DOCSLIB.ORG

Betwixt a False Reason and None at All ______Pyrrhonian Lessons on Common Sense and Natural Commitments

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Betwixt a False Reason and None at All ______Pyrrhonian Lessons on Common Sense and Natural Commitments View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to COREyou by provided by Sydney eScholarship Betwixt a false reason and none at all __________________________________________ Pyrrhonian lessons on common sense and natural commitments Shane G. Waugh Doctor of Philosophy Thesis The University of Sydney 2008 Page 1 Acknowledgements 4 Abstract 5 Preface 7 Hume’s insight 7 Preliminary definitions 8 Why we ought to care about commonsensical scepticism? 12 Common Sense Naturalism and dialogue with scepticism 15 Reading Sextus: the apraxia challenge and debate over dogmata 17 Pyrrhonism and common sense: against Broughton 27 i) Sextus’ perception of his reader 28 ii) Sextus’ perception of his own project regarding common sense 34 a) Sextus’ explicit statements on common sense 34 b) Sextus’ account of inquiry 38 iii) The commonsensical response to philosophical theory 42 The Pyrrhonian project 47 Outline of the chapters 50 Chapter 1. Common Sense Naturalism 53 Outline 53 An observation and a distinction 54 Naturalism in CSN 63 i) The nature of naturalism 63 ii) Interlude: an objection concerning reflection 66 Arguments for the naturalism of CSN 68 i) Argument 1: Hume and Reid (and Sextus) on natural justification and default entitlement 70 ii) Argument 2: Wittgenstein and Strawson on transcendental arguments 82 Naturalism and commonsensical commitment in CSN: two views 86 i) Hume and Sextus: common sense as scientific nature 87 ii) Strawson: nature as the presupposition of reason 90 iii) Reid: tensions over nature and common sense 92 a) Outline of the basic points of Reid’s view 92 b) Reid’s primary ‘foundationalist’ view 94 c) Reid’s secondary ‘proto-transcendentalist’ view 97 Nature and common sense: convergence, divergence and debate 103 Summary of CSN and its problems 105 Chapter 2. Common sense and radical Pyrrhonian scepticism 109 Outline 109 An outline of Pyrrhonism 112 i) Problematic inquiry 112 ii) Pyrrhonism and radical but non-general scepticism 116 iii) Pyrrhonism and everyday practice 124 The precariousness of problematic and radical inquiries 126 i) Inquiry and levels of scrutiny 126 Page 2 ii) Engaging in problematic inquiry 131 iii) Unserious scepticism and problematic inquiry 133 iv) Eliminable defeators and scepticism 137 v) Interlude: an objection from Williams 141 Pyrrhonian scepticism and reflection 144 i) Reflection and levels of scrutiny 144 ii) Another objection from Williams, and a partial response 148 iii) Levels of scrutiny and norms of inquiry 151 iv) Further norms: the judgement of experts 155 v) Further norms: memory and scepticism 158 Implications of Pyrrhonism thus understood 159 i) The force of Pyrrhonism and a challenge for reason 159 ii) Irreducible instability 161 iii) Conclusion: the challenge of Pyrrhonism 163 Chapter 3. Hume’s Title Principle and perspectivist scepticism 165 Outline 165 Hume’s ‘Title Principle’ and natural justification 167 i) The Title Principle 167 ii) Propensity to believe in accord with our telos 173 iii) Interlude: a Pyrrhonian assessment of out epistemic situation 180 iv) Hume’s possible confusion: Psychology and Reason 181 Scepticism and epistemic merit 182 Unstable beliefs, common sense and mood 185 Mood and perspectivism 190 i) Clarifying mood 190 ii) Mood and common sense 193 iii) Another brief comment on Williams’ objection to Pyrrhonism 195 Common sense, norms and natural commitment 196 i) Common sense and mood 196 ii) Towards an account of common sense 198 iii) Advantages of taking the content of common sense to be norms 204 iv) ‘Fictional’ grounds 207 v) Mood and perspectivism 209 vi) Mood and rational unity 212 Conclusion: the inevitability of Pyrrhonian scepticism 214 i) Natural commitments 214 ii) A Pyrrhonian response to the Pyrrhonian dilemma 215 iii) Endemic Pyrrhonian scepticism 216 References 219 Page 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thanks and praise must first go to God, as in all things, for without His help and guidance nothing would be possible. Thanks must also go to my wife Eleni. Only those who have written a thesis and know me could understand the burdens that come along with being married to an academic. Without her encouragement and support I would never have finished. I must also thank my Supervisor, David Macarthur, for not letting me get away with bad philosophy. I have learnt much from him about how philosophy ought to be done and his unfailingly encouraging, if critical, comments were crucial to me producing anything of value. I must also thank my parents for their continual and unhesitating support for the project, my sister for her many hours of minding the children so that I could write something and my brother for his many insightful suggestions. Finally, thanks go to those friends who have given me their kind understanding and patience by not asking me how the thesis was going. Page 4 ABSTRACT Betwixt a false reason and none at all