Azerbaijan’s Regional Role

Iran and Beyond

By Richard Weitz

September 2013

Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • • Azerbaijan’s Regional Role

Iran and Beyond

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 2

AZERBAIJAN’S GROWING GLOBAL INFLUENCE ...... 5

EMPOWERING RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE ...... 11

MANAGING IRAN'S REGIONAL AMBITIONS ...... 20 IRAN'S AZERBAIJANI MINORITY ...... 21 CURRENT TENSIONS ...... 23

CONCLUSIONS ...... 33

Executive Summary Ÿ 1 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • • Executive Summary The Republic of Azerbaijan, a close U.S. ally since Azerbaijanis regained their independence following the Soviet Union’s collapse, has become a prominent role model for Muslim-majority nations seeking to manage religious and ethnic differences in a harmonious and productive manner.

Thanks to its secular policies and embracing approach toward religious an ethnic diversity, Azerbaijanis have accrued substantial soft power as an attractive Muslim model for emulation by other countries.

By enhancing this soft power, the United States can challenge Iran’s influence among Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere, where Azerbaijan is already viewed more favorably than Iran.

In particular, Azerbaijan can serve as a model for Iran’s large and influential Azerbaijani minority, which could indirectly change Tehran’s obnoxious foreign and defense policies without the risky use of U.S. military power.

The first part of this report reviews Azerbaijan’s recent history and its growing soft power and other forms of influence.

Thanks to its natural blessings—above all its people, geography, and energy resources—Azerbaijan has achieved remarkable economic, diplomatic, and soft power influence. Vision and perseverance also helped Azerbaijanis overcome their post-Soviet trauma and treacherous neighborhood to emerge as an influential force for religious, economic, and other forms of cooperation in an often-troubled world.

During the two decades since Azerbaijanis regained their national independence on October18, 1991, its diverse people have experienced a remarkable comeback. The country’s GDP has grown from $1.2 billion in 1992 to more than $60 billion today. Azerbaijan is presently one of the few countries to serve on the UN Security Council, having won election in October 2011 to that seat for the first time in one of the Council’s most competitive elections in recent history. Azerbaijan gained this coveted status based on its contribution to reducing global tensions as well as on the basis of its energy riches.

The report’s second part discusses the role of religion in Azerbaijani society and politics.

The country adheres to a strict separation of Church and State. The government offers benign but hands-off support for all religious groups in the country, empowering all denominations to run their own institutions through mosques, churches, synagogues, etc., and other independent hierarchies. Azerbaijani officials follow the physician’s principle of “do no harm” toward religious groups and try to create favorable conditions for the freedom of worship—such as by declaring November 16 as an official Day of Tolerance--and strive to conserve the country’s different religions, cultures and traditions.1

Executive Summary Ÿ 2 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

The government also pursues an active policy of conserving the country’s diverse religious heritage, among other means by restoring houses of worship and other religious facilities, both in the country and beyond.2 In practice, Azerbaijanis strive to go beyond mere tolerance (refraining from discrimination or anti-religious acts) to embrace interfaith mutual respect, understanding, and collaboration.3

Figure 1 The President of Azerbaijan works the challenge of expanding his country’s regional influence.

Credit Photo: Bigstock

They celebrate their country’s rich ethnic and religious diversity, taking pride in the dozens of religious groups that have been living in harmony on their lands for centuries, learning how to get along despite the invariable difficulties in managing religious differences, which normally involve fundamental human principles and values.

The third section of the report reviews Azerbaijan’s complex relationship with Iran, which extends beyond their common religious heritage to encompass economic ties as well as geopolitical rivalry.

Azerbaijan shares extensive historical and cultural ties with Iran as well as a 620-kilometer land frontier along with a Caspian Sea border. Although Azerbaijanis desire to maintain correct and proper relations with Tehran, Iran’s leaders have regularly denounced Azerbaijan’s secular policies and occasionally sought to destabilize Azerbaijan’s government through terrorism and other provocations.

A mixture of offensive and defensive considerations motivates Iranian leaders. For some Iranians, as a neighboring country with a Shiite majority population and a history of ties with Persia, Azerbaijan is a natural target for exporting the Iranian Revolution as manifested in the Islamic Republic’s clerical system of government.4 For others, Azerbaijan’s soft power, secular government, Western orientation, and independent energy, economic, and security policies have reinforced Tehran’s hostility.

Executive Summary Ÿ 3 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Iran’s aggressive clerical regime considers Azerbaijan as falling within its zone of influence and has taken actions to reinforce that message. Over the past few years, Azerbaijan’s security services have foiled a number of alleged Iranian plots to carry out terrorist attacks against Western and Israeli interests in Azerbaijan.

Despite Iran's official denial of any involvement, many believe that Tehran’s clerical regime is complicit in aiding the attacks against Western and Israeli targets in Azerbaijan and elsewhere in the world as a means to intimidate Azerbaijan against supporting Western military actions against Iran, an unfounded concern of some Iranians reinforced by irresponsible Western news commentaries.

Perhaps even more importantly, as explained in detail below, the close cultural and ethnic ties between Azerbaijan and Iran have alarmed Iranian leaders into fearing that their own people, especially Iran’s ethnic Azerbaijani minority, would prefer their government adopt the kind of moderate domestic and foreign policies found in independent Azerbaijan.5

Iran is home to a large ethnic Azerbaijani population of around 30 million people. Like Iran’s other minorities, the country’s Azerbaijani have suffered from various forms of state-supported discrimination, especially in the public sphere. Azerbaijan’s independence has rekindled Iranian fears about potential Azerbaijani autonomous movements in Iran. 6

The report then assesses the partnership Azerbaijan enjoys with the United States and Israel.

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Azerbaijan was among the first countries to offer the United States unconditional support in the war against terrorism. Its leaders denounced the al-Qaeda crimes and have permitted U.S. warplanes to overfly Azerbaijani territory in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, which drove the Afghan Taliban from power. Since then, Azerbaijan has provided landing and refueling support for U.S. military transports to Afghanistan and allowed NATO countries to deliver material to their troops in Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network that passes through Azerbaijan’s territory.

In addition, Azerbaijan contributes to U.S. energy and economic goals. By exporting enormous amounts of natural gas from its own production as well as serving as a vital land corridor for Caspian and Central Asian energy deliveries to European countries, Azerbaijan reduces Europeans’ dependence on Russian and Iranian energy sources and helps thwart Iranian threats to global energy supplies by closing the Strait of Hormuz or curtailing its own oil exports.

Furthermore, U.S. firms have a major presence in Azerbaijan thanks to the government’s preferential treatment of U.S. energy companies, which began in the 1990s. Its diplomats have since used their country’s membership on the UN Security Council and other mechanisms to support U.S. regional and global security goals.

Executive Summary Ÿ 4 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • • Azerbaijan’s Growing Global Influence Although Azerbaijan has a population of less than ten million people who recently freed themselves from the dysfunctional Soviet economic system, the oil and natural gas deposits found along Azerbaijan’s section of the Caspian Sea have helped propel the country’s global influence. This energy revenue constitutes a significant portion of Azerbaijan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Azerbaijan became a major oil-producing region more than a century ago. After independence, 1990s, Azerbaijan signed multibillion-dollar contracts with Western companies to revitalize its oil exports. As a result, Azerbaijan’s economy has grown at an astounding rate in recent years and Figure 2 Oil Fields Near Baku provided its people with the

Credit: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Oil_Rocks_near_Baku.jpg resources to undertake major diplomatic initiatives and raise their welfare and that of their neighbors. An estimated 30 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves and seven billion barrels of proven oil reserves have given the Azerbaijani government a powerful source of revenue and diplomatic influence.

Despite Azerbaijan’s challenging security environment, the country’s oil and gas resources have continued to attract substantial foreign investment, which helped to boost the national economy as well as secure foreign support against external predators. The growing oil production of the Azeri-Chirag- Guneshli oil field and the discovery of the large Shah Deniz gas field have generated windfall oil revenues.

The government has used this windfall to help reintegrate people displaced by the war with Armenia, improve Azerbaijan’s basic infrastructure, spruce up the Baku skyline, and support various diplomatic and religious initiatives.7 According to the World Bank, a poverty level that once encompassed nearly half of the country’s population has fallen dramatically in recent years.8 The government is trying to place Azerbaijan’s economy on a more stable footing by diversifying and strengthening non- hydrocarbon sectors such as agriculture, finance, and communications.9

Azerbaijan’s Growing Global Influence Ÿ 5 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is developing a new form of soft power influence through its growing foreign investments.

If, during the 1990s, Azerbaijan’s foreign economic policy focused on attracting foreign direct capital to the country, today Azerbaijanis have become major foreign investors in the neighboring countries.

Figure 3 Caspian Oil and Gas Resources. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2002/09/irans-claim-over-caspian-sea-resources-threaten- energy-security

For example, in 2011, the state energy corporation the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) became the largest foreign investor in Georgia despite Russian hostility to that country’s government. Azerbaijan also provided Georgia with electricity and gas during its war with Russia in 2008.

According to Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the number of foreigners who travel to Azerbaijan has increased every single year since 2007. In 2010, tourists spent more than $740 million in Azerbaijan.10 The country's tourism sector is expected to continue growing by 9.5 percent annually during the next ten years.11 Azerbaijan often bids for sporting, music, and other prominent multinational cultural events that enhance the country’s status and prestige.

Azerbaijan’s Growing Global Influence Ÿ 6 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

The most prominent event occurred in May 2012, when Azerbaijan successfully hosted the Eurovision song contest, a music festival immensely popular in Europe and watched by millions of viewers. Tens of thousands of people from around the world traveled to Baku to attend the contest, putting Azerbaijan in the global spotlight and stimulating the local economy in the process. Hosting the Eurovision contest highlighted Baku’s status as a safe, secure, and modern city.12

Azerbaijan has become Eurasia’s great connector and assumed a prominent and powerful role well beyond that of helping to rebuild the fabled Silk Road linking peoples to its east and west (and increasing to its south, to include the Middle East).

The country helps bridge numerous gaps in multiple ways—connecting the Christian and Muslim worlds, Europe to Asia, the Turkic and Christian worlds, and the West to the East. It is simultaneously a member of both the Council of Europe and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

Even Azerbaijan’s folk music blends Western and Eastern elements, and its singers excel at traditional as well as modern music.13

Azerbaijani officials are constructing energy pipelines and other conduits to realize their vision of their country as a global hub of multi-model transportation, a project that also reinforces their desire to reduce religious, ethnic, and other possible sources of tension in their region. Azerbaijanis are therefore on the frontline in averting the feared and destructive clash of civilizations. In recent years, Baku has hosted some of the most prominent events and initiatives designed to promote inter-civilizational dialogue, understanding, and cooperation.

Yet, Azerbaijan’s location at the crossroads of Iran, Russia, the Middle East, and Europe has constrained Baku’s ability to pursue an independent foreign policy.

Azerbaijan and the rest of the Caucasus region have been an object of rivalry between the Persian, Ottoman and Russian empires for centuries. This competition has continued even after the demise of these empires as well as the rise and fall of the Soviet Union. Despite Azerbaijan’s impressive economic performance and religious tolerance, the country is still relatively weak in comparison with its neighbors, primarily due to its relatively small size (86,000 square km and 9 million inhabitants). Today, the interests of Iran, Russia, Europe, and the United States in the South Caucasus and Caspian region can still clash; confronting the Azerbaijani government with the need to accommodate the parties as best they can while still advancing its own interests.

Geographically vulnerable and surrounded by states that view themselves as great powers, the Azerbaijani government has sought to execute a foreign policy that is balanced, unthreatening, and pragmatic, though in recent years it has developed additional capacity and leverage and increasingly assertive in defending its core national security interests.

Azerbaijan’s Growing Global Influence Ÿ 7 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Azerbaijan’s leaders have been trying to leverage Azerbaijan’s pivotal location, energy resources, and other assets to help manage its volatile neighborhood while pursuing its own regional objectives, which focus on recovering the territories occupied by Armenia, averting a war with Iran while countering Iranian subversion, minimizing foreign leverage over Azerbaijan’s domestic policies, and establishing Baku, the national capital and a major port city, as a center for regional commerce.

