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Crackdown on Civil Society in Azerbaijan

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Crackdown on Civil Society in Azerbaijan No. 70 26 February 2015 Abkhazia South Ossetia caucasus Adjara analytical digest Nagorno- Karabakh resourcesecurityinstitute.org www.laender-analysen.de www.css.ethz.ch/cad www.crrccenters.org CraCkdown on Civil SoCiety in azerbaijan ■■The Best Defense is a Good Offense: The Role of Social Media in the Current Crackdown in Azerbaijan 2 By Katy E. Pearce, University of Washington ■■No Holds Barred: Azerbaijan’s Unprecedented Crackdown on Human Rights 6 By Rebecca Vincent, London ■■Does Advocacy Matter in Dealing with Authoritarian Regimes? 9 By Arzu Geybullayeva, Prague ■■ChroniCle From 27 January to 23 February 2015 14 ■■ConferenCe / Call for PaPers 4th ASCN Annual Conference “Protest, Modernization, Democratization: Political and Social Dynamics in Post-Soviet Countries” 16 Institute for European, Russian, Research Centre Center Caucasus Research German Association for and Eurasian Studies for East European Studies for Security Studies The George Washington Resource Centers East European Studies University of Bremen ETH Zurich University The Caucasus Analytical Digest is supported by: CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 70, 26 February 2015 2 The Best Defense is a Good offense: The role of social Media in the Current Crackdown in azerbaijan By Katy E. Pearce, University of Washington abstract While Azerbaijan has been on the path to full-fledged authoritarianism for quite some time, the increased repression of 2013 and 2014 is, to many Azerbaijan watchers, unprecedented. Other articles in this issue detail the legislative and practical actions taken by the regime over the past few years. This piece focuses on the role of social media with historical contextualization. introduction most importantly, the Internet can provide more news Many pundits give too much credit to the role of infor- and information alternatives to state-provided media. mation and communication technologies in politi- All of this also occurs in Azerbaijan. Yet, changes cal events. Policymakers enthusiastically assume that in the regime’s approach toward social media require a through “putting cracks in the wall” of authoritarian- more careful examination. Essentially, the regime moved ism, regimes can be defeated and, moreover, that infor- from ignorance to tolerance to defense to offense in a mation and communication technologies are a powerful decade. It is only with contextualization and an under- crack-making tool, although rarely are the mechanisms standing of history can the effect of social media in the for this process elucidated. Yet any tool that can put a current crackdown be understood. crack in the wall can also be used to nail a door shut, build a new prison, or hit someone over the head. Read- ignorance era ers must understand that information and communi- In the early 2000s, few Azerbaijanis used the Internet. cation technologies are merely tools and authoritarian While Internet cafes and some workplaces may have pro- regimes have the resources to use the tools more effi- vided Internet in this era, it was not until the end of the ciently and effectively than the resource-less. 2000s that over 10% of Azerbaijani homes had a personal Contextualization is also essential: it must be acknowl- computer with online access (See Figure 1 on p. 5). In this edged that most Azerbaijani citizens are in fact not using era, the Internet seemed to be a glimmer of political hope social media. Facebook’s own user numbers show that in Azerbaijan because at that time individuals who were only 18% of Azerbaijanis are on the site as of January interested in politics and were active online were more 2015.1 And in the last Caucasus Barometer public opin- likely to be pro-democracy advocates. And with so few cit- ion survey in 2013, only 33% of Azerbaijani adults have izens online, the regime essentially ignored online activities. ever used the Internet2 and only 13% of adults are online every day. So while certainly many urban educated Azer- Tolerance era baijanis use social media, it is impossible to judge what Internet use in Azerbaijan grew at the end of the first all Azerbaijanis think based on the social media behavior decade of the 2000s. Netbooks and personal computer of a few. Additionally, the use of social media for politi- prices dropped significantly at this time, making them cal information gathering and deliberation are not pop- more affordable for more households. This was also the ular for any individuals. Most social media users spend beginning of the social media era—MySpace, Face- their time communicating with friends. book, vKontakte, and Odnoklassniki joined established Yet the Internet and social media’s role in Azerbai- sites like LiveJournal and encouraged many established jani political life is far from unimportant. We know that and new users to join them. Some early Azerbaijani information and communication technologies can allow Internet celebrities, like Ilgar Mammadov and Hebib for easier collective action in authoritarian states where Muntezir, formed small