This dissertation argues that if we are to respect the common sense perspective then Pyrrhonian scepticism can be neither avoided nor defeated. While Pyrrhonian scepticism can be diagnosed it cannot be cured, at least, so long as we take a non- revisionary attitude towards common sense. The fundamental reason for this is that Pyrrhonian scepticism derives from the application of norms of inquiry that constitute part of the content of common sense in unusual but not fanciful or impossible situations. Implicit in this dissertation is a distinction between Cartesian and Pyrrhonian scepticisms, and for present purposes these two scepticisms can be distinguished on two criteria. First, unlike Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism is not global in its doubts. It is not global because it does not attempt to question our entitlement to entire domains of commitment, for instance commitments to anything beyond the content of our perceptions, all at once. Nor does Pyrrhonism attempt to deny the possibility of knowledge. Rather, Pyrrhonian scepticism questions our entitlement to one commitment at a time and is hence iterative rather than global. This leads to the second far more interesting criterion in that unlike its Cartesian cousin Pyrrhonian scepticism claims not to be revisionary of the common sense perspective. In fact Pyrrhonian scepticism represents itself as the common sense perspective under special conditions. On this reading Pyrrhonian scepticism is a form of common sense scepticism. The claim that Pyrrhonian scepticism is commonsensical calls for a clarification of in what exactly the common sense perspective consists, and its relationship to scepticism. Of particular interest in this regard is a position that has been called Common Sense Naturalism (CSN). CSN consists, in part, in three important claims. First, that we are constrained, both logically and psychologically, to take ourselves to have an entitlement to common sense. Second, that because we are thus constrained, we have an entitlement to those commitments that constitute the content of common sense. Third, that the content of common sense is inherently anti-sceptical. These three claims jointly warrant Page 5 the conclusion that appeals to commitments to which we are commonsensically entitled can feature prominently in refutations of scepticism. I argue that CSN is incorrect in that even if we have an entitlement to our common sense commitments we have an equally valid entitlement to Pyrrhonian scepticism, as Pyrrhonian scepticism can be derived from the common sense perspective itself. I also argue that CSN is correct but misleading in suggesting that we are constrained, both logically and psychologically, to take ourselves to have an entitlement to the content of common sense. CSN is correct in that we are always forced to take ourselves to be entitled to some commonsensical commitments but overlooks the fact that the content of these commitments varies, becoming at times amenable to Pyrrhonian scepticism. In fact what we take to be commonsensical is sensitive to our mood at the time. This can be used to explain that feature of the phenomenology of scepticism according to which Pyrrhonian scepticism is a recurrent but not a constant problem. Presenting these arguments requires both that the nature of CSN be clarified (chapter 1), that the relationship between common sense and Pyrrhonian scepticism be established (Chapter 2). Finally, we must also provide an account of the content of common sense be given (Chapter 3) which provides warrant for continued inquisitive activities even after the emergence of Pyrrhonian scepticism from within common sense. Page 6 PREFACE Outlining the Pyrrhonian project Hume’s insight As the title of this dissertation suggests, what is offered here are several lessons that can be drawn from the tradition of Pyrrhonian scepticism on the topics of common sense and our natural commitments. In one sense these lessons could be taken separately, as each deals with a different aspect of the nature of and relationships between common sense and natural commitment. However, there is also a broader strategy at work directed towards an overall point. This overall conclusion is that respecting common sense presents us with a dilemma, specifically, a dilemma regarding our entitlement to that which we take to be commonsensical. In fact respecting common sense eventually leads us to that some conclusion Hume found himself drawing when he wrote in the Treatise of Human Nature that “[w]e have therefore no choice left, but betwixt a false reason and none at all”. The guiding principle of this dissertation is that Hume was on to something. The primary claim of this dissertation is that taking ourselves to have an entitlement to certain common sense ideas and an entitlement to respect certain common sense norms can lead us, seemingly inevitably, to the denial that we have any such entitlement. This leads to the secondary claim that the anti-sceptical adherent of common sense faces a dilemma. This dilemma runs as follows. Either we have an entitlement to common sense or we do not.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU Monografie Fundacji Na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej
    HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU monografie fundacji na rzecz nauki polskiej rada wydawnicza prof. Tomasz Kizwalter, prof. Janusz Sławiński, prof. Antoni Ziemba, prof. Marek Ziółkowski, prof. Szymon Wróbel fundacja na rzecz nauki polskiej Renata Ziemińska HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU W POSZUKIWANIU SPÓJNOŚCI toruń 2013 Wydanie książki subwencjonowane przez Fundację na rzecz Nauki Polskiej w ramach programu Monografie FNP Redaktor tomu Anna Mądry Korekty Ewelina Gajewska Projekt okładki i obwoluty Barbara Kaczmarek Printed in Poland © Copyright by Renata Ziemińska and Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika Toruń 2013 ISBN 978-83-231-2949-3 WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU MIKOŁAJA KOPERNIKA Redakcja: ul. Gagarina 5, 87-100 Toruń tel. +48 56 611 42 95, fax +48 56 611 47 05 e-mail: [email protected] Dystrybucja: ul. Reja 25, 87-100 Toruń tel./fax: +48 56 611 42 38, e-mail: [email protected] www.wydawnictwoumk.pl Wydanie pierwsze Druk i oprawa: Abedik Sp. z o.o. ul. Glinki 84, 85-861 Bydgoszcz Spis treści wstęp ......................................................................................................... 9 część i. pojęcie i rodzaje sceptycyzmu rozdział 1. genealogia terminu „sceptycyzm” ........................... 15 rozdział 2. ewolucja pojęcia sceptycyzmu .................................. 21 Starożytny sceptycyzm jako zawieszenie sądów pretendujących do prawdy .......................................................................................... 21 Średniowieczny sceptycyzm jako uznanie słabości ludzkich sądów wobec Bożej wszechmocy
    [Show full text]
  • Agrippa's Trilemma: Scepticism and Contemporary Epistemology
    This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights and duplication or sale of all or part is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for research, private study, criticism/review or educational purposes. Electronic or print copies are for your own personal, non- commercial use and shall not be passed to any other individual. No quotation may be published without proper acknowledgement. For any other use, or to quote extensively from the work, permission must be obtained from the copyright holder/s. Agrippa's trilemma: scepticism and contemporary epistemology Aaran Steven Burns PhD Philosophy March 2020 Keele University Word Count: 74970 1 Acknowledgements I must at least try (and fail) to express the deserved amount of gratitude by giving thanks to those who have aided me over the last four years – and perhaps even the last 7. My mother and grandmother have given constant support, particularly over the last year, allowing me to stay with them while finishing things up. My partner, Kathryn Hayward has offered more support than I likely deserved and shown more patience than I could reasonably expect, not to mention the more direct efforts she made in reading drafts of my work. In the early stages of my research I had a number of email exchanges with both Richard Fumerton and Laurence BonJour, who were both immeasurably helpful in helping me to understand these issues more clearly. BonJour in particular has left an almost embarrassingly large mark on my work. Although our email exchange was short, the amount which I gained was vast, and only multiplied from the subsequent reading of his work.
    [Show full text]
  • An Asymmetrical Justification of Deduction: Ending the Sceptical.Debate
    AN ASYMMETRICAL JUSTIFICATION OF DEDUCTION: ENDING THE SCEPTICAL.DEBATE by PATRICK EDWARDS BA.(Hon), The University of British Columbia, 2005 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Philosophy) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April 2007 © Patrick Edwards, 2007 Abstract The purpose of this paper is to explore the possibility of answering the sceptic's demand for a non-dogmatic beliefs. In order to do justice to the sceptic's demand, we will first take time to carefully develop the strongest sceptical position possible. This will be done by considering a selection of sceptical positions dating from ancient Greece, through the early modern period, to the twentieth-century. We will use the law of non-contradiction both to lend structure to this historical taxonomy, and to act as a measure of sceptical rigour. It will be argued that Arcesilaus's scepticism marks the closest approximation of the sceptical ideal, yet, he, too, remains dogmatic to some extent. The twentieth-century discussion will focus on Susan Haack's investigation into the justification of deduction. It will be argued that her treatment of the justifications of deduction and induction as symmetrical is misguided: there is an asymmetry between the two justifications. Next, it will be shown that this asymmetry results from the permissibility of a circular justification of deduction. We will examine the implications of such a circular justification and how they relate to the sceptical debate. Ultimately, it will be shown that the sceptic's demand for justification without dogmatic beliefs is itself dogmatic and circular.
