Civil Service Glossary of Terms
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The Chinese Civil Service Examination's Impact on Confucian Gender Roles
University of Louisville ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository College of Arts & Sciences Senior Honors Theses College of Arts & Sciences 5-2015 The Chinese civil service examination's impact on Confucian gender roles. Albert Oliver Bragg University of Louisville Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/honors Part of the Asian History Commons, and the History of Gender Commons Recommended Citation Bragg, Albert Oliver, "The Chinese civil service examination's impact on Confucian gender roles." (2015). College of Arts & Sciences Senior Honors Theses. Paper 71. http://doi.org/10.18297/honors/71 This Senior Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts & Sciences at ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Arts & Sciences Senior Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the author, who has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Chinese Civil Service Examination’s Impact on Confucian Gender Roles By Albert Oliver Bragg Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for Graduation summa cum laude University of Louisville May 2015 Bragg 2 Introduction The Chinese Civil Service Examination was an institution that lasted virtually uninterrupted for roughly thirteen-hundred years, beginning during the late Sui Dynasty in 587 C.E. and ending in 1904 shortly before the collapse of the Qing Dynasty1. While the structure and number of examinations varied widely from dynasty to dynasty, the fundamental content of the examinations was to test one’s knowledge of the Confucian classics: The Analects, The Book of Mencius, The Book of Changes, The Book of Documents, The Book of Poetry, The Book of Rites, and the Tso Chuan. -
Determinants and Consequences of Bureaucrat Effectiveness: Evidence
Determinants and Consequences of Bureaucrat Effectiveness: Evidence from the Indian Administrative Service∗ Marianne Bertrand, Robin Burgess, Arunish Chawla and Guo Xu† October 21, 2015 Abstract Do bureaucrats matter? This paper studies high ranking bureaucrats in India to examine what determines their effectiveness and whether effective- ness affects state-level outcomes. Combining rich administrative data from the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) with a unique stakeholder survey on the effectiveness of IAS officers, we (i) document correlates of individual bureaucrat effectiveness, (ii) identify the extent to which rigid seniority-based promotion and exit rules affect effectiveness, and (iii) quantify the impact of this rigidity on state-level performance. Our empirical strategy exploits variation in cohort sizes and age at entry induced by the rule-based assignment of IAS officers across states as a source of differential promotion incentives. JEL classifica- tion: H11, D73, J38, M1, O20 ∗This project represents a colloboration between the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA), the University of Chicago and London School of Economics. We are grateful to Padamvir Singh, the former Director of LBSNAA for his help with getting this project started. The paper has benefited from seminar/conference presentations at Berkeley, Bocconi, CEPR Public Economics Conference, IGC Political Economy Conference, LBSNAA, LSE, NBER India Conference, Stanford and Stockholm University. †Marianne Bertrand [University of Chicago Booth School of Business: Mari- [email protected]]; Robin Burgess [London School of Economics (LSE) and the International Growth Centre (IGC): [email protected]]; Arunish Chawla [Indian Administrative Service (IAS)]; Guo Xu [London School of Economics (LSE): [email protected]] 1 1 Introduction Bureaucrats are a core element of state capacity. -
Continuation of Locality Payments for Non-General Schedule Employees
The President's Pay Agent Washington, DC 20415-0001 November 24, 2014 MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES SUBJECT: Continuation of Locality Payments for Non-General Schedule Employees The law requires that locality pay for non-General Schedule (GS) categories of employees must be renewed each year (5 U.S.C. 5304(h)). Each year, the President’s Pay Agent issues a memorandum to continue locality pay for non-GS categories. This memorandum continues locality payments in 2015 for the same Governmentwide and single-agency categories of employees who are authorized to receive 2014 locality payments, except where agencies have informed us they no longer need locality payments for certain single-agency categories of employees. This action does not increase percentage rates of locality pay and does not authorize locality pay for any categories of employees not already receiving locality pay. Under the President’s alternative pay plan for 2015, locality pay percentages will continue at the same rates that were in effect since 2010 for the Governmentwide categories shown in Attachment 1 with no further action required by any agency. Under the statute, locality payments may be made to single-agency categories of employees only at the request of the head of an Executive agency. Attachment 2 shows single-agency categories receiving locality pay in 2014, and these categories will continue to receive locality pay in 2015 at existing percentage rates without any further action required by any agency unless the head of an Executive -
