Can an Authoritarian Regime Have a Meritocratic Public Administration? The Case of Azerbaijan CAP Paper 207 (CAAF Fellows Papers), June 2018

Elchin Karimov is a researcher in the area of economic activity. The clients oc- nationalism, ethno-political conflicts, and democracy cupy all chief administrative po- sitions in the government. Since in post-communist space. He obtained his Master’s they are not appointed on merit, in “International Relations: Europe from Visegrad and are indeed heavily incentiv- Perspective,” a joint degree granted by four universities ized to extract rent from their po- in Central Europe, in early 2016. He did his junior sitions, they are poor managers who jeopardize investment and fellowship at the Caucasus Research Resource Center growth in the country. Azerbaijan (CRRC Azerbaijan), exploring the reactions of Azerbaijani civil society actors to the escalation of As Azerbaijan hopes to diversi- fy its economy by attracting for- the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in April 2016. In the eign investment to the non-oil past, Elchin was involved in civic activism and Track sector of the economy, however, Two cross-border engagements between Armenia and it will need to create a favorable Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. business climate. One thing that investors often look for is quality public services. Thus, building a n 2014, in the face of a severe are key actors in the design and meritocratic civil service mesh- economic crisis following the implementation of public poli- es with the goals of the country’s Ifall in the oil price, Azerbaijan cies, professionalizing the civil strategic economic roadmap, experienced the smallest GDP service is central to realizing the which seeks to attract foreign in- growth of any post-Soviet country. government’s reform ambitions— vestors by 2025. These severe economic short- although many believe this aim to comings opened up space for be unachievable without demo- What do we mean when we say reform. Thus, in 2016, Azerbaijan cratic changes to the political a “meritocratic civil service”? launched an initiative to diver- system. There is no universal consensus, sify its economy and minimize but it is generally agreed that it its dependence on oil, with the At present, Azerbaijan’s public involves hiring the people who goal of achieving sustainable administration system does not are most qualified for civil ser- economic growth. One element systematically rely on meritocrat- vice positions. Broadly speaking, of this reform has been improv- ic principles. It is a patron-client meritocracy is a social system ing public services, including system based on rent-seeking and where “merit or talent is the ba- by building a meritocratic civil corruption. The ruling regime dis- sis for sorting people into posi- service system, a process that tributes power among its clients tions and distributing rewards.” has been carried out piecemeal and gives them informal author- Race, gender, class, and other since 2009. Since civil servants ity to manipulate the country’s

CAP Fellows Paper 207 1 identity markers are irrelevant to al practices designed to reform (1969-1987), then held the post this competition. In many coun- the bureaucracies—and improve of president for another decade, tries, meritocratic recruitment the economies—of non-demo- until his death in 2003. During to the civil service involves open cratic states, and whether these his presidency, Azerbaijan was competition—exams, panel in- are relevant to Azerbaijan. The considered a semi-authoritarian terviews, etc.—in which candi- methodology relies on data from country, maintaining some ele- dates are assessed on how well secondary sources to assess the ments of political and civil lib- they meet each requirement of degree of meritocracy in Azer- erties. After his father’s death, the position. Done correctly, this baijan’s civil service and show Ilham Aliev became president, process should avoid patronage, that there is potential to build a constricting political space and nepotism, and corruption. With- meritocratic system supportive moving the country toward full out a meritocratic bureaucracy, of economic development even authoritarianism. In 2017, Intel- a state cannot hope to achieve its in this non-democratic regime. ligence Unit’s democracy index development agenda. The paper concludes by offering placed Azerbaijan on the list of recommendations to local and in- “authoritarian” regimes, with an Taking a narrow view of “meri- ternational non-state actors who overall score of 2.65 out of 10.1 tocracy” in the civil service, this can influence governmental deci- paper seeks to examine the cur- sion-making in the current polit- Azerbaijan’s political system is rent situation of Azerbaijan’s ical context. characterized by strong, central- civil service and compare it to ized administration; low political the government’s aspirations for Azerbaijan as a Patronal and participation; weak rule of law; reform. It begins by providing Authoritarian State and widespread corruption. The background on Azerbaijan’s po- state administration system is litical system and bureaucracy, Like many other former Soviet formed of a “pyramidal web” of before describing the changes republics, Azerbaijan has strug- patron-client relations: the rul- that have taken place since early gled to transform its Soviet-era ing elite (patron), who is at the 2018. It then seeks to answer the public administration and econ- top of the pyramid, distributes question of to what extent meri- omy into more modern forms. political and economic power to tocratic civil service reform can The incumbent regime has been clients, thus buying their loyalty.2 be undertaken in the context of in power since 1993. Heidar Aliev The dominant political and eco- the country’s patronal system, ruled the country for nearly two nomic powers are the Pashayevs turning to look at internation- decades prior to independence (the family of the First Lady)3 and

Figure 1. Transparency International corruption perception index (0—highly corrupt; 100—very clean)

Source: “Corruption Perception Index,” Transparency International, 2017, https:// www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017. CAP Fellows Paper 207 2 Figure 2. World Bank governance indicator: Control on corruption (percentile rank)

Source: “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” World Bank, http:// info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports three regional clans (the Nakh- (see Figure 2). The goals for the period ending in chivanis, Yerazis, and Kurds),4 2020 are to increase state effec- with regional clans as their cli- The patronal system means that tiveness and market competition. ents. Clan leaders, in turn, favor state resources are underutilized, This involves increasing the effi- and support members of their assets are mismanaged, and even ciency and flexibility of the coun- own clans, causing this informal the most qualified bureaucrats are try’s public services. The main web to spread across the entire powerless to resist corruption.9 roadmap emphasizes the role of state apparatus. Henry Hale de- Thus, the state needs an effective the government in establishing a scribes this “social equilibrium,” body for fighting corruption. The favorable atmosphere for doing where “individuals organize their Commission on Combatting Cor- business. It draws attention to political and economic pursuits ruption of the Republic of Azer- improving public-private part- primarily around the person- baijan, intended for precisely this nerships, ending illegal inter- alized exchange of concrete re- purpose, remains largely ineffec- vention into business, increasing wards and punishments through tive, although some progress has market competition and exports, chains of actual acquaintance” been observed, according to the supporting entrepreneurs, im- rather than impersonal ideas and latest OECD reports on Monitor- proving e-governance, and im- values, as patronalism.5 ing of Istanbul Anti-Corruption proving Azerbaijan’s position on Action Plans.10 international indexes. The Presi- Nepotism, cronyism, and favor- dential Administration formed a itism are characteristic of pa- Strategic Roadmaps for Reform commission focused on the lat- tronalist states, and Azerbaijan ter goal in 2016. It has had some is no exception.6 Corruption sus- In 2016, Azerbaijan adopted a early success: Azerbaijan rose 6 tains the patronal structure by re- number of strategic roadmaps positions on the World Bank’s inforcing clients’ dependence on for developing the non-oil sector “ease of doing business” index the ruling regime.7 Unsurprising- of the economy. Alongside the in 2017 (to 57th). The country has ly, therefore, Transparency Inter- main “Perspectives of Nation- attempted to simplify the bu- national’s corruption index for al Economy” document, eleven reaucracy around doing business, 2017 ranked Azerbaijan 122nd out separate roadmaps were adopted although systemic issues contin- of 180 countries (see Figure 1).8 for specific sectors. The project ue to hinder the growth of small World Bank data on governance is broken down into three stag- businesses.11 also indicates that control on cor- es of diversification: 2016-2020, ruption is very low in Azerbaijan 2020-2025, and 2025 onwards.