    [Show full text]
  • How Many Wittgensteins?
    How many David G. Wittgensteins? Stern 1. Debates in Wittgenstein scholarship The paper maps out and responds to some of the main areas of disagreement over the nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy: (1) Between defenders of a “two Wittgensteins” reading (which draws a sharp distinction between early and late Wittgenstein) and the opposing “one Wittgenstein” interpretation. (2) Among “two-Wittgensteins” interpreters as to when the later philoso- phy emerged, and over the central difference between early and late Witt- genstein. (3) Between those who hold that Wittgenstein opposes only past philosophy in order to do philosophy better and those who hold that Wittgenstein aimed to bring an end to philosophy and teach us to get by without a replacement. I begin by summarizing and responding to these debates over the nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his philosophical methods. My reply turns on the point that each of these debates depends on some deeply un-Wittgen- steinian, and quite mistaken, assumptions. Why should we have to argue over whether there is “something in common to all that we call” (PI § 65) Wittgenstein’s philosophy (early, late, or all of it)? As there are both continu- ities and discontinuities in Wittgenstein’s thought, we would be better off acknowledging that his writings “are related to one another in many differ- ent ways” (PI § 65) and turning to the more productive task of investigating A. Pichler, S. Säätelä (eds.), Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and his Works, pp. 205–229, Frankfurt a.M.: ontos verlag 2006, © ontos verlag, David G. Stern. |205 those relations in greater detail.
    [Show full text]
  • The Elusive Third Way: the Pyrrhonian Illumination In
    The Elusive Third Way: The Pyrrhonian Illumination In Wittgenstein’s On Certainty Roger Eichorn University of Chicago [email protected] Draft: January 3, 2012 ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that, as with the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, Wittgenstein’s response to skepticism in On Certainty involves the attempt to free us from philosophy itself and is therefore not a philosophical position, strictly speaking, but is best understood as a therapeutic metaphilosophy designed to bring into view the relationship between our everyday epistemic practices and those of philosophy such that we simultaneously come to recognize (a) the pragmatic-transcendental ‘self-standingness’ of the everyday, and (b) its philosophico–epistemic groundlessness. The result of this ‘illumination’ of the everyday is therapeutic in the sense that it is intended to transform our meta-doxastic attitude by purifying it of dogmatism. KEYWORDS: Wittgenstein; skepticism; Pyrrhonism; Sextus Empiricus; ancient skepticism “The Elusive Third Way” / 2 The difficulty of philosophy not the intellectual difficulty of the sciences, but the difficulty of a change of attitude... Work on philosophy is... actually more of a kind of work on oneself. On one’s own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one demands of them.) – Wittgenstein, “Philosophy” (§86 of The Big Typescript) 1. Introduction Commentators on Wittgenstein all agree that he had something to say about philosophical skepticism. Beyond that, one finds in the literature precious little—if any—common ground regarding Wittgenstein’s attitude toward, or the nature of his response to, skeptical threats to knowledge. In the collection of notes that his literary executors published under the title On Certainty (henceforth: OC), it is clear that Wittgenstein is concerned, at least as a jumping-off point, to address G.E.
    [Show full text]
  • Unmitigated Skepticism: the Nature and Scope of Pyrrhonism
    UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Unmitigated Skepticism: The Nature and Scope of Pyrrhonism Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6fk1n2b1 Author Wong, Andrew David Publication Date 2017 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Unmitigated Skepticism: The Nature and Scope of Pyrrhonism A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by Andrew David Wong Committee in charge: Professor Monte Johnson, Chair Professor Casey Perin, Co-Chair Professor Samuel Rickless Professor Donald Rutherford Professor Edward Watts 2017 © Andrew David Wong, 2017 All rights reserved. The Dissertation of Andrew David Wong is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: Co-Chair Chair University of California, San Diego 2017 iii DEDICATION To my mother and father iv EPIGRAPH By way of preface let us say that on none of the matters to be discussed do we affirm that things certainly are just as we say they are: rather, wereport descriptively on each item according to how it appears to us at the time. Sextus Empiricus v TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page ................................... iii Dedication ..................................... iv Epigraph ...................................... v Table of Contents ................................. viii List of Abbreviations ...............................
