Reply of the Delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan
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Mid-Year Update: 10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2021
Red Lines: Up- heaval and Con- tainment in the Horn of Afri- ca Red Lines: Up- heaval and Con- tainment in the Horn of Afri- ca MID-YEAR jhkjUPDATE: 10 CONFLICTS TO WORRY ABOUT IN 2021 The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) August 2021 TABLE OF CONTENTS (in no particular order) ETHIOPIA 2 INDIA AND PAKISTAN 5 MYANMAR 8 HAITI 11 BELARUS 14 COLOMBIA 17 ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN 20 YEMEN 23 MOZAMBIQUE 27 THE SAHEL 30 EDITED BY: Timothy Lay, Roudabeh Kishi, and Sam Jones GRAPHICS BY: Adam Miller, Josh Satre, and Elliott Bynum LAYOUT BY: Sogand Afkari WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY: Braden Fuller and Clionadh Raleigh (Ethiopia) Ashik KC (India and Pakistan) Elliott Bynum (Myanmar) Sandra Pellegrini and Maria Fernanda Arocha (Haiti) Franklin Holcomb (Belarus) Bhavani Castro (Colombia) Franklin Holcomb (Armenia and Azerbaijan) Valentin d'Hauthuille (Yemen) Sam Ratner (Mozambique) Héni Nsaibia (The Sahel) ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 1 ANALYSIS Ethiopia: Administrative contests in the context of rising ethno-nationalism Braden Fuller and Clionadh Raleigh The summer of 2021 has been the most destabilizing efforts by the central government to govern the re- time yet in Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s tenure. While gion (VOA Amharic, 1 June 2021; Office of the Prime the general election resulted in the Prosperity Par- Minister – Ethiopia, 3 June 2021). As federal soldiers ty’s (PP) overwhelming victory, violence from multi- struggled to maintain territorial control, Ethiopia’s ple active insurgencies in Ethiopia has overwhelmed top officials have faced heavy diplomatic pressure federal resources, with the threat posed by the Tigray — including sanctions — over the involvement of Er- People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) most apparent in re- itrean troops, civilian targeting, and sexual violence cent summer months. -
Appeasement and Autonomy | Armenian
APPEASEMENT AND AUTONOMY BRIEF / 2 Jan 2021 Armenian-Russian relations from revolution to war by GEOPOLITICALSERIES Narek Sukiasyan PhD candidate and teaching associate at Yerevan State University, Armenia Summary › Armenia’s 2018 Velvet Revolution did not INTRODUCTION change the country’s foreign and secu- rity policy priorities: a close security al- Armenia’s foreign policy and its role in the post-Soviet liance with Russia has been used to bal- space are often characterised as ‘pro-Russian’. While ance its regional adversaries Turkey and such a description is partially true, it is overly sim- Azerbaijan; however, the revolutionary plistic. This Brief analyses the main trends and evolu- prime minister Nikol Pashinyan has also at- tions in Armenia’s Russia policy after the 2018 Velvet tempted to increase Armenia’s autonomy Revolution: how the changes have influenced Russia’s vis-à-vis Russia. approach towards Armenia, how these dynamics af- › Pashinyan’s attempts to address the for- fect Armenia’s autonomy and what the consequences mer presidents’ abuses of power and cur- of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war are for Armenia’s tail Russian influence in Armenia, coupled regional security and alliances. with moves that could have been interpret- ed as anti-Russian, have created tensions After the revolution and up until the 2020 with Moscow. Nagorno-Karabakh war, no substantial strategic changes were made to Armenian foreign policy. The › The need to sustain the strategic alliance leadership has avoided framing its external affairs in circumstances in which the Kremlin has in geopolitical ‘pro or against’ terms, promoting a been deeply mistrustful of Armenia’s new ‘pro-Armenian’ policy that aims to maintain good re- leadership has forced Pashinyan’s govern- lations in all directions and prioritises sovereignty as ment to appease Russia. -
1 to the PRESIDENT of the AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC Mr
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC Mr. HEYDAR ALIYEV* Dear Heydar Aliyevich, According to the exchange of views on the issues of strengthening the ceasefire regime, which took place in Baku, I am sending to you, as it was agreed, the proposals of the Minsk Conference co- chairmen. The proposals of the mediator on strengthening the ceasefire in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict On behalf of the Co-chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Conference (hereinafter – the Mediator), with the purpose of strengthening the ceasefire regime established in the conflict region since May 12, 1994 and creating more favourable conditions for the progress of the peace process, we jointly suggest that the conflicting sides (hereinafter – the Sides) should assume the following obligations: 1. In the event of incidents threatening the ceasefire, to immediately inform the other Side (and in a copy – the Mediator) in written form by facsimile or by the PM line with an exact specification of the place, time and character of the incident and its consequences. The other Side is informed that measures are being taken for non-admission of reciprocal actions which could lead to the aggravation of the incident. Accordingly, the other Side is expected to take appropriate measures immediately. If possible, proposals about taking urgent measures to overcome this incident as quickly as possible and restore the status quo ante are also reported. 2. Upon receiving such a notification from the other Side, to immediately check the facts and give a written response not later than within 6 hours (in a copy – to the Mediator). -
Transnational Armenian Terrorism and Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict of 1988-1994) End