CAP Fellows Paper 207 3 Azerbaijan’s Civil Service to transfer some state functions tion of changes in early 2018, the System to the public entity, which can SEC has been organizing written also exercise commercial activity examinations for the “A” and “B” Brief Overview of the General and earn income.”13 groups, issuing certificates valid Situation and Recent Changes for five years to those who pass Recruitment Process the exams. It then offers inter- Since the early 2000s, Azerbai- views only to those who possess jan has attempted to reform and There are two categories of re- the relevant certificates. The transform its Soviet-style civil cruitment to the civil service in interview takes place before a service to a contemporary model Azerbaijan: general and special- panel composed of at least three that would meet the demands of ized. The specialized one is for a persons—one (or more) from the the modern world. The first law select group of state bodies that relevant state body, one from the on the civil service, adopted in have their own recruitment and SEC, and one independent ex- 2000, applies to the executive, promotion systems similar to the pert—and the interview process legislative, and judicial branches, general one.14 The recruitment is open for public viewing in or- while Article 109 of the Consti- process for the general civil ser- der to ensure transparency and tution differentiates political ap- vice involves open competition, fairness. The written competition pointees from civil servants.12 which consists of a written test and interview evaluate the gener- and an interview. This applies al knowledge, professional skills, In 2005, a special government to the 1st-7th classification of ad- and reasoning abilities of a can- body—the Civil Service Commis- ministrative positions of the 1st- didate, as well as his or her posi- sion—was established by pres- 5th category of state bodies (see tion-specific expertise. Individu- idential decree to take control details in Appendices 1 and 2). als dissatisfied with their results of human resource policies and The SEC usually conducts writ- have the right to appeal. their implementation. The Com- ten exams at least once a month, mission was responsible for pre- and exams are given by groups There is a separate general com- paring a central written examina- of civil service positions. The “A” petition for those who have tion for civil service recruitment, group refers to administrative worked in the civil service for at improving and implementing civ- leadership positions, while the least five years and who possess il service strategy, conducting rel- “B” group includes administra- the relevant skills and competen- evant trainings for civil servants, tive executive positions. The writ- cies for their intended adminis- and dealing with complaints of ten test given to the “A” group is trative positions. The candidates Ethics Code abuses. It was sub- more challenging than that given for this competition are not re- sequently abolished and the ma- to the “B” group. Under the new quired to have certificates to work jority of its functions handed over system, applicants pay 70 to 110 in a civil service job.16 to the State Examination Centre AZN (US$41-65), depending on (SEC), established in 2016 by the types of certificates required Candidates who pass the inter- presidential decrees. The SEC has for the relevant subgroups of ad- view are introduced to the head also subsumed the State Student ministrative positions.15 of the relevant state body, who Admission Commission, making makes a final decision. The select- it responsible for the admission Civil service recruitment begins ed person does a six-month in- of students to higher education internally. State bodies can inter- ternship, during which time they institutions. According to the view current employees with the are mentored by an appropriate OECD’s anti-corruption report, relevant skills and experience to specialist. If the mentor’s feed- the unification of these two state fill administrative vacancies. If back is positive, the individual is commissions can be explained no suitable individual is found, hired on a three-month proba- by “the need for cost efficiency of the position goes to open com- tionary contract. Upon success- public administration in line with petition, a far more transparent ful completion of this period, the new approach of the government practice. Since the implementa- civil servant is given a long-term

CAP Fellows Paper 207 4 job contract. Other candidates is the last stage of recruitment, under local executive bodies and remain on a reserve list for two in which heads of state bodies representatives of administrative years, to be considered should a choose one of a shortlist of candi- territorial units do not go through 19 vacancy arise. If there are suit- dates, a process that undermines open competition. able candidates in reserve for a the merit-based system.17 new civil service vacancy, these Performance Appraisal vacancies are not announced for Parrado, who has extensive- competition. ly studied the Azerbaijani civil Civil servants’ performance is as- service and recruitment system, sessed according to the “Rules of Comprehensive reform efforts in notes that the 5th-7th grades of civil Performance Appraisal of Civil 2016 have encompassed changes servants, who have been recruit- Servants,” adopted in 2014. The in the civil service. Prior to the es- ed through open competition, performance appraisal system tablishment of the SEC, only the make up 31 percent of all vacant seeks to evaluate the performance 5th-7th classifications of adminis- positions and those in the 1st-4th of civil servants within a year. trative positions were recruited categories make up 9.6 percent of Currently, performance-based rd th though a centralized exam (orga- all positions, amounting to a to- assessment applies to the 3 -7 nized between 2009 and 2016 by tal of 2,838 staff members (as of classifications of civil servants. the now-abolished Civil Service 2014).18 The latest State Statistics The civil servant is evaluated by Commission). Meritocratic re- Committee figures, from 2016, his/her direct supervisor based cruitment has now been extend- indicate that Azerbaijan has a on a list of measures, including ed to the 1st-7th classification of total of 30,090 civil servants. Of professional skills and ethical administrative positions in the these, 1,214 civil servants occu- values. The supervisor’s remarks 1st-5th category of state bodies. py supreme-3rd category admin- are placed on the civil servant’s Nevertheless, open competition istrative positions. However, no “performance appraisal report,” does not apply to the supreme-3rd separate statistics are publicly which affects promotions, demo- classes of administrative posi- available on those working in tions, bonuses, and future train- 20 tions in the supreme category of supreme state bodies to identi- ing. state bodies (see details in Appen- fy the number of civil servants dix 2). The recruitment process to whom open competition does A recent change to the Law on 21 for this category involves direct not yet apply. There are separate Civil Service was the removal promotion or internal interview, statistics only on the number of of the regular attestation exam entailing a lack of transparency deputy heads of local executive every five years for civil servants, that casts doubt on the imple- bodies (257), the recruitment of substituting it with SEC’s certif- mentation of meritocratic princi- whom does not go through open icate system. Hence, every civil ples at the highest level of public competition. In addition, admin- servant who has been hired since administration. Another concern istrative positions in state bodies 2018 is required by law to earn a