    [Show full text]
  • Pyrrhonian Skepticism
    Pyrrhonian Skepticism Walter Sinnot-Armstrong, Editor OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Pyrrhonian Skepticism This page intentionally left blank Pyrrhonian Skepticism EDITED BY Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 1 2004 1 Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Sa˜o Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto Copyright # 2004 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Excerpt from ‘‘Little Gidding’’ in FOUR QUARTETS, # 1942 by T. S. Eliot and renewed 1970 by Esme Valerie Eliot, reprinted by permission of Harcourt, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pyrrhonian skepticism / edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-516972-7 1. Skepticism. 2. Skeptics (Greek philosophy) I. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 1955– B837.P97 2004 149´.73—dc21 2003056362 987654321 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper Contents Contributors vii Introduction to Pyrrhonian Skepticism Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 3 PART I 1. Historical Reflections on Classical Pyrrhonism and Neo-Pyrrhonism Gisela Striker 13 2. Cartesian Skeptics Janet Broughton 25 3. Berkeley, Pyrrhonism, and the Theaetetus Kenneth P. Winkler 40 4. ‘‘A Small Tincture of Pyrrhonism’’: Skepticism and Naturalism in Hume’s Science of Man Don Garrett 68 5.
    [Show full text]
  • Can an Ancient Greek Skeptic Be
    HOW TO BE A PYRRHONIST What was it like to be a practitioner of Pyrrhonist skepticism? This important volume brings together for the first time a selection of Richard Bett’s essays on ancient Pyrrhonism, allowing readers a better understanding of the key aspects of this school of thought. The volume examines Pyrrhonism’s manner of self-presentation, including its methods of writing, its desire to show how special it is, and its use of humor; it considers Pyrrhonism’s argumentative procedures regarding specific topics, such as signs, space, or the Modes; and it explores what it meant in practice to live as a Pyrrhonist, including the kind of ethical outlook which Pyrrhonism might allow and, in general, the character of a skeptical life – and how far these might strike us as feasible or desirable. It also shows how Pyrrhonism often raises questions that matter to us today, both in our everyday lives and in our philosophical reflection. is Professor and Chair of Philosophy at the Johns Hopkins University. His translations of works by Sextus Empiricus include Against the Logicians (Cambridge, ) and Against the Physicists (Cambridge, ), and he is also the editor of The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism (Cambridge, ). HOW TO BE A PYRRHONIST The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Skepticism RICHARD BETT The Johns Hopkins University University Printing House, Cambridge , United Kingdom One Liberty Plaza, th Floor, New York, , USA Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, , Australia –, rd Floor, Plot , Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – , India Anson Road, #–/, Singapore Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.
    [Show full text]
  • Sképsis: Revista De Filosofia ISSN 1981-4534 Vol. XI, N. 21, 2020, P
    Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia ISSN 1981-4534 Vol. XI, N. 21, 2020, p. 188-209 SEXTUS EMPIRICUS ON ISOSTHENEIA AND EPOCHÊ: A DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL Roger E. Eichorn Chicago, IL, USA Email: [email protected] Our problem with arguments in traditional epistemology is to get past their veneer of implausibility in order to get ourselves into a position to diagnose. We have to “intricate” ourselves before we extricate ourselves. Thompson Clarke, The Nature of Traditional Epistemology 1 The Nature of Isostheneia and Epochê: A Two-Sided Debate? In “The Modes in Sextus: Theory and Practice,” a paper written specially for his recent collection How to Be a Pyrrhonist (2019), Richard Bett focuses on Sextus Empiricus’s presentation and use of the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus and the Five Modes of Agrippa.1 The Modes are “standardized forms of argument designed to induce suspension of judgment” (108).2 Bett argues that both sets of modes are in tension with what I will refer to as ‘the Psychological Reading’ of Sextan isostheneia (equipollence) and epochê (suspension of judgment). In the contemporary secondary literature on Sextus, the Psychological Reading is presented as the standard interpretation in opposition to the revisionist ‘Rational Reading.’3 The difficulty of reconciling the Modes with the Psychological Reading is problematic for those who, like Bett, find the Rational Reading to be incompatible with Sextus’s undogmatic, non-doctrinal brand of skepticism.4 Bett describes the Psychological–Rational distinction this way: How are we to understand Sextus’ statement that the opposing arguments and impressions assembled by the skeptic have isostheneia, “equal 1 In Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH), the Ten Modes are presented at PH 1.35–163 and the Five Modes at PH 1.164–77.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cambridge Companion to QUINE
