CEU eTD Collection
UNDERSTANDING PRIME MINISTERS’ PERFORMANCE IN IN PERFORMANCE MINISTERS’ PRIME UNDERSTANDING András Bozóki, Supervisor In partialIn fulfilment ofrequirements the for the degree of Carsten Schneider, Central European University CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE EUROPE EASTERN AND CENTRAL John Lea Sgier, Central European University Central European University Central European Department ofPolitical Science “MINDSET MATTERS” MATTERS” “MINDSET Higley, University ofAustin, Texas DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Budapest, Hungary Supervisor Bojana Kocijan Submitted to May By , Central European University
2014 y panel
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CEU eTD Collection May Bojana Kocijan publi person noted. unless otherwise and/or written previously materials no contains thesis This institutions. other degreesinany other accepted forany materials contains work no I hereby this that declare
2014
Statement
shed by another another by shed CEU eTD Collection
With Love andGratitude To MyTo Family
CEU eTD Collection who performed poorly. leaders office in keep frequently and well perform who leaders sanction Europeans Eastern why study The prospects. contextua that electoral suggests ministers’ their increase Prime always asymmetrical. not often did performance very programmatic but better suggests literature as symmetrical (programmatic always policymaking not and decision conduct their the of relatio the that demonstrates also it performance) in outcomes the position exploring ministers’ to performance) prime of aspects and exploring populists deliver study and the While framework as welfare. democratic citizens’ erode the that characterized policies violate ineffective to ministers likely more are Prime rhetoric populist corruption. in engaged and politics of personalization democratic for manifested populi democratized as into governance. Oncesettings,oldvalues transmitted the required norms from different values by characterized was which communism, in to continue values and norms old where settings democratized newly in relevant especially are shows, study the mindsets, Leaders’ democracy. under important appear and past the from over carry values contextual variables and cultural demographic finds studyoutperform the performance, programmatic ministers’ prime to reference In Latviarates countries. in thaninother Latvian while governance, democratic in best perform ministers prime Estonian and Polish reforms. structural and transitions of complexity the to relates effective than democratic more are they That EU. the i engaging and membership EU valuing politicians pro largely are They policymaking. social policy and economic or integration, EU framework in outcomes democratic the erode severely nor improve greatly neither They welfare. moderately politicians average reforms to committed moderately generally and institutions democratic of respectful are ministers prime weak CEE thesis. formally culture negative the their despite that in strong demonstrates study as perceived are The ministers prime (CEE) Europe Eastern and Central most powers, Constitutional actors. policymaking main integration, the (EU) Union as Policy European for criteria institutions. as set democratic outcomes for in respect concomitant by outcomes making policy social and effective economic delivering survey requires expert governance the an using on assesses based collection governance study democratic data The in original ministers welfare. prime European citizens’ Eastern improves 33 of that performance governance effective and study conduct This perform. leaders how in plays accounts largely it demonstrates and matters culture mindset that argues role the about speculated only hitherto literature has The performance. leadership in culture political of role the explores dissertation This Abstract
reference to their policymaking abilities. Findings of the study only partially confirm confirm partially only study the of Findings abilities. policymaking their to reference
prime ministers perform worst, which is in line with generally higher corruption higher generally with line in is which worst, perform ministers prime lec peet eeomns CE rm mnses ee oilzd during socialized were ministers prime CEE developments. present fluence l factors surrounding elections, rather than past record in office, explains explains office, in record past than rather elections, surrounding factors l
sessing performance requires establishing that prime ministers are ministers prime that establishing requires performance sessing
aibe. codn t path to According variables. . rm mnses promne n democratic in performance ministers’ Prime s. nship between different types of performance is is performance of types different between nship n activities that bring their countries closer to to closer countries their bring that activities n
for prime ministers’ integrity of of integrity ministers’ prime for shifts the research focus from from focus research the shifts - aig el (procedural realm making - eedn tere, old theories, dependent
that improve citizens’ citizens’ improve that - European European sm, CEU eTD Collection I full bear and my for their sister unconditional love grateful for taught all she all she me for for and done me. has Imostly Because my am to indebted parents always amI but project, thisof completion witnessthe to longer live not couldmothermy regret deeplyI boundariesthe of law, resulting in irreparable social and political injustices. was it that furtherme convinced and in when tied nicely nights has plot The solitary writing. with manydone was I during after right sleep me to impossible accompanied “Karadyi” series drama TV Turkish The many “ Kristina studies. my of year final the in Budapest privately we way when studies, doctoralparted in enroll to encouragement his for Kocijan Jerko to indebted am I HellenSullivanand Looney I my am to thankful and mates friends flat SalmaIorgu,Irina and expedited submission of the final manuscript. O’Riordan, Helen Sullivan Coch Fiona to grateful especially am I Czech. in Hudáčková Farkasvölgyi Szabolcs s the translatedwho followingindividuals the of generoushelp a with wavesurvey third a launch to able was I Fund inBratislava without which I not could engage and complete my studies. doctoral Eur Central bysupport financial and opportunity research the acknowledge I populism. on project joint a in produced dataset use me letting for Hawkins to Medzihorsk gratitude my extend I of Texas. in helpful extremely n project and for contributing its original to arguments during the for research semester I at Universitythe spent Higley was final John on to grateful Carsten feedback am I comprehensive manuscript. methodology.the providing of structure in and instrumental was design Lea and research suggestions methodological thesis’ on feedback provide crucial Schneider Carsten and Sgier Lea appreciate. most I visible, clearly not was tunnel” the of end dissertation.supportencouragement, “thebecamedoctoral whenHis and ituntil times especiallya at idea my Bozóki, András to transformation grateful the witnessed foremost who friend, am and supervisor I leadership. political navigate of me minefield helped and scientific journey the doctoral my through in part took who everyone to gratitude deep my extend I Acknowledgments urvey questionnaire; Ardi Priks in Estonian, Inga Popovaite in Lithuanian, Martins Sijats in Latvian, in Sijats Martins Lithuanian, in Popovaite Inga Estonian, in Priks Ardi questionnaire;urvey coffee absences” that extended for months as Iwas reaching thesis completion.
responsibility for all errors and omissions I inadvertently made what in follows. . gety prcae nt Slts redhp n hsiaiy hogot ay rp to trips many throughout hospitality and friendship Salát’s Anita appreciate greatly I s. ý
and Oana Lup for providing expertise regarding specific aspects of the thesis. I thank Kirk Kirk thank I thesis. the of aspects specific regarding expertise providing for Lup Oana and n ugra, lkada i i Pls, ae Kra i Soa ad Silvia and Slovak in Kurian Matej Polish, in Lis Aleksandra Hungarian, in
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Looney Looney andSean who proofread dissertation’s chapters at short notice - áo Tóka Gábor Looney for making many years spent in beautiful Budapest fun and exciting.andBudapest beautifulfun in spent years makingmany for Looney mindset mattersmindset , support and understanding, it is to them I this dedicate thesis. Drte Bhe Lvne Littvay, Levente Bohle, Dorothee , , and that corruption among elites can easily happen within happen easily can amongcorruptionelites that and , opean University in Budapest and InternationalVisegrand Budapest in Universityopean
Kopričanec
of this project from when it was only a vague a only was it when from project this of
Rusu, Raluca Ami Ashley Pop, Moore, Sean rane, Ashley Moore, Alessia Johns, David Johns, Alessia Moore, Ashley rane, , my friend and neighbor excused my too too my excused neighbor and friend my , umerous and timely interventions in my in interventions timely and umerous
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Juraj , á d d
CEU eTD Collection EXPERT AND SURVEYS EXPERT TERMS, RANKINGS MINISTERIAL PRIME 2: CHAPTER UNDERSTANDING 1: CHAPTER PRIME PERFORMANCE MINISTERS’ INT ListFigures of List ofTables Acknowledgements Contents of Table 1.3 Explainingprime ministers’ programmaticperformance 1.2 Assessingminis prime 1.1 Prime ministers’ ability toinfluence decis 2.6 Limitations2.6 assessing to prime ministers 2. 2.4 Qualityexpe of 2.3 The 2.2 Expert 2.1. The setting importanceof institutional for assessin RODUCTION 1.3.4 Institution1.3.4 exp 1.3.3 Contextual Leader1.3.2 1.3.1 Cultural exp 1.2.5 Prime ministers’ electo 1.2.4 Categorization of prime ministers’ progra 1.2.3 Prime ministers’ programmati 1.2.2 Types minist ofprime 1.2.1 Establishing criteria for prime minis 1.1.2 Power 1.1.1 Process 5 Other dataresources 2.1.1 Case selection 1.3.1.2 Executive Personalization 1.3.1.1 survey questionnaire
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CEU eTD Collection Appendices List ofreferences CONCLUSION BETTER FOR MINISTERS PRIME REWARD PROGRAMMATIC PERFORMANCE? EUROPEANS EAST DO 6: CHAPTER
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CEU eTD Collection Table 4.11 Table 4.10 Table 4.9 by(WR) BTI 4.8 Table Table 4.7 performance 4.6 Table Table 4 Table Table 4.3 Institutions (SDI) ministers’ Prime 4.2 Table Table 4.1 Table individual 3.6Powerprime ministers of IndexTableministers’ 3.5 ofprimepowers Table 3.4Types ofintra Table 3.3 Tableconcentration 3.2Power inprime ministers Table 3.1Strength of Table ofvariables and 2.8Matrix data sources Ta InterclTable 2.6 IIIII)responseI, (ES and 2.5 Table III)Table 2.4 Third wave expertsurvey (ES TableII)survey 2.3 Second wave (ES expert Table 2.2 First expert Table 2.1 Prime ministerial terms and term durations Tables of List ble 2.7
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CEU eTD Collection Figure 5.3 g 5.2 Figure g 5.1 Figure Figure Figure Figure 1.1 Figures of List Table 6. Table 6.1 Table regression 5.14Multiple output Table 5.13The political Table ofleaving 5.12Circumstances office Table 5.11 cabinetTable 5.10Theof parties number Table 5.9 Table 5.8 Table 5.7 governance 5.6 Table Table 5.5 governance democratic Table in performance and populism ministers’ governance prime matrix: Correlation 5.3 Table Table 5.2 Table 5.1 Table 4.14 Table 4.13 Table 4.12 overnance overnance
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CEU eTD Collection other when that in inconclusive, and mixed are research cumulative this of results the Because 64 2007: 200 Dansereau and 2007, Yammarino al et. Hunter 1988, Rice and Kenny 1991, (Simonton leadership surrounds that context the of importance the address to fail explanations institutional and personal that argued however Rose 1995, (Elgie office what in while in do cannot variance or can the leaders explains what is difference institutional that emphasized primarily was 2009 Bass and an performance ( traits office. personal in that performance argued presidents’ largely of Scholars determinants about intrigued become scholars where (US) States United the in initiated was research performance Leadership others. over variables imp the leadershipperformanceofemphasize Consequently, explanations cases. leadership isolated few very or one comparing descriptive, mostly and limited is research Weste research turn leads betterperceptions to public ofdemocracy. acco deliver to ability its and worth intrinsic democracy’s about reassured are voters however, well, perform leaders If ambitions. authoritarian with leadership groups or politicians poor of indicator an is pe apathy Political participation. political discouraging or encouraging by democracy of quality the influences indirectly leadership political Consequently, g between discriminating about perceptions voters’ the stop may voters performances, determines disappointing continuous After system. voters political a as democracy on leave they impression the and citizens democra contemporary In 1). 1987: (Blondel erased” been has else everything once remain that leaders political most national the is is what it citizens, to to bones, visible bare its to politics reduces one “If noted, Blondel ago decades few A INTRODUCTION rformances, where voters may become less willing to defend democracy by eliminating eliminating by democracy defend to willing less become may voters where rformances, rn democracies and is largely an largely is and democracies rn eerh n edrhp efrac i nt vr avne fed f td. Previous study. of field advanced very a not is performance leadership on Research - n sesn laesi promne s oty qualitative, mostly is performance leadership assessing on 5 Hrly n Bnntn 01 Hls 2012 Helms 2011, Benington and Hartley 85, Barber 1977, LasBarber 1977, ). Once leadership performance research caught the eye of European scholars, it it scholars, European of eye the caught research performance leadership Once ).
o ad a laes prevn te al s pltcl crooks”. “political as all them perceiving leaders, bad and ood s well 19 9 Msili t l 20, Haug 2009, al. et Masciulli , 69 object of political biographies. Comparative leadership Comparative biographies. political of object , Greenstein Greenstein , 1
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European politicians who value EU membership and accommodate their their accommodate and membership EU value who politicians European - making, while making, sets. In contrast, higher corruption rates in Latvia may relate to more more to relate may Latvia in rates corruption higher contrast, In sets.
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e ministers that are successful in one type are are type one in successful are that ministers e - transition economic and social restructuring.socialeconomicand transition
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that mindset matters and that and matters mindset that cial cial CEU eTD Collection electoral on programmatic ministers’ performance thesymmetryand toexplain asymmetry or performance. between types of different prime of effect the test to used also is literature voting def is performance programmatic ministers’ Prime powers. ministers’ prime of discussion a in addressed briefly is but thesis, this of interest immediate an not is performance ministers’ prime of aspect procedural The policies. and personal as on literature the from borrowed are performance cultural, ministers’ prime of effect the performance. programmatic testing ministers’ prime for on variables used contextual variables of pool a identified culture institutions. democratic of respect concomitant by policymaking social and economic integration, EU in outcomes effective deliver to abilitythe assessing for model a P develop performance. to leadership used is governance policy democratic influence on to Literature able assessment. part) large (in were ministers prime that certainty the increases it because governance democratic in performance ministers’ prime decision influence to ability real ministers’ prime decision cabinet on Literature study. this in asked questions research main the answer chronologically that literature of pieces re perform poorly. frequently and well perform who ministers prime reward sometimes only Europeans Eastern why explain scandals, political and perceptions, voters’ alternatives, suggestelectoral thesis the factors, Contextual chances. electoral their increase not do policymaking social and integration EU economy, the in performance of records good ministers’ Prime literature. previous by suggested as symmetrical not and asymmetrical is re by rewarded sometimes performa electoral only and programmatic between relationship the however, often, Most election. is success programmatic ministers’ prime that finds study democratic new the into pop on sets transmitted data once and, regime original new two by old supported is finding This governance. democratic endangers the establishment, from carryover a is that h tei i st is thesis The
ulism, including expert surveys and coding of prime ministers’ speeches. The The speeches. ministers’ prime of coding and surveys expert including ulism, ructured in the following way. In chapter one, I review four important important four review I one, chapter In way. following the in ructured rim e ministers’ performance in democratic governance is defined as as defined is governance democratic in performance ministers’ e - aig n pie iitr’ oes r hlfl n estima in helpful are powers ministers’ prime and making ined as performance in democratic governance. Economic Economic governance. democratic in performance as ined 6
L iterature on political leadership and politic and leadership political on iterature - making. This is an antecedent to assessing assessing to antecedent an is This making. , nldn te viaiiy of availability the including s, outcomes set as criteria for for criteria as set outcomes sessing the sessing he dfeet ye of types different Three - success of public of success lc toe who those elect ting nce nce al -
CEU eTD Collection variables on prime ministers’ programmatic performance. The chapter outlines levels of of levels outlines chapter The performance. programmatic ministers’ prime on variables “outstanding”,“average” and “likely populists”. variable ministers’ prime of cat discussion the are ministers make prime the possible, governance democratic of To dimensions separate in performance dimensions. four all of aggregate ex Then, reports. democratic separate the and dimensions in governance’s discussed first is data Expert policymaking. in social and performance economic as defined enta is which governance, performance democratic programmatic ministers’ Prime performance. important vetoes toachieve their policy preferences. overcome can theory, player veto with line in and, prerogatives various use can ministers prime provisions, Constitutional by them to given powers weak formally the despite how, demonstrates characteristic making decision dispersed of context the in outcomes policy to contributions ministers’ prime clarifies decision on influence direct them allowing b the shift to prerogatives personal and institutional inherent any inleadership to interested performance. study cha The methods. other over advantages their explain and surveys expert of characteristics the outline I ministers, prime CEE of number are that large a of performance the assess to attempt empirical settingsfirst the is thesis this Because governance. perfor institutional their evaluating of for and characteristics ministers prime the selecting discuss for appropriate I analysis. of unit study’s the chapter In grzd n he gop bsd n h scope the on based groups three in egorized In chapter five, the study examines the effect of cultural, demographic and contextual contextual and demographic cultural, of effect the examines study the five, chapter In In contextual, exploit to ability ministers’ prime the demonstrate I three, chapter In
hpe fu, peet n miia mpig f rm mnses programmatic ministers’ prime of mapping empirical an present I four, chapter two, I outline the case selection and the logic of using the prime ministerial term as term ministerial prime the using of logic the and selection case the outline I two, et aa s icse a a idx f eortc oenne wih is which governance, democratic of index an as discussed is data pert o olcie aies n alaetr dmcais Te chapter The democracies. parliamentary in cabinets collective to w here applicable here l fu dimensions: four ils pter also addresses the study’s limitations, which are which limitations, study’s the addresses also pter - making. This is an important research step that that step research important an is This making. 7
compared
alance of power closer to the center, thereby thereby center, the to closer power of alance
– mat iin f hi performance: their of vision impact
eortc conduct democratic o te aa sources data other to ac i democratic in mance E integration, EU , such as media media as such an - CEU eTD Collection performanceacross types different ofperformance. understand our improve can that factors at looks chapter the Alternatively, holds. literature, previous by expected as performance, ministers’ prime of types different between relationship symmetrical a whether is chapter this of focus The performance. bivariate regressions and are multiple totest thehypothesis used chapter. this in v distant more a is office in period of circumstance political A office. leaving circumstances and terms the of nature the duration, term parties, cabinet of number type, cabinet include and environment perform programmatic ministers’ prime on tested is which of effect the variables, Contextual orientation. political their and education of field their is office, assuming at which age ministers’ prime the of include performance, programmatic effect during experience the political variables, of Demographic type the communism. and experience political are previous interest ministers’ of variables prime cultural Other speeches. ministers’ prime of coding the and surveys originat that ministers prime individual in personalization executive and populism In chapter six, prime ministers’ programmatic performance is weighed against electo against weighed is performance programmatic ministers’ prime six, chapter In ariable that surrounds prime ministerial terms. Statistical analyses including ANOVA, including analyses Statistical terms. ministerial prime surrounds that ariable ne ae hs rltd o rm mnses immediate ministers’ prime to related those are ance, 8
ing about prime ministers’ variable ministers’ prime about ing etd n rm ministers’ prime on tested
e from expert expert from e ral ral CEU eTD Collection before because step, research relevant a to is This foundation established. empirically are provide powers ministers’ literatures these in offered Arguments decision influence to ability ministers’ prime of understanding decision cabinet on literature section, this In 1.1 identifie variables other while performance, programmatic ministers’ prime explaining in important most are personalization executive and populism as manifested ministers’ prime of culture political I performance. ministers’ prime in variation for account to likely variables identifies that leadership political and elites of culture minister political on literature prime the review I Finally, types. different of its between relationships understating criteria proper establishing for important is literature This performance. electoral and programmatic types; different its and performance ministers’ explain that variables for variat looking and performance assessing to step research preceding a is decision influence to ability real ministers’ prime estimating because first, reviewed are Literatu questions. research answer explaining ministers’ variation performance. inprime of culture on political Literatures types. different its and performance ministers’ prime assessing for suitable are p such for that criteria in interested question second study’s answer will criteria voting economic and performance as here policy influenced part used large in outcomes ministers prime that certain be to has one performance, their decision influence decision mini prime cabinet estimating and understanding on for helpful are Literatures powers ministers’ study. main this three in the of asked one questions answering at research targeted each literatures, three review I chapter, this In CHAPTER1
Prime abilityministers’ toinfluencedecision ion in performance. In the second part of this chapter, I review the literature on prime prime on literature the review I chapter, this of part second the In performance. in ion h catr s divided is chapter The d inpoliticalleadership literatureare relevant. less :
UNDERSTANDINGPRIME MINISTERS’ PERFORMANCE - making. This is an important initial research step, because prior to assessing to prior because step, research initial important an is This making.
lts n pltcl edrhp fe a ol f aibe ta cn ep in help can that variables of pool a offer leadership political and elites
n he prs ec adesn ltrtrs ht chronologically that literatures addressing each parts, three in n line with study’s main argument that “mindset matters”, matters”, “mindset that argument main study’s with line n res on cabinet decision cabinet on res - making and prime ministers’ powers will broaden will powers ministers’ prime and making 9 romne Ltrtrs n rm ministers’ prime on Literatures erformance.
- making
-
making and prime ministers’ powers powers ministers’ prime and making - making in real political contexts. political real in making chapter three where prime prime where three chapter ’ efrac and performance s’ - sters’ real ability to to ability real sters’ making and prime prime and making - making
CEU eTD Collection have offices 127 2007; al. these et (Blondel tasks political Hungary, and administrative both of and aspects combine offices these Slovakia Lithuania, and Poland Slovenia, In weak. Lat in is while role, minister administrative prime if increases capacity political influence to 1 other each on depend who actors of network a of composed but hierarchical 19 are mi prime of role the that emphasizing cabinets arguing assumption decision this cabinet challenged for responsible jointly are and participate administrative and ministers individual capacities ministers,of prime ministers’ offices prime parties, political system, political decision cabinet efficient for important are that factors about and (2001) communism of fall the since cabinets CEE origins, of aboutactivities and understanding composition structure, w advances interviews research their on of based endeavor are cumulative that The volumes ministers. edited two by CEE in knowledge making and Blondel in ( ministers Poland prime and Hungary strong especially favoring countries, framework institutional the behind reasoning the decision Cabinet 1971). Hen Wolden 1990, Strom 1996, Shepsle Laverand 1991, Thiebault and (Blondel process cabinet in participate who others) many decision and termination formation, 1.1.1 Process theyare responsible. held outcomes, policy concrete influence to ability real the had they that convinced be to has one performance, ministers’ prime assessing Process
In CEE, if prime ministers are strong, prime ministers’ offices mostly have administrative capacity, while their their while capacity, administrative have mostly offices ministers’ prime strong, are ministers prime if CEE, In 80, Padgett and Abromeit Abromeit and Padgett 80, – n
135). 135). essy 200 essy Cabinets in parliamentary democracies are co are democracies parliamentary in Cabinets - retd ieaue s neetd n the in interested is literature oriented
- Müller 1 oriented literatureoriented ,
Blondel et al. 1993 and 2007, and 1993 al. et Blondel -
oml ae h gets cnrbto ad mrvd aie decision cabinet improved and contribution greatest the made Rommel - making research applicable to CEE is rare with few studies discussing discussing studies few with rare is CEE to applicable research making
via, Estonia and Czech Republic they are more influential in political matters. In In matters. political in influential more are they Republic Czech and Estonia via, d 1994, Farell 1994, r e a. 00 Gallagh 2000, al. et orp
- based on which their performance is assessed and for which for and assessed is performance their which on based 1 making. Prime ministers are considered as actors (among (among actors as considered are ministers Prime making.
nisters is above is nisters ( 2007,
1971). Other scholars insisted the insisted scholars Other 1971). Körösényi see also Goetz and Wollmann andsee Goetz Wollmann 2001). also 10 Blondel and Blondel process process
llective bodies where all cabinet members members cabinet all where bodies llective ministers rm ministerial prime r t l 20, ug ad Keman and Budge 2001, al. et er
1999, Schiemann 2004, Zubek, 2001). 2001). Zubek, 2004, Schiemann 1999, and Müller
actors actors - - (Foley making aig aig Sm authors Some making. making - Rommel ht atcpt i cabinet in participate that
2000, Suleiman and Rose Rose and Suleiman 2000, as such and thus hierarchical hierarchical thus and core executive core
et al. 1993, Far 1993, al. et
the structure of of structure the
ith 300 300 ith
1990, 1990, is not is some r ell ell - CEU eTD Collection Lithuania. media groups, interest (presidency, external and ministers), of experience professional disagreement, of level autonomy, ministerial styles, for responsibility the and crisis 4 the from themselves 231). 1997: Elgie ( cabinet collective distance popu to A 2013). (Körösényi, politicians it to contributing elected allows which cabinets, decision personalized collective to prone more decision influence to ability ministers’ prime increases 3 cross no or 225). (1997: areas certain to attention skewtheir constraints little institutional other or time because like with is sector, model one Segmented in them. policymaking between influence significantly can actors few s In policymaking. for also restri but implementation, policy for only not responsible are servants b In members. cabinet other or minister prime to reference much without ministries, m In responsible. collectively are they which for decision a to agree must ministers all and ministers(collectivity) all of participation with taken are cabinet decision influence equally c In implementation. policy to confined mainly bureaucrats and minister prime 2 models are general usedministers. toprovide estimatesof of prime powers individual cabinet in influential c cabinet in discussions dominant, is minister prime where models bureaucratic and/or monocratic of elements with collective are recently studies off. howeverCEE, original took some resea of type models Cabinet context. institutional the in change power the shift change a induce may and styles constellation leadership and personalities political disasters, natural crisis, cabinet laws, electoral including factors many and however static not are models Cabinet semi or parliamentaryany in time given any at actor cabinet each of making tomakeposition these(Vercesi decisions 2012). at also looking by improved politics a proposed (1997) Elgie debate, coreexecutive / ministerial prime the by Inspired 1995). Dowding 1990, Dunleavy and (Rhodes policymaking
In Her research looks at configurations of internal (prime minister’s office, ministers’ and prime ministers’ personal personal ministers’ prime and ministers’ office, minister’s (prime internal of configurations at looks research Her aoiain lcoa lw poue ige at gvrmns ih tog parliamen strong with governments party single produce laws electoral Majoritarian monocratic cted number of people can equally influence policymaking in all important areas. In areas. important all in policymaking influence equally can people of number cted
oes of Models
y eeoig six developing by
leadership and monocratic cabinets. Financial crisis may require technocratic expertise and segmented segmented and expertise technocratic require may crisis Financial cabinets. monocratic and leadership
government prime minister minister prime government
, political parties, civil servants) factors for uncovering predominant cabinet model in in model cabinet predominant uncovering for factors servants) civil parties, political , aie decision cabinet
– - eiin aig 21: 9. n hpe tre aie decision cabinet three chapter In 19). (2010: making decision aig ih o ige co al t domin to able actor single no with making
models
- how aig Etra eet lk wr, aua dsses a rqie more a require may disasters natural wars, like events External making.
inisterial 3
ollegial, ministers not autonomous and prime minister’s office office minister’s prime and autonomous not ministers ollegial,
is wee an oiia atr hv ve have actors political main where liest rm n cbnt oe t aohr ihu a concomitant a without another to model cabinet one from 2 aie dcsos r md ad o ol at only not and made are decisions cabinet -
decides policy across all issue areas, while ministers are only agents of of agents only are ministers while areas, issue all across policy decides aig lo etmtn pwr t ifune decision influence to powers estimating allow making lar leader is likely to lead a monocratic, while an unpopular leader a leader unpopular an while monocratic, a lead to likely is leader lar f aie decision cabinet of
cabinets, ministers can greatly influence influence greatly can ministers cabinets, - 11 framework for comparative study of the executive the of study comparative for framework making. In contrast, prime ministers in coalitions may be be may coalitions in ministers prime contrast, In making.
