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Autentični Skepticizam: Razgraničenje Dijalektičke Protuteže Pozitivnoj Epistemologiji

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Autentični Skepticizam: Razgraničenje Dijalektičke Protuteže Pozitivnoj Epistemologiji AUTENTIČNI SKEPTICIZAM: RAZGRANIČENJE DIJALEKTIČKE PROTUTEŽE POZITIVNOJ EPISTEMOLOGIJI Bazdan, Vanda Doctoral thesis / Disertacija 2016 Degree Grantor / Ustanova koja je dodijelila akademski / stručni stupanj: University of Zagreb, Department of Croatian Studies / Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Hrvatski studiji Permanent link / Trajna poveznica: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:111:577061 Rights / Prava: In copyright Download date / Datum preuzimanja: 2021-10-05 Repository / Repozitorij: Repository of University of Zagreb, Centre for Croatian Studies Centre for Croatian Studies Vanda Bazdan AUTHENTIC SKEPTICISM: THE DELINEATION OF A DIALECTICAL COUNTERPART TO POSITIVE EPISTEMOLOGY DOCTORAL THESIS Supervisor: prof.dr.sc. Filip Grgić Zagreb, 2016 Hrvatski studiji Vanda Bazdan AUTENTIČNI SKEPTICIZAM: RAZGRANIČENJE DIJALEKTIČKE PROTUTEŽE POZITIVNOJ EPISTEMOLOGIJI DOKTORSKI RAD Mentor: prof.dr.sc. Filip Grgić Zagreb, 2016 Summary Common traits identified through a critique of those arguments which serve as paradigm cases in the prevailing distinction between two types of skepticism in this dissertation serve as a stepping stone to a different interpretation of skeptical approach in philosophy. The interpretation primarily draws on authentic commitment to skepsis, inquiry, inherent to all original skeptical arguments, and thus represents a reading of skepticism based on genuine appreciation of the proclaimed aim to skeptical argumentation, which is to serve as a dialectical counterweight to that which is determined. As such, the reading of skepticism offered is far removed from those interpretations in which skepticism is portrayed as a theory of ignorance or negative dogmatism. Through the prism of traits identified in delineation of authentic skeptical approach, this study further investigates the causes and consequences of these latter interpretations, specifically in the form in which they appear in philosophical discourse of 20th century epistemology and epistemology of the day. Key words: skepticism, Academic skepticism, Pyrrhonian skepticism, Cartesian skepticism, dialectical aim, dialectical counterweight, skepsis, authentic skepticism, phantom skepticism. 1 Sažetak S obzirom na brojna izdanja kojima je skepticizam predmet, bilo da se radi o pregledima, kritičkim osvrtima, ili obranama i zagovaranju skepticizma, čini se kako je riječ o jednoj od onih tradicija čiji je naziv dio osnovnog pojmovlja filozofije, te je time općepoznat; naime, čini se kako bi mnogi, ako ne i svi koji se bave filozofijom ustvrdili kako su upoznati sa ovom tradicijom ili barem jednim od njezinih brojnih dijelova, te kako ne bi bili u neprilici kada bi se od njih tražila definicija 'skepticizma'. Moglo bi se, utoliko, zaključiti kako još jedna studija o skepticizmu nije potrebna. MeĎutim, često u odnošenju spram onoga što se čini poznatim i bliskim izostane temeljito razmatranje i propitivanje; pa je preispitivanje baš tog poznatog i bliskog dobrodošlo. Upravo je postojanje višestrukih opisa onoga što se podvlači pod naslov 'skepticizam' u opsežnoj literaturi poslužilo kao poticaj pisanju ove disertacije. U kakofoniji glasova o skepticizmu, za i protiv skepticizma, ova disertacija je prvenstveno rezultat potrage za pojmovnom jasnoćom, te predstavlja pokušaj uspostavljanja harmonije u odnošenjima sa ovom tradicijom. Čitatelj ne treba očekivati kako će na stranicama koje slijede pronaći prikaz svih onih pristupa u filozofiji koji su bivali podvedeni pod naziv 'skepticizam' ili prikazivani kao oblici skeptičke misli, već temeljito razmatranje onih zajedničkih značajki koje čine skepticizam 'skepticizmom', onog kontinuiteta na osnovi kojeg se ovaj pristup u filozofiji smatra tradicijom te stječe uvid u značaj i smislenost dijelova ove tradicije, nažalost često dovedenih u pitanje. Najbolje je stoga ovu disertaciju promatrati kao prikaz skepticizma u kojem se najprije odgovara na pitanje što je zapravo 'skepticizam', iako se može steći dojam kako je riječ o obrani ove tradicije, jer se opisuje i značaj i smislenost skeptičke argumentacije, ili o reviziji skepticizma, jer su ponuĎene smjernice za svaku sljedeću uporabu skeptičkih argumenata. Primjereno potrazi za pojmovnom jasnoćom, odgovor na pitanje o naravi skepticizma započinje razmatranjem porijekla naziva 'skepticizam', ili preciznije, izvornog smisla naziva σκεπτικοί, smisla koji je potaknuo prve samoproglašene skeptike na izbor takve titule. S obzirom da je titula služila razgraničenju od ostalih smjerova u filozofiji, za očekivati je kako će prikaz skepticizma kojemu je izvorni smisao titule polazna točka podjednako imati oblik kritike skepticizma, razgraničenja