Are Public Sector Workers Paid More Than Their Alternative Wage? Evidence from Longitudinal Data and Job Queues
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: When Public Sector Workers Unionize Volume Author/Editor: Richard B. Freeman and Casey Ichniowski, eds. Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-26166-2 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/free88-1 Publication Date: 1988 Chapter Title: Are Public Sector Workers Paid More Than Their Alternative Wage? Evidence from Longitudinal Data and Job Queues Chapter Author: Alan B. Krueger Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7910 Chapter pages in book: (p. 217 - 242) 8 Are Public Sector Workers Paid More Than Their Alternative Wage? Evidence from Longitudinal Data and Job Queues Alan B. Krueger Several academic researchers have addressed the issue of whether federal government workers are paid more than comparable private sector workers. In general, these studies use cross-sectional data to estimate the differential in wages between federal and private sector workers, controlling for observed worker characteristics such as age and education. (Examples are Smith 1976, 1977 and Quinn 1979.) This literature typically finds that wages are 10-20 percent greater for federal workers than private sector workers, all else constant. In conflict with the findings of academic studies, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s of- ficial wage comparability survey consistently finds that federal workers are paid less than private sector workers who perform similar jobs.’ Moreover, the government’s findings have been confirmed by an in- dependent study by Hay Associates (1984). Additional research is needed to resolve this conflict. When the focus turns to state and local governments, insignificant differences in pay are generally found between state and local govern- ment employees and private sector employees. -
Nepotism and Meritocracy
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Göteborgs universitets publikationer - e-publicering och e-arkiv NEPOTISM AND MERITOCRACY ANDERS SUNDELL WORKING PAPER SERIES 2014:16 QOG THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg Box 711, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG December 2014 ISSN 1653-8919 © 2014 by Anders Sundell. All rights reserved. Nepotism and meritocracy Anders Sundell QoG Working Paper Series 2014:16 December 2014 ISSN 1653-8919 ABSTRACT Despite the crucial importance of a well-functioning and impartial public administration for growth and well-being, we know little of how such bureaucracies can be created, and why elites allow them to be. One reason for this dearth of studies is that there are few to none quantitative measures of historical bureaucratic development. This paper analyzes the surnames of civil servants in the Swe- dish central public administration over 200 years to track nepotism in recruitment. A decline in nepotism is registered during the 19th century. The nobility however continued to thrive in the ad- ministration even after reform, due to disproportionate access to education. Paradoxically, birth was thus an important predictor of success in a system that generally was considered meritocratic. This continuity could explain why the old elite accepted reform.1 Anders Sundell The Quality of Government Institute Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg [email protected] 1 The author wishes to thank Andreas Bågenholm, Heather Congdon Fors, Carl Dahlström, Mikael Gilljam, Jenny de Fine Licht, Victor Lapuente, Martin Sjöstedt and seminar participants at University of Gothenburg and Lund University for valuable input during the preparation of this manuscript. -
Implementation of Meritocracy in the Public Sector of Kazakhstan
IMPLEMENTATION OF MERITOCRACY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR OF KAZAKHSTAN by Nargis Saginova A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Public Administration at NAZARBAYEV UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBIC POLICY ʼ ASTANA 2017 ABSTRACT Kazakhstan's ultimate goal for the next 20 years is to become one of the most economically successful top 30 countries in the world. In order to get onto that list, the President of the country, on a regular basis, sets goals that should be achieved by politicians, businessmen, scholars, students and others. One of the latest goals was the introduction of 5 reforms in 2015 that included a huge transformation of the civil service. The reform was aimed at creating a professional and effective civil service free from corruption, nepotism, and tribalism, with bright leaders who will guide the country towards success and prosperity. Thus, political stability will gradually result in economic success. The focus of the civil service reform was the implementation of principles of meritocracy. Meritocracy guarantees that access to the civil service will be equally given to everyone interested in working for the government and who has the proper qualifications. Promotion should be based on their merits ignoring things like subjectivism, nepotism, corruption etc. On the basis of the reforms, the government has introduced new law ‘On civil service’. Thus the main objective of this thesis paper is to investigate whether the principle of meritocracy has been introduced and implemented in the civil service of Kazakhstan. Using the example of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan I have researched whether the results of this process have been successful or not. -