Šarkutė - aig Tee oes ee further were models These making. t decision ate 4
(2010) found Lithuanian(2010) found cabinets rch is close to non to close is rch ollective - ry specific policy interests or or interests policy specific ry making process. Decisions in in Decisions process. making ureaucratic
government, all actors can can actors all government, decision - segmented segmented presidential system. presidential tary majorities, which which majorities, tary
- hared sectoral intervention intervention sectoral
government, civil civil government, who - making in their their in making
oenet a government,
-
existent in existent
government, government,
s n the in is - making making
type, type, - CEU eTD Collection for funds withhold to ability the have policies. competing parties, they because political vetoes effective are be may players finance legisla of veto the Ministers implementation. of effective passage for most support The their withdraw 44). can they 2005; because (O’Malley, change policy prevent effectively prevent can ministers) parties, 7 Norway). Ireland, 6 186). 2007: al. et (Blondel matters social affairsor foreign pri European East while 2000), Goetz 1993, 5 players veto important remove to ministers prime allow yearsin office lessweak than for threewere perceived (Blonde ministers prime while strong, perceived were office in longer yearsor three ministers prime CEE 2003). Heffernan popularity 154) 1994: (King parties fewer with cabinets heading ministers prime than Prime powers. ministers’ 1993). Gerlich and Philipp coalitions (Muller, heading organization cabinet in interested ministers prime consensual to compared s have to found were cabinets party single heading areas policy same in interested their to powers ministers’ prime and weak norm consequently a governments coalition making parliament, the into entry easy parties small allow Helms 1995, the to related are powers ministers’ prime argue authors Some contexts. political real in powerful become power formal much without ministers prime interes primary The 2005). decision O’Malley influence to ability ministers’ prime in 1.1.2 Power
West European prime ministers were found to be more involved in foreign affairs (Muller, Phillipp and Gerlich Gerlich and Phillipp (Muller, affairs foreign in involved more be to found were ministers prime European West King (1994) was the first to categorize West European prime ministers as “strong” (Germany, the UK, Greece, Greece, UK, the (Germany, “strong” as ministers prime European West categorize to first the was (1994) King In a parliamentary democracy, many veto players (the president, Constitutional court, interest groups, political political groups, interest court, Constitutional president, (the players veto many democracy, parliamentary a In Power - Portugal and Spain), “medium” (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden) and “weak” (Italy, Netherlands and and Netherlands (Italy, “weak” and Sweden) Denmark, Belgium, (Austria, “medium” Spain), and Portugal In addition to structural or personal factors discussed above, certain political resources resources political certain above, discussed factors personal or structural to addition In oriented literature is a part of the process the of part a is literature oriented
may be an important electoral asset assisting prime ministers’ powers (Jones 1991, (Jones powers ministers’ prime assisting asset electoral important an be may -
oriented literatureoriented 2005, Haughton 2005). Highly proportional systems with low electoral thresholds electoral low with systems proportional Highly 2005). Haughton 2005,
Duration in office in Duration Prime
ministers heading cabinets with many parties are likely to be weaker weaker be to likely are parties many with cabinets heading ministers ministers (e.g. the Netherlands, Italy, and Israel). Other Israel). and Italy, Netherlands, the (e.g. ministers or allow policy change. Few vetoes are however effective and in a position to to position a in and effective however are vetoes Few change. policy allow or
5
.
interests es osnul rm mnses itrse i policymaking, in interested ministers, prime consensual Less
could also influence prime ministers’ powers. For example, For powers. ministers’ prime influence also could Number of parties of Number o power of t me ministers in economic policy, cabinet organization and rarely in in rarely and organization cabinet policy, economic in ministers me
and 12 styles
- -
oriented literature, but is specifically interested specifically is but literature, oriented retd ieaue s o xli hw n why and how explain to is literature oriented - tronger ability to influence decision influence to ability tronger making directly (Farell 1971, King 1994, 1994, King 1971, (Farell directly making
(Elgie 1995). Not all prime ministers are ministers prime all Not 1995). (Elgie
is also important in determining prime prime determining in important also is tion and ministers who can slow down policy policy down slow can who ministers and tion institutional setting institutional 7
rm oiin wee hy could they where positions from l et al. 2007). l et
6
Pie ministers’ Prime . (Rose 1991, Elgie 1991, (Rose authors relate relate authors - making,
CEU eTD Collection co cabinet for charge in are they department,Unlike ministers, primeministers have todevote ineach toissues more because time of preferences the cabineother about information accurate more and more have They 252). (2005: others decision the over control str have ministers prime chairs, cabinet decision for forum influence to powers their increase and opponents decision ministers’ prime for defeat electoral of costs increase threat electoral an to tied motions confidence majority, parliamentary a of interest re from results government new the unless elections, prospective and parliament the of dissolution failure, government to leads accepted contr to them allows notif that motion confidence a which to certainissue a tie can Theyparties. coalition andparliamentary best, are parties their of prospects electoral to ability ministers’ calling and burdens public impose would that bills vetoing deliberation, for policies proposing to relate may setting agenda parliamentary specifically, More 146). 2005: (O’Malley parliament the through real in power ministerial prime of (Tsebelispolitical contexts 199 variation the pinpoint to fail would one ministers, prime A vetoes. diverse of number large a overcoming in them assist agenda that elections parliamentary calling and and setting, cabinet ministers, dismissing and appointing as such prerogatives O’M change. policy expect not influencedecision to ability ministers’ prime increase would vetoes similar ideologically of numbers fewer theory, Tsebeli 1991, Jones 2005, (O’Malley change policy prevent
ccordingly, if one were to examine only Constitutional principles and institutional powers of of powers institutional and principles Constitutional only examine to were one if ccordingly, etn cbnt agenda cabinet Setting to Ability - ma
king (O’Malleyking 2005:161 confidence motions at the final stages of policy de policy of stages final the at motions confidence t actors, which allows them to set the most advantageous forum for decisionfor advantageous forum the most set to them allows which actors, t - set set making; however, policy change occurs in situations where veto theory would would theory whereveto situations in occurs change policy however, making; - aigadt pooesltos o aie ipts(05 233 (2005: disputes cabinet for solutions propose to and making call elections call
alaetr agenda parliamentary - making process and to extract policy gains by restricting choices of of choices restricting by gains policy extract to and process making alley (2005) argues this is because prime ministers’ have political have ministers’ prime because is this argues (2005) alley 5
mle pie iitr’ blt t cos te ot favorable most the choose to ability ministers’ prime implies , O’Malley 2005).
is related to confidence motions prime ministers can use when when use can ministers prime motions confidence to related is - riain n nt o rnig eaae m separate running for not and ordination - uctural advantages over ministers that allow them to exert exert to them allow that ministers over advantages uctural 177, 182).
shuffling. If keeping the current government is in the in is government current the keeping If shuffling.
nal pie iitr’ blt t ps legislation pass to ability ministers’ prime entails 13
s 2002). s
liberation ( liberation
According to veto player player veto to According Döring ol the behavior of of behavior the ol inisters. Prime Prime inisters.
2001). Prime Prime 2001). - 254). - making.
As
CEU eTD Collection ou policy which to extent the generally) least decision influence to powers ministers’ prime where three chapter to foundation provide will literatures These politics. real in powers ministers’ prime estimating power Constitutional to next resources, political specific and cabinets within decision cabinet of models Specifically, contexts. unde our to contributed powers ministers’ prime on literature and cabinet the within position ministers’ prime (2005: minister 227). ministers’ prime or parties of other of members than members remove to easier are parties Consequently, failure. government’s to lead can which party, potent a actor’s removed of thereof) lack (or support influences dismissal how be on primarily factors, other also can which ministers, prime ( threat” “psychological against intended or committed offences for 207). put can or ministers prime oppose would they where positions from vetoes remove can or policies ministers’ prime put can ministers prime personnel, decision influence to use can “final(2005: 247). offers” decision influence to abilityministers’ prime increases aspects cabinet different about knowledge Finally, negotiations. through or minister deci certain a how allows ministers among standing proposals’ about knowledge Superior ministers. most to acceptable is it when agenda the on item an putting by or agenda the on them Pr 241). (2005: funds limited of distribution the about ministers between occur that arguments to reference in role impartial an policies, them gives which support to funds limited for ministers other with compete not do generally ministers
By n hs eto, motn ltrtr o cbnt decision cabinet on literature important section, this In ministers prime tools powerful most the of one is politicians other of careers Controlling sadn o pie iitr’ oes o nlec decision influence to powers ministers’ prime of rstanding dis missing sion will be made; in full cabinet, or in the committee, unilaterally by prime by unilaterally committee, the in or cabinet, full in made; be will sion
them ministers and cabinet personnel prime ministers can remove veto players veto remove can ministers prime personnel cabinet and ministers Tsebelis
in portfolios where they agree with prime minister (O’ Malley 2005: Malley (O’ minister prime with agree they where portfolios in
- 1999). Nevertheless, dismissal powers are usually contin usuallyare powers dismissal Nevertheless, 1999). aig Kn 19) By 1994). (King making motn vt paes n lcs hr te wl support will they where places in players veto important - making and allows them to propose n propose to them allows and making 14 ime ministers can veto proposals by not putting putting not by proposals veto can ministers ime
tcomes that are criteria for assessing prime prime assessing for criteria are that tcomes - making help in positioning prime ministers ministers prime positioning in help making appointing
groups that can easily ally against against ally easily can that groups - aig ht xlis prime explains that making - aig il eemn (at determine will making - prime ministers to ministers prime aig n el political real in making
iitr ad cabinet and ministers
provisions help in in help provisions on - negotiable negotiable gent on gent decide CEU eTD Collection o and internal other many of result forces. aexternal are but activities, leaders’ to connected exclusively not the for account onlypartially leadershippolitical of performance assessing and leadership political and managerial between analogy an drawing manage of performance understand company to as profit such and outcomes between survival level aggregate correlations and use styles and assertively characteristics leaders’ researchers company studies, organizational and management methodological (Strang to performance unsuccessful) or (successful leaders’ connected to point clearly is performance ministers’ would that criteria upon agreed predetermined no are there because challenges, and complexities prime for criteria Establishing 1.2.1 ministers’ prime about questions where performanc six and four chapters to performance. foundation ministers’ give prime literatures of types different between relationship asymmetrical performance. said of categorization of importance the explain as well as performance ministers’ prime assessing for suitability its for argue and governance democratic of index an performa develop then I performance. ministers’ prime of indicators as literature the criteriafor Iministers’ assessing performance.first prime reflectcriteria identified ondifferent in a that resources political use can powers, decision weak formally their of regardless influence ministers, prime literature, to powers ministers’ prime and arena legislative th reviewed I section, previous the In 1.2 canconsidered responsible. be they which for contribution own their are section, next the in discussed performance, ministers’ utcomes, which moves explaining change in dependent variable from understanding leaders’ leaders’ understanding from variable dependent in change explaining moves which utcomes,
Assessing prime ministers’ performance
llow them to influence political agenda directly. In this section, I review the literature on literature the review I section, this In directly. agenda political influence to them llow
Establishing criteriaEstablishing ministers’ prime performance for e and the relationship betweenand types therelationship different e are discussed. ofperformances
Performance of an individual leader can be better assessed by studying policy policy studying by assessed better be can leader individual an of Performance
based on GDP rates, inflation levels or unemployment in a given polity could givenpolity a in unemployment or levels inflation rates, GDP on based ial, r I Finally, performance of an individual leader. Macroeconomic indicators are are indicators Macroeconomic leader. individual an of performance
ve te cnmc oig ieaue ht a ad n explaining in aid can that literature voting economic the eview e literature on prime ministers’ position in wider executive wider in position ministers’ prime on literature e
15
nce and discuss different types of of types different discuss and nce rs (Strangio et al 2013). However, However, 2013). al et (Strangio rs
- making. Based on this this on Based making. io et al. 2013). In the the In 2013). al. et io
These These - CEU eTD Collection in ministers prime only assessing decision leaders’ of outcomes and impact leaders’politicalabout little tells polls opinion in goodstanding dura Long grounds. normative and methodological on challenged be can duration term and popularity Both polls. opinion in standing good had and backing party strong id (Croatia), Sanader (Hungary), a fromdismissal office (Baylis may lowpopularity indicate 84). 2007: agenda out carry and formulate to time insufficient means term brief a contrast, In agenda. their forward and goals substantive achieve to him/her allowing public the in support term, parliamentary 200 Mueller 2007, (Baylis success leaders’ for account accurately they arguing these using assessing for indicators contested less are popularity leaders’ sometimes and office in duration Because 2013). al. et (Strangio performance leadership indicate accurately more institutions for respect and conduct of integrity or popularity leaders’ o office in duration if or leadership, of indicators are outcomes political or policy if certain not is it Empirically, leaders. individual assessing for frameworks normative systematic develop reasons prime are 2.6) section outcome(s) account performance are suitable to for ofindividual leaders. policy indicators suitable that are outcomes unarguably establish can one if for even responsible Additionally, primarily problematic. decisions as cabinet minister) (prime actor one out mem singling cabinet makes which all decisions, and members cabinet all of participation decision democracies, parliamentary democracies in Nevertheless, decision that of outcomes decision influence to powers
entified as successful leaders, because all of them completed their parliamentary terms, had had terms, parliamentary their completed them of all because leaders, successful as entified 4 ). According to duration indicator, prime minister is successful if (s)he completes his/hers completes (s)he if successful is minister prime indicator, duration to According ). If only leaders’ duration is used as performance criteria, Prime ministers ministers Prime criteria, performance as used is duration leaders’ only If two, chapter in detail in (discussed leaders assessing of challenges Methodological - making. In addition, using term duration as an indicator of performance is limited to limited is performance of indicator an as duration term using addition, In making. which is a reflection of prime ministers’ strong party backing and political and backing party strong ministers’ prime of reflection a is which - making, which adds value to executive studies (O’Mal studies executive to value adds which making, -
making, discussed in previous section, to understanding the the understanding to section, previous in discussed making, why researchers studying Western leadership were reluctant to to reluctant were leadership Western studying researchers why decision
Mečiar of l of
parliamentary democracies, but would allow for little variation variation little for allow would but democracies, parliamentary eaders’ success, it is still not empirically clear, which policy policy which clear, empirically not still is it success, eaders’ - making is collective meaning that all decisions are made by by made are decisions all that meaningcollective is making
- (Slovakia) and Klaus (Czech Republic) would all be be all would Republic) (Czech Klaus and (Slovakia) aig s ipre ( dispersed is making 16
leadership, previous literature resorted to resorted literature previous leadership, bers are responsible for cabinet cabinet for responsible are bers Hart
t’ n Ur 08 ad in and 2008) Uhr and tion in office or leaders’ or office in tion
ley 2005: 292). 2005: ley d n early an nd – Rommel Rommel Orbán r even even r
CEU eTD Collection 8 in an through measured best prime is of which understanding impact, better political ministers’ offer can governance democratic in ministers performance (prime popularity, leaders’ of indicator accurate policymaking social and economic integration, EU the ministers’ prime werearguably reaching far (Haughton 2005). produced governments his reforms the but 95), 2007: Baylis 2012, (Mesik politician unpopular duration. (Braithwaite in years transition early three in development economic rapid than Estonia’s for credited largely more is Laar However, exceeding neither terms ministerial prime consecutive identified require be would unjustifiably) conclusions firm but voters, short all by Similarly, testing. and empirical parties their by both support political possible very course of is It policymaking. in success their with do to anything had Merkel Angela or Thatcher byMargaret premierships long decades that straightforward empirically not is It impact. political their and office in longevity leaders’ hypothesis testing allow to variables dependent not and independent appropriate more are popularity leaders’ and/or duration Term successful. not as ministers prime unpopular and/or long all identify would and Pakulski Körösényi 2007, (Baylis performance of indicator an as popularity of use the to connected ends, terms at popular equally be not may terms their of beginnings time also is popularity Leaders’ hypothesis. test not are polls opinion because limited, rea also is performance ministers’ prime of indicator an as popularity Using fixed. are terms whose and elected directly are who presidents assessing in
In 2003 survey only 4% of respondents said they trusted him (Haughton and and him(Haughton trusted they said survey ofrespondents 4% only In2003 dily available in all countries and for all leaders, preventing production of large datasets to to datasets large of production preventing leaders, all for and countries all in available dily Because of explained reasons, I argue that evaluation of policy outcomes and integrity of of integrity and outcomes policy of evaluation that argue I reasons, explained of Because that conclusions oversimplified prevents outcomes policy to according leaders Assessing
2011). 08. lvk zrna a sod ahr al i oiin polls opinion in badly rather stood had Dzurinda Slovak 2008).
conduct manifested as respect for democratic institutions democratic for respect as manifested conduct
- la sting and/or popular prime ministers as successful, and all short all and successful, as ministers prime popular and/or sting s nucsfl Fr xml, soin ar evd w non two served Laar Estonian example, For unsuccessful. as
- lasting and unpopular prime ministers would (somewhat (somewhat would ministers prime unpopular and lasting
17
- ’ variant and prime ministers popular in the the in popular ministers prime and variant promne Ulk tr drto or duration term Unlike performance. )
that long terms are a reflection of their their of reflection a are terms long that dmcai governa (democratic Ribar 2004: 128) 2004: Ribar
termediary estimate of the the of estimate termediary which is another limitation another is which and performance in in performance and
nce) is a more more a is nce) 8
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Assessing programmatic performance as prime ministers’ performance in democratic democratic in performance ministers’ prime as performance programmatic Assessing Index of democratic governanc democratic of Index
effectiveness. Performance in democratic governance can shed a light on match match on light a shed can governance democratic in Performance effectiveness. aig n Sul 21, ac ad le 19, ei 21, Norris 2010, Bevir 1995, Olsen and March 2010, Scully and waring
that be that ed in multiple elections (2010: elections multiple in ed come less capable of limiting elites’ limiting of capable less come
evaluate prime ministers’ programmatic performance and then programmaticperformancethen ministers’evaluate andprime in social and economic terms but garnered strong support support strong garnered but terms economic and social in - rseiy iin ht s intereste is that vision prosperity e as criteria for evaluating prime ministers’ programmatic programmatic ministers’ prime evaluating for criteria as e help in help etr eortc governance democratic better 20 capture
i psil (oes t l 20) and 2001) al. et (Bovens possible is e explain that in CEE undemocratic elites operate operate elites undemocratic CEE in that large performance in democratic governance democratic in performance 123
ulc backing public ing 4 - Ph 2009 Pehe , 4). 4).
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Bühlmann rig h pbi interest. public the erving
Q Quality of governance literature is interested in the quality of public services, quality of policy formulation and and formulation policy of quality services, public of quality the in interested is literature governance of Quality uality of democracy democracy of uality
to deliver effective policy outcomes that improve citizens’ welfare citizens’ improve that outcomes policy effective deliver to oe tde o dmcai gov democratic of studies Some interested (solely) in the the in (solely) interested from assessing regimes’ democratic characteristics (democratic performance), extent of extent performance), (democratic characteristics democratic regimes’ assessing from
et al. et
2004, Hogstrom 2013, Foweraker and Krznaric 2003, Mansfeldova and Ruksanova Guasti 2010) or 2010) Guasti Ruksanova and Mansfeldova 2003, Krznaric and Foweraker 2013, Hogstrom 2004,
2011 . , Altman and Perez and Altman , As an extension of democratization literature, democratic governance shifts shifts governance democratic literature, democratization of extension an As itr 03 Hls 2012 Helms 2013, hifter
studies studies either focus on a degree to which polities feature democratic characteristics characteristics democratic feature polities which to degree a on focus either ).
studying D anaig n Scully and Mainwaring emocratic governance emocratic cies - Linan 2001, Copedge Copedge 2001, Linan
interaction
as less democratic, if these were delivered in delivered were these if democratic, less as tutr ad fetv plcmkn) ht ny n their in only that policymaking) effective and structure ot likely most interactions n gaate ihs ht mrv ctzn’ economic citizens’ improve that rights guarantee and ernance stay at the level of assessing the regime’s regime’s the assessing of level the at stay ernance - b Brun Brun 21 ).
f fetv policymaking effective of
ors 21) rus h ms scesu in successful most the argues (2012) Norris 2007). Quality of democracy studies are less interested interested less are studies democracy ofQuality 2007). continue about indicators most suitable for for suitable most indicators about continue
between any of these dimensions. The main The dimensions. these of any between 2001 is interested in democracy’s instrumental democracy’s in interested is ocracy)
, Andreev 2008, Diamo 2008, Andreev , define democratic governance as as governance democratic define 10
n assig oiy outcomes policy assessing and 9 , quality of public services and services public of quality , matters more than countries’ levels levels countries’ than more matters
, but also its in its also but , a procedurally democratic democratic procedurally a nd and Morlino 2005, Morlino and nd under
democratic trinsic trinsic CEU eTD Collection is (IDG) governance democratic of index two figure in effectiveness, and democracy between (or stronggovernance, study inthis and inchapter which four five. isdiscussed governance for reasons bad and and combination leadership odd effective) frequently investigating on time more spend to need would studies Leadership governance. good mean automatically expertise) or flexibility qualitie opposite if learn to able not and are leadership we of and instances governance “bad” (only) to applicable is it that in limited somewhat is study His governance. bad explains leadership undemocratic and ineffective weak, between interaction interests personal and status power own their on more focused are leaders if governance bad in results leadership g is leadership incurring goals its of some achieves that leadership inefficient as and rigidity or ignorance, incompetency, leaders’ as defined is leadership Poor and policies economic bad as governance bad go bad and leadership poor of aspects on focusing governanceby democratic in leadership importanceof the addresses Helms governance. democratic effective more of expectation and heighteneddemands social and economic managing confront of tasks institutions and leaders American Latin how explore (2013) Shifter and Dominguez and widespreadinstitutions c the emphasizing aregrowth, economic in democracy records worse of to related levels lower while welfare, citizens influence profoundly that areas policy corr positive found years, fifteen past the in countries employment, democracy, of level security and welfare prosperity, Based on conceptualization of democratic governance in previous literature as interaction as literature previous in governance democratic of conceptualization on Based governance. democratic of center the at leadership of aspect the place studies Several vernance among vernance dcto, n scrt (2010 security and education, e nerally nerally rather than advancing the common good (Helms 2012 (Helms good common the advancing than rather nesnby ih costs high unreasonably the rule of law, control of corruption, economic growth, inflation, poverty, inflation, growth, economic corruption, of control law, of rule the o al t poue od oenne i i psil ta effective that possible is it governance, good produce to able not orruption and clientelism (Ibidclientelism orruption and presidents and prime ministers in ministers prime and presidents ineffective .
Indicators used in their study are regime level m level regime are study their in used Indicators
leadership affairs while representing heterogeneous societies with with societies heterogeneous representing while affairs
eas o ipoe ue f resources of use improper of because 1) Te td, plcbe o ai American Latin to applicable study, The 12). : n wa (r nfetv) edrhp n good and leadership ineffective) (or weak and 22 violations of central norms of liberal democracy. liberal of norms central of violations
failing to achieve its self its achieve to failing elations between levels of democracy and democracy of levels between elations :
123). s of bad leadership (competency, (competency, leadership bad of s close relationship between weak between relationship close the G8 the
democracies b : 5 : - set goals because of of because goals set - 6).
For Helms For easures of the the of easures . . He defines He . hl poor While , the the , CEU eTD Collection one. appendix social unemployme and inflation, budgeting, 14 and banking reforms, citizens’economic (structural measures economic ministers’ 13 furtheraway or closer his/herscountry 12 one appendix s institutions democratic 11 well citizens’ influence profoundly areas these conduct. in outcomes democratic political of Theoretically, norms embracing and restructuring social and economic integration, p change social and political CEE, In practically. and theoretically both justified is IDG aggregate an compose that dimensions four of Selection Figure 1.2 Prime social integra EU the in performance ministers’ prime assessing effectiveness (un)democratic ministers’ ministers’ prime prime dimensions; estimate separate two to of study composed is this IDG in performance. adopted criteria a as developed
Performance in in Performance Performance in EU integration EU in Performance Democrat Performance in economic policymaking policymaking economic in Performance
14 esrs ( measures
policymakingarea. c conduct c
Democratic conduct
especially health and pension reform) reform) pension and health especially social prosperity, see survey questionnaire, appendix one. appendix surveysee questionnaire, prosperity,
ministers’ performance d in
(measured on 1 1 on (measured policymaking policymaking
c as uch
h rl o law of rule the Prime ministers’ performance in democratic governance
(measured on 1 1 on (measured
– fromEurope (measured on 1 on (measured
10 scale) scale) 10 integrity maue o 1 on (measured EU integration , the media, Constitutional courts, etc., see survey questionnaire, questionnaire, survey see etc., courts, Constitutional media, the , – ref
, see survey questionnaire, appendix one. appendix surveysee questionnaire, , 10 scale) 10 emocrat ers to the integrity of integrity the to ers
-
10 scale) scale) 10 23 n rset o dmcai isiuin and institutions democratic for respect and and and
refers to “any move(s)” prime minister makes to bring bring to makes minister prime move(s)” “any to refers - ractically (in largest part) involved the EU EU the involved part) largest (in ractically ic governance 10 scale) scale) 10 citizens’ social welfare, see survey questionnaire, questionnaire, survey see welfare, social citizens’
refers to to refers
refers to to refers policymaking Economic the relationship between between relationship the prime ministers’ prime eortc conduct democratic Effectiveness the relationship between between relationship the tion
conduct in reference to to reference in conduct 12
economic ,
policymaking Social programmatic prime ministers’ ministers’ prime 11 -
being and and being assessing nt) and and nt) 13 prime prime
and
CEU eTD Collection 192). 1987: (Blondel research external and leaders’ 15 Because are realities. that leadership ministers to prime correspond CEE perform closely of and environments simple leadership comparatively in found issues important theoretically choose to important was it discre preferred, was parsimony because and easy, not is criteria applicable universally Discovering comparisons. is governance protection, democratic environmental (e.g. assessed be transp could performance ministers’ prime which in endless is governance democratic good for account would that issues of list The Europe. Eastern in governance democratic of aspects be cond be may integration democratic ministers’ prime on EU conditioned the in performance Good status. subordinate given been have should However, concept. the theoretical to contributing in weight equal given are governance democratic of elements All welfare. social and economic citizens’ influence most to likely is areas these economic in performance ministers’ produce also must leaders. leaders European authoritarian because leaders, only democratic only to to intrinsic not is intrinsic areas social isand economic in integration Performance EU in performance while democracies, ( during communism to accustomed were Europeans East equality social ensure would state welfare while lifestyles, th democracy, of favor in were Europeans East important. dimensions these consider institutions outcomes influence significantly of because
e EU integration and market economy, because transformations in these would ensure Western Western ensure would these in transformations because economy, market and integration EU e This would also require taking in the account concrete requirements requirements concrete account the in taking require also would This te dimensions. Nevertheless, the model developed here takes account of the most most the of account takes here developed model the Nevertheless, dimensions. te ort and communication, culture and and culture communication, and ort h itnin ee s o t b ehutv, u t cpue utpe ms) important (most) multiple capture to but exhaustive, be to not is here intention The itioned on good on itioned economicrecord. ance is variable and because leaders are usually better in some, but worse in other areas, other in worse but some, in better usually are leaders because and variable is ance environments, but would not allow not would but environments, several
politic Bozóki
al resources that make them powerful in practice, prime ministers can ministers prime practice, in powerful them make that resources al assessed in this study provide the basis for drawing meaningful meaningful drawing for basis the provide study this in assessed
2008). 2008).
as I explain in chapter four, it is possible that some dimensions dimensions some that possible is it four, chapter in explain I as
n hs areas these in Prime Prime ministers’ democratic and there are obviously many other policymaking areas policymaking other many obviously are there and cross
conduct
- country comparisons comparisons country agriculture). However, selected areas in which which in areas selected However, agriculture). 24
. , while good performance in social area may may area social in performance good while ,
oh oil cetss n international and scientists social Both and social outcomes; however, prime prime however, outcomes; social and 15
for assessing performance of leaders of performance assessing for and constraints constraints and and would be more suitable for small N N small for suitable more be would and
conduct
i of prime ministers’ prime of s intrinsic to leaders in in toleaders s intrinsic internal internal CEU eTD Collection o Nevertheless, scores. better reforms. receive should reforms of ministers number larger that except with status, “outstanding” their ministers improve or prime spoil not does which others, than reforms economic of number governance democratic 16 ten on “average” “positive”, policymaking. democratic dimensions; effective governance’s democratic two in reflected is influence impact political ministers’ prime of appreciation scope on based populists” and “likely “average” “outstanding”, ministers; prime of categories three develop I section, dimensions previous several in performance ministers’ prime assessing to addition in and creativity m agenda, set to capacity categories from dichotomous ranging in leaders placing for qualities leadership 19 (King “strong”/“weak” 1978), (Burns“transformational”/“transactional” (Helms “ethical”/“unethical” 2012 “effective”/”ineffective”, “good”/“bad”, areas. between other in distinguish worse but some, in Scholars dichotomous. predominantly are far so literature performance the in identified categories Leadership better minister’s prime a for accounting in measured (when performance dimensions) leaders’ multiple However, outlined. was performance ministers’ governance democratic of index section, previous the In 1.2.4 prime of status variable capture properly discussedministers’ performanceis inthe next section.as will that categories develop to important also is it
hs study This b C , Nye 2008, Kellerman 2004), “successful”/“unsuccessful” (Pakulski and(Pakulski “successful”/“unsuccessful” Korosenyi 2011) 2004), Kellerman , Nye 2008, - point scale. “Outstanding” prime ministers leave positive, while likely populist negative populist likely while positive, leave ministers prime “Outstanding” scale. point ategorization of primeategorization of ministers’ In line with Blondel’ssuggestion with line In Average prime ministers are likely to likelyto are ministers Averageprime ’ tts should status cannot
(Masciulli, 2009 (Masciulli, ntuetl blt t ifune epe n efc otoe, organization outcomes, effect and people influence to ability instrumental
con for account ) prime ministers bring about. about. bring ministers prime )
reflect reflect
or is usually variable and developing categories are helpful in better better in helpful are categories developing and variable usually is
“negative, which is reflected in their higher, mid higher, their in reflected is which “negative, Impa tvto, strateg otivation, major major h etn o change of extent the
:
ct 7 positive - 10) - prime ministers leave in democratic governance can be be can governance democratic in leave ministers prime impact .
only
reforms that 16
programmatic programmatic modify policies they inherit theypolicies modify
, vision y, vision of performance, which contributes to subtler to contributes which performance, of vision
leadership’s dichotomization oversimplif dichotomization leadership’s , 25
oe usadn pie minist prime outstanding Some hl l while nme o rfrs mlmne in implemented reforms of (number
(19 ,
kl ppls sau sol rfet ao negative major reflect should status populist ikely entrepreneurial 87 2) The 29). :
performance e a criteria as set
to a limited extent limited a to scope innovativeness, innovativeness, r used are
- ers may introduce larger larger introduce may ers
point or lower scores lower or point 94) leaders. Different Different leaders. 94)
for assessing prime prime assessing for f rm ministers’ prime of otie i the in outlined , each dimension of of dimension each
by researchers researchers by (1978: 94). (1978: utstanding prime prime utstanding
conduct ies adaptation
reality,
and and al ,
CEU eTD Collection re and performance good incumbents’ between (Lewis Chappell and Veiga 2000). incumbents the of share seat) (and vote analyzed studies Other 25). (1991: unemploymentthat inflationsignificantlythe countriesandfound Westernand lower in elections little very explain or insignificant, are results to economic indicators macroeconomic used and elections 300 almost over democracies Van 2007). Eijk, and Der Franklin ( relationship weak Lewis 2005, Budge a and McDonald only finding others while 2012), strong to moderate candidates’ easier records. Retr economic poor for them sanction and performance economic good for leaders award voters that assumption symmetrical straightforward, simple, a in founded is voting Economic explaining in useful are asym the or symmetry section this in reviewed voting economic of Theories performance. ministers’ prime of types different between relationship the of asymmetrical) or (symmetrical are pe of type performance one than more ministers’examining different, prime of types Because performance. ministers’ prime assessing for suitable benchmark political final the is performance electoral 1.2.2, section in indicated As 1.2.5 Primeministers’ are only governance(e.g.democratic in impact nor average, an leave ministers prime Average governance. democratic in impact ospective voting, Fiorina (1981) argues, simplifies electoral process for voters who find it find who voters for process electoral simplifies argues, (1981) Fiorina voting, ospective eaie impact negative o evaluate to ie fnig o eooi vtn ltrtr epaie h aymtia tendency asymmetrical the emphasize literature voting economic of findings Mixed are literature voting economic of findings However, moderately effective). prospective performance based on their policyprospective performance ontheir based proposals.
government’s past performance instead of investing effort in learning about about learning in effort investing of instead performance past government’s Finally, . eainhp ewe icmet’ efrac ad re and performance incumbents’ between relationship metry between prime ministers’ programmatic and electoral performance. electoral and programmatic ministers’ prime between metry electoral performance
t s osbe ht oe rm mnses ae ie rcrs of records mixed have ministers prime some that possible is it
- Beck 1988, Cheibub and Przeworski 1999, Van der Brug, Brug, der Van 1999, Przeworski and Cheibub 1988, Beck Paldam looked at a large number of high income Western Western income high of number large a at looked Paldam prime minister’s conduct is generally is conductminister’s prime rformance is required to account for the direction the for account to required is rformance 26
– - Bec lcin rset. tepig o clarify to Attempting prospects. election ad icel 90 Be 1990, Mitchell and k nesn 07 Bengtsso 2007, Anderson mixed, some mixed,
studies demon studies democratic,but - election (Colomer (Colomer election neither po neither
n ocue that conclude tsn 2004, gtsson 2004, n strating sitive, sitive, they CEU eTD Collection less are voters’ elections, between discontinuities organizational other or leaders names, party in for account also incu If leaders. cansanction to ability voters’ weakens systems party and reward Parties of 2004). asymmetry al. et Anderson 2004, Gavin and eventuall and perceptions voters’ influence may campaigns electoral during performance government’s of presentations Media 2000). (Anderson performance bad for 76 (2004: increasing or stable is turnout electoral which in and support they parties between switch frequently not do voters which in elections in voting economic of effect strong finds Bengtsson important an is context Electoral p America support electoral Latinlarge mobilize in sections, previous in saw we As 2007). co institutional and political or voters individual either Nadeauet al.2002). explan Hellwig indicators Duch macroeconomic and countries periods, un to use different researchers to relate may literature voting 2003 Whitten and Palmer 2004, Bengston leade sanction to likely less are voters which voters, to clear less it make parties of number higherwith Coalitions explain coalition ruling the outcomes. economic for responsible is who voters to blur or clarify either opposition the of strength or system, committee the of nature coalition), respons of and Powell 2007, (Anderson Lewis settings 1993, Whitten different in voting economic explaining in important ambiguity empirical 1). The availability of electoral alternatives can largely determine if voters punish incumbents punish voters if determine largely can alternatives electoral of availability The 1). and Stevenson and ations as to why economy’s influence on vote varies systematically (Anderson 2007: 276, 2007: (Anderson systematically varies vote on influence economy’s why to as ations The operation of reward of operation The
2010 ibility” thesis arguing that variables such as the type of government (majoritarian vs. (majoritarian government of type the as such variables that arguing thesis ibility” ). However, contradictory findings also emphasize the importance of contextual contextual of importance the emphasize also findings contradictory However, ).
