences between the data on the total recovery and production of commer- cial gas. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 115 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In our opinion, the forecasts of the IEA greatly overestimate the potential of gas export and production in the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan (see Table 12). This reassessment is related to the following factors: n first, the forecasts for Kazakhstan are evidently based on the statistics for total recovery and not on the data regarding the production of commercial gas; n second, associated gas accounts for most of the gas produced in Kazakhstan. Since development of the Kashagan and Karachaganak fields will, as we presume, be carried out at a slower rate than the time schedules announced, the production of associated gas will grow at Table 12

Forecasts of Natural Gas Production by the Central Asian Countries and Azerbaijan, billion cu m until 2030

2009 2015 2020 2030 Actual

National Statistics

Turkmenistan 41

Uzbekistan 66

Azerbaijan 17

Kazakhstan 9 15

Total 133

International Energy Agency

Turkmenistan 41 85 104 119

Uzbekistan 66 72 70 70

Azerbaijan 17 20 36 49

Kazakhstan* 36 47 49 61

Total 160 224 259 299

Authors

Turkmenistan 41 60 85 100

Uzbekistan 66 70 70 60

Azerbaijan 17 20 20 25

Kazakhstan 9 15 20 30

Total 133 165 195 215

* Evidently the International Energy Agency relies on total recovery statistics.

S o u r c e s: Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2011-2015, Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan; World Energy Outlook 2010, International Energy Agency; and authors’ estimates. 116 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION a slower rate. This consideration is fair for Azerbaijan where gas production by the international con- sortium lags behind schedule; and third, keeping in mind the experience of the 1990s-2000s, gas pro- duction in Turkmenistan will not grow as quickly as planned. Gas production in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan will amount to a to- tal of 195 billion cu m in 2020 and 215 billion cu m in 2030, which is 64 and 84 billion cu m less than the IEA forecast, respectively. This difference is explained by the differences in evaluating the dy- namics of external and internal demand for Central Asian and Azeri gas.

Table 13

Forecasts of Natural Gas Export by the Central Asian Countries and Azerbaijan, billion cu m until 2030

2009 2015 2020 2030 Actual

National Statistics

Turkmenistan 17

Uzbekistan 15

Azerbaijan 8

Kazakhstan 7 10

Total 47

International Energy Agency*

Turkmenistan 17 56 73 85

Uzbekistan 15 8 3 –1

Azerbaijan 8 9 23 35

Kazakhstan 4 7 4 4

Total 44 80 103 123

Authors

Turkmenistan 17 30 50 60

Uzbekistan 15 15 15 15

Azerbaijan 8 9 20 30

Kazakhstan 7 10 10 10

Total 47 64 95 115

* Net export (export minus import).

S o u r c e s: Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2011-2015, Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan; World Energy Outlook 2010, International Energy Agency; and authors’ estimates. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 117 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

We think that Central Asia and Azerbaijan will be able to export 95 billion c m in 2020 and 115 billion cu m in 2030 (see Table 13). In so doing, Turkmenistan will account for more than half of the export. Becoming an important center of oil and gas production will raise the importance of the Caspian countries in the world energy industry. Most of the hydrocarbons produced in Central Asia go to the markets of the APR countries, primarily China. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are also playing an important role in the globalization strategy of Chinese energy companies.

China in the Oil and Gas Sector of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan

There is objective complementarity in the energy sphere between China, on the one hand, and the Central Asian countries, on the other. China has a common land border with Kazakhstan. Major Central Asian gas exporter Turkmenistan has access to the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The XUAR in turn is a major and, what is particularly important, growing center of China’s oil and gas production. In 2010, around 35 million tonnes of crude oil were produced there, which amounted to 14% of China’s total production (see Fig. 2). In terms of natural gas, corresponding in- dices amounted to 30 billion cu m and 32% (see Fig. 3). It is convenient and beneficial for China to import Central Asian hydrocarbons through the XUAR with its developed oil refining and pipeline infrastructure.

Figure 2

The XUAR in China’s Total Oil Production, million tonnes and %

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1970 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2010

million tonnes % of total Chinese production

S o u r c e s: Statistical Yearbook of China, National Bureau of Statistics of China for different years and Chinese business periodicals.

Special mention should be made of cooperation between China and Kazakhstan in the oil indus- try and between China and Turkmenistan in the gas sector. 118 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Figure 3

The XUAR in China’s Total Natural Gas Production, bcm and %

35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

bcm % of total Chinese production

S o u r c e s: Statistical Yearbook of China, National Bureau of Statistics of China for different years and Chinese business periodicals.

China and Kazakhstan Oil

In recent years, the PRC has been increasing its oil imports from neighboring post-Soviet repub- lics, particularly Kazakhstan, at an accelerated rate. In 2010, this Central Asian republic accounted for 4.2% of China’s total oil imports compared to 1% in 2000 (see Table 14).

Table 14

Post-Soviet Oil Exporters: Share in the Total Crude Oil Imports of the PRC, %

1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010

Former U.S.S.R. 0.2 3.1 11.1 12.8 12.6 11.0 10.6

Russia 0.2 2.1 10.1 11.0 8.9 7.5 6.4

Kazakhstan 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.8 3.7 3.5 4.2

S o u r c e s: Calculated on the basis of U.N. COMTRADE data and customs statistics of the PRC.

Kazakhstan is also placing greater importance on oil export to the Chinese market. In 2007, oil export from Kazakhstan to China came close to 6 million tonnes, which amounted to approxi- mately 10% of all of Kazakhstan’s oil export. That year, the PRC became the fourth largest oil market for Kazakhstan after Switzerland, Italy, and France. After a direct oil pipeline from Kazakh- stan to China was put into operation, the latter became the second largest export market for Kazakh oil (see Table 15). Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 119 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 15

Kazakhstan: Main Export Markets for Oil, million tonnes

2001 2008 2010

Bermuda Islands 8.0 Switzerland 23.7 Italy 15.9

Russia 5.3 Italy 11.4 China 9.7

Italy 4.4 France 9.3 France 7.3

Ukraine 3.7 China 6.4 The Netherlands 7.0

Virginia Isles (British) 3.0 The Netherlands 5.1 Austria 4.9

UAE 2.1 Israel 4.6 Canada 3.6

Germany 1.4 Russia 4.0 Rumania 2.4

Great Britain 1.4 Rumania 2.0 Israel 2.2

Poland 1.1 Spain 1.9 1.8

China 0.6 Turkey 1.8 Greece 1.7

S o u r c e: Compiled according to: customs statistics of Kazakhstan.

The economic and geographic complementarity of the two countries in the oil sphere was re- flected in the fact that in 2005 an oil pipeline was built from Kazakhstan to China with a throughput capacity of 10 million tonnes a year. This was the first Kazakh oil pipeline that did not pass through the territory of third countries and join local oil fields with foreign consumers directly. The Ka- zakhstan-China Pipeline Company is the pipeline owner and delivery operator, of which the Chi- nese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and National Oil and Gas Company of Kazakhstan KazMunaiGaz became shareholders on parity conditions.12 In 2009, the PRC and Kazakhstan fin- ished building the Kenkiak-Kumkol oil pipeline, which made it possible to increase the total capac- ity of the oil pipeline to China. In the future, the total capacity of the oil pipeline to China could be raised to 50 million tonnes a year. The oil pipeline has already become the main export channel for Kazakh oil to the PRC. In 2010, more than 10 million tonnes of oil were exported via it, approximately 8 million tonnes of which comprised oil produced in Kazakhstan (see Table 16). Cooperation between Chinese and Kazakh oil companies is even more important. In tough com- petition with other foreign investors, Chinese companies have established control over several oil fields in Kazakhstan. In terms of current oil production volume, Chinese companies are right behind the American companies that control the Tengiz field. In 2009, qualitative shifts have occurred in oil cooperation between Kazakhstan and the PRC. n First, under a transaction called “financial resources in exchange for oil,” China has reserved credit resources for Kazakhstan totaling $5-10 billion (see Table 17). n Second, the China Investment Corporation bought approximately 11% of KazMunaiGaz Ex- ploration and Production (KMG EP), which is a production subdivision of the state oil com- pany KazMunaiGaz.

12 See: A. Kosherbaeva, Struktura i effektivnost ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva Kazakhstana i KNR, KazMun- aiGaz Consulting, Astana, 2006. 120 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 16

Oil Export from Kazakhstan via the Main Routes, million tonnes

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010*

CPC all oil 30.5 31.1 32.6 32.2 34.6 34.9

inc. Kazakh oil — 24.4 25.6 25.8 27.5 28.4 Russian oil — 6.7 7.0 6.4 7.1 6.5

Uzen-Atyrau-Samara 15.0 15.6 16.0 16.8 17.5 15.5

Port of Aktau 8.9 9.9 8.9 7.6 9.3 —

Atasu-Alashankou — 2.2 4.8 6.1 7.7 10.1

inc. Kazakh oil — — 4.8 5.1 6.2 — Russian oil — — — 1.0 1.5 —

Other, including rail 0.2 5.0 5.6 5.4 7.6 —

Total Kazakh oil 54.6 57.1 60.8 60.7 68.1 71.2

* Estimates.

S o u r c e s: Data of the KazTransOil Company; business periodicals of Kazakhstan.

Table 17

China: Largest “Financial Resources in Exchange for Energy Resources” Contracts with Central Asian Countries

Time Amount of Contracted Agreement Loan, Oil was Reached $bn Deliveries

Kazakhstan April 2009 5-10 —

Turkmenistan April 2009 4.1 Development of gas fields, building of export gas pipeline

Turkmenistan May 2011 4 Development of gas fields, building of export gas pipeline

S o u r c e: World and Central Asian business periodicals.

Enhancing cooperation with the PRC will make it possible for Kazakhstan to increase oil ex- ports to the Chinese market. Other Asian countries are also showing an interest in investing in Ka- zakhstan’s oil sector. In April 2011, India made a breakthrough into Kazakhstan’s oil producing sec- Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 121 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tor. India’s oil and gas corporation, ONGC, signed an agreement with KazMunaiGaz on joint explo- ration of the Satpayev block in the shallow part of the Caspian shelf, the reserves of which are estimat- ed at 256 million tonnes of oil equivalent.13 Nevertheless, given even the most favorable development of events, production will not begin before 2020. In the foreseeable future, China will remain Kazakhstan’s main energy partner in the APR, since this partnership is based on shared interests and opportunities. Kazakhstan sees China as a large and geographically close oil sales market. It is particularly important that against the back- ground of stagnation, as well as the probable drop in demand for oil on the European markets, de- mand for oil in China will only grow in the next decades. In so doing, in contrast to all the other export routes, oil can be delivered directly from Kazakhstan to the PRC without involving transit countries. This does not mean that the European vector is becoming less important for the export of Ka- zakh oil. American and European companies, which will continue exporting to the European markets, will ensure the lion’s share of current and future oil production in Kazakhstan. This is particularly true since both the country’s current oil export infrastructure, as well as that being created, is most devel- oped in the European vector. However, it is possible that in the near future American and European oil and gas companies will be delivering oil to China from Kazakhstan.

China and Turkmen Gas

Whereas in Kazakhstan, Chinese companies are targeted toward oil, in Turkmenistan their in- terests are tied to natural gas. A breakthrough in gas cooperation between the two countries occurred in April 2006 when the PRC and Turkmenistan signed a strategic comprehensive agreement on partnership in the gas sector. According to the agreement, a main export gas pipeline with a throughput capacity of 30 billion cu m a year was to be built from Turkmenistan to China. Gas was to be delivered for 30 years.14 The gas fields on the right-hand bank of the Amu Darya River with total reserves of up to 1,700 billion cu m, the development right to which Chinese companies had acquired, were pegged as the resource base for filling the gas pipeline. Keeping in mind that the two countries do not have a common border, the PRC built coupling gas pipelines through the territory of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, thus joining the Kazakh, Uzbek, and Turkmen sections into one. Like Kazakhstan, at the beginning of 2009 Turkmenistan, at the peak of the global financial and economic crisis, received large funds from China for investing in the “financial resources in exchange for raw hydrocarbons” project (see Table 17) to implement natural gas production and gas pipeline construction projects. In May 2011, Turkmenistan entered a second transaction of the same type with the PRC. The more than $4 billion received for 10 years with a three-year grace period will go toward developing the Iuzhny Yolotan-Osman field and building a new branch of the export gas pipeline to China. In exchange, Turkmenistan has pledged to deliver additional gas to the Chinese market for ten years.15 In 2010, Turkmenistan exported a total of 4 billion cu m of natural gas to China. However, by 2015, with the necessary purchasing power, gas deliveries to the Chinese market could increase to 40 billion cu m. In the spring of 2011, the PRC reached a preliminary agreement with Turkmenistan

13 See: “Satpayev Deal Ends Long Indian Wait for Kazakh Upstream Entry,” International Oil Daily, 19 April, 2011. 14 See: “Turkmensky gaz poidet na vostok,” available at [http://www.turkmenistan.ru/?page_id=5&lang_id= ru&elem_id =event &sort=date_desc], 4 April, 2006. 15 See: Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, Vol. L, No. 18, 9 May, 2011. 122 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION on the import of an additional 20 billion cu m of gas beginning in 2015. If this agreement is executed, the total volume of Turkmen gas contracted by China will reach 60 billion cu m.16 Not only Turkmen, but also Uzbek and Kazakh gas may be exported via the gas pipeline.

Prospects for Exporting Central Asian Gas to China

Chinese companies are participating in several prospective gas projects in Uzbekistan. In June 2006, the Chinese National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Cooperation (CNODC) en- tered an agreement with Uzbekneftegaz on carrying out exploration and survey work at five invest- ment blocks in the Ust-Yurt district, the Bukhara and Khivin regions, as well as in the Ferghana Val- ley. Over five years, CNODC will invest $208 million in the project and if hydrocarbons are discov- ered, the Chinese and Uzbek companies will establish a joint venture on a parity basis for exploiting the fields.17 In August 2006, the CNPC, within the international consortium which also includes Uzbekistan’s Uzbekneftegaz, Russia’s LUKoil, Malaysia’s Petronas, and South Korea’s National Petroleum Corporation, signed a production sharing agreement for carrying out exploration and sur- vey work in the Uzbek sector of the Aral Sea. According to some estimates, the potential reserves in the contract zone may amount to 1 trillion cu m.18 In June 2010, the CNPC agreed to buy up to 10 billion cu m of gas a year in Uzbekistan.19 In April 2011, Uzbekistan signed an agreement with the PRC on building the third branch of the main Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline. The gas pipeline with a throughput capacity of up to 25 billion cu m a year will be put into operation by 2014. The China Development Bank and the CNPC will finance the project costing $2.2 billion.20 Foreign investor companies are relating the prospects for their gas projects in Uzbekistan to the Chinese market. LUKoil is planning to raise the production of natural gas at the Uzbek fields in the Kandym-Khauzak-Shady-Kungrad zone, the reserves of which are estimated at 100 billion cu m, to 18 billion cu m by 2015.21 In the future, gas exports to China will also be carried out by Malaysia’s Petronas, which has several small gas projects in Uzbekistan in its portfolio.22 Kazakh gas will also be pumped into the Central Asia-China export gas pipeline. In Febru- ary 2011, Kazakhstan and the PRC signed an agreement on joint development of the Urikhtau gas condensate field, the potential reserves of free gas of which are estimated at 40 billion cu m.23 The KazMunaiGaz and CNPC joint venture will develop the field on a parity basis. Gas will be deliv- ered to the southern regions of Kazakhstan, which are currently supplied with Uzbek gas, for which the CNPC will launch the Beineu-Bozoi-Shymkent gas pipeline in 2015.24 In the future, Kazakh gas will be exported to China.

16 See: “China Firms Up More Natural Gas Supplies from Turkmenistan,” International Oil Daily, 4 March, 2011. 17 See: “Kitaiskaia CNODC uchredila v Uzbekistane docherniuiu kompaniiu,” available at [http://business.uzreport. com/ main.cgi?lan=r&pg=130], 26 December, 2006. 18 See: “Gaz so dna Aralskogo moria,” available at [http://neftegaz.ru/lenta/show/58245/], 19 September, 2005. 19 See: “Uzbeks Eye Reserve Boost,” International Oil Daily, 18 May, 2011. 20 See: “Uzbekistan, China Ink Pipe Deal,” International Oil Daily, 26 April, 2011. 21 See: “Lukoil Outlines Ambitious Uzbekistan Plans,” International Oil Daily, 20 May, 2011. 22 See: “Petronas to Build Uzbek Plant,” International Oil Daily, 25 May, 2011. 23 See: E. Butyrina, “KazMunaiGaz and CNPC budut sovmestno razrabatyvat mestorozhdenie Urikhtau,” Pano- rama (Almaty), No. 11, 25 March, 2011. 24 See: “China Eyes Kazakh Gas Field,” International Gas Report, Platts, Issue 668, 28 February, 2011. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 123 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Keeping in mind the information available in mid-2011, we believe that by 2020 Central Asian gas export to the PRC will amount to 40-50 billion cu m, whereby Turkmenistan will account for most of it (see Table 18). By 2030, export could rise to 55-75 billion cu m, whereby Turkmen gas will retain its dominating position. Table 18

Forecast of Central Asian Gas Export to the PRC until 2030, billion cu m

2010 Actual 2020 Forecast 2030 Forecast

Turkmenistan 4 30-40 40-60

Kazakhstan — 3 5

Uzbekistan — 5 10

Total 4 38-48 55-75

S o u r c e: Authors’ estimates.

European Vector of Gas Export from the Caspian Countries

Azerbaijan in the European Gas Market

At the end of 2011, Azerbaijan proved to be the only new post-Soviet gas exporter able to carry out deliveries to the European market, albeit in modest amounts and only via Turkey. Development of the Shah Deniz field made it possible for Azerbaijan to become a gas exporter. The participants in the consortium founded in June 1996 are: British Petroleum (project operator— 25.5%), Statoil (25.5%), the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) (10%), LUKoil (10%), Iran’s NICO (10%), France’s TotalFinaElf (10%), and Turkey’s TPAO (9%). The field’s reserves were initially estimated at 625 billion cu m of gas and 100 million tonnes of conden- sate, but later Azerbaijan stated that the proven reserves of Shah Deniz reach 1.2 trillion cu m of gas and 240 million tonnes of condensate.25 Export from Shah Deniz is carried out along the Baku (Azer- baijan)-Tbilisi (Georgia)-Erzurum (Turkey) gas pipeline 1,050 km in length. The throughput capacity of the gas pipeline is only 8 billion cu m a year. In March 2001, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed an intergovernmental agreement, according to which Turkey pledges to buy almost 90 billion cu m of gas over a span of 15 years. The international consortium has entered initial contracts on gas purchase: Turkey—6.3 billion cu m of gas a year; Azerbaijan—1.5; and Georgia—0.8 billion cu m. Later Azerbaijan increased its contracted amounts of gas by 3 billion cu m. The intergovernmental contract set forth the price of exported Azeri gas: $63 per 1,000 cu m for Georgia and $120 for Turkey.26 Azerbaijan is still a modest gas exporter. In 2010, its total gas exports amounted to around 7 billion cu m, 4.9 billion cu m of which were delivered via the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline (see Table 19).

25 See: A. Grivach, “Udvoenie ‘Shakh-Deniza’,” Vremia novostei, 28 September, 2007. 26 See: T. Tagiev, “Eksportnye dilemmy Azerbaidzhana,” Neftegazovaia vertikal, No. 3, 2009. 124 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 19

Azerbaijan: Production and Export of Natural Gas, billion cu m

2007 2008 2009 2010

Production 23.6 26.2

inc. commercial gas 16.3 16.7

Total export, billion cu m 1.8 5.3 7.7 7.0

inc. the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline 4.7 5.2 4.9

S o u r c e: Business periodicals of Azerbaijan.

There are serious contradictions between Azerbaijan and Turkey regarding the price of exported gas. Azerbaijan has repeatedly made and continues to make attempts to re-examine the price terms of buy-sell contracts that are disadvantageous to it, but to this day these attempts have proven fruitless since Turkey and Georgia do not agree to revise the contracts.27 Western transnational corporations in cooperation with the government are implementing a strategy to turn Baku into an oil and gas transit hub for Central Asian hydrocarbons.

Prospects for Gas Export from Turkmenistan to Europe

In the longer run, if European investors join the act, increasing amounts of Turkmen gas might also begin arriving in the European markets. Europe has long been regarding Turkmenistan as one of the main suppliers of natural gas for the pan-European Nabucco gas pipeline being planned. But these plans have essentially not been put into practice. The projects have been blocked until very recently from the European side by the absence of real gas purchasers willing to also assume significant investment and political risks. Turkmenistan, on the other hand, well-seasoned in the gas conflicts and wars of the 1990s, is strictly abiding by the simple principle that Turkmen gas is sold on the country’s border, while all risks associated with its delivery to the end consumer are born by the external participants concerned. This principle essentially works in gas relations between Turkmenistan and Russia. Cooperation in the gas sector with China is developing on the basis of the same principle. In the spring of 2008, Turkmenistan stated that, beginning in 2009, it was reserving 10 billion cu m of gas a year for export to the European markets.28 This is hindered by the position of the other Caspian countries, which for environmental considerations are against building the Turkmenistan- Azerbaijan gas pipeline along the bottom of the Caspian Sea. In December 2010, the American company INS CERA, under contract from the World Bank, European Commission, and European Investment Bank, prepared a project for establishing the Cas- pian Development Corporation (CDC). This is an institutional and commercial corporation especially

27 For more on the problems of Azeri gas import in the context of Turkey’s interests, see: G.M. Winrow, Problems and Prospects for the “Fourth Corridor”: The Position and Role of Turkey in Gas Transit to Europe, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, NG30, June 2009. 28 See: A. Grivach, “Po pervomu zvonku,” Vremia novostei, 21 April, 2008. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 125 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION created for carrying out purchases and ensuring the transportation of large amounts of natural gas from Turkmenistan to the European and possibly other markets.29 It is presumed that the CDC will sign a long-term 20-year contract with Turkmenistan on the purchase of gas and ensure its delivery to the European markets via the main gas pipeline through Azerbaijan. There are plans to begin purchas- es in 2014 and bring their volume up to 10 billion cu m by 2017, to 20 billion cu m by 2019, and to 30 billion cu m by 2020.30 In so doing, the CDC will buy Turkmen gas at the average price in the Euro- pean markets excluding its transportation costs (the netback principle) and the corporation’s invest- ment outlays.31 Building a gas pipeline that joins Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan along the bottom of the Caspian Sea will be an important aspect of the CDC’s activity. As was mentioned above, this construction would be stalled by several Caspian states, so at the beginning of 2011 the EU energy commission stated that the Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan gas pipeline project would be implemented under the auspic- es of the European Union. The Energy Commission did not exclude that the CDC would be the only investor and owner of the gas pipeline, which would free Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan of all political and investment risks.32 The purchase price for Turkmen gas is the weakest link in construction of the CDC. The posi- tions of the sides on this matter are not entirely clear. Keeping in mind the high volatility of oil prices, to which the main bulk of natural gas imported by Europe is pegged, it is advantageous for Turkmen- istan to enter long-term export contracts under the “take or pay” principle, in the same way as is done in Gazprom’s export contracts. But for the European Commission a contract based on the “take or pay” principle would mean rejection of the strategy toward complete liberalization of the European gas sector. Launching of the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-PRC gas pipeline confirmed the ap- peal of the Asian vector in export of Caspian hydrocarbon resources and raised the likelihood of im- plementing other large gas pipeline projects.

Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) Pipeline Project

The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline construction project has been under dis- cussion since the beginning of the 1990s. Turkmenistan agrees to sell gas on the Turkmen-Afghan border at a price no lower than in China. In December 2010, India officially joined the project. The four countries signed a framework agreement, according to which Turkmenistan will export 90 mil- lion cu m of gas a day for 30 years. In the first two years, Afghanistan will receive 5 million cu m a day, then 14 million cu m, while the rest will go in equal proportions to India and Pakistan.33 There are plans to lay a gas pipeline of 1,650 km in length and costing $7.6 billion through Afghanistan and Pakistan to Fazilka on the Pakistani-Indian border, and its construction is scheduled for 2012-2015. Turkmenistan managed to reach an agreement that gas would be sold on the border with Afghanistan and that the international consortium would assume all the risks of further transpor- tation. In so doing, Turkmenistan is willing to offer the three buyer countries different gas prices.34 Afghanistan will have a particular advantage in terms of transit tariff.

29 See: Caspian Development Corporation, Final Implementation Report, IHS CERA, December 2010. 30 See: Ibid., p. 67. 31 See: Ibid., p. 78. 32 See: “EU Accepts Trans-Caspian Responsibilities,” Petroleum & Intelligence Weekly, Vol. L, No. 12, 28 March, 2011. 33 See: “India Signs Up for Turkmenistan Gas,” International Gas Report, Platts, Issue 663-664, 20 December, 2010. 34 See: “Big Afghan Backing Boosts TAPI Prospects,” World Gas Intelligence, Vol. XXI, No. 51, 22 December, 2010. 126 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Ensuring security of the gas pipeline in Afghan territory is still subject to doubt. The government of Afghanistan stated its willingness to create a special service comprising at least 5-7,000 people for protecting the gas pipeline. Influential field commander , who heads the armed group of the Hizb-e-Islami party operating in the province of Herat on the border with Pakistan, ex- pressed support of the gas pipeline in a special address. The position regarding the gas pipeline in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, which are unofficially controlled by the Taliban, is still in doubt.35 The project is of high priority for the U.S., which is looking for resources for stabilizing the situation and promoting the economic development of Afghanistan. By 2014, the official U.S. mis- sion in Afghanistan should be complete, but projects such as TAPI are giving grounds for continuing the presence of NATO and U.S. forces in the country. Moreover, the U.S. is pursuing a strategy of gentle encapsulation of Iran by means of economic sanctions and so is blocking advance of the Iran- India gas pipeline project as an alternative to TAPI. If TAPI were implemented, it would essentially help to strengthen economic ties between Paki- stan and India and to develop a dialog on other issues of bilateral relations between these countries. But it is possible that by participating in TAPI India is solving the tactical task of putting indirect pressure on Iran in order to prompt the latter to place its nuclear missile program under international control. India supports the U.S.’s tough position on Iran, largely because the U.S. softened its position on India’s nuclear status, which opened up the international uranium market for it. However, India has not refused to participate in the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline construction project, which will bypass Afghan territory.36 Russia also indirectly stated its support of the TAPI project when it talked about the possible participation of Gazprom in the project.37 The arrival of Turkmen gas in Gwadar (Pakistan) with par- allel construction at the port of a natural gas liquefying plant essentially does not contradict China’s interests. The Asian Development Bank is carrying out economic coordination of TAPI. Diversification of export markets under conditions of surplus gas supply in the European market and difficulties with implementing export contracts in Russia is very attractive for Turkmenistan, particularly since the matter does not concern preference of the Asian vector over the European. Turkmenistan’s natural gas reserves are so high that large projects can be implemented in both vectors. There were initially plans to deliver the gas of the Dauletabad field via TAPI. In December 2010, Turkmenistan signed agreements with the CNPC, Petrofac International (UAE), and LG (South Korea) on the development of the giant Iuzhny Yolotan gas field with reserves from 4 to 21 trillion cu m,38 which could become a raw material base for the gas pipeline.

Conclusion

The analysis conducted makes it possible to maintain that in the next two decades, launching the energy resources of post-Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan into global economic circulation will be carried out at accelerated rates: —first, the countries of the region, mainly Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, are rich- ly endowed in reserves of oil, natural gas, coal, and natural uranium;

35 See: “Big Afghan Backing Boosts TAPI Prospects.” 36 See: M.C. Vaijayanthi, “India Asserts Importance of TAPI,” International Gas Report, Platts, Issue 660, 8 No- vember, 2010. 37 See: J. Roberts, “Turkmenistan Favors EU over Russia,” International Gas Report, Platts, Issue 660, 8 Novem- ber, 2010. 38 See: “CNPC, LG Win $9.7 Billion of Turkmen Gas Contracts,” available at [http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ news?pid= newsarchive&sid=a41E4ecIpaTY], 30 December, 2009. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 127 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

—second, the Caspian is the largest and growing producer of oil and gas outside the OPEC zone, which raises its significance in ensuring global energy security. Europe and the PRC view deliveries of hydrocarbon resources from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan as an important element in diversifying the import of energy sources; —third, the energy resources of the Caspian countries are already largely de facto controlled by American, European, and Chinese corporations. It stands to reason that almost all the key players acting in the Central Asian and Caspian energy sector are interested in drawing local resources into global circulation as quickly as possible.

Amil MAGERRAMOV

D.Sc. (Econ.), Professor at Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

Hajiaga RUSTAMBEKOV

D.Sc. (Econ.), Professor at Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS UNDER THE PRESSURE OF TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS

Abstract

his article examines the reasons for interests alien to the peoples of the Cen- T and consequences of the territorial tral Caucasus significantly undermine de- conflicts in the Central Caucasus from velopment potential and inhibit the positive the perspective of the discriminating pres- steps the regional states are taking toward sure they are putting on the economy of integration in world economic relations. the region as a whole and each of the Consequently, progress can only be countries situated there in particular. An achieved by restoring territorial integrity and analytical and situational review leads to gradually establishing economic integration the conclusion that conflicts which pursue relations among the states of the region.

Introduction

It is impossible to talk about the Central Caucasus as a whole today, not taking account of per- haps the geographic aspect. This region, comprised of states with different levels of economic devel- 128 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION opment and different geopolitical models in the contemporary world, is too fragmented to be consid- ered a single whole. Moreover, the Caucasian peoples, even though they have many of the same social and everyday traditions owing to their long history of coexistence, nevertheless have different nation- al and identification roots and ways of looking at the world. It seems that, based on the aforesaid, a formula for Central Caucasian interaction should be mainly sought by identifying those economic interests that, through integration cooperation, will clearly benefit all the peoples of the region.

The Caucasus in the Global Trends of Economic Integration and Regionalization

Contemporary interstate interaction in the economy is, more often than not, taking the upper hand over other primarily historical and ideological considerations as the most rational option. It is becoming increasingly clear that socioeconomic progress in the regional states will only slow down if they move ahead with their backs constantly turned to the future. This rather banal truth has already been grasped by the peoples of North America, Western Europe, and for the most part Eastern Asia; that is, those re- gions of the world in which the greatest achievements have recently been observed in science, technol- ogy, and the quality of economic growth. Otherwise, the past will predominate over the present and the future, enfeebling peoples and making them vulnerable to external threats. Unfortunately, in the Central Caucasus, such an unproductive scenario of regional relations is still being actively played out. At the same time, the national and consolidated economic development potential of the Central Caucasus, where the sovereignty of the three states (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia) has been re- stored, can be significantly raised not only by economic integration factors, but also by overcoming the growing losses from the existing conflicts. Only in this way will these countries be able to free them- selves from the discriminating pressure the territorial conflicts are putting on the regional economic sit- uation. Discrimination manifested in restricted socioeconomic development resources at the national or regional level, regardless of whether it is imposed from the outside (exogenous) or generated by internal reasons (endogenous), puts the target of discrimination in an invariably unfavorable position. If we keep in mind that the endogenous and exogenous factors of economic discrimination have become entangled in a complex knot of problems not only in the Central Caucasus, but also throughout the entire region, the situation can only be rectified by following the global development trends, among which regional- ization occupies a prominent place. In this respect, we can only agree with the opinion that “integration into the world economy requires understanding the intraregional integration capabilities.”1 In our opin- ion, the Central Caucasus has all the objective prerequisites for this. These prerequisites comprise, n first, the national economic interests of the Central Caucasian states that are putting forward basic criteria for regulating the dimensions, forms, and vectors of foreign economic relations; n second, the formation, preservation, and development of an integrated national economic system; n third, the need to create favorable conditions for the economic activity of domestic manufac- turers within the country and beyond it; n and fourth, the economic and social gain from integration at the micro, macro, and subregion- al levels. There are also sufficient conditions (economic, technological, and communication) for utilizing the aforesaid prerequisites through regional integration processes. However, the political factor, the

1 E. Ismailov, V. Papava, Tsentralnyy Kavkaz: istoriia, politika, ekonomika, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 2007, p. 9. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 129 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION effect of which is hampered in the Armenian link of the potential Central Caucasian trio, remains insufficient for manifesting the consolidated potential of regional economic integration. However, paradoxically, this link is the weakest in the resource and economic respect and, it seems, needs the region’s integration potential more than the others. However, by engaging in territorial claims and aggression toward neighboring states, Armenia has essentially hampered the long-term capabilities of the most available and efficient alternative for realizing its own economic interests. It stands to reason that its regional neighbors will also incur losses from this policy, which runs counter to global eco- nomic development.

Territorial Conflicts versus Economic Interests

After decades of world “hot” and “cold” wars, mankind now has the opportunity to develop a universal system capable of safeguarding it from various forms of military gambles and battles for supremacy in geostrategic races. Nevertheless, this opportunity has still been far from tapped, and the Central Caucasian region is a good case in point. There are many reasons for this, primarily the fact that the international balance of power, which changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has made the region a target of the political and economic interests of the states situated around its perim- eter and on the wider international arena. The situation today has reached the point where it is entirely possible that the region could detonate a global clash. This is graphically demonstrated by the hostil- ities against Georgia in the summer of 2008 and the subsequent international response to them. It has also confirmed once again that the world community cannot ignore the conflicts in any, particularly a pivotal, region, which the Caucasus undoubtedly is. Nevertheless, conflicts differ in genesis in every region. In the Central Caucasus, they are terri- torial-separatist and, as a rule, supported from the outside. Furthermore, the incontestable fact is ig- nored that separatism is easily proliferated and often has a boomerang effect. For example, support of separatism in Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) and in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) has to a large degree promoted its growth in the Russian Northern Caucasus. All the same, it is the people of the so-called self-proclaimed territories who are suffering the most from the separatist processes. For example, it is a well-known fact that with respect to the important socioeconomic indices of their development when they were part of the Azerbaijan S.S.R., the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh were in a more favorable position than the population of other regions of the republic and were not subject- ed to any pressure with respect to realization of their legal and linguistic-cultural needs.2 These indi- ces were much higher in Nagorno-Karabakh than in Armenia. That is, separatism in this region of Azerbaijan had no economic undertones, rather it was artificially stirred up, organized, and guided in order to meet alien geopolitical interests. However, separatism was of no benefit to the people living there themselves. The same can also be said of the territories of Georgia engulfed in conflict. When analyzing the situation in the Central Caucasus, we must primarily proceed from the fact that external geopolitical influences should not cast aspersions on the historically developed and in- stitutionally formed economic territorial integrity of the region’s internationally recognized states. Only if this is avoided will local conflicts be prevented from escalating from zones of increased atten- tion of the rest of the world into hot spots of global dimensions. Consequently, international security should be perceived not as abstractly global, but as specifically regional. Where does this lead us? n First, it must be clarified that now more than at any time in the past the fate of international security depends on the resolution of local, isolated conflicts.

2 This is statistically proven in: Z. Samedzade, Nagornyy Karabakh: neizvestnaia pravda, Baku, 1995, pp. 21-32. 130 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n Second, a mechanism must be drawn up that makes use of prolonged regulation to overcome the local conflicts rather than freezing them. And here it is important to look for, find, and implement a paradigm of regional economic coexistence based on integration forms of cooperation. The peoples of the Caucasus are neighbors by divine intervention rather than by choice. The re- gion is a vast melting pot of religions, cultures, languages, and traditions. Almost all the ethnicities of this region live alongside neighboring nationalities and ethnic groups in the latter’s territory, and many people of the same nationality lived and continue to live on both sides of the state borders. But this has proven insufficient for establishing good neighborly relations. Moreover, too close interpenetration harbors the danger of borders being redrawn where states are reestablished. What is more, the Cauca- sus has suffered from the negative energy generated by the breakdown of the single state, the Soviet Union, with its irresponsible attitude toward building national-territorial structures along the lines of Russian nesting dolls (matryoshkas). What must be done to ensure that genies of war do not escape from the small dolls nestling in the center of the stack? It stands to reason that the Central Caucasus can only become a zone of peace and cooperation if the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and Georgia is restored. Without this, full-fledged, region-wide economic cooperation is impossible. However, there is hope today that progress can be made in this vector. For example, the prospects for establish- ing the Caucasian Common Market, a project that has long been discussed without much success and into which other neighboring countries, foreign investors, and innovation technology could later be drawn, are not so far-fetched. The dangerous delay in settling internal and regional conflicts is dis- couraging large-scale investments and widening the cracks in relations between the countries in the region. Nevertheless, people are becoming more aware of the fact that only “by means of joint efforts can the region’s countries overcome the grievous inheritance of the recent past and build a safe future. In these conditions, studies based on objective criteria of the prospects for economic integration, col- lective security, conflict settlement, and democratic development in the Southern Caucasus are be- coming immensely important.”3 Keeping in mind that sufficient production capacities, energy resources, rare mineral supplies, intellectual potential, and internationally important transport infrastructure are concentrated in the Central Caucasus, which forms a kind of bridge between two seas and many civilizations, it would be illogical, to say the least, not to talk about economic integration in this region. Permitting artificial fanning of the territorial conflicts and raising them to the level of hostility and war, while all the de- veloped regions of the world are, on the contrary, engaging in integration, looks even more irrational. Integration is opening up borders and making them so transparent that we are already talking about the population of dozens of countries with a far from perfect history of interrelations becoming one nation. Against this background, attempts to establish increasingly new borders in the Central Cauca- sus signify regression and can only lead to socioeconomic deceleration in globalization rates.

Economic Development in the Context of the Territorial Problems of the Central Caucasian Countries

The suspended armed conflicts are having a negative effect on the economy, primarily because the large amount of resources in the country or region are not being used for the benefit of people or

3 G. Khutsishvili, R. Mshvidobadze, G. Nizharadze, Integration & Conflict Resolution in the Southern Caucasus: Reality or Illusion? Findings of Sociological Surveys, ICCN, Tbilisi, 2001 (text in Russian). (The authors of the cited book mean the territory that comprises Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. Today, it is usually called the Central Cauca- sus. This updated definition of the region appeared after the book was published.) Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 131 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION for their prosperity and development. Today, the Central Caucasian region is being intensively mili- tarized, which is particularly promoted by the foreign military bases stationed there. Armenia, for example, is openly called an outpost (a front-rank military foothold) and Russian armed forces are consistently being built up in its territory. Foreign authors are also pointing out that with “some 20,000 soldiers Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the most militarized regions of Europe.”4 All of this cannot help but prompt Azerbaijan, which has set itself the goal, substantiated by international law, of restoring the country’s territorial integrity, to take retaliatory steps in the military sphere. Essential alienation of up to one third of its state territory and the constant external threat are prompting Geor- gia to increase its military spending too. Given the unresolved territorial conflicts, the increase in military spending could deal a blow to the economic progress of the region as a whole and of each of its states individually, damage the investment climate for a long time to come, and exhaust the possi- bilities for economic integration, albeit still hypothetical, in the region in the foreseeable future. However, not everything in the Central Caucasus is so depressing. The close and mutually ad- vantageous economic cooperation between Azerbaijan and Georgia is a kind of antecedent of the re- gion’s transformation into a geo-economic integration entity. The Caucasian tandem, a term appro- priately coined by E. Ismailov and Vladimer Papava, comprised of Azerbaijan and Georgia, is bring- ing political stability and specific benefit to the region. Accruing a multitude of infrastructure projects with Turkey and other countries of the Black Sea Basin, the tandem is becoming the central link in economic cooperation in the relatively important geo-economic expanse that encompasses Hither and Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. The prerequisites for Central Caucasian regional economic integration not only comprise natu- ral and material factors. The Caucasus enjoys multi-century traditions of economic cooperation man- ifested in its rather well-developed territorial division of labor and production cooperation, the roots of which go back to the period before the Caucasus was conquered and joined the Russian Empire. Its varied natural and climatic conditions and diverse ethnic composition make multilateral specializa- tion of labor, as well as the formation of local interrelated markets, possible in the Caucasus, which is enhancing intensive exchange and commerce. As part of the Empire, the Caucasus long remained a rather economically isolated region, where most of the commodities consumed were products of re- gional reproduction. That is, there are indeed, albeit in rather hyperbolized form, grounds to maintain that “at all times the Caucasus was a single region: the social and economic ties of the local peoples created an integral and mutually dependent regional economy and common values.”5 The common world outlook of the Caucasian peoples, their mutual trust, and their willingness to establish contact played an instrumental part in the evolution of economic cooperation. All of this created additional stimuli for long-term forms of economic communication, made trade routes and stopping places (caravanserai) safe, and established favorable conditions for dealing in commodity loans and money bonds. It was not until much later that the colonizers generated an unfavorable im- age of the Caucasian. However, the Caucasian people have always been distinguished by loyalty, hospitality, diligence, and business acumen. All of this greatly cut back on transaction expenses and stimulated intraregional trade. Only against this background could complex communication struc- tures be erected and major cities built as craft and trade centers. The products made in the Caucasus were always distinguished by their quality and enjoyed renown throughout the world. It can confi- dently be said that the level of economic culture in the Caucasus has always been higher than the culture of the conquerors who came there. Most of the means of production used and products consumed belonged to the same space-time context in the Caucasus, which shows that it possessed the necessary level of skills and labor technol- ogy. This helped to form intraregional proportions of exchange, prices, and money circulation.

4 H. Krüger, The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. A Legal Analysis, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010, p. 23. 5 R. Metreveli, The Caucasian Civilization in the Globalization Context, CA&CC Press® AB, Stockholm, 2009, p. 87. 132 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In Soviet times, despite the prevalence of the vertical and sectoral structures of the Union’s centralized management, the economy of the Caucasian region retained coherence in the use of many raw material and energy sources, transportation network, and economic ties at the level of individual economic entities. All of this makes military opposition of the Caucasian peoples absurd and wasteful from the perspective of economic efficiency.

The Negative Impact of War on the Economy of the Caucasian Region Countries

Azerbaijan

The hostilities of 1991-1994 hampered Azerbaijan’s positive economic development. At that time, the economic infrastructure of Karabakh, one of the largest historical regions of Azerbaijan, was subjected to mass destruction. If we keep in mind that the country had only just restored its sovereign- ty and was experiencing a systemic transformation crisis, it becomes clear just how arduous the con- sequences of this aggression were. During the war on Azerbaijan, Armenia took temporary control over the 198 km border between Azerbaijan and Iran and, after violating Azerbaijan’s 360-km-long state borders, occupied almost 20% of the country’s territory. Along with the territory occupied out- side Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenians captured a total of 890 cities, villages, and settlements. Na- tional economic facilities were destroyed and plundered: 150,000 residential buildings, 7,000 public buildings, 693 general education schools, 695 health care facilities, 800 km of roads, 160 bridges, 2,300 km of water supply lines, 15,000 km of power lines, 280,000 hectares of woodland, and 200,000 hectares of plough land. According to the initial estimates, the Azerbaijan Republic suffered $60 billion in damages. Moreover, all of Azerbaijan’s reserves of mercury, obsidian, and perlite, 35-60% of its construction and facing material, 23.8% of its forest resources, and 7.8% of its water supplies are still in occupied territory.6 Despite all of this, Azerbaijan’s leadership overcame the odds to sign a truce and begin creating a model for the country’s accelerated economic development. This model extricated Azerbaijan from the crisis, advanced its economy to a leading position in the region (almost 3/4 of GDP of the Central Caucasian region), and turned it into one of the most dynamic in the world. Azerbaijan’s oil diplomacy played a great role in this process, in which Georgia also became involved on a mutually beneficial basis. In recent years, 33 production sharing agreements have been signed with foreign oil companies, and 53 energy companies from 20 countries are participating in oil and gas operations. Oil production in Azerbaijan has reached a record level of 50.7 million tonnes a year, which makes it possible to invest $20 billion a year in the most diverse, mainly non-petroleum, production and infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, the country has been forced to spend large sums on building up its armed forces (military spending occupies second place in the state budget) to over- come the consequences of the Karabakh war and repel the aggression still going on against its inde- pendence and territorial integrity.

Georgia

Like all the post-Soviet countries, in 1992-1994, at the beginning of its independent develop- ment, Georgia found itself in an economic, social, food, and energy crisis. The volume of its gross

6 [http://www.azconsulate.spb.ru/index.php?type=page&id=45]. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 133 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION industrial product had dropped to the 1958 level and its gross agricultural product had dropped even lower — to the 1945 level. As a result, according to its GDP results, Georgia ranked lowest of the former Union republics. The territorial conflicts and growing separatist trends in Abkhazia and in the Tskhinvali region largely promoted these phenomena. The conflict in Abkhazia essentially stymied all revenue from , one of the traditional and developed branches of the country’s economy. The first refugees appeared, the number of whom grew and reached 300,000 people. All of this time, Georgia relied on economic cooperation with Azerba- ijan to resolve its difficult problems. Active use was made of the multi-profile and primarily transit capabilities of economic cooperation among Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Acquiring an addi- tional boost from the intensive economic reforms and transfer to contemporary institutions of eco- nomic management, Georgia’s GDP rose by 6.4% as early as 2010, which is quite high in terms of international indices. However, the country’s achievements could be much higher if it were not for the interference of territorial conflicts. The military conflict of 2008 alone cost Georgia $2 billion, while loss of control over a third of the country’s national territory lowers the country’s potential GDP by almost 15% a year.