Figure 4 The View from Azerbaijan of the Armenian Challenge Map http://www.refugees-idps-committee.gov.az/en/pages/1.html

A key element of this effort is Azerbaijan’s pursuit of a balanced foreign policy toward other countries. Azerbaijan has maintained diverse foreign relations and membership in international organizations. In the early 1990s, Azerbaijan joined a number of organizations, including the United Nations, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the International Monetary Fund, the CSCE (which later became the OSCE), and NATO’s new North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later re-named the Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997) and its Partnership for Peace program. Most recently, Azerbaijan joined the Non-Aligned Movement on May 25, 2011, to garner influence with its large membership.

Russia's preeminent role in the South Caucasus has also strongly shaped Azerbaijan's strategic posture. The Azerbaijani government has sought to maintain good relations with Russia even while developing ties with Western governments. Azerbaijanis and Russians have sustained good economic and social

Azerbaijan’s Growing Global Influence Ÿ 8 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • • ties despite the demise of the Soviet Union. Russia is one of Azerbaijan’s largest trading partners, with annual bilateral running about $3 billion in 2012.14 Since 2009, Azerbaijan has been a major natural gas exporter to Russia through an agreement between SOCAR and Gazprom, Russia’s leading energy conglomerate. Many Azerbaijanis live in Russia and vice-versa. Russia’s Azerbaijanis have played a very active role in developing Russia’s economy as well as supporting economic ties between Russia and Azerbaijan.

Today the owner of the Russia’s biggest oil company, Lukoil, is an ethnic Azerbaijani.

These economic and social ties helped cushion the sometimes tense political ties between the two countries due to Moscow’s closer ties with Armenia as well as suspicions that the Kremlin wants to see the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict continue indefinitely as a means of ensuring Moscow’s continued preeminent leverage in the region through arms sales and diplomatic influence. Russia recently confirmed a large arms deal with Azerbaijan, whose military has many Russian/Soviet weapons systems, but possible Russian military intervention on Armenia’s behalf represents a major constraint on Azerbaijan’s potential military options regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.

Armenia is a member of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), where Azerbaijan has not joined any formal military alliance. Whereas Russia recently withdrew from its early warning radar base in Gabala, the Russian military retains long-term access to its main Armenian base in Gyumri The Azerbaijani government’s tolerant polices towards its Russian Orthodox citizens have helped sustain good ties with Russia. In 2011, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill wrote that, "Inter-religious dialogue is successfully conducted in Azerbaijan, where there is a successful model of religion-state relations, which provides for freedom of religion under reasonable protective measures.” He added that the Russian Orthodox Church community of Azerbaijan, the country’s largest Christian denomination, is not subjected to government harassment. 15

Relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey have remained strong for decades.

The two countries share strong cultural and ethnic ties (Azerbaijanis are a Turkic people). Some people of Azerbaijan and Turkey describe their two countries as "one nationality and two governments," reflecting the deep connection between them. The two governments cooperate regarding Armenia, Georgia (reciprocal recognition of territorial integrity), the pipeline transit of oil and gas (which includes Georgia), and other matters. Turkey’s defense ties with Azerbaijan are especially important given Azerbaijan’s exclusion from NATO and the CSTO, which includes Armenia as well as other former Soviet states. Powerful economic ties bind Turkey and Azerbaijan, ranging from Azerbaijan’s supply of natural gas to Turkey to the large presence of both countries’ companies and workers in the other. The two countries are both attractive emerging markets for foreign investors.

Azerbaijan’s Growing Global Influence Ÿ 9 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Through the territory of Turkey, Western Europe can gain access to Azerbaijan’s coveted energy resources, circumventing Russia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that runs from Azerbaijan to Europe (bypassing Russia and Iran) has conveyed more than one billion barrels of oil into Europe since it became operational in 2007.

In June 2012, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed an agreement to build a $7-billion Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) that is projected bring 10 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas to European markets starting in 2018. By 2017, SOCAR will have about $17 billion worth of investments in Turkey’s economy, making it the single largest foreign direct investor in that country.

For Europeans, Azerbaijan is a dual corridor, for transporting energy to the west and enabling the EU and NATO to project power (diplomatic, economic, and military) to the east.

The European Union values Azerbaijan’s key transit role for Caspian energy supplies to Europe since it supports the various east-west pipeline projects of the European Commission. The EU has included Azerbaijan as a key partner in its eastern neighborhood outreach efforts. Many European tourists visit Azerbaijan, attracted by its reputation as a “land of fire,” where natural conditions allow fires to burn on water. Baku is considered a European cultural treasure. EU leaders generally praise Azerbaijanis’ tolerant attitude toward religion.

Conversely, Azerbaijan also uses cultural diplomacy to reinforce its relations with European countries. Azerbaijani charitable organizations donates significant amount of funds for the restoration of the various historic sites in Europe.

For example, the Heydar Aliyev Foundation has started a project to restore France’s Versailles Palace and the Cathédrale de Notre Dame de Strasbourg. Azerbaijani singers perform well at European cultural events, such as the Eurovision song contest, while foreign performers often visit Azerbaijan on their regional tours.

Azerbaijan is an active member of many international organizations, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, and other Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The OSCE “Minsk Group” arose more than a decade ago to encourage a negotiated resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. It is headed by a co-Chairmanship that consists of France, Russia and the United States and includes Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan and the rotating membership of the OSCE Troika (current, previous, and upcoming annual chairing countries). Azerbaijan has engaged in various NATO projects, including supporting the war in

Azerbaijan’s Growing Global Influence Ÿ 10 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Afghanistan as well as participating in numerous exercises, some peacekeeping operations, and other programs under NATO’s Partnership for Peace program.

For example Azerbaijani forces have served under NATO auspices in Kosovo and in Afghanistan in line with the country’s goal of promoting peace and stability in its neighborhood.

The Azerbaijani government has provided more than two million euros to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund to support the NATO goal of transitioning the lead role in combat operations to the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF).

Azerbaijan has also been training civilian Afghan government personnel, including police officers. At times, some 40% of NATO’s non-lethal transit to Afghanistan has gone through Azerbaijan, and the country’s territory could perform a vital role in facilitating NATO’s accelerating military draw-down from Afghanistan and Central Asia. Azerbaijani officials have developed close cooperation with NATO to the extent that they have refrained from applying for formal alliance membership, arguing that function (content) matters more than form (status).

Empowering Religious Tolerance Azerbaijanis pride themselves as being “tolerant Muslims” who eschew the kind of extremism found in neighboring Iran or among Wahhabi sects in Sunni-dominated countries.16

Azerbaijan is one of the few Muslim-majority countries where one sees mosques, churches, and synagogues coexisting in peaceful harmony. This tolerance is a longstanding element of Azerbaijani political culture that traces back to Ancient times as well as the influence of the European Enlightenment under Tsarist Russia and Marxist-Leninism under the Soviet Union.17

This benign model has survived even during the 1990s, when the former Soviet bloc was swept by religious wars, notably in Tajikistan and the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. Even after Armenia occupied one-fifth of Azerbaijan’s territory, displacing one million Azerbaijani citizens, the Armenian Church in Baku operated without interruption.18 In 2009, Baku was elected the capital of Islamic culture for Azerbaijan’s contribution in promoting global religious tolerance.19

Azerbaijan lacks the types of laws or cultural tenets found in the more conservative Muslim states that restrict women from engaging in certain activities. Women are free to walk and shop wherever they wish without male escorts. About one-fifth of the members of the national parliament are women and even greater percentage of women hold posts in local government bodies. Many ethnic and religious minorities are also represented in the parliament and other public institutions

President Ilham Aliyev has described "the fraternity and friendship between” Azerbaijan’s various ethnic and religious groups as the country’s "greatest resource.”20 According to the 1999 census, ethnic

Empowering Religious Tolerance Ÿ 11 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • • groups within Azerbaijan include 90.6% Azeri, 2.2% Dagestani, 1.8% Russian, 1.5% Armenian, and 3.9% of other ethnicities.21 The presence of these various ethnic groups has also meant that numerous languages are spoken in the country: Azerbaijani (Azeri) 90.3%, Lezgi 2.2%, Russian 1.8%, Armenian 1.5%, other 3.3%, unspecified 1%.22

Figure 5 Lutheran Church of the Savior in Baku.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Azerbaijan

After gaining independence, the President of Azerbaijan issued a special decree on the protection of the rights and freedoms of the national minorities, ethnic groups and the protection and development of their language and culture. In Azerbaijan, citizenship is unrelated to religion, race, or ethnicity—something Americans find normal but represents an exceptional approach for Europe and Eurasia. And it is not only legislation that guarantees religious freedom. The political culture and national traditions also encourage tolerance. Azerbaijanis have always looked favorably on multiculturalism.

Given Azerbaijan’s geographic location and its long history, the variety of religious beliefs within the country should not be surprising. While the current dominant religion in Azerbaijan is Islam, at various times in history, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Christianity have had paramount status in the country. What is surprising is the lack of major religious conflict in Azerbaijan, which after all is in a neighborhood replete with violent struggles between religious and secular sources. Two of the most religiously unstable territories of the former Soviet Union are located to Azerbaijan’s north: Chechnya and Dagestan. In most of the Caucasus, people typically define their community on the basis of ethnic nationalism, which contributes to ethnic-political conflict.

The Soviet experience strengthened this pattern by listing ethnicity in passports. Given the disastrous experience of the 1990s, when Europe and Eurasia was swept by vicious ethno-nationalist wars, and the decade after that, which saw the horrendous 9/11 terrorist attacks and other outrages committed by false believers in the name of Islam, the international community is fortunate to have Azerbaijan as a leading bulwark against further ethno-nationalism. In Azerbaijan, the community transcends ethnicity.

Reflecting their civic definition of a national community, people use the inclusive term “Azerbaijani” rather than “Azeri” when defining their fellow citizens. Fortunately, decades of Soviet repression not only failed to extirpate all the underground religious activities in Azerbaijan, but had the perverse effect of strengthening inter-religious cooperation against the common atheist foe.

Empowering Religious Tolerance Ÿ 12 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

The religious makeup of Azerbaijan has remained relatively stable since the country regained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Approximately 95% of the population of Azerbaijan is Muslim, with the remainder consisting mostly of Russian Orthodox, other Christian groups (such as some recently growing Protestant sects), Jews, and nonbelievers.23 In a 2012 survey of 1,500 Azerbaijani respondents entitled, "Islam in Azerbaijan: Realities and Public Opinion," conducted by the Center for Religious Studies in cooperation with the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Azerbaijan, 96.8% of those polled considered themselves to be Muslims, 0.8% as Orthodox Christians, and 0.1% as Jews.24

Based on data from the Pew Research Center, between three to four percent of the world’s Shiite population lives in Azerbaijan.25

Geographically, the areas surrounding the Baku and Lankaran regions in the southeast are considered to be more Shiite, while some northern regions are populated by Sunni Dagestani people. Islam has less influence in central Azerbaijan. Some of the country’s younger people have become devout Muslims or at least interested in learning more about Islam.26 But almost all Azerbaijanis still treat religion as a form of cultural and ethical identity rather than a political philosophy that should shape government policies.27

Figure 6 Qirmizi Qaseba has a large Jewish community.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Azerbaijan

Furthermore, there are around 25,000 to 30,000 Jews in Azerbaijan, divided into three main groups: Ashkenazi (European) Jews, Caucasian Mountain (aka Persian or Bukharian) Jews, and the less prominent Georgian Jews.28 While some Mountain Jewish families have lived in Azerbaijan for centuries, the ancestors of many of Azerbaijan’s Ashkenazi Jews arrived in the 19th or early 20th century. Some fled persecution from Russia, Persia, or other neighboring governments, while others were drawn by Baku’s growing oil industry and religious tolerance.29 The Soviet government generally suppressed Jewish religious identity, and many Azerbaijani Jews joined other Soviet Jews and fled the Soviet Union once emigration controls weakened and then collapsed.30

Since then, the Israeli government, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the World Jewish Agency, and Azerbaijani Jews inside and outside the country have been supporting a revival of Jewish culture and traditions in Azerbaijan. They helped finance the construction of the new synagogue in Baku that opened in March 2003.31

Empowering Religious Tolerance Ÿ 13 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Azerbaijan was one of the ancient Christian states and descendants of the ancient Christians who refused to convert to Islam still live in Azerbaijan, such as the Udins who live in the village of Nij. Their Church was restored recently. Many of Azerbaijan’s Christians now reside in urban areas or near Armenia, although there are pockets of non-Islamic peoples throughout Azerbaijan.