- derstand economic voting (Fiorina 1981, (Fiorina voting economic derstand 20 Beck and Mitchell and Beck of - punishment thesis. Marinova (2011) finds that high party instability instability party high that finds (2011) Marinova thesis. punishment 08,
cnmc oig eerhr fud otxul aibe ae more are variables contextual found researchers voting economic
Lewis s
onr vrain n cnmc voting economic in variation country – punishment thesis is very often asymmetrical and contingent on contingent and asymmetrical often very is thesis punishment despite poor performance poor despite
– aibe xliig smer o reward of asymmetry explaining variable Beck and Stegmaier and Beck rs for bad performance (Anderson performance bad for rs
1993). ) . High number of contradictory findings in economic economic in findings contradictory of number High . 27 Powell and Whitten (1993) forward the “clarity the forward (1993) Whitten and Powell
mbent and opposition parties undergo changes undergo parties opposition and mbent Lewis ntext in which voting occurs (Anderson, (Anderson, occurs voting which in ntext
– 2007, Nadeau et al. 2002, Samuels and and Samuels 2002, al. et Nadeau 2007, Beck (1988) Beck
(Mainwaring and Scully 2010 Scully and (Mainwaring Anderson 2007, Bengtsson 2004, 2004, Bengtsson 2007, Anderson pls leaders opulist y their vote choice (Sanders choice vote their y
f n etr democracies Western in inds inds
1995
party number of parties in parties of number - uihet thesis. punishment , can successfully successfully can Anderson 2000 Anderson is to blame and blame to is :
125). 125). , . CEU eTD Collection reward the of operation The gradually. implemented were cuts social re opposi the or media the for if likely, prospects more however was equal punishment Electoral welfare. social had cut not did that 2003 governments until 1980 from countries OECD 2011). al. et Vries EU and policymaking reward the extend researches maki when consider voters factors many the of one only good performance.future prospects for Europeans unclear East usually offered Europe. Eastern performance, in bad democracy for leaders of sanction quality generally the and control popular of link fin (2009) Roberts this, to Contrary parties. wing left work agricultural and collar blue pensioners, (unemployed, off worse pro wing right support they educated) and (entrepreneurs fro benefited voters If performance. bad for parties sanction to than rather policies, post f prospects district prospects 272). 2007: (Anderson, incu between asymmetry for account better can that contexts (Lewis reward of voting conditionality the emphasize reasons retrospective of logic contradict that a considerations status ethnic or minority religion, class, loyalty, party on based vote their cast may voters reasons, economic of Regardless be. would government future alternative an what voters pe bad for blame to is who voters to blur changes party because performance, bad for leaders sanction to likely - omns vtr ae iey o upr pris ht r epce t dlvr favorable deliver to expected are that parties support to likely are voters communist - Voters generally weigh economic performance most at elections, but economic issues are issues economic but elections, at most performance economic weigh generally Voters reward the CEE, In level or regional data. Researchers generally confirm that unemployment lowers lowers unemployment that confirm generally Researchers data. regional or level or economic voting (Pacek 1994, Doyle and Fidrmuc 2003). Fidrmuc (2000) finds finds (2000) Fidrmuc 2003). Fidrmuc and Doyle 1994, (Pacek voting economic or rformance. Highly fragmented party systems do not allow distinguishing by by distinguishing allow not do systems party fragmented Highly rformance. Armingeon and Gige and Armingeon - level policies (Armingeon and Giger 2008, Giger 2010, Tavits 2007, de de 2007, Tavits 2010, Giger 2008, Giger and (Armingeon policies level tion emphasized social issues during electoral campaign and less likely if if likely less and campaign electoral during issues social emphasized tion lcoa porm wih constraint which programs electoral - punishment thesis is mostly tested in tested mostly is thesis punishment - uihet hss o te ise sc as such issues other to thesis punishment
r (2008) find governments cutting social welfare in 18 18 in welfare social cutting governments find (2008) r 28 - punishment thesis on cross on thesis punishment
u ae es aal t dsigih between distinguish to capable less are but ds electoral accountability is the strongest the is accountability electoral ds – g lcoa dcsos Consequently, decisions. electoral ng reform parties, while if they become become they if while parties, reform mbents’ performance and electoral and performance mbents’ their
Visegrád blt t slc laes with leaders select to ability – er Beck, 1988). All these these All 1988). Beck, s) they tend to support support to tend they s) - election compared to to compared election - uihet hss in thesis punishment - national institutional national
countries based on on based countries corruption, social social corruption, m the reform reform the m nd other other nd CEU eTD Collection FigureModel explaining for 1.3 ministers’ prime understand to study this performance. by offered model a contex of snapshot and Figure five. demographical chapter in tested are cultural, performance governance) (democratic programmatic variables; of types of effect three The identified. are performance programmatic ministers’ prime in variation explain to likely variables where leadership and culture political on literature the review I section, this In 1.3 variation inprime ministers’ programmatic performance place. takes for account that variables of discussion section, next the In detail. in discussed is performance In reward the six, chapter spotted. easily more are performance government’s for responsible those where contexts in pronounced more generally is voting Issue voting. issue in context institutional of importance corruption to relation
personalization, previous previous personalization, Age, education, political political education, Age, Demographicalvariables Institutional variables Institutional Contextual variables Contextual Type of government, ofgovernment, Type characteristics, time characteristics, Populism, Executive Executive Populism, cabinet and mandate and cabinet political experience political Cultural variables Cultural Explaining Prime performanceExplaining ministers’ programmatic period ofservice period Indicators: Indicators: Indicators: Indicators: ideology
(Tavits - -
punishment thesis between prime minist prime between thesis punishment
2007) and EU related issues (de Vries et al. 2011) emphasize 2011) al. et Vries (de issues related EU and 2007)
prime ministers’ programmatic performance 29
Prime ministers’ Prime
Prime ministers’ Prime ers’ programmatic and electoral electoral and programmatic ers’
ul n rm ministers’ prime on tual performance powers
programmatic
1. 3 is a a is 3 the CEU eTD Collection and and (Gallina obstruct political development 2011). social,economic democracy of quality the structure, democratic undermine elites by practiced structures power informal and framework institutional formal between elite low by characterized are democracies non consolidated characterize values, same the share not cooperative strong with elites mis that groups different united in divided elites, fragmented while relationships, produces In structure. circulation democratic elite to democracies, adapted are consolidated networks power and rules democratic to according power exert elites democracies, in while preservation, power system of design conceptions their elites to according regimes, authoritarian In regimes. political of nature the determining in 1 al. et (Higley change political of coherenceand ofAustraliangovernments continuity (2008:205 tra that credos” “political democratic and egalitarian leaders’ Australian of importance the emphasizes example for Kemp democracy. of quality the explaining in variables for physical and historical socioeconomic, than relevant matter more generally and and cultural that found institutions (2013) Hogstrom political effectiveness. government and policies differences citizens, cultural politicians, that confirmed influence (2005) Roller and democracies Western 18 for in beliefs outcomes and attitudes values, of for culture of importance the importance emphasized (1993) Castles democratization. and democracy the to pointed (1993) Huntington culture. outcomes. policy and democracy an culture, Almond between relationship a found literature Previous explanations1.3.1 Cultural programmatic their explaining than performance. powers ministers’ prime determining for programmatic relevant more ministers’ prime in variation Insti explaining variables. contextual and demographical to compared performance in relevant most the are mindset” ministers’ “prime as generally defined explanations, cultural section, this in further argue, I As Some authors emphasize the importance of consensual or disunited elites for the outcome outcome the for elites disunited or consensual of importance the emphasize authors Some Vra 16) rud eorc i mr lkl i spotd y ii political civic by supported if likely more is democracy argued (1963) Verba d
998). Recent studies pointed to the relevance of political elites political of relevance the to pointed studies Recent 998). nscend party differences and are responsible for the relative the for responsible are and differences party nscend 30 - osldtd eorce. osqety non Consequently, democracies. consolidated
lt cnut Glia 00. Informal 2010). (Gallina conduct elite - institutional quality and a mismatch mismatch a and quality institutional - 210).
ntttoa vrals are variables institutional tutional explanations are explanations tutional
trust each other and do do and other each trust policy - CEU eTD Collection inf on and sector) weaken energy and justice (e.g. informality by over informality generate that actors political on focuses research Informality regulations. 17 re is elite mindset similar of co values democratic of supportive not mindsets 200 (Rupnik populism, co of legacy power, of personalization in manifested legaciesare Communist the developments. influencepresent and beliefs old CEE, In 82). 2011: (Gallina politics of suspiciousness and pessimism general the as well as expectations economic unrealistic by paralleled is initiative individual of levels low with society over dominance state acc and governing of style authoritarian Instead, 2000). Lengyel and (Higley duties of change automatic mean not did 2005). Linde and (Ekman changes elite or institutional of independently continueand based socially are which 201 economic generate to institutions capturing highly personalized. remains power the however exist, power and money to connected not structures depersonalized Political democracy some includes structures. culture democratic outweigh periodically networks power informal and culture behavior in democracy” “simulated about speak norm by countered frequently but place, in (2010) are institutions democratic where Hungary Ilonszki and Lengyel 2008). Gallina 2009, non with background elites democratic Political democrats”. without “democracies as defined best are that systems entire In
“ CEE, I nformality” refers to behavioral behavioral to refers nformality” 4 ). Negative political culture is primarily a result of path of result a primarily is culture political Negative ).
formal oiia sse. Informality system. political Informality in CEE is mainly negative and includes practices targeted at creating or or creating at targeted practices includes and negative mainly is CEE in Informality
lts per omly eortc bt i but democratic, formally appear elites f lts n laes I CE n cuty a fly dpe t dmcai political democratic to adapted fully has country no CEE, In leaders. and elites of n hierarchical and legal and political institutions (Meyer et al. 2008, Lauth 2000). Lauth 2000). 2008, al. et (Meyer institutions political and legal 7 Formal abolishing of communist regime and replacement of political institutions institutions political of replacement and regime communist of abolishing Formal Glia 00. C 2010). Gallina ,
n scaiain co socialization and
- enforced by strong patron strong by enforced decision
codes, values and traditions that cannot be described by formal democratic democratic formal by described be cannot that traditions and values codes, - onsequently, political elites with untransformed communist communist untransformed with elites political onsequently, compatible elements (e.g. openness to the media) the to openness (e.g. elements compatible 17 citizens -
aig clue f ofit cruto ad nationalism and corruption conflict, of culture making, s lre at f lts mnaiy rdcn political producing mentality elites’ of part large a is
n elites and r oiia gis (Grzymala gains political or - exist with formal democratic framework (Pehe (Pehe framework democratic formal with exist 31 -
raiy oiae oml ntttos n the and institutions formal dominate reality n exist with democratic structure. Reproduction Reproduction structure. democratic with exist ormal structures (corruption and clientelism) that that clientelism) and (corruption structures ormal - ’ client relationships that continue to draw draw to continue that relationships client
mmunist political culture continues to to continues culture political mmunist expectations regarding state goals and and goals state regarding expectations - dependency of norms and values, and norms of dependency
,
on on - areas exposed to or taken or to exposed areas Busse 2010, Gallina Gallina 2010, Busse , and some and , - eptance of of eptance breaching - CEU eTD Collection and conspiracy, of instead circumstances as the people to superior elite seesthe that elitism problems treats and opponents in good sees which pluralism, to its next in power using corrupt and conspiring is public the of interest the which of instead elite”, “bad the and people” “good the between cont ideological different with filled easily vessel empty an rather is but ideologies, other as programmatic, and conscious as quite not is Populism nationalism). and socialism Kaltwasser Rovira and Mudde 2013, Tormey and Moffitt 2010, Hawkins 2004, Mudde 1999, (Canovan ideology thin a as or 2001) (Weyland politically 19 ofneedscitizens. to refers government. of responsiveness and representativeness competition, electoral fair and free law, of rule the as such undermines 18 Haughton2011), leaders (Hawkins 2009,Balcere 20 Deegan 2011, Pauwels and (Rooduijn parties in populism measure to effort an made Kalt Rovira cross in and development countries its single for reasons uncover and types its identify meaning, its clarify to trying in of attention attracted recently only rela is populism researchers.Because has democracy and populism between relationship The supremacy. EU against identity national preserve to populism to resorted occasionally elite the and Fico by used instrument important an example was minority Hungarian for the against directed Slovakia, populism national In culture. elite political of elements important the of one is Populism 1.3.1.1 Popul prime of proxies as indicators these use I thatareministers’ mindsets account likelytolargely for (Gallina their performance 2008). and culture political elite of manifestations are (G leaders elites political is attitudes a establishing to and easy not quantify are attitudes Cultural 2005). (Korkut mindset elites’ old the break and circle elite bou
This study does not include corruption, which is however, an important aspect of of aspect important an however, is which corruption, include not does study This Populism is frequently defined in the literature as a political strategy certain rulers use to sustain themselves themselves sustain to use rulers certain strategy political a as literature the in defined frequently is Populism dre o decision of ndaries
self
Mečiar for nationalist policymaking (Gallina 2010). In 2010). (Gallina policymaking nationalist for Mečiar
good governance good allina 2010). allina - serving officials officials serving asr 201 wasser ehdlgcly challenging methodologically ism
and leaders leaders and
- Previous literature Previous 2 aig evn ltl opruiy o dmcai oties o ne the enter to outsiders democratic for opportunity little leaving making ,
Mde 01 Deegan 2011, Mudde , democracy, lowers trust in institutions and attacks foundations of democratic regimes regimes democratic of foundations attacks and institutions in trust lowers democracy, w - ho strip public assets for personal benefits and and benefits personal for assets public strip ho allows einly Erp ad ai Aeia (ejr 2010, (Meijers America) Latin and (Europe regionally
(Mudde 2004: 543). Populism is one of discourses discourses of one is Populism 543). 2004: (Mudde
iet ik between link direct
2012, Taggart 2000, 2000, Taggart 2012, initial steps in steps initial ativelyconceptcontested (Mudde 2004, Plattner 2010, Hawk 2010, Plattner 2004, (Mudde found that populism, personalization and corruption and personalization populism, that found However, . 32 Bozóki -
ent (Hawkins 2012). At its core, populism distinguishes distinguishes populism core, its At 2012). (Hawkins ent rue 07 Soky 00. oe studies Some 2000). Skolkay 2007, Krause establishing aiettos of manifestations 09
2012) combined with other “isms” (e.g. liberalism, liberalism, (e.g. “isms” withother combined 2012) ) or inmedia ulc and public 19 cultural mapping of the elite and elite the of mapping cultural
, researchers invested more timemore invested researchers , Poland and the Czech Republic, Czech the and Poland do not invest them in funding the the funding in them invest not do debates ins 2009) ins documented appearance of of appearance documented b ty hvo ad underlying and ehavior pical for pical elites’ political culture that that culture political elites’
(Rooduijn 2012).(Rooduijn .
democratic politics politics democratic M
- own Kraus and and Kraus de and udde
interest interest
18 It It
CEU eTD Collection and corrupt as parties perceiving strengtheningmay institutions democratic populistpresidents. of counter a check powers to coalitions presidents’ build to able not are parties, their fragmented and in parliaments weak power and concentrate hands presidents Populist structure. democratic weakens or contributes of authors reduction These of or development inequality. institutions sustained and weakness to poverty conducive consequently not which policies system, in results the and in democracy players veto of number the defi their In America. Latin in leadership populist and totheEUstructuresalso points against asaappeals. populist protective belt th for poses minorities). populism danger the (e.g.emphasizes (2007) Rupnik groups certain or EU) the welfare, (e.g. policies certain opponents, towards party to opposed but elections, of favor populis that argue (2008) Krastev and and Smilov Similarly, opponents. political criminalizes minorities of participation political challenges law, of rule the democracy, representative undemocratic of circle vicious creating thus practices. politics, contentious using start also may who opponents, to avenues electoral off shut to tend populists power in once However, competition. opposit the in populists when argue (2013) Kaltwasser Rovira and Mudde as true, especially is This 2012). (Hawkins participation political increase consequently and voters mobilize can discourse populist intense as monitored, opposition the viewing by contestation, undermines populism while However, held. regularly and fair otherwise are that acquire elections the consequently in advantage and balances, and checks eliminate liberties, civil authoritarianism. undermine competitive populists to leads forcefully most populism that argue 201 Kaltwasser Rovira and Mudde 1999, (Canovan democracy on has populism effects the about ambivalent generally are Scholars In CEE, populism can have milder or more dangerous consequences. Voters may start start may Voters consequences. dangerous more or milder have can populism CEE, In governance democratic between relationship negative a found (2008) Walker and Navia Mes ežnikov nd to produce effective democratic governance. The authors suggest suggest authors The governance. democratic effective produce to nd
et al. (2008) find that populism in Eastern Europe undermines undermines Europe Eastern in populism that find (2008) al. et alienated from the people, the from alienated 3 , Levitsky and Loxton 2013). Levitsky and Loxton (2013) Loxton and Levitsky 2013). Loxton and Levitsky , ion become fierce champions of open and fair electoral electoral fair and open of champions fierce become ion - based democracy manifested in exclusionary sentiments sentiments exclusionary in manifested democracy based mhsz te motne f edrhp ht either that leadership of importance the emphasize 33
nition, populist presidents tend to reduce to tend presidents populist nition,
an enemy that must be constantly constantly be must that enemy an e quality of democracy in CEE, but CEE, in democracy of quality e which may lead to political apathy, political to lead may which
ne n power, in Once m is in is m CEU eTD Collection dominate to leaders allows This programs. party formulating in leaders party of influence extended and leadership party for elections direct in manifested organizations, party local and refers personalization Party 201 (Kriesi media the in coverage leaders’ on focus Lobo 2001, Montero and vote al. on et Aarts 2007, leaders (McAllistar choice of effect the in (only) interested are studies Some programs. party than more voters to appeal leaders whether and parties on than leaders on more focuses media the whether inter three entails personalization Electoral in. interested is researcher a personalization of area the on depending changesfollowed institutional by concomitant presidentialism. towards not is that leaders of importance increased an of because democracies parliamentary of outlook ( parliamentarism” “presidential and 2004) Fiers and of “presidentialization (Maddens labels; presidentialization” “institutional 2005), Webb and Poguntke 1993, (Mughan politics” different under literature the in appears thesis Personalization o responsibility and power political to closer it moves and decision of aspect collective the removes Personalization mindset). elite (undemocratic personal Executive 1.3.1.2 Executive p power counter to institutions the strengthening than concentratingby tendencies leaders 2010). (Gallina important more be may personnel r a are institutions the of Shortcomings framework. institutional the weakening for critical more are elite by practices using designed insufficiently voters or weak not are frustrated CEE in institutions America, mobilize to ability the and problem real the camouflage and slogans nationalist charisma have to likely are ministers (e.g. the threaten can populism instances some in but Orbán in Hungary or Kaczynski’s in Poland) (Smilov and Krastev 2008: 9) 2008: Krastev and (Smilov Poland) in Kaczynski’s or Hungary in Orbán I a arwr es, esnlzto cn e eetrl, pry ad “executive” and “party” “electoral”, be can personalization sense, narrower a n
- ization is another manifestation of prime ministers’ negative political culture culture political negative ministers’ prime of manifestation another is ization eae apcs okn a wehr ate pt mhss on emphasis put parties whether at looking aspects related ersonalization sl o po cmimn o ter medd cos s cags in changes so actors, embedded their of commitment poor of esult
2008 to an increased power of party leaders in relation to party activists activists party to relation in leaders party of power increased an to , Blais et al. 2003, Mayerhoeffer and Esmark Esmark and Mayerhoeffer 2003, al. et Blais ,
2011 , Curtic , 34
e and Holmberg 2005, Holmberg and e
fundamental - solu 2 Hazan 1996) emphasizing a presidential presidential a emphasizing 1996) Hazan Kae 94 Rht n Sh and Rahat 1994, Kaase , tion (Gallina 2011: 85). Unlike in Latin in Unlike 85). 2011: (Gallina tion idvda laes ( leaders individual f rnils f lib of principles . However, However, .
Bit tner, 2011, Gunther Gunther 2011, tner, 2011 . . rl democracy eral subtle informal informal subtle
Populist prime Populist ) while others others while ) at leaders, party oe 2008 Foley e afer 2007). 2007). afer - making making ). ). -
CEU eTD Collection (Aylott Sweden and Denmark in observed S 2011, al. et Back 2005, is personalization some while cabinets, Norwegian in personalization 20 personali uncover (1983) Philips 2009 Laswell 1977, (Barber performance compo personality different of importance the emphasize leader in variables demographical and identified psychological personality, are variables of types three Generally, performance. Leader 1.3.2 and Mishler c CEE in feature a and past communist the with leader personalized paternalist I 2010). Gallina 2006, informal t exclude and correctives on democratic outweigh that codes based becomes politics Consequently, advancement. career determining kinship and clientelism on based network personal a create can who leader a by activities subtle entail ( dispersed and collective being of instead concentrated, and hierarchical becomes power the which of because leaders individual by setting prime ministers’ terms. during personalization executive on primarily is here interest the because study, this in 2012, Kolodny and Poguntke party than rather leaders Gallina 2011, Korosenyi individual and (Pakulski of standing government or electoral on vote their base who voters for process electoral simplifies which theygovernmentslead, and elections onfidence in institutions and prominence given to political personalities political givento prominence and institutions in onfidence
ae studies Rare Llefl e a. 02 Wts t l 21, efra 20, haso 21) Rji and Rejai 2010). Theakston 2005, Heffernan 2013, al. et Watts 2012, al. et Lilienfeld , Leader - Executive etrd xlntos mhsz te motne f esnl attributes personal of importance the emphasize explanations centered c edrhp ope with coupled leadership ic
1994). -
centered explanations centered testing testing bcue f t pltcl utr caatrzd y omns lgc, ak of lack legacy, communist by characterized culture political its of because ,
personalization
purport undstrom 2009, Pedersen and Knudsen2005). and Pedersen undstrom2009,
executive personalization have mixed results. results. mixed have personalization executive
n post n
s
to represent to –
Webb 2002 Webb communist realm, communist
model 20 y hrceitc rqie fr h eegne f revolutionary of emergence the for required characteristics ty
refers to a strong influence over decision over influence strong a to refers 2009
of policy of irrhcl raiain ad ueurtc politics. bureaucratic and organization, hierarchical 2008 , Simonton 1987, Herman 1980, Greenstein 2003, Greenstein 1980, Herman 1987, Simonton , country’s national interests, national country’s ). T
ucker 1995). Personalization of decis of Personalization 1995). ucker Electoral and party personalizations are less relevant less are personalizations party and Electoral , McAllister 2003: McAllister , 35 making. personalization usually means means usually personalization
.
Leaders nents or leadership styles for leadership for styles leadership or nents Studies engaged in personality analysis personality in engaged Studies he “political other” ( other” “political he
Kolltveit (2012) finds no support for for support no finds (2012) Kolltveit
259 of this sort have been a strong a been have sort this of , B ,
means for coming to coming for means londel et al. 2010, Webb, Webb, 2010, al. et londel (Gallina 2008 (Gallina - - making and agenda and making etrd literature; centered Bozóki authoritarian and and authoritarian ion - making can can making
in and Simon Simon and : pl
57 leaders’ atforms atforms , terms Rose Bass
A CEU eTD Collection leaders different impact of the in range ofa instead dichotomies, for rei which manner, distinctive a in polity the molded has leader the believed is it unless written in of any whether clear not is it because leadership, about knowledge 21 contextsenabled (Bennister 2012, by Hargrove political Owens andinstitutional and 2003). more thus Grint 2008, (Dowding situations other cannot not but some, and for (only) suited are factors components personality other) contextual (or particular disregarding for criticized addition Personality in performance. is good approach to lead (always) characteristics these if learn cannot we and possess leader might a qualities possible other all against set usuallynot are example forleaders” (Stogdill performance successful achievement energy, (intelligence, th which about agree not does Literature general. in leadership about inferences for opportunity little providing cases, individual on focus mostly studies Personality rarely is examination their and syste measured easily not are traits Personality variables. two the agency of product the to structure of importance the reducing for criticized c to not and personality leaders’ to due is difference this which to extent the uncover to difficult still is it easy, were difference a make leaders that establishing if even because challenging, methodologically is performance postcolonial and societies. young in institutions and cultures political of development for courage) and charac of importance the emphasizes (2012) Rotberg and study, recent character more a president’s In job. the on with satisfaction based leaders of types four proposes (1977) Barber leadership.