Figure 3. Recruitment to Civil Service in Azerbaijan

Source: Constructed by the author

CAP Fellows Paper 207 5 valid certificate every five years. Presidential Decree 1008 (Au- to sustain, as skilled civil servants After receiving the certificate gust 9, 2016) transferred all will likely find themselves with twice (for 10 years), civil servants these functions and activities to more lucrative offers. In addi- receive the third certificate for an the SEC. However, like the com- tion, the underpaid civil servant unlimited time.22 mission before it, the SEC has will always have financial incen- Code of Ethics struggled to carry out all these tive to take bribes, undercutting functions in the face of limited re- the government’s potential an- The government of Azerbaijan sources and overburdened staff.23 ti-corruption drive. Thus, the has promoted ethical behavior in compensation of civil servants, the civil service. The Commission Why Is a Civil Service Job Not which currently lags far behind on Combatting Corruption un- Attractive? private-sector salaries,29 must be der the President of the Repub- made competitive. lic of Azerbaijan was instituted A cursory look at the SEC’s web- in 2004. Since then, the “Law on site reveals that there is a con- To What Extent Can Meritocracy Combatting Corruption” (2004), siderable shortage of applicants Work in a Patronal System? “Law on Rules of Ethical Conduct for low-grade administrative po- of Civil Servants” (2007), Nation- sitions. This shows that there is Public administration reform is al Anti-Corruption Action Plan a lack of interest in civil service progressing in Azerbaijan. As (2012-2015), and National Action jobs. In addition, according to described above, meritocratic Plans on Promoting Open Gov- the head of the SEC’s Board of recruitment principles now ap- ernment (2012-2015, 2016-2018) Directors, more than 2,000 po- ply to mid-level administrative have all been adopted to take sitions are filled by temporary positions as well as low-level steps against corruption. government contractors, who fill ones. This is a positive step to- the vacancies until a civil servant ward building meritocracy. Yet The Law on Ethical Conduct Rules can be selected in a competitive research on the impact of meri- for Civil Servants (2007) provides process.24 However, even these tocratic recruitment to the 5th-7th the main guiding principles for contract-based employees do not grades has found disappointing the ethical behavior of civil ser- apply for consideration in open results. According to Weinmann’s vants. Previously, the now-abol- competition.25 Most civil ser- focus group analysis, conducted ished Civil Service Commission vice vacancies have to be re-an- in Baku with civil servants and and head of the relevant state nounced, and even then there is citizens in 2013, civil servants body monitored ethical behavior. not enough interest to fill them.26 did not follow ethical rules and The Commission studied public personal connections were still opinion of civil servants’ behav- One of the reasons for this is the important to promotion.30 Re- ior and raise public awareness as low salaries that come with civil spondents did not seem to believe to which practices were ethical. service jobs. In 2016, the average that there was a sincere effort to It also prepared relevant recom- monthly salary of a civil servant engage in merit-based recruit- mendations for each state body was 634 AZN (US$372.90).27 The ment.31 to help it cope with corruption Numbeo database indicates that and violations of the Ethics Code. living expenses for one person in The question is whether individ- In addition, it delivered training Baku (before rent) are US$386, ual-level meritocracy can be ef- courses on ethical behavior to while a four-person family would fective within a highly patronal civil servants, determined train- need US$1,389 to cover living system. The centralized exam- ing needs, and gave suggestions expenses exclusive of rent.28 The ination system aims to avoid pa- to state bodies about the types of current salaries, therefore, can tronalism, and this method has training that civil servants need- hardly hope to attract the “best been deemed effective at promot- ed. On top of that, it was respon- people” to the civil service. Even ing meritocracy in other contexts sible for improving the adoption if the most qualified individuals where a high level of patronal- of legislation. are selected, meritocracy is hard ism exists.32 Nonetheless, giv-

CAP Fellows Paper 207 6 en how rooted patronalism and of institutional reforms in this tion has been positive. According rent-seeking are in the state ad- area”34 to research done by ASAN (and ministration, it is hard to institu- therefore potentially biased), 71 tionalize meritocracy. Moreover, Currently, there are thirteen percent of respondents believe Azerbaijan lacks the institutional ASAN centers, five of which are that ASAN is an effective tool in strength to sustain meritocracy: in Baku. Since its launch, over fighting corruption.40 ASAN has neither independent civil society 21 million people have used one also boosted the business envi- organizations (vertical account- of the more than 240 ASAN ser- ronment of the country by fa- ability) nor autonomous parlia- vices.35 These include: issuing cilitating the issuing of licenses ment (horizontal accountability) IDs/passports, driving licenses, and reducing fees, which is wel- exist to oversee bureaucrats’ ac- various other licenses, and an comed by EU businesses.41 It has tivities. ASAN visa;36 notarial services; also contributed to improving the registration of real estate issues; country’s image on some inter- One Stop-Shop Innovation: Par- utilities; banking; insurance; national indexes, such as “doing allel Public Services for Building fine-paying; legal services; migra- business” and “perception of cor- Meritocracy? tion issues; and so on. The ASAN ruption.” Service makes substantial use of ASAN (Azerbaijani Service and e-governance, with a particularly However, although ASAN under- Assessment Network) was estab- noteworthy service being “ASAN pins the public administration lished by presidential decree in Imza” (electronic signature ob- system of Azerbaijan, the major- 2012 as a subordinate agency of tained by mobile number), which ity of public services outside its the Public Service and Social In- allows citizens to sign documents scope remain inefficient and cor- novation Agency under the Pres- digitally.37 rupt. In addition, the clans have ident of the Republic of Azerbai- largely monopolized economic jan. Its acronym—ASAN—means With its clean, fast, and gentle areas of the country, including “easy” in Azerbaijani, and it has service, ASAN has gained popu- big state and private companies, become a one-stop shop for var- larity both at home and abroad. export and import of main goods, ious types of high-quality public Ninety-eight percent of users etc., thus hindering open market services. The five principles of have expressed satisfaction with competition. ASAN—transparency, efficiency, it.38 Moreover, some interna- gentleness, responsibility, and tional bodies, such as the OECD, Moreover, ASAN has not altered comfort33—have shown them- World Bank, UN, and Transpar- the services offered by public selves to be genuine values. ASAN ency International, have positive- bodies, but rather created a paral- was established to: ly appraised ASAN’s activities;39 lel system that includes the most- • “reduce extra expenses and ASAN was given a UN Public used public services. The govern- loss of time on the part of citizens” Service Award for “Improving ment has not commented on why • “respect ethical rules and the Delivery of Public Services” it chose to create a parallel one- civilized behavior toward in 2015. It has also obtained ISO stop shop rather than reforming citizens” 9001:2008 international certifi- the public bodies as a whole,42 • “upgrade the level of cation for its quality management but it is clear that ASAN has left professionalism” standards. room for the elite to continue • “strengthen trust in state to benefit from patronage at the structures” ASAN has brought new organiza- same time as the political leader- • “increase transparency and tional standards to Azerbaijan’s ship claims to have reformed its strengthen the fight against civil service system, emphasiz- public service delivery.43 That is, corruption” ing transparency, integrity, and ASAN has supplemented, rather • “ensure great use of electronic a corruption-free environment. than altering, the patronal Azer- services” Its contribution to curbing petty baijani bureaucracy.44 Thus far, it • “expand the effectiveness corruption in public administra- is unclear which system will pre-