Armenia

At the beginning of the 1990s, a serious economic slump was observed in Armenia. Many plants and factories ceased to operate due to the lack of raw material and energy resources, while agriculture regressed to small commodity production. The limited export resources and monopolization of the main economic sectors made Armenia particularly sensitive to the crisis phenomena in the world and the Russian economy, on which the country greatly depends. The imbalance in foreign trade caused by economic isolation from neighboring countries, Turkey and Azerbaijan, right down to the present time is compensated for to some extent by international assistance (mainly from the Armenian diaspo- ra), remittances from Armenians working abroad, and foreign (mainly Russian) direct investments. In 2010, Armenia ranked 76 according to the human development index, which is the worst rating among the Central Caucasian countries (Azerbaijan ranks 67 and Georgia 73). In 2011, Forbes, one of the most prestigious and well-known economic publications in the world, ranked Armenia second after Madagascar in the rating of the world’s worst economies. Armenia’s national statistics service published salary statistics that surprised many of the world’s analysts: the average salary in Armenia has dropped by a whole 7.7% and amounts to $238, writes the electronic economic publication Stock Exchange Leader. This is the lowest average wage index in the Caucasian region. For example, in Georgia this index amounts to $318 and in Azerbaijan to $396. No serious achievements were registered in the Armenian economy in 2011. The population’s standard of living continues to drop, while there is also a low level of competitiveness, increased monopolization, polarization of income, and growing emigration rates. Some very small advances have been made, but they cannot be described as achievements.7 The greatest problems of Armenia’s socioeconomic development are related to the aggressive policy being pursued in the region. As a result, it has lost the opportunity to establish economic coop- eration with the most economically strong state of the Central Caucasus—Azerbaijan. Armenia found itself removed from the transnational projects in which Azerbaijan participates and does not have the opportunity to trade directly with Turkey. This has caused Armenia’s economy to lose its independ- ence, acquiring the nature of an outpost supplied from the outside, while the Armenian population is becoming poorer and emigrating from the country.

7 See: A. Minasian, “V usloviiakh regressa ekonomiki Armenii pravitelstvo ne imeet moralnogo prava ostavatsia u vlasti,” Vestnik Kavkaza, 1 February, 2012. 134 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Where to Go and How

Only consistent economic integration in the Central Caucasus aimed at restoring the economic and political ties among the states can direct the region into an entirely new channel of development. In the factorial respect, the Central Caucasus, perhaps even more than other regions, is prepared for such economic trade relations leading to a peaceful world. So integration policy in search of peace in the Central Caucasus could and should be successful. It can offer essentially different approaches based on unification and not division of the region into opposing countries relying on different exter- nal forces.8 Mutual gain, voluntariness, economic cooperation, and equality of all the countries and peoples could become the driving forces behind the Caucasian Common Market. Implementing comprehen- sive measures could lead in the future to a duty-free and non-visa zone in the Caucasus and the forma- tion at the regional level of something like the Schengen Area. But the difficulty is that this issue concerns countries and peoples, the relations between which are still rather complicated. So there is no way of knowing whether it would succeed. But the main thing is moving toward a goal. Azerbaijan and Georgia have already taken the first confident steps in this direction, which, by advancing the idea of creating a Common Caucasian Home, have opened up new prospects for economic cooperation among the peoples of the region. There is even talk of possible confederative relations between Az- erbaijan and Georgia, which is not hypothetical, but substantiated by the real state of interdependence that has developed between the economies of these two countries. Another detail should be noted—the at times semi-serious rivalry among the Caucasian peoples on an entire range of aspects of thinking or behavior. There is nothing wrong in this and it could even be of benefit if the talk is shifted to economic competition. Margaret Thatcher writes that globaliza- tion “ensured that national economies were opened up to international competition”9 and made their weak and strong positions obvious, which could be leveled out by means of economic cooperation and integration of factors and efforts to achieve mutual gain. Economic integration can only be achieved in the Caucasus if the conflicts and wars in the re- gion are overcome and Armenia gives up its pro-empire policy with respect to its neighbors. In addi- tion to everything else, this is of detriment to the economic interests of the region’s peoples who have found themselves under the discriminating pressure of the territorial conflicts. The sooner the sup- porters of aggressive separatism, nationalistic supremacy, and territorial conquests understand this, the sooner the Caucasus can become a region of economic growth and social prosperity.

8 See: A. Abasov, A. Khachatrian, Varianty resheniia karabakhskogo konflikta: idei i realnost, LTD “Eni Nesil” Publishing House, Baku, 2002, p. 38. 9 M. Thatcher, Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 2002. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 135 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOCULTURE

Teymur ATAEV

Independent Researcher (Baku, Azerbaijan).

AZERBAIJAN: INDEPENDENCE AND THE RELIGIOUS PARADIGM (THE ISLAMIC QUESTION AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF TWENTY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE)

Abstract

his article presents a comprehensive they have affected the stability of the state, T discussion of the development of Is- and the ways Islam and its creative poten- lam in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, the tial can be used to promote social progress problems of the Islamic community, the way in Azerbaijan.

Introduction

When put in the historical context, twenty years of independence is not that long; however, for the generation that lived to see the downfall of one country and the emergence of several others on its ruins, they seem to have lasted longer than an epoch. These changes claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, made millions of others forced migrants, ruined the everyday existence of even more people, and led to the occupation of historical homelands, etc. It is for the future generations to pass political, cultural, and economic verdict on this stretch of history. Very much as usual, opinions (convictions, 136 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION moods, and versions) will be geared toward the prevailing ideologies: some rejoice at the removal of “curtains” and borders of all sorts; others mourn the past and see what happened as a tragedy that deprived millions of their chance in life; while still others look at what happened in many other differ- ent ways. One thing, however, cannot be disputed: in many respects the transition period (a “time of troubles” for many) has been a historic event that echoed across the world.

The Religious Component in the Post-Soviet Expanse

Today, a new sociopolitical order has taken shape across the post-Soviet space and in the coun- tries that in the past formed what was known as the socialist camp. The social and cultural context and the economic background are very different from what they were in the past. The philosophy and values of the previous generations have “gone with the wind,” which explains the warped spiritual and moral paradigm of all the social groups, the result of actively promoted mercantilism. In other words, the newly independent countries embraced the market component as their own for economic purposes and as a compass in personal relationships: total commercialization extended from politics and the economy to the spiritual and moral spheres. Strange as it may seem in view of the above, the religious component not merely survived in the new social conditions, it acquired a new lease of life. This is one of the outstanding phenomena of the last two decades; it was enough to convince the huge numbers that there was a Higher Power in the Universe. It is frequently asserted that religion is the only force able to oppose the lawless- ness of permissibility in many spheres on life. Many people, however, believe that it was the global beaux monde that planted religious feelings and continues to insist on them in pursuance of its own interests. No matter what, religion has become much better heard in the post-Soviet space; it has moved into the vast political and social niche vacated by Soviet ideology. It should be said that while at the early stages certain forces deliberately introduced the confessional aspect into social life, today the interest in religion is fed by the people themselves. In any case, in the CIS the religious component is accompanying global changes in all spheres of life. Normally, this is confirmed by the number of newly built (restored) churches, synagogues, and mosques, their increased attendance on religious holydays, the greater number of potential pilgrims, etc. This, however, can hardly be regarded as an objective indicator of the level of confidence in re- ligion. Indeed, many of those who attend churches, synagogues, and mosques on religious holydays have no use for religion and its injunctions. Many Muslims limit their religious zeal to Friday khut- bahs and specific dates; while just as many keep their religious feelings to themselves and do not brandish their religiosity. In other words, figures cannot and do not reveal the true picture; they are especially deceptive when it comes to assessing religious feelings. This means that any discussion (even the most superficial) of the development of Islam in Az- erbaijan should move away from figures and their interpretations: the true picture becomes more or less clear when the situation is seen from the inside.

The Troubled 1990s

On the whole, the early years of the last decade of the last century are remembered in light of the avalanche of religious feelings that engulfed the Soviet (not yet post-Soviet) people. They Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 137 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION flocked to churches, mosques, and synagogues and bought mountains of religious literature in search of reliable information about the spiritual side of life, etc. With few exceptions, this side of social life proved to be neglected or, rather, abandoned to missionaries arriving from all over the world bringing piles of religious literature in their luggage. The old customs barriers had fallen while new ones had not yet been erected. The newly independent countries proved easy prey for all sorts of charities, many of which pursued their own specific aims. Others, and there were many of them, built new mosques, which increased the number of religious organizations. It was at that time that religious education abroad became affordable: the host country, or all sorts of foreign struc- tures, offered free education to practically anyone willing to study. In this way, a huge number of young men from the post-Soviet ethnically Muslim regions found themselves in famous or, much more frequently, obscure religious educational establishments of the Middle East. This spontane- ous process created problems in the Azeri Ummah as soon as the first Muslims educated abroad returned home. The “religious old timers” immediately noticed that it was a generation of “new” Muslims educated in a different, Sunni, tradition who returned to Azerbaijan from Medina, Cairo, and some other cities. This requires no further explanation. Whatever the case, these young people had different ideas of Islam than the older generation, which triggered an active discussion of which Muslims were “more Islamic.” This was when the highly lamentable tradition of dividing Muslims into “right” and “wrong” appeared; those who followed it concentrated on external attributes rather than on the mean- ing of faith or on an allegedly different Aqida (teaching). On the whole, it is obvious that the Aqida is the same for practically all Muslims, since all of them accept nearly all of its points. At the turn of the 21st century, the outer appearance of the faithful was taken as the manifestation of a true or false faith. The Abu Bakr mosque in Baku, built on the money of the Society of the Revival of Islamic Heritage (SRIH) of Kuwait, was the center from which these “new ideas” spread far and wide. The SRIH is well known in the Islamic world; it operates in several Muslim countries, including in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The Gap Widens

Registered in 2002, the Abu Bakr mosque attracted people in great and rapidly increasing numbers. It could no longer contain the Friday crowds; people congregated outside the mosque. The khutbahs of Imam Gamet Suleymanov stirred up a lot of enthusiasm among the faithful, while the mosque’s website became very popular. This explains why most of the Baku population regard- ed the mosque as the leader of the Islamic movement in the republic; the mosque, in turn, confirmed its image not only on Fridays and Islamic holydays: on ordinary days it offered lectures to the rap- idly increasing audiences. The faithful congregated inside and outside the mosque and lured pas- sers-by, numerous in this frequented place, to the mosque. A particularly important nuance, howev- er, was that the mosque acquired the halo of “radical ,” a trend hitherto unknown in the republic. On the whole, the country has always been home to both the Shi‘a and Sunni branches, which have lived peacefully side-by-side without the slightest contradictions. Sunnis lived in the north of Azerbaijan, along the borders with Russia, while the Shi‘a lived in the south, where the republic bor- ders on Iran, and predominated in Baku. The differences began and ended with religious affiliation with one of the branches. Early in the 2000s, everything changed. I have already written that the outer appearance of an ideal Muslim was actively discussed in the mosque. The imam pointed out that “those mosque frequenters who wanted to live by the laws of the Shari‘a” should have beards and wear shortened trousers: beards “were recommended by others,” while trousers “should not hang below the ankles so that the wearer looked modest and neat.” This 138 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION divided the Muslims into those who agreed with these rules (in order to look like a faithful Muslim living by the Shari‘a) and those who preferred to dress as usual. Statements to the tune of what Imam Suleymanov once said, “we treat such people normally,” widened the gap; this and other pronounce- ments of the same kind could hardly produce a different effect. The “dress code” was supplemented with other “deviations” in those Muslims whom “those wishing to live by the Shari‘a” treated “nor- mally.” The theses and “visual evidence” of wrong praying habits detected in many Muslims (they al- lowed their arms to hang during namaz) were pushed to the fore. It was explained that during the Tashahhud (the portion of prayer where the Muslims kneel on the ground), the index finger should be moved. History does not tolerate the subjunctive, but let me say that if the “difference” between the followers of different mazhabs were limited to “wrong” external attributes, many of the “moderate” Muslims would have never been very negative about the Abu Bakr mosque because much of what was said there related to spirituality and the Koranic postulates. Gradually, however, the vocabu- lary of those who frequented the mosque was enriched with the terms Shirk (polytheism), Kafir (unbeliever), Murtad (apostate), and other similar names applied to those who were considered to be “not one of us.” Not infrequently those who had just come to the mosque and started learning the ABCs of Islam relished throwing these terms around. Those who studied abroad were not alien to this practice either. On the one hand, this focused attention on the external side of religiosity, even though in Islam the creative approach has been and remains the main feature of genuine religious feelings. People started paying more attention to appearances than to the rituals. On the other hand, the gap between the “right” and the “wrong” became too obvious: what was going on inside and outside the mosque could no longer be ignored. Gradually, society learned to perceive the “bearded Wahhabi in shortened trousers” as a social danger.

The Ideas of Taqfir1

Very soon the situation acquired new overtones: in the first half of the first decade of the 21st century, a small fraction of the Abu Bakr frequenters started talking about Suleymanov as “not a gen- uine Muslim who cooperates with the authorities.” At first, against the background of the discussions on Dar ul-Islam (the Muslim regions of the world) and Jahiliyyah (the pre-Islamic period in the his- tory of Arabs, that is, “the land of ignorance”) as applied to the contemporary period, some of those who frequently attended the mosque started theorizing about an “Islamic state” and Jihad. After a while, they started calling (vaguely) for practical implementation of this idea. Imam Suleymanov, who, from the very beginning, cut short all deliberations on this subject, was accused of colluding with the authorities. The anti-Suleymanov group included Azerbaijan in Jahiliyyah; they insisted that the faithful Muslims should regard the heads of the “nominally” Muslim states as Kafirs (unbelievers). Suleymanov, on the other hand, considered Heydar Aliev to be a Muslim.

1 “In the mid-1970s, in Egypt there appeared a Muslim movement which the journalists started calling At-Taqfir wal-Hijra (excommunication and emigration), which put in a nutshell its program. The word “Taqfir” means to judge somebody to be a “Kafir” (a non-Muslim infidel), based on his behavior resembling the behavior of an infidel. Hijra means “flight” or “emigration” or “leaving,” such as Prophet Muhammad and his followers did when they left for the city of Medina to avoid persecution in Mecca in the 7th century; thus, if a society is pronounced to be an infidel society, the members of Taqfir wal-Hijra see it as their duty to start an armed struggle (jihad) against the infidels” (A.A. Ignatenko, “Chistilshchiki islama,” NG-Religii, 17 November, 2010).—Ed. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 139 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

These theoretical accusations (statements) drove the inner mosque opposition to the idea of Taqfir and to equating some Muslims and “unfaithful” as the pivotal point. The International Crisis Group (ICG) pointed out that in his fatwah Gamet Suleymanov described as Kharijites2 all those who supported these ideas and who believed that people who behaved “not as they themselves do” were “unfaithful Muslims.” Later, he tagged them followers of Taqfir who taught that Islam concentrated on “power and jihad” rather than on “the five pillars of Islam.” Gamet Suleymanov deemed it neces- sary to point out that, by attaching the tag Kafir to Muslims, these people “are ignoring the prescrip- tions of the Shari‘a” and could be described as “vehicles of radical ideas.”3 In Azerbaijan, it was commonly believed (with good reason) that the ideas of Taqfir arrived from the Northern Caucasus: while preparing to declare a Caucasian Imarat in 2007 the North Cauca- sian leaders preached that those Muslims who “helped infidels by word or by deed” (state officials, law enforcers, and even religious figures) were “opponents of Allah” and that, therefore, the “mem- bers of the kafir group” should be fought against in the same way as the “infidels.” They added that if a Muslim was recognized as an infidel he could be murdered, while “his property is considered halal (permissible to use or engage in.—Ed.); his wives divorced; his children cannot inherit from him, while his parents disinherit him.”4 Two years ago there was an explosion in Abu Bakr during prayer; two people were killed. Ev- idence gave every reason to believe that those to blame for the incident came from the Northern Cau- casus. In the fall of 2008, the Azeri law enforcers identified those who had been involved in the act of terror. Ilgar Mollachiev, believed to be Imam of the Daghestanian Jamaat, was considered to be one of them.5 The statement issued by the Ministry of National Security (MNS) of Azerbaijan said that those who had organized the explosion planned to revive an armed group called the Forest Brother- hood and set up armed units for carrying out terrorist acts in Azerbaijan to undermine its social and political stability. The documents mentioned the existence of armed groups—Sumgayyt jamaaty, which was to implement the terrorist plans, and Guba-Gusar jamaaty, which intended to set up mili- tary camps in the republic’s mountain forests.6 The mosque was closed down after the explosion.

Fear of the Wahhabis and Religion as a Whole

It should be said that late in 2007, the MNS stated that it prevented several large-scale terrorist acts, including a large-scale operation by a “radical group of Wahhabis” against several state struc-

2 Literally “those who went out”—an extremely radical Muslim sect condemned by the majority of the faithful; this was the earliest religious novelty in Islam. They are mentioned in the Sunnah; this event marked a new period in the life of the Islamic community, the period of discord and dissidence.—Ed. 3 From the answers of Gamet Suleymanov in the Questions-Answers section on the site of Abu Bakr, available at [http://www.abubakr-mescidi.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=752&st=30; http://www.abubakr-mescidi.com/forums/ index.php?showtopic=860&st=120; http://www.abubakr-mescidi.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=868&st=150]; Az- erbaijan: Independent Islam and the State, Report No. 191, Europe, 5 March 2008, available at [http://www.crisisgroup. org/~/media/Files/europe/191_azerbaijan_independent_islam_and_the_state_rus.pdf]; Talking to Imam Suleymanov, available at [http://salyafi.my1.ru/news/2008-12-20-240]; Interview of G. Suleymanov, available at [http://www.day.az/ news/society/57685.html]. 4 Answers of Amir Seyfullah to questions of Muslims, available at [http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/ 2006/08/28/46749.shtml]. 5 For more detail, see: T. Ataev, “Mollachiev ubit. No voprosy ostaiutsia,” available at [http://www.azeri.ru/papers/ echo-az_info/26681/]. 6 See: “Vzryv v mecheti ustroili chleny voorozhennoy gruppirovki,”, available at [http://www.day.az/print/news/ society/129314.html]. 140 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tures, foreign embassies, and foreign missions. The prevention of other terrorist attacks was also re- ported. It is not my intention to talk about the political underpinnings of such statements, but I deem it necessary to say that early in the new century society was confronted with the Wahhabi trend in Islam and became scared. It was not the fear of destabilization or of armed acts justified by religious ideas; people were concerned about the social and ideological factor. Strange as it may seem, the people whom others perceived as Wahhabis (today they are called Salafis) scared the rest by their outer appearance in particular. On second thoughts, however, there was nothing strange in this: the mosque insisted on presentable clothing. Under Soviet power and during the early years of independence, was, on the whole, associated with the mullahs mainly involved in burial rites and mourning. Dressed in baggy trousers and jackets and wearing unpolished shoes they looked unkempt and decidedly downtrodden. Developing by leaps and bounds, Wahhabism was far removed from the amorphous and hardly intellectual Muslim clergy. Albeit well-educated, with good command of several foreign languages, having a broad vision of the world, and knowing how to present their ideas, their outer appearance nevertheless made the Friday congregational prayers want to take to their heels as quickly as possible. And this stands to reason: identically dressed people (the beards and shortened trousers were per- ceived as a uniform) leaving the mosque after Friday prayers in well-organized groups could hardly produce a different response. “How else can we respond to a crowd of identical people prepared to fulfill any mission at any moment?” This of course was an exaggeration, but one has to admit that the uniformed cohorts of Abu Bakr looked like an immutable force prepared to act and succeed. The media context was created by Russian TV, which indulged in showing bearded people rushing into attack with the Allahu Akbar battle cry. The terrorist acts in the post-Soviet expanse were mainly associated with clandestine Wahhabi organizations. Information about casualties among civilians and pictures of suicide bombers’ belts, weapons, and uniforms were the media’s staple food. The result was predictable: people associated this with the local Wahhabis; they learned to fear them and expect all sorts of trouble from them. The explosion in Abu Bakr in August 2008 confirmed these fears; as could be expected, no one, even the people who lived nearby, knew anything at all about what was going on inside the mosque; the “uninitiated” remained ignorant of the truth, although everyone heard rumors that in the mosque emissaries were busy enlisting volunteers wishing to help the “Chechen brothers.” Regrettably, in many cases these fears were transformed into the fear of religion. At the same time, relations between imam Suleymanov and the Taqfir opposition developed into sharp disa- greements on the Abu Bakr website (in the Questions and Answers section), which alienated many of his former supporters. This looked like more confirmation of trouble inside the mosque and among the Azeri Muslims in general. Some of these people associated Gamet Suleymanov with the radical ideas emanating from the mosque. None of the official religious or special state structures deemed it necessary to publish an official statement about the developments in the mosque. This explains why a large share of active (and passive) observers shifted their rejection of the Wahhabis to Islam as a whole.

What about an Alternative?

While Abu Bakr rallied its supporters, no alternative was offered to those interested in religion, apart from sporadic TV programs and articles in the press that said next to nothing about what was going on in the religious sphere. The more or less frequented Islamic and secular websites concentrat- Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 141 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ed on rituals; discussions in the virtual space developed into scandals among supporters of different mazhabs, a faithful reflection of what was going on in real life. Nothing was done to present “alterna- tive” (“real” according to experts) Islam. Religion, meanwhile, was developing in two directions— static (official) and active (religious communities at the mosques)—which refused to have anything to do with each other. Some people attended mosques; others preferred to practice religion at home. Little by little an intellectual group appeared based on the intelligentsia, but its voice (views, arguments, doubts) was barely discernable within the ummah. On the whole, society was most active during Gurban-bayrami and Ramazan; during the month of Ramazan, TV and radio paid a lot of attention to Islam, but well-substantiated programs about religion were practically absent. The faithful were left to their own devices (self-develop- ment, self-awareness, they had to find their own path to the Truth by perceiving Islam at an intel- lectual and sensuous level); on the other hand, many people attended lectures and khutbahs in mosques and spoke to other believers. There were those who went abroad in search of knowledge about Islam. In other words, the information about Islam came from different sources; more than that, no one knew how to educate moderate believers—this explains why there was no unity in the Muslim com- munity of Azerbaijan.

Are There Hostile Mazhabs?