“esnlt” Genti 1968 (Greenstein “personality” e their Biographies can teach us about different leaders and their characteristics, but cannot offer great advance in in advance great offer cannot but characteristics, their and leaders different about us teach can Biographies matical, most often an object of descriptive biographies descriptive of object an often most matical, ’ teristics of transformational leaders (e.g. vision, the ability to mobilize followers, integrity followers, mobilize to ability the vision, (e.g. leaders transformational of teristics
achievements. B achievements. salsig h rltosi bten esnlt c personality between relationship the Establishing
suit able to account for the interaction between leaders’ skills that are constrained or or constrained are that skills leaders’ between interaction the for account to
iographies iographies 2000 , Blondel 1987, Fiedler 1967 Fiedler 1987, Blondel ,
also tend to focus to tend also - and neta cniin. osqety proaiy tde are studies personality Consequently, conditions. ontextual oriented, self oriented, ), although some studies have extracted personality traits traits personality extracted have studies some although ),
Bass
19 on “exceptional” rather than ordinary leaders ordinary than rather “exceptional” on 36 81 - confidence and sociability) that are likeliest for likeliest are that sociability) and confidence
. esnl hrceitc ietfe i “great in identified characteristics Personal ).
leaders’ leaders’ (Blondel 1987: 1987: 123). (Blondel ). ). 21 “Skill i “Skill
or informative media evaluations. media informative or qualities were particularly instrumental instrumental particularly were qualities haracteristics and leaders’ leaders’ and haracteristics
n context” explanations explanations context” n exact components make up make components exact
and nforces the penchant penchant the nforces not integrating integrating not . They are are They .
explain rarely rarely
are
if CEU eTD Collection pe of genesis real The intelligent. res are also leadersmore educated better orthat energetic are less leaders that older we speculate can a is and leadership age with decreases example for energy of that likely is It factors. part psychological or personality which understand cannot we Presently, leader of types three influence to performanceand theseattentioncloser by variablesdeserve (Blondel researchers 1987: 120). likely are origins geographical even or ethnicity religion, occupation, education, Theak 1983, Philips and (Rejai effectiveness leaders’ for matter background occupational or age that believing for support little found however relationship the examined that studies Few effectiveness. leadership analysi of systemic of recruitment lack a is in There leaders. interested political sociologists empirical by used originally were and ideology and occupation education, origin, social leaders’ include variables Demographical performance. their international arena. psycho the knowing that Th 2004). (Post Castro Fidel and of makeup psychological a built request, CIA’s at Post, Jerrold psychiatrist, A policy. foreign of area the in only on the are focus abnormality However,psychoanalytical examination. factorsworth important to and illness” tends “mental also that suggest Psychoanalysis can leader. which leaders, “unbalanced” the of (in)effectiveness the to of element contributed given a why explain cannot they because limited are but way, certain why explaining in successful are studies These 2012). Renhson ( childhoods or adolescence their during occurred that events and personalities, leaders’ between decision and motivations behavior, leaders’ explaining in o focuses leaders of Psychoanalysis adser n Flmn 00 Flmn n Vlny 02 Flmn 05 Grnk 2012, Geronik 2005, Feldman 2002, Valenty and Feldman 2000, Feldman and Landtsheer There is currently no systematic knowledge about potential inter potential about knowledge systematic no currently Thereis eorpia aayi o laes s neetd n o laes background leaders’ how in interested is leaders of analysis Demographical leaders such as such leaders
- centered variables and it is best that researchers examine them separately. separately. them examine researchers that best is it and variables centered tn n Gl 20, zi n Hlmr 03. eetees leaders’ Nevertheless, 2013). Hillmer and Azzi 2005, Gill and ston - rfl o avrais los o efcec i daig ih hm in them with dealing in efficiency for allows adversaries of profile Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, Kim Jon II Jon Kim Milosevic, Slobodan Hussein, Saddam Laden, bin Osama e main main e rsonal attributes however, remains unclear and the exploration exploration the and unclear remains however, attributes rsonal n “deeper” aspects of leaders’ personalities and is interested is and personalities leaders’ of aspects “deeper” n attractiveness of psychoanalysis in psychoanalysis of attractiveness 37
s of the effect of demographic variables on on variables demographic of effect the of s - making by looking at the relationship the at looking by making
research has proven very usefulveryproven has research particular a - correlations between the the between correlations l o demographical, of ult foreign relations is is relations foreign
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Contextual explanations
ion (interplay) between leaders’ contexts, institutional and personal factors, especially in in especially factors, personal and institutional contexts, leaders’ between (interplay) ion Contextual factors may play a role both in perceptions of prime ministers’ performance, ministers’ prime of perceptions in both role a play may factors Contextual in context (temporal) the of importance the only address sometimes studies Contextual circumstances
rss wars, crises, al
07 Ymaio n Dneeu 200 Dansereau and Yammarino 2007,
nn hi edrhp Laesfc ifrn stainl icmtne during circumstances situational different face Leaders leadership. their ining
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aua dsses r cnas Smno 19, en ad ie 1988, Rice and Kenny 1991, (Simonton scandals or disasters natural context may entail various known and unforeseen events such as as such events unforeseen and known various entail may context
64 : -
5 Hrly n Bnntn 01 Hls 2012 Helms 2011, Benington and Hartley 85, - u ta wud e h cs wt proaiy trbts of attributes personality with case the be would than cut hat prime ministers’ ability to act is always dependent always is act to ability ministers’ prime hat aracteristics, mandate characteristics and temporal temporal and characteristics mandate aracteristics, in - potnt (civn mc udr favorable under much (achieving opportunity 38
the origi the
9 Masciu , n o n f personal attributes of leaders, usin leaders, of attributes personal f butes of leaders, examination of of examination leaders, of butes l e a. 2009, al. et lli constraints or opportunities on on opportunities or constraints - economic realities. n tmoa efcs on effects temporal and Kane and Kane fe eautn Blair’s evaluating After a Haugh Bodl 1987, Blondel ,
Patapan 201 Patapan ton
2005, 2005, 0 ). ). g CEU eTD Collection and ministers other above usually are ministers prime and bodies collective true nowadays are 2012 (Helms leadership constraint that politics democratic in media the of importance the emphasize authors Some cabinets. party single produce laws majoritarian with those while governments, electo proportional during with systems Parliamentary mandates. point their any at parliament the by dismissed easily are ministers prime while terms, for fixed elected directly are Presidents systems. parliamentary in ministers prime than constrained leaders’ reducing powers of likelihood with actions leaders’ on opportunities and constraints impose d well “how determine than rather do”, can leader a much “how determine primarily will Institutions performance. their pe than leadership explaining in relevant more are courts) Constitutional laws, electoral parliamentarism, or presidentialism (politicalparties, institutions political national in Differences who leaders constrain (Elgie diff of performance explaining Institution 1.3.4 chapterfive. in analysis statistical in handled are that performance ministers’ b prime on two, variables contextual chapter in discussed are this in to limitations reference and performance ministers’ prime of perceptions in included potentially is that pri Canadian between association difficulty. situational and performance the find indeed and performance leaders’ Wallace example, For 2000). Genovese and (Lammers assessments comparative balanced provide would low and circumstances) rsonal2007: 9 attributes (Rose c Institution
) 1 .
Institutional explanations are more relevant for explaining leaders’ powers rather than than rather powers leaders’ explaining for relevant more are explanations Institutional
depending on the regime type regime the on depending 995, Rose 995,
Few parliamentary governme parliamentary Few and Suedfeld (1988) assume that situational difficulty would influence evaluation of of evaluation influence would difficulty situational that assume (1988) Suedfeld and - centered studies emphasize the importance of importance the emphasize studies centered
- centered
2007 one is what a leader has done”. Constitutional provisions will primarily will provisions Constitutional done”. has leader a what is one , Helms 2005 Helms , - ae ite potnte t cha to opportunities little have potnt (civn ls udr naoal crusacs leaders circumstances) unfavorable under less (achieving opportunity
explanations erent ).
). ). occupying personalities political nts (except for fully consensual systems like Switzerland) like systems consensual fully for (except nts . For example, presidents in presidential systems are systems presidential in presidents example, For . As elaborated in theories of institutionalism, institutions institutionalism, of theories in elaborated As
This study does not account for “situational difficulty” “situational for account not does study This 39
ut is primarily interested in the effect of of effect the in interested primarily is ut institutions and institutional change in in change institutional and institutions g o mdf te (ees 1999 (Peters them modify or nge ral laws tend to produce coalition produce to tend laws ral h same the political e ministers’ me leaders’ office less less ). ).
CEU eTD Collection ministers’ prime establishing for criteria as rankings programmatic expert and method collection data main the as surveys expert observation, of unit study’s as terms ministerial prime behind logic contextual) inthe effectchaptertypes variablesfive interested ofthree thatis of variables i of variation explaining pool Finally, in a helpful identified performance. leadership political and electoral elites of and culture political on programmatic literatures ministers’ prime between relationship performance programmatic ministers’ performance electoral assessing and for programmatic suitable criteria establishing for helpful are voting economic and performance ministers’ prime on Literatures established. empirically are powers ministers’ criteria hereas used outcomes influencepolicy to part) large(in ministerswere able prime ensuresthat it because performance, ministers’ prime assessing to step preceding important an is This making. decision cabinet on Literatures ministers’ powers for are helpful understandin study. this in asked questions research ability toinfluence decision that except performance, ministers’ prime performance. us tell not do but goals, their achieving in powerful more ministers prime make however prerogatives These practice. in powerful more them makes which players, veto control in discussed decision influence directly can
In this chapter, I reviewed three important literatures that chronologically answer main main answer chronologically that literatures important three reviewed I chapter, this In o assig efrac. hs ltrtrs r ue i catr he wee prime where three chapter in used are literatures These performance. assessing for n rm mnses pormai promne I te et hpe, dsus th discuss I chapter, next the In performance. programmatic ministers’ prime on
Tee ieaue ae sd n hpe four chapter in used are literatures These . eto 112 pie iitr hv dfeet oiia rsucs loig hm to them allowing resources political different have ministers prime 1.1.2, section Consequently, institutional differences are less relevant in this study for explaining for study this in relevant less are differences institutional Consequently, performance. - making
performance and and performance - making (Blondel 1987: 166, Foley 2000, Heffernan 2003). As As 2003). Heffernan 2000, Foley 166, 1987: (Blondel making n prime ministers’ performance. These literatures are used in in used are literatures These performance. ministers’ prime n , which is , is presented is t
hey are relevant for estimating prime ministers’ ministers’ prime estimating for relevant are hey g prime ministers real ministers g prime to influence ability decision discussed inchapter three. 40
the relationship between between relationship the and chapter and where
six that is interested in empirical empirical in interested is that six an empirical mapping of prime prime of mapping empirical an (cultural,
- making and prime prime and making ifrn types different demographical
prime ministers’ ministers’ prime much about their about much
and and of of e - CEU eTD Collection 22 democracy under mindset their and communism under socialized were they because governance, lea of population justifiable a are CEE ministers democracies. prime new in “elites’ mismatch to Consequently, likely are structure. structure democratic formal democracy’s in and mindset” transmitted once continue to likely are that s specific a to accustomed was leadership where environments in socialized democracies new in Elites Kazakhstan. mak would it Hence, structure. leaders’ institutional authoritarian where match to settings likely authoritarian is mindset” for “authoritarian holds same The likely. less is structure democratic long have elite the where settings In experience. democratic short with settings from leaders select to justifiable until Slovenia and Croatia countries evaluates study This 2.1. interested inleadership performance. study any to inherent generally are that limitations study’s some to point I Finally, regression. ANO analysis; statistical by six and five chapter test in hypotheses to and three chapter in arguments support to used variables of resources data outline also I performance. of rankings expert developing for analysis media and studies case over surveys ministers’ prime estimate to designed questionnaire survey discuss rate, response survey expert report then are that and selecting settings for suitable institutional of characteristics general the outline as first term I ministerial analysis. prime of using unit of study’s logic the and selection case discuss I chapter, this In EXPERTRANKINGS MINISTER PRIME 2: CHAPTER
Last prime ministerial term evaluated in study this ministerialtermevaluated Last prime e little sense to assess performance in democratic governance of presidents in Azerbaijan or Azerbaijan in presidents of governance democratic in performance assess to sense little e The importance of institutional setting forassessingThe importanceofinstitutional setting prime ministers’ the present the ,
programmatic ugr, oad Ceh eulc n Slovakia and Republic Czech Poland, Hungary, 22 - em ex term . Because this study argues “mindset matters” for leaders’ performance, it was it performance, leaders’ for matters” “mindset argues study this Because
; performance of prime ministers in democratic governance in governance democratic in ministers prime of performance
and performance and data quality, as well as address advantages of expe of advantages address as well as quality, data and performance perience with democracy mismatch between elites’ conduct and and conduct elites’ between mismatch democracy with perience evaluating prime ministers’ performance in democratic governance. I governance. democratic in performance ministers’ prime evaluating three Baltic States, Baltic three
epcal i nw ot omns democracies communist post new in especially , A TERMS IAL ended ended
Lithuania, Est Lithuania, 41 in June2013 in
ders for assessing performance in democratic democratic in performance assessing for ders
EXP , onia ;
two VA, bivariate, multiple and logit and multiple bivariate, VA, ,
and Latvia and
R SURV ERT omr uolv republics, Yugoslav former performance et of rules and values and rules of et from
the mid the four Y AND EYS Visegrád
- 1990s
were rt
CEU eTD Collection politic consensual fully in sense little make also would performance leadership Assessing name. monarch’s in place evaluate takes to sense no make decision also monarc constitutional would British the It of appointments. performance cabinet and ministerial prime semi is that France in Fr a of performance the assess to sense little make would It 2011). 201 and 2005 (Helms opportunities and constraints distinct par decision in influential are and a in executivepowerdistribution on powerbased political of apex the at are who leaders making.Selecting the head ministers prime where presidents weak elitesCEE tofulfillthe requirements ofthat process. similaractivities by required (except in2013),which Croatia thatjoined EU membership 2004 in elite I of mindsets”. “past observation the similar feature and communism allows under socialized were countries nine that all in Elites relationships. timeline sufficient is which experience, nin all in age.Elites in similar democraciesare their and 1990s early in democratized countries nine All factors. of pool a for controlling allow countries Wolchi and (Bunce 1998 until 1994 from authoritarianism Slovak’s to point may of selection Accordingly, analysis. the for suitable (Przeworsk country betweenconduct r their and carried the of some feature to likely is ticular regime is important, because different institutional arrangements provide leaders with leaders provide arrangements institutional different because important, is regime ticular All nine countries are e are countriesnine All understands study this level, regime the At
- a mnmm asrs ht h icmet aqie oe truh eua elections regular through power acquire incumbents the that assures minimum) (at making, although the British Queen has few reserve powers and government officially officially government and powers reserve few has Queen British the although making, prime ministerial terms ministerial prime 1999). i n addition, all nine countries went through the EU accession process to gain to process accession EU the through went countries nine all addition, n
hs s motn fr eiin aot hc pie iitra trs are terms ministerial prime which about decisions for important is This - presidential, the president dominates policymaking and has control over over control has and policymaking dominates president the presidential, al systems like Switzerland where it would be impossible empirically impossible be would it where Switzerland like systems al equirementsby structure,measured of democratic scores. experts’ ither parliamentary democracies or semi democraciesor parliamentary ither
were selected from share many similar characteristics, which which characteristics, similar many share from selected were - vr aus rm h ps, bevbe s mismatch a as observable past, the from values over e countries have about twenty years of democratic democratic years of twenty about have countries e 42
, h hs ite o o oe t influence to power no to little has who h, democracy
Mečiar’s term is justifiable; otherwise, one one otherwise, justifiable; is term Mečiar’s 2a , Rose 200 Rose , in its minimalist version minimalist its in ench prime minister, because minister, prime ench - presidential regimes with regimes presidential 7 , Rockman 2003, Elgie 2003, Rockman , k 20 k - institutional 11 where a where ). Nine ).
- CEU eTD Collection 2012) prime 28 thewas and institution 1996 27 2004) Nyblade office ministers’ prime and (Masuyama ministers) prime of visibility public increased 26 2004) o of possession by explained resources party 25 publicity political personalized direct 24 Swiss addition, In departments. thefor outcom leader decision federal in for participation direct charge a in citizens greater are allows have that democracy not counselors does she than or matters) he urgent federation, in in official (except ranking highest the precedence, of order Swiss to according becomes and turn, presidential her/his takes councilor a when Even basis. rotating yearly a on presidents 23 formal only The two these between powers ministers’ prime premier in difference are six and Slovenia Poland, Estonia) Lithuania, and Latvia, (Hungary, parliamentary inf making. to capable and strong generally are study this in selected ministers prime and powers ministers’ prime estimating to devoted is three become ministers prime CEE that likely stronger is it However, 2007). and 1996 (Baylis presidents to compared transition early in especially weak were ministers prime CEE found studies Some w CEE, In Spain). and Malta Ireland, (Germany, democracies European continental or Zealand), New and Canada, Australia, m prime UK, (the democracies Westminster like ministers prime strong Assessing produce that settings institutional 2005). O’Malley 1994, (King Finlandin like ministers prime weak with democracies parliamentary in ministers prime of performance evaluate to sense little one point pin to
In Norway In In Japan In was Berlusconi Italy, In n sal pie iitra powers ministerial prime Israel, In n wteln, h eeuie oe i sae bten ee member seven between shared is power executive the Switzerland, In n iln, nentoaiain f politic of internationalization Finland, In
ministers’ office has increased the ability of prime ministers to coordinate cabinet cabinet coordinate to ministers prime of ability the increased has office ministers’ u o nn cutis rm hc pie iitra trs r slce: he are three selected: are terms ministerial prime which from countries nine of Out
s oiial rlvn fcos uh s o eape at sses tblzd Chapter stabilized. systems party example for as such factors relevant politically as ,
several factors several ,
no strong support support strong no
(Berlusconi was both both was (Berlusconi - person that can significantly influence decision influence significantly can that person distinction between these between distinction es of that decision that es of
that
improv an exceptionally strong strong exceptionally an point to an increase in increase an to point abandoned e bt ak f the of lack but ne, are observed to to observed are for increased prime ministers prime increased for Soai, n Ceh eulc. T Republic). Czech and Slovakia, , e e do not have sufficient knowledge about prime ministers’ powers. powers. ministers’ prime about knowledge sufficient have not do e
cabinet co cabinet 24 coalition and party leader party and coalition
, Iceland,Italy , did not increase once once increase not did -
in 2001 (O’Malley 2007) (O’Malley in2001 making. s - give to rise got o pbi sco, ovrec o pry ideologies party of convergence sector, public of growth , ordination (Takaysu 2005) (Takaysu ordination
te pltcl eore Vrei 201 (Vercesi resource political other prime ministerial power (e.g. power ministerial prime prime minister because because minister prime regime 25 43 , Japan , increase in increase
s - direct direct single one of responsibility the blurs which making,
’ powers were found; were powers ’ are direct presidential elections in premier in elections presidential direct are ), while weakness of other other of weakness while ),
26 nses promne s utfal in justifiable is performance inisters’ , Israel, prime ministerial ministerial prime prime ministerial powers (Paloheimo 2003) (Paloheimo ministerial powers prime institutionally different institutionally
il demonstrate will 27 of a combination combination a of s of Federal Council, who serve as as serve who Council, Federal of s , the Netherlands and Norwayand Netherlands the , - here is generally no practical practical no generally is here making. , and
decline in party factionalism and and factionalism party in decline
however diitaie eom within reforms administrative elections elections 3 - decision 23 rsdnil ( presidential , O’Malley O’Malley , Italian prime ministers ministers prime Italian
It would also make also would It ,
of spe of strengthening of of strengthening une decision luence
were introduced in in introduced were - that individual individual that making regime types. regime cific political cific and Cavatorta Cavatorta and
(Kolltveit (Kolltveit Croatia, Croatia,
powers powers ,
and and the the
28 is - - -
CEU eTD Collection is33 study as coded and collapsed are terms consecutive 31 2014) 30 2004) al. regul the maintaining 29 surveys expert for common rate response Consequently, low and collection data of process cumbersome Cross performance. com largest the hitherto is 26%) (about empirically, observed ministers terms), prime ministerial as (prime governments served 103 individuals these In 2014. April until 1990s early from caretakers) including (not governments 103 here, studied countries nine the In 2.1.1 because resignation meansministers’ prime ministers’for responsibility decision simultaneous on “ ( confidence” literature contingent the in labeled is is which parliament minister, prime new the a of appointment by dismissal government’s Germany, and falls automatically government elections the in votes most received that parties 65) sustain continuously must and parliament regimes, presidential ( majority parliamentary required by countered r only is power this however, Republic), Czech the and Lithuania, decision in influence Elgie decision influence to power little but relations, international in duties representative with presidents ceremonial generally producing elections indirec and countries presidential
Caretakers are interim governments that do not have the authority to influence policymaking, but are in charge of of charge in are but policymaking, influence to authority the have not do that governments interim are Caretakers See appendix two for the total number of prime ministerial terms and individual prime ministers (1990 ministers prime individual and terms ministerial prime of number total the for two appendix See h nme of number The . As an individual, the prime minister is usually the leader of political party or coalition of of coalition or party political of leader the usually is minister prime the individual, an As
CasePrime Selection:ministerial terms 199
, see table 2.1 table see , 9 , Elgie et al. et Elgie Körösényi leadership studies leadership rm ministerial prime ar operation of government until new government is elected or appointed or elected is government new until government of operation ar -
onr suis f edrhp r rr, hc i piaiy eae t the to related primarily is which rare, are leadership of studies country
- h pie iitr eie hshr atoiy rm pplry elected popularly a from authority his/hers derives minister prime the making may increase if the president has veto powers (e.g., Poland, Poland, (e.g., powers veto has president the if increase may making
2011, Sedelius 2006). 2006). Sedelius 2011, 1999, Schiemann 2004, Zubek 2001, Helms 1996). Consequently, prime prime Consequently, 1996). Helms 2001, Zubek 2004, Schiemann 1999,
if a p a if terms t are presidential -
making is in practiceof ministers superiorindividual making isin tothat predominately within country oriented and focused on few few on focused and oriented country within predominately rime minister rime plcbe o nlss n hs td i i raiy N6) However, (N=63). reality in is study this in analysis to applicable one term so that the total number of prime ministerial terms in this this in terms ministerial prime of number total the that so term one 30 Assig 33 Assessing . its confidence to remain in power in remain to confidence its the resignation of the cabinet in its entirety. its cabinet ofthe resignation the in elections in parliamentary countries, both countries, parliamentary in elections 44 Köker
-
In premier In
aig(ipat18: 68 1984: (Lijphart making
Suat 2005 (Shugart resigns, retires, or retires, resigns,
2013). I 2013). 31
- rm mnseil em ot f 103 of out terms ministerial prime presidential democracies president’s president’s democracies presidential n parative study of prime ministers’ prime of study parative both parliamentary and premier and parliamentary both :
325). elative because it is easily easily is it because elative dies
In . In Hungary, Poland Poland Hungary, In . constructive vote of of vote constructive – oh eie types regime both
74, Lijphart 199 Lijphart 74, (
O’ Malley 2005: Malley O’ ( 29 Müller
were in office in were
-
Rommel et Rommel types of of types -
April April 81 2, 2, - . ,
CEU eTD Collection terms shorter ministers’ ministers’ prime between correlation minimum for office in were five and years three m or years three for office in were 19 ministers, prime 33 of cases.Out of increasenumber the analysisthe to in includedyears alsothree were than less Rommel policies implementing and developing for time sufficient allow to longer or years three last should terms ministers’ prime Ideally, elections. multiparty first held countries CEE most and of assessment. object an 1997 is post until political which survey, 1993 the in from indicated I 2013), minister until 2003 prime from president was Klaus (e.g. ministers, prime and presidents prime which survey, Laa (e.g. assessment the of object an in is term indicated ministerial specifically I confusion experts’ avoid to 2002), until 1999 from and 1994 until 1992 from minister prime was Estonia in Laar (e.g. terms, consecutive r to terms I collapsed elections, afterthe continued minister primesame the but elections, in was minister 1990). regardless mandate, legislative same the countries ministerial prime of patterns in interested is that research for suitable not are but cases, single about knowledge depth import are studies Case leadership. of theories general building for possibilities offer they because valuable especially are studies leadership N medium or Large UK. the comparatively and that volume edited an published evaluatesper recently only have (2013) colleagues and Gill and TheakstonHillmer 2013, and (Azzi skills leadership their and/or leaders Prime ministe Prime prime same the where terms ministerial prime selected I definition, this to According term ministerial Prime , Baylis 2007, Lijphart 1999, Warwick 1994), but several prime ministers in office for office in ministers prime several but 1994), Warwick 1999, Lijphart 2007, Baylis , .
fet rm mnses promne s n tr. f rm minist prime If term. one as performance ministers’ prime eflect
formance of a larger number of prime ministers in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Canada, Zealand, New Australia, in ministers prime of number larger a of formance office during the same legislative term. If prime ministers’ terms were broken by by broken were terms ministers’ primeIf term. legislative same the during office rial terms are selected non selected are terms rial - ntttoa relationships institutional
do not necessarily mean better placement on expert rankings. These These rankings. expert on placement better mean necessarily not do is defined term i n the literature as the same individual i individual same the as literature the n durations and performance, which indicates that prime prime that indicates which performance,and durations f at o mnseil changes ministerial or party of 45 -
randomly and start sometime after 1992 when 1992 after sometime start and randomly
two years two or prime ministers’ performance in many many in performance ministers’ prime or r 1999 r ore, 14 were in office between two and and two between office in were 14 ore, - . There is no statistically significant significant statistically no is There . 2002). If prime ministers were both were ministers prime If 2002).
Bde n Keman and (Budge these consecutive these r sre non served ers
ant for their in their for ant 200 n office during during office n 6). Strangio 6). ( Müller - - - CEU eTD Collection Table 2.1 Prime ministerial terms and term durations term and terms ministerial prime of overview an durations analyzed study. inthis is 2.1 Table Republic. Czech the in five Slovenia, and Slovakia, Poland, Croatia, evaluates study This rates. return high for chances increase to T years. three than shorter terms of selection justifies somewhat This failures. performance mean necessarily not do terms shorter but policies, coherent develop to time less had have might ministers prime Lithuania Latvia Latvia Latvia Latvia Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Estonia Estonia Estonia Estonia Republic Czech Republic Czech Republic Czech Czech Republic Czech Croatia Croatia Croatia Country
Republic
Adolfas Šleževičius Adolfas Dombrovskis Valdis AigarsKalvītis Bērziņš Andris Šķēle Andris Gyurcsány Ferenc Medgyessy Péter Orbán Viktor Horn Gyula Ansip Andrus JuhanParts Laar Mart Vähi Tiit Nečas Petr Topolánek Mirek Vladimír Zeman Miloš VáclavKlaus Kosor Jadranka Sanader Ivo Račan Ivica minister Prime Špidla
he number of of number he
four in four (2 terms collapsed in 1) in terms (2 collapsed 2003 Dec 23 2000 Jan 27 Mandate 10 Mar 1993 Mar 10 (4 2009 Mar 12 (3 2004 Dec 02 May 05 2000 (2 1995 Dec 21 (3 2004 Sep 29 May 27 2002 1998 Jul 08 1994 Jul 15 (3 Apr200 05 Apr2003 10 1999 Mar 25 ( Apr1995 17 terms (2 coll Jun 2010 28 1) in terms (2 collapsed Aug 2006 16 2002 Jul 12 1998 Jul 17 1) in terms (2 collapsed 1993 Jan 01 2009 Jul 6 3
46 terms terms terms terms terms terms terms
Estonia, Hunga Estonia,
collapsed in in collapsed in collapsed in collapsed 1) in collapsed in collapsed collapsed in collapsed
in each country was kept purposefully low low purposefully kept was country each in - 5
– – – – apsed in 1) in apsed
– - – – – – – – - -
– – – – – –
23 Dec 2003 Dec 23 27 May27 2002 1998 Jul 08 2004 Jul 19 2002 Jul 12
2011 Dec 23
17 Dec 199 Dec 17
17 Jun17 2013
14 Apr 2009 Apr142009 04 Apr 2011 Apr2011 04 Apr2005 12 Mar 1997 17
20 Dec 2007 2007 Dec 20 15 Feb 1996 Feb 15 2011 Oct 25 28 2002 Jan 6 Jul 2009 6 2009 Jul 7 Aug 7 1997 08 May 08 2009 07 Nov 2002 Nov 07 2004 Sept 29 1 1 1 1) 1 ) ) ) ) three prime ministerial prime three
y Lti,ad Lithuania and Latvia, ry,
7
(Years, rm ministeria prime Duration 2.11 2.11 3.11 2.10 1.11 5.6 2.7 3.1 2.6 1.7 4.7 2.4 2.9 2.6
4 4 2 3 2 4 5 Months)
terms
,
and
in l CEU eTD Collection influence ministers’ looked ability at (Baylisweakness prime earlier to intransition 2007); others political qualitative largely and small is where ministers prime about studies ministerial prime 19 (Blondel in investigation of mode primary the useful is biography especially are rankings Expert 2013). Hillmer and Azzi 2006, Gill and 1998, Theakston 1999, Hillmer Sheppard and Granatstein 1997, Jr. Schlesinger 1948, (Schlesinger democracies and old presidents in of ministers performance prime of rankings establish to used previously were surveys Expert years since or longer two for served that countries CEE nine in ministers prime 89% about of performance evaluates (2006 (1990 included; not were but analysis, present the fit would terms ministerial prime Four months. of number 15 was remaining tenure of month last the in Source: 2.2 Expert Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia Poland Poland Poland Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania –
–
Own calculation based on based calculation Own
1993)
number of days in the last month of tenu of month last the in days of number
2008) s urveys expert and rankings ,
bcue rfrne a gvn o longer to given was preference because , M
art Laar (1992 Laar art
early 2013. June 1990s until Borut Pahor Pahor Borut Janez Drnovšek Janez Fico Robert Dzurinda Mikuláš Mečiar Vladimír Tusk Donald LeszekMiller Jerzy Kubilius Andrius Algirdas GediminasVagnorius Buzek Janša ParlGov database ParlGov
r oe a eta ot ws de t te oa nme o mnh. f the If months. of number total the to added was month extra an more, or Brazauskas –
1994)
, Mart Siimann (1997 Siimann Mart ,
re was less than 15 days, one month was deducted from the total total the from deducted was month one days, 15 than less was re 09 Nov 2004 2004 Nov 09 1) in terms (6 collapsed May 14 1992 2006 Jul 04 1) in terms (3 collapsed 1998 Oct 30 1994 Dec 13 1) in terms (2 collapsed 2007 Nov 16 1) in terms (2 collapsed 2001 Oct 19 1) in terms (2 collapsed 1997 Oct 31 1) in terms (2 collapsed 2008 Nov 28 1) in terms (3 collapsed 2001 Jul 03 1996 Nov 27 (2 terms collapsed in 1) in terms (2 collapsed 2008 Nov 11
(Döring and Manow 2012) Manow and (Döring 47
. Some studies explained prime ministerial ministerial prime explained studies Some . – –
– – – –
– – – – – – 08 Jul 2010 Jul 08 Jun01 2006
04 2006 Jul 04 May 02 2004 Oct 2001 19
29 Oct 1998 Oct 29 21 Nov 2008 Nov 21 2011 Nov 18 2012 Oct 14 May 04 1999 10 Feb Feb 2012 10 11 Nov 2002 Nov 11 - 87 lasting terms. terms. lasting ). In ). –
1999), and Gediminas and 1999),
CEE,
.