CAP Fellows Paper 207 7 vail: will ASAN’s reformist model There are two dominant theories efficiency of public governance. spill over to other public services of public-sector administration in or will it too be swallowed up in non-democratic states: tradition- Below, I provide a brief over- the corrupt system?45 al Public Administration and New view of the approaches that three All in all, the establishment of Public Management. (Elements countries—China, Singapore, and ASAN has been a tremendous in- of the latter are selected for the Malaysia—have taken to achieve novation that has increased the “best fit” model.) The tradition- meritocratic public administra- efficiency of Azerbaijan’s pub- al Public Administration model, tion without implementing dem- lic service system, albeit only in influenced by the ideas of Max ocratic changes in their political certain areas. Its staff is young, Weber, first emerged in the UK systems. highly skilled, and respectful of and Prussia in the late 19th centu- civil service ethics. However, the ry, based on two main principles: The Case of China majority of the public adminis- hierarchy and meritocracy.46 Re- tration is outside its scope and lying on centralized control and Chinese good governance remains corrupted and non-mer- organizational hierarchy, public amounts to the “development ef- itocratic due to the prevalence of administration detached policy- fectiveness”50 of the state. Good patronalism. making from implementation in governance elements in China, order to build an effective and ef- such as transparency and ac- Theoretical Framework and ficient public administration sys- countability, do not really look Country Case Studies on tem.47 like traditional good governance, Civil Service Reforms but exist in another dimension. In the 1980s, the New Public For example, top-down vertical In order to build the rational-le- Management theory, designed accountability works within the gal bureaucracy considered ideal to respond to the limitations of Communist Party system, mak- by Max Weber, Azerbaijan needs traditional public administration ing civil servants accountable to to implement systemic chang- and the demands of a competi- their state bodies. Another im- es that will weaken patronalism. tive market economy, emerged portant element of good gover- Changing the patronal nature of in several OECD countries.48 This nance is decentralization, which the regime is unlikely in the near theory suggests implementing has aided in the effective man- future, but there are still ways of private-sector management prin- agement of state administration. improving the public administra- ciples in the public sector, empha- By pragmatically selecting certain tion system in order to achieve sizing cost management, “small elements of decentralization to economic liberalization. In this government,” performance man- implement, the ruling party has section, I present some case stud- agement and audit, the decentral- maintained control and strategi- ies of countries whose leaderships ization of public administration, cally enhanced governance. Local have successfully applied select entrepreneurial leadership, etc.49 government bodies may enjoy principles of various theories There are also so-called “third administrative and economic in- of public administration to im- wave” public administration the- dependence, but they do not have prove public governance in their ories (New Public Service; New political freedom.51 non-democratic regimes. I focus Public Governance, including the in particular on non-democratic whole-of-government approach), China has an authoritarian and Asian regimes that have profes- which emphasize a democratic patrimonial political system. sionalized their public adminis- approach to governance and re- These rules of the game are a trations and achieved sustainable spond to the limitations of tra- great drawback in most devel- economic growth. My goal is to ditional public administration oping countries, including most determine which measures they and New Public Management. I post-Soviet countries. However, took can be usefully transferred also will touch on e-governance, the Chinese civil service is large- to Azerbaijan. which focuses on using new tech- ly considered meritocratic.52 Like nology to improve the quality and politicians, civil servants are ap-