When talking about a united social group we should first of all establish whether people closed ranks against someone (or certain forces) and for the sake of something. The unity of the ummah pre- supposes shared interests; in the absence of mutual understanding among the Azeri believers (many of them never thought about it), a large group of Muslims appeared who believed that they should, first and foremost, prove to the others that they were right. They insisted that their mazhabs were the only right ones and went as far as practicing da’waat, not because they wanted to enlist new believers, but because they wanted to stress the advantages of their own mazhab. Let me repeat that ethnic and confessional tolerance has always been Azerbaijan’s hallmark; there have never been any religious disagreements, no matter how small. Today, an “alienation zone” (let me use this term) has appeared, from which a “shore of contradictions” is not far off. This rift did not appear spontaneously; today, there are practically no jobs for those who received religious educa- tion abroad; “traditional Islam” is the talk of the day. The developments of the last decade brought the ummah to this rift. It should be said in all justice that the Administration of the Muslims of the Cau- casus (AMC) has been the least guilty of this. The blame lies on the local religious communities that indulged in latent or open propaganda of their ideas about the faith and forms of abeyance of the in- junctions of the Most High as the only correct ones. This is leading to implacable clashes among believers. Everything will end well if people limit their religious zeal and peculiar tastes to their dress, but they could be driven further to plunge into a full-scale conflict. Ethnic and religious contradictions (which might develop into mortal conflicts) are the shortest way toward an outburst in any region at any time. This is a very important time for Azerbaijan: there are certain external forces that would like to establish control over its natural riches. In this case, the religious component might be used as a detonator. 142 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION A Disunited Ummah Threatens Stability of the State (with References to Lenin)

Let me remind you of what happened in the first half of 2010. “Baku may be forced to make a geopolitical choice between Iran, Russia, and the U.S.,” said Raymond Tanter, former Senior Member on the U.S. National Security Council staff at the White House, who currently serves as president of Iran Policy Committee in Washington D.C. Speaking about the current situation in the region, he pointed out that the cooperation between Moscow and Washington on missile defense as a part of an extension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty “is much more likely to involve the in Azerbaijan than when the Bush Administration was negotiating with the Russians.” He went on to warn that “…if the Iranian regime objects because Baku and Tehran have signed a mutual agreement not to allow their territory to be used by third countries for hostile actions, then Azerbaijan may be forced to choose between closer relations with the superpowers or appeasing the Iranian regime. “Baku would be much better off under the joint cooperation of Moscow and Washington than under the sway of Tehran,” he emphasized.7 This was not said to stress Russian-American unity (at least at that time) on the Iranian nuclear file, rather it was said in so many words that “he who is not with us is against us.” By the “sway of Tehran,” Raymond Tanter meant an “Islamic revolution;” nothing of that sort had been said before. Back in 2010 I took it as a warning to Azerbaijan, that is, as certain food for thought about how the situation might possibly develop and how it might be formulated in the worldwide context. This was especially important because Baku had not been invited to the nuclear (or anti-nuclear) summit in Washington.8 It is not my task to analyze the “geo-comments” of the time; I would like to establish the extent to which Afghanistan’s religious context might prove responsive to the efforts of those resolved to play the “Islamic card.” To be successful, revolutions should stem from fertile soil and be encouraged from the outside. Significantly, in 1915, that is, two years before the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia, Lenin wrote in his The Collapse of the Second International that a “crisis of the upper classes” is the main warning sign of a coming revolution, creating “a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth” when “the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual;” because of this “there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed in ‘peace time,’ but in turbulent times are drawn into independent historical action.”9 After ruling for three years, Lenin was more specific in his Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder: “revolution is impossible without a nation-wide crisis for a revolution to take place, it is essential, first, that a majority … of the class-conscious workers should fully realize that revolution is necessary; second, that the ruling classes should be going through a governmental crisis, which draws even the most backward masses into politics.” This “weakens the government, and makes it possible for the revolutionaries to rapidly overthrow it.”10 Significantly, the Bolshevik leader was writing about a “revolution.”

7 [http://news.am/eng/news/17977.html]. 8 See: T. Ataev, “Mozhet li ‘tsvetnaia revolutsia’ smenit fon na religiozny ottenok , ili Signaly o vozmozhnykh igrakh vokrug ‘islamskogo faktora’ v Azerbaidzhane,” available at [http://ia-centr.ru/expert/7757/]. 9 [http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/csi/index.htm]. 10 [http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/pdf/Lenin_Left_wing_Communism.pdf]. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 143 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

He said nothing about external impacts, which is not surprising: had “foreign forces” been men- tioned as one of the springs of a revolution—either ideological or financial—the head of the Soviet state would have stirred up doubts about the domestic roots of regime change. Today it is common knowledge that practically all revolutionary events in the Recent Period of the history of the world were triggered by a combination of external and internal forces; the 1917 revolutionary situation in Russia being no exception. An analysis of what is described by world historiography as the national-liberation struggle (in the mid-20th century, for example) reveals external interference: locked in geopolitical confronta- tion, the Soviet Union and the United States were spreading their influence in their own zones of the Third World. The Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran was inspired from Paris, where the religious opposition had been camped for many years. Foreign influence was definitely present in 2010 when crowds poured into the streets after the general elections. The same can be said about the color regime change in the CIS countries. We know today that Lenin’s formula that revolution could triumph when the “lower classes” no longer wanted to live in the old way and the “upper classes” could not carry on in the old way was wrong. Lenin had his own reasons to assert this. My readers may object that in many cases an armed putsch (plot) was enough for a regime change, even if there was foreign interference in a “revolutionary-liberation movement.” This is true, but an analysis of the world’s response to these facts easily reveals the following. If none of the lead- ing world powers were involved in the regime change, the “regime-changers” were promptly re- moved. In all other cases (that is, when the strings were pulled from abroad), the new regime was gradually legalized, not by all of the geopolitical rivals, of course, but by one of the camps of the powers that be. In any case, a regime change requires protesting crowds: without them no revolution or re- gime change is possible. At different times in history, revolutionary crowds had different make- ups: young officers from noble Russian families in the 19th century (the Decembrists); Russian workers of the first half of the 20th century; the intellectuals who led the “liberal-democratic” per- estroika of the late 1980s; Solidarnost across the border in Poland during the latter half of the 1980s; the “national team” of disgruntled people in Greece; and the worldweb-inspired Arab Spring. In other words, essentially anyone can feel “humiliated and insulted” (Dostoyevsky) for whatever reason, even if they prefer to keep it to themselves. Some of the forces among the powers that be invariably admit that the protesters are right. This cannot be otherwise because power can only be undermined by a lack of agreement (latent or carefully concealed) in the country’s upper echelons (“the ruling classes should be going through a governmental crisis” as Lenin put it). Whether the opposition at the top is highly ideological or inspired from abroad is irrelevant: oppo- sition is an inevitable element of domestic political trouble. This perfectly fits what Raymond Tanter said about a possible “Islamic revolution” in Az- erbaijan. Is its soil fertile enough? If the answer is “yes,” we need to ask who will pump up the protest potential in the religious sphere? On the whole, much has happened in this sphere: there is a law that bans unregistered religious communities (some observers regard this as an encroachment on the freedom of association). Under the new law, experts of the State Committee for Religious Structures have the right to ban, without going to the court, publication and dissemination of reli- gious literature. Some of the experts described the ban as a violation of Constitutional norms (al- though they agreed that religious literature should be limited to licensed bookshops). There is a ban on religious rites performed by clergy educated abroad; the hijab was banned from schools; TV has discontinued practically all religious programs. The faithful, and other social groups for that mat- ter, are hardly delighted. On the other hand, closure of a large number of mosques created numerous problems because those who attended them still need prayer houses. Friday services should be performed for large 144 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION crowds; some of those who attended the closed mosques stayed there for hours: they talked to elders or tried to find the truth in hour-long vigils. Where are they now? Who are they speaking to, what sort of information are they receiving? This and the contradictions between mazhabs (of which I have written above) are creating ten- sion that cannot and should not be ignored, even though this situation will probably not explode if and when external forces try to upset the present fragile balance in the country. Today, religious peace is high on the list of priorities of the Azeri powers wishing to consolidate the state’s stability.

How Can Social Unity Be Achieved?

We all know that society is arranged “in order of size” (if the term is applicable at all). This situation usually leads to a lack of understanding between the supporters of secular and religious ways of development. In real life, the leeway is not that constrained. Many of those prepared to follow the secular path leave much space for religious people without, however, pushing them to the fore. On the other hand, there are religious people prepared to accept “secularly minded citi- zens” in a religious state. On the whole, the variants of the above are numerous. It is good if the leeway (no matter how limited) exists. What can be done if it is absent? Both sides abound in people who refuse to listen to their opponents or to familiarize themselves with their ideas. This not merely limits the space for those prepared to look for common points: mutual animosity separates people. This is the natural outcome in a situation where some people perceive everyone wearing miniskirts or open tops as the enemy, while others hate beards and shortened trousers. This gradually develops into a situation in which the faithful are perceived as aliens by the secular, or vice versa. It is highly important to create a communicative-innovational space in which all citizens will be listened to and heard. In this case, living and developing ideas will no longer be disseminated in a space isolated from the life of society. This can be organized as a center (or any other structure)—the form is unimportant. What is important is to overcome the “hostile” (in some cases inverted commas look superfluous) attitudes. In so doing, we will undermine the plans (ideological or imposed) of groups of citizens to alienate themselves from society. Without this, all plans designed to stabilize the situation inside the Muslim community and between it and the secular part of the Azeri society are doomed to failure. In the absence of a communicative-innovational space, the defrosted critical mass might ig- nite confrontation. We cannot say what might happen; all forecasts will prove futile because exter- nal forces acting through agents inside the country might use the artificially fanned chaos in their own interests. We know that not all population groups are prepared to listen to alternative opinions, but we should start moving in this direction as soon as possible. We have approached the stage at which an Azeri Muslim civil identity should be formed that presupposes the active involvement of all people in building an edifice of civil society. As the first step in this direction, we need a single center engaged in creating conceptual foundations for the development of the ummah by consolidating the intellectu- al potential of the expert community and the spiritual elite. This will bring us closer to elements of the ummah as an attribute of civil society based on Islamic values, which will make the socially creative potential of Islam one of the cornerstones of the country’s foundation. This prospect is absolutely logical. In 2010, when speaking at the Baku summit of religious leaders Globalization, Religion and Traditional Values, President Ilham Aliev described Azerbaijan Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 145 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION as “a natural bridge between Europe and Asia” and spoke of Islam as “our holy religion.” He went on to say that globalization was a relatively new phenomenon and that “we must not under the pressure of globalization forget about our national values. We must continue to maintain them” to avoid the norms “that have nothing to do with our national mentality” and that are imposed on the country under the pretext of globalization. The president of Azerbaijan developed the ideas which Heydar Aliev first formulated at the international symposium Islamic Civilization of the Caucasus held in Baku in 1998. He then pointed out that “we accept the Islamic culture and Islamic cultural wealth as they were given in our sacred book, the Koran” and added that “Azerbaijan may become a Research Center of Islamic Civilization in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan has the right to this.” The important question is to what extent is the ummah ready? Or, more specifically: “Are there people in the confessional milieu able to address tasks of global importance?”

Conclusion

Science and education are two pivots of the social and economic success and spiritual and moral health of any society. In July 2011, the government and parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia passed a law under which lessons in Islam were introduced into the school curriculum for Muslim students starting in the 2012/13 academic year. According to Minister of Education Sylvia Lermann, the new subject will help Muslims to integrate. Can we be absolutely sure that if a similar law is passed in Azerbaijan there will be enough knowledgeable teachers to supply our children with adequate information? We need a Council for Islamic Education; we need standards of Islamic based on unified programs for higher and secondary Islamic educational establishments, as well as textbooks on all religious disciplines. All mazhabs should be involved in the process to avoid some of them possibly rejecting the teaching programs. Hopefully, their concerted efforts will bring them closer; primary and secondary religious education inside the country will take the edge off the debatable issue of religious education abroad. This will bring to light the creative potential of Islam in the spiritual, cultural, social, and educational spheres. In fact, back in the 19th century prominent Tatar scholar, teacher, and enlightener Husain Faiz- khanov put forward a comprehensive conception of religious and secular education for the Russian Muslim Tatars that included the creation of a group of well-educated secular and religious Tatar elite; in other words, he wanted to provide Tatars with higher secular and religious education. The imperial powers objected; in 1870 Emperor Alexander II signed The Rules on the Measures Designed to Educate Non-Russians Living in Russia, which described “Russianization of all non- Russians in order to blend them with Russians” as the main task. It is different today; it seems that time has come to revive Faizkhanov’s approach. A certain number of places at higher educational establishments that train specialists needed in the national economy can be reserved for religiously-oriented Muslims: any religious educational establishment, either a madrasah or an institute, concentrates on teaching religious and related sub- jects, while state education supplies secular knowledge as well. We may also come back to the idea Damir Mukhetdinov, First Deputy Chairman of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of European Russia (DUMER) and member of the RF Public Council, formulated three years ago. He said that there were two types of higher Muslim education best suited to the post-Soviet expanse integrated, as fully as possible, in the secular legal context. The graduates of madrasahs and Islamic institutes and either enter secular higher educational establish- ments to continue their studies under close supervision of the Spiritual Administrations of Muslims, 146 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION or they receive higher secular education while being shakirds (pupils) of religious educational estab- lishments. The advantages are obvious: well- educated diplomaed ulemas will be able to stand op- posed to self-imposed Islamic scholars who profess radicalism.11 Not everyone will be ready to accept this, but no one will reject it outright. Before criticizing others we should look at ourselves; we are all fond of discussing and condemning others, and of look- ing for and finding faults with others to exonerate ourselves. Let’s move from idle talk to practical moves. Each and everyone should recognize that if today we fail to arrive at important conclusions about what is going on in the ummah, we will deprive our society and the state of a chance to grow, move forward, and prosper.

11 See: D.V. Mukhetdinov, “Uchastie gosudarstva v sisteme religioznogo obrazovaniia rossiyskikh musulman,” available at [http://pda.islamrf.ru/news/umma/islam-world/2876/].

Lyubov SATUSHIEVA

Ph.D. (Law), Assistant Professor at the Department of Constitutional and Administrative Law, Berbekov State University of Kabardino-Balkaria (Nalchik, the Russian Federation).

NATIONAL CULTURES IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN THE 19TH-EARLY 20TH CENTURIES

Abstract

he author traces the history of the le- tions with it as early as the 17th-18th cen- T gal status of the national cultures of turies, they did not turn their attention to the peoples who became integrated the national cultures until much later. In the into the Russian Empire at different times Russian Empire, the rights of ethnic minor- (the North Caucasian peoples in particu- ities to confess their own religion and de- lar). Whereas the Russian authorities had velop their own cultures were only partially to accept Islam and establish legal rela- recognized.

Introduction

Many times throughout its history the Caucasus, a far from simple region, has been a pivotal point in Russian policy when Russian society entered a period of transition and revised its basic prin- ciples. In the 18th-20th centuries, the law, as a multifunctional social regulator, was an important part Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 147 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of Russia’s Caucasian policy. In the last few decades, there has been an outburst of interest in legal regulation in the Caucasus in line with the transition period experienced by Russian society and the Russian state. While the South Caucasian states have been building their own legal systems, the Northern Caucasus, as part of the Russian Federation, has been going along with the rest of the state. The current fairly complicated national and religious problems show that control over national and religious spheres is still very much needed. Today, the efforts of the radical Islamic leaders to replace the Russian legal system in the Northern Caucasus with the Shari‘a have added new dimen- sions to the history of Russian law in the region. (The radical Islamic leaders argue that the Shari‘a, the Islamic legal system, was and is much closer to the North Caucasian peoples, who find it much more understandable.) Today, the question of the legal status of the national cultures of the peoples of the Russian Empire, which for some time and for several reasons remained outside the scope of the Russian laws, still stirs up heated debates and discussions. n First, national culture was identified with religious (mostly Islamic) culture. n Second, as Olga Belyaeva has written, “For historical reasons, the Russian Empire took shape as a unitary centralized multinational state. State administration in the national regions took into account, to a certain extent, the historical, socioeconomic, cultural, everyday, and religious specifics of the regions’ autochthonous population.” The system of state governance geared at these specifics was never adjusted to the social, economic, and political changes in Russian society, the growing national self-awareness of the non-Russian peoples, and their mounting desire to achieve national-state self-identification.1

Legal Foundations for Preserving the Cultures of the North Caucasian Peoples in the Latter Half of the 19th Century

At the formal (official) level, the Russian imperial authorities declared that all peoples who joined the empire would preserve their specific cultures. In 1837, for example, the war minister in- structed Velyaminov, who commanded the troops stationed on the Caucasian Line and in the Black Sea area, to inform the peoples of the Sunzha, Kabarda, and Kuban lines that “their rights to the lands, faith, and customs of their ancestors will be preserved and that His Majesty the Emperor asked that they be assured that no one had any intention of depriving them of these rights and that their loyal service would be rewarded.”2 Private sources of the same period, however, such as memoirs of offic- ers who served in the Northern Caucasus, showed that respect for the ethnic cultures of Caucasian mountain dwellers was an illusion. For example, in 1842, officer Sergey Bezobrazov had the follow- ing to say about the culture of the North Caucasian mountain dwellers: “The entire Caucasian Range and the numerous tribes who live there should not be regarded as a fortress, or an army, or a nation but, as I said in the very beginning, the shelter of proud and inveterate robbers.”3 In his memoirs, Bezobrazov described the North Caucasian peoples as savage Caucasian tribes.4

1 See: O.V. Belyaeva, Voprosy gosudartsvennogo ustroystva v Gosudarstvennoy dume dorevolutsionnoy Rossii, Author’s abstract of Ph.D. thesis, Moscow, 2004, pp. 11-12. 2 State Military-Historical Archives of Russia, rec. gr. 13454, inv. 2, f. 281, p. 1rev. 3 S.D. Bezobrazov, “Rassuzhdenie i mnenie o pokorenii Kavkaza 1842 goda,” in: Kavkazskiy sbornik, Vol. 2 (34), Moscow, 2005, p. 141. 4 See: Ibidem. 148 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In the early half of the 19th century, the Russian officials who put the main principles of state power into practice in the newly acquired regions frequently described them as national regions. In fact, they regarded religion and legal regulations established on customary law as national specifics rather than national cultures based primarily on the native language. Cultural assimilation was the obvious and dominant trend in the empire’s outskirts with a non-Russian population. Russian polit- ical ideology stressed Russia’s civilizational mission in the newly acquired lands. We can learn the details from notes left by numerous travelers who visited these parts in the first half of the 19th century. For example, the state opened a school in the fortress of Nalchik for boys of 13-14 from families of elders of Karachais, Kabardins, etc., where the pupils were taught in Russian. “The government, which opened the school, was guided by wise political considerations. Children of the local people will readjust their original ideas and gradually abandon their dislike of the Russians. They will return home more educated, more developed, and more receptive to European customs.”5 “The children are kept in decent conditions and are dressed according to local customs. Under a Muslim mullah they observe all the fasts prescribed by the Koran, and the Russians are very far from the thought of converting them to .” “Thanks to the efforts of the Russian govern- ment, their dispositions become softer, children of the local princes and uzdenes (common peo- ple.—Ed.) are educated in Russia and enter Russian service where they become aware of the advan- tages of civilization… The customs of these people (the Kabardins) can be changed only through civilization.”6 The way the imperial authorities treated the local (traditional) elites of the mountain peoples serves as the best example of how the empire treated the culture of the peoples in the recently ac- quired territories. From the very beginning, Russia was interested in the North Caucasian elites; it tried to incorporate the mountain nobility into the imperial administrative-political system in order to adjust the Russian administrative structures to the local conditions. As a rule the local police (formed as a military guard) was based on the local elites. E. Bitova has written that members of all the Balkar noble families were in the Russian service. She has pointed out that “the constant Rus- sian military presence in the Caucasus and the oaths of allegiance and service of the Balkar no- bles in the Russian army not so much destroyed the traditionally high political status of the tau- bies (feudal lords.—Ed.) who possessed considerable administrative, military and judicial power in their societies as changed its quality. Those members of the mountain nobility who demon- strated loyalty to the Russian czar and ensured social and political stability in their societies could expect privileges according to the new principles considered legitimate by the Russian government. A certain, fairly small, part of Balkar society, its ethnic elite, was involved in the sphere of Russian culture.”7 On the other hand, the legal status of the national cultures of the peoples recently incorporated into the Russian Empire was created by the imperial administration, which regarded the traditions made part of the governance system as an instrument for legitimizing Russia’s power in the Northern Caucasus. Historians have confirmed this. E. Bitova, for example, has pointed out that at the first stage of incorporation of the Northern Caucasus into the Russian Empire (the 18th-early 19th centu- ries), the military administration was combined with local self-administration, local traditions, and the local institutions. This was done, writes she, to ensure a smooth transfer to the new system of governance and recognition of its legitimacy.8 Under Vicegerent of the Caucasus Mikhail Vorontsov,