Civil Service Law
Unofficial Translation Final Version of CS Law 06/09/ 005, Zarif Waez CIVIL SERVICE LAW CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS Basis: Article 1 In accordance with Article 50 of the Afghanistan Constitution, this Law has been enacted to establish sound administration, to implement reforms in the administrative system, and to regulate the activities of the Civil Service. Objectives: Article 2 This Law has the following objectives: 1. To establish sound administration through the planning and implementation of reform of the country’s administrative system. 2. To determine the duties of Civil Service. 3. To fill Civil Service posts on merit and competency. 4. To regulate personnel management arrangements and duties of civil servants. Civil Service: Article 3 The Civil Service performs all the executive and administrative activities of the Government based on provisions in law. The Civil Service includes the following activities: 1. Manages, regulates and delivers government services. 2. Develops policies, and provides and offers professional advice. 3. Develops, prepares and implement laws, decrees and relevant regulations Civil Servant: Article 4 1) A civil servant is a person appointed by the Government to perform its executive and administrative duties based on the provisions in law. The ranks and grades of civil servants will be regulated according to the relevant legal document. 2) Any person who is not included in the ranks and grades described in Clause 1 of this Article is not considered to be a civil servant. 1 Chapter 2 Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) Leadership of IARCSC: Article 5: 1) The IARCSC is established in order to lead, regulate, reform, formulate and implement structure policies of public administration system. -
The Admission of Government Agency Reports Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) by John D
The Admission of Government Agency Reports under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(c) By John D. Winter and Adam P. Blumenkrantz or (B) matters observed pursuant having hearsay evidence admitted under to duty imposed by law as to which Rule 803(8)(c) follow from the justifica- matters there was a duty to report, tions for adopting the rule in the first excluding, however, in criminal cases place. The hearsay exception is premised matters observed by police officers on several conditions. First, the rule as- and other law enforcement person- sumes that government employees will nel, or (C) in civil actions . factual carry out their official duties in an honest 2 John D. Winter Adam P. Blumenkrantz findings resulting from an investiga- and thorough manner. This assump- tion made pursuant to authority tion results in the rule’s presumption of n product liability and other tort ac- granted by law, unless the sources of reliability. Second, the rule is based on the tions, plaintiffs may seek to introduce information or other circumstances government’s ability to investigate and re- Igovernment records or documents, indicate lack of trustworthiness. port on complex issues raised in many cas- federal and nonfederal alike, to establish es, from product liability claims to section one or more elements of their claims. In This article focuses specifically on 1983 actions against government officials. this regard, plaintiffs attempt to rely on the third prong of the rule: the use of Government agencies generally possess reports or letters written by government agency records in civil actions that result levels of expertise, resources, and experi- agencies responsible for overseeing the from an agency investigation made ence, including access to information that health, safety, and consumer aspects pursuant to authority granted by law. -
The Maturation of Federal Employees As an Interest Group
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: The Federal Civil Service System and The Problem of Bureaucracy Volume Author/Editor: Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-40170-7 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/john94-1 Publication Date: January 1994 Chapter Title: The Maturation of Federal Employees as an Interest Group Chapter Author: Ronald N. Johnson, Gary D. Libecap Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8636 Chapter pages in book: (p. 96 - 125) 5 The Maturation of Federal Employees as an Interest Group 5.1 Introduction The legislative histories of major laws affecting the civil service system show that an active role in shaping them was played by early federal employee unions. The evidence offered in this chapter reveals that federal employee groups were able to utilize these earlier institutional changes to expand their influence and direct the subsequent course of the civil service system. Indeed, as an interest group, federal workers have done rather well. Even though fed- eral workers do not have the right to strike, most of the evidence indicates that the ‘compensation of federal employees generally exceeds the amount that they would earn either in the private sector or elsewhere in the public sector. Federal unions have achieved this favorable outcome, at least in part, be- cause they have been granted direct input into the design of the very institutions that determine their members’ compensation. By law, federal wages must be comparable with those in the private sector. -
TESTING the SCHOLARS How Do You Choose Who Runs a Dynasty? Why Do People Seek Power?