CAP Fellows Paper 207 8 pointed, but they are allowed to The Case of Singapore it possible for the government of rise up the hierarchical ladder of Singapore to attract foreign in- the state bureaucracy according to Singapore is a good example of vestment.61 The Bureau’s research their merit.53 Performance-based how an authoritarian political division supports this progress by promotion—which aims at per- elite can construct a profession- offering recommendations to dif- formance maximization—is ap- al public administration and ferent state bodies as to how they plied in the Chinese civil service, achieve the desired growth. Pub- should fight corruption. with some exceptions at higher lic administration reforms in Sin- levels. It should be noted that this gapore targeted institutional and Reforms in Singapore have em- performance is primarily judged attitudinal changes in the civil ser- braced the whole public adminis- on economic indicators, in line vice, and today Singapore has one tration in order to achieve effec- with the Chinese government’s of the most effective civil service tive and efficient governance. The focus on social stability, improv- systems in the world.58 Singapore government has carried out bud- ing people’s livelihoods, and rais- took a pragmatic approach, using get reforms to make the state’s ing GDP.54 Powerful sanctions are the “best practices” that fit its use of financial resources more imposed on the state bodies if civ- context.59 The government first efficient, a process that has seen il servants do not meet economic dissolved ineffective state entities state-owned companies largely demands. Career development in and replaced them with new or- privatized. The rule of law has the civil service also depends on ganizations. To change civil ser- been cemented in order to attract political loyalty, creating a “po- vants’ attitudes toward citizens, foreign investment. And the gov- litical meritocracy.”55 This has al- the government has invested ernment has achieved public-sec- lowed China to achieve its devel- heavily in training civil servants. tor reforms that have created opment goals (economic growth, The “retention and retirement” high-quality healthcare, educa- poverty reduction, and human program forced incompetent civil tion, housing, and infrastructure, development),56 even as patron- servants to retire while promot- as well as providing financial se- age and personal connections re- ing competent ones.60 The fired curity. Notably, these successful main important to some degree.57 civil servants were replaced with reforms have been driven by ex- new, more effective ones in open ceptional political will and facili- The training of civil servants competition. To attract and re- tated by the country’s small size. has been a key objective in Chi- tain competent employees, the na. The Chinese government has government has raised salaries, The Case of Malaysia invested heavily in enhancing making them competitive with the education and skills—and those in the private sector. A per- Malaysia is another interesting changing the mindset—of civ- formance-based awards and pro- example. It was fully authoritari- il servants. Another important motion system has also served to an when it began its public-sector issue is states’ capacity and the sustain meritocracy. reforms in the 1980s, but the gov- political commitment of the rul- ernment nevertheless managed ing regime to tackling corruption. A Central Complaint Bureau to select context-appropriate China has advanced a lot in this was established to hear citizens’ principles of New Public Man- regard, though corruption in its complaints about mistreatment agement and build a better public civil service has not been system- by civil servants. The political administration system.62 atically eradicated. Singapore, leadership has been ruthless in for instance, has been far more combatting corruption. The Cor- The government believed that an successful at building profession- ruption Practices Investigation Asian model of good governance al public administration while Bureau has been very effective would be most suitable for Ma- achieving huge economic growth in fighting corruption in both the laysia. With the goal of reaching under a single party system. public and private sectors. The sustainable economic growth, the existence of a corruption-free Malaysian government under- business environment has made took extensive privatization of its

CAP Fellows Paper 207 9 state-led companies, reducing the What Lessons and Best Prac- make extensive use of e-gover- size of the public sector. This step tices Can Azerbaijan Draw nance tools to increase the effec- enabled effective and efficient From Other Countries? tiveness of its public services and management of public-sector fi- fight corruption. This will remove nancing. One-stop public service The above case studies illustrate an impediment to economic in- shops were created to give busi- that it is possible to achieve mer- vestment and growth in Azerbai- nesses easy access to the govern- itocratic public administration jan. The Commission on Combat- ment services they needed. The without political democratiza- ting Corruption can establish a Malaysian government success- tion. Yet in selecting reforms, it is centralized online system to re- fully promoted and incorporated essential to consider the specific ceive feedback from citizens and Islamic values into civil servants’ context of a country. Singapore’s businessmen on the performance ethical code. All state bodies were small size and favorable location of public bodies and continu- required to have standards rated were unique factors that contrib- ously improve public services on 67 at ISO 9000 series63 to improve uted to the success of reforms. basis of this feedback. Such an service quality.64 In addition, Ma- In addition, its state administra- approach has proven effective in laysia invested heavily in e-gover- tion and political economy were curbing corruption in Singapore. nance, which boosted the quality not based on patronalism and Another effective digital tool for of services while minimizing red rent-seeking.66 The public admin- fighting corruption would be a tape and corruption. This ap- istrations of Malaysia and China mobile app like the one current- proach to public service reform do have patronalistic patterns, ly being used in China, which al- did not follow a single model of however. Although Azerbaijan lows users to instantaneously re- reforms, but drew on both Asian can hardly hope to simply copy- port corrupt practices. Evidently, (Japanese) and Western (Austra- and-paste the methods of any of there is substantial scope to use lian, Canadian, British) practices other countries, it can still draw e-governance to fight corruption to create a “best fit” model for its lessons from each of these exam- and boost the effectiveness of context.65 Malaysia’s strong, sta- ples. public services. ble central government allowed for the success of reforms. First of all, civil servants in all Again benefiting from Singa- three countries are well paid. pore’s rich experience of pub- In sum, all three of the aforemen- This is particularly true of Singa- lic-sector reform, Azerbaijan has tioned countries used a “best fit” pore. The aim has been to attract joined the Kazakhstan-based model to reform their civil service and retain skilled people, as well Regional Hub for Civil Services systems in a context-appropriate as reduce their incentive to take in Astana, a project conducted manner. This selectivity allowed bribes. Related to this, all three jointly by the UNDP and the Ka- incumbent political leaders to re- countries have selectively em- zakhstani government that now tain power. Evidently, therefore, ployed principles of New Public involves 38 countries and several even non-democratic regimes can Management to build efficient international organizations. The successfully reform their civil ser- and effective public administra- Hub is associated with the UNDP vice in order to improve the econ- tions. One element of this ap- Global Center for Public Service omy and people’s livelihoods. In proach was reducing the size of Excellence in Singapore, and they each case, we see that political state bodies and dissolving inef- have produced some joint studies will plays a key role in realizing fective ones to reduce stress on discussing civil service system in reforms and economic liberaliza- the budget, thus freeing up funds the region. In the Hub, partici- tion. that can be directed to improving pant countries work to develop the compensation of low-level “best fit” practices for their public civil servants. administrations by sharing their knowledge and experiences.68 Secondly, like the three countries Whether through the Hub or bi- discussed above, Azerbaijan can laterally, Azerbaijan could work