5 J.-Ch. de Bess, “Puteshestvennik v Krym, na Kavkaz, v Gruziiu, Armeniiu, Maluiu Aziiu i v Konstantinopol v 1829 i 1830 godakh,” in: Adygi, Balkartsy i Karachaevtsy v izvestiiakh evropeiskikh avtorov XIII-XIX vekov, Compiled by V.K. Gardanov, Nalchik, 1974, pp. 337-338. 6 I.F. Blaramberg, “Istoricheskoe, topograficheskoe, statisticheskoe, etnograficheskoe i voennoe opisanie Kavka- za,” in: Adygi, Balkartsy…, p. 415. 7 E.G. Bitova, “Balkarskaia znat v usloviiakh vkliuchenia v administrativno-politicheskuiu sistemu Rossiyskoy im- perii,” Istoricheskiy vestnik, Vol. 2, Nalchik, 2005, pp. 152-153. 8 See: Ibid., p. 145. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 149 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION it became the rule to appoint local people to official posts; they were involved in drafting laws and administrative decisions.9 Vladimir Degoev believes that Russian bureaucrats in the Caucasus, whom he calls the “enlight- ened ‘colonial’ bureaucracy,” abandoned the arrogant Kulturträger (a bearer of culture) approach toward the spiritual life of the “savages” and the “temptation to compare it with Russian-European values in the context of the ‘higher-lower’ or ‘better-worse’ categories.” Russian bureaucrats had in mind not absorption as E. Bitova, another expert in Caucasian studies, believes,10 “but shaping a phenomenon which Canadian historian H. Rhinelander aptly called a national-imperial culture. Finally, it was this rather than any other formula that triumphed in the late 19th and 20th centuries despite the objective and subjective obstacles.”11 Vladimir Degoev has pointed out that the Russian authorities in the Northern Caucasus wanted to create an imperial supra-ethnic and supra-confes- sional identity of the local peoples… This policy is often defined by the not entirely correct or at least conventional term “Russification.” In fact, it was a much wider, much more capacious, and more complicated civilizational process, which deserves a different term. I think that it was rather “imperial self-identification” of the individual, class, and society taking shape under the impact of explicit material and spiritual stimuli and the specific cultural and ideological environment, which presupposes a conscious and free choice.12 Degoev further writes that “national specifics were not squeezed out or suppressed; they were blended with imperial culture in a very natural way and augmented and enriched it.”13 “While Russia was reinforcing its position in the Caucasus, the two cultures lived through the difficulties of mutual adaptation. The Russian generals regarded their ‘civilizational mission’ as an absolute boon and not infrequently identified it with their absolute right to bring the Caucasian peoples ‘the light of reason and enlightenment.’”14 Vladimir Degoev believes that “despite the considerable civilizational distinctions between the Trans-Caucasus and the Northern Caucasus, Russia was pursuing similar policies in both sub-regions designed to achieve their geostrategic, political, sociocultural, ideological, and economic integration into the imperial system” through different means.15 Andreas Kappeler occupies a more flexible position on the legal status of the national cultures of the recently joined peoples. On the whole, he is convinced that Russia had no consistent national policy16 and turns to the theoretical model currently popular in the West. Formulated by K. Deut- sch, E. Gellner, and M. Groch, it divided the nations of Europe into “small” and “large.” The “large” peoples had their elite, developed culture and the living tradition of statehood; the “small” peoples, on the other hand, could not boast a fully developed social structure; their tradition of high culture and statehood was either non-existent or interrupted. There were also intermediary types.17 Andreas Kappeler regards the North Caucasian highlanders as a “small” people.18 In the 19th cen- tury, culture was as important as religion for the development of the mountain peoples. Kappeler, however, has pointed out that throughout the 19th century the peoples of the Russian Empire were drawn into national movements which the imperial authorities suppressed by limiting their cooper- ation only to the elites of the non-Russian movements. “The new national elements did not fit the

9 See: Ibid., p. 152. 10 See: Ibid., p. 141. 11 V.V. Degoev, “Kavkaz v sostave Rossii: formirovanie imperskoy identichnosti,” in: Kavkazskiy sbornik, Vol. 1 (33), Moscow, 2002, p. 34. 12 See: Ibid., p. 38. 13 Ibid., p. 47. 14 Ibid., p. 40. 15 Ibid., p. 45. 16 See: A. Kappeler, “Natsionalnye dvizheniia i natsionalnaia politika v Rossiyskoy imperii: opyt sistematizatsii (XIX-1917),” in: Rossia v XX veke. Problemy natsionalnykh otnosheniy, ed. By A.N. Sakharov, V.A. Mikhaylov, Mos- cow, 1999, p. 107. 17 See: Ibid., p. 101. 18 Ibid., p. 104. 150 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION traditional imperial principles, therefore Russia could not develop into a national state like France or Germany.”19 Even though the Russian Empire was moving toward a law-governed state with dominating le- gal principles, it was still a country of political expediency; this is amply shown by the legal regula- tion of national-religious relations between the Russian authorities and the non-titular peoples (the term applied was inorodtsy, non-Russians), that is, peoples who became part of the empire in the 17th-19th centuries. In the Russian Empire, national and religious relations were regulated by secular laws; the state was obviously determined to gradually transfer the rights of Russian subjects of the empire to all the peoples incorporated in it and to create a mechanism for observing these rights, i.e. a mechanism for realizing the rights of the Russian Muslims. On the whole, the legal regulations applied to three groups of the population: (1) regulation of legal relations between the state and the non-Russian contingent of the em- pire; (2) limitation of the rights of non- (mainly Jews and Muslims); (3) disenfranchisement of certain nationalities (mainly Jews). In fact, the rights and duties of the Muslim clergy and all the Russian Muslims were formulated by (1) Russian secular legislation which partly took into account the regulations of the adat (cus- tomary law) and the Shari‘a (Muslim law) and (2) ad hoc instructions and other documents. The Caucasian War was one of the decisive factors that affected national and religious policy in the Northern Caucasus; it helped the empire to consolidate its power in the alternating periods of war and peace. In the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries, military authorities, which used military methods to rule the local people, predominated; civil authorities, in turn, tried to modernize the life of the North Caucasian mountain peoples through laws and legal reforms. This meant that the legal sta- tus of the North Caucasian Muslims was determined mainly by instructions and other documents is- sued by the military, which remained in force for indefinitely long periods of time.

The Legal Foundations for Preserving the Cultures of the North Caucasian Peoples in the Latter Half of the 19th Century

The way the Russian authorities treated the traditional system of power, viz. communal rela- tions, revealed the general trend of Russia’s policy in the cultural sphere. Khasan Dumanov deemed it necessary to point out that “the customary legal regulations relating to the functioning of the village community underwent considerable changes. The czarist administration, which preserved the com- munity among the Kabardins, patterned it on the Russian community based on mutual responsibility of its members who answered not only for themselves but also for all the other members.”20 Tradi- tions were used in many other ways to improve the administrative systems. In 1894, a Temporary Statute on Measures Designed to Restrain the Local Population of the Terek Region from Plundering

19 See: Ibid., pp. 101, 105, 108. 20 Kh.M. Dumanov, Obychnoe imushchestvennoe pravo kabardintsev, Nalchik, 1976, p. 20. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 151 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and Especially from Using Violence against the People of Non-Local Origin appeared, which legal- ized the tradition of the mountain peoples: mutual responsibility for each case of stealing if no culprit was found. This rule was widely applied in the event of stealing from Russians living in the Northern Caucasus. V. Matveev believes that the traditional administrative structures in the Northern Caucasus preserved by the military-popular administration helped Russia to control the situation. The adminis- trative system “relied on long-term political compromise,” the final aim of which was to help the mountain people adjust to Russia and acquire a common Russian civil self-identity.21 Olga Belyaeva writes: “In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Russian Empire was a con- tinental multinational state that ensured relative domestic security, external stability, and develop- ment for its population; it possessed enough economic potential and military might to maintain the balance of power on the world scene.”22 “According to most historians of law and lawyers, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Russia was a unitary state. Constitutional law described a unitary state as an integral state with no state units, while administrative territorial units have no political inde- pendence.”23 At the same time, multinational unitary states have certain specifics: “In states where different nationalities live compactly in their own territories, a certain degree of decentralization— autonomous administrative structures for certain peoples—is permitted.”24 In the Northern Caucasus, Russia preserved communal organization and partly legalized tradi- tional courts of justice, which used customary law. The Mountain Courts of Justice organized by the Russians applied the regulations of customary law in the Kuban and Terek regions. This judicial sys- tem replaced the previous Judicial Statute of 1864. The Decree which introduced it said the following: “…in places occupied by mountain peoples the vicegerent of the Caucasus is vested with the right to identify the time when magistrates can be introduced on an equal footing with those operating in plac- es populated by Russians; before this happens the disputes between mountain dwellers (which the judicial statutes of 20 November, 1864 related to the competence of justices of the peace) should re- main in the competence of the Mountain Oral Courts of Justice, which should acquire a new status as soon as the vicegerent of the Caucasus deems it timely.”25 Under the Decree, so-called Temporary Rules were elaborated for the Mountain Courts and approved by the vicegerent of the Caucasus on 18 December, 1870. They were expected to function until the judicial statutes of 20 October, 1864 had been enacted; they functioned until 1917. There were three conditions that determined whether a case fell under the jurisdiction of the Mountain Courts: the litigant should belong to mountain tribe, the district should be within the territorial jurisdiction of the mountain court, and the type of case itself26 ; these courts dealt with criminal and civil cases. “On the whole, the Mountain Oral Court relies on the local customs and applies the general imperial laws in cases that have no precedence in the local cus- toms,”27 as well as divorces and cases of inheritance according to the Shari‘a. There were also aul courts of justice which dealt with petty offences and insults in mosques.28 According to Dilyara Usmanova, whereas at the earlier stages limitations in Russian legislation were mostly related to the religious sphere, at later stages limitations for national reasons predominat- ed.29 It seems, however, that the attitude toward the national cultures of non-Russians was much sim-

21 See: V.A. Matveev, “K voprosu o posledstviyakh Kavkazskoy voyny i vkhozhdenii severokavkazskihk narodov v sostav Rossii,” in: Kavkazskaia voyna: uroki istorii i sovremennost: Materialy nauchnoy konferentsii, Krasnodar, 1995, p. 196. 22 O.V. Belyaeva, op. cit., p. 15. 23 Ibidem. 24 Ibid., p. 16. 25 N.M. Reynke, N.M. Agishev, V.D. Bushen, Materaily po obozreniiu gorskikh i narodnykh sudov Kavkazskogo kraia, St. Petersburg, 1912, p. 10. 26 See: Ibid., pp. 12-13. 27 Ibid., p. 15. 28 See: Ibid., p. 13. 29 See: D.M. Usmanova, Musulmanskie predstaviteli v rossiiskom parlamente 1906-1916, Kazan, 2005, p. 91. 152 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION pler and much more understandable than the state’s religious policy. In his article “O raznoplemen- nosti v naselenii gosudarstv” (On States’ Tribal Patchiness) written in 1911, Dmitry Milyutin, Minis- ter of War in 1861-1880, outlined the principles of the empire’s national policy and pointed out that “Russia should remain united and undivided;” he denounced the centrifugal processes that were gain- ing momentum in the empire’s outskirts.30 By the late 19th -early 20th centuries, the straightforward Russification policy bore its first fruit. National cultures in the outskirts, in the Northern Caucasus in particular, weakened while assimilation of the mountain peoples gained momentum. Early in the 20th century, several Moscow lawyers prophesied the following: “Over the course of time and as culture penetrated the mass of the mountain peoples and partly because of their natural assimilation with the Russians (even if barely discernible), many of the law-related customs of the highlanders lost their previous importance.”31 Russia’s policy in the sphere of education was the main issue in Russia’s attitude toward the national cultures of non-Russians. On the whole, documents of the latter half of the 19th century show that in the 1870s the impe- rial authorities began imposing the so-called Ilminsky system on the non-Russians based on a combi- nation of the native and Russian languages. It had been tested in the Volga area and then moved to the Caucasus.32 Starting in the 1880s, those who ruled the Caucasian vicegerency concentrated on education “as the most effective method for raising the moral level of the local people and bringing them closer to the dominant nation.”33 Early in the 20th century, Caucasian Vicegerent Illarion Vorontsov-Dashkov was convinced that the Ilminsky system perfectly suited the Caucasus.34 He further wrote that “the task of the comprehensive schools in inland Russia is to raise the intellectual level of people. The comprehensive schools in the Caucasus should plant the among the people who speak their own languages; Russian is undoubtedly the most important factor in unifying the numer- ous autochthonous tribes with the empire.”35 He was displeased with the desire of the North Cauca- sian Muslims to develop education in their native languages and teach the fundamentals of Islam. He also wrote that “under the general nationalist sentiments the local Caucasian society has awakened to the need to teach native Caucasian languages in secondary educational establishments.”36 The Rus- sian authorities intended to continue this policy. In his memorandum on the Muslim question, Minis- ter of Internal Affairs Alexander Makarov suggested that educational efforts in Russian should be invigorated in the Muslim regions.37 In the 1990s, modernization of historical science and jurisprudence led to the emergence of sev- eral points of view among those academics who analyzed the imperial policies in the national out- skirts among the non-Russians. On the one hand, local, in particular North Caucasian, academics, believe that in the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries the North Caucasian highlanders became victims of “cultural” genocide. Zhilyabi Kalmykov, for example, deems it necessary to point out that not until the 1990s “could [historians] liberate themselves from the Great Power ideological schemes of czarism and Sta- linism.” He goes on to say that the North Caucasian mountain dwellers “lived through a long period

30 See: D.A. Milyutin, “O raznoplemennosti v naselenii gosudarstv,” Istochnik, No. 1, 2003, p. 51. 31 N.M. Reynke, N.M. Agishev, V.D. Bushen, op. cit., pp. 113-114. 32 See: Sbornik dokumentov i statey po voprosu ob obrazovanii inorodtsev, St. Petersburg, 1869. 33 Grand Prince, Vicegerent of the Caucasus Mikhail Nikolaevich, “Zapiska ‘O meropriiatiiakh k vozvysheniiu urovnya grazhdanskogo blagosostoianiia i dukhovnogo preuspeniia naseleniia Kavkazskogo kraia’ (1879 g.),” in Kavka- zskiy sbornik, Vol. 2 (34), Moscow, 2005, p. 154. 34 See: Vorontsov-Dashkov, Vsepoddaneyshaia Zapiska po upravleniiu Kavkazskim kraem, St. Petersburg, 1907, pp. 108-109. 35 Ibid., p. 103. 36 Ibid., p. 115. 37 See: A.A. Makarov, “Ob’yasnitelnaia zapiska po ‘musulmanskomu voprosu’,” Istochnik, No. 1, 2002, p. 64. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 153 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION when the traditional social and political institutions of the Kabardins and Balkars were violently bro- ken down to be replaced with colonial law and order.”38 Ekaterina Vorobyeva argues that in the 19th century the Russian Empire steered toward an “in- tegral” state based on the idea of state unity, a single nation, and the policy of drawing peoples closer together, while the peoples, on the contrary, were striving for national development.39 These ideas and trends became especially prominent in the latter half of the 19th century when “imperial policy demonstrated a trend toward cultural and administrative unification. This presupposed that the impe- rial authorities interfered much more than before in the lives of the non-Russian communities, the cultural specifics of which came to be regarded as an obstacle on the road toward integration.” Fur- thermore, “the mounting national movements, on the one hand, and the changed imperial project, on the other, created a new problem—the ‘non-Russians’ issue, a mosaic of smaller elements such as Polish, Finnish, Jewish, Muslim, etc.”40 Successful implementation of the autocratic strategy would have transformed the Russian Empire into an “integral” state. Imperial policy meant unification of the empire and sustainable unity. Ekaterina Vorobyeva has written the following: “In the multinational Russian Empire unification of the state into a single entity meant that the empire should be unified administratively, socially, and culturally. Though never consistent and never equally applied to all non-Russian subjects, the principle of ‘state unity’ became dominant in imperial ideology and prac- tice... This ideology served as the prism through which the Russian Muslims were scrutinized, the cultural specifics of whom proved an important impediment to integration.”41 On the other hand, many Russian historians (A. Avramenko, O. Matveev, P. Matyushchenko, V. Ratushnyak) contest the very formulation of the problem. “Recently, it has become popular to accuse Russia of genocide. While agreeing that the Caucasian War was a tragedy which shaped the his- torical fates of the Adighes, the authors doubt that the term ‘genocide’ is applicable to the way czarism treated the Adighes… Genocide presupposes deliberate extermination of certain groups because of their ethnic, racial, religious, or other affiliations… In the course of the Caucasian War, Russia fought only those who refused to lay down their arms and obey Russian autocracy. Those Adighes who did this and agreed to move to the Kuban and Laba preserved their language, culture, and self-administration. Even before the revolution they were educated in St. Petersburg and joined the Russian intellectual elite. There was no intention of scattering the Adighes across Russia; they have been preserved as an ethnic group; in Turkey, on the other hand, much was done to assimilate them.”42

Large-Scale Eviction of the North Caucasian Highlanders to the Middle East

This means that the academic community is divided over the question of whether the mass evic- tion of many of the North Caucasian mountain dwellers to the Middle East was “cultural genocide” and whether the national cultures survived. Here is how different authors answered the questions in the 1990s-2000s.

38 Zh.A. Kalmykov, “Administrativno-sudebnye preobrazovania v Kabarde i gorskikh (balkarskikh) obshchestvakh v gody russko-kavkazskoy voyny,” in: Kavkazskaia voyna: uroki istorii i sovremennost, p. 116. 39 See: E.I. Vorobyeva, Musulmanskiy vopros v imperskoy politike rossiiskogo samoderzhavia: vtoraya polovina XIX veka—fevral 1917 goda, Author’s abstract of Ph.D. thesis, St. Petersburg, 1998, p. 5. 40 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 41 See: Ibid., p. 169. 42 A.M. Avramenko, O.V. Matveev, P.P. Matyushchenko, V.N. Ratushnyak, “Ob otsenke Kavkazskoy voyny s nauchnykh pozitsy istorizma,” in: Kavkazskaia voyna: uroki istorii i sovremennost, p. 39. 154 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

According to Oleg Matveev, the Russian military and civilian authorities in the Northern Cau- casus did a lot to promote and develop the local cultures. “An analysis of the ethno-political and so- cio-cultural impact of the Caucasian War proves that Russian statehood and the Great Power and imperial principles not only preserved but also created new ethnic communities. The latter acquired imperial thinking to serve as the vehicles, builders, and guardians of Russian statehood rather than becoming narrow-minded separatists.”43 Many authors are devoted to obviously pro-Russian imperial positions and tend to justify eve- rything that was done. Fedor Troyno, for example, deems it necessary to point out that “cultural influ- ence proved beneficial: this was first time in their history that the mountain peoples acquired a nation- al intelligentsia. Many village communities asked the authorities to open secular schools and collect- ed money to maintain them. Young mountain dwellers mainly from privileged social groups were educated in grammar schools and universities in Russia. The Caucasian peoples gained access to the achievements of world civilization and contributed to Russian culture.”44 Valery Maltsev, in turn, pointed out that “the traditions of administration of the time of the Caucasian War—military-admin- istrative structures, legislative limitations, limited rights of part of the empire’s population—caused by the government’s vacillations and its counter-reformist course in the last decade of the 19th centu- ry slowed down the process of integration of the Northern Caucasus into the social, political, and economic structure of the Russian Empire and revealed its ‘specific situation’ of sorts in this re- spect.”45 Alexander Siver has admitted that there were attempts to acculturate the North Caucasian mountain dwellers, although, first, it was a natural process when a stronger culture engulfs a weaker one; and second, the assimilated peoples profited from this. He writes that “in the Russian Empire acculturation of the Adighes proceeded in two key directions: natural acculturation realized through acceptance of novelties and targeted acculturation realized by the Russian authorities; in fact, these intertwined phenomena cannot be separated. Indeed, targeted acculturation confirmed the dominant position and high prestige of Russian culture, which contributed to natural acculturation.”46

Conclusion

It should be said that the Russian Empire partially recognized the rights of non-Russians to con- fess their religions and cultivate their ethnic cultures. The bourgeois-democratic reforms of the 1860s-1870s changed the entire system of civil and criminal law; all physical persons (with the exception of women), all subjects of the empire (formally irrespective of their ethnic and religious affiliation and social status) became entities of civil law. An analysis of the principles on which the state and the individual cooperated revealed that the Russian state granted all of its peoples, first, personal rights as subjects of the empire and, second, collective rights and duties as peoples belonging to non-Russian ethnic groups with different religious affilia- tions. The legal status of Islam in different regions of the Russian Empire was different; it depended on the time when different Muslim peoples became incorporated into the Russian Empire. The North- ern Caucasus became part of Russian statehood much later than the other regions; this explains why the region lacked a legal system for regulating the status of Muslims.

43 O.V. Matveev, Kavkazskaia voyna na Severo-Zapadnom Kavkaze i ee politicheskie i sotsiokulturnye posledstvi- ia, Author’s abstract of Ph.D. thesis, Krasnodar, 1996. 44 F.P. Troyno, “Kavkazskaia voyna i sudby gorskikh narodov,” in: Kavkazskaia voyna: uroki istorii i sovremen- nost, pp. 87-88. 45 V.N. Maltsev, “Vliianie Kavkazskoy voyny na administrativno-sudebnye reformy na Severnom Kavkaze vtoroy poloviny XIX veka,” in: Kavkazskaia voyna: uroki istorii i sovremennost, pp. 265-267. 46 A.V. Siver, Shapsugis. Etnicheskaia istoria i identifikatsia, Nalchik, 2002, p. 110. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 155 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

A careful analysis of the Russian laws revealed that, on the whole, they never prevented non- Russians from gaining the same civil rights as the Russians, even though there were many exceptions (acquiring the status of a Russian noble, etc.), a sure sign that in the 17th-early 20th centuries the Muslims were discriminated against because of their religious or ethnic affiliation.47 The failures in applying Russian laws in practice in the Caucasus should be carefully analyzed to avoid possible blunders when establishing correct relations in North Caucasian society and be- tween it and the external world and when adjusting Russia’s laws to different societies. A historical-legal analysis of how religious specifics were taken into account in the empire’s Muslim regions (in the Northern Caucasus in particular) suggests that in the course of current mod- ernization of Russian legislation, the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religion should contain articles on the special legal status of Russian Muslims. In a contemporary , Islam (which is both a Muslim legal system and the doctrine of a Muslim state) is inevitably limited, while these limitations should be set forth in separate legal documents.

47 See: D.M. Usmanova, op. cit., p. 91. 156 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOHISTORY

Rizvan HUSEYNOV

Deputy Chairman, Center for the Protection of the Rights of Refugees and Forced Migrants of Azerbaijan, Doctorate Candidate, Human Rights Institute, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).

MONUMENTS OF MATERIAL CULTURE AND CONFLICTS IN THE CAUCASUS (A FORTRESS OF IREVAN CASE-STUDY)

Abstract

he author deals with the destruction and Irevan (Irevan Gala), the now destroyed his- T falsification of monuments of material torical and architectural center of Erevan, to culture, one of the most painful reper- illustrate the sad fate of the monuments of cussions of the ethnic conflicts in the Cau- material culture that became victims of the casus. He uses the medieval Fortress of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Introduction

On 23 December, 2011, the Center for the History of the Caucasus at the Azer-Globe Institute of Social and Political Studies organized an event in Baku to mark the 500th anniversary of the Irevan (Erivan) fortress. Today, this is the site on which Erevan, the capital of the Republic of Armenia, is situated. The Center presented a rich collection of documents, archival materials, pictures, and photo- graphs of the medieval Irevan Fortress (Irevan Gala), now destroyed, that used to be the historical Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 157 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION center of Erevan. It was partially preserved until the 1920s, when the leaders of newly formed Soviet Armenia decided to liquidate this monument of medieval Azeri architecture. Armenia picked up the gauntlet and responded to the issues raised in Azerbaijan with a decision to revive the abandoned Old Erevan project; this means that the semblance of a historical center will be knocked together out of several well-preserved buildings of the turn of the 20th century moved to the center from all corners of the republic’s capital. In other words, what was once the medieval center of Erevan will be replaced with an imitation dated to the late 19th and early 20th century. We cannot help but wonder where the ancient architectural monuments are in a city that claims to be the oldest on Earth? The answer is obvious: Erevan has launched a wide-scale architectural-historical falsification of the .