onih značajki argumentacije koje odgovaraju odabranoj tituli (njezinom smislu i svrsi razgraničenja) od onih koji s ovom nisu u skladu. Prvi dio disertacije je preliminarna kritika skepticizma. Polazeći od naziva σκεπτικοί koji jednostavno znači 'istraživači', u preliminarnoj se kritici upravo ono što se željelo istaknuti prisvajanjem ovakve titule drži prvom posebnom karakteristikom 'skepticizma'. Naime, prije nego što ga je prisvojila tradicija koja je predmet ovoga rada, ovaj je naziv, što 2 se uostalom i čini primjerenim, opisivao sve filozofe. Iako se svi filozofi upuštaju u istraživanja i propitivanja, skeptici su prisvajanjem ove titule za svoj pristup ukazali na to kako oni, za razliku od drugih, ostaju odani istraživanju, dok za druge to istraživanje ima svoj kraj. Istaknuta privrženost istraživanju postaje jasnija ukoliko se primijeti kako na kraju argumenata kojima se skeptici služe ne pronalazimo tezu, nešto što je određeno, utemeljeno i potvrĎeno tim argumentima kao odgovor na pitanje koje je bilo predmetom rasprave. Argumenti skepticizma tako nisu resursi koji donose odgovor, ovi argumenti završavaju nanovo utvrĎenim problemom, pitanjem, ukazivanjem na nerazriješenost rasprave, daljnjim istraživanjem, a ne odgovorima. Prikaz skepticizma u ovoj disertaciji počinje ovim uvidom te time polazište ima u uvažavanju nastojanja izvorne skeptičke argumentacije, koja se očituje u opredijeljenosti za pitanje i predstavlja pomak od onog tumačenja koje ovaj pristup izjednačuje sa teorijom neznanja, odnosno negativnim dogmatizmom. Tumačenja u kojima se skepticizam izjednačuje s teorijom neznanja, odnosno u kojima je prikazan kao pristup čija argumentacija završava potvrĎenom negativnom tezom, su brojna. Pritom opisane, navodno skeptičke teze, najčešće imaju oblik negacije neke propozicije, ili preciznije, negacije kognitivnog statusa neke propozicije. Najopćenitija i najpoznatija navodno skeptička teza tako bi bila tvrdnja kako ne znamo ništa ili ne možemo ništa znati. Uzimajući u obzir privrženost (nastavku) istraživanja koju su skeptici pokušali istaknuti prisvajanjem naslova 'istraživači', prijedlog je ove disertacije kako se opisani prikazi skepticizma zapravo ne bave skepticizmom, odnosno ne bave se onim što bi bilo ispravno nazivano skepticizmom. Time disertacija ne dovodi u pitanje negacije i argumente kojima se negacija iznosi kao dio argumentacije 'istraživača', već se suprotstavlja tumačenju tih negacija kao teza. Naime, tumačenjem skeptičke negacije kao teze zanemaruje se karakteristična usmjerenost argumenata koje rabe oni koji nastavljaju istraživanje završavajući argumentaciju (ponovnim) postavljanjem pitanja. Priznavanjem usmjerenosti skeptičkih argumenata, negacija se pokazuje kao protu-teza odgovoru koji se dovodi u pitanje, ne teza kojom argumenti završavaju, pa se zanemarivanjem ove usmjerenosti zanemaruje dijalektička težnja izvornih skeptičkih argumenata, preciznije, težnja stavljanja u pitanje onog što se smatra odreĎenim. Svaka interpretacija skepticizma koja ovaj pristup opisuje kao priklanjanje negaciji, ukratko, ne uzima u obzir složenost 'nastavljanja pitanja' te razmatra skepticizam u nepotpunoj formi. Uzimajući u obzir namjeru nastavljanja istraživanja te složenost postavljanja pitanja nečemu, prijedlog je ove disertacije kako negaciju koja je dijelom skeptičke argumentacije ne bismo trebali promatrati kao odvojenu od afirmacije kojoj se 3 suprotstavlja, odnosno argumente skeptika razmatrati odvojeno od argumenata njihovih protivnika. Pošto tumačenja koja skepticizam izjednačuju s teorijom neznanja takoĎer rabe naziv 'skepticizam' za ono što opisuju, u svrhu postizanja pojmovne jasnoće u ovoj disertaciji će se za takve opise rabiti naziv 'fantomski skepticizam'. Naime, ovaj naziv čini se primjerenim jer sažima nekoliko značajki takva navodnog skepticizma. Skeptik koji potvrĎuje negativnu tezu, najčešće je iluzija, privid, odnosno ne postoji, osim u mišljenju filozofa koji ga priziva u raspravu, onog filozofa koji najprije iznosi 'što bi skeptik imao za reći', ne bi li potom njegove tvrdnje opovrgnuo. Svakako, postojali su (i postoje) i filozofi koji su zagovarali i zastupali ovakav fantomski skepticizam, meĎutim, njihova argumentacija, iako oblikom oponaša argumente skepticizma, te se čini skeptičkom, u suštini nije ono za što se izdaje. Utoliko, fantomski je skeptik ili privid ili se prijetvorno prikazuje kao nešto što zapravo nije. Kako bi se što jasnije razgraničilo ono što ispravno možemo nazivati skepticizmom od onoga što ovaj naslov ne zavrjeĎuje, u ovoj disertaciji se pristupe koji su vjerodostojni, uistinu onakvi kakvima se čine, koji odgovaraju izvornom naumu uporabe naziva 'istraživači', opisuje pod nazivom 'autentični skepticizam'. Prikaz skepticizma u ovoj disertaciji je prikaz složenosti onog pristupa koji nastavlja istraživanje. U ovakvom prikazu skepticizma, teorije neznanja i svako razmatranje skepticizma
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