For example there are a couple hundred Catholics in Azerbaijan, many of them foreign residents. In 2006, Azerbaijan reopened its first Catholic Church since Stalin closed the previous one in Baku, which had been opened in 2012, in the 1930s. The Vatican paid for the construction while the Azerbaijani government donated the land in the country’s capital.32 In 2011, the Vatican and Azerbaijan signed a treaty that secures the legal status of the Catholic Church in Azerbaijan; the parties see the treaty as a possible model for other Muslim-majority countries.33

Actual religious observance varies within the population, but in general Azerbaijanis are not preoccupied with their religion and few seek to impose their religious preferences on others. As a general principle, Azerbaijanis have an open and tolerant attitude towards the various religions that are practiced in their country. Although some cases of religious discrimination inevitably occur, the law obliges the government to let Azerbaijanis practice any religion except those that advocate violence, extremism, or seek to constrain the religious practices of others. According to the government, 4-6 percent of the Azerbaijani population may be called “active” practitioners of Islam, meaning that they try to obey all Islamic customs, whereas some 90 percent consider themselves essentially Muslims even though they comply with only some religious rules and customs.”34

In a fall 2004 poll, only 23% of the respondents wanted to see Islamic law in Azerbaijan. While 87.2% considered themselves as religious, 63.6% said that they never prayed. When asked how they felt about all types of Muslims (i.e., Sunnis and Shiites) praying together in one mosque, 30.5% said that they would not object in principle while half said that they would be glad.35 In a more recent Gallup Poll, approximately half the Azerbaijani respondents said that religion played only a modest role in their daily lives, while merely 21% described religion as being an important part of their daily lives.36

Even before the Soviet occupation, Azerbaijan’s elite considered their Muslim religion primarily as a cultural orientation that should not determine political and other non-religious issues.37 Azerbaijan was the first Muslim majority country whose government allowed all people the right to vote in national elections regardless of their ethnicity, gender, race, or religion, even ahead of the United States.38 The country also had the first school for Muslim girls, which was constructed in 1901.39

Other Azerbaijani firsts include being the first country in Eurasia to stage opera and ballet performances.40 On May 28, 1918, the new Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan became the first democratic parliamentary government in the Muslim world, though the Bolsheviks cut this achievement short.

Empowering Religious Tolerance Ÿ 14 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Notwithstanding his Bolshevik convictions, Vladimir Lenin ordered the 11th Soviet Red Army to seize the country, reestablishing Moscow’s imperial control over Azerbaijan’s oil riches. The Red Army invaded Azerbaijan in April 1920 and then incorporated Azerbaijan into the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The Soviet government repeated this crime even as the Soviet Union was disintegrating. The Red Army returned to Baku in (“Black”) January 1990 and sought to violently suppress Azerbaijan’s powerful independence movement through a misguided show of force and collective punishment.

Although most Azerbaijanis are Muslim, Islam is not the state ideology. Azerbaijan is officially a secular country whose Constitution guarantees all members of its society the right to worship as they see fit. Adopted by popular referendum on November 12, 1995 and amended on August 24, 2002, the Constitution of Azerbaijan has been largely effective at protecting religious liberties.41

After visiting Azerbaijan in late February 2006, Asma Jahangir, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief for the UN Commission on Human Rights, found an “undisputable degree of tolerance” among Azerbaijanis on religious questions: “The most striking feature of Azerbaijan regarding issues relevant to my mandate is the easygoing and dispassionate attitude shown by the Azerbaijanis towards religion. In February 2012, the House of Representatives of the U.S. state of Mississippi adopted a resolution describing Azerbaijan as a country that is among the most progressive in Islamic societies, where support for secularism and tolerance is high.42

As one might expect, isolated examples occur of overzealous local authorities or intolerant private individuals harassing members of certain religious groups.43 Yet, unlike in many other majority- Muslim countries, in Azerbaijan religion is wholly separated from the affairs of state and government, a stance that helps defend those whose faith or practices differ from the country’s Muslim majority.

Under Article 48 of the Constitution, titled “Freedom of conscience,” the following rights are protected:

I. Everyone enjoys the freedom of conscience.

II. Everyone has the right to define his/her attitude to religion, to profess, individually or together with others, any religion or to profess no religion, to express and spread one's beliefs concerning religion.

III. Everyone is free to carry out religious rituals; however this should not violate public order and contradict public morals.

IV. Religious beliefs and convictions do not excuse infringements of the law.”44

In addition to the general religious freedoms addressed in Article 48, the Constitution also directly addresses the separation of state and religion under Article 18:

Empowering Religious Tolerance Ÿ 15 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

I. Religion in the Azerbaijan Republic is separated from state. All religions are equal before the law.

II. Spreading and propaganda of religions humiliating people's dignity and contradicting the principles of humanism are prohibited.

III. The state educational system is secular.”45

Azerbaijan’s State Committee of for the Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA) plays a key role in implementing the Azerbaijani state’s approach toward religion. Its major responsibilities are:

• To create corresponding conditions to implement the freedom of faith, • State registration of religious organizations in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Azerbaijan, • To provide corresponding amendments and supplements to regulations (statues) of these organizations, • On the request of the religious organizations to provide necessary aid for achievement of the agreement with the state organs and to expect their help in the solution of the necessary problems, • To help in strengthening of mutual understanding, tolerance and respect between the religious organizations of different religious convictions, • To prevent confrontation and discriminations and other negative cases happened on the religious ground. In addition to promoting religious freedom within the country, the Committee seeks to engage the larger world community. It boasts that, “The embassies of foreign states, the representatives of international organizations, different centers of culture, the organizations of humanitarian help and charity, as well as the businessmen of different faiths all conduct their activity in liberal Azerbaijan.”46

The government also uses legislation to curb religious-based extremism or violence. In addition to trying to promote religious liberty, the SCWRA is responsible for monitoring the activities of sanctioned religious organizations, as well as the publication of religious material throughout the country. Religious groups are expected to register with Azerbaijan’s government to receive official sanction. Muslim groups in the country are required to gain the acceptance of the Muslim Caucasus Board before being considered by the SCWRA.47

Mosques have been shut down when they fell under the control of Muslim groups financed from abroad that practiced religious intolerance toward others. Although the Azerbaijani authorities do not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, they resolutely resist interference in their own country’s internal affairs by foreign governments or their local agents.

In 2009, the Azerbaijani parliament strengthened the government’s enforcement mechanism by forcing all organizations to re-register by January 1, 2010.48 On May 8, 2009, Azerbaijan’s parliament, the Milli

Empowering Religious Tolerance Ÿ 16 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Majlis, amended the country’s Law on the Freedom of Religion through additional legislation, which was signed by the country’s president on May 29, 2009. The amendments broadened the registration requirements for religious groups in order to limit prevent foreign extremists from recruiting followers in Azerbaijan.49 They required religious communities to provide more details about their doctrines, traditions, duties, restrictions, and attitudes towards family, marriage and education as well as biographical data about the community’s founders.

Furthermore, the new legislation restricted religious observance outside of the home at locations other than the group’s registered address.50 In addition to the amendments to the Law on Religious Freedom, two amendments were made to Azerbaijan’s Constitution, with the stated purpose of limiting the recruitment efforts of Islamic extremists. Article 18 of the Constitution was changed to read: “Spreading of and propagandizing religion (religious movements), humiliating people's dignity, and contradicting the principles of humanism are prohibited.” A new section was added to Article 48, which now reads, No one shall be forced to express (to demonstrate) his or her religious faith and belief, to execute religious rituals and participate in religious ceremonies.’”51

Despite some alarm at the time, from today’s vantage point it is clear that the changes introduced in 2009 have not altered Azerbaijan’s fundamentally free religious landscape. More than 500 religious groups have registered with the government, including more than 30 non-Muslim groups.52 There are more than one thousand functioning mosques in Azerbaijan as well as many Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant churches and several synagogues.53

As in many European countries, religiously charged demonstrations have occurred occasionally since December 2010, when the government began enforcing a ban on the Muslim headscarf, or hijab, which is prohibited under rules that define the kind of uniforms school children must wear in Azerbaijan.

While no law specifically prohibits the hijab be worn in public, the Law on Education requires school children to wear uniforms that do not include them and the Ministry of Education insists on a strict application of this law.54 The ban led to demonstrations that began in late 2010. In October 2012, some two hundred Muslim activists protested the ban outside the Education Ministry and fought with the police in Baku.55 Sentiments towards the hijab vary within the country’s various Muslim communities.

For example, Salafis, have not joined the Shiite AIP’s fight to remove the hijab ban since they generally do not wear Islamic dress. Given the largely secular nature of Azerbaijan’s Muslim citizens, the groups in opposition have been relatively small, though they appear to have received some foreign (Iranian) support. However, some analysts worry that the government’s de facto prohibition against the wearing of hijab in schools risks radicalizing other Muslims by politicizing the issue. In any case, the government's efforts to counter Islamist extremism enjoy wide support, within Azerbaijan and elsewhere.

Empowering Religious Tolerance Ÿ 17 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Fundamentalist schools of Islamic thought are viewed negatively by much of the population. A 2012 poll by the Baku-based Center for Strategic Studies provides specific numbers confirming the marginalized nature of Islamic radicalism within Azerbaijan. Only 5% of the respondents supported establishing an Islamic religious state in Azerbaijan, while about 90% of the respondents expressed respect for other religions. Only 2.6% of respondents share the ideas of Salafism (Wahhabism), while 42.8% consider it an alien ideology and 30.2% have a negative attitude towards its members, equating Wahhabism with the extremism of al-Qaeda or other Sunni militant groups.56 Elshad Iskandarov, the head of the SCWRA, said that the research confirmed that that the Azerbaijani people support religious tolerance and reject religious radicalism.57

In another form of soft power, Azerbaijanis regularly host conferences and other events where they share their religious experience and policies with hundreds of foreign guests representing a majority of the world’s countries. For example, speaking at the re-opening of the Ajdarbay mosque in Baku on December 22, 2011, President Ilham Aliyev called Azerbaijan’s mutli-culturalism and religious tolerance” our contribution to the world's heritage”. I believe that our experience has not been studied yet. If it is studied, then I am convinced that the current situation in our country can be used as a model.”58

Iskandarov has also said that his country’s “model of interfaith tolerance" should be Azerbaijan’s other major export item along with energy products—"our human relations and tolerance are just as important as the other commodity they know better, the energy."

Iskandarov explained that "our model of tolerance can be shared with Europe and elsewhere and can be implemented in other places where there is definitely a need for more cooperation.

"The Heydar Aliyev Foundation’s “Azerbaijan - home to tolerance" project has helped reconstruct religious edifices throughout the world, including a mosque in Georgia.59 In addition, the “Baku Process” has launched a series of landmark inter-religious events that take place every year or so in Azerbaijan. A 2008 meeting of the Culture Ministers of the Council of Europe launched the process and adopted a "Baku Declaration" that defined its goals.60

In November 2009, the Diplomatic Academy of Azerbaijan and the General Secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) hosted an international conference on " Inter-religious dialogue: from mutual understanding to joint cooperation". Its two hundred attendees, who discussed cultural and religious cooperation across civilizations, included ministers and experts from the member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and from other countries.61 President Aliyev told the attendees that, “All peoples and representatives of all religions live in Azerbaijan as one family. They actively work for development of Azerbaijan. They make contribution in general development of Azerbaijan as Azerbaijani worthy citizens."62

Empowering Religious Tolerance Ÿ 18 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

The 2010 Baku summit of the world’s religious leaders occurred the following year. Its 250 attendees, representing various confessions from 35 countries, sought to counter terrorism, fanaticism, extremism, narcotics trafficking and other global threats.63Baku hosted a World Forum on Intercultural Dialogue in April 2011 that was attended by more than 500 religious figures, politicians, media and NGO representatives, and leading scholars from throughout the world.64 UNESCO, the UN Alliance of Civilizations, the Council of Europe, the North-South Center of the Council of Europe, ISESCO and Euronews supported the World Forum, whose discussions focused on the conceptual, managerial, political and practical aspects of intercultural dialogue, especially on modalities to enhance the dialogue.