Karabakh Oleg KUZNETSOV, PhD in History, MCL (Moscow, Russia) First Terrorist War: A Look from Russia (Transnational Armenian Terrorism and Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict of 1988-1994) End. For the beginning, see İRS-Heritage 2 (21), 3 (22) 2015 n addition to numerous acts of terrorism and wide- spread terrorist crimes related to the organization by Iforeign nationals of illegal armed groups in the terri- tory of Armenia and their participation in the activities of such groups, representatives of the Armenian side to the conflict committed other crimes of a similar nature during the Karabakh war, facts that were recorded on the Azerbaijani side. First of all, we are talking about a Car in which journalist S. Asgarova, Lt-Col Larionov, Maj Ivanov and Sgt Goyek were shot dead by Armenian terrorists on 9 January 1991 58 www.irs-az.com 4(23), WINTER 2015 very specific terrorist crime like an armed insurgency, criminal liability for which is stipulated by Article 279 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. The main qualifying feature of this criminal act is the motiva- tion and goal-setting of participation in the crime: those guilty of committing it take action to change the constitutional system or the territorial integrity of the country. Actions of this kind were committed by soldiers of Armenian origin under the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 336th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 23rd Motorized Infantry Division of the 4th Army of the CIS Joint Armed Forces under the command of Major Seyran Ohanyan, who not only seized fighting equipment - infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2) - without a military order, but also used them against Azerbaijani territorial defense units in the battle of 25 February 1992 for the town of Khojali, which subsequently led to mass deaths of civilians in this town. -
Nagorno Karabakh Republic (Artsakh Republic) Human Rights Defender
NAGORNO KARABAKH REPUBLIC (ARTSAKH REPUBLIC) HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDER (OMBUDSMAN) INTERIM PUBLIC REPORT ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY AZERBAIJANI MILITARY FORCES AGAINST THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THE NAGORNO KARABAKH REPUBLIC AND SERVICEMEN OF THE NAGORNO KARABAKH DEFENCE ARMY ON 2-5 APRIL 2016 SHUSHI APRIL 2016 Contents Foreword ........................................................................................................................ 3 I. Hatred and Discriminatory Policy towards People of Armenian Ethnicity and Its Horrific Consequences ................................................................................................... 5 A) Spreading Hate Speech and Incitement to Violence ............................................... 5 B) Hate Speech in the Azerbaijani Mass Media and Social Networks ......................... 9 C) Hate Speech and Incitement to Violence by Azerbaijani High-Ranking Officials and Other Public Persons ................................................................................................. 11 II. Grave Violations of International Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law by the Azerbaijani Forces ......................................................................................................... 16 A) Killing and Wounding Children as a Result of Shelling Civilian Settlements, including Schools and Homes ..................................................................................... 16 B) Torture, Dismemberment and Mutilation of the NKR Defence Army Servicemen’s Bodies ....................................................................................................................... -
Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Armenia
Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Armenia February 2021 Detailed Methodology • The survey was conducted on behalf of “International Republican Institute’s” Center for Insights in Survey Research by Breavis (represented by IPSC LLC). • Data was collected throughout Armenia between February 8 and February 16, 2021, through phone interviews, with respondents selected by random digit dialing (RDD) probability sampling of mobile phone numbers. • The sample consisted of 1,510 permanent residents of Armenia aged 18 and older. It is representative of the population with access to a mobile phone, which excludes approximately 1.2 percent of adults. • Sampling frame: Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia. Weighting: Data weighted for 11 regional groups, age, gender and community type. • The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.5 points for the full sample. • The response rate was 26 percent which is similar to the surveys conducted in August-September 2020. • Charts and graphs may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. • The survey was funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development. 2 Weighted (Disaggregated) Bases Disaggregate Disaggregation Category Base Share 18-35 years old n=563 37% Age groups 36-55 years old n=505 34% 56+ years old n=442 29% Male n=689 46% Gender Female n=821 54% Yerevan n=559 37% Community type Urban n=413 27% Rural n=538 36% Primary or secondary n=537 36% Education Vocational n=307 20% Higher n=665 44% Single n=293 19% Marital status Married n=1,059 70% Widowed or divorced n=155 10% Up -
'Populism': Armenia's “Velvet Revolution”
The Armenian Studies Program and the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies present the 42nd Educator Outreach Conference Authoritarianism, Democratization, and ‘Populism’: Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution” in Perspective Saturday, May 1, 2021 Livestream on YouTube University of California, Berkeley From end March to early May 2018, a series of peaceful protests and demonstration led to the resignation of Prime Minister (PM) Serzh Sargsyan, whom the then ruling Republican Party he chaired had newly nominated for that office. Having completed his two terms as President, from 2008 to 2018, Serzh Sargsyan’s attempt to remain in power became obvious. This attempt also made it evident that the amended 2015 Constitution, which he had promoted to invigorate democratization by shifting power from the office of the President to the Parliament and the office of the Prime Minister, was merely a ploy to extend his rule. It was also the proverbial “last straw that broke the camel’s back.” A kleptocratic, semi-authoritarian regime that appeared to control all the levers of power and of the economy suddenly, and unexpectedly, collapsed. This regime change—which the leader of the protests and incoming new prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, referred to as a “Velvet Revolution”—was peaceful, something unusual for a post-Soviet republic. Subsequent parliamentary elections brought to power a new generation, younger deputies mostly between the ages of twenty-five to forty. A similar generation change also characterized the formation of the government. Youth, however, also means inexperience as almost none of the new deputies and ministers had held any political position in the past. -