CAP Fellows Paper 207 10 more closely with Singapore to power can see reforms through. Recommendation for the SEC: take advantage of its expertise in If political will is lacking, reforms public service improvement. alone will be ineffective: creating • Conduct a study to a centralized exam to recruit mer- understand why contract-based The case of China provides a pos- itorious civil servants will alone employees working temporarily itive example of how to profes- do nothing to fight corruption in in civil service positions are sionalize public administration the civil service. not interested in applying to under an authoritarian regime. become civil servants in open Like Azerbaijan, it is a highly pa- Policy Recommendations competition. On the basis of tronal state in which political loy- these findings, the SEC could alty is required (unlike in Webe- Given the patronal nature of the come up with recommendations rian variants of bureaucracy) but Azerbaijani regime, it is unlikely for enhancing the prestige of meritocracy remains important. that systemic changes will take civil service jobs and share these In highly patronal systems, Li and place any time soon. Ideally, the suggestions with the relevant Gore emphasize, patronage can government needs to limit cli- state bodies. be limited by the establishment ents’ exploitation of state assets of an effective system of checks and monopolization of the econ- Short-Term Recommendation and balances to oversee the ac- omy so as to reduce corruption at for the Central Government of 69 tivities of civil servants. A cen- the highest level of public admin- Azerbaijan: tralized examination is essential istration. However, this is unlike- but not enough; a comprehen- ly in the short term, as it might • Raise monthly salary of low- sive approach is needed to build create additional risks for the and mid-level civil servants. a merit-based civil service sys- country’s ruling elites, who share Competitive salaries will help tem, including a transparent and power with their clients and ma- reduce corruption by making merit-based promotion system, nipulate the main economic ar- civil servants immune to the legal protection of whistle-blow- eas. temptations of bribery (Singapore ers, and independent and effec- has been particularly successful tive overseeing mechanisms (eg. The appearance of ASAN was an in this). This policy will also China’s vertical accountability). outgrowth of Azerbaijan’s pa- attract competent civil servants This system could be established tronal nature. The regime decid- and encourage them to remain in Azerbaijan, a recommendation ed to create a parallel one-stop in their jobs rather than seeking I elaborate in the next section. shop to take care of some public more lucrative private-sector services rather than attempt re- employment. In conclusion, the success of re- form of the state bodies them- forms is dependent, above all, selves, thus simultaneously im- Long-Term Recommendations on the political will of the Azer- proving public service delivery for the Central Government of baijani ruling elite to implement and cementing patronalism.70 Azerbaijan: them—and to curb corruption. As This implies that the eradica- the political system is constructed tion of patronalism in Azerbaijan • Send the very best senior to allow and strengthen executive would be difficult, especially as it bureaucrats to earn degrees in power on the patronal ladder, re- may be undesired. Public Administration at the form is only possible once the re- best schools abroad, with the gime itself is willing for change to Under these conditions, the fol- stipulation that they return, work happen. Top-down systemic re- lowing recommendations may for the government for five years, form is effective in authoritarian help local and international pub- and propose positive changes. contexts—as the cases of Singa- lic policymakers, academics, NGO These individuals will learn the pore, China, and Malaysia show— leaders, and other interested par- best international practices while but popular detachment from ties to improve Azerbaijan’s pub- studying abroad. In addition, the politics means that only elite will- lic administration system: foreign atmosphere in the best

CAP Fellows Paper 207 11 schools (located in Singapore, the • Raise public awareness. UK, the US, etc.) will affect their Encourage citizens to report civil attitude toward the civil service. servants’ misuse of power via China has successfully used this online tools and mobile apps. approach to professionalize its • Require public institutions to civil service.71 have ISO 9000 series standards • Establish an independent to improve their quality accountability inspection within management. This strategy each state body to oversee the has helped Malaysian public activities of this state body (top- organizations to boost their down vertical accountability). quality management. The commissions will assess the body’s performance in relation to pre-determined benchmarks and report this information to the relevant higher-level institution at the end of each calendar year. This will help the state to achieve its development agenda and keep all state bodies accountable to the one above them in the hierarchy. It will also push out incompetent civil servants, which is particularly important in the superior-2nd grades, where there is currently no performance- based assessment. This method has inculcated accountability in China in the absence of non- state actors and an independent parliament, and could be similarly effective in Azerbaijan. • Promote e-governance in fighting corruption. Develop a comprehensive online form on the SEC or Commission on Combating Corruption website in order to receive complaints from citizens and respond them quickly and effectively. Maintain confidentiality to protect citizens unless the cases turn out to be fake.72 In addition, develop a smartphone app to report corruption, an approach already taken in India, China, and Russia, among other countries. This will encourage the reduction of corruption in public and private institutions alike.

CAP Fellows Paper 207 12 Appendix 1. Categorization of state bodies76

1st category state bodies - Supreme Mejlis of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic - Chief Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan - Chamber of Accounts of the Republic of Azerbaijan - Office of Judicial Legal Board - Office of an Attorney of the Republic of Azerbaijan for Human Rights (Ombudsman) 2nd category state bodies - Supreme Court of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic - relevant executive power body of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic - Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan - Prosecutor’s Office of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic - Office of an Attorney of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic for Human Rights (Ombudsman) - appeal courts of the Republic of Azerbaijan - Office of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Azer- baijan - Secretariat of the Commission on Fight against Corruption of the Republic of Azerbaijan - relevant executive power bodies - Office of the National TV and Radio-Broadcasting Board 3rd category state bodies - state agencies and state services established under the relevant ex- ecutive power bodies - regional centers of the Office of an Attorney of the Republic of Azer- baijan for Human Rights (Ombudsman) - Office of the Central Election Commission of the Nakhichevan Au- tonomous Republic - relevant executive power bodies of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic - Office of the National TV and Radio-Broadcasting Board - courts on grave crimes - administrative economic courts - military courts - Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Re- public - Baku City Prosecutor’s Office 4th category state bodies - relevant executive power bodies - regional divisions of relevant executive power bodies - bodies subordinate to/under relevant executive power bodies - city (region) courts - district (city) prosecutor’s offices - military prosecutor’s offices 5th category state bodies - local divisions of state agencies and state services established under relevant executive power bodies - bodies under relevant executive power - representations of relevant executive power bodies in an ad- ministrative territorial district

CAP Fellows Paper 207 13 Appendix 2. Classification of administrative positions in civil service77

Supreme state bodies—the main executive, legislative and judiciary bodies of Republic of Azerbaijan: 1) Administration of President of Republic of Azerbaijan, including Administrative Department of the Presi- dent, Special Medical Service of the President, and Cabinet of Ministries 2) Milli Mejlis (Parliament) 3) Constitutional Court 4) Supreme Court Supreme category of administra- - head of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan tive positions in supreme state - head of the Administrative Department of the President bodies - head of Special Medical Service of the President - head of the Secretariat of the First Vice-President of Republic of Azer- baijan - head of Office of Milli Mejlis - head of Office of Constitutional Court - head of Office of Supreme Court - head of Office of Cabinet of Ministries First classification of administra- - deputy head of the Secretariat of the First-Vice President in the Presi- tive positions in the supreme state dential Administration bodies - head of division in the Presidential Administration - assistant to the First Vice-President in the Administration - deputy head of Office of Milli Mejlis and Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, Administrative Department of the President, Special Medical Ser- vice of the President, Cabinet of Ministries, and heads of divisions in these state bodies - heads of the Office of the state bodies of the 1st category - advisors and assistants of head of the Office of Ministries of Cabinet, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, and Milli Mejlis