Medieval Irevan as Seen by Painters and Presented in Archival Documents

Chukhursaad, one of the four beylerbeyliks of the Azeri , predated the Irevan (Erivan) khanate situated in the territory of present-day Armenia. In 1504, Shah Ismail of the Safavid dynasty instructed his military leader Revangula Khan to build a fortress in this territory.

Figure 1

1796: View of Irevan and Minarets 158 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The fortress built in seven years occupied a favorable position on the high rocky southeastern banks of the River Zangi (several centuries later the Armenians who came to settle in these lands start- ed calling it Razdan). The new fortress was called Revan in honor of its builder Revangula Khan; later, due to the phonetic specifics of the Turkic languages, it was called Irevan. It was a city of min- arets; there were 8 mosques in the fortress and 800 houses; Azeris were the only residents. In 1827, after twenty-three years of failed attempts to take the fortress, it was finally captured by Russian troops and survived intact until the mid-19th century only to be destroyed in 1864; its walls, which looked very much like the walls of the Icheri Sheher fortress in Baku, were pulled down, the cemeteries destroyed, and the names of the quarters changed, while all the people (Az- eris) were driven out. Figure 2

1927. Irevan. These people call the still standing Palace of the Irevan Sardar the main attraction of the Caucasus

Some of the constructions inside the Irevan Fortress survived until the 1920s when the au- thorities of Soviet Armenia began complete demolition of the fortress, palace, mosques, bathhous- es, and all other buildings that bore a trace of the city’s Muslim and Azeri past. In 1936, when the process was complete, the Armenians started calling their capital, the ancient Azeri city of Irevan (Erivan), Erevan. They destroyed the memory of the person who built the city and of those who once lived in this pearl of Azeri and Muslim architecture. In 2011, the Irevan Fortress would have turned 500. There is, however, material evidence of Erevan’s Azeri past. I have in mind a picture by Franz Roubaud “Surrender of the Erivan Fortress on 1 October, 1827,” which shows the fortress with its mosques, minarets, khan’s palace, and people clad in Muslim clothes. In Armenia, the events that marked the 500th anniversary of the destroyed Irevan Fortress in Baku and the coverage of the events in the Azeri and Russian media were interpreted as a challenge and a threat. The Armenian leaders hastened to instruct historians, architects, officials, public figures, Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 159 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Figure 3

Franz Roubaud’s Surrender of the Erivan Fortress on 1 October, 1827

and the media to refute the facts presented by the Azeris about the sad fate of the historical center of Erevan. The matter here concerns very same medieval Irevan that was destroyed to support the na- tionalist Armenian historical concept claiming that only Armenians comprised the indigenous popu- lation of the territory that is now Armenia, and that, therefore, there can be no other historical and architectural monuments apart from Armenian. The Armenian side, however, failed to make a more or less coherent contribution to the discussion raised by Azerbaijan about the destroyed historical center of Erevan.

The Myth of Erevan being Older than Rome

For several decades now, Armenian academics and the Armenian political establishment have been insisting that the Armenians built Erevan in hoary antiquity and that it was older than Rome. In the 1960s, with the Irevan fortress safely out of the way, historians of Soviet Armenia created a myth that Erebuni-Erevan had been founded in 782 B.C.; they relied on what remained of Teishebaini, an Urartian fortress discovered dozens of kilometers away from the historical center of Erevan. It was clear from the very beginning that the ancient ruins were unrelated either to Erevan or to the Armeni- ans; however, Armenian scholars stood their ground. 160 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Everything began in the 1950s when Soviet archeologists found, at some distance from Erevan, Urartian ruins and a cuneiform tablet, the letters on which were interpreted as RBN. The Armenians immediately offered their own interpretation: these letters stood for Erebuni (that is, Erevan). So the cuneiform tablet became part of the history of the Armenian capital, which invited harsh criticism from prominent Soviet and foreign scholars, including those who had participated in the digs at the fortress. Academician Isaak Mints, Soviet historian of world fame who visited the digs, and equally famous Academician Boris Piotrovsky, archeologist and historian of the Orient, who had participated in the digs, resolutely objected to the Armenian interpretation. The Armenians did not despair: they continued looking for proof that the fortress was part of the history of the Armenians and Erevan. Geologist Suren Ayvazian was especially active; after meeting Academician Piotrovsky, he started arguing about the dates of ancient Armenia. Later, he quoted him as saying: “As a geologist you should know that no natural process passes without a trace. If, as you insist, there was an ancient Armenia of Moses of Chorene (Movses Khorenatsi), I would like to see archeological confirmation of this.”1 Suren Ayvazian did not go far: he selected Metsamor, a Bronze Age settlement, to prove its con- nection with Armenia; he falsified2 drawings of coins bearing allegedly Hayassa (old Armenian) hiero- glyphs, which he dated to the 19th century B.C. and supplied them with what he passed for translations. In 1968, however, when checked at the department of numismatics of the History Museum of Armenia, the coins turned out to be issued in A.D. 1133-1225 by atabeks of Azerbaijan of the dynasty of Ildegizids.3 In the same article, Ayvazian published what he called “the Hayassa inscriptions” he had dis- covered on the rocks of Metsamor which, on closer inspection carried out in 1968 by Prof. V. Krach- kovskaya, turned out to be signs of the Cufic Arab script of the 19th century A.D.4 The recently discovered Teishebaini Fortress, the falsified coins of the Azeri atabeks, and the inscriptions did not prevent the leaders of the Armenian S.S.R. from insisting that the Hayas- sa-Armenian culture had existed in these lands; in 1968, Armenia celebrated the 2,750th anniversary of Erevan. Since that time, the republic has been officially celebrating the mythical age of its capital. It should be said that many Armenian academics, including Suren Ayvazian, who try to prove that Armenia has existed in the Caucasus since hoary antiquity, rely on the work of “father of Arme- nian history” Moses of Chorene, who allegedly lived in the 5th century. Back in the early 19th centu- ry, in the second volume of his Mémoires sur l’Armènie (1819), French Orientalist Jean Antoine Saint-Martin (1791-1832) criticized and exposed a great number of forgeries, inconsistencies, and falsifications in “Ashkharatsuyts” (literally, Picture of the World) ascribed to Moses of Chorene. The French Orientalist published a French translation in the second volume of his Mémoires sur l’Armènie.5 Saint-Martin introduced his work with an article on the epoch when “Ashkharatsuyts” ascribed to Moses of Chorene was written and demonstrated that the work contained information, names, and word usages that could not have appeared earlier than the 10th century; this means that it could not have been written by Moses of Chorene, who lived in the 5th century. In his translation of “Ashkhar- atsuyts,” Armenian academic K. Patkanov partially agreed with the French scholar.6 This means that the work ascribed to Moses of Chorene is not a reliable historical source.

1 S.M. Ayvazian, Istoria Rossii. Armiansky sled, Kron-Press, Moscow, 2000, p. 78. 2 See: S.M. Ayvazian, in: Izvestia Akademii nauk Armyanskoy SSR, Nauki o Zemle Series, XVII, 6, Erevan, 1964. 3 See: B.B. Piotrovsky, “Pismo v redaktsiiu,” Istoriko-filologicheskiy zhurnal, AN Arm. SSR, Erevan, No. 3, 1971, pp. 302-303. 4 See: Ibid., p. 303. 5 See: J.-A. Saint-Martin, Mémoires historiques et géographiques sur l’Arménie, suivis du texte Armenien de l’histoire des princes Orphélians, Paris, 1819, pp. 301-394. 6 See: Armianskaia geografia VII veka po R.Kh (Pripisyvavshaiasia Moiseiu Khorenskomu), Transl. by K.P. Patkanov, Print shop of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, V.O., St. Petersburg, No. 12, 1877, 9 sheets. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 161 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The Fortress of Irevan as a Victim of Armenian Mythology

As soon as Baku published new facts related to the liquidation of the Fortress of Irevan, the medieval historical center of Erevan, the Armenian leaders decided to launch the long abandoned Old Erevan project. Under the project, the center of the Armenian capital will be filled with all sorts of buildings dated to the turn of the 20th century brought from all over the city. It is expected that the result will look like the capital’s historical center. This means that the medieval center of Erevan, which was gradually destroyed by the Armenian leaders in Soviet time and during independence, will be replaced with a semblance of the architecture of the late 19th-early 20th centuries. Erevan, meanwhile, claims to be the world’s most ancient city, but where are its ancient architectural monuments and why do the Armenians need to restore 20 build- ings of the turn of the 20th century? Erevan is clearly launching a huge project of architectural and historical falsification of the old city because the true (medieval) makeup of Irevan (Erivan, today Erevan) is strikingly Muslim, Azeri, to be exact. It cannot be restored without upturning Armenian ideology, which insists that the Arme- nians have been the only ethnicity living in the region for almost 8,000 years. If Erevan wants to re- gain its old makeup, it can rely on a vast number of drafts and plans of the old city; there are pictures by prominent European artists Jules Tavernier and Jean-Baptist Chardin and their Russian colleagues Franz Roubaud and Grigory Gagarin, the latter painting the Fortress of Irevan in the minutest detail in the 19th century. The Armenian leaders declined an offer of help from Azerbaijan made by Deputy Head of Po- litical Studies Sector at the Administration of the President of Azerbaijan Fuad Akhundov: “Even if buildings 100 to 150 years old are disassembled somewhere brick by brick and reassembled in the center of Erevan they will not have any architectural or historical value… We can offer the Arme- nian side these pictures and drawings. I should say that Erevan with the status of the world’s only ancient city without a historical center will become the world’s only city with a newly built histor- ical center.”7 The fact that Armenia declined the offer added an edge to the problem of liquidation of the Azeri architectural monuments and deportation of the Azeris from the Republic of Armenia. By their mere presence, the monuments of Azeri architecture bitterly reproached those who had gradually and consistently been driving the Azeri population out of Armenia and were visible confir- mation of the fact that the Azeris had been living in these lands since time immemorial. For 300 years, the Fortress of Irevan was an administrative and political center of the Irevan Khanate and the source of its power, until czarist Russia moved into Transcaucasia in the 19th centu- ry. This started a series of bloody wars between the Russian, Ottoman, and Persian empires for re- gional domination. For twenty-three years, the Russia Empire tried to capture the strategically impor- tant Fortress of Irevan at the junction of the two other empires. In 1804, ruler of the Irevan Khanate Muhammed Khan, supported by Khan Kelbali of Nakhchivan, managed to defend the fortress against General Tsitsianov’s troops that besieged the fortress. Several years later, on 25 September, 1808, an eight thousand-strong czarist army under General Field Marshal Gudovich besieged the fortress once more; Huseyngulu Khan and his brother Hasan Khan demonstrated no mean military talent in organ- izing defenses. Gudovich retreated empty-handed. Nicholas I, who ascended the throne in 1825, sent a large army of 12 thousand under General Paskevich armed with powerful long-range guns to take the fortress in October 1827. The guns partly ruined the walls; after bloody fighting the fortress was finally captured. Franz Roubaud’s Surrender

7 Fuad Akhundov: “My mozhem predostavit Armenii starye chertezhi dlia vosstanovleniia tsentra Erevana” IA REGNUM, 7 February, 2012, available at [http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1496663.html]. 162 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of the Erivan Fortress on 1 October, 1827 shows the moment when the Russian troops entered the fortress. After taking the fortress, the Russian army did not destroy it. Even when the khanate had been abolished and an Armenian region and then the Irevan Gubernia established, the fortress remained the heart of the city and its main attraction. The fortress was destroyed in 1864; the walls, which looked very much like the walls of the Fortress of Baku, were ruined, the cemeteries destroyed, and the names of the quarters changed, while the Muslims (Azeris, Kurds, and ) were driven out. Total destruction of the fortress and monuments of medieval Azeri architecture started when the Ar- menian S.S.R. was established on the former Azeri lands. In the 1920s, what still remained of the Fortress of Irevan was destroyed by the Armenian au- thorities together with the Sardar Palace, mosques, bathhouses, and other buildings that retained memories of the city’s Muslim past. In 1936, after completing their self-imposed task, the Armenians started calling the city Erevan: they finally wiped out the memory of the city’s founder and of those who lived in this pearl of Azeri and Muslim architecture.

Erevan, the World’s Only “Ancient” City without a Historical Center

The Irevan Fortress and its buildings looked very much like Icheri Sheher in Baku, the khan’s palace in Sheki, and the khan’s palace in Shusha that has now essentially been destroyed by the Arme- nians on the Azerbaijani territory they occupy. These and many other architectural monuments (in- cluding the Fortress of Irevan) clearly outline the area of the Azeri medieval culture, which still irri- tates the Armenians who have found no better remedy than to destroy the historical center of their capital. Many ancient cities (Moscow, Tbilisi, and Baku among them) have historical centers protect- ed by the state and loved by the people. If the Fortress of Irevan, the historical center of the Armenian capital, had any, even the slight- est, connection with the Armenians, it would have survived. The center was ruined because it looked like, and was, a monument of Azeri medieval architecture which could not be passed for Armenian. The fact that in 1827 exiled participants in the uprising of December 1825 put on a performance of Griboyedov’s Woe from Wit in the Sardar Palace, which the author, a prominent diplomat of his time, was involved in, did not save the fortress. In his notes, Griboyedov wrote in enthusiastic terms about the sumptuous palace and its hall of mirrors where he stayed in his diplomatic capacity. President of Armenia Serzh Sargsian had to admit that the fortress did exist. In October 2008, when opening the Rossia Square in Erevan with President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev, he said that it had been built on the site of the Fortress of Irevan, a monument (surprise, surprise!) of Armenian- Russian friendship. The attempts of certain Armenian authors to shift the blame for the destruction of the histor- ical center of Erevan to the period of “fighting the remnants of the past” under Soviet power do not hold water. Many other Soviet cities—Moscow, Vilnius, Tbilisi, and Baku—suffered but managed to preserve their historical cores, conceptual forms, and medieval architecture. It is common knowledge that at first Soviet power demonstrated no mean zeal when removing the memory of the past—all sorts of religious buildings and old churches—but stopped short of razing the entire me- dieval heritage to the ground. In Erevan, however, in the 1930s and, later, in the 1960s, the repub- lican (not federal) authorities destroyed the historical center with its medieval structures, mosques, bathhouses, the Sardar Palace, and even the walls. This is nothing more than an act of unrivalled vandalism. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 163 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In the history of Russia and other countries, the Mongolian onslaught is depicted as the most de- structive: much was burned down and ruined, but the architectural treasures of Central Russia (Yaro- slavl, Suzdal, Vladimir, etc. that form part of the Golden Ring tourist route) survived 300 years of the so- called Tatar-Mongol yoke. The Armenian authorities have obviously outdone the Mongol invaders in terms of their treatment of Erevan’s historical monuments and others throughout Armenia.

The Fortress of Irevan in Russian, Armenian and Other Sources, on Maps, Drawings, and Pictures

It is extremely important to study in further detail the destroyed historical center of Erevan, which means that despite the Armenians’ refusal to accept Azerbaijan’s assistance, it would be expe- dient, in terms of shedding light on the matter and restoring memory, to show old photos, maps, and drawings of the Irevan Fortress, as well as its buildings and environs. Here is how the Irevan Fortress8 and the Sardar Palace, the place where Griboyedov’s Woe from Wit was first performed, looked in the early 20th century. Figure 4

The Fortress of Irevan. View from the River Zanga

8 See: “The Fortress of Erivan. View from the River Zanga,” in: Utverzhdenie russkogo vladychestva na Kavkaze, Ya.I. Liberman Print Shop, Tiflis, Vol. IV, 1901, p. 164. 164 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Figure 5

The Palace of the Khan (Sardar) of Irevan where in 1827 exiled Decembrists performed Woe from Wit in the presence of its author

The “Plan of the Fortress of Erivan” drawn on 25 September-1 October, 1827 during the siege of the city by Russian troops led by General Paskevich9 offers a more detailed picture of how the Irevan Fortress and its buildings looked at that time. The plan shows the buildings inside the fortress situated on the high rocky banks of the River Zanga; it should be said that the Azeri khans, who allowed an Armenian church to be built next to the mosques and their palace, demonstrated a lot of tolerance. The fact that Persian and Armenian inns were situated outside the fortress meant that they were guests in Irevan; they came to sell their mer- chandise and had to remain outside the fortress. Those Armenian academics who insist that Irevan was a Persian khanate and that, therefore, the for- tress was a monument of Persian culture are wrong. Indeed, in one of his messages to the rulers of Shamshadil, the Khan of Irevan said that the lands of Irevan, Baku, Sheki, Nakhchivan, and other northern khanates gath- ered force to fight the “infidels” and that the Persian Shah marched on Azerbaijan together with his army to support Azerbaijan: “Until the infidels are all destroyed the Shah’s army will remain in Azerbaijan.”10

9 See: “Plan of the Fortress of Erivan with Indication of What Should Be Done and Where from 25 September to 1 October, 1827,” in: Utverzhdenie russkogo vladychestva na Kavkaze, Vol. IV, p. 306. 10 “An address of Husein Khan of Erivan to the Shamshadil elders Nasib bek, Ali bek, Emir Kuli bek, Mamed Has- an bek, and Ali Kuli bek,” in: Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoy arkheograficheskoy komissiey, Vol. II, Print shop at the Ad- ministration of the Caucasian Viceroy, Tiflis, 1868, Document 1204, pp. 603-604. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 165 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Figure 6

“Plan of the Fortress of Erivan” with indication of what should be done and where between 25 September and 1 October, 1827

A report by two Persian Armenian turncoats to Russian General Tsitsianov speaks about the Azeri (Adderbeyjan Tatars or simply Tatars) population of Irevan. The report pointed out the best method for capturing the fortress and said that Tatars lived in the fortress, while Armenians lived outside it and could be moved back to Persia, their homeland, which they left in 1804-1805 to move to the Caucasus to become Russian subjects. “Even if the new Khan of Erivan intended to move the Armenians to inland Persia where they once lived, according to the old historical books … we inform you that today there are few soldiers in Erivan, no more than 3,000 infantry; the Erivan people are the 166 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Tatars, who live in the fortress and outside it… Today, all Tatars of Erivan have risen up against the mentioned khan (Mekhti Kuli Khan of Erivan.—R.H.).”11 The letters are dated to the fall of 1805 when General Tsitsianov tried, with little success, to take the Irevan Fortress. Under Soviet power, the Church of the Intercession, the first Russian Orthodox Church built in the newly acquired lands inside Figure 7 the fortress, was destroyed. The Church of the Intercession of The Russian troops took the Most Holy Mother of God Irevan on 1 October, 1827, the holyday of the Intercession of the Most Holy Mother of God; one of the local mosques was trans- formed into an Orthodox church and dedicated to the Intercession of the Most Holy Mother of God to commemorate the victory. It was reconstructed in 1839; ac- cording to information dated to 1913, the church had not been used for some time, but remained standing. It was later destroyed. The Armenians were doing their best to steer the discussion in a different direction and refute the fact that the Irevan Fortress and other monuments of medieval architecture in Armenian territory belonged to the culture and his- tory of Azerbaijan. Today, Erevan insists that all the Muslim monuments in Armenia were built either by Persians or even Turks, and not by Azeri khans and rulers. However, the Armenians have so far failed to explain why they destroyed these “Persian” and other Muslim monuments, mosques, and other buildings.

By Way of a Conclusion

I believe that the best way to conclude this article is to quote from archival documents that dis- prove everything what the Armenian side is trying to prove. It insists that until the early 20th century no Azerbaijan existed as a geographic and administrative entity and, therefore, there were no Azeris; this means that there are no medieval Azeri monuments either in Armenia or in the Caucasus. Let me refer to the book Opisanie pereseleniia Armian adderbijanskikh v predely Rossii (De- scription of How the Armenians of Adderbijan were Moved within the ) by Sergey Glinka. The author was personally involved in moving Armenians to the Azeri khanates that Russia acquired in its wars with Persia. The title suggests that there were Azeri lands; Armenians were de- scribed as Adderbijans, in accordance with the place where they lived.12 In Azerbaijan, however, no one tries to exploit the book to insist that all Armenians were ethnic Azeris and that everything they had done so far was also Azeri. In this context, the statements by the

11 “Letter of melik Abram and yuzbashi Gavrila to Prince Tsitsianov,” in: Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoy arkhe- ograficheskoy komissiey, Vol. II, Document 1205, p. 604. 12 See: S.N. Glinka, Opisanie pereseleniia Armian adderbijanskikh v predely Rossii: s kratkim predvaritelnym izlozheniem istoricheskikh vremen Armenii, Print shop of the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages, Moscow, 1831. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 167 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Armenians that everything was Persian, including Nizami, a medieval Azeri poet who wrote in Farsi, and the architecture of the Irevan Fortress built by Azeri khans, look extremely flimsy. If we extend this logic, all Armenian scientists, poets, and people of art who lived and worked in the Soviet Union were Soviet and, therefore, unrelated to the Armenians. It should be said in all justice that the Armenians found an elegant way out of the situation caused by the name of the country Azerbaijan. They argue that before 1918 it referred to Persian Azerbaijan and that there was no Azerbaijan in the Caucasus. Numerous historical sources, however, show that the name of the place and administrative term “Azerbaijan” were related to the lands stretching from Iranian Khamadan to Derbent, Karabakh, Ganja, Irevan, Nakhchivan, and other terri- tories within the Caucasus. Stepan Burnashev (1743-1824), a Russian diplomat who represented Russia at the court of Georgian King Heraclius II, travelled far and wide across the region; he left a complete description of the Azeri lands, as well as a detailed account of the region’s geography, administration, and ethnic composition in the latter half of the 18th century. Here is what he had to say about Azerbaijan: “On division of the Adrebijan possessions. Today, Georgia in the north, that is, the Kingdom of Kakhetia and Kartli (which in the past were also part of the lands of Adrebijan), the Caspian Sea and the prov- ince of Gilan in the east, the Arak area in the south, and Turkey in the west belong to the lands which are called Adrebijan.”13 This means that, according to the Russian diplomat, Azerbaijan, as an administrative, geograph- ic, and historical region, occupied part of the Northern Caucasus, practically the entire Central Cau- casus, up to and including some of the Georgian territories, the entire territory of the present-day Republic of Armenia as far as Turkey, the north of Iran (known today as Southern Azerbaijan), and almost the entire eastern coast of the Caspian Sea. He also described the khanates of Azerbaijan, each in a special section: “There are the Derbent, Nukhis-Shaki, , city and , Shaisevan (Shakhsevany of Ardebil), Shusha, Genja (Ganja), Erivan, Nakhchivan, Karadag (in Iran), Talish (Talysh), Myshkin, Maraga, Urumiya (Urmiya), Khoy” and other khanates. He also wrote that most of the Azeri khans were independent and did not depend on Persia since they had their own armies and entered into political unions with other khanates and states.14 Similar information can be found in European sources. In 1864, British Consul in Tabriz Keith Abbott wrote in his memorandum for the Royal Geographical Society: “The country known to the Persians as Azerbaijan is divided between them and Russia, the latter Power possessing about five- eighth of the whole, which may be roughly stated to cover an area of about 80,000 square miles, or about the size of Great Britain; 50,000 square miles are therefore about the extent of the division be- longing to Russia, and 30,000 of that which remains to Persia. The Russian division is bounded on the north and north-east by the mountains of Caucasus, extending to the vicinity of Bâkou on the Caspian. On the west it has the provinces of Imeretia, Mingrelia, Gooriel, and Ahkhiska (now belonging to Russia); on the east it has the Caspian Sea, and on the south the boundary is marked by the course of the River Arrass (Araxes) to near the 46th parallel of longitude, thence by a conventional line across the plains of Moghan to the district of Talish, and by the small stream of Astura which flows to the Caspian through the latter country. In this area are contained the following territorial divisions: Geor- gia or Goorjistan, comprising Kakhetty, Kartaliny, Somekhetty, Kasakh; the Mohammedan countries of Eriwan, Nakhshewan, Karabâgh, Ghenja, Shirwan, Shekky, Shamachy, Bâkou, Koobeh, Salian and a portion of Talish.”15

13 Opisanie oblastey Adrebijanskikh v Persii i ikh politicheskogo sostoianiia, sdelannoe prebyvaiushchem pri E.V. tsare Kartamenskom i Kakhetinskom Iraklii Temuradoviche polkovnikom i kavalerom Burnashevym v Tiflise v 1786 g., Burnashev Stepan Danilovich, Kursk, 1793. 14 See: Kh. Agaeva, R. Huseynov, The Toponym of Azerbaijan in Medieval and Later Sources, Collection of arti- cles, Elm ve Tekhsil, Baku, 2011, pp. 229-246 (in Azeri). 15 K.E. Abbott, “Extracts from a Memorandum on the Country of Azerbaijan,” Proceedings of the Royal Geo- graphical Society of London, Vol. 8, No. 6, 1863-1864, pp. 275-279. 168 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

There is an even earlier source—the diary of an Armenian merchant Zakaria of Akuliss written in 1647-1677—which suggests that at that time the territory known as Azerbaijan covered more or less the same territories: “The year 1677, 18 December. I, Zakaria, son of Mgdisi of Akuliss Agamir, started from Tabriz to Maraga. The Khan of Maraga was son of Aga Khan Huseyn guli khan married to the daughter of Mirza Ibrahim, the vizier of Adilbeyjan. This country has been always densely pop- ulated and very fruitful. Here they grow excellent rice which is better than Indian and is taken as far as Spain as a present. This country grows good cotton, a lot of tobacco; there are raisins and doshab.”16 I have presented here archival documents, photos, and drawings from different sources to clar- ify the question of who built the numerous Muslim monuments in Armenia and help to restore the old initial image of Erevan-Irevan. There are over a hundred drawings, maps, and photographs that can be used for the purpose; Azerbaijan is ready to help Armenia because old Erevan is a cultural and historical treasure that be- longs to the Azeri, Russian, and other peoples.