If the remaining number of days days of number remaining the If
cumulative knowledge cumulative
2 n u, hs study this sum, In 0 13, Strangio et al. et Strangio 13, 10.6 3.11 3.11 3.11 4.11 7.8 2.6 2.5 3.3 4 4 4 Jozef Antall Jozef
Kirkilas Kirkilas
CEU eTD Collection social andthe EUpolicymaking. prime to also relates and effectiveness economic only beyond goes study this in forwarded governance democratic of concept the and indicators, economic on data offer individ of measures betweenrelationship the about little veryhowevertime, in point any ateconomy the of state the about deal great a us tell can indicators Macroeconomic measures. ministers’ prime empirically to able be inflation, yearly not that would establish I institutes, these by provided indicators at macroeconomic looked I If Eurostat. or Bank World like institutes financial by available data level country countries’ or politics otherwise biased provide opinions. to “outsiders” are these if especially journalists, by written reports media than accurate being of pr different under living of ministers’ experience prime an also but politics, about countries’ their about knowledge the estimates have only not performance provide who Experts spoken. are languages different nine nine in ministers prime 33 certainlynot studybut onlyfew, researcherto a allow would analysis media to related limitations Language assessments. comparative for opportunity and countries. few across leaders few some primeavailablemayfor ministers ministers’ performancebe only Media prime coverage of compare or case leadership isolated one on focus usually performance settings. innewly democratized and conduct elite of patterns about knowledge advance can and analysis statistical in hypothesis systematic no is ba there content, media informative post how about knowledge Beyond 2012). Ilonszki and Lengyel conce were studies decision e o lre dtst ae xrml vlal bcue hy rvd sfiin dt t test to data sufficient provide they because valuable extremely are datasets larger on sed only a pie iitr ad iies well citizens’ and ministers prime ual Measuring prime ministers’ performance through expert through performance ministers’ primeMeasuring have surveys Expert - making in larger institutional context (Haughton 2005, Blondel et al. 2007) and some and 2007) al. et Blondel 2005, (Haughton context institutional larger in making n oe efrac aes (e.g. areas performance some in rned with a negative political culture among culture political negative a with rned ime ministers ime - communist prime ministers handled political tasks. Expert rankings Expert tasks. political handled ministers prime communist clear advantages over case studies or media analysis. Case studies Case analysis. media or studies case over advantages clear eco
nomic . Consequent . rwh r nmlyet ae i ay a rlt to relate way any in rates unemployment or growth
- en. n diin fnnil nttts primarily institutes financial addition, In being. 48 economy or environment), which reduces the the reduces which environment), or economy
ly, their assessments have a higher chance chance higher a have assessments their ly,
assessments has advantages over over advantageshas assessments Visegrád Visegrád
elites (Gallina 2008, (Gallina elites
iitr’ conduct, ministers’
countries wherecountries CEU eTD Collection evaluating ou that consequently, theoretically and is making II ES to decision influence to proceeding powerful sufficiently are ministers that prime CEE that learned confident I meaningful. me made analysis data complete, was one) appendix in questionnaire survey (see the andpowers ministers’ prime about Iquestions included ES 2012. June in completed was and English in early2012 in sent was I ES III). (ES countries nine of languages native in and II) (ES English Ithroughout asESII(firstIII the text (second ESwave) wave), and (third wave). ES higher a also but data, missing of possibility the increases which questions, some skipping allowed questionnaire survey the to respond to how guidelines and research the of description short a included internet was survey The 2.3. three)appendix inthesurvey. participated e affil institutional their that notified rate. return the increase Confidentiality to strategy a as also but sensitivity, was topic’s the of identity because invitation personal experts’ of Confidentiality science. political in students doctoral or facultymembers eitheroften aremost Experts researchinstitutes. departm on indicated profiles research on based score. experts 2005: (O’Malley experts expertise internet via manner efficient in and time short in acquired be can mass data large a where tool collection data efficient an are surveys Expert xperts from 39 universities or research institutes in nine CEE countries (full list indicated in indicated list (full countries CEE nine in institutes research or universities 39 from xperts The ’ superior knowledge ensures a ensures knowledge superior ’ Experts invited to respond to the survey are residents of nine countries and were selected were and countries nine of residents are survey the to respond to invited Experts ES I included nine questions, while ES II and ES III each included six same q same six included each III ES and II ES while questions, nine included I ES s h are who
urvey o te ae hnmnn cos ag nme o css i i jsiibe o eot to resort to justifiable is it cases, of number large across phenomenon same the for prime ministers’ ministers’ prime
q of experts’ experts’ of uestionnaire
82). needn o rsac ad nwegal aot h sbet f interest of subject the about knowledgeable and research of independent epne rate. response E xpert surveys xpert - based administered in “survey monkey” software. Email invitation invitation Email software. monkey” “survey in administered based Institutional affiliation affiliation Institutional performance in ES II and III. Table 2.2 presents ES I data on the the on data I ES presents 2.2 Table III. and II ES in performance
iation might be used for expression of data quality. In total, total, In quality. data of expression for used be might iation The survey was sent in three waves that are referred to to referred are that waves three in sent was survey The cms f hs decision this of tcomes provide
reasonably accurate quantitative reflection of the “true” “true” the of reflection quantitative accurate reasonably
a quantitative measure for concepts for measure quantitative a 49 ental web sites of sites web ental - based surveys. If a researcher cannot acquire acquire cannot researcher a If surveys. based
was not not was inter explicitly - - making are suitable criteria for for criteria suitable are making executive relationship. After ES I AfterES relationship. executive explicitly explicitly their affiliated affiliated their
guaranteed and they were they and guaranteed urned n email in guaranteed of universities or universities
interest uestions in uestions .
The The and and a -
CEU eTD Collection Source Table 2.3Second expert survey wave (ES II) non a surveys sent of number the rate, response the on data II ES presents 2.3 Table ministers. prime individual of personalization executive and social characteristicsII policymaking.populist aboutalso prime ministers’ includedquestions ES governance: democratic of dimensions (see II ES 2013. June in one completed appendix in was questionnaire and English in 2012 late in sent was II ES Source: 2.2 non versus responses the and reminders, and surveys responses. sent of number the rate, response Total Total Slovenia Slovakia Poland Lithuania Latvia Hungary Estonia Republic Czech Croatia Country Total Slovenia Slovakia Poland Lithuania Latvia Hungary Estonia Republic Czech Croatia Country
Fir - responses. : ES II (December 2012 2012 (December II : ES
st st e
ES I (January 2012 2012 (January I ES
xpert
s urvey Response rate (%) rate Response Response rate Response
wave I) (ES – 40 (avg.) 40 29 62 23 42 20 86 19 70 11
21 40 31 45 31 30 36 31 20 32 June2012) –
(avg.) June2013)
(%) ) included questions about prime ministers’ performance in four four in performance ministers’ prime about questions included )
, see survey questionnaire in appendix one appendix in surveysee , questionnaire , see survey questionnaire insurvey see , questionnaire Sent 317 16 40 55 33 25 45 30 48 25 Sent 406 24 50 70 43 30 50 43 60 36
eortc conduct democratic
nd reminders, and the number of responses versus versus responses of number the and reminders, nd Reminders 50 Reminders
61 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 6
38 7 5 3 3 3 4 3 7 3
te U integratio EU the , appendix one appendix Respon Respon 99 18 17 10 14 10 10 5 9 6
180 12 31 16 18 43 42 ses 6 8 4
ses
, cnmc and economic n, No response No No Response No 218 11 22 38 23 16 31 24 38 15 226 12 19 54 25 24 35 18 32
7
survey survey
- CEU eTD Collection 10% about for decreased rate response The waves. survey three across survey the to responding the to respond about to times with 42 survey reminded were who experts 1000 almost to sent was survey The (ES I,II andIII) Table 2.5Total response rate, number surveys of and reminders and and thetotalnumber ofresponses versus non reminders and surveys sent of number total the rate, response average total presents 2.5 Table Source Table 2. the number ofreminders,and andthenumber sentsurveys ofnon versus responses was II ES in barrier language the that indicate would III ES in rate response higher significantly addition, In populism. ministers’ prime about question the include not did II,but ES as questions test by quality s data different a ensure to to questionnaire same was exact the III (sending ES sending of reason The 2013. late in completed countrieswas and CEE nine the languagesofnative the 2013in fall in IIIsent was ES Total ES (I, II, ESIII) (I, Total Total Total Total Total Slovenia Slovakia Poland Lithuania Latvia Hungary Estonia Republic Czech Croatia Country sent in Engl in sent : ES III (June 2013 2013 (June III : ES
ES III ES II ES I
4 Third expert survey wave (ES III)
ish played at least some role. Table 2.4 presents ES III data on the response rate, rate, response the on IIIdata ES presents 2.4 Table role. some least at played ish
Response rate (%) rate Response
Response rate Response one
–
December 2013), see surveysee December 2013), - 20 17 20 15 20 10 28 23 45 third 5
31 (avg.)31 20 32 40 (avg.)
f xet rsodn t ad about and to responding experts of
(%)
Sent 955 232 317 406 Sent
232 20 30 25 35 20 12 30 40 20
-
responses betweenresponses waves. threesurvey
51 questionnaire
Reminders 42 27 61 38 Reminders et of experts). ES III included the same same the included III ES experts). of et
27 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
in appendix one inappendix
Responded responses non versus Responded 334 180 55 99 two
55 10 4 3 7 8 9 2 6 6
-
thirds
of experts not not experts of - No response No No response No response. - eet check retest
619 175 218 226 175 16 27 18 25 11 10 24 34 10 - response
that that
CEU eTD Collection 33 Staats2009). and (Biglasier isless relevant rate did provide. experts knowledge and information 32 being, of estimation primegeneral ministers’governance. performance butprovide indemocratic of areas(exact) the about ex Consequently, sector. banking the in measures experts Slovenian effectiveness, Janša’s estimating in while measures, unemployment his about thought have may experts Estonian effectiveness, Ansip’s estimating conduct th have citize to had ministers prime measures (exact) the about specific not was questionnaire The prosperity. citizens’ to contributed policymaking in effectiveness and conduct ten a on governance democratic in performance ministers’ prime estimating for used primarily were surveys Expert 2.4 two, three, fivesix. four, and on based are countries these in performance ministers prime of estimates and survey) the to responded experts five than (less rate response satisf a in result not IIIdid Hungary,ES and Latvia, InSlovenia, II. ES in 32% and (40%) I ES in rate response highest the to compared 20%) (only III ES in lowest was rate response the barrier language than expertise rather insufficient that meaning rate, response the inflate expected) originally I (as not did 40% and 10% between rate response the report other usually to compared accomplishment successful a is which 31% is waves survey three across rate response average total The wave. survey new each in
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is more important, because i because important, more is Quality expertof data ns’ well ns’ ought s, Croatian experts experts Croatian s,
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one has to be to has one democraticconduct f these differences are small then the di the then small are differences these f could have could is most important in explaining response rate percentages. In fact, In percentages. rate response explaining in important most is
reports reports
ar in mind that response rates in percentages may be less relevant than than relevant less be may percentages in rates response that mind in ar xet wr akd o hn aot o pie ministers’ prime how about think to asked were Experts S ubstantive difference between those who responded responded who those between difference ubstantive primarily thought about his involveme his about thought primarily
a
response rate of 15% ( of15% rate response (only)
and effectiveness that contributed to citizens’ well citizens’ to contributed effectivenessthat and 52
pert rankings do not make us knowledgeable knowledgeable us make not do rankings pert ES II scores, as indicated in appendices one, one, appendices in indicated as scores, II ES democratic conduct democratic . 33
Sending the survey in native languages native in surveythe Sending fference between lower and higher response response higher and lower between fference
Hellová studies be engaged in engaged be
2010). using expert surveys that that surveys expert using may have have may
, Slovak experts could experts Slovak , nt in corruption. In corruption. in nt to contribute to to contribute to considered his considered to to and those who those and democratic democratic actory 32 - ’ ,
CEU eTD Collection rate. response very low Slovakia, Republic, Czech 34 Hungarian that or ministers prime Slovenian estimating in consistent were experts Slovenian Inter underlying an of measure good d a are dimensions separate *** * governance democratic Source Table 2. onlyof exper onthe possible side ministers Becauseprime same the measuring in average) (on another one to relative are (experts) raters different coefficient correlation and a “noise” very small reliability data good indicates which personalization, executive in and governance democratic of range scale a of (out points two exceed (usually) integration. The prime individual score mini differences of in 0.6 and policy in 0.8 personalization, executive in 0.9 policy, economic in 1.1 were scores average III and II ES between differences difference score average II ES Launching significant at 0.01 level (2 0.01 at significant emocratic governance) (Cronbach governance) emocratic Slovenia Slovakia Poland Lithuania Latvia Hungary Estonia Republic Czech Croatia Country
Average score difference difference score Average
Cronbach’s alpha estimate alpha Cronbach’s - rater consistency was established within country, because it was important to ensure that that ensure to important was it because country, within established was consistency rater :
Calculation performed in SPPS based on within country ES II expert responses across four dimensions of of dimensions four across responses expert II ES country within on based SPPS in performed Calculation n diin to addition In 6
Interclass
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ICC c
0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0.9 0 0.9 0.8 orrelation coefficient
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tailed) tailed) between ES II and III scores scores III and II ES between to
the in the data experts. onthe sideof are selected non areselected 34
s -
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test
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test check between ES II and ES III ensured data reliability. The reliability. data ensured III ES and II ES between check test Number of raters (experts) ofraters Number – ts retest check described above, I also calculated interclass interclass calculated also I above, described check retest . Table 2. 0.66 0.66 0.59 0.92 0.71 0.74 0.28 0.77 0.34 0.75 inter
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6
of concept’s separate dimensions separate concept’s of
demonstrates 53
is calculated ba calculated is
ten latent latent Significance
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prime ministers’ performance in performance ministers’ prime sters’ between ES II IIIsters’ betweenand ES didnot ES
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 osrc ( construct (IRR)
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performance in performance .93 .99 .97 .97 .94 .98 .93 .97 .96 Croatia, Lit Croatia, is that the erroris that the is
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ensure comparability of data one also has to to has also one data of comparability ensure performance performance ensions ptions ofmany ptions different
1996 7
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CEU eTD Collection conduct. democratic while performance, economic on contingent “likely 35 and “average” “outstanding”, groups; three in ministers prime of categorization by chapter in overcome is challenge This another. one against performance of areas different weighing requires which areas, separate in performance blurs governance democratic in score criteria as governance weighted equally four using by challenge this overcomes study ofatwould needareas least account performance for totake two asbenchmarks assessment. This (Ro areas different in performance in successful had sufficient to(generally) powers influence policymaking. outcome. Nevertheless,did establishrel study this policy the particular and establish contribution to ministers’ difficult prime small very each is between relationship it Empirically, evaluated. is performance which in each criteria much how about wonder still can that item particular we each to contributed (alone) minister and prime individual estimate raw a is however, This, decision making. influence to powers ministers’ prime real establishing empirically by three, chapter i challenge this overcome I outcomes. policy to contributions individual leaders’ for accounts that step research preceding a in engage to performance leadership assessing at attempt research al. et (Strangio outcome policy if empirically education, minorit agriculture, in measures at look also we should or policy, economic and foreign in leaders of performance evaluate we if sufficient it Is success. a indicate would impact the which appropriat most) (the is influence policy leaders’ that agreement an was there if Even performance. leaders’ of indicators appropriate are popularity or impact policy conduct, of integrity terms, long leaders’ if know not do We success.
As I explain in chapter four, four, chapter in explain I As y rights of andprotection theenvironment? edrhp efrac i uuly area usually is performance Leadership decision democracies, In ad h etn t which to extent the and ,
for prime ministers’ performance. However, the overall prime ministers’ prime overall the However, performance. ministers’ prime for some dimensions might be subordinate and and subordinate be might dimensions some
2013, Baylis 2007:84)? Baylis 2013, - making is dispersed and it is very difficult to establish establish to difficult very is it and dispersed is making performance in EU integration may be be may integration EU in performance atively prime high CEE ministers ofcertainty degree that
e indicator, we can further speculate about the areas in in areas the about speculate further can we indicator, e n niiul leader individual an 56 - ain maig ht edr ae ee equally never are leaders that meaning variant se 2000). Consequently, each leadership study study leadership each Consequently, 2000). se
This empirical uncertainty requires each requires uncertainty empirical This
aoe cnrbtd o particular to contributed (alone) it is likely that that likely is it 35
separate areas of democratic of areas separate contingent on prime ministers’ ministers’ prime on contingent
is established here as a a as here established is social policymaking social four four
is is n -
CEU eTD Collection pr or parliamentary as characterized democracies electoral and proportional withweak presidents laws. settings similar from terms ministerial institutionally prime selected purposefully I differences, institutional for control To p more that constra to relate leaders of assessment the of assessments empirical require unfolds. term ministers’ prime which in environment would which 2000), Genovese and (Lammers leaders betwee distinction a making entails variability are that circumstances times and different requirements at different office by defined in are leaders Different study. leadership any to challenge different junctures. term at performances better (potential) between distinction a making without performance ministers’ would this worried I rankin however, experts’ Consequently, rate. response terms, the decrease their of end the at and start the at minister prime each of performance evaluate to experts asking by performance of measure” “double a introducing this overcome have could I progresses. term their as expectations all to respond from away move leaders as wanes an as labeled at successful society moment aleader betweentook the the in occurred that changes at looking merely to opposed solved, be must that problems the of take to need also would performance leaders’ of Variabilityperformance. between scope the to according populists” shapes rone to coalitions composed of many parties that constrain prime ministers’ ability to act. to ability ministers’ prime constrain that parties many of composed coalitions to rone ns n opportunities and ints h aiiy o oto fr numerous for control to ability The Lead rm mnses pstv, vrg o negative or average positive, ministers’ prime
ers’ performance is performance ers’ h oeal odtos f leadership. of conditions overall the
inevitable “decline of charisma” where strong support closer to elections inevitably elections to closer support strong where charisma” of “decline inevitable the beginning of their terms their of beginning the
Huho 2005) (Haughton also differences in institutional structure that provide different different provide that structure institutional in differences - mat iin f efrac ta alw distinguishing allows that performance of vision impact the time einn o ter terms their of beginning
- office and themomenthe/she (Blondeloffice left and 19
variant than closer to term’s end. T end. term’s to closer than 57 . structural and temporal E n “low opportunity” and “high opportunity” opportunity” “high and opportunity” “low n
and
etrl system lectoral Proportional electoral laws for example are are example for laws electoral Proportional Additional leaders’ are leaders’ ( rcet 02 Sornk 01. This 2011). Skowronek 2002, Crockett
gs reflect an average estimate of prime of estimate average an reflect gs oiia impac political problems
eas te ae es be to able less are they because a b an be can
usually perceived to be more be to perceived usually
his is what Max Weber Max what is his atr i a inherent an is factors t into account the nature the account into related to comparative comparative relatedto
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CEU eTD Collection 2012 thatoccurred during hisprime ministerial term. III ES in powerful more as perceivedwas Dzurinda performance.his to unrelatedfactors on not and wh significantlyassessments, experts’ influence not did 2013 summer in involvement corruption and scandal party’s Reform his of revelation The crisis. economic global the of onset the at downturn economic immediate the rating credit Estonia’s stabilized that reforms economic overseeing for popularity improved his to relate may This dimensions. governance’s democratic estimates their biased survey between in ministers prime about acquired experts information new to related “outstanding”, as II ES on based “av categorized ministers prime waves, survey two between governance. democratic of dimension simil were waves survey two between scores ministers’ Prime rankings. expert resembling closely in resulted III test the of results The waves. survey two between scores ministers’ b subjectivity experts’ overcome I Largely, the (e.g. setting. another measures in “average” and one in ministers’ good” “very as assessed were prime media) the to relationship exact which show to out carried is study another unless more are performance of estimates the in infused values distinct (possibly) e reflect st 201 (Helms responses calculated politically include simply may rankings experts’ and culture and values prevailing of product governance democratic non and p inherent an has which others, indirectly of observation the surveys through concepts Expert measure challenges. methodological few to related is surveys expert of Use andards about what is “very good” or “very bad” performance and lower grades may simply simply may grades lower and performance bad” “very or good” “very is what about andards
compared to ES II compared toES erage” and “likely populists” wouldchangeerage” and “likely nothappen. anddid populists” categories this Small score difference between ES II and III indicates some “noise” in expert data likely data expert in “noise” some indicates III and II ES between difference score Small xperts’ increased increased xperts’ - adm ro between error random rnvreceigmr hn he ons u o cl ag f1 n any in 10 of range scale a of out points three than more exceeding never ar , which mayrelate scandals which tothecorruption revelation ofa of , series during Fr xml, soin ni i sgiiaty prdd n S I i all in III ES in upgraded significantly is Ansip Estonian example, For . .
Experts’ estimates about prime ministers’ performance can simply be a a be simply can performance ministers’ prime about estimates Experts’ expectations experts’ estimations and prime ministers’ performance in in performance ministers’ prime and estimations experts’ 2a ich indicates they focused on his individual accomplishments individual his on focused they indicates ich : 9). Experts in different countries may have different different have may countries different in Experts 9). : Gri 20 (Garzia
If the score difference was larger than three points points three than larger was difference score the If y launching ES III that allowed comparing prime prime comparing allowed that III ES launching y 58
1 MAlse 20, em 2008 Helms 2007, McAllister 11,
s and improved economic growth after after growth economic improved and s - retest proved that ES II and and II ES that proved retest
difficult to overcome, to difficult otential
). waves that waves of random of
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Researches assessing performance of Canadian and British prime ministers related experts’ characteristics experts’ related ministers prime British and Canadian of performance assessing Researches s b is In this ch this In i - annual rs’ party positioning positioning party rs’
apter, I discussed case selection and the logic of using prime ministerial term as term ministerial prime using of logic the and selection case discussed I apter, country , 6 ). In Britain In ).
in all democratic governance’s dimensions except the EU integration. EU the except dimensions governance’s democratic all in - level measure of democracy, market economy and management and economy market democracy, of measure level n hpe four chapter in
, party preference, age or scholarly discipline played significant role in experts’ experts’ in role significant played discipline scholarly or age preference, party 36
is also oee, fie t ak xet ab experts ask to failed I However,
ae te xet may experts the same, on a country level. xet’ estimates experts’ ing expert rankings. I pointed to several study’s study’s several to pointed I rankings. expert ing
59 to influence decision
)
o xet’ assessments experts’ to
validity” in line with media reports about prime prime about reports media with line in their
wr tee rm mnses with ministers prime these award
( esnl characteristics personal are dok n Collier and Adcock - making. oprd to compared
(Azzi and Hilmer 2013, 2013, Hilmer and (Azzi ocratic governance. I governance. ocratic a marginal impact (Azzi (Azzi impact marginal a u ter personal their out
I f experts’ and and experts’ f
Bertlesmann 2001) hy are they ;
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n hs hpe, dmntae how demonstrate I chapter, this In - do provisions Constitutional outcomes. policy which for responsibility bear and to ted making powereach of in o om h gvrmn ad rps is members its propose and government the form to The chapter The sto i te parliament the in osition
the e in a prime minister and the government’s program program government’s the and minister prime a in e
zc Rpbi, the Republic, Czech first looks at prime ministers’ prime at looks first
the most votes in the election to form the government and upon upon and government the form to election the in votes most the dividual prime minister. minister. dividual prime I C In . president’s nomination (or recommendation)(or nomination president’s - s to policy outcomes. Establishing (a degree) of prime prime of degree) (a Establishing outcomes. policy to s
prime roatia, the president president the roatia,
contextual rsdn apit the appoints president 60 minister
WR I RA POLITICAL REAL IN OWERS Constitutional powers and then at p at then and powers Constitutional
,
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rsdn triangle president lly among party leaders. A prime prime A leaders. party among lly
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The oenets rga ad ebrhp Atce 9 f h Cnttto) In Constitution). the of 59 (Article membership and program government’s
the speaker of the parliament the of speaker the recommendation Croatian Constitution state Constitution Croatian (or parliamentary groups) nominates the prime ministerial candidate who who candidate ministerial prime the nominates groups) parliamentary (or appoints and dismisses the prime minister and ministers (recommended ministers and minister prime the dismisses and appoints
In Slovakia,
In Poland, the president president the Poland, In are also very general about prime ministers’ duties ministers’ prime about general very also are dto o te rm Minister Prime the of ndation onstructive vote of confidence requires concomitant naming of a a of naming concomitant requires confidence of vote onstructive appoints the prime minister and ministers (upon the prime prime the (upon ministers and minister prime the appoints the president appoints a president the
of
the
prime minister 61 s that the prime minister and cabinet members cabinet and minister prime the that s
(Article 33 of the Constitution). In Latvia, the the Latvia, In Constitution). the of 33 (Article )
nominates and nominates (Article 77 of the Constitution) and Constitution) the of 77 (Article parliamenta (ril 102 (Article ) )
nd dismisses the prime minister and and prime minister the nd dismisses cabinet members. appoints a prime minister minister prime a appoints ry vote of confidence (Article confidence of vote ry ence in an individual minister, individual an in ence overnment’s programovernment’s f h Cnttto) In Constitution). the of
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o h primn ad h peiet Ltin n Soa Constitution Slovak and Latvian president. the and parliament the to its its
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The PPI provides a snapshot of the state of legislative power in the world as of 2007 of as world the in power legislative of state the of snapshot a provides PPI The I Includes Includes nclude Executive :
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olwn idctr: parliam indicators: following - legislative and the inter legislative the and - eiltv rltosi. aie ltrtr sget te et niao to indicator best the suggests literature Cabinet relationship. legislative
CEE - executive arena (prime minister vs. president) in different political political different in president) vs. minister (prime arena executive
parliaments
ry weak) to 1 (very strong). (very strong). weak) 1 to ry ower. In table 3.1 strength of CEE parliaments is indicated is parliaments CEE of strength 3.1 table In ower.
38 ent’s ability to impeach the president or replace the prime minister, minister, prime the replace or president the impeach to ability ent’s
(FishKroenig and2009). defined as defined - executive relationship
63
the the
PPI* 0.72 0.75 0.75 0.78 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.81 0.78 legislature’s sway over the over sway legislature’s e oes o nlec decision influence to powers ve
members of the chief executive chief members ofthe - eiltv (prime legislative
and the and . It is It .
ability of parliament to to parliament of ability
calculated so that the the that so calculated e xecutive
iitr vs. minister identifies - making .
37
ty of ty and by
CEU eTD Collection t known better were Walesa, or Havel like presidents, higher also when but popularity, mandates direct their to attributed was hand other the on strength Presidents’ Protsyk 2007, al. 200 Sedelius 2006, et Blondel 2007, and 1996 (Baylis offices ministers’ prime ineffective and inter frequent for allowing structure developed insufficiently factors, foreign systems, party developed poorly producing patterns recruitment duration, term short to related weakness ministerial Prime ministers. prime than stronger however were powers formal weak despite presidents, communist within are and 2001). and (Blondel ineffectiveness to prone more powe be to and parliament the to ministers’ relation prime reduce significantly to considered are that governments minority during even reality, in important more be may agreements elites’ or personalities political that (su bill the opposed who parliamentarians after Zeman) of (supportive parliamentarians remaining of support the by pass executive thus possibilities contextual exploit skillfully can who actors executive account into take to fails also index PPI coalition cabinets. lived, shorter by characterized governments consensus than makers policy effective executiv stable and dominant with characterized are that democracies majoritarian ( Lijphart’sHowever, lasting. wereshort 14 and indicate as and term, However, terms. governmentslasting unlikely are toengage short that is argument The terms. short with ministers prime to compared are stronger terms considered longer with ministers prime indicator, this on Based durability. ministers’ prime or o branches legislative and executive the of power relative the measure
In a parliamentary democracy, presidents are ceremonial are presidents democracy, parliamentary a In cut the about agreement in not is literature The . For example, Klaus tolerated Zeman’s minority cabinet (1998 cabinet minority Zeman’s tolerated Klaus example, For the executive institutionally weaker institutionallyweaker executive the f he yas t iiu ae ae a ciei o acmlsig legislative accomplishing of criteria as taken are minimum at years three if 6 , d in chapter five, section 5.3.3, in this study, 19 prime ministers were long long were ministers prime 19 study, this in 5.3.3, section five, chapter in d Körösényi pporters of Klaus then in opposition) left the parliament. This suggests This parliament. the left opposition) in then Klaus of pporters e facto de
largely inexperienced politicians, policy constraints imposed by imposed constraints policy politicians, inexperienced largely 1999, Zubek 2001, Goetz and Wollmann 2001, Haughtonand Wollmann2005). Goetz 2001, Zubek 1999,
hfig th shifting
in effective decisionin effective 64 2012
lcs f oe fo te alaet o the to parliament the from power of locus e than ) findings challenge this claim, emphasizingclaim, this challengefindings ) - off point that dist that point off
p rime ministers. In early transition, post Inearlytransition, ministers. rime - making (Warwick 1994).making (Warwick and representative figureheads figureheads representative and f government is cabinets’ cabinets’ is government f inguishes short and long and short inguishes - 2002) and bills would bills and 2002) a pie ministers prime han - executive clashes executive Müller e are not more more not are e
- Rommel Rommel
s in rs -
CEU eTD Collection tra corruption on restrictions and implemented early the from oriented laws. corruption developed poorly 39 to ministers prime times, considered be can powers executive decision influence to powers strong has Kalvītis), who minister prime the in concentrate (e.g. oligarchs of interest the in powers oligarchs of interests the to relation in only understood properly be can powers ministers’ prime expert, Latvian one decision influence to post powers significant in oligarchs of emergence the given finding, unsurprising an interesting,however an is This ministers. prime in concentrated is power the that agree not do prime challenge decision influence to powers few prime semi Lithuania’s to relate may which minister, prime in concentrated is power executive th in the split are experts Lithuania, In ministers. that agree strongly experts countries, all In executive Source Table 3. presidents. 3.2 countri communist 89 2007: (Baylis Slovakia Slovenia Poland Lithuania Latvia Hungary Estonia R Czech Croatia Country
Based on the opinion of Latvian expert, oligarchical expert, Latvian of opinion the on Based and 3.3 :
E
2
(Prime minister and his/her cabinet) his/her minister and (Prime S
Power concentration
I, see survey questionnaire, appendix one appendix surveysee questionnaire, I,
suggest, the executive powersuggest, theexecutive isconcentrated
This is in clear contrast to politics in Estonia and less so in Lithuania, which were anti were which Lithuania, in so less and Estonia in politics to contrast clear in is This anti concentrated
ministers over power distribution in the executive. the in distribution power over ministers - Power Power - es (Blondel es 0. G 90). corruption corruption (%) 100 100 83 75 88 50 40 98 93
39
I te rm mnse is minister prime the If . who do not belong to oligarchical elite (e.g. Bērziņš), are likely to have have to likely are Bērziņš), (e.g. elite oligarchical to belong not do who sto. fe 20, eea pee o anti of pieces several 2000, After nsition. radually
ntttoa framework institutional
in primein ministers et al. et Respondents Number of Numberof - making (e.g. power to veto legislation) and do (on occasion) occasion) (on do and legislation) veto to power (e.g. making however, , 25 14 41 38 becometighter
9 9 2 8 4 2007
?” Response options: “yes”/”no”. Responseoptions: ?” - making. Based on a confidential correspondence with correspondence confidential a on Based making. :
178 : “Is political political : “Is eir agreement about the power concentrating in the the in concentrating power the about agreement eir
not concentrated not 65 , Zielonka , business business tbe xctv laesi eegd n post in emerged leadership executive stable
, n po cmimns f h eie t ipeet anti implement to elites the of commitments poor and nevertheless
isl a oiac, eg Šēe, r ss his uses or Šķēle), (e.g. oligarch, an himself Power Power (%) - 25 13 50 60 17 2 0 7 0 presidentialism where presidents are given are presidents where presidentialism
interest groups in Latvia Latvia in groups interest
power
in prime ministers who are in primethan ministers stronger
and Pravda and
corruption levels in Latvia remain high. Latviaremain in levels corruption
in your country in
- orpin eilto i Lti were Latvia in legislation corruption
Respondents - Number of Numberof transition
In Latvia, experts generally experts Latvia, In 2001) and as data in table in data as and 2001) 3 2 9 3 1 0 3 0 5
concentrated in the concentrated emerged because of the the of because emerged
Latvia who retain retain who Latvia - making. At other other At making. of Respondents of Total Number Total - 12 16 18 42 41 30 5 8 4 corruption corruption
– - CEU eTD Collection on powers of distribution Constitutional to relate often most ministers prime and presidents between cause their domains. elite elite to or Poland, and Croatia in like reduced intentionally were powers t early shi gradual about thesis the inter of incidence higher to related also is which presidents, than stronger are ministers prime that agree who (72%) experts Lithuanian of al. et (Blondel minist prime where parliamentarism of logic the with line in generally decision influence to powers strong have presidents not and ministers prime agre anonymously Lithuania in except countries, all in experts 3.3, table in indicated As in practice and institutionally Source Table: 3.3 in decision decision little Slovakia Slovenia Poland Lithuania Latvia Hungary Estonia R Czech Croatia Country table 3.3 onesgaue appointment countersignature, s
: E policy ineffectiveness policy eoe oe cutmd o osnul oiis n wr ls wlig o c otie of outside act to willing less were and politics consensual to accustomed more become
ransition. This gradual shift is related either to institutional change where presidents’ presidents’ where change institutional to either related is shift gradual This ransition.