Second classification of adminis- - deputy head of division in the Presidential Administration trative positions in the supreme - deputy head of divisions in the Office of Milli Mejlis and Constitutional state bodies Court, Supreme Court, Administrative Department of the President, Spe- cial Medical Service of the President, and Cabinet of Ministries - deputy heads of the Office and heads of divisions of the state bodies of the 1st category - head of offices of the state bodies of the2nd categories in the Nakhiche- van Autonomous Republic - heads of state agencies and state services established under relevant ex- ecutive power bodies - trade representatives in Embassies and Consulates of Azerbaijan in for- eign countries - deputy heads of relevant executive bodies - assistants to the Deputy Chairman of Milli Mejlis and Deputy Prime Minister - assistant and advisor to the Chairman of the Supreme Mejlis of the Na- khchivan Autonomous Republic - deputy head of the Baku City Executive

CAP Fellows Paper 207 14 Third classification of administra- - specialists in the Presidential Administration, Administrative Depart- tive positions in the supreme state ment of the President, Special Medical Service of the President, Office of bodies Milli Mejlis, Office of Constitutional Court, Office of Supreme Court, and Office of Cabinet of Ministries - heads of divisions, their deputies and specialists of other state bodies directly supporting the head of the Azerbaijani state - deputy heads of state agencies and services under relevant executive bodies - deputy heads of division of the state bodies of the 1st category - heads of office and their deputies of state bodies of the 2nd category - deputy heads of office and heads of division of state bodies of the 2nd category in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic - deputy heads of state agencies and state services established under the relevant executive power bodies Fourth classification of adminis- - specialists in the offices of state bodies of the 1st category trative positions in the supreme - heads of division and their deputies in 2nd-category state bodies state bodies - deputy heads of division of 2nd-category state bodies in the Nakhiche- van Autonomous Republic - deputy heads of relevant executive power bodies Fifth classification of administra- - specialists of 2nd-category state bodies tive positions in the supreme state - heads of office of 3rd-category executive power bodies in the Nakhiche- bodies van Autonomous Republic - heads of division and their deputies of 3rd-category state bodies - heads of local division of 4th-category state bodies

Sixth classification of administra- - specialists of 3rd-category state bodies tive positions in the supreme state - head of division and deputies of relevant 4th-category executive power bodies bodies - deputy heads of local divisions of 4th-category state bodies - heads and their deputies of the local divisions of state agencies and state services (5th category) Seventh classification of admin- - specialists of relevant executive power bodies – state bodies of the 4th istrative positions in the supreme and 5th categories, local divisions of relevant executive power bodies, state bodies bodies being under and subordinated to relevant executive power bodies, regional (city) courts, bodies subordinated to relevant executive power bodies, local divisions of state agencies and state services established un- der relevant executive power bodies, bodies being under and subordinat- ed to such state agencies and state services - heads, deputy heads, and specialists of the bodies under relevant execu- tive power bodies - representatives, their deputies and specialists on administrative territo- rial areas of relevant executive power bodies

CAP Fellows Paper 207 15 Endnotes 13 “Anti-Corruption Reforms in Azer- http://www.e-qanun.az/frame- baijan. Fourth Round of Monitoring work/4481. 1 Alikhan Baimenov and Max of the Istanbul Anti-Corruption 26 Parrado, “Civil Service Profession- Everest-Philipps, “Meritocracy and Action Plan,” OECD Anti-Corrup- alisation,” 47. Public Service Excellence,” UNDP tion Network For Eastern Europe 27 “Günün Nəbzi,” YouTube vid- Global Centre for Public Service and Central Asia, 2016, http://www. eo, 36:26, posted by “Dövlət Excellence (Singapore) and Regional oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/ İmtahan Mərkəzi,” February 26, Hub of Civil Services in Astana OECD-ACN-Azerbaijan-Round-4- 2018, https://www.youtube.com/ (Kazakhstan), 2015 Monitoring-Report-ENG.pdf. watch?v=PqFmYJ8EEBU. 2 Ibid., 6. 14 Natig Cafarli, economist, personal 28 Ibid. 3 Ibid., 7. interview with the author, April 20, 29 Ibid. 4 “Democracy Index 2017: Free 2018. 30 Average monthly nominal wage Speech is under Attack,” The 15 Salvador Parrado, “Civil Service for all administrative positions in Economist Intelligence Unit, Professionalisation in Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan. Re- 2017, http://www.eiu.com/ Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and trieved from the website of the State Handlers/WhitepaperHandler. Ukraine,” SIGMA (November 2014), Statistical Committee of Republic ashx?fi=Democracy_Index_2017. http://www.sigmaweb.org/publica- of Azerbaijan, https://www.azstat. 5 “Azerbaijan: Turning over a New tions/ParradoDiezS-CS-Profession- org/MESearch/search?departa- Leaf?” ICG Europe Report 156 alisation-Nov2014.pdf. ment=22&lang=az. (2004), 9, https://d2071andvip0wj. 16 OECD, “Anti-Corruption Reforms 31 Numbeo “Cost for Living” data. cloudfront.net/156-azerbaijan-turn- in Azerbaijan.” Retrieved from https://www.num- ing-over-a-new-leaf.pdf. 17 The following government bodies beo.com/cost-of-living/in/Baku. 6 “Azerbaijan: Vulnerable Sta- have a specialized process: Prose- 32 Parrado, “Civil Service Profession- bility,” ICG Europe Report 207 cutor’s Office, Ministries of Justice, alisation,” 52. (2010), https://www.files.ethz.ch/ Defense, Foreign Policy, Internal Af- 33 Ibid., 49 isn/120824/207%20Azerbaijan%20 fairs, Tax, Migration; State Security/ 34 Ibid., 49 -%20Vulnerable%20Stability.pdf. Foreign Intelligence/ Customs Ser- 35 Baimenov and Everest-Philipps, 7 Farid Guliyev, “Political Elites in vices; Central Bank; and feldyeger “Meritocracy and Public Service Azerbaijan,” in Challenges of the communication. Excellence,” 7. Caspian Resource Boom. Domes- 18 “Dövlət Qulluğuna Qəbul Qay- 36 State Agency for Public Services tic Elites and Policy-Making, ed. daları ilə Bağlı Nələri Bilməliyik,” and Social Innovation under the Andreas Heinrich and Heiko Pleines Dövlət İmtahan Mərkəzi, 2017, President of the Republic of Azerbai- (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, http://www.dovletqullugu.com/up- jan, http://vxsida.gov.az/redirect/ 2012), 118. loads/buklet-dovlet-qulluqu_.pdf. index/cat_id/81/MainOrNot/0. 8 Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: 19 “Açıq dərs – dövlət qulluğu,” 37 Ibid. Eurasian Regime Dynamics in YouTube video, 48:24, posted 38 Ibid. Comparative Perspective (New by “Dövlət İmtahan Mərkəzi,” 39 “ASAN visa” is an electronic sys- York: Cambridge University Press, November 17, 2017, https:// tem issuing visas to foreigners trav- 2014), 20. www.youtube.com/watch?v=k9t- eling to Azerbaijan. Applicants can 9 Ibid., 118. jRSV6btg. receive a visa online within three 10 Marlene Laruelle, “Discussing 20 Parrado, “Civil Service Profession- working days. See https://evisa.gov. Neopatrimonialism and Patronal alisation,” 46. az/en/. Presidentialism in the Central Asian 21 Ibid. 40 “What is ASAN IMZA?”ASAN Context,” Demokratizatsiya 20, no. 22 Presidential Decree 1474/2017, IMZA, http://asanimza.az/what-is- 4 (2012): 315. http://www.e-qanun.az/frame- the-asan-imza-mobile-id/. 11 “Corruption Perception Index,” work/35877. 41 “Moving towards Citizens: The Transparency International, 2017, 23 Parrado, “Civil Service Profession- ‘ASAN Service’ Model: The Azer- https://www.transparency.org/ alisation,” 54. baijani Service and Assessment news/feature/corruption_percep- 24 “Law of the Republic of Azer- Network,” Vision—The Think Tank, tions_index_2017. baijan about Changes to ‘Law on 2015, http://www.visionwebsite.eu/ 12 Hui Li and Lance L.P. Gore, “Mer- Civil Service’ of the Republic of UserFiles/Vision_ASAN_Report. it-Based Patronage: Career Incen- Azerbaijan,” No. 267- VQD, May 31, pdf. tives of Local Leading Cadres in 2016, http://e-qanun.az/frame- 42 Farid Osmanov, “Curbing Cor- China,” Journal of Contemporary work/33482. ruption in Azerbaijan: The Case China (2017): 1-18. 25 Law on Civil Service, article 28.1, of ASAN,” Building Integrity WP