16 Dnevnik, Publishing House of the Armenian SSR, Erevan, 1939, pp. 90, 94, 111, 119.

Zurab PAPASKIRI

D.Sc. (Hist.), Professor at Sukhumi State University (Tbilisi, Georgia).

ANOTHER LOOK AT ONE OF THE FALSE HISTORICAL POSTULATES OF THE ABKHAZIAN SEPARATIST IDEOLOGY: ON THE QUESTION OF ABKHAZIA’S POLITICAL-STATE STATUS IN 1921-1931

Abstract

his is a strictly academic summary of Abkhazian historians and politicians have T separatist ideas about Abkhazia’s po- written about the so-called Abkhazian S.S.R. litical-state status in 1921-1931 and as a Soviet socialist republic (allegedly abol- their place in the ideological arsenal of Ab- ished in early 1931 by Stalin and Beria, two khazian separatists. The author critically an- omnipotent Georgians) “independent” of the alyzes a vast body of highly varied docu- Georgian S.S.R. does not hold water. This mentary materials to demonstrate that what thesis is essentially the main historiographic Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 169 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and ideological weapon used by the separa- statehood of Georgia and in favor of the cre- tists in their struggle against the homogenous ation of an independent Abkhazian state.

Introduction

Academic speculations around Abkhazia’s political-state status of 1921-1931 date back to the 1920s when S. Basaria and S. Ashkhatsava, two prominent members of the intelligentsia and ideolo- gists of the Abkhazian separatist movement of the time, published their definitive works on the histo- ry of Abkhazia. They intended to provide historiographic substantiation of the so-called state inde- pendence of the Abkhazian S.S.R. declared by the Abkhazian Bolsheviks in March 1921.1 Later, in the 1950s, the subject of the all but forced eradication of the “independent” Abkhazian S.S.R. due to the intrigues of “perfidious” Tbilisi came to the fore when the political situation in the Soviet Union proved conducive to the revived separatist ideology in Abkhazia. Since that time, anti-Georgian riots, encouraged by false historiographic postulates, flared up approximately once every ten years (in 1957, 1967, and 1977-1978). At first, information about the riots was suppressed; in the 1970s, how- ever, it became common knowledge. Recently, Georgian academics (L. Toidze, A. Menteshashvili, J. Gamakharia, and others) have provided exhaustive commentaries and shed light on “misrepresentations of the facts.” However, the separatists are still determined to keep the subject alive; they insist that what they call “Abkhazian independence” was liquidated in 1931. It turned out that in other countries too, there is any number of experts on the Soviet Union’s political and state order whose interpretation of Abkhazia’s political- state status in 1921-1931 cannot be accepted as completely correct. For example, Prof. Angelika Nußberger, a prominent German expert in international constitutional law and Director of the Insti- tute for European Law at the University of Cologne, who was awarded an honorary doctorate by the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, wondered in one of her monographs why Stalin had made Abkhazia which was allegedly independent until 1924 an autonomous republic and joined it to Georgia: “Warum hatte Stalin Abchasien, das bis 1924 eigenständige Republik war, zu einer au- tonomen republik zurückgestuft und der Republik Georgien einverleibt?”2 (Here and elsewhere, the emphasis is mine unless otherwise stated.—Z.P.) She is not totally correct: even if we agree to treat the Abkhazian S.S.R. as “independent” from Georgia, it remained “independent” not until 1924, as the author has wrongly written, but until early 1931. It was this monograph which forced me to return to a subject already covered in earlier publica- tions3 in order to draw the attention of the international academic community to it and finally achieve an informational and ideological breakthrough in this sphere.

Political and State Order of Abkhazia in 1921

The state order of Abkhazia became one of the major problems to be tackled by the Bolshevik leaders of Georgia-Abkhazia after the Russian Red Army forcefully established Soviet power in

1 See: S.P. Basaria, Abkhazia v geograficheskom, etnograficheskom i ekonomicheskom otnoshenii, Sukhum-Kale, 1923; S.M. Ashkhatsava, Puti razvitia abkhazskoy istorii, Sukhum, 1925. 2 A. Nußberger, Das Volkerrecht. Geschichte. Institutionen. Perspektiven, Bonn, 2010, S. 45. 3 I have covered the problem in the following works: Z.V. Papaskiri, Essays on the History of Contemporary Abk- hazia, Part II, 1917-1993, Tbilisi, 2007, pp. 80-108 (in Georgian); Z.V. Papaskiri, Abkhazia: istoria bez falsifikatsii, Sec- ond revised edition, Tbilisi, 2010, pp. 230-251. 170 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Georgia. At this time, known in Soviet historiography as the “triumphal march of Soviet power,” the Bolshevist leaders of Russia and their Abkhazian lackeys indulged themselves in vehement anti- Georgian propaganda; the tone was set by Stalin and Orjonikidze, two “glorious sons of the Georgian people,” who encouraged, in word and deed, all sorts of provocative actions in all parts of Georgia, particularly Abkhazia. Here is what Stalin, at that time People’s Commissar for National Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R., ecstatically wrote in his article, which appeared in Pravda on 23 May, 1918, about “heroic Abkhazia on the Black Sea coast, which has unanimously risen against the blackguard bands of the Tiflis ‘gov- ernment’ and is repelling their assault on Sukhum, arms in hand.”4 In their anti-Georgian propaganda, the Bolsheviks relied on the notorious slogan of the “right of nations to self-determination”; having armed themselves with this Leninist ideological perver- sion, the Abkhazian Bolsheviks led by E. Eshba and N. Lakoba brought up the question of declar- ing the Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic as independent from Georgia. Early in March 1921, a so-called joint session of the Revolutionary Committee of Abkhazia, heads of the local party organ- izations and, sic!, representatives of the Revolutionary War Council of the 9th Red Army and the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P.(Bolsheviks) passed a decision to declare Abkhazia a Soviet Socialist Republic.5 Very soon, however, the Abkhazian Bolsheviks, probably under the spell of the Revolution- ary War Council of the 9th Red Army, pushed aside what had been said about the national interests of the Abkhazian people and started talking about joining Abkhazia to the R.S.F.S.R. Here is a document of great importance. On 26 March, 1921, members of the Revolutionary Committee of Abkhazia (E. Eshba, N. Lakoba, P. Agniashvili, and N. Akirtava) sent a telegram to Lenin and Sta- lin in Moscow to find out what the party leaders thought about the state order of their republic: “Will Soviet Abkhazia be an independent republic or an administrative unit and how will general policy look…” In the same telegram they offered their own version: “Soviet Abkhazia should be part of the Russian Federation.”6 No comment needed. Such were the “patriots” who headed Sovi- et Abkhazia in those days. The Kremlin instructed Georgy Orjonikidze, its chief emissary in Transcaucasia and Secre- tary of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.), to sort things out regarding Abkhazia’s state order. This was probably the first time that Orjonikidze was confronted with an echo of the unbri- dled anti-Georgian campaign he and his Georgian and Abkhazian party comrades launched in Ab- khazia. On 27 March, 1921, he held an urgent meeting with Efrem Eshba, whom he tried to con- vince to retreat from his previous conviction that Abkhazia should become part of Russia. Eshba, who abandoned the earlier agreement (they met in Moscow even before Soviet power was estab- lished in Georgia-Abkhazia) under which Abkhazia should have preserved its autonomous status inside Georgia, justified his shift by saying: “We thought that Abkhazia would become part of Soviet Georgia, but when we came here and felt the atmosphere … we unanimously decided that Abkhazia should be declared independent, at least temporarily, until the congresses of Soviets, in order to eliminate national strife.”7 On 28-29 March, 1921, a meeting which gathered in Batumi to discuss the structure of Soviet power and the Communist Party in Abkhazia was attended by G. Orjonikidze, Member of the Rev- olutionary War Council of the Front and the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.); Sh. Eliava,

4 J.V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 4, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1953, p. 97; L. Toidze, “K voprosu o politicheskom statuse Abkhazii,” in: Razyskania po istorii Abkhazii/Gruzii, Tbilisi, 1999, p. 297. 5 See: B.E. Sagaria, “Sozdanie i uprochenie organov gosudarstvennoy vlasti. Obrazovanie SSR Abkhazii,” in: Isto- ria Abkhazskoy ASSR, Sukhumi, 1983, p. 101. 6 B.E. Sagaria, Obrazovanie i ukreplenie sovetskoy natsionalnoy gosudarstvennosti v Abkhazii. 1921-1938 gg., Su- khumi, 1981, pp. 41-42. 7 Ibid., p. 28; A.M. Menteshashvili, Istoricheskie predposylki sovremennogo separatizma v Gruzii, Tbilisi, 1998, p. 59. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 171 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Member of the Revolutionary Committee, C.C., and Revolutionary War Council of the 9th Red Army and People’s Commissar of the Georgian Navy; M. Toroshelidze, Chairman of the Revolu- tionary Committee of the Batumi Region and Member of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Geor- gia; E. Eshba, Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee and Member of the Organizing Bureau of the R.C.P. in Abkhazia; and N. Lakoba, Member of the Organizing Bureau of the R.C.P. in Ab- khazia and Military Commissar of Abkhazia. The meeting satisfied the request of the “Abkhazian comrades,” albeit with certain reservations, and ruled that “until the congress of Soviets of Abkhaz- ia, the question of the federation of Soviet Abkhazia with the R.S.F.S.R and S.S.R.G. will remain open. Abkhazia is declared a Soviet Socialist Republic. Until the conference, its party organization will be called the Organizing Bureau of the R.C.P. in Abkhazia and will work under the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. Decrees of the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia will be taken into account in order to avoid contradictory moves by both revolutionary committees.”8 The Georgian side managed to register the temporary nature of Abkhazia’s “independence” as a Soviet Socialist Republic, which, as a state unit, would be obliged to tie its future either to the R.S.F.S.R. or to Soviet Georgia at the next congress of Soviets. There were no other alternatives. On 11-20 March, 1921, the Revolutionary Committee of Abkhazia officially announced that the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia had been set up. The same day, it triumphantly informed Lenin about this and praised the “great liberatory role of the (valiant) Red Army.”9 On 21 May, 1921, the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia officially “recognized” and “hailed” “the foun- dation of the independent Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia” and expressed its conviction that “relations between the S.S.R. of Georgia and the S.S.R. of Abkhazia will be finally settled at the First Congress of the Soviets of Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies of both Abkhazia and Georgia.”10 The Bolshevist leaders of Georgia had to keep their promise and give greater freedom to the “fraternal peoples of Ajaria, Abkhazia, and Ossetia.” As a result, on 21 May, 1921, the so-called inde- pendence of the Abkhazian S.S.R. was recognized. In fact, neither the people in the Kremlin, nor the Georgian communists, nor the Abkhazian Bolsheviks wanted to set up an independent Abkhazian state. So-called independence was nothing more than a political ruse intended to win the separatist- minded sections of the Abkhazian population over to Soviet power. On 12 August, 1921, at a regional meeting of the Communist Party, Orjonikidze disclosed the true meaning and motives of Abkhazia’s “independence”: “When Abkhazia demanded independence we pointed out to the Communists of Abkhazia that a tiny state cannot be independent, but we finally agreed to its independence. We said that if the Abkhazian people mistrust the Georgians, let Abkhazia be independent; let it heal the wounds inflicted by the Mensheviks. Later the Abkhazians would admit that they needed close unity with Georgia, their Soviet neighbor.”11 By January 1922, Nestor Lakoba, one of the leaders of the Abkhazian Bolsheviks, had already recognized the historical need for unity with Georgia. In January 1922, speaking at the first regional party conference, he declared: “When we, the executives of Abkhazia, told our older party comrades that to preserve the idea of Soviet pow- er among smaller nations, such as Abkhazia (which was very important), we should for one minute declare Abkhazian independence, we heard: ‘You can declare independence if this helps to preserve the Soviet idea and strengthen Soviet order in this Abkhazia.’ Soviet Abkhazia, having experienced independence, answered: ‘Historical and economic conditions demand that Abkhazia and Georgia become a single whole.’”12

8 J. Gamakharia, B. Gogia, Abkhazia—istoricheskaia oblast Gruzii, Tbilisi, 1997, p. 469. 9 B.E. Sagaria, Sozdanie i uprochenie…, p. 102. 10 Ibidem. 11 A.M. Menteshashvili, op. cit., p. 64. 12 L. Toidze, op. cit., p. 302. 172 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

These pronouncements of the latter-day leaders of Georgia-Abkhazia disclosed the falsity and cynicism of the so-called Leninist national policy they were pursuing. We all know that its main aim was not the national-state prospect of smaller peoples but setting up a new Communist empire. Prom- inent Abkhazian historian Stanislav Lakoba aptly pointed out that “Ilyich (Lenin.—Ed.) was ob- sessed with the idea of a world revolution; he thought in the categories of ‘continents’ and ‘asias,’ rather than ‘georgias’ or ‘abkhazias’.”13 It should be said, however, that the same author contradicts himself by trying, for some reason, to present Lenin as an “inspirer” of Abkhazian independence and sets him against Stalin and Orjonikidze whom he accuses of “strangling Abkhazian independence.” Stanislav Lakoba told an incredible story: allegedly, Lenin promised Efrem Eshba that he would grant Abkhazia its independence in exchange for “Abkhazia’s ‘successful mission’ in Turkey.”14 The ref- erence is to the “diplomatic mission” the Kremlin entrusted to E. Eshba and N. Lakoba: preliminary negotiations with the government of Kemal Atatürk on a Russian-Turkish treaty which was signed in Moscow on 16 March, 1921. Stanislav Lakoba writes that Lenin allegedly granted independence to Abkhazia as a token of gratitude for the agreement on Batumi under which Turkey renounced its claims on Batumi and its environs.15 This means that Lenin, having employed all the means at his disposal to acquire Batumi, “set Abkhazia free.” Stanislav Lakoba deliberately misleads the reader; he knows that Lenin was not interested in Abkhazia’s independence—he himself offered an unfavorable assessment of Lenin’s political ambi- tions, of which I have written above. The Abkhazian historian knows full well that setting up the so- called Soviet Socialist Republics (such as Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) as officially sovereign states headed by members and alternative members of the C.C. of the Russian Communist Party(Bolsheviks) and the Caucasian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party(Bolsheviks) was noth- ing but a political game. In this way, Soviet Russia tried to camouflage its occupation and annexation of Transcaucasia. The Transcaucasian countries (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) were not, and could not, be independent: the final say on national-state building belonged to the Kremlin and Lenin. Lenin’s notorious letter “To the Communist Comrades of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Daghestan, and the Mountaineer Republic” of 14 April, 1921 is ample evidence of this. Stanislav Lakoba knows that the supreme legislatures of this apology for “sovereign states” had no say in the most important decisions related to the state order of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; this right belonged to the supreme party instance—the Politburo of the C.C. of the Russian Communist Party(Bolsheviks) in Moscow. The decisions were implemented by the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.). This means that neither Lenin nor other leaders of the Party and the Soviet state intended to set up sovereign states independent from Moscow in the territory of the former Russian Empire when they declared Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, etc. (to say nothing of Abkhazia) Soviet Socialist Re- publics. This was nothing but a screen behind which the new Bolshevist leaders of Russia nurtured their imperial designs. This does not mean, however, that those who inspired and organized Abkha- zia’s “independence” as a socialist republic did not look too far—they wanted to detach Abkhazia from the rest of Georgia. Independence of the Abkhazian Soviet republic was formal; even before it became part of the Georgian S.S.R. on 16 December, 1921 with the ambiguous status of a treaty republic, no one treat- ed it as an independent state entity; this much is obvious from numerous official documents of the time. The main and most frequently quoted document is Lenin’s letter “To the Comrades Commu- nists of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Daghestan, and the Mountaineer Republic.” When instruct- ing his party cronies in the Caucasian republics, the leader of the Communist Party and the Soviet

13 S.Z. Lakoba, Otvet istorikam iz Tbilisi. Dokumenty i fakty, Sukhumi, 2001, p. 90. 14 Ibid., p. 88. 15 See: Ibidem. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 173 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION government for some reason “neglected” Abkhazia, another “independent” republic. Lenin’s tele- gram of 5 April, 1921 (almost a month after occupation of Georgia) sent to Orjonikidze is no less eloquent: “Your reply is neither full nor clear. Please find out the details from the Georgian Revo- lutionary Committee. First, has the Soviet Government of Georgia confirmed concession on the Tkvarcheli mines to the Italians, when, and on what terms? Reply briefly by telegram, details by letter.”16 At that time, Lenin obviously thought of Abkhazia as part of Georgia and did not deem it necessary to discuss the Tkvarcheli mines issue with the Revolutionary Committee of “independ- ent” Abkhazia. Later, on 28 November, 1921, Lenin presented his project of a federation of the Transcaucasian republics to the Politburo of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.), which was approved the next day with slight amend- ments. The document said in part that “the Central Committees of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan shall be instructed (through the Caucasian Bureau) to submit the federation question for broad discus- sion … conduct vigorous propaganda in favor of a federation, and secure decisions to that effect by the congresses of Soviets in each of these republics.”17 As we can see, for some reason Lenin never mentioned Abkhazia and planned the new unit as a federation of three socialist republics—Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Historians have pointed out that even after the Abkhazian S.S.R. had been declared, the Revo- lutionary Committee of Georgia “repeatedly discussed matters related to Abkhazia at its sittings— issuing it loans, the Tkvarcheli mines, the Bzyb concession…, etc.”18 When writing about the latter, historians invariably deem in necessary to say that on 21 May, 1921, when the Revolutionary Com- mittee of Georgia “recognized,” so to speak, the “independent status” of the Abkhazian Soviet Social- ist Republic, the plenary session of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Georgia, after discussing the Bzyb concession, ruled: “not to object to the signing of this concession by the Government of Georgia if it is substantive and useful.”19 It is invariably pointed out that Abkhazia as an independent entity was absent from the econom- ic union of the Caucasus set up in August 1921 consisting of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, as well as Daghestan, the Mountaineer Republic, Kabarda, and Nakhchivan. It was likewise absent as an in- dependent unit from the Economic Bureau of the Transcaucasian Republics created by the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) on 16 August, 1921. “Representatives of Abkhazia, as well as of other autonomies, had no right to vote” at the plenary sittings of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.).20 Letters, instructions, and telegrams written by the leaders of the Communist Party and the Sovi- et state even before Abkhazia officially joined Georgia on 16 December, 1921 directly point to Abk- hazia’s autonomous status within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. Here is the most interesting document. Stalin, who at that time filled the posts of the R.S.F.S.R. People’s Commissar for Nation- alities and the People’s Commissar for Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection, clarified the situation for Avel Enukidze, Secretary of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, as follows: “Abkhazia is an autonomous part of independent Georgia, which means that it does not and should not have its own representatives in the R.S.F.S.R. For the same reason, it cannot get a credit from the R.S.F.S.R.”21 In his telegram to Enukidze of 13 September, 1921, Stalin was even more outspoken: “The visa for issuing money to the Abkhazians is invalid if not approved by the People’s Commissar-