The forum’s motto was "United through common values, enriched by cultural diversity." In December 2012, a forum on “State and Religion: Increased Tolerance in a Changing World” took place in Azerbaijan.65

These recent dialogue events build on some earlier post-9/11 conferences that had a greater focus on countering extremism, such as an October 2002 conference in Baku on terrorism and religious extremism. Baku has hosted related events, such as last October’s first International Humanitarian Forum to assess "XXI century: hopes and challenges."

Attended by Presidents Aliyev and Vladimir Putin, the two-day meeting aimed to solve this century’s most important human challenges through holding wide-ranging dialogues, exchanges, and discussions.66 Its seven panels addressed such subjects as "Humanitarian aspects of economic models of development"; "Modem technologies that changed the world"; "Traditional values system in postmodern culture"; "Biotechiologies and ethical problems"; "Multiculturalism: achievements and problems"; "Social journalism and high technologies"; and "Convergence of sciences."67

Most recently, from May 29 to June 1 of this year, Baku hosted the Second World Forum in Intercultural Dialogue. Speaking at the opening ceremony, President Aliyev noted how the participation of culture ministers from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation member states and those of the Council of Europe “means that Baku, along with its role of a geographical bridge, also serves as an intercultural bridge.”

The President further noted that, "Azerbaijan has been home to the nations living here and representatives of all religions for centuries. We are proud that today Azerbaijan is an independent, multi-ethnic and multi-faith country. Representatives of all religions, all nations live as one family in peace, friendship and understanding.” He called this “our great wealth and great advantage, and I believe that this factor played a role in the successful development of Azerbaijan.”68

The Forum is held every two years in Baku under the auspices of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

Empowering Religious Tolerance Ÿ 19 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • • Managing Iran's Regional Ambitions The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic of Iran have a very long history of close cultural and ethnic ties. Nonetheless, their relationship in recent years has been turbulent. This discord is the result of global and political developments. While Azerbaijan was part of Iran or the Persian Empire, following two defeats to Russia in the 19th century, Iran ceded control over the territory that eventually became the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Russian and Persian empires divided Azerbaijan in 1828.

The smaller areas north of the Aras River fell under Moscow’s control, and eventually became today’s Republic of Azerbaijan. The larger territory south of the Aras, including the city of Tabriz, became part of modern Iran. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan achieved independence again. Iran was one of the first countries to recognize the new state because Iranian leaders assumed they would exercise dominant influence in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. A number of Iranian missionaries went to Azerbaijan to gain new converts to Iran’s militant version of Islam.6

Figure 7 Azerbaijan is part of Iran's neighborhood. Credit Image: Bigstock

Iranian clerics assumed important positions in some of Azerbaijan's most prominent mosques, while others established Islamic schools (Madrasas) in Azerbaijan. They used their positions to promote Iran's concept of velayat-e-faqih and secure allegiance to Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.69 Azerbaijanis did not prove receptive of Iran's brand of Shiism, with its interpretation of the preeminent political role of the clergy.

Historically, Azerbaijan has maintained a very strong secular tradition that predates the Soviet era. After Azerbaijan rejected Iran’s path and aligned with the West, the Iranian government retaliated by

Managing Iran's Regional Ambitions Ÿ 20 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • • siding with Christian Armenia in its war with Muslim Azerbaijan. Tensions between Tehran and Baku have since ebbed and flowed over the years, with generally declining economic ties mixing uneasily with often tense political relations.

Although most people welcome Azerbaijan’s embracing attitude toward religious diversity, Iranian officials have criticized this lax environment as contaminated by Western immorality.70 The clerical regime considers the secular and pro-Western policies pursued by the independent state of Azerbaijan as a potential existential threat to the Islamic Republic, whose government enforces strict religious principles and discriminates against religious and ethnic minorities.

Conversely, if Iranian-brand Shiite radicalism were to take root in Azerbaijan, it would destabilize the country by antagonizing Azerbaijan’s Sunni Muslims and other minorities. The negative regional effects of Iran’s gaining another ally—in this case at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East—cannot be underestimated. Among other problems, it would impart new momentum to global terrorists inspired by the Iranian government’s militant brand of Shiism.

Iran's Azerbaijani Minority The Iranian government, hoping to gain a close regional ally, was one of the first to establish full diplomatic relations with the new Republic of Azerbaijan.71 But relations soon began to deteriorate after the secular-oriented Popular Front of Azerbaijan and President Abulfaz Elchibey came to power in 1992.

Rather than join an Iranian axis, Elchibey aligned with Turkey and the West and sought to promote freedom for Iran's Azerbaijani minority. Iranians then supported efforts to force Elchibey out of office and also provided support for Armenia’s invasion and occupation of Azerbaijani lands in and around the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Elchibey’s successors have exercised much greater constraint regarding Iran’s Azerbaijani minority, but the issue remains a sore point in the bilateral relationship.

Although there are no official Iranian statistics, there may be more than twenty million ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran. This amounts to the largest concentration of ethnic Azerbaijanis in any country, with the independent Republic of Azerbaijan holding second place with less than ten million citizens. Iran’s ethnic Azerbaijanis live primarily in the west and north of the country, a region also known as "Southern Azerbaijan." The modern Iranian provinces of Ardabil, East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Zenjan, Hamadan Ostans loosely cover this 170,000 square kilometer area, and adjacent areas of Astara, Qazvin and other Iranian territories near the independent state of Azerbaijan.72

The region became part of modern Iran after the Turkmenchay Treaty divided Azerbaijani Khanates between the Tsarist Russia and Iran. As recently as 1946, the Moscow government plotted to detach the Southern Azerbaijan and incorporate it into Soviet Azerbaijan in a Stalinist plot that helped set the

Managing Iran's Regional Ambitions Ÿ 21 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • • stage for the Cold War.73 Iran’s large provinces such as Tehran, Alborz and Khorasan also have large number of ethnic Azerbaijanis.74

These Azerbaijanis constitute one of Iran’s largest ethnic groups, amounting to perhaps one third of Iran’s total population. Its most prominent members include Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as well as the head of the Green opposition movement, Hossein Moussavi. Like the Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Azerbaijan, Iran’s ethnic Azerbaijanis reportedly are more secular-oriented than the fundamentalist Shiites who rule Tehran.75

Figure 8 Azerbaijanis make the point that Southern Azerbaijan is not Iran.

http://www.gloria-center.org/2013/03/the-rise-of- nationalism-among-iranian-azerbaijanis-a-step- toward-irans-disintegration/

Ironically, Iran’s Azerbaijan minority is “also among the richest groups in Iran, is represented by senior positions inside the Iranian government, and is heavily connected to the crucial bazaari trade.”76 Tehran’s authoritarian leaders may recognize that historically it is precisely the middle classes who often lead the charge for political liberalization. Their extensive economic resources give them a vested interest in trying to influence government policies that could threaten their wealth.

Neighboring Azerbaijan’s attractive soft power could reinforce this process since Iran fears that as an independent country, Azerbaijan stirs the aspirations of ethnic cohorts in Iran for greater rights or even secession.

This fear may have grown with the rise of the Iranian opposition “Green Movement” and its rhetoric in support of ethnic minorities.77 Despite their favorable economic status, most Iranian Azerbaijanis, like other Iranian minorities such as Kurds, have been subject to cultural and ethnic discrimination by the ruling Persian majority. The Tehran government has banned ethnic minorities, including Azerbaijanis, from educating their children in their national languages, or to use their language in state institutions, such as courts or in the media.78

Iranian policies that have damaged the local ecology around Lake Urmiya have also aroused ethnic Azerbaijanis resentment.79 Soccer rivalries have recently stoked the flames of Azerbaijanis-Persian ethnic tensions, with diehard Azerbaijani and Persian supporters of feuding soccer teams in Iran

Managing Iran's Regional Ambitions Ÿ 22 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • • chanting nationalist slogans. With Iranian Azerbaijanis denied other means of expressing their identity, the Tractor Sazi Tabriz Football Club based in Tabriz, the capital of East Azerbaijan Province, has become a symbol of the nationalist identity of many Iranian Azerbaijanis.

Iranian leaders are concerned that the example of an independent and developing Azerbaijan to the north, a semi-independent Kurdish region in northern Iraq to the west, and a rising sense of cultural and nationalist awareness may prompt Iran's Azerbaijanis to demand more autonomy over their own affairs, if not outright independence from Iran.80 In the eyes of some observers, Iranian's clerical regime “views Azerbaijan’s secular system as an existential threat.” 81 Since the theocracy in Tehran claims that it is a symbol for the Muslim world, and since Khamenei believes that he is the leader of not just the Shia, but of all the Muslims in the world, one can understand why the Islamic Republic feels threatened by its more liberal and prosperous neighbor.

Since Azerbaijan is more secular, its society more open, and the people have more freedom, it is understandable that the people of Iran would look to the regime in Azerbaijan and seek to emulate that type of government. Many Iranian citizens today, especially among Azeri-speaking Iranians, tune in for Azerbaijan-based satellite TV stations. The Azerbaijani stations are providing these viewers with a liberal content that differs starkly from the austere programs' menu of official Iranian TV channels. The latest phases in this TV assault saw Azerbaijan host a number of high-profile American and European pop stars in lavish concerts that attracted tens of thousands of fans and still more TV viewers in Azerbaijan and abroad.82

The Iranian regime fears that exposure to foreign media outlets might introduce Iranians to a different and more attractive lifestyle in other societies not far from Iran, making the economic limitations and religious restrictions of life in Iran clearer in comparison, and thereby less tolerable.83 “The satellite channels… have one objective only –to attack Islam, our Islamic government and [the] great people of Iran,” one Iranian cleric has declared on TV. The Iranian government has launched a concerted campaign to ban and confiscate satellite dishes in Iran and to impose heavy fines on those violating the ban.84

Moreover, the Iranian government is increasingly employing signal jammers to interfere with undesirable TV broadcasts. The Iranian authorities have intensified their TV-jamming campaigns during sensitive times such as the controversial 2009 presidential elections in Iran and the Arab Spring uprisings.27 The use of such signal jammers may cause miscarriages and other health problems.85

Current Tensions Despite their close cultural, ethnic, and historical ties, important differences distinguish Iran from Azerbaijan.86

Managing Iran's Regional Ambitions Ÿ 23 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Above all, while the Islamic Republic is a Shiite theocracy, Azerbaijan is a strongly secular country. Iranian political and religious figures regular castigate what they call Azerbaijani authorities' anti- religious policies such as closing fundamentalist mosques and banning the wearing the veil in schools. To the proponents of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini's political principle of "velayat-e-faqih," or the “rule of the supreme jurist,” Baku's rejection of a strict Islamic model, where the realms of faith and state are fused together, is abhorrent.

For example, Iranian officials and clergy have attacked Azerbaijan’s prohibition on the display of religious symbols, claiming it defied Azerbaijan’s Islamic heritage.87

They have compared the Azerbaijani government’s policies to those of the first Shah of Iran ad Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founders of the secular republics in Iran and Turkey.88 During a visit by Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Abiyev to Tehran, the Azerbaijani flag was hung upside down, with the green stripe representing Islam on top, above the blue background representing the Turkic nation, symbolizing Iran's disrespect for Azerbaijan's secular Shia Turkic model.89 Similar flag incidents have occurred in the past. 90 Iranians have provided support for Azerbaijani political opposition groups opposed to the government’s secular line, most notably the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, led by Movsum Samadov.91

Figure 9 Iran whipped up opposition to Eurovision song contest in Baku. http://www.dw.de/tensions-rise-between-iran-and-azerbaijan/a-16006008

Reflecting on the growing tension between his country and the Islamic Republic of Iran, S.R. Sobhani, CEO of the Caspian Group, observes that, "Azerbaijan’s secularism, religious tolerance, economic growth, and Western oriented foreign policy now form a model for the freedom loving people trapped in Iran. A successfully modernized Muslim state north of its border spells danger for Iran’s theocracy."