The inter The
-
S
making figures than presidents who are largely ceremonial, which is support is which ceremonial, largely are who presidents than figures making
I, see survey questionnaire, appendix one appendix surveysee questionnaire, I, Power concentration within executivethe .
-
making power. Within the executive, the Within power. making
2007). Semi 2007). - executive conflict however remains at least a hypothetical possibility that can can that possibility hypothetical a least at remains however conflict executive (prime minister or president or minister (prime -
presidentialism, as I explained abo explained I as presidentialism, ft of the executive po executive the of ft and prime ministers’ lower achievements (Sedelius achievements lower ministers’ prime and s,
dismissal - executive conflicts executive : “In the executive, w executive, the : “In s, 66
)? presidents’ competencies in in competencies presidents’ ”
wer in favor of prime ministers prime of favor in wer
prime ministers are institutionally stronger stronger institutionally are ministers prime Prime minister stronger than president than ministerstronger Prime ho is stronger political figure, figure, political stronger is ho
ve, accounts for lower percentage percentage lower for accounts ve, in Lithuania in (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 72 r ha te executive the head ers
. Expert data support data Expert .
replacement ees o fore or defense - making, which is which making,
2006).
compared to to compared ed by data data by ed
Conflicts s
where where
e that e ign ign CEU eTD Collection the Indi parliame 2010. holding until 1990 the in one times from the times 76 from Poland different in and is Republic 175 Czech the in presidents elected party veto used their Lithuania and in elected terms directly their Presidents in are early elections parliamentary are when power they veto use close, to likely more are presidents elected Directly veto. presidential 40 competition. and conflict provoking thereby influenceinstituti rules, however, Gradually to and opportunities procedures more political with of actors formation providing institutionalization of levels lower semi in especially conflict, countries inter the that agreegenerally experts 3.4, table in indicated As *NR consensual”, “mostly and mostlyconflictual” but cooperative, “sometimes mostlybut cooperative”, Presidents ministersand Prime Source Table 3. relationship and between prime ministers, presidents, to ability the exercise not do inter the that empirically ensure and credibility cabinet’s on effect which work, their criticize dismiss publicly may to they powers ministers, prime formal have not do presidents although practice, In 67). 2005: Sedelius 8, veto of use or matters policy Slovakia Slovenia Poland Lithuania Latvia Hungary Estonia R Czech Croatia Country
President’s power to veto legislation is is legislation veto to power President’s
constellation of political forces in government and parliament (Tavits 200 (Tavits parliament and in government forces ofpolitical constellation –
number ofrespond number : ES I, : ES
4
Type
is cooperative and on occasion conflictual. Some scholars suggest that inter that suggest scholars Some conflictual. occasion on and cooperative is same period period same Conflictual
see survey questionnaire, appendix one appendix surveysee questionnaire, Mostly Mostly (%) s of i 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
ntra
( ents Köker - NR* executive relationships 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
in yourcountry?” in -
presidential democracies presidential 2013) onalization process normalizes predictability and the likelihood for likelihood the and predictability normalizes process onalization 40
cooperative cooperative influence policy influence conflictual, conflictual, Sometimes but mostly but
that can endanger prime ministe prime endanger can that , which indicates that likelihood of presidential veto is always contingent on on contingent always is veto presidential of likelihood that indicates which , - (%) executive conflicts are few, meaning that presidents generally presidents that meaning few, are conflicts executive
55 92 44 83 50 61 50 66 25 used veto used perceptions about perceptions
eaie eas s because relative
Response options: “mostly conflictual”, “sometimes conflictual, conflictual, “sometimes conflictual”, “mostly options: Response 75 NR 17 11 15 26 27 7 3 4 1 : , in ,
“
-
Overall, how would you evaluate the the you evaluate would how Overall, making, I asked experts to evaluate the nature of nature the evaluate to experts asked I making, 67
Estonia Estonia cooperative, cooperative,
Sometimes Sometimes but mostly but conflictual
is more likely in early transition, because of of because transition, early in likely more is (%) prime ministers’ overall achievements. To achievements. overall ministers’ prime which isindicated by 32 25 12 13 24 ome ome 0 6 0 0 5
9
, in , parliamentary majority can always overrule overrule always can majority parliamentary
Hungary 39 Hungary - executive relationship relationship executive rs’ policy reforms (Protsyk 2006 (Protsyk reforms policy rs’ NR 10 10 9 0 4 1 0 5 1 0 can have a profoundly negative profoundly a have can : 35).
consensual
, in , Mostly Mostly (%)
Latvia 35 Latvia35 10 31 11 50 28 38 75 8 7
data intable 3.4.
relationship between between relationship
and in and
NR 12 ntary majority. majority. ntary 3 1 5 2 3 3 3 3
across CEE acrossCEE
- Slovakia 36 Slovakia executive Total Total NR
31 12 16 18 43 41 rectly 6 8 4
: CEU eTD Collection ministerial allocating and ministers appointing portfolios in freer become ministers prime while domains, ministerial prime 42 party ofruling stronginfluence 41 to led eventuallywhich Vagnorius unpopular enjoyed still parliamentary support. However, latter the because Vagnorius, government’s remove to parliament on the ask commenting openly not could continuously He matters, policy of series a performance in say a have to andAdamkus,ambitious wantedVagnorius unlikeBrazauskas,constant. president was was more gained ahim voteof(Sedelius confidence 140 2006: which economy, the of liberalization further for plan a outlined and initiative political supp strongly resignation. still his however, openly) Miller not (though broader request a to and search government Miller’s to for support Kwasniewski political prompted allegations corruption ongoing and popularity funding. highway on bill cabinet’s and social that of party a number removed he once a minority a on as continued and disagreed issues economic coalition fragile His 2001. in minister prime become inter The government. Buzek’s challenge the by openly not did he although 2000, especiallyduring areas, policy of number large initiated a across cabinet laws vetoed He minister. prime was Buzek when power veto used frequently president Polish The policymaking. in role significant a play to success of degrees varying cancabinet lead instability to the exploit may who which matters, executive in say interventions greater a have to presidents’ support parliamentary strong of to lack cabinet’s vulnerable more and powerful less be to inter in role a play may below, 200 (Sedelius decreases conflict
I C n Poland n abinet stability stability abinet In Lithuania, the int the Lithuania, In Poland In (Zubek 2001) (Zubek , presidential powers powers presidential , related to (in his opinion) flawed privatization and problematic economic reforms. economic problematic and privatization flawed opinion) his (in to related may relate to many factors including including factors many to relate may 42 Ltuna n rcnl i te zc Rpbi, rsdns tepe with attempted presidents Republic, Czech the in recently and Lithuania ,
related to related Vagnorius’s
( Šarkutė er decreased decreased 41 -
executive conflict between president Adamkus and Prime Minister Prime and Adamkus president between conflict executive -
and, consequently, ineffectiveness. executive conflict. executive
the sluggish economy during Russian economic crisis in 1998, in crisis economic Russian during economy sluggish the
Adamkus 6: 2010)
re i te alaet ue te potnt t rgi the regain to opportunity the used parliament, the in orted
after 1997 1997 after 3, rty 20) A ye f oenet a explained as government, of type A 2006). Protsyk 131, resignation in 1999. The relationship between Adamkus and and Adamkus between relationship The 1999. in resignation lgih econ Sluggish
used his better standing in opinion poll better standing inopinion his used - xctv tnin did tensions executive - and subsequent presidents become less willing to interfere in in interfere to willing less become presidents subsequent and 1, Nations in Transit in 2004). 1, Nations 68
Prime ministers in minority cabinets are like are cabinets minority in ministers Prime monocrat mc rwh hg uepomn, falling unemployment, high growth, omic c aie model, cabinet ic
o dmns we Miller when diminish not alaetr spot and support parliamentary
did not support the support not did s, compared to quite ly ly
CEU eTD Collection su alone not is president the and parliament the to relation ministers prime and conflict the of particular nature the because between relationship the country, about information more per provide can domain conflicts of number sheer the than relevant more Šķēle, Horn, Klaus, se ministers prime because study; this in relevant less is transition in earlier presidents of strength relative is presidents inter of incidence Theinfluence policymaking. to able arelargely who ministers prime concentratesin p real in presidents the perceptions performance. ofhisoverall worse to contributed have may scandal bribe a in role disputed Miller’s over Kwasniewski with confli Miller’s Similarly, 168). 2006: have (Sedelius achievements economic Vagnorius’s hampered could issues economic over Adamkus president and Vagnorius Minister Prime between n may ambassadors foreign of dismissals and appointments over Kwasniewski president with disagreements Buzek’s Similarly, performance. social and/or economic Račan’s on impact little had have may officials inter the be example, For achievements. overall his/her and act to autonomy conflict of domains wou particular research the between of relationship type This occurs. conflict the which in domains particular depth more in investigating from benefit would research further conflict, to given provisions executive actors (Sed power institutional than rather personalities different between animosity inter the that indicating harmonious, as fir his in Kubilius (Paskas, ministers Prime subsequent we Pie iitr aa ad P and Račan Minister Prime tween - xctv cnlcs s occasional, is conflicts executive This section was interested in position of prime ministers in relation to the parliament and parliament the and inrelation to prime ministers of inposition This sectioninterested was inter of likelihood and provisions institutional at looking simply of Instead lected from that period are few and many were in fact strong personalities (e.g. (e.g. personalities strong fact in were many and few are period that from lected generally cooperative, supporting prime ministers’ ability to act independently. The The independently. act to ability ministers’ prime supporting cooperative, generally ot have played a big role in Buzek’s social performance. In contrast, a clash clash a contrast, In performance. social Buzek’s in role big a played have ot
Mečiar and Drnovšek). The particular domain of inter of domain particular The Drnovšek). and Mečiar ’ elius 2006:149).
erae pwr. eea etmto o pie iitr’ oiin in position ministers’ prime of estimation General powers. decreased olitical contexts. According to expert data, the executive power in CEE CEE in power executive the data, expert to According contexts. olitical
res however - xctv cnlc i, n ag pr, eae t political to related part, large in is, conflict executive ident 69
Mesić
h rltosi bten rm mnses and ministers prime between relationship the st term and Brazauskas) can be described be can Brazauskas) and term st
over appointments of chief intelligent intelligent chief of appointments over , ld provide grounds for judging the the judging for grounds provide ld
osqet lesser consequent fcet o ag eprcly prime empirically gauge to fficient - executive conflict is is conflict executive - xctv tensions executive
rm ministers’ prime
- executive executive conflict’s conflict’s ct CEU eTD Collection prime salient. to less close are preferences policy their where ministers positions in placed be can who players committees. cabinet establishing or bycabinet the using rel may prerogatives These decision influence to entitlements important equally is contexts political framework.institutional of analysis the why is This 53). 200 (Sedelius actors political by changed formally even and stretched translated, interpreted, is decision actors, constrain for relevant people and the organization choosing by the and over processes control institutional exerting by policymaking influence can They personnel. out shape to position a in frequently (Blondel19 fields policyof range wideinfluence a to able ministers other above usually are ministers prime and rule collectivity However the under operate reality in cabinets responsible. jointly them for are who ministers all of decisions co overall cabinet power to relation in position ministerial ministers’ prime about vague generally are prime Constitutions countries. across in variation much explain cannot provisions Constitutional section, ministe prime powers and ministers’ position prime in interested more is discussion the section, this In actors. and institutional ministers other prime between relationship the on focused analysis the section, previous the In resource 3.3 Political prerogativesuse toincrease ineachministers country theirinpractice. can prime powers is This political whyministers’ sectionat contexts. powerslooks specific next inreal political the
Several political prerogatives can increase prime ministers’ formally weak constitutional weak formally ministers’ prime increase can prerogatives political Several actors. They usually state that prime ministers are cabinet heads and responsible for its for responsible and heads cabinet are ministers prime that state usually They actors. ’ preferences’ - aie’ amnsrtv resources. administrative cabinet’s issuing directives to ministers, setting the cabinet’s agenda, chairing cabinet m cabinet chairingthesettingcabinet’sagenda, ministers, to directives issuing ordination. The logic of cabinet collectivity requires that cabinet decisions are are decisions cabinet that requires collectivity cabinet of logic The ordination.
O’Malley
but real political contexts determine the extent to which institutional framework institutional which to extent the determine contexts political real but s and prime powerss and ministers’ , or in positions where their preference wheretheir positions in or , (2005) suggests that suggests (2005)
ate to powers about organizing a cabinet and allocating and cabinet a organizing about powers to ate - aig wih eurs h aayi o cneta factors contextual of analysis the requires which making, rs have within the cabinet. As emphasized in the previous previous the in emphasized As cabinet. the within have rs Political resources allow prime ministers control over veto veto over control ministers prime allow resources Political comes and are able to affect structures, processes, and and processes, structures, affect to able are and comes prime ministers ministers prime
70 Prime ministers ministers Prime
s – different from prime ministers’ prime from different
seemingly without any power to power any without seemingly r i a oiin o raie a organize to position a in are 87 : 166). Prime ministers are ministers Prime 166). : - aig Institutions making. , few parliamentary parliamentary few , to the analysis of of analysis the to
portfolios or or portfolios eetings
are 6 : , .
CEU eTD Collection change prevent policy 43 long and successful whose relatively a Ansip, after Estonian eroded of popularity 2014 March in resignation Recent posts. ministerial prime and/or ministers prime contrast, In electo as considered office. from removal fearing without prerogatives of use them allow which services, party their keep to order in benefits and concessions policy granted be to 256 2005: (O’Malley unite ministers prime to behind likely are and policy over discretion more have who candidates lists party on putting by members party other of career the control to ability the have parties their for assets electoral a who ministers Prime electorate. bythe supported and to sold be must that policies behind parties unite to them allows which popular, electorally are they if especially account, into ministers’ prime for support other by policies preferred on based personnel cabinet structure to ministers prime allows their to closest disputes cabinet to them allowing p c to ability bad are prospects electoral m which accepted, not minister prime motion confidence (O’Malley,2005). ministers agenda cabinet and parliamentary control setting the alternatives veto for unilaterally policy make rime ministers
A veto player player veto A Cabinet agenda setting is another powerful tool that tool powerful another is setting agenda Cabinet the settingallow Prerogativesthat all election all isa s ’
to force to political preferred policies, especiallypreferred if choose the most favorable forum for deci for forum favorable most the choose
from happening from s
ral liability for their parties are likely to be removed from party leadership leadership party from removed be to likely are parties their for liability ral
n i rltd o islto of dissolution to related is and s
ay lead to early elections and incur costs to opposition parties if their their if parties opposition to costs incur and elections early to lead ay
is is actor policy preferences by threat of parliament’s dissolution, if the policy is is policy the if dissolution, parliament’s of threat by preferences policy consequently – cabinet actors. Prime ministers’ party leadership should also be taken taken be also should leadership party ministers’ Prime actors. cabinet or worse than the prospects of prime minister’s party minister’s prime of prospects the than worse or
The ability to control parlia control to abilityThe whose agreement is n is whoseagreement civ plc changes policy achieve
players .
preferred policies. preferred 43 a strong warning to other parties who parties other to warning strong a .
“alternatives for others”“alternatives for , the right to call elections, appoint and dismiss dismiss and appoint elections, call to right the , - 261, ecessary for policy change, or whose objection whoseobjection or change, policy for ecessary 71 his/her partygoodhis/her has chances electoral
Katz 2001). These prime ministers are likely are ministers prime These 2001). Katz The ability to appoint and dismiss ministers ministers dismiss and appoint to ability The h parliament. the
n ifune decision influence and mentary agenda mentary term sion increases prime ministers prime increases
- and his replacement by a much much a by replacement his and making and propose solutions to solutions propose and making
generally include generallyinclude C niec motion onfidence involves the right to call to right the involves
- con making ( Ibid sider sider re considered re the : 282). The The 282). : would , through through , ’ abilityto . rejecting
s powers powers
allow s
CEU eTD Collection thantofaceindividual that electoraluncertain present for solutions all. outcomes to compared potent be also agree rather may parties other and ministers’ prime because mayelections, calling powers dismissal However, goals. their achieve to use can importan more is ministers dismiss to or elections call to ministers’ power the if clear not also Itis policies. preferred prime supporting stop who ministers remove to corrective a be always can powers that possible import more is is ministers It dismiss to IPP’s. power country across and whose within from dimensions differ separate significantly of not aggregate do an averages is it because threatened, greatly not is measure reality in power of dimensions some if Even other. each to relate decision all that considered I study, this of object primary the ofpowerdimensions equally contr not is that research separate a out carry not could I and ministers, prime CEE of powers about knowledge prior no is there because parsimonious of whi establish empirically sake not could I because and the solution, for However, dimensions. other on contingent be may dimensions some (IPP) that acknowledge I power however IPP, to ministerialcontributes equally dimension power prime Each estimates. of index an develop to used are parliament contro (f) and agenda cabinet setting (d) ministers, dismissing (c) elections, facto contextual an is elections, upcoming in chances claim. this example tosupport electoral better have to perceived colleague younger h ie ws o rie t cue esr o pie ministers’ prime of measure crude a at arrive to was idea The as literature previous the in identified resources political following 3.5, table In - t in practice. Power to call elections may be the most important power prime ministers’ ministers’ prime power important most the be may elections call to Power practice. in t making and not contribute to understanding about how separate dimensions of powers of dimensions separate how about understanding to contribute not and making rs that increase prime ministers’ powers: ( powers:increase ministers’ primethat rs
ibute to IPP. ibute to ant than power to appoint them, given that dismissal dismissal that given them, appoint to power than ant 72
a) selection of ministers, (b) calling(b)ministers,the of selection a) ch dimensions weigh more, primarily more, weigh dimensions ch
weigh more, the overall IPP overall the more, weigh ability lling agenda of the the of agenda lling to dismissal of one one of dismissal to
based on expert expert on based
o influence to CEU eTD Collection categories weak and medium strong, in ministers prime European West placed who first the are decision ineffective and indecisive ministers ministers prime strong that established literature Previous 3.4 Powersof individualprimeministers prime toinfluenceindividual ministers decision ministerial prime general despite strength weak were ministers prime Croatian some ministerial if prime or general the weakness, despite strong were ministers prime Latvian some if us tell not to ability their in decision influence weakest are ministers prime Latvian that us teach powers ministers’ prime Cross agenda. parliamentary and cabinet’s elections, personnel, cabinet’s mo have ministers prime generally but variation country cross some is there power of dimensions separate In policies. preferred their achieve to ability ministers’ prime moderate a indicates which two, approximate IPP’s their however, outcomes; influ to powerful least appear ministers prime Lithuania and Latvia In goals. their decision I making. generally are ministers prime CEE suggest, data As power. ministerial prime of strong index freedo of IPP. level ( choices: Response parliament?” the of setthe agenda e) and agenda setcabinet ministers,d) dismiss c) elections, call b) ministers, select a) to: have country Source: Table 3. freedom Total avg. Total Slovakia Slovenia Poland Lithuania Latvia Hungary Estonia R Czech Croatia Country
E )”were indicated in expert surveys as percentages. Each dimension equally (20 %) contributes to country country to contributes %) (20 equally dimension Each percentages. as surveys expert in indicated )”were m” = 3 to allow ranking of countries on a three a on countries of ranking allow to 3 = m” 5 . This is why it is important, as discussed in the next section to estimate the ability of of ability the estimate to section next the in discussed as important, is it why is This .
-
S Numerical Numerical
making, while in all other countries prime ministers have moderate ability to achieve achieve to ability moderate have ministers prime countries other all in while making, Index prime of ministers’ power
SelectMinisters
Cota Hnay n Pln pie iitr hv srn pwr t influence to powers strong have ministers prime Poland and Hungary Croatia, n I, see survey questionnaire, appendix one appendix questionnaire, survey see I, 2.5 2.1 2.6 2.8 2.0 2.2 2.9 2.3 2.2 3.0 value -
making com making
was added to each response choice response each to added was
Call Elections 2.5 1.4 1.6 1.9 1.2 1.0 1.7 2.9 1.2 2.5 pared to other CEE prime ministers. However, these estimates do do estimates these However, ministers. prime CEE other to pared
lt o pwr fedm” “some (freedom)”, power of “lots
Dismiss Ministers
- : 2.3 2.3 1.8 2.8 1.9 1.8 2.9 1.9 2.5 3.0
makers (Blondel et al et (Blondel makers “In general, how much freedom does Prime minister in your in minister Prime does freedom much how general, “In 73 -
making. -
point scale where 1 indicates weak, 2 moderate and 3 and moderate 2 weak, indicates 1 where scale point ; “little freedom” = 1, “some freedom” = 2 and “lots and 2 = freedom” “some 1, = freedom” “little ;
moderately powerful moderately Setcabinet
eae o tog blt t dcd on decide to ability strong to derate 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.7 2.4 1.8 3.0 2.1 2.2 3.0
pow
decisive, while weak prime prime weak while decisive, Controlparliament ‘s agenda 2007 r ( er freedom :190
to influence decision influence to - country estimates of of estimates country 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.7 1.9 1.9 2.8 ).
) King (1994) was was (1994) King ad “little and ” ne policy ence
power power IPP 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.4 1.9 1.8 2.7 2.2 2.0 2.9
- -
CEU eTD Collection decision influence to powers their ( for weak as Medgyessy) seven and medium as Topolánek) and (Kosor two strong, perceived are 23 ministers, prime CEE 32 of out data, expert to According ofrespondents **NR=Number in I ES *Not included influenc Source Table 3.6 prime as ministers, data expert intable decision on based Robert Fico Robert Dzurinda Mikuláš Mečiar Vladimír Nečas Petr Mirek Špidla Vladimír Zeman Miloš VáclavKlaus Tusk Donald LeszekMiller JerzyBuzek Kubilius Andrius Algirdas Brazauskas Vagnorius Gediminas Šleževičius Adolfas Ansip Andrus JuhanParts Laar Mart Vähi Tiit Dombrovskis Valdis AigarsKalvītis Bērziņš Andris Šķēle Andris Pahor Borut Janša Janez Drnovšek Janez Kosor Jadranka Sanader Ivo Račan Ivica Gyurcsány Ferenc Medgyessy Péter Viktor Horn Gyula minister Prime : ES I ES : Topolánek e Orbán
d
ecision making”. Response options; Response making”. ecision
Power of individual prime ministers
*
, see survey questionnaire, appendix one appendix questionnaire, survey see ,
, because mandate was still unfolding mandatestillwas because ,
-
aig oes Ti catego This powers. making 90 68 100 N/A 23 0 92 100 88 81 0 70 90 89 30 80 20 60 80 78 11 100 20 100 100 10 100 10 43 0 100 72 (%) Strong 63
13 19 N/A 3 0 12 13 13 20 0 7 9 8 3 4 1 3 4 5 7 1 9 1 5 5 1 10 1 6 0 14 10 NR** 17
3.6 indicate. “strong”, “weak”, “ “weak”, “strong”,
11 56 0 60 0 40 0 50 21 71 0 7 Weak(%) 0 5 0 N/A 15 77 8 0 8 15 71 0 10 11 50 0 60 0 0 24 0
Špidla
: “Please assess the strength of each prime m prime each of strength the assess “Please :
74 rization is used to assess powers of individual individual of powers assess to used is rization
Bzk Prs Briš Phr Rčn and Račan Pahor, Bērziņš, Parts, Buzek, ,
1 5 0 3 0 0 4 0 5 3 10 0 1 NR 0 1 0 N/A 2 10 1 0 2 3 17 0 1 1 5 0 3 0 0 2
medium
- 11 33 0 20 0 0 0 40 29 0 21 Medium(%) 10 26 0 N/A 61 23 0 0 4 4 29 30 0 0 20 20 20 40 20 13 50 36 making. These data are comparable are data These making.
” (King ”
’s categorization
1 3 0 1 0 0 5 0 4 5 4 0 3 NR 2 5 0 N/A 8 3 0 0 1 1 7 3 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 1
, 1994 , 9 9 9 5 5 5 10 10 10 14 14 14 14 NR Total 19 19 19 N/A 13 13 13 13 16 24 24 10 10 9 10 5 5 5 5 8 inister inister
). to direct to
ly
CEU eTD Collection is and estimates experts’ on makingbased 46 Cro but in study, this 45 ministe prime indicates that point reference 44 Ho expect. would decision influence .01). This decision influence to prime that found ( governance democratic I in performance ministers’ effective. always necessarily not are ministers prime strong by outcomes decision of outcome The performance. successful to relates (always) strength ministers’ prime that or outcomes, policy polit EU road coalition but weak, scandals privatization leadership decision ineffective decision in effectiveness and styles et al. (Blondel making decision cabinet with (effectiveness) satisfaction overall better reported strong pri no reported ministers of 64% that indicated changereported who ministers of About 34% about and styles ministers’ prime in change weak. or strong were they if determine not could 16% ministers of 70% About styles ministers’ prime about literature previous of findings to
Research applies to interviews with 300 ministers since early transition early since ministers 300 with interviews to applies Research Leadership s Leadership xctv proaiain s con a is personalization Executive me ministers become more influential. Moreover, ministers who perceived prime ministers as ministers prime perceived who ministers Moreover, influential. more become ministers me ical impacts. It is not straightforward that prime ministers’ weakness (always) means bad bad means (always) weakness ministers’ prime that straightforward not is It impacts. ical 2007: 182, Findings of previous literature indicate a difference between prime ministers’ powers and and powers ministers’ prime between difference a indicate literature previous of Findings some however, was There
(Fish 1999, Haughton 2002, Baylis Haughton(Fish 1999, 2007). 2002, that had little in common except a goal to remove to goal a except common in little had that
means that prime ministers’ whomeans areas perceived thatin referencetotheir ability prime weaker to fetv i decision in effective ht nldd de eooi cii, olpe f h bnig ytm and system banking the of collapse crisis, economic deep a included that tyle is not a direct measure of prime ministers’ influence on decisio on influence ministers’ prime of measure direct a not is tyle Šarkutė atia, plus Bulgaria and Romania and Bulgaria plus atia, w - aig ee n at oe fetv. hs s otay o ht h literature the what to contrary is This effective. more fact in were making ever, weak prime ministers are likely to be less influential in contributing to contributing in influential less be to likely are ministers prime weak ever, -
maker; -
aig ( making Bodl t l 20: 182) 2007: al. et (Blondel 45
2010).