    P1: FCH/FFX P2: FCH/FFX QC: FCH/FFX T1: FCH CB633-FM CB633-Gibson-v1 December 18, 2003 15:56 The Cambridge Companion to QUINE Edited by Roger F. Gibson Jr. Washington University, St. Louis v P1: FCH/FFX P2: FCH/FFX QC: FCH/FFX T1: FCH CB633-FM CB633-Gibson-v1 December 18, 2003 15:56 published by the press syndicate of the university of cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom cambridge university press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru,UK 40 West 20th Street, New York, ny 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, vic 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcon´ 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org c Cambridge University Press 2004 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2004 Printed in the United States of America Typeface Trump Medieval 10/13 pt. System LATEX 2ε [tb] A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data The Cambridge companion to Quine / edited by Roger F. Gibson, Jr. p. cm. – (Cambridge companions to philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-521-63056-8 – isbn 0-521-63949-2 (pbk.) 1. Quine, W. V. (Willard Van Orman) I. Gibson, Roger F. II. Series. b945.q54c36 2004 191 – dc21 2003055313 isbn 0 521 63056 8 hardback isbn 0 521 63949 2 paperback vi P1: FCH/FFX P2: FCH/FFX QC: FCH/FFX T1: FCH CB633-FM CB633-Gibson-v1 December 18, 2003 15:56 contents List of Contributors page xi Abbreviations xv Willard Van Orman Quine 1 roger f.
    [Show full text]
  • Neo-Pyrrhonism Markus Lammenranta
    This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Bloomsbury Academic in Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, ed. by D. Machuca & B. Reed, on 14-12-2017, available online: http://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/skepticism-from-antiquity-to-the-present-9781472514363/. Neo-Pyrrhonism Markus Lammenranta 1. Introduction Classical Pyrrhonian skepticism had a practical side: the skeptics tried to attain tranquility by suspending beliefs. David Hume (1975: 160) famously attacks this form of skepticism thus: (1) life without beliefs is psychologically impossible, and (2) even if it were possible, life would be very short because intentional action is not possible without beliefs. Assuming Hume is right, it is no surprise that there have not been many Pyrrhonian skeptics. It is also a common interpretation that classical Pyrrhonism is based on the equal plausibility of conflicting or contrary propositions. When we find such sets of propositions, it is psychologically impossible for us to believe one of them rather than the other, and we are forced to suspend belief. However, if Hume is right, there cannot be many such conflicts, and therefore classical Pyrrhonism does not offer a serious skeptical challenge to our beliefs. This seems to be a widespread diagnosis of classical Pyrrhonism among contemporary epistemologists. It explains why they have been more interested in Cartesian skepticism, which appears to raise more interesting skeptical problems. However, there are a few philosophers who think that we should take Pyrrhonism more seriously, and that it should even be accepted. When it is properly understood, we can see that there have even been actual and, indeed, very influential Pyrrhonian skeptics such as Michel de Montaigne, Hume himself, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and, among contemporary philosophers, Robert Fogelin and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.
    [Show full text]
  • Ancient Skepticism: Overview Diego E
    Philosophy Compass 6/4 (2011): 234–245, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00385.x Ancient Skepticism: Overview Diego E. Machuca* Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientı´ficas y Te´cnicas Abstract Scholarship on ancient skepticism has witnessed a remarkable renaissance in the last three decades. Specialists in ancient philosophy have explored the complex history of the Greco-Roman skeptical traditions and discussed difficult philological and exegetical issues. But they have also assessed the philosophical significance of the various ancient skeptical outlooks. In this first paper, I provide a general presentation of this area of study, while in the two subsequent articles I will focus on some of the topics that have been the object of much attention in the recent literature on ancient skep- ticism. 1. General Presentation Nowadays, hardly anyone familiar with the extant fragments and works of the ancient skeptics and with other sources of information about their thought, such as reports and summaries, would question the philosophical import of the different strands of ancient skepticism. However, this was not always the case, since until quite recently most scholars of ancient philosophy undervalued the Greco-Roman skeptical traditions.1 This tendency began to recede in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in line with a general reevaluation of the philosophy of the Hellenistic and Imperial periods. Not only has there been, as in the Renaissance, a strong revival of interest in ancient skepticism, but also the historical accu- racy and the interpretive and analytic insight of scholarly studies have been, in general terms, superior to those of previous work.
    [Show full text]