Managing Iran's Regional Ambitions Ÿ 24 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Moreover, Tehran accuses Azerbaijan of allowing Israeli intelligence to use its territory as a base of operations against Iran.92

Azerbaijan and Iran remain divided over the status of the Caspian Basin’s energy resources. Tehran insists on having an equal one-fifth share of the Caspian even though its coastline is smaller than that, while Azerbaijan has already received recognition of its share by Russia and Kazakhstan.

Furthermore, Tehran, backed by Moscow, maintains that all five littoral governments must approve construction of trans-Caspian energy pipelines, which allows them to veto east-west energy routes that circumvent Iranian and Russian territory. Iran’s position discourages risk-averse foreign investment in the Caspian Basin region. Iran has the second most powerful navy in the Caspian after that of Russia. Iranian leaders have used their fleet to enforce claims over contested maritime resources. In 2001, Iran dispatched military ships and aircraft to threaten two Azerbaijani ships exploring oilfields in the southern Caspian Sea.93

Although Azerbaijan has suffered from Iranian threats since it gained independence in 1991, these have sharply escalated in recent years.

Figure 10 Iran puts constant pressure to seek to reduce Azerbaijan's regional influence;

http://blog.heritage.org/2012/02/23/irans- clandestine-operations-threaten-azerbaijan/

Recent Iranian provocations towards Azerbaijan have included Iranian accusations that Azerbaijan was helping Israel’s Mossad spy agency assassinate Iran’s nuclear scientists, Western intelligence agencies to monitor Iranian activities, the recall of the Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan to protest a visit by the Israeli president, an assassination attempt against the Ambassador of Israel to Azerbaijan, and the flying of an Iranian warplane through Azerbaijan’s airspace without authorization.

The Azerbaijani authorities have arrested a number of individuals over the years suspected of being Iranian spies. They also suspect that Iranians have been supporting local extremists in Azerbaijan as well as international terrorists.94 For example, the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan is seen as something of a “fifth column” working on Tehran’s behalf, as our Iranian-indoctrinated religious youth and the local branch of Iran’s Royal Bank.95

Managing Iran's Regional Ambitions Ÿ 25 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Azerbaijan’s geographic position between Iran and Russia has long made Baku a logical destination for covert and overt operations at the intersection of the West-East paradigm, and its history as a regional hub for spying does not appear to be over. In 2007, Azerbaijan convicted 15 people of collecting intelligence on Western and Israeli activities on behalf of an allegedly Iranian-linked spy network. The following year, Azerbaijani officials said that they foiled a plot to explode car bombs near the Israeli Embassy in apparent retaliation for the killing in Syria of a top commander in Hezbollah, the Iranian- backed militant group.96

In addition to seeking to destabilize the regime in Baku through spy networks, Iranians have launched cyber attacks against Azerbaijan. In January 2012, several websites belonging to Azerbaijani state bodies were hacked. The hackers left notes at some of these websites accusing the Azerbaijani authorities of “serving Jews.”97 Azerbaijan’s Ministry of National Security subsequently arrested some two dozen people who allegedly had been employed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to spy on Azerbaijan and recruit more collaborators.98

The 22 detainees were said to have received orders from the Revolutionary Guards to “commit terrorist acts against the US, Israeli and other Western states' embassies and the embassies' employees.”99 While the arrest caught headlines, the event should not be surprising in the broader context of the covert war in that Israel and Iran engage in throughout the globe.

The Iranian regime is also a player in the broadcast game. Sahar TV, an Iran-based satellite channel, broadcasts in Azeri. In addition to the more traditional religious content characteristic of official Iranian broadcasts, Sahar broadcasts programs designed to discredit the Azerbaijani government.100

The Iranian authorities also encourage Iranian Azerbaijani religious authorities to issue aggressive fawas challenging independent Azerbaijan’s secular principles.101 Furthermore, the Iranian government offers scholarships designed to draw young theology students from neighboring countries to its leading religious seminary in Qom, where they could be indoctrinated into the principles of the Islamic Republic. Several Azerbaijani students are believed to have received religious training at the hands of Iranian clerics at Qom.102 Iran is also extending its financial tentacles into Azerbaijan under the guise of charitable organizations that provide financial assistance to orphans and elderly.

What's more, some reports indicate that Iranian missionaries are active in Azerbaijan's southern regions, where they seek to gain new converts to Iran's official brand of Shiite Islam and promote Islamic militancy.43 The Imam Khomeini Relief Committee provides aid to refugees displaced during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict along with religious supporting Iranian fundamentalist interpretations of religion.103 Reports also suggest that the Iranian preachers are challenging Baku's authority by encouraging polygamy, which is banned by law in Azerbaijan, and espousing greater adherence to the provisions of the Shariah, Islamic law.104

Managing Iran's Regional Ambitions Ÿ 26 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Experts on the South Caucasus region believe that Azerbaijan's prosperity and generally good ties with foreign countries, which contrast starkly with Iran's continuing growing economic woes and diplomatic isolation, take a heavy toll on the Iranian regime's legitimacy and long-term survivability.

The regime in Tehran has claimed that it is the champion of Muslims across the world. For instance, former Judiciary Chief, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, “declared the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to be ‘the hope of Islamic national and Islamic liberation movements.’”105

Despite such rhetoric and such assertions, not only Sunni Muslims, but also Shias from Azerbaijan and other surrounding countries have opposed the Iranian regime.

Figure 11 Meeting between Azerbaijan and Iranian leaders to discuss differences and cooperation.

http://www.azernews.az/azerbaijan/577 84.html

This is because the regime in Tehran uses its religious influence to infiltrate, spy in, and plot to destabilize surrounding countries. Azerbaijan’s border regions with Iran are especially vulnerable to such conduct. Iranian books and tape recordings of Iranian religious books can be found in local bazaars. They are also at the front line in Azerbaijan’s defenses against the trafficking of drugs from Iran that originate from Afghanistan to European markets.

During his 2012 testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Ariel Cohen, a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, recalled that, “In 2007, Said Dadasbeyli, an Azerbaijani cleric and alleged leader of a group known as the ‘Northern Mahdi Army’ was accused of receiving assistance from the Qods Force and plotting to overthrow the secular government. The Azerbaijani authorities believed he had provided Iran with sensitive intelligence on the American and Israeli embassies in Baku. In October 2009, two Lebanese Hezbollah operatives and their four local Azerbaijani assets were charged with plotting to attack the U.S. and Israeli embassies. In January 2012, three men were accused of planning to assassinate a rabbi and a teacher working at a Baku Jewish school.”

Managing Iran's Regional Ambitions Ÿ 27 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

The reason Tehran wants to destabilize the regime in Baku is not because Tehran is afraid of Azerbaijan’s military might.

Rather, the regime in Iran is threatened mostly by Baku’s secular system, regional alliances, and soft power.

According to Cohen, “[s]ecular Azerbaijan is not the model Iran wants to see at its northern border: a prosperous, energy-exporting, Western-oriented and Israel-friendly, majority-Muslim country.” Matters are made more complicated because of Azerbaijan’s recent international relations; “Azerbaijan's victory in the 2011 Eurovision song contest; hosting Eurovision in 2012 as well as concerts by Jennifer Lopez; Rihanna; and Shakira; and hosting the under-17 Women's World Cup Soccer Tournament may all be interpreted as points scored in the soft power competition with the Islamic Republic.”

In Cohen’s assessment, the Iranian government likely orchestrated the demonstration of Iranian youth in front of the Azerbaijani consulate in Tebriz; they protested against Azerbaijan’s hosting of sacrilegious events such as the Eurovision song contest and a gay pride march in Baku.Tehran’s relationship with Baku is “further complicated by rising Azerbaijani nationalism inside Iran and by the fact that Iranians “come in droves to relax in Baku, and not vice versa.”106

Cohen is not alone in asserting that Tehran is threatened by Azerbaijan’s soft power.

Figure 12 Turkish and Azerbaijan flags.

http://www.acus.org/content/azerbaijan-and-turkey-flags

Brenda Shaffer, Senior Lecturer at University of Haifa, has reached a similar conclusion. Shaffer has claimed that “Tehran fears that Azerbaijan-a secular, modern, Shia- majority state that adheres to strict separation of religion and state--could serve as an alternative model for its own citizens.” Moreover, since “Iranian citizens frequently visit their northern neighbor, Tehran sees Baku's more open lifestyle as a threat to its domestic control.”

In addition to the Republic of Azerbaijan’s soft power, Tehran also perceives Azerbaijan’s foreign alignments as threatening.

In a region marred by conflicts, both active and dormant, one's choice of friends and allies is seldom made without creating new rivalries or exacerbating existing ones. In the past, Iran was uncomfortable with Turkey’s military support for Azerbaijan, which included joint exercises following Iranian military threats against Azerbaijan in 2001. Ankara has also provided critical economic and diplomatic

Managing Iran's Regional Ambitions Ÿ 28 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • • support for Azerbaijan, though the relationship has become more balanced over time, with Azerbaijan offering Turkey its natural gas and transit rights. More recently, Iranian complaints have focused on Azerbaijan's cooperation with the United States and Israel.

Washington established diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan in 1992 and opened an embassy in Baku in March 1992. President Heydar Aliev issued a decree establishing a strategic partnership with Washington after he returned from his first trip to the United States in 1996. Over the past two decades, the Republic of Azerbaijan and the United States have strengthened their international partnership.

According to the U.S. Department of State, the United States is committed to strengthening democracy and an open market economy in Azerbaijan. It wants an Azerbaijan that is peaceful, democratic, prosperous, and strategically linked to the United States and U.S. allies in Europe.

Figure 13 Many Azerbajani speakers greeted US legislators at Baku meeting in June 2013.

http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&id=9391: azerbaijan-rolls-out-red-carpet-for-visiting-us-lawmakers&Itemid=428

The United States seeks new ways to partner with Azerbaijan to promote regional security and stability, enhance energy security, and strengthen economic and political reforms. U.S. companies are involved in offshore oil development projects with Azerbaijan and have been exploring emerging investment opportunities in Azerbaijan in telecommunications and other fields. Baku has given the Pentagon permission to use Azerbaijan’s airspace to evacuate medical emergencies as well as to support the war in Afghanistan.

Azerbaijan and the United States also cooperate to protect the energy and other infrastructure on the Caspian and to counter WMD-related smuggling through these seas and its land territory.107 Azerbaijanis and others have complained that Washington sometimes sacrifices Azerbaijani interests to gain favor with Armenia or Russia, but Iranian leaders still consider the U.S.-Azerbaijani ties too close.

The Iranian regime is also unhappy about the Azerbaijani-Israeli partnership. These ties developed soon after Azerbaijan recovered its independence, well before Baku’s relations with Tehran soured.108 Azerbaijan and Israel have continued to see each other as attractive partners. They collaborate in many areas, including culture, agriculture, medicine, energy, economics, and security.

Managing Iran's Regional Ambitions Ÿ 29 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Azerbaijan has a history free of virulent anti-Semitism and a growing Jewish population that may now number more than 40,000. Israel has one of the largest Azerbaijani diasporas in the world; its 55,000 immigrants from Azerbaijan hold influential positions in Israel’s political and economic sectors.109 Trade between the two countries now totals $4 billion annually, the highest figure between Israel and any of the newly independent countries that make up the former Soviet Union.110 In February 2012, Azerbaijan signed a $1.6 billion arms deal with Israel’s state-controlled Israel Aerospace Industries.111

The Iranian Foreign Ministry called in Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Iran for an explanation for the deal, which the ambassador, Javanshir Akhundov, gave as helping to liberate occupied Azerbaijani lands and in no way directed at Iran.112 Meanwhile, SOCARs Caspian Drilling Company and other Azerbaijani experts are helping Israel develop its newly found natural gas deposits. In addition to the exchange of military material, a third of all Israeli oil is sourced from Azerbaijan, via a pipeline that ends at Ceyhan in Turkey.113

Azerbaijan’s secular leaning undoubtedly aids the burgeoning economic relationship, and Israelis have been less critical of Azerbaijani policies than Western governments that do not find themselves directly threatened by Iranian religious zealots.114 Even so, the partnership is more about geopolitical positioning and mutual interests, rather than any cultural or historical links. Among other considerations, Azerbaijanis might expect that the “Israeli lobby” will help Azerbaijan dilute the superior influence of the Armenian Diaspora in Washington.115 However, it should be noted that the vast majority of the dealings between the countries has been outside of public view.