TESTING THE SCHOLARS How do you choose who runs a dynasty? Why do people seek power? ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Students will explore the classical Chinese civil servants exam system, compare it to / EDUCATOR their current exam systems, and construct their own ideas of what it means to be qualified for a role and how to prove qualification. If you are planning to use this as part of a visit to The Field Museum, see the Page field trip guide on page 7. 1 of BACKGROUND 7 INFORMATION Image: During the Qing Dynasty, students took the civil service examination in door-less cells. Running an empire required a network of The only furniture was a set of boards that could be arranged as a desk and bench or a bed. dedicated and well-educated officials. The men Illustration by Sayaka Isowa for The Field Museum. who governed the empire had to pass a grueling exam. For roughly 1,300 years, China’s emperors used the civil toe, twice. Their supplies, carried in baskets like service examination system to identify talented men for the ones in the drawing above, were searched. It’s government service. Stationed throughout the empire, said that guards even checked inside dumplings. scholar-officials maintained order and reported back to Yet some test-takers found ways to smuggle in help. the emperor on local events. This system was so effective, The museum holds examples of silk cloth covered in even foreign dynasties like the Manchus embraced it writing, cheat sheets that could have been sewn into during the Qing Dynasty (AD 1644-1911). -
India and China
India and China: A Comparative Analysis of Mobile Phones in Agriculture By C2014 Prashanthi Bonthu Submitted to the graduate degree program in Global and International Studies and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. ________________________________ Chairperson Professor Eric Hanley ________________________________ Committee Member Professor Darlene Budd ________________________________ Committee Member Professor John James Kennedy Date Defended: Feb 3rd , 2014 The Thesis Committee for Prashanthi Bonthu certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis: India and China: A Comparative Analysis of Mobile Phones in Agriculture ________________________________ Chairperson Professor Eric Hanley Date approved: Feb 3, 2014 ii Abstract In 2010, China and India were named the first and second largest mobile phone markets in the world based on their number of subscribers. India and China have focused on extending their telecommunication services into rural areas for socio-economic benefits. Both countries liberalized and privatized the industry under different political regimes utilizing different strategies. The aim of this thesis is to examine the collaborative efforts of public and private agencies in India and the role they do in disseminating information to farmers through mobile phones when compared to the government agencies in China that have been created to share that information in order to determine which program is more effective. To answer this question, the thesis compares Indian and Chinese policies and programs enacted to encourage sales and use of mobile phones in the agricultural sector to increase efficiency and encourage growth. As free market principles and private for-profit corporations are generally more efficient than government agencies, this thesis hypothesizes that the policies and development initiatives taken by the Indian government are more successful in disseminating information than the government agency approach followed by China. -
Civil Service Entry Level Police Exam Frequently Asked Questions
Civil Service Entry Level Police Exam Frequently Asked Questions Basic Requirements of the Exam: Who can take the Municipal or Transit Entry-level Police Exam? Education/Experience Requirement: As of the date of appointment, candidates must have either a high school diploma or equivalency certificate approved by the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education or three years of experience in the armed forces of the United States with last release or discharge under honorable conditions. Age Requirement: Pursuant to Massachusetts General Law (M.G.L.) Chapter 31, § 58, candidates must be 19 years of age on or before the first date the examination is being administered for municipal firefighter, police officer and transit police officer. Candidates are also required to be at least 21 years of age by the date of appointment as a municipal police officer or transit police officer. Please review the list of Civil Service departments to identify those that may have an upper age limit: Civil Service Police Departments. Who can take the State Trooper Entry-level Exam? Education Requirement: Candidates must have a high school diploma or equivalency certificate approved by the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. Age Requirement: In order to take the examination for State Trooper and pursuant to M.G.L. Chapter 22C , § 10 , candidates must be at least 21 years of age and less than 35 years old as of the last date to file an application for an examination. How much does it cost to take an exam and are there hardship exceptions? The combined examination fee for Municipal Police Officer and State Trooper is $150.