CAP Fellows Paper 207 16 2017/001, Blavatnik School of Gov- national Review of Administrative Respublikasının Qanunu, № 926-IQ ernment, University of Oxford, 2017. Sciences 57, no. 1 (1991): 85-100. (2000), 43 Osmanov, “Curbing Corruption in 62 Robinson, “From Old Public Ad- http://www.e-qanun.az/frame- Azerbaijan.” ministration.” work/4481 44 “EU Business Climate Report: 63 Ballatore Benedetto Francesco, 77 Ibid. Azerbaijan 2017,” German-Azerbai- “The Reform of the Public Admin- jan Chamber of Commerce (AHK istration in Singapore: A Model Azerbaijan), 2017, https://eeas. to Follow in Italy?” MPRA Paper europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_busi- 52685 (2013), 6, https://mpra. ness_climate_report_azerbai- ub.uni-muenchen.de/52685/1/ jan_2017.pdf. MPRA_paper_52685.pdf. 45 Shahla Sultanov, “Azerbaijan 64 Ibid., 7. Anti-Corruption Initiative Draws 65 Noore Alam Siddiquee, “Public Decent Public Review,” Eur- Service Innovations Policy Transfer asiaNet, October 16, 2014, https:// and Governance in the Asia-Pacific eurasianet.org/s/azerbaijan-an- Region: The Malaysian Experience,” ti-corruption-initiative-draws-de- JOAAG 2, no. 1 (2007). cent-public-reviews. 66 An internationally recognized 46 Sultanova, “Azerbaijan Anti-Cor- certification of quality management ruption Initiative.” standards for both public and pri- 47 Farid Guliyev, email to the author, vate organizations. 2018. 67 Siddiquee, “Public Service Inno- 48 Osmanov, “Curbing Corruption in vations.” Azerbaijan.” 68 Ibid. 49 Mark Robinson, “From Old Pub- 69 Lan Hu, “One Party Dominance lic Administration to the New Pub- Survival: The Case of Singapore and lic Service: Implications for Public Taiwan” (PhD diss., The Ohio State Sector Reform in Developing Coun- University, 2011). tries,” UNDP Global Centre for Pub- 70 Dana Al Emam, “Singapore lic Service Excellence, 2015. Shares Experience in Public Sec- 50 Ibid. tor Reforms,” The Jordan Times, 51 Ibid. August 30, 2014, http://www. 52 X.U. Runya, S. U. N. Qigui, and S. jordantimes.com/news/local/singa- I. Wei, “The Third Wave of Public pore-shares-experience-public-sec- Administration: The New Public tor-reform. Governance,” Canadian Social Sci- 71 Colin Knox, “Public Sector Reform ence 11, no. 7 (2015). in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” 53 Xiaoyun Li, Sanjeev Ahluwalia, International Journal of Public and Dong Qiang, “Lessons In Administration (2017). Public Sector Reform from Chi- 72 Li and Gore, “Merit-Based Patron- na,” World Bank, 2013, 16, http:// age.” siteresources.worldbank.org/ 73 Farid Guliyev, email to the author, EXTGOVANTICORR/Resourc- 2018. es/3035863-1289428746337/Les- 74 Kenneth Jarrett and Lie Huihan, sons_PSR_China.pdf. “Understanding China’s Changing 54 Ibid. Civil Service,” Chinese Business 55 Ibid. Review, July 1, 2009, https://www. 56 Li and Gore, “Merit-Based Patron- chinabusinessreview.com/under- age.” standing-chinas-changing-civil-ser- 57 Ibid. vice/. 58 Ibid. 75 This system has been used in the 59 Ibid. Corruption Practices Investigation 60 Ibid. Bureau in Singapore. See https:// 61 Jon S.T. Quah, “Administrative www.cpib.gov.sg/. Reform: Singapore Style,” Inter- 76 Dövlət Qulluğu haqda Azərbaycan

CAP Fellows Paper 207 17