A leaked U.S. diplomatic cable from 2009 quoted Azerbaijani President Aliyev, who succeeded his father in 2003, describing relations with Israel as “like an iceberg, nine tenths...below the surface”.116

For this reason, Azerbaijan has not yet established an embassy in Israel. In addition, Azerbaijan joined most of the rest of the international community and voted in favor of elevating Palestine’s status as an observer state in the UN General Assembly. However, this lower profile has not spared the Azerbaijani government from Iranian criticism. Citing Wikileaks and other sources, the Iranian media has accused the Azerbaijani authorities of collaborating with the Zionist entity and the United States against Iran.117

In any case, Israeli leaders are on record as praising Azerbaijan for its friendship and bilateral relationship with the Jewish state, calling Azerbaijan a “model for moderate Muslim states.118” Israel’s relationship with Azerbaijan is constructive and strategic, where both sides receive enormous benefits and an important ally in the process. With the start of the Arab Spring and the fall of Hosni Mubarak, who had aligned Egypt with the West and Israel, Israel lost its most important ally in the region.

Matters have become more unfavorable for Israel as parliamentary and presidential elections in the region have empowered the Muslim Brotherhood, and other Islamist parties. Furthermore, efforts at reconciling Israel and Turkey remain stalled. Thus, Azerbaijan, as a secular state with a 90 percent

Managing Iran's Regional Ambitions Ÿ 30 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Shiite population, is a significantly important ally for Israel. Furthermore, Israeli leaders applaud Baku’s benign treatment of its Jewish population.119 Israeli President Shimon Peres, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman have all traveled to Azerbaijan to make that point.

In light of the continuing tension between Tehran and the West, Iranians profess to fear that Israel or the United States might use Azerbaijan's airspace as a conduit for an airstrike against military and nuclear installations deep inside Iran.13 Azerbaijani authorities have given repeated and convincing assurances that they would never allow their territory or airspace to be used against Iran.120

In May 2005, Azerbaijan signed an agreement with Iran in which both parties pledged never to use their territories to attack the other.121 Notwithstanding the tension between Tehran and Baku, Azerbaijanis genuinely oppose military strikes against Iran. Any strike would hurt Azerbaijan’s economic interests, threaten refugee flows against Azerbaijan, and expose Azerbaijan to retaliation by Iran’s superior military forces.122 Its offshore Caspian energy infrastructure would prove especially vulnerable to an Iranian counterattack, but any conflict could interfere with the flow of oil and gas westward through the Caspian Basin, to the detriment of Azerbaijan’s economy.123

Furthermore, Azerbaijan relies on Iran to supply gas to its Nakhchivan region, which is separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenian territory, in exchange for transit fees to use a newly built pipeline.

Figure 14 Truck drivers waited at the border in Bilasuvar, Azerbaijan, to cross into Iran.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/world/mi ddleeast/iran-and-azerbaijan-wary-neighbors- find-less-to-agree- on.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

For political signaling and other reasons, Iranian authorities have sometimes imposed lengthy border delays for Azerbaijani truckers seeking to deliver goods to the enclave. Azerbaijani leaders also have no plan to annex or detach Southern Azerbaijan from Iran. The region’s population is significantly larger and more religious than the smaller and more secular population of Azerbaijan, so its reintegration is seen as more a long-term possibility among some Azerbaijani nationalists rather than an explicit near-term policy goal.

Managing Iran's Regional Ambitions Ÿ 31 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

The Azerbaijani government has also sought to include Iranian enterprises in its Caspian energy projects to avert further shows of force by Iran (such as occurred in 2001) against Azerbaijan’s offshore energy activities.124

Iran has not always reciprocated Azerbaijani efforts at strategic reassurance.

Often it seems like Iranian leaders believe that making more threats against Baku will prove more effective at constraining Azerbaijan’s strategic collaboration with Israel and the United States. Ironically, the Islamic Republic not only interferes in Azerbaijani affairs, but has aligned itself with Christian Armenia against Muslim Azerbaijan.

Armenia traditionally seeks close ties with Iran as a means to pressure Azerbaijan and use its territory for international commerce. Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey have remained closed since the early 1990s, requiring that all international trade pass through Georgian and Iranian territory. Armenian-Iranian trade consists mostly of energy products, food, and chemicals. Due to Iran’s high tariffs on Iranian imports, the commerce is very imbalanced, with Iranian imports from Armenia constituting less than 15 percent Iran’s exports to Armenia.125

Even so, the trade is more important for Armenia, which has fewer large trading partners. They recently established an industrial zone in southern Armenia for Iranian-Armenian joint ventures, though the two countries have been negotiating a free trade agreement for years without effect.126 Furthermore, Iran and Armenia are constructing pipelines to transport natural gas from Iran to Armenia. These imports would supplement the gas that Armenia receives from Russia, which passes through Georgian territory and is therefore vulnerable to tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi. In return, Armenia provides Iran with some surplus electricity, mainly generated from Armenia’s Metsamor nuclear plant.127

Earlier this year, the two governments agreed that Armenia and Iran would increase their exchanges of gasoline and oil products.128

It is thought that Iran provides some weapons to Armenia, partly to counter weapons Israel provides Azerbaijan. Some Shiite fundamentalists in Iran want Tehran to adopt a more balanced or even pro- Azerbaijani stance in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, but thus far realpolitik has won out over any principle of Islamic or Shiite solidarity. Armenia has good relations with the United States, where many Armenians live, but the country’s close economic ties with Iran have caused tensions with Washington policy makers.

The international sanctions on Iran have disrupted various joint Armenia-Iranian economic projects by delaying or preventing Tehran from fulfilling its pledges to fund certain joint energy and transportation projects with Armenia, which often receives Iranian loans for this purpose.129 In addition

Managing Iran's Regional Ambitions Ÿ 32 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • • to energy pipelines, these projects include building two 130 MW hydroelectric power stations along the border, high voltage transmission lines to connect their power grids, and railway lines. At the same time, Iran’s economic ties with Azerbaijan have been falling. Whereas it used to be one of Azerbaijan’s leading trading partners, in 2011, less than one percent of Azerbaijan’s total trade turnover was with Iran.130

Conclusions As a relatively small country surrounded by larger neighbors (Russia and Iran being the most prominent), Azerbaijanis will continue to leverage their oil wealth, strive to attract foreign investment, pursue a tolerant approach towards ethnic and religious groups, and eschew conflicts with Russia and the West while managing tensions with Iran and Armenia. Since achieving independence again in 1991 secular Azerbaijan has become the antithesis of the theocratic regime in Tehran.

Where Iran is regressive and intolerant, Azerbaijan has strived to become modern and progressive. Where Tehran is fanatically anti-Western, Baku has eagerly embraced theUnited States, Israel, and other Western countries. Finally, Baku's prosperity contrasts with Iran's continuing economic decline and encourages Tehran to fear that Azerbaijan might become a magnet for its large and restive Azerbaijani minority, threatening the Islamic Republic’s internal cohesion and territorial integrity.

A lasting solution to Azerbaijan’s Iran problem must await Iran’s genuine democratization and liberalization, which would result in a more tolerant and less aggressive regime in Tehran granting greater freedoms to its oppressed minorities and not seeking to subvert the civil affairs of neighboring states.

Until then, Azerbaijan can benefit from the help of the United States and other friendly countries to resist Iranian threats. The stronger and more dynamic Azerbaijan’s relations with the United States, the less likely Azerbaijan will suffer from Iranian bullying.

Following its post-Soviet independence, the U.S. government and American companies were eager to develop Azerbaijan’s oil and gas fields through their foreign direct investment. The U.S. government has also seen Azerbaijan as an important ally in its efforts to build the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, which bypasses Russian territory.

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Azerbaijan was among the first countries to offer the United States unconditional support in the war on terrorism, opening its airspace to the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Since then, Azerbaijan’s airbases have provided landing and refueling support for U.S. military transports to Afghanistan as well as unlimited ground transit rights to U.S. forces and suppliers supporting the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan.

The country looks to be an important conduit for U.S. combat forces as they leave Afghanistan.

Conclusions Ÿ 33 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Azerbaijan was also the first Muslim nation to send its troops to serve with U.S. forces in Iraq. Azerbaijan will remain an energy partner for U.S. allies in Europe for decades to come now that natural gas, both produced in and transported through Azerbaijan, is replacing the country’s declining role as an oil supplier. Azerbaijan is using some of its hydrocarbon wealth to purchase U.S. government bonds as well as to buy Boeing aircraft and other U.S. products, supporting thousands of jobs in the United States.

Figure 15 Azerbaijan works with international forces to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan. Azerbaijan army soldiers from the Azerbaijan Armed Forces gather together during a military advisory team (MAT) and police advisory team (PAT) training exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, Sept. 14, 2012.

This exercise was designed to replicate the Afghanistan operational environment in order to prepare MATs and PATs for counterinsurgency operations with the ability to train, advise and enable the Afghanistan National Army and the Afghanistan National Police. http://www.dvidshub.net/image/666466/military-advisory-team-police-advisory-team-ii-training- exercise#.UgDTfhZ9kto#ixzz2bBVhNNlI

Nonetheless, in 1992, the United States Congress banned direct aid to the government of Azerbaijan – the only exception to the United States’ contribution of aid to the post-Soviet governments – as a response to the reciprocal Azerbaijani-Armenian blockades during and after the Nagorno-Karabakh War. Azerbaijani officials view this legislation as grossly unfair given that Armenian forces continue to occupy Azerbaijani territory illegally.131

Conclusions Ÿ 34 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

It was only in 2002 that the Congress, responding to Azerbaijan’s support in the war on terror, authorized the president to waive Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom of Support Act, which prohibits direct U.S. military aid to Azerbaijan’s government, on national security grounds. The United States has sold surveillance and border security equipment to Azerbaijan under this exception. Some recent strains have emerged following what some Azerbaijani strategists consider Washington’s setbacks in Georgia, Iraq, and Syria; tensions over human rights; sacrificing Azerbaijan’s interests to make progress with the Reset with Moscow; and a political deadlock over Senate confirmation of a U.S. ambassador to Baku.

But Azerbaijan’s relations with the United States appear to have strengthened in the last year, with the U.S. Senate finally confirming an ambassador to Azerbaijan (Richard Morningstar) and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton making an official visit to Azerbaijan in June 2012. Nonetheless, Section 907 remains a serious obstacle in relations between the two countries, especially from the Azerbaijani perspective, which objects to being discriminated against compared with Armenia. Azerbaijan does not believe the temporary waiver of Section 907 is sufficient since it leaves open possible future U.S. aid cutoffs.132

There are a variety of ways for the United States to counter Iranian influence in Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus, but several seem most profitable at the present time. The United States can use its foreign aid and investment to strengthen its influence in the region, it can work with Baku to strengthen Azerbaijan’s benign soft power, and the United States can employ its international influence to find a peaceful solution to Azerbaijan’s territorial conflict with Armenia.

These policies would also help counter the narrative of U.S. abandonment and indifference that one sometimes hears in Baku among Azerbaijanis worried about U.S. regional setbacks, diplomatic preoccupation with Moscow, and the fear of being left to deal with rising Russian-Iranian influence in the South Caucasus.133

For example, though the resources the Islamic Republic invests in influencing events in Azerbaijan is unknown, one can be sure that the amount the regime in Tehran spends to indoctrinate and influence Azerbaijan’s youth is considerable. Iran is known to spend considerable sums to develop “Iranian Cultural Centers” in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. While these institutions are called “Cultural Centers,” they typically serve as recruiting institutions for Tehran.

Furthermore, Iran provides scholarships and opportunities for Azerbaijanis nationals and others to travel to Iran and to study in Iranian higher education institutions.134 The United States has the resources to fight this tactic. U.S. higher education institutions are undoubtedly better than their Iranian counterparts and Azerbaijanis would more likely study in the United States than in Iran. Americans should seek to provide more education and scholarship opportunities to Azerbaijani youth.