- perceived making
hc i likely is which xctv personaliz executive
- iuu vral mauig rm mnses aiiy o nlec decision influence to ability ministers’ prime measuring variable tinuous making in detail detail in by weak prime ministers ministers prime weak by ifrne n iitr’ ecpin aot rm ministers’ prime about perceptions ministers’ in difference rs’ p rs’ - prime ministers prime making. Šleževičius making. osition withinthe cabinet osition wih is which , discussed in chapter five. in chapter discussed
(Blondel et al. 2007) al. et (Blondel 75 related to contextual factors surrounding his his surrounding factors contextual to related
.
political impact political
iey eae t hs leadership his to related likely D
ation as strong, 10% perceived them as weak and weak as them perceived 10% strong, as zurinda zurinda
) was perceived strong, but a a but strong, perceived was 46
Mečiar and put Slovakia back on the on back Slovakia put and Mečiar
orlt ngtvl ( negatively correlate
until 2003 in 2003 until 44 a feunl b frequently can on the other hand was perceived perceived was hand other the on
based on ministers’ perceptions. ministers’ on based ) and prime ministers’ ability ministers’ prime and ) n making, but can be taken as a a as taken be can but making, n
CEE
countries also included included also countries e positive, while while positive, e r
f a of = relatively relatively - .54, surplus surplus several several p
< - CEU eTD Collection (prim center the from decision shift can cabinets collective in ministers prime powers and structure. theinstitutional mini prime between relationship the explaining for matter personalities ministers’ prime to related possibly factors other that indicates This settings. weak institutionally in Kalvītis) (e.g. institutiona settings. in Medgyessy) (e.g. strong institutionally in occur weak of incidence frequent do explain cannot alone setting ministers institutional However, are prime strong ministers and prime claim, this where support settings in likely ( Hungary are in example, for like, dominant institutionally ministers prime premi strong and that parliamentary suggested prime both weak in and clam, found this support are not do ministers data Expert 2006). Protsyk 2007, al et (Blondel inter of chances the where and making premier that shortterms notautomatically do mean ineffectiveness. necessa not do terms longer ministers’ prime that indicates This governance. democratic in performance their and durations term ministers’ prime between relationship significant statistically find not did I claim. this support cannot study this in analysis decision effective in engage to able less are ministers prime lasting short durations, term to reference In duration. term or framework ability toinfluence in hav ministers outcomes prime policy strong because tying performance, ministers’ justifies prime study to areas this particular in ministers negative prime strong the the of finding, incidence important Although higher an is ministers. strength and prime performance ministers’ strong prime between to relationship compared outcomes policy particular Cabinet in likely more are ministers prime weak that literature the in suggested also was It literaturesuggest Previous - presidential democracies where presidents retain some powers powers some retain presidents where democracies presidential decision
policyoutcomes. e minister). For For minister). e - making lly strong settings and the incidence of strong of incidence the and settings strong lly models developed by Elgie (1997) are useful in explaining how explaining in useful are (1997) Elgie by developed models ed prime ministers’ strength or weakness relates to institutionalto relates weaknessstrength or ministers’ prime ed
- example, making
- executive conflicts are higher (e.g. Lithuania, Poland) Poland) Lithuania, (e.g. higher are conflicts executive Bodl t l 20: 189 2007: al. et (Blondel 76 in his second prime ministerial term (1999 term ministerial prime second his in
Á - making power closer (or further away) away) further (or closer power making gh er rily lead to effective performance and performance effective to lead rily
-
rsdnil ytm. t a also was It systems. presidential 2001). Expert survey data partially partially data survey Expert 2001). Wrik 1994 Warwick , o nlec decision influence to Prime Prime
ministers ministers ministers greater e - ). 2002), 2002),
sters’ sters’ Data Data -
CEU eTD Collection which party, Additionall deputy. scandals corruption Sanader’s of revelation 48 r Ru 2013. October in elections early and parliament the to majority of vote a not receive did his of supporter reality 47 decision cabinet In structure. institutional than leadership weak his to more related weakness Pahor’s decisio decentralized Slovenian countered and styles leadership strong their used Janša and Drnovšek partners coalition by policies preferred his of support and coalition among agreements to relate His parties. often most appointments ministerial where Slovakia associates. loyal influence decision to cabinet success of degree varying with attempted they presidents, were both of when Later autonomy ministerial and collectivity countered easily Zeman and Klaus (e.g. attributes personal ( to 1997 ( making autonomous not Lithuania, reshuffl and (Blondel government Laar eplaced him eplaced Schiemann
After oo was Kosor prime and minister when reduced ministerial autonomy and shifted cabinet decision making to the centre of of centre the to making decision cabinet shifted and autonomy ministerial reduced
Nečas resigned in summer in resigned Nečas n n ugr, ntttoa structure institutional Hungary, In s o rae chsv team cohesive a create to es - making where ministers haveautonomy ministers large making where Š stay in power. power. in stay
arkute 2010). In Poland, the role of role the Poland, In 2010). arkute the proved successful in 2013, after whichafter she in2013, successful proved after the electoral victoryof electoral afterthe constitutional changesreduced constitutional large say in cabinet appoin cabinet in largesay oee wae ta Sndr l Sanader than weaker however 2004: 139), and prime ministerial weakness primarily relates to prime ministers’ ministers’ prime to relates primarily weakness ministerial prime and 139), 2004:
prime minister minister prime y, within her party, party, her within y, , - - 47
aig by making making is decentralized, but strong personalities personalities strong but decentralized, is making and
Zemanovci Zemanovci confidence in the parliament, parliament, the in confidence
Strong
the The stalemate was solved when several ODS members defected, prompting dissolution of of dissolution prompting defected, members ODS several when solved was stalemate The the
Medgyessy cabinet
rm mnse’ ofc plays office minister’s prime
Müller prvn mnseil n p and ministerial approving party, created in 2009 as a as 2009 in created party, Mečiar is a dominant figure, t dominant figure, is a
2013, Zeman nominated a technocrat Jiří Rusnok as prime minister prime as Rusnok Jiří technocrat a nominated Zeman 2013, . different factions started started factions different
- Social Democrats Social oml 01 2) I Latvia, In 28). 2001: Rommel ’s
ol esl oecm cletv ad at cbnt in cabinets party and collective overcome easily could and her ambiguous relationship to these scandals when she was his his was she when scandals these to relationship ambiguous her and centered weak leadership leadership weak tments and dismissals dismissals and tments rey eas o the of because argely president’s president’s rae opruiis o srn Pie ministers Prime strong for opportunities creates and Nečas’s ODS domineering c domineering ODS Nečas’s and snok remained prime minister until early 2014 when 2014 early until minister prime remained snok had to to had
77
in the . .
n oiaccl inr cabinet inner “oligarcical” an
he cabinethe discussion
counter weight to Social democrats Social to weight counter continue as an independent. as ancontinueindependent. prime minister has not been dominant until until dominant been not has minister prime power struggles with a goal of removing her from her removing of goal a with struggles power
powers and shifted decision making decision shifted andpowers (Blonde skills). Strong political Strong skills).
ie iitra appointments ministerial rime a (Haughton 2002: 1323). 1323). 2002: (Haughton
waning significant was a result of strong party backing backing partystrong of result a was l and l popularity of HDZ, especially after after especially HDZ, of popularity Müller like Šķēle oe n aie decision cabinet in role oalition oalition s
collegial, the ministers Sanad -
Rommel 2001: 105). 2001: Rommel continuously made made continuously
argued it still still it argued personalities like like personalities zc cabinets Czech r n Kosor and er . Rusnok, however however Rusnok, .
20: 2. In 32). (2001: In Slovenia, In who was in in was who
Croatia, Croatia, of Sobotka had had closer closer
their the the 48 - .
CEU eTD Collection issues 49 dismissing and appointing like prerogatives political use can ministers prime chapter, this of part second the in discussed and literature previous by suggested as However, actors. cabinet among decision where cabinets collective of heads research ofconflicts. ofsheer numbers mo in explore should research further suggested, I As domains. executive the over clash occasionally presidents and ministers inter the data, expert by suggested orga to resources various use can ministers prime strong, generally are parliaments CEE While presidents. the and parliaments the to relation in positions la is ministers’ prime examined role chapter the their specifically, More parliament. terms, the of that their to subordinate throughout parliament the of support keep must ministers’ prime Because parliament. the and executive the between relationships accountability determine Consti vague generally at looked first chapter The evaluated. is performance which in outcomes policy actors) to other contributed not (and ministers’ prime that certain be to has one and performance for criteria th in because relationship, this establish empirically decision influence directly to ministers’ prime ability allowing ministers’ center the prime to closer power demonstrate of balance the to shift that prerogatives was personal and institutional chapter contextual, this of task primary The 3.5 Conclusion more directly outcomes. influence political thus and favor their in power of balance the shift to use skillfully can ministers’ prime resources contexts. political decision influence to ability ministers’ prime in variation explain fully duration so. doing shift
Račan ed Račan
In addition to being a part of wider institutional framework, CEE prime ministers are also also are ministers primeframework, CEE institutional wider of part a beingto addition In decision led six party electoral coalition that ended a decade of Tu of decade a ended that coalition electoral party six led
’s icsin f aie mdl sget ta nihr ntttoa srcue o term nor structure institutional neither that suggests models cabinet of Discussion role was frequently subordinated t subordinated frequentlywas role
- aig power making
ht per t mte mr ae niiul personalit individual are more matter to appears What
tutional provisions about prime ministers’ powers. At most, Constitutions most, At powers. ministers’ prime about provisions tutional
re detail the nature of these domains, instead of insisting on the the on insisting of instead domains, these of nature the detail re lsr o h cne ad ek Račan weak and center the to closer - xctv rltosi i msl coeaie bt prime but cooperative, mostly is relationship executive
o solving -
making is b is making 78 coalition disputes coalition
e next chapter, policy outcomes are used as used are outcomes policy chapter, next e ased on dependency and not dominance not and dependency on ased djman’s rule djman’s nize the parliament in their favor. As favor. their in parliament the nize
- aig I ws motn to important was It making. , but because it it because but , 49
was
less e ad political and ies clashed on various various on clashed - making in real real in making successful
o exploit to rgely in
CEU eTD Collection procedura ministers’ prime between performanceappears asymmetrical literature. andnotsymmetrical inprevious assuggested relationship the Nevertheless, analysis. the in ministers prime (weak) seven keeping justifies partially which outcomes, policy good produce ministers always not do prime ministers prime strong weak while polices, effective because produce sometimes conflated, be not should effectiveness and powers prime chapter, ministers’ this in data expert by suggested generally As data. survey expert by evaluated pro ministers’ aspectprocedural to generallyrelate chapter this of findings andargumentschapter one, in detail in discussed performance,ministers’ outc policy to contributed possibly actors other that and alone them to attributable be not their may chapter that following acknowledgesthe in study assessed achievements this and ministers prime seven only weak Out as actors. perceive other experts to much so not are and chapter ministers next prime the to in attributable performance ministers’ prime for criteria as set achievements policy power tothe closer cent decision shifting by outcomes policy influence to ability their and weakness ministerial in ministers prime formal between relationships prime the explaining in matter attributes personal ministers’ prime weak of incidence the decision Cabinet settings. and strong institutionally settings weak institutionally prime in strong of ministers incidence the explain fully not do suggested, literature previous as duration, decision influence to ability their in weak as seven and medium as two strong, as ministers prime (N=23) perceive experts ministers, prime 32 of cross prime This outcomes. policy influence are to ministers prime powerful CEE moderately power, generally ministerial prime of index an on Based policies. preferred elect calling ministers, ministers’ powers is supported by expert data on individual prime ministers’ powers. Out powers. ministers’ prime individual on data expert by supported is powers ministers’ nsm piemnsesaelreyprevdb eprsa srn,wihesrs that ensures which strong, as experts by perceived largely are ministers prime sum, In rmai promne eie a promne n eortc oenne is governance democratic in performance as defined performance grammatic er. er. os ifunig alaetr ad aie aed t ahee their achieve to agenda cabinet and parliamentary influencing ions,
s
of prime ministers’ performance. In the next chapter,prime next Inthe performance. ministers’ prime of 79 - maki
ms I ln wt dfeet ye o prime of types different with line In omes. ng models were used to demonstrate how how demonstrate to used were models ng - aig Institutional making. of 32 prime ministers, ministers, prime 32 of ad programmatic and l - country estimate of of estimate country tutr ad term and structure - making making
CEU eTD Collection country level. to compared is index integration) Stiftung EU the in (except dimension each in performance prim data, expert of quality emphasize To separate governance. in democratic performance of dimensions variable ministers’ prime of discussion allows it good”, because important “very categories; three in grouped “ave are ministers prime discussed, are governance conduct democratic policymakin social and economic integration, EU in performance of aggregate (an effectiveness of index an as presented are data expert Then, governance. democratic of dimension separate each in presented are data policymaking social and economic integration, EU the dimensions; governance’ democratic separate in achievements ministers’ prime estimate to invited were two) chapter (see countries improve spheresocialand integration, EU economic the effectivepolicymakingin governance toinfluencein the position them responsibility own their are assessed is performance ministers’ prime which outcomes policy that established is it if valid considered be can chapter this in presented data Expert policymaking. to contributions actors’ other not and ministers’ prime are chapter this in outcomes, policy that justify to decision important was It research. in influence step important an was empirically to actors other from independently ability ministers’ prime between and relationship cabinets the Establishing of collectivity by characterized making dispersed and provisions constitutionally decision of inspite weak to influenceoutcomes, policy Asdemonstratedpolitical contexts. by CEEprimeministers are data, moderatelyexpert powerful decision influence to ability ministers’ prime estimated I chapter, previous the In CHAPTER4: PRIME MINISTERS’ PROGRAMMATICPERFORMANCE ae ad vr bd bsd n hi soe o ten on scores their on based bad” “very and rage” Prime ministers’ programmatic performance, labeled as as labeled performance, programmatic ministers’ Prime
citizens’ prosperity. To measure performance in democratic governanc democratic in performance measure To prosperity. citizens’
nal itgiy f odc i rfrne o oml ntttos f eorc and democracy of institutions formal to reference in conduct of integrity entails
BI, eas o wih xet aa n ah ieso ae lo rsne on presented also are dimension each in data expert which of because (BTI),
and effectiveness). In each section where separate dimensions of democratic of dimensions separate where section each In effectiveness). and ) and g) finally . used as criteria for prime ministers’ programmatic performance programmatic ministers’ prime for criteria as used
rm mnses dmcai cnut n promne in performance and conduct democratic ministers’ prime s n ne o dmcai gvrac (n grgt of aggregate (an governance democratic of index an as 80
. In the first part of this chapter, expert expert chapter, this of part first the In . reliance on parliamentary support. support. parliamentary on reliance - on sae Ti ctgrzto is categorization This scale. point efrac i democratic in performance , which is consideredto is which , , because they were were they because , e, experts in nine nine in experts e, - making Bertelsmann ministers’ e - making
in real in
in in - CEU eTD Collection not would leadership “bad” or “good” of cases ministers’ isolated few or prime one in performance ministers’ of comparison allow integrity assessments democratic expert quantitative ministers, prime conduct democratic diametricallyexperiences opposed to during communism structures democratic (new) under practiced are and over carry egotistic and trend this explains largely attitudes V and values of dependency Path practice. in consensual Elites confrontational. is that system eliteaccept nominally the and consensual is that structure institutional the between exists gap a principle, In 2008). Gallina 2012, Ilonszki is authoritarian and (Lengyel corruption of compromise, that to culture” unwillingness political politics, po to insensitivity conflicts, personality “negative excesses, consensual a of lack feature by elites characterized CEE suggested literature Previous 4.1 Primemini ministers’ prime of levels different of performance areas. indifferent understanding better allows performance of vision on based prim of Categorization populists”. “likely and “average” “outstanding”, conduct democratic to equallin performance variable be their on not Based framework. democratic may support to minister determined prime effective an and effectiveness in successful less easily is minister primeDemocratic results. equal achieve not do (usually) leaders’ which performancein methodological the of one a two, in chapter inherent in challenges addressed As dimension. another in worse and ministers’ mini prime chapter, this of part second the In alues and norms embraced in communism that was paternalistic, non paternalistic, was that communism in embraced norms and alues
To test the “negative culture” hypothesis, experts were asked to assess prim assess to asked were experts hypothesis, culture” “negative the test To scope effectiveness to account for better understanding of likely better performance in one one in performance better likely of understanding better for account to effectiveness
(democratic conduct (democratic sters’
eortc ntttos bt nae n n neortc eair ht s not is that behavior undemocratic an in engage but institutions, democratic
during their terms. Unlike case studies that would allow comparing only few few only comparingallow would that studies case Unlike terms. their during
o ol wti a ige bt cos many across but single, a within only not democratic conduct n efciees Pie iitr ae rue i tre categories; three in grouped are ministers Prime effectiveness, and ssig edrhp efrac, s conig o (ay aes of areas (many) for accounting is performance, leadership ssessing
/
effectiveness) and effectiveness)
81 sters’
pular discontent (elitism) and frequent charges frequent and (elitism) discontent pular eortc conduct democratic (Gallina 2007). impact (“good”, “average”, and “bad”) and “average”, (“good”,
countries. Assessing prime prime Assessing countries. e ministers’ performance ministers’ e - transparent, hiera transparent,
s oprd to compared is that require conduct require that e ministers’ e reference rchical rchical prime prime y .
CEU eTD Collection 50 institutions of levels different with ministers prime of discussion allows which scale, ten on scores their on based undemocratic”) nor democratic “neither and “undemocratic” conduct framework. democratic of undermine operation severely regular nor improve, significantly neither that ministers prime are extremes two ce a of parties or incumbent the favor that laws electoral introduce or press the of freedom curtail that laws media introduce may minister Prime “undemocratic” an example, For balances. and checks of working regular otherwise distorts that making decision usual the distort significantly) not in engage to likely is least minister prime undemocratic the while (at institutions, democratic of working not do that decisions make to ten likely on is estimates minister experts’ by assessed is and law) of rule the for respect or judiciary the of independence media, the and press of freedoms (e.g. democracy section areelite behavior to contribution valuable and political leadership literature. elite gauge to sample used hitherto other any than 33 a of countries CEE nine sample in terms a ministerial prime Consequently, leaders. few these of achievements the beyond much us teach
Categorization is borrowed and adapted fr adapted and borrowed is Categorization
Democratic cond Democratic
f niiul rm mnses n group and ministers prime individual of .
uct
is defined as prime ministers’ integrity in reference to institutions of institutions to reference in integrity ministers’ prime as defined is
om Blondel (1987), see chapter one chapter see (1987), om Blondel 82 al 41 rsns xet aa on data expert presents 4.1 Table nd dataset on their on dataset nd
- te i tre categories three in them s institutional relationship and findings of this this of findings and relationship institutional - on sae Democratic scale. point
democratic conduct democratic rtain size. In between these between In size. rtain respect for democratic democratic for respect 50
(“democratic”,
democratic democratic
is larger larger is
Prime Prime - point point
CEU eTD Collection previous support partially elite ministerial findings are addressed below. prime of conduct democratic to related findings democratic. moderately as appear ministers prime Hungarian ex where in visible partially is which 2000, after especially opponents, enemies political as than other rather each view polarized; fully are elites Hungarian ministers. occasional prime Czech feature and elites Czech and Slovak eu and democratic. nationalist prime most Polish the and consensual generally generally are are ministers elites Poland, In conclusions. similar to comes on findings previous to reference In conduct. elite and structure democratic between gap a to point 33 of out ministers, prime six only while (N=17), democratic moderately or (N=10) democratic either are thes culture” political “negative the support partially only data Expert in ended mandate afterhis in III ES included was * Nečas category proper score of case In 5 sc following on based category each in placed are ministers Prime (un)favorabl freedoms, media ruleoflaw, as the such institutions democratic to related conduct ministers’ prime how about think assessment your making When democratic”. “fully 10 and undemocratic” Source Table 4. Total 10 Total Dombrovskis Valdis Horn Gyula Pahor Borut LeszekMiller Račan Ivica Špidla Vladimír Medgyessy Péter Kubilius Andrius Drnovšek Janez JerzyBuzek (7.0 Democratic -
7 indicating neither indicatingneither 7 –
: ES II and III: “Please assess assess “Please III: and II ES : 9.0) 1
Categories of prime ministers
mutual elite relationships elite mutual
difference between ES II and ES III (see appendix four) better score was used for placement in the the in placement for used was score better four) appendix (see III ES and II ES between difference
ro
democratic - skeptic tendencies, which is also is which tendencies, skeptic 7.6 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.7 8.2 8.7 Mean
, nor nor ,
democratic conduct democratic undemocratic conduct undemocratic VáclavKlaus Bērziņš Andris Zeman Miloš Šleževičius Adolfas Nečas Petr Mirek Vagnorius Gediminas Fico Robert Kosor Jadranka Laar Mart Dzurinda Mikuláš Algirdas Brazauskas Tusk Donald Vähi Tiit Ansip Andrus Gyurcsány Ferenc JuhanParts Nor” “Neither (5.0 (5.0 among ’ democratic conduct 17 – Topolánek
7.0)
*
Visegrád
83
June of each prime minister on 1 1 on minister prime each of
and 7 7 and
2013
ore range; 1 1 range; ore observable in expert data expert in observable elites (Gallina 2008), this study generallystudy this 2008), (Gallina elites -
9 indicating 9
5.2 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.7 Mean 6.0 5.2
-
5 indicating undemocratic conduct undemocratic indicating 5 democratic conduct democratic Mečiar Vladimír AigarsKalvītis Janša Janez Šķēle Andris Sanader Ivo Orbán Viktor Undemocratic
esn wy hs study’s this why Reasons (2.6 (2.6 is. Most prime ministers prime Most is. e electoral laws, etc. electoral e –
10 scale where 1 is “fully “fully is 1 where scale 10 –
5.0) 6
among Slovak Slovak among
et data pert 2.6 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.9 3.9 Mean 3.4
; CEU eTD Collection Sanader assessments. pre elite to apply not may finding this but relationships, elite polarized anti in entrenched and predatory become Hungarian of relationships examine among predominates culture” political “negative examples apparent all on based Unsurprisingly, uses 2008) and (2007 Gallina cases, her Ka As leadership. “bad” prior of examples no (only) on have more we s guess, Previous ministers. prime different heuristic by performance of except levels about knowledge performance, ministers’ prime about rankings “ ( Blondel to According Orbán, (e.g. apparent are pathologies leadership where ministers prime select only not assessnine countries prim used is to elites’ anddemocratic or leaders’conduct institutions. particu in behavior elite of curtail taste a give does relationships automatically elite mutual of nature The not etc. law, of rule the press, may of freedoms elites Hungarian among relationships polarized example, For m relationships elite confrontational elite Mutual relationships. elite party mutual of r level the at stays research her but media), judicia (e.g. institutions democratic and conduct elites’ between relationship the account the in takes (2008) Gallina institutions. democratic and conduct elite between relationship the p study, this Unlike
elationships good znk’ i Poland, in czynski’s - – Orbán Hungary, or U rhetoric EU ”
edrhp pathologies Leadership in mandates) ministerial prime (33 elite ministerial prime of sample large a study, this In ) feature feature ) edr ae sesd et o ptnily “ (potentially) to next assessed are leaders
are an important aspect of decision aspectof important an are All . elements of “negative political culture” such as such culture” political “negative of elements
i undemocratic six They conclude, Hungary has become a “simulated democracy” based on on based democracy” “simulated a become has Hungary conclude, They revious revious
in other in
1987), Mečiar literature focused primarily on mutual elite relationships and not on not and relationships elite mutual on primarily focused literature lar country, but cannot fully account for the relationship between between relationship the for account fully cannot but country, lar
Visegrád rvosy bevd n te studies other in observed previously edrhp gene leadership
n Fc i Slovakia, in Fico and e ministers’
y not ay power, power, rm ministers Prime elite
countries. , especially since Orbán’s 2010 victory when elites elites when victory 2010 Orbán’s since especially , automatical usin 84 - ralizations ralizations democratic conductdemocratic making likely related to related makinglikely g
of
Visegrád manipulation
pathological bad
( y rd fra dmcai framework democratic formal erode ly Orbán ”
Orbán leaders r ol psil atr (potentially) after possible only are
elite. ,
, Janša deception, populis deception, leader populist rhetoric, involvement involvement rhetoric, populist
. Prior to analyzing experts’ experts’ analyzing to Prior . and ege ad lnzi (2012) Ilonszki and Lengyel . Unlike other does studies,it . Unlike - institutional constellation in constellation institutional , r also are Šķēle Gyurcsány ship effectiveness;however, se ocue that concludes she , ,
Kalvītis present tudies focused tudies
m, racist and racist m, n Hungary in
,
in
Mečiar). Mečiar). Mečiar, ry, the ry, expert expert . .
CEU eTD Collection levels. regional and national including 51 compared data level onSDI. tocountry period. given which ministers’ an functions their social performing and of capable political and (SDI) institutions integration democratic of stability participation, dimensions five political of composed is indicator democracy Its until 2003 2012. from countries 130 in transformation economic and political of state the evaluates that management and economy market democracy, dimensions; three of index aggregate an is to compared is five. a conclusions anybefore test, empirical sustain must democracy and populism between relationship the However, leader. pluralist a to compared structure democratic undermine to likely more is leader populist a that undemocratic”, andanti populism which indicates nor democratic, “neither as experts by assessed are Klaus), Fico, (e.g. populism their for ministers known prime some 4.1, table in indicated As democracy. of institutions formal attacks that decisi mean automatically not may rhetoric populist and/or nationalist as manifested corrupt in
BTI uses a comprehensive system of expert evaluations that are crosschecked for their validity validity theirfor crosschecked are that evaluations expert of system uses comprehensive a BTI
democratic institutions are functioning and and functioning are institutions democratic To demonstrate quality of expert data, i data, expert of quality demonstrate To o sadl, r uortc tl o governing. of style autocratic or scandals, ion eortc conduct democratic (representativeness).
n al 42 cuty ee dt o pie ministers’ prime on data level country 4.2, table In Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Stiftung’s Bertelsmann
re possible about the relationship, which is discussed in detail in chapter in detail in discussed is which relationship, the about possible re
are similar to SDI in that both measures evaluate a degree to to degree a evaluate measures both that in SDI to similar are
SDI assesses assesses SDI index (BTI) index
d are 85 n dge t wih eortc ntttos are institutions democratic which to degree a
t - able 4.2, able democ dqaey accepted adequately whether
on stability of democratic instit democratic of stability on racy
prime ministers’ prime they However, may were not be conflated. It conflated. possible is not be ; stateness, the rule of law, law, of rule the stateness, ; violated or violated rm mnses mindset ministers’ prime .
eortc conduct democratic Expert data on prime prime on data Expert democratic conduct democratic at many levels, manylevels, at improved utions. BTI utions. on - making making
in a in are 51
CEU eTD Collection democracy” as “defective identified 52 scores in or Slovenia in Janša (e.g., score country overall pr undemocratic one that mind in keep must however data expert of Interpretation undemocratic. generally are ministers prime Croatia and Latvia in while democrat “very” only is and that Poland elite ministerial prime its than democratic” “more appear eroded largely balances and checks actor of range scale a of (out 9.5 scores Hungary data. expert in than SDI in apparent less is variation score scoring country Estonia, effectively. and mea SDI’s of year efficientlyevery in ten maximum institutions appropriate by process legitimate a arepreparedin decisions political perfect”democracieswhere “almost are nine),slightlybelow SDI on Based score country individual ***SDI legitimate a in implemented * score incountry a reflected ministers’ prime in difference score of case In *P Source: institutions (SDI) 4. Table Total Slovakia Latvia Croatia Republic Czech Slovenia Hungary Lithuania Estonia Poland Country *
The The rime ministers’ rime SDI is measured on a 1 1 a on measured is SDI - more realistic measurement of measurement more realistic inst
E
S
2
prime ministers’ democraticprime conduct ministers’ of system the when tenure second Orbán’s during especially relationship itutional
II and III III and II rm ministers’ Prime in
Estonia. In other countries, prime ministerial elite is only moderately democratic, democratic, moderately only is elite ministerial prime countries, other In Estonia. ten) “ measure democratic conduct democratic
and stability of democratic institutions (SDI) by (SDI) BTI institutions stability and democratic of
on BTI effective for 2012, which does not properly account for dynamism in dynamism for account properly not does which 2012, for effective BTI on
-
idctd n al 42 l nn cutis (e countries nine all 4.2 table in indicated , 10 point scale where 9 and 10 indicate political decisions that are prepared, made and and made prepared, are that decisions political indicate 10 and 9 where scale point 10 process Expert survey (mean all PM) (mean all survey Expert is an average of all bi annual scores available available annualscores bi isanof averageall Democratic condu Democratic
eortc conduct democratic with a score of 7.95 out of a scale range often range scale outa of of7.95 withscore a Hungary’s Hungary’s
y prpit atoiis fetvl ad efficiently and effectively authorities appropriate by
-
country scores are aggregates of all prime ministers’ scores in each country each in ministers’scores prime all aggregates of are scores country 6.0 4.3 4.8 5.8 6.0 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.5 7.5 52 Oc SI s oprd o xet aa CE countries CEE data, expert to compared is SDI Once .
democratic conduct democratic democracy surement is considered a “perfect democracy”. Cross democracy”. “perfect a considered is surement ct ).
86
was made in BTI’s 2014 edition, wherei edition,Hungary 2014 madeBTI’s in was
Mečiar in Slovakia downgrade country level level country downgrade Slovakia in Mečiar
cuty level) (country
between ES II and and II ES between m mnse cn ral sol the spoil greatly can minister ime
by BTI BTI by
n saiiy f democratic of stability and .
SDI cp Cota ht scores that Croatia xcept
from 2003 until 2012 fromuntil 2012 2003 * III, better score is used and and used is score better III,
10.0 * 9.5 9.5 9.1 8.9 9.7 9.7 9.3 9.7 9.3***
/ Mean
BI oeok 2012) codebook (BTI
s ic in in ic - .