16 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 45, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 115. Lenin mentioned the Tkvar- cheli mines issues in his letter “To the Comrades Communists of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Daghestan, and the Mountaineer Republic” (V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 16, 1965, p. 316). 17 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 33, 1965, p. 127. 18 J. Gamakharia, B. Gogia, op. cit., p. 117. 19 Ibidem. 20 Ibid., p. 118. 21 Quoted from: A.M. Menteshashvili, op. cit., p. 67. 174 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION iat for Finances of Georgia… It should be borne in mind that the Abkhazians sold several million poods (Russian measure of weight [1 pood = 16.38 kg].—Ed.) of tobacco to the Europeans … without reporting either to Georgia or to the R.S.F.S.R., which has deprived them of the right to ask the R.S.F.S.R. for money.”22 This means that from the very beginning the people in the Kremlin regarded Abkhazia as an autonomous part of Georgia; this was an official approach rather than the intrigues of Stalin, the “om- nipotent Georgian,” as Stanislav Lakoba wants to convince his readers.23 It is pointless to “rehabili- tate” Stalin as a patron of his “Fatherland” (Georgia), as our Abkhazian colleague tries to do. He should have borne in mind that it was Stalin, Orjonikidze, and their cronies—the Georgian Commu- nist-internationalists—who buried Georgia as an independent state. He seems to have forgotten that it was Stalin and Orjonikidze who inspired and organized the “triumphal” march of the “valiant” Red Army on Georgia and that later they forced Georgia into the Transcaucasian Federation, after which it lost even the semblance of state sovereignty. Let’s have a look at the official materials which prove that the independence the Bolshevist re- gime “bestowed” on the Abkhazian Communists as a reward for their indefatigable struggle against the Menshevist government of the Georgian Democratic Republic was merely temporary. It is a well- known fact that from the very beginning the top party leaders represented by the members of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) insisted that the Abkhazian S.S.R. be transformed into an autonomous republic within the Georgian S.S.R. On 5 July, 1921, a plenary meeting of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.), which was attended by Stalin, discussed the Abkhazian question and ruled that party work should be geared “toward unification of Abkhazia and Georgia in the form of an autonomous republic as part of Georgia.”24 It should be said that the Abkhazian leaders were not overjoyed. On 15 October, 1921, the Joint Sitting of the Organizing Bureau of the R.C.P.(B.) in Ab- khazia and the Revolutionary Committee passed a resolution which spoke of the necessity to establish “close ties between the S.S.R. of Georgia and Abkhazia … by concluding an official treaty between the two equal Union republics.”25 In his letter to the Caucasian Bureau of 14 November, 1921, Efrem Eshba went even further; he wrote about “direct (bypassing Georgia) membership of Abkhazia in the Transcaucasian Federa- tion.”26 Two days later, on 16 November, after discussing the question of “the relations between Abkhazia and Georgia,” the Presidium of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.), attended by Eshba, passed a different decision: “1. Independent Abkhazia is economically and politically inexpe- dient. 2. Request Comrade Eshba to present his final conclusion on Abkhazia joining the Federation of Georgia on the principles of a treaty or the R.S.F.S.R. as an autonomous region.”27 This means that the top party leaders passed their verdict: Abkhazia had to part with its illusory independence. This document is highly interesting because it allowed Abkhazia to choose one of two options: either join Georgia as a “treaty republic” or join the R.S.F.S.R. as merely an autonomous region. Prominent Georgian scholar Levan Toidze has justly pointed out that the status of an autono- mous region “was two levels lower.” It is commonly believed that this was a sign of “discrimination of Georgia of sorts.”28 On 24 November, 1921, the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) passed a decision under which the Organizing Bureau of the R.C.P.(B.) in Abkhazia was transferred to the C.C. C.P.(B.) of Georgia. On 16 December, 1921, the question was finally settled: “a Union Treaty between the So- cialist Soviet Republic of Abkhazia and the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia” was ceremoni-

22 A.M. Menteshashvili, op. cit. 23 S.Z. Lakoba, Ocherki politicheskoy istorii Abkhazii, Sukumi, 1990, pp. 83-84. 24 A.M. Menteshashvili, op. cit., p. 65; L. Toidze, op. cit., p. 299. 25 J. Gamakharia, B. Gogia, op. cit., p. 481. 26 L. Toidze, op. cit., p. 301. 27 J. Gamakharia, B. Gogia, op. cit., p. 482. 28 L. Toidze, op. cit. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 175 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ously signed in Tbilisi. Abkhazia became part of the Georgian S.S.R. as a so-called “treaty repub- lic.” No one questioned the fact that the treaty of 16 December made Abkhazia part of the Georgian S.S.R. in the legal sense; this was never challenged and never revised. Here is what was written in a definitive work Istoria Abkhazskoy ASSR (1917-1937) (History of the Abkhazian A.S.S.R. 1917- 1937) published in 1983: “The fact that Abkhazia joined Soviet Georgia on the strength of a treaty was undoubtedly of great importance… Formation of the S.S.R. of Abkhazia and its joining the S.S.R. of Georgia on the strength of a treaty and through it joining the T.S.F.S.R. and the U.S.S.R…”29 Recently, however, some Abkhazian historians and Badzhgur Sagaria, who wrote the passage quoted above, have been denying the hitherto obvious fact that Abkhazia did join the Geor- gian S.S.R.; they insist that unification of Abkhazia and Georgia was registered later, in the Consti- tutions of Georgia of 1922 and 1927.30 Certain points of the Treaty of 16 December testify beyond a doubt to the fact that Abkhazia did join the Georgian S.S.R. under a treaty and did not unite with it as an equal member of a federation. The Treaty said that “the Soviet Socialist Republic of Geor- gia and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia are establishing military, political, and financial- economic cooperation with each other. “2. For the purpose of achieving the aforementioned goals, both governments declare united the following Commissariats: a) Military; b) Finances; c) Public Economy; d) Post and Telegraph; e) Workers and Peasant Inspectorate; f) Public Commissariat of Justice; g) Maritime Transportation. “Note: foreign affairs shall remain fully within the competence of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia.” Under the Treaty, “every regional union, namely within the Federation of the Trans- Caucasus Republics, Abkhazia enters through Georgia, which renders one third of its seats.”31 All official documents of the congresses of Soviets of both Abkhazia and Georgia confirmed that Abkhazia had joined Georgia. According to Abkhazian historian Sagaria, “the First Congress of Soviets of Abkhazia legally registered the form of Abkhazia’s state-legal status within Georgia.”32 The Constitution of Georgia of 1922, to which Stanislav Lakoba refers directly, stated (contrary to what our Abkhazian colleague probably wants to see) that “the Autonomous Socialist Soviet Repub- lic of Ajaria, autonomous region of South Ossetia, and the Socialist Soviet Republic of Abkhazia are parts of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia, which they joined on the basis of voluntary self- determination. The Socialist Soviet Republic of Abkhazia is united with the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia on the strength of a special treaty of unity between these republics.”33 This means that all the units enumerated above belonged to a single state which was called the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia.

29 B.E. Sagaria, Sozdanie i uprochenie…, p. 106. 30 See: B.E. Sagaria, “Abkhazia v perekhodny period ot kapitalizma k sotsializmu. Postroenie osnov sotsialis- ticheskogo obshchestva (1921-1941),” in: Istoria Abkhazii. Uchebnoe posobie, ed. by S.Z. Lakoba, Sukhumi, 1991, pp. 332- 333; O.Kh. Bgazhba, S.Z. Lakoba, Istoria Abkhazii s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney, Textbook for 10-11 years of secondary schools, Sukhumi, 2006, p. 342. 31 [http://abkhazworld.com/articles/reports/189-union-treaty-between-december-1921.html]. 32 B.E. Sagaria, Sozdanie i uprochenie…, p. 106. 33 J. Gamakharia, B. Gogia, op. cit., p. 485. 176 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Political Speculations of Separatist “Historiography” on the Political-State Status of Abkhazia in 1921-1931

I have already written that separatist “historiography” refuses to admit the fact that on 16 De- cember, 1921, the Abkhazian S.S.R. joined the Georgian S.S.R. on the strength of a treaty. Moreover, since the 1970s, this subject has been a target of political-ideological speculations by the separatist leaders. If the Abkhazian S.S.R. united with the rest of Georgia on an equal footing and created a sort of two-constituent federation or, according to the latest fashion, a new “allied state,” this would have been reflected in the name of the state. We all know that at that time so-called “allied states” were formed by uniting Soviet socialist republics on an equal footing; the new states were given new names. At first, it was the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (T.S.F.S.R.) which signed agreements as a constituent with other Soviet socialist republics—Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia—on the creation of a single allied state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the U.S.S.R.). It should be said that the Treaty on the creation of the U.S.S.R. specified that the T.S.F.S.R. consisted of three Soviet socialist republics (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan). Abkhazia was not mentioned as a constituent which formed the U.S.S.R. (even Georgia was not a constituent); it was mentioned among the autonomous republics. Moreover, under Art 15 of Chapter 4 of the Union Trea- ty, “the autonomous republics of Ajaria and Abkhazia (as written in the text.—Z.P.) were de facto put on the same footing as the autonomous regions of the R.S.F.S.R. As distinct from the autonomous republics of the R.S.F.S.R. (which had 5 representatives each in the Soviet of Nationalities, the Un- ion’s highest legislature—the same number as the Union republics), Ajaria and Abkhazia had 1 rep- resentative each (the same number as the autonomous regions of the R.S.F.S.R.), as well as the “au- tonomous regions South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Nakhchivan.”34 As an autonomous republic, Abkhazia was mentioned in the Soviet Constitution of 1924, which confirmed Art 15 of the Union Treaty: “The autonomous republics of Ajaria and Abkhazia and the South Ossetian, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Nakhchivan autonomous regions send 1 repre- sentative each to the Soviet of Nationalities.”35 From the very beginning, the Abkhazian S.S.R. was de facto an autonomous unit of Georgia; this is substantiated by the fact that its budget was part of the budget of Georgia, while its government and Communist Party structures were accountable to Georgia’s executive and legislative power and the C.C. of the Communist Party of Georgia.36 This was corroborated by the First Regional Conference of the Abkhazian Organization of the R.C.P.(B.) held on 7-12 January, 1922. It renamed the party the Abkhazian organization of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Georgia and elected its delegates to the First Congress of the C.P.G.37 Later, on 12-18 February, 1922, the First Congress of Soviets of Abkhazia elected dele- gates to the First Congress of Soviets of Georgia.38 The Abkhazian S.S.R. operated within the legal framework of the Georgian S.S.R. In February 1923, the Presidium of the Central Executive Com- mittee and the Council of People’s Commissars of Abkhazia passed a joint decision “on applying

34 Istoria Sovetskoy Konstitutsii. Sbornik Dokumentov. 1917-1957, Moscow, 1957, p. 229; J. Gamakharia, B. Go- gia, op. cit., p. 489. 35 L. Toidze, op. cit., p. 303. 36 See: Ibidem. 37 See: A.E. Kuprava, “Abkhazia v nachale vosstanovitelnogo perioda. Pervye meropriiatiia Sovetskoy vlasti,” in: Istoria Abkhazskoy ASSR, pp. 92-93. 38 See: Ibid., p. 93. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 177 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the Criminal Code of the Georgian S.S.R. approved by the All-Georgia Central Executive Commit- tee in November 1922 to the entire territory of Abkhazia.”39 The above testifies beyond a doubt to the fact that in March 1921 the S.S.R. of Abkhazia was formally declared independent; its later “unification” with the Georgian S.S.R. was a formal act: from the very beginning Abkhazia was regarded as an autonomous part of Georgia. Those forces in Ab- khazia which stirred up the separatist-minded popular masses with demagogic unfounded promises that under Soviet power Abkhazia would become independent could not reconcile themselves to re- ality. They tried to revise the state-legal relations between Tbilisi and Sukhumi that had taken shape by 1925 by drafting the first Constitution of Soviet Abkhazia. The Third Congress of Soviets of Abkhazia held on 26 February-3 March, 1925 in Sukhumi endorsed the Constitution of the S.S.R. of Abkhazia; today, the ideologists of Abkhazian separatism treat it as a “Constitution of Sovereign Abkhazia”40 and present it as such to the people. Early in the 1990s, the separatists brandished it as a “constitutional-legal weapon”: on 23 July, 1992, the separa- tist wing of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia, in gross violation of the rules which demanded consti- tutional majority, revived the 1925 Constitution and endorsed it as a Fundamental Law. By violating constitutional order, the separatists tried to remove Abkhazia from the constitutional field of Georgia and declare what they called the Republic of Abkhazia as a state independent of Georgia. We all know that this was the last drop in the bucket; the patience of the Georgian population of Abkhazia snapped. Several days later a conflict began to unfold. Without going too far into the numerous legal inconsistencies of the 1925 “Constitution,” it can be said that this “masterpiece” of legal thought removed Abkhazia from the legal field of the Georgian S.S.R. The higher Communist Party authorities of Georgia and Transcaucasia inevitably paid attention to the “shortcomings” of the Constitution of the Abkhazian S.S.R. Very soon, prob- ably after a great deal of brainwashing, the leaders of the Communist Party and the government of Abkhazia “saw the light” and promised to readjust the republic’s Fundamental Law. On 26 Novem- ber, 1925, speaking at the Seventh Conference of the Abkhazian Regional Organization of the C.P.G., Nestor Lakoba said that “the Constitution was written in the silliest manner.”41 An elo- quent admission, indeed! Several days later, on 2 December, at the Fourth Congress of the Commu- nist Party of Georgia, he was even more outspoken: “Comrade Kakhiani (head of the Communist Party of Georgia.—Z.P.) was quite right when he said that some of the executives had vague ideas that Abkhazia might directly join the Transcaucasian Federation, etc. I myself and many other executives entertained this idea. We have abandoned it once and for all, not because Comrade Kakhiani threatened us with this vagrant thought… In Abkhazia the problem is that if it really wants to become independent and move away from Georgia, it will tumble down like a house of cards built by a mischievous boy.”42 Nestor Lakoba was consistently repentant. His speech at the Third Session of the All-Georgia Central Executive Committee, the supreme legislature of Georgia, held in Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhazia, on 13 June, 1926 is the best example of Lakoba’s metamorphosis. “From the very begin- ning of Soviet power,” said he, “some people who failed to understand how things stood and some of our enemies have been trying to undermine power in the Republic of Abkhazia by saying that Abkhazia can leave Georgia or can remain with it. Is this so? To avoid misunderstandings we should say in so many words that Abkhazia cannot leave Georgia; it has no such intention and does not want to. Soviet Abkhazia has no intention of leaving Soviet Georgia; it is prepared to go any- where with Soviet Georgia, as part of Soviet Georgia, even to the next world, if you will… Ab- khazia and Georgia have one common destiny. Abkhazia joined Georgia of its own free will. Long

39 B.E. Sagaria, “Priniatie Kostitutsii SSR Abkhazii,” in: Istoria Abkhazskoy ASSR, p. 193. 40 S.Z. Lakoba, Otvet istorikam iz Tbilisi…, p. 93. 41 Quoted from: J. Gamakharia, B. Gogiia, op. cit., p. 491. 42 Ibidem. 178 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION live Soviet Georgia and the working masses of Abkhazia, which are 100 percent loyal to it despite all the rumors!”43 This was what one of the ideologists of the seditious 1925 Constitution of Abkhazia said on different occasions. This means that by that time the political situation in the country and the Commu- nist Party had changed, probably because Trotsky and his cronies had lost their positions in Abkhazia, while Stalin, on the other hand, was gaining power and consolidating his grip on the party and the state. This is what Abkhazian historian Stanislav Lakoba says.44 On 27 October, 1926, the results of the “educational efforts of the higher Communist Party and Soviet authorities (the C.C. C.P.G. and All-Georgia Central Executive Committee in particular) were summed up. The Third Session of the Central Executive Committee of Abkhazia, in fulfillment of the instructions issued by the Third Ses- sion of the All-Georgia Central Executive Committee, which pointed out that the Constitution of the S.S.R. of Abkhazia should be brought into harmony with the Constitution of the Georgian S.S.R., adopted an amended version of the Constitution. It was finally endorsed in March 1927 by the Fourth Congress of Soviets of Abkhazia. The new version differed radically from the previous one. Chapter I of the Fundamental Law said: “The Republic of Abkhazia is a socialist state of workers and peasants (not a “sovereign” state, as it was described in the 1925 Constitution.—Z.P.) united on the basis of the Union Treaty with the Georgian S.S.R. and entering the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic through the Georgian S.S.R.” The same chapter said that “the citizens of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Abkhaz- ia, while retaining their citizenship of the Republic, are also citizens of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia.” This was absent from the previous version.45 The article on the state language was cor- rected. In the 1925 Constitution only Russian was granted the status of the state language. In the new version, Art 8 of Chapter I said that “the languages of state institutions on the territory of the Abkha- zian S.S.R. are: Abkhazian, Georgian, and Russian.”46 Under Art 16 of the same chapter, the S.S.R. of Georgia was one of the constituents (the U.S.S.R., T.S.F.S.R., and S.S.R. of Abkhazia) which with- in the competence “determined by their constitutions” had the right to exploit the state resources (land, forests, water, subsoil, etc.) of Abkhazia.47 The Constitution established the level and order of involvement of the people of Abkhazia in governing the Georgian state. Art 18 of Chapter II said that “the representatives of Soviets of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Abkhazia shall take part in the All-Georgia Congress of Soviets on the basis of the following quota: one deputy per 10,000 inhabitants.”48 Art 19 of the same chapter said that “the All-Georgia Congress of Soviets shall elect representatives of the Socialist Soviet Repub- lic of Abkhazia to the Central Executive Committee of All-Georgia; the number of representatives shall be determined by the All-Georgia Congress of Soviets.”49 This means that in the supreme leg- islature of the Georgian state (and not a mythical “allied” state), Abkhazia had no quota estab- lished by parity; the number of its representatives was established by the All-Georgia Congress of Soviets. The Constitution kept Abkhazia within the Georgian state-legal expanse. Art 22 of Chapter II said that “the Codes, Decrees, and Decisions adopted by the Central Executive Committee of All- Georgia applied to the entire territory of the Georgian S.S.R. shall be binding in the territory of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Abkhazia.”50 Art 24 of the same chapter specified that “the All-Georgia Congress of Soviets and the Central Executive Committee of All-Georgia shall have the right to re-

43 J. Gamakharia, B. Gogiia, op. cit., pp. 494-495. 44 See: S.Z. Lakoba, Otvet istorikam iz Tbilisi…, pp. 93-94. 45 J. Gamakharia, B. Gogia, op. cit., p. 497. 46 [http://abkhazworld.com/articles/reports/338-basic-law-constitution-ssr-abkhazia-1926.html]. 47 See: J. Gamakharia, B. Gogia, op. cit., p. 498. 48 [http://abkhazworld.com/articles/reports/338-basic-law-constitution-ssr-abkhazia-1926.html]. 49 Ibidem. 50 Ibidem. Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 179 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION voke the Resolutions of the Congress of Soviets, Central Executive Committee, and the Council of People’s Commissars of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Abkhazia that contravene the provisions specified in Chapter II of this Constitution.”51 Art 92 of Chapter IV of the Abkhazian Constitution proved beyond a doubt that the S.S.R. of Abkhazia was not a Soviet republic independent of Georgia: “The state budget of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Abkhazia is a part of the budget of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia and it shall be approved by the Central Executive Committee of All-Georgia as a constituent part of the all-state budget of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia.”52 The articles of the Abkhazian Constitution adopted by the Fourth Congress of Soviets of Ab- khazia in March 1927 prove that all the allegations that the S.S.R. of Abkhazia was supposedly a sov- ereign Soviet republic which had established “equal federative state-legal relations” with Georgia are totally unfounded. At his time, well-known member of the Abkhazian separatist-minded intelligent- sia S. Basaria fervently supported these allegations.53 Today, the ideological leaders of the separatists have not yet parted with this illusion. In fact, there is no doubt that from the very beginning (at least from 16 December, 1921 when it joined the Georgian S.S.R. as a treaty republic) the S.S.R. of Abkhazia was regarded as an inalienable part of a single Georgian state. By the late 1920s, it became clear, writes prominent Abkhazian historian Badzhgur Sagaria, that “the decade of change in the political, economic, and cultural life of Abkhazia and Georgia as a whole called for different forms of state constitutional relations between them.”54 A special document of the Council of People’s Commissars of Abkhazia pointed out that “the treaty of 16 December, 1921 … no longer relates to reality” since “the real … relations between these republics have been specified by their Constitutions.” On the strength of this, the Council of People’s Commissars of Abkhazia con- cluded that “the term ‘treaty republic’ applied to the S.S.R. of Abkhazia had lost its meaning.”55 In April 1930, the Third Session of the Central Executive Committee of Abkhazia passed a decision, on the strength of a report delivered by Nestor Lakoba, to remove the term “treaty republic” from the Abkhazian Constitution. In February 1931, the Sixth Congress of Soviets of Abkhazia approved this decision and amended the Constitution. From that time on Abkhazia became an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Georgian S.S.R. This dealt a heavy blow to the separatist forces of Abkhazia, which for nearly a decade had been keeping the nation under ideological pressure. This act revealed the falsity and demagoguery of the so-called Leninist national policy that had allegedly liberated the Abkhazian nation subjugated by what was described as the “bourgeois-nationalist” government of democratic Georgia and granted it national-state “independence.” In fact, this apology for independence granted to the Abkhazian peo- ple was nothing more than a token of gratitude for the “heroism” they had shown when fighting the Georgian Democratic Republic; it was an illusion from the very beginning. In 1931, the relations that had taken shape after 16 December, 1921 when the so-called Union treaty between Abkhazia and Georgia was signed, which made Abkhazia a “treaty republic” within Georgia, were officially con- firmed and nothing more. It should be said that in the 1920s-1930s the changed political-state status of Abkhazia was nothing out of the ordinary: it was part of the policy pursued by the leaders of the Communist Party and the state and had nothing to do with Stalin’s nationality. Here are several examples: in July 1920, Nakhchivan became an “independent” Soviet Socialist Republic only to be transformed in February

51 Ibidem. 52 Ibidem. 53 See: J. Gamakharia, B. Gogia, op. cit., p. 125. 54 B.E. Sagaria, “Preobrazovanie dogovornoy SSR Abkhazia v avtonomnuiu respubliku,” in: Istroia Abkhazskoy ASSR, p. 249. 55 Ibid., p. 250. 180 Volume 6 Issue 2 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

1923 into an autonomous territory (later an autonomous republic) within the Azerbaijan S.S.R. In 1918, the Stavropol, Kuban, and Black Sea socialist republics appeared, which later became admin- istrative regions and territories of the R.S.F.S.R. This is the whole truth about the allegedly independent Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia in 1921-1931.

Conclusion

The above suggests that in 1921-1931 the so-called sovereign Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia was officially part of Georgia; that is, it was Georgia’s autonomous unit both de facto and de jure. Allegations that the S.S.R. of Abkhazia was a state unit independent of Georgia and that it lost this status in 1931 due to the intrigues of Stalin, “an omnipotent Georgian,” and the Communist leaders in Tbilisi are nothing more than political insinuations of the ideologists of Abkhazian sep- aratism determined to exploit this “historical argument” to fan anti-Georgian sentiments among the Abkhazians.