Conclusions Ÿ 35 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Azerbaijanis’ main international preoccupation is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which Tehran manipulates to gain influence in Armenia and keep Azerbaijan distracted. Exploiting Azerbaijan’s post- independence chaos, Armenian troops conquered the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven surrounding districts in 1992. Although the parties signed a ceasefire agreement in 1994, Armenian forces have defied UN Security Council resolutions and continued to occupy one-fifth of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory since 1992. Thus far, the Azerbaijani side has pursued an admirably restrained policy toward the occupation.

Rather than arming the remaining 800,000 refugees from the conflict who are still alive in a modern terrorist movement or army of national liberation, the government has encouraged restraint. Azerbaijani officials have emphasized that they would like to settle their territorial disputes with Armenia through peaceful means. They have therefore and have concentrated their efforts on achieving a negotiated settlement under the auspices of the United Nations, the OSCE, and other international bodies.135

Yet, Azerbaijanis have indicated that they cannot accept Armenian occupation of so much legally recognized Azerbaijani territory indefinitely. Azerbaijan has used some of its energy riches to build a powerful military that many experts believe could forcefully seize the disputed territories, which includes parts of Azerbaijan currently occupied by Armenian troops, provided Iran and Russia do not intervene on Armenia’s behalf. The 2008 Georgia War shows how these supposed “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet Union can abruptly thaw and explode. Each side has deep-seated grievances about the other’s behavior, such as the Khojaly tragedy on February 26, 1992, but if relations among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey can improve, then Armenia might rely less on Tehran to balance Azerbaijan in the region.

The United States should exploit these contacts and step up its efforts to promote a Nagorno- Karabakh settlement as a means to reduce Iranian influence in the South Caucasus and to prevent the collateral damage to U.S. security and energy interests in Eurasia that would ensue from another Armenia-Azerbaijani war.

The current structure seeking a negotiated settlement, the OSCE Minsk Group, has failed to make enduring progress despite more than a decade of efforts. The U.S. administration should appoint a high-level envoy of the sort that it is routinely sent to the Middle East, to propose concrete bridging proposals directly to the parties in conflict. Russian concerns about maintaining regional stability during the Sochi Winter Olympics could make 2013-2014 an unusually favorable time for a new high- profile U.S. diplomatic initiative. Congress can do its part to support this effort by repealing Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom of Support Act.

Whatever its value in ending the original Nagorno-Karabakh war, this outdated provision is now impeding U.S. diplomatic flexibility and weakening U.S. influence in both Armenia and

Conclusions Ÿ 36 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

Azerbaijan, including efforts to promote their democratic development and sustain their autonomy from foreign influence.

Ideally, Congress and the administration should support a negotiated settlement to the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict with financial and diplomatic assistance to both states, ranging from enhanced trade benefits to full-scale U.S. diplomatic representation to U.S. efforts to promote Armenian-Turkey reconciliation.

By seeking more vigorously to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the United States could improve its leverage in the South Caucasus while decreasing Iranian influence. By strengthening Azerbaijan’s soft power, the United States would counter Iranian threats because the people of the Middle East, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus, would view Azerbaijan, a pro-Western, prosperous, and secular state, as a superior model to that of Iran’s bankrupt theocracy.

In particular, Azerbaijan can serve as a model for Iran’s embattled minorities, which can indirectly compel the clerical regime to moderate its aggressive domestic and foreign policies without the risky use of U.S. military force.

1 “MP: Azerbaijan attaches great importance to dialogue between religions and cultures,” Trend News Agency, January 28, 2011.

2 A. Maharramli, “Exhibition dedicated to Azerbaijan opened in CE,” Trend Daily News, June 21, 2010.

3 Ambassador Elshad Iskandarov, “Interfaith Respect and Dialogue in Azerbaijan,” presentation at Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC, December 5, 2012.

4 Alex Vatanka, speaking at “Iran-Azerbaijan Relations and Strategic Competition in the Caucasus,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, April 29, 2013.

5 Asim Mollazade, speaking at “Iran-Azerbaijan Relations and Strategic Competition in the Caucasus,” Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, DC, April 29, 2013.

Conclusions Ÿ 37 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

6 Anar M. Valiyev, “Azerbaijan-Iran Relations: Quo Vadis, Baku?,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 244, September 2012, http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pepm_244_Valiyev_Sept2012.pdf.

7 Jim Boulden, “Does Azerbaijan’s Black City Have a Golden Future,” CNN.com, November 16, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/14/world/azerbaijan-baku-economy-boulden/index.html.

8 "Azerbaijan," World Bank Database, http://data.worldbank.org/country/azerbaijan.

9 Jason Katz, “An Odd Voice from a Noble Land,” Trend Daily News, April 15, 2010.

10 “Tourism Statistics in Azerbaijan,” Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of Azerbaijan, p. 5, http://statistics.unwto.org/sites/all/files/pdf/azerbaijan_inbound.pdf.

11 “Tourism a Priority for Azerbaijan Says President Ilham Aliyev, Joins UNWTO/WTTC Campaign,” Joint Press Release by the World Tourism Organization and the World Travel and Tourism Council, November 24, 2011, http://www.wttc.org/news-media/news-archive/2011/tourism-priority- azerbaijan-says-president-ilham-aliyev-joins-un/.

12 David Herszenhorn, “Azerbaijan’s Delights in Taking the Stage as Eurovision Host,” New York Times, May 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/world/asia/azerbaijan-revels-as-host-of- eurovision-song-contest.html?ref=azerbaijan&_r=0.

13 “Mehriban Aliyeva: Eurovision is considered an important event, which contributes to inter- cultural dialogue,” Trend Daily News, May 13, 2012.

14 Rasim Babaev, “По итогам 2012 года товарооборот между Азербайджаном и Россией может достичь $3 млрд. – Посол,” 1news.az, December 12, 2012, http://www.1news.az/economy/20121221042711548.html

15 “Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia: Azerbaijan conducts successful inter-religious dialogue,” Trend Daily News, February 2, 2011

16 Jennifer Solveig Wistrand, "Azerbaijan and ‘Tolerant Muslims’," Caucasus Analytical Digest, November 20, 2012, http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/DetailansichtPubDB_EN?rec_id=2341.

17 Heydar Mirza, speaking at “Iran-Azerbaijan Relations and Strategic Competition in the Caucasus,” Center for Strategic and International Studies. April 29, 2013.

18 “MP: Azerbaijan attaches great importance to dialogue between religions and cultures,” Trend News Agency, January 28, 2011.

19 U. Sadikhova, Azerbaijani people proud of their heritage & identity: U.S. President's advisor on Muslim affairs,” Trend Daily News, August 28, 2009.

Conclusions Ÿ 38 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

20 “Azerbaijan model of tolerance for various religions, nations – president,” Azartac news agency, Baku February 16, 2012, by BBC Worldwide Monitoring February 19, 2012.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid

23 “Religion,” Administrative Department of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Presidential Library, http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_en/atr_din.pdf.

24 “Majority of the Population of Azerbaijan Is Against Religious Radicalism,” Youtube, November 15, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sfx9VbPI0Lw.

25 “Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population,” The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, October 1, 2009, http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Topics/Demographics/Muslimpopulation.pdf.

26 Farid Alakbarov, “You Are What You Eat: Islamic Food Practices and Azerbaijani Identity,” Azerbaijan International, September 30, 2000, p. 48

27 Mirza, speaking at “Iran-Azerbaijan Relations and Strategic Competition in the Caucasus.”

28 “New Jewish Synagogue Opens in Baku,” Azerbaijan International (Summer 2003), p. 13.

29 “Azerbaijan and the Jewish Community,” http://www.visions.az/history,112/#cite-note_18; and Jason Katz, “An Odd Voice from a Noble Land,” Trend Daily News, April 15, 2010.

30 “History of the Azerbaijan Jewish Community,” Euro-Asian Jewish Congress, http://eajc.org/page258.

31 “New Jewish Synagogue Opens in Baku,” p. 13

32 Azerbaijan to have first Catholic church since Soviet 1930s crackdown,” Associated Press, September 12, 2005.

33 Howard Friedman, Vatican Signs Agreement With Azerbaijan Securing Legal Status of Church,” Religion Clause, July 8, 2011.

34 “People, Culture and Religion,” Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Poland, http://azembassy.pl/index.php?section=25#14.

35 I. Bayandurlu, “Poll shows Azerbaijan as tolerant country, Zerkalo, Baku, in Russian 12 Feb 05 page 12.

BBC Worldwide Monitoring February 14, 2005.

Conclusions Ÿ 39 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

36 Steve/Crabtree and Brett/Pelham, “What Alabamians and Iranians Have in Common – State of the World: Importance of Religion,” Gallup World Poll, February 9, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/114211/Alabamians-Iranians-Common.aspx.

37 Svante Cornell, ”The Politicization of Islam in Azerbaijan,” Silk Road Papers, Central Asia- Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, October 2006, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0610Azer.pdf

38 Mehrangiz Najafizadeh, “Gender And Ideology: Social Change And Islam In Post-Soviet Azerbaijan,” Journal of Third World Studies (Spring 2012), p. 81.

39 Leyla Aliyeva: Azerbaijan is a country where different cultures, nations and religions live in peace,” Trend Daily News (Azerbaijan) November 3, 2012.

40 “Leyla Aliyeva: Azerbaijan is a country where different cultures, nations and religions live in peace,” Trend Daily News (Azerbaijan) November 3, 2012.

41 “International Religious Freedom Report for 2011 - Azerbaijan,” United States Department of State, (2011), p. 2, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192997.pdf.

42 M. Aliyev, “State of Mississippi adopts resolutions on Azerbaijan,” Trend News Agency, February 22, 2012.

43 “International Religious Freedom Report for 2011 - Azerbaijan,” p. 5.

44 “The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan,” President of Azerbaijan’s Official Website, Section II Article 48, (http://en.president.az/azerbaijan/constitution/#%20BASIC%20RIGHTS).

45 Constitution, Section I, Article 18.

46 “The State Committee of Azerbaijan Republic For the Work With Religious Associations,”

http://www.azerbaijan.az/_StatePower/_CommitteeConcern/_committeeConcern_e.html.

47 International Religious Freedom Report for 2011 - Azerbaijan,” p. 2.

48 Peter Roudik, “Azerbaijan: New Law on Religious Organizations,” The Law Library of Congress, June 16, 2009, http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205401364_text).

49 International Religious Freedom Report for 2009 – Azerbaijan,” U.S. Department of State, October 26, 2009, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2009/127299.htm.

50 Shahin Abbasov, “Azerbaijan: Religious Freedom Case Nears Decision,” Eurasianet, April 19, 2012, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65291.

51 “International Religious Freedom Report for 2009 – Azerbaijan.”

Conclusions Ÿ 40 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

52 “Religions in Azerbaijan,” http://www.azerbaijans.com/content_499_en.html.

53 Jennifer Solveig Wistrand, "Azerbaijan and ‘Tolerant Muslims’," Caucasus Analytical Digest, November 20, 2012, http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/DetailansichtPubDB_EN?rec_id=2341.

54 “Nations in Transit 2012: Azerbaijan,” Freedom House, 2012, p. 93, http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Azerbaijan_final.pdf.

55 Agence France-Presse, “Clash Over Hijab Ban in Azerbaijan,” New York Times, October 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/06/world/asia/azerbaijan-sees-clashes-over-hijab- ban.html?_r=0.

56 Zaur Shiriyev, “Islam in Azerbaijan: Unity and Diversity,” Today's Zaman, November 20, 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-298762-islam-in-azerbaijan-unity-and-diversity.html

57 “Majority of the Population of Azerbaijan Is Against Religious Radicalism,” Youtube, November 15, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sfx9VbPI0Lw.

58 Azeri president hails contribution to positive image of Islam worldwide”,” APA news agency Dec 23, 2011, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, December 29, 2011.

59 “Heydar Aliyev Foundation President meets Catholics-Patriarch of all Georgia,” Trend Daily News, November 6, 2009.

60 “Azerbaijani President: People lived as one family in Azerbaijan at all time,” Trend Daily News, April 8, 2011.

61 U. Sadikhova, “Dialogue between religions is very important: OIC,” Trend Daily News, November 11, 2009.

62 “All peoples and representatives of all religious live in Azerbaijan as one family: Azerbaijani President Ilham,” Trend Daily News, November 7, 2009.

63 S. Aliyev, “Caucasus Muslims Organization: Baku summit to develop interconfessional relations,” Trend Daily News, April 26, 2010.

64 Ibid.; and “Azerbaijani President: People lived as one family.”

65 M. Aliyev, State committee: Tolerance in Azerbaijan is based on historical roots,” Trend Daily News, December 19, 2012.

66 E. Tariverdiyeva, “Former Italian FM: Baku is good example of multiculturalism and mutual respect of religions,” Trend News Agency, October 4, 2012.

Conclusions Ÿ 41 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

67 E. Tariverdiyeva, “Ariel Cohen: Azerbaijan sends strong message to world,” Trend Daily News, October 10, 2011.

68 “World Forum on Intercultural Dialogue kicks off in Baku,” Baku Forum, June 3, 2013, http://bakuforum-icd.az/service/lang/en/page/44/sid/39/nid/52/n/1/.

69 Altay Goyushov, “Islamic Revival in Azerbaijan, Hudson Institute,” Current Trends: Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World, November 11, 2008, http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/islamic-revival-in-azerbaijan.

70 Joby Warrick, “Tiny Azerbaijan Unleashes Pop-Power Against Iran’s Mullahs,” Washington Post, October 14, 2012, p.1, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-14/world/35500049_1_iranian- regime-caspian-sea-nagorno-karabakh.

71 Ibid.

72 Nasib L. Nassibli, "Azerbaijan- Iran Relations: Challenges and Prospects (Event Summary)." Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/12750/azerbaijan_iran_relations.html

73 Jamil Hasanli, At the Dawn of the Cold War: The Soviet-American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941-1946 (Cambridge: Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series, 2006).

74 Raheleh Behzadi,”Eurovision Song Contest Presents New Challenge In Iran-Azerbaijan Relationship,” CACI Analyst, May 16, 2012, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5774.

75 Ibid.

76 Varun Vira and Erin Fitzgerald, "The United States and Iran: Competition Involving Turkey and the South Caucasus," Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies August 4, 2011), p. 20, http://csis.org/files/publication/110804_iran_chapter_8_turkey_casp.pdf.

77 Ibid. p. 21.

78 "Global Insider: Iran-Azerbaijan Relations," World Politics Review, July 29, 2011, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/9631/global-insider-iran-azerbaijan-relations. See also “State of Iranian Azerbaijanis discussed in Washington,” April 14, 2012, http://www.news.az/articles/politics/58234.

79 Brenda Shaffer, “Azerbaijan in the UN Security Council - new items on the global agenda,” Jerusalem Post, November 27, 2011

80 Emil Souleimanov, "Iranian Azerbaijan: The Brewing Hotspot of Future Separatism?" Central Asia-Caucasus (CACI) Analyst, October 27, 2010. http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5432.

Conclusions Ÿ 42 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

81 Arastan Orujlu, "Iran Crisis Poses Major Risks to South Caucasus," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, February 20, 2012, http://iwpr.net/report-news/iran-crisis-poses-major-risks-south-caucasus.

82 Warrick, "Azerbaijan’s Big Weapon?

83 Joby Warrick, "Tiny Azerbaijan unleashes pop-power against Iran’s mullahs," The Washington Post, October 14, 2012. http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-14/world/35500049_1_iranian- regime-caspian-sea-nagorno-karabakh.

84 Nicholas D. Kristof, "In Iran, They Want Fun, Fun, Fun," New York Times, June 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/opinion/kristof-in-iran-they-want-fun-fun-fun.html?_r=2&.

85 Geoffrey Ingersoll, "Iran May Be Sterilizing Its Citizens In Its Effort To Jam Foreign Television," Business Insider, October 1, 2012, http://www.businessinsider.com/doctor-iranian-television-jamming- signals-cause-infertility-miscarriages-2012-10#ixzz2HsCLcb40.

86 Vira and Fitzgerald, "The United States and Iran: Competition Involving Turkey and the South Caucasus, p. 20.

87 Raheleh Behzadi,”Eurovision Song Contest Presents New Challenge in Iran-Azerbaijan Relationship,” CACI Analyst, May 16, 2012, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5774.

88 “Azerbaijan Iran’s Media Steps Up Criticism of Azerbaijan,” The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, May 29, 2011, http://www.crethiplethi.com/irans-media-steps-up- criticism-of-azerbaijan/islamic-countries/iran-islamic-countries/2011/.

89 Raheleh Behzadi,”Eurovision Song Contest Presents New Challenge In Iran-Azerbaijan Relationship,” CACI Analyst, May 16, 2012, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5774.

90 Ariel Cohen, "Azerbaijan: Between Iran and a Hard Place," The National Interest, March 21, 2012. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/azerbaijan-between-iran-hard-place-6667?page=show.

91 “Tensions Growing Between Azerbaijan and Iran?.” Stratfor, March 14, 2011, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63070.

92 Aris Ghazinyan, "Troubled Talk in the Neighborhood: Complicated Triangle Entwines Armenia, Iran, Azerbaijan," ArmeniaNow.com, February 20, 2012, http://armenianow.com/commentary/analysis/35774/iran_azerbaijan_relations_worsening_israeli_coop eration.

93 Khoshbakht B.Yusifzade, “The Status of the Caspian Sea: Dividing Natural Resources Between Five Countries,” Azerbaijan International (Autumn 2000), p. 9, http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/83_folder/83_articles/83_yusifzade.html.

Conclusions Ÿ 43 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

94 “IRAN: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia squeezed between Tehran and Washington,” Los Angeles Times, December 11, 2010, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2010/12/iran- azerbaijan-armenia-georgia-russia-intelligence-weapons-wikileaks.html.

95 Valiyev, “Azerbaijan-Iran Relations.”

96 "Did Iran Plot to Kill Israelis in Azerbaijan?" CBS News, February 21, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57382023/did-iran-plot-to-kill-israelis-in-azerbaijan/.

97 "Azerbaijani Official Websites Victimized By Cyberattack," Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, January 17, 2012, http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijani_websites_hacked/24454171.html.

98 K. Zarbaliyeva, “Iranian intelligence agents detained in Azerbaijan,” Trend, March 14, 2012, http://en.trend.az/news/politics/2003620.

99 “Azerbaijan Arrests 22 Suspects in Alleged Iran Spy Plot,” BBC News, March 14, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17368576.

100 "Azerbaijani Audience Gets A Taste Of Iranian 'Soft Power'," Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, July 9, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/content/Azerbaijan_Gets_Taste_Iranian_Soft_Power/1182664.html.

101 Mirza, speaking at “Iran-Azerbaijan Relations and Strategic Competition in the Caucasus.”

102 Michael Rubin, Iranian influence in the South Caucasus and the surrounding region, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, December 5, 2012, http://www.aei.org/speech/foreign- and-defense-policy/regional/middle-east-and-north-africa/iranian-influence-in-the-south-caucasus-and- the-surrounding-region/.

103 Ali Alfoneh and Ahmad K. Majidyar , “Iranian Influence in Afghanistan: Imam Khomeini Relief Committee,” AEI Online, July 27, 2010,

http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/middle-east-and-north- africa/iranian-influence-in-afghanistan-outlook/

104 Ariel Cohen, Iran Threatens U.S. Interests in the South Caucasus, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, December 5, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2012/12/iran-threatens-us-interests-in- the-south-caucasus.

105 Ibid.

106 Cohen, “Iran Threatens U.S. Interests in the South Caucasus.”

107 “Israeli-Azerbaijani relations will continue at high spirit–envoy,” News.Az, January 21, 2013, http://www.news.az/articles/politics/75201.

Conclusions Ÿ 44 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

108 Brenda Shaffer, “Azerbaijan’s Cooperation with Israel Goes Beyond Iran Tensions,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 2067, April 16, 2013, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/azerbaijans-cooperation-with-israel-goes- beyond-iran-tensions.

109 “There has never been anti-Semitism in Azerbaijan-Joseph Shagal,” News. Az, July 8, 2011, http://news.az/articles/politics/40070.

110 Sheera Frenkel, “What's the Israel-Azerbaijan connection?,” Christian Science Monitor, April 26, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0426/What-s-the-Israel-Azerbaijan- connection

111 Associated Press, “Israel signs $1.6 billion arms deal with Azerbaijan,” Haaretz, February 26, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-signs-1-6-billion-arms-deal-with- azerbaijan-1.414916

112 Associated Press, “Azerbaijan says it busts alleged pro-Iran group,” Boston Globe, February 21, 2012 http://articles.boston.com/2012-02-21/news/31083836_1_azerbaijan-busts-pro-iran-group

113 “Odd but useful allies,” The Economist, January 21, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21543201

114 David M. Herszenhorn, “:Iran and Azerbaijan, Already Wary Neighbors, Find Even Less to Agree On, New York Times, June 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/world/middleeast/iran- and-azerbaijan-wary-neighbors-find-less-to-agree-on.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

115 Jimmy Johnson, “Palestinian rights don’t factor into Israel-Azerbaijan relations,” The Electronic Intifada, March 28, 2011,

http://electronicintifada.net/content/palestinian-rights-dont-factor-israel-azerbaijan- relations/9285.

116 Thomas Grove, “Azerbaijan Eyes Aiding Israel against Iran,” Reuters, September 30, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/30/us-iran-israel-azerbaijan-idUSBRE88T05L20120930

117 “Azerbaijan Iran’s Media Steps Up Criticism of Azerbaijan,” The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, May 29, 2011, http://www.crethiplethi.com/irans-media-steps-up- criticism-of-azerbaijan/islamic-countries/iran-islamic-countries/2011/

118 “Israeli Ambassador Praises Ties With Azerbaijan,” AzerNews, November 2, 2012, http://www.azernews.az/azerbaijan/45728.html.

119 Emil Guliyev, “Peres Meets With Azerbaijani Leader in Landmark Visit,” AFP, June 29, 2009, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/Jun/29/Peres-meets-with-Azerbaijani-leader-in- landmark-visit.ashx#axzz2IYAFW7DR.

Conclusions Ÿ 45 Azerbaijan’s Regional Role • • •

120 Nargiz Gurbanova, “Azerbaijan Is Not Israel's Secret Staging Ground,” Foreign Policy, April 2, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/02/azerbaijan_is_not_israels_secret_staging_ground.

121 Stephen Blank, New Military Trends In The Caspian,” CACI Analyst, June 1, 2005, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/3072

122 Valiyev, “Azerbaijan-Iran Relations.”

123 Gallia Lindenstrauss and Iftah Celniker, “Azerbaijan and Iran: Hostile Approach but Limited Rivalry,” Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) Insight No. 366, August 26, 2012, http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=9948.

124 Gulmira Rzayeva, “Iran Sanctions: What Impact For The Shah-Deniz Project?,” CACI Analyst, Janaury 25, 2012, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5701.

125 Haroutiun Khachatrian, “An Unsuccessful Year Of Armenian-Iranian Cooperation,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, November 30, 2011, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5677.

126 Ibid.

127 Naira Melkumyan, “Armenian Concern at Pressure on Tehran,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, February 17, 2012, http://iwpr.net/report-news/armenian-concern-pressure-tehran.

128 F. Milad, “Iran to Supply Gasoline and Oil Products to Armenia,” Trend, February 28, 2012, http://en.trend.az/capital/business/1997790.html.

129 Khachatrian, “An Unsuccessful Year Of Armenian-Iranian Cooperation,”

130 “Iran-Azerbaijan Relations and Strategic Competition in the Caucasus,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 29, 2013, http://csis.org/files/attachments/130429_IranAzerbaijan.pdf.

131 Dadashova, “Presidential Perspective.”

132 Herszenhorn, “Iran and Azerbaijan, Already Wary Neighbors.”

133 Author’s interviews in Baku, May 2013.

134 Michael Rubin, “Iranian influence in the South Caucasus and the surrounding region.”

135 Brenda Shaffer, “Azerbaijan in the UN Security Council - new items on the global agenda,” Jerusalem Post, November 27, 2011.

Conclusions Ÿ 46