CEU eTD Collection gauge prime ministers’ effectiveness. indicators to as are taken social policymaking economicand EU, the state; inanycitizen member E every influence generally that matters social and economic EU, the of importance the communication or transport agricultural, other many Obviously are policy. policymaking social and economic integration, several EU in the prosperity areas; citizens’ policymaking to contribute that outcomes deliver also must ministers prime in performance of concept the on Based 4.2. policymaking. areas three in effectiveness ministers’ prime on data th governance, democratic of concept the with line In democracies. elite of minister mechanisms prime behind exact Uncovering why. and countries which in ministers, prime by arelearn ruleattackedexact media,corruption, of area(s)(e.g.that aboutjudiciary) more law, the mechanism the at depth and rhetoric l as such culture ministers’ ofmindset theelite ina give democrat more theat hint howeverdo same; politiciansthe arenot individual of corruption and levelscorruption comparatively are ministers Estonia and Slovenia prime in corruption where of levels lower to compared corruption, of levels higher have also democratic less comparatively are ministers prime where Croatia and Latvia Slovakia, ministers’ prime on data Expert Prime effectivenessPrime ministers’ U)eortc conduct (Un)democratic - nttto relationship, institution political mindset political executive
c o consensualism, of ack as would improve the lives of citizens such as environment related issues, issues, related environment as such citizens of lives the improve would as - institutional relationship would broaden our knowledge about the quality the about knowledge our broaden would relationship institutional personalization. behind s n that can manifest in aspects of democratic or undemocratic political political undemocratic or democratic of aspects in manifest can that
country.
prime ministers’ behavior and democratic institutions. We should We institutions. democraticbehaviorand ministers’ prime
a i dsusd n hpe five chapter in discussed is as , hc is which democratic conduct democratic
democratic governance, in addition to being democratic, democratic, being to addition in governance, democratic sentiments of mutual mistrust, mistrust, mutual of sentiments ute research Further
policies. Nevertheless, for the sake of parsimony and and parsimony of sake the for Nevertheless, policies. important for genuine functioning of contemporary contemporary of functioning genuine for important 87
: are in line with corruption with line in are
the EU integration, economic and social and economic integration, EU the
would benefit from looking in more more in looking from benefit would ic (Kocijan (Kocijan ic
s rmrl rltd to related primarily is e next section presents expert expert presents section next e ainls and nationalist forthcoming
levels in CEE. in levels ht operate that
. State ). uropean uropean populist prime prime
CEU eTD Collection EU in performance ministers’ groups and integration prime on data expert presents 4.3 Table unfolded. accession) manda ministerial prime when time the of regardless possible, is minister process the from countries their distances that co ministers prime by move every while performance, EU (“good”) considered is enterprise collectivethat to closer countriestheir brings that ministers (Gilbe enterprise collective a in powers sovereign their transfer to willing are states nation European whereby process a as In integration) (EuropeanHooghe thepresentBlankEuropeanization isdefined study, and 1996). process a which to system political a as defined outcome the and Zimmermann 2009, Diez and (Wiener process a as integration European understand authors Some 2001). Henderson 2004) on high was Europeanization collapsed, communism After 4.2. performance indem w both solution, parsimonious for However, performance. economic to social of position subordinate a pe good from follow to likely is policymaking social in performance Good policymaking. economic on contingent is policymaking social that in weight equal an given are times communist during to accustomed Europeanswere East protection social and equality ensure social would area social the makingin c new where EU the joining by accomplished be would living open more and better a for desire this for and countries, Western in saw they East governance. w democratic Europeans and democratization of theories by supported is approach This utis would ountries llective EU project is considered as an unsuccessful (“bad”) EU performance. By adopting a adopting By performance. EU (“bad”) unsuccessful an as considered is project EU llective 1 Primeministers’ performance integration EU in
any s poet f oiia, oil n eooi mdriain ( modernization economic and social political, of project a as mainly ere given ere - oriented view of European integration, performance in EU integration of every prime prime every of integration EU in performance integration, European of view oriented ne demo anted an ae h possibility the have ocratic governance.ocratic equal weight in theoretically contributing to the concept of concept the to contributing theoretically in weight equal prime ministers prime Dür cracy; because they thought democracy leads to the comfortable life life comfortable the to leads democracy thought they because cracy; t 201 rt
contributing to prime ministers’ effectiveness ministers’ prime to contributing 2012, Pierson 1996), while for others Europeanization is a result result a is Europeanization others for while 1996), Pierson 2012, 3 . n hs nesadn, vr “uoen oe b prime by move” “European every understanding, this In ).
o ep cnmc ben economic reap to in three categories (“good”, “bad” and “average”) based based “average”) and “bad” (“good”, categories three in
( Bozóki ,
a transition to market economy was necessary. This necessary. was economy market to transition a rformance in the economic area, which may mean mean may which area, economic the in rformance 88
2008).
All three areas of e of areas three All
the agenda of of agenda the
ft o E membership. EU of efits of integration is directed (Marks, (Marks, directed is integration of . However, it is likely is it However, . CEE elite CEE tes (pre or post post or (pre tes ffective governance ffective Bozóki prime ministers’ prime s
( 08 13, 2008: Kopeck Policy Policy EU EU – ý
CEU eTD Collection between category. and average bad than presidential Euro his for known Klaus accession. EU from away authorita in engaged integration EU the against openly not (except Lithuania or Latvia democratic of twelve dimensions other to compared success A governance. most achieved they where area an also but agenda, ministers’ prime on high only not was integration EU that suggest data Expert 2013 in June mandatetermination after in III ES included was *Nečas category of case In performance indicatingaverage 1 range; score following on based category each in placed are ministers Prime moves” or yourcount brought moveministerthat primeby each “any about think assessment, your making When integration. EU in performance good” “very 10 Source: Table 4. levelsEU integration ofperformance in ten on scores their on Total 16 Total Gyurcsány Ferenc Medgyessy Péter Dzurinda Mikuláš JuhanParts Sanader Ivo Dombrovskis Valdis Algirdas Brazauskas Ansip Andrus Tusk Donald Špidla Vladimír Horn Gyula Laar Mart Kosor Jadranka Kubilius Andrius LeszekMiller Drnovšek Janez (7.0 Performance Good –
9.0)
E prime ministers performed moderately well well moderately performed ministers prime 3 S
ES II and ES III score difference (see appendix appendix (see difference score III ES and II ES
Categories of
II and III: “Please assess performance of each Prime minister on 1 on minister Prime each of performance assess “Please III: and II
aoiy f rm mnses N1) efre wl i E integra EU in well performed (N=16) ministers prime of majority
his
rm mnseil em s breln cs with case borderline a is term ministerial prime p - on sae wih a which scale, point 7.7 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.1 7.4 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 9.0 Mean rime
and and
Mečiar and Klaus) performed badly in EU integration. EU in badly performed Klaus) and Mečiar
ministers’ performance EU in integration 7 -
9 indicating good performance inintegration performance EU good indicating 9 Orbán Viktor Bērziņš Andris Nečas Petr Janša Janez Mirek Vagnorius Gediminas Fico Robert Pahor Borut Zeman Miloš JerzyBuzek Vähi Tiit Račan Ivica (5.0 Performance Average
– 12
Topolánek 7.0) ry closer to or furtheraway or to closer ry .
*
lw di llows
89
five
- skepticism csin f rm mnses ih different with ministers prime of scussion ) better score was used for placement in the proper proper the in placement for used was score better ) n o and 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.9 5.9 6.2 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.8 6.9 Mean 6.0
nly five prime ministers ministers prime five nly rian behavior that moved Slovakia Slovakia moved that behavior rian
from that was that -
Mečiar Vladimír Šķēle Andris Šleževičius Adolfas AigarsKalvītis VáclavKlaus Performance Bad
- Europe. 5 indicating poor performance poor indicating 5 10 scale where 1 is “very bad” and and bad” “very is 1 where scale 10 (2.6 (2.6
–
5.0)
voiced more during his his during more voiced a 5
cr o 49 ht is that 4.9 of score
Mečiar, while Mečiar, either from from either tion, while while tion, 2.6 4.3 4.4 4.6 4.9 Mean 4.2
,
5 -
7 CEU eTD Collection La integration. EU in performers best the are Estonia governance 6.5 with moderate generally is integration EU in performance ministers’ Prime is score better III, and II ES between score incountry a performance reflected usedand integration EU ministers’ prime in difference score of case In country *P Source Table 4. comparisons. i EU in performance ministers’ prime on data level country presents 4.4 Table relations. foreign of complexity than relevance more bear commitments EU ministers’ prime that indicator an is Estonia) in (especially ministers prime Baltic other many by Baltic of aspects economic ministers ( countries Baltic for security energy of source and partner trading main the remains Russia aspirations, EU their of regardless addition, In home. at welcomed not was which requirements, accession EU larg a have States Baltic hand, other the On West. the to belonging of reasons cultural also but Russia, from away security national EU Baltic Russia, to proximity geographical their of countries. Because Baltic to specific accession, EU of context historical and political larger to relation Poor Total Slovakia Latvia Republic Czech Lithuania Hungary Slovenia Estonia Croatia Poland Country rime ministers’ rime - that Russian relations. On the one hand, Baltic States were eager to join the EU, to divert their divert to EU, the join to eager were States Baltic hand, one the On relations. Russian
efrac i E itgain y eea Bli pie iitr ms b itrrtd in interpreted be must ministers prime Baltic several by integration EU in performance
: E
4
S II and III III and S II
is comparatively is
Prime ministers’ p in EU integration integration EU in unk Pta ad ilna 03. n hs es, efrac o Bli prime Baltic of performance sense, this In 2003). Zielonka and Pettai Rupnik, . Similar to country variations in in variations country to Similar .
EU integration performance performance integration EU –
prime ministers’ performance in EU integration EU in ministers’performance prime a - erformance EU in integration (country level) EU better a b cniind n pcfct o gooiia, utrl an cultural geopolitical, of specificity on conditioned be may
- Russian relations Russian score e Russian minority that had to be accommodated based on based accommodated be to had that minority Russian e -
country scores are aggregates of all prime ministers’ prime all of aggregates are scores country than Prime ministers’ EU integration performance ministers’EUintegration Prime average scores average prime ministers’ democratic conduct democratic ministers’ prime 90 . However, good performance in EU integ EU in performance good However, .
Expert Survey (Mean all PM) all (Mean Survey Expert tvia and Slovakia are average performers performers average are Slovakia and tvia
- U rela EU in other dimensions other in tgain o lo cross allow to ntegration 6.5 5.2 5.4 6.0 6.5 6.7 6.9 7.2 7.4 7.6
tions unavoidably transform transform unavoidably tions
an av an
erage score of of score erage of democratic of oad and Poland , *
scores in each in scores - country ration d CEU eTD Collection p a On feelings expansion. European are of groups aspects elite different different but to Europe”, opposed “more against is group of no aspects vein, different similar of a In more Europe. want groups elite different rather Europe”; “more e no wants elites, group national of pool wide a In itself. further integration the in of than rather direction process, and integration type the in pronounced more variation with process, integration tha find (2013) Russo rathercompletely rejecting than project (Hartleb 2012). theEU temp expressing instrument Euro occasions, rare on Except project. pro only not largely is elite ministerial prime CEE suggest and thesis Europeanization” “negative the support 113 2008: Gallina 2007, (Gallina Euro of examples on based is it because limited rather is argumentation of line This agenda. EU the nationali 2007, Rupnik 2007, (Gallina integration political post in especially Europeanization”, generally pro 2000) since (especially were who ministers, prime its of all of engagement constant a required good Croatia’s lengthie 2009. comparatively its in which 2013), in joined Croatia while 2004, in EU givenjoinedstudy this in countries eight (all process zone unsurprising Euro is integration the EU joined in performance Slovakia leadership Fico’s under while accession EU Slovakia’s for credited is Dzurinda Otherwise, to related largely Slovakia) (in is which apparent, is mid with - kpiim n ny e laes mn Ceh Kas ad Polis and (Klaus) Czech among leaders few only in skepticism ae o the on Based lit Previous st, radical and populist feelings to attract voters or divert the blame for policy failures to failures policy for blame the divert or voters attract to feelings populist and radical st, in CEE do appear occasionally relevant in politics, a good example of which is when when is which of example good a politics, in relevant occasionally appear do CEE in - point scores, but their worse EU integration performance compared to other countries other to compared performance integration EU worse their but scores, point
f ainl oe pa, betn t ol a iie nme o plc aes or areas, policy of number limited a only to objecting play, power national of - - uoen bt lo engage also but European, European politicians. European politicians. oral concerns about the national interests national the about concerns oral rtr sgetd E pltcl lts ae und o “negative to turned have elites political CEE suggested erature td o eie tiue twrs U integration EU towards attitudes elite of study t national elites continue to provide a solid backing to a European European a to backing solid a provide to continue elites national t –
120, 143 120, - accession period when they started opposing further further opposing started they when period accession - d kpi vie ae asd bt only but raised, are voices skeptic
n ciiis ht rn ter onre coe t EU to closer countries their bring that activities in – 91
147,
Ágh
167
Mečiar’s 2008), using EU using 2008), – that are that
172, 190 172,
along ractical poor
at odds with the EU trajectory, EU the with odds at –
eortc commitments democratic te apiat i 2004, in applicants other (aznk tis elite twins) (Kaczynski h n w waves two in 195). 195). - ie however side, related issues to evoke evoke to issues related
Expert data do not do data Expert s sf” strategic “soft” as accession r Cta and Cotta , anti - EU EU lite lite . CEU eTD Collection 2.7. 53 citizens’ on had measures these effect the rather goals, economic achieve to applied ministers economic citizens’ and measures relatesto performance well economic citizens’ to contribute growth economic inducing or rate ministers Prime 4.2.2 performance. weak effect of concept a the with remains EU line In the elites. national why among culture political about democratic and more values consensual learn of transmitter should we European, anti or pro are elites undemocratic occasional amidst powerlessness general nat EU by outbursts to related reasons to paid also be should attention More consensual. and democratic more cultures political national making un to support EU elites’ of level the and elites’ between relationship the of direction the testing from benefit would mak generally and level national ministe prime improve gradually also may membership EU However, institutions. national supra in membership by required conduct consensual accept to ministers prime of tendency greater mean may level national at norms democratic of acceptance because pro being between relationship the of ambiguity to points which EU common the towards Some project. activities their accommodated also EU but saw only beneficial, not as ministers membership prime CEE that indicates governance democratic of dimensions during Greece failing financially for package financial Radičová’sgovernment a support to refused elite Slovak
The correlation between two dimensions dimensions two between correlation The
Primeministers’ performance economic policymaking in bette Relatively - EU
53 prime ministers were more pro more were ministers prime
. ’ ional elites (Rupnik elites ional
esrs n cnmc ra agtd t euig nmlyet n inflation and unemployment reducing at targeted area economic in measures t s osbe ht eortc rm mnses r gnrly pro generally are ministers prime democratic that possible is It
economic measures economic performance r in 2011. ive governance, the next section discusses prime ministers’ economic economic ministers’ prime discusses section next the governance, ive
e well
E pltcl utrs oe osnul consensual. more cultures political CEE
however however 2007 - of prime ministers ministers prime of being cover if supra national structures have any capabilities in in capabilities any have structures national supra if cover :
by by 22 is positive and strong and ( ispositive . It is less relevant which economic measures prime prime measures economic which relevant less is It . prime ministers and the relationship betwee relationship the and ministers prime – - 92 European than democratic (e.g. Sanader, Janša), Sanader, (e.g. democratic than European
5).
In addition to insisting on questions whether questions on insisting to addition In prime ministers’ democratic conduct conduct democratic ministers’ prime in EU integration compared to other other to compared integration EU in r
= .76, .76, =
p < .01), see chapter two, table, two, table, .01),chapter see < rs’ - democratic conduct democratic being. In this section, section, this In being. democratic conduct democratic Further research research Further - Eur n these n opean, and
at at
CEU eTD Collection with differentministers ofeconomicperformance. levels ten on scores their on based “average”) and a groups and performance economic ministers’ provide to position a in ministers’ prime of them estimation puts that unfolded terms ministerial where countries prime of residents as conditions economic of experience personal also but politics, prime welfare. citizens’ measuring for methodology arebetter institutes financial by measured macroeconomicindicators on had measures economic the of prime However, health economy. general for actors responsible only the not are leaders Clearly, ministers. prime by measures economic to relate anyhow rates unemployment or inflation yearly in fluctuations indicators. macroeconomic financial by many provided indicators of macroeconomic account take must that econ economic citizens’ relateto would measure omitted an how assessing for wayempirical no is becausethere these and place) took never but desired, were that (measures measures economic omitted for blame or credit take also could performance. economic unsuccessful indicate rate, would this down, unemployment unemployment the tackle to attempts for only tenures, their during economy the of aspect problematic every for “blamed” or “credited” economic
omic measures that ministers’ economic ministers’ Assessing economic conditions in any country in a given period is a comprehensive task task comprehensive a is period given a in country any in conditions economic Assessing the effect of economic reforms they initiated during their terms. If a prime minister minister prime a If terms. their during initiated they reforms economic of effect the well well - - en i mr important. more is being being. This is why prime ministers’ economic performance reflects only only reflects performance economic ministers’ prime why is This were implemented.
performance. Experts have superior knowledge about their countries’ countries’ their about knowledge superior have Experts performance. ministers’ part of economic responsibility relates to the effect their their effect the to relates responsibility economic of part ministers’ are also important. important. also are economic performance. Table 4.5 presents expert data on prime on data expert presents 4.5 Table performance.
rm hs perspectiv this From prime ministers prime
93 - However, policy omissions are difficult to judge, judge, to difficult are omissions policy However, on scal point u ipeet maue ta d nt bring not do that measures implements but
institutions would not allow determining if if determining allow not would institutions hs s h epr etmts n not and estimates expert why is This
, hc a which e,
in three categories (“good”, “bad” (“good”, categories three in e, prime ministers ministers prime e, oee, okn ol at only looking However, lw dsuso o prime of discussion llows Prime ministers ministers Prime intermediate n r not are but but CEU eTD Collection state losers transformation’s compensate to efforts generous with marketization and cohesion social and policymaking, transformation in market between influence groups’ social organized and capitalism citizens’ embedded of limitation severe with reforms market 54 freerministers ofeconomic implementation reforms. 2 countries Baltic in adopted capitalism of type neoliberal the to relate may Latvia) in (except ministers prime Baltic by performance economic successful Relatively opened that reforms implemented Dzurinda and Drnovšek Račan, transition, in Earlier crisis. financial du growth to path a on and bankruptcy from economies Baltic diverted that measures for credited especially are Ansip) Dombrovskis, (Kubilius, ministers Prime Baltic policymaking. in As * category appendix (see difference score III ES and II ES of case In average score following on based category each in placed are ministers Prime well economic citizens’ to measures ofthese the relationship taxationand economic ministers’ economic in performance good” “very 10 Source: Table 4. N Total 7 Total Vähi Tiit Račan Ivica Dombrovskis Valdis Drnovšek Janez Dzurinda Mikuláš Ansip Andrus Kubilius Andrius Performance Good 013
(7.0 (7.0 The authors identify three models of ca of models three identify authors The ečas was included in ES III after mandate termination in June 2013 in June mandatetermination after in III ES included was ečas searching for searching ) – 54 dicated by expert data, only seven prime ministers performed well in economic economic in well performed ministers prime seven only data, expert by dicated
and 8.2)
E
5 economies of their their of economies S ht iis atcpto o itrs gop i decision in groups interest of participation limits that
Categories of
7 II and III and II
-
9
indicating good indicating
compromise solutions. compromise
: “Please assess performance of each Prime minister on 1 on minister Prime each of performance assess “Please : measures -
formed in Visegrad countries and Croatia Croatia and countries Visegrad in formed
Mean p 7.5 7.0 7.0 7.2 7.6 7.9 7.9 8.2 rime
uh as such
countries to foreign investments, which re which investments, foreign to countries performance in
ministers’ performance in economic policymaking
Šķēle Andris Orbán Viktor Zeman Miloš Mirek Tusk Donald Špidla Vladimír JerzyBuzek LeszekMiller Fico Robert Vagnorius Gediminas Horn Gyula Laar Mart JuhanParts Algirdas Brazauskas (5.0 Performance Average
tutrl eom, ba reforms, structural – pitali
15 7.0) Topolánek policymaking policymaking
sm in CEE; (a) neoliberal (a) CEE; in sm
economic policymaking. economic
94
(c) (c)
area. When making your judgment think about prime prime about think judgment your making When area. six neocorporatist neocorporatist ) better score was used for placement in the proper proper the in placement for used was score better )
nki ng and budgeting, inflation, inflation, budgeting, and ng Mean
entailing entailing 5.7 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.7 5.8 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.5 ran -
being ge; 1 1 ge; -
formed in Baltic states Baltic in formed with -
Mečiar Vladimír AigarsKalvītis Sanader Ivo Jadranka VáclavKlaus Šleževičius Adolfas Bērziņš Andris Pahor Borut Ferenc Janša Janez Medgyessy Péter Nečas Petr Performance Bad - formed in Slovenia Slovenia in formed
pe - (2.9 (2.9 aig wih los prime allows which making, -
10 scale where 1 is “very bad” and and bad” “very is 1 where scale 10
various corporatist groups and the the and groups corporatist various 5 indicating indicating 5 rmanent search for compromises compromises for search rmanent – – started economic growth. economic started
Gyurcsány 12 5.0) (Bohle and Greskovits, Greskovits, and (Bohle Kosor
*
poor,
unemployment
entailing entailing
entailing r entailing 5 -
7 indicating indicating 7 ring 2008 2008 ring Mean radical radical 3.9 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.9 adical
(b) (b) or or
CEU eTD Collection sustainability and regime welfare property, private stability, price and currency competition, market of organization development, 57 Hungarian interests, 56 reforms 55 revenue, debt tradebalance, strengthoutput economy market of dimensions the of one is EP BTI. by (EP) performance 1990s. mid which Horn, by introduced package (P health economic short positive immediate an have not did that taxes) higher (e.g. reforms structural painful to resorted ministers prime these that sev by countered were which results, economic Kalvītis, Sanader, Nečas, positive some achieved Medgyessy,(N=15) ministers Prime successful Moderately Klaus). Gyurcsány, and Šleževičius, (Pahor, charges corruption or scandals that resign to tendency higher a have economy the in well perform improvements economic (Kosor to lead not did that measures adopted and reforms structural proper ( scandals i to corruptionfailed poorly performed that ministers prime Other Šleževičius). Kalvītis, and/or Sanader, failures, economic for responsibility blur to used in manifested reforms to related is ministers prime twelve by performance economic Bad
Medgyessy decreased the central value of the of value central the decreased Medgyessy Kosor Kosor akt cnm i cmoe o floig iesos econo dimensions; following of composed is economy Market
55 Table which was which i Medgyessy , toue nw ae a a epne o h ogig cnmc crisis economic ongoing the to response a as taxes new ntroduced government bonds government
(BTI codebook, 2012). codebook, (BTI
4.6 compares 4.6 by following by perceived by investors as a flawed piece of economic policy that prompted prompted that policy economic of piece flawed a as investors by perceived ierson 2004, Baylis 2007). An example for this is widely unpopular austerity austerity unpopular widely is this for example An 2007). Baylis 2004, ierson
56 populist rhetoric (Janša, Sanader, Mečiar, Kalvītis, Klaus,Mečiar) that is is that Klaus,Mečiar) Kalvītis, Mečiar, Sanader, (Janša, rhetoric populist Gucáy Phr ēzņ) Itrsigy pie iitr ta dd not did that ministers prime Interestingly, Bērziņš). Pahor Gyurcsány, ,
and and
expert data expert andcodebook investment (BTI 2012). led to considerable interest rate hikes rate interest considerable to led macroeconomic indicators
- em fet bt ee tews ncsay o long for necessary otherwise were but effect, term was on prime ministers’ prime on floating floating necessary to avoid imminent bankruptcy in Hungary in Hungary in bankruptcy imminent avoid to necessary 95 eral negative economic achievements. It is likely is It achievements. economic negative eral forint’s forint’s
exchange rate exchange ;
GDP mic performance, level of socio economic economic socio of level performance, mic
by Hungarian national bank national Hungarian by economic performance performance economic
growth
r , but failed to introduce structural structural introduce to failed but , esponding to Hungarian exporters Hungarian to esponding
is frequently also related to to related also frequently is , inflation, employment, inflation, tax , a lack of commitment for for commitment of lack 57
measured as the as measured s ale of ale Nečas
to
mplement economic economic
forints and and forints , Janša, Janša, , - term term ’
CEU eTD Collection of financial scand number large a to related likely is which economy, the in performers poor as experts by assessed interests personal committed not generallyis that mindset ministers’ ministers prime Croatian) (and Latvian neoliberal the ministers. prime Baltic by performance better to contribute may Lithuania and Estonia in adopted model neoliberal The measure. and expert on Republic poorly perform Czech that Hungary the except measures, both on successful moderately are countries other All indicators. macroeconomic positive moderately have but measure, expert on economy the in poor performLatvia and Croatia while measure, expert on successful moderately but measure, economic moderate Estonia indicate achievements. EP and data expert both performance, economic to reference In budget balanced stability, score country ***EP price levels, employment high rates, c sustainable a and debt reasonable growth GDP high relatively with performance a debt toward tendency budget, unbalanced data macroeconomic * scores country us are scores better III, and II ES between performance economic in difference score of case In incountry each scores policymaking economic in performance ministers’ *Prime indicator (EP) Source performance (EP) by BTI Table 4.6 * Total Total Croatia Latvia Republic Czech Hungary Slovenia Slovakia Poland Lithuania Estonia Country EP is measured on a 1 1 a on measured is EP : E :
S
Prime ministers’ p
II and III and II
capitalist . als that areamong (Kocijanals Prime ministers thatfrequent Czech is an average of all bi annual scores available available scores annual bi ofall isan average including including
– Compared to moderate macroeconomic indicators, macroeconomic moderate to Compared
Prime ministers’ performance in economic policymaking* in economic ministers’performance Prime prime ministers’ prime - and Lithuania are the only two countries that appear “very good” on BTI on good” “very appear that countries two only the are Lithuania and
10 scale where scale 10 oe hs o iia efc, n te wors the and effect, similar no has model
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country scores are aggregates of all prime ministers’ ministers’ prime all of aggregates are scores country by BTI byBTI
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hs s agl rltd o rm mnses gnrl omtet to commitment general ministers’ prime to related largely is This
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and the relationship between these measures and citizens’ and measures these between relationship the and 59 reforms but to but reforms (N=22) Pzwrk ad iog 19, reosi 00, which 2000), Przeworski 1997, Limongi and Przeworski , market transformation market ag o institutions of range rm ministers prime
opcs o civ go eooi rsls Hwvr a However, results. economic good achieve to rospects inefficiencies performed either well or moderately well in economic in well moderately or well either performed 97 financial
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nevnin i sca shr (especially sphere social in interventions ng citizens to achieve welfare objectives, objectives, welfare achieve to citizens ng ht may that
scandals and corruption. In line with the the with Inline corruption. and scandals that together determine the welfare of of welfare the determine together that is likely to incur to likely is
o b to be not transitional costs transitional
provision for basicfor provision lerated politically politically lerated deliberate deliberate - social point point (e.g. and CEU eTD Collection Performance allowances. family and pensions care, health education, free guarantee, Eastern achievement is area social the in unsurprising performance lower comparatively this inequality income and exclusion costs transactional of complexity the Given post by encountered area. social the in poorly performed ministers prime nine and success moderate achieved (N=22) majority a while well, performed ministers 2013 in June mandatetermination after in III ES included was *Nečas category appendix (see difference score III ES and II ES of case In 1 range; score following on based indicatingaverage category each in placed are ministers Prime being and reforms) health and pension (especially measures in performance good” “very 10 Source: Table 4. Social policymaking is an area where prime mini prime where area an is policymaking Social Total 2 Total Špidla Vladimír Kubilius Andrius Performance Good
(7.0 (7.0
E 7 – Europe, where people are accustomed to a range of state provisions such as employment as such provisions state of range a to accustomed are people where Europe, S
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rime social policymaking area policymaking social I adto, xet’ os pretos bu pie ministers’ prime about perceptions worse experts’ addition, In .
Šleževičius Adolfas Kosor Jadranka Valdis Orbán Viktor Zeman Miloš Laar Mart LeszekMiller JuhanParts Janša Janez Gyurcsány Ferenc JerzyBuzek Ansip Andrus Horn Gyula Fico Robert Vagnorius Gediminas Medgyessy Péter Dzurinda Mikuláš Pahor Borut Račan Ivica Vähi Tiit Algirdas Brazauskas Drnovšek Janez Performance Average ministers’ performa (5.0 (5.0 t reformers such as high levels of unemployment, poverty, social social poverty, unemployment, of levels high as such reformers t – ry good performance in performance good ry
7.0) Dombrovskis 22
h rltosi o tee esrs o iies sca well social citizens’ to measures these of relationship the 98 . When making your judgment think about prime ministers’ ministers’ prime about think judgment your making When .
nce in policymakingsocial seven
sters’ achieved least success. Only two prime two Only success. least achieved sters’ ) better score was used for placement in the proper proper the in placement for used was score better ) social social Mean 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.8 5.5 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.8
policymaking -
entitlement”
VáclavKlaus Mečiar Vladimír Mirek Šķēle Andris Sanader Ivo AigarsKalvītis Bērziņš Andris Tusk Donald Nečas Petr (3.0 Performance Bad
- 10 scale where 1 is “very bad” and and bad” “very is 1 where scale 10 - –
indicating 5 5.0) Topolánek
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7 - CEU eTD Collection 58 social riskgroups. particular on policies social particular nation of impact to the assess relation not in does but poverty framework, protection at risk assesses and country given a