discussion groups that were freedom of assembly is limited. The Internet can also pro- popular among the politically active. vide a space for public deliberation and discussion as well Given the Azerbaijani regime’s control over main- as a platform for expressing discontent, all more chal- stream media, the Internet and social media have long lenging in an authoritarian environment. But perhaps played a role as an information source providing views outside of what the regime broadcasts. And, according 1 <http://www.katypearce.net/january-2015-facebook-use-in- to history professor Altay Goyushov, after the first round armenia-azerbaijan-and-georgia-according-to-facebook/> 2 <http://www.katypearce.net/2013-internet-penetration- of media crackdowns in Azerbaijan in 2008, the Inter- armenia-azerbaijan-georgia/> <http://www.katypearce.net/ net and social media took on new meaning as one of 2013-caucasus-internet-and-technology-infographic/> the few spaces for alternative information and indepen- CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 70, 26 February 2015 3 dent deliberation.3 Goyushov argues that in 2009 and In what seems like a coordinated offensive plan, pro- 2010, the growth of social media and especially Face- regime youth organizations hijack hashtags and flood book completely changed information flow in Azerbai- social media with attempts at discrediting alternative jan and, he argues, that over time Facebook became media, frequently using fake social media accounts the center of everything in Baku—new ideas, social to appear to have more support.5 And numerous pro- and political issues, and discussions that would have regime gossip sites leak kompromat and rumors about never been allowed before were now happening online. oppositionists—all at a much lower cost and with fewer direct links and attribution to the regime than in the Defense era pre-social media era. In fact, in authoritarian media sys- But, as time passed and more Azerbaijanis went online, tems, the Internet and social media are even more rumor Azerbaijani Internet users became more diverse. The and scandal-laden than traditional media. regime became increasingly concerned that the relative Yet—especially due to the current wave of crack- free space of social media would no longer be contained downs on independent media, including the harassment to well-educated Bakuvians. The regime also witnessed and closure of independent media outlets like Radio Lib- the speed by which critical content can spread on social erty and Azadliq Newspaper and the blocking of foreign media and became increasingly concerned that it would grant funds to support independent media—in the cur- be less able to predict and control citizens’ reactions to rent crackdown era, even more than in the past, social such content. Thus, what was once considered a safe media and the Internet provide one of the few spaces space for free expression was no longer. The regime took where alternative information can be distributed and advantage of the perceived freedom of expression online found. And, despite the risks involved in sharing or pub- and used it for greater surveillance of citizen behav- lishing oppositional content, for some brave Azerbaijanis, ior. The regime also realized that it needed to demon- the Internet and social media are truly all that is left. strate to citizens that online dissent would not be toler- These brave outspoken Azerbaijanis are essentially ated. We can specifically point to the Donkey Blogger Internet celebrities. Their celebrity was built on the struc- case in 2009 as a turning point: what happens online ture and norms of social media and Facebook in par- in Azerbaijan has offline repercussions. This has been ticular. There is an unusual mix of interpersonal and repeatedly demonstrated: the N!DA trials, the Harlem broadcast communication that enables followers to have Shake arrest, and punishment of popular online per- a parasocial relationship with a figure. While an indi- sonalities like Mehman Huseynov. Popular online dis- vidual posts political commentary between photos of a sent is swiftly and severely punished for everyone to see. new baby or a child’s graduation and a video clip of a favorite song, followers have a sense of intimacy with offense era that person that is likely not reciprocated but enables Unlike earlier eras, current oppositional Azerbaijani a connection much deeper than what they would have Internet users are well aware of the regime’s capacity and with a traditional political figure. willingness to punish online dissent. And more recently, the regime has moved from purely defense to the addi- recent Crackdown in the offense era—Do tion of well-funded offense in dealing with dissent online. They even Know There is a Crackdown? The regime does tolerate some alternative information In the most recent wave of crackdown, social media sharing as it provides the regime with a sense of what have essentially become the only place for individuals to oppositionists think, and social media discussion about share and receive information and discuss what is hap- alternative news provides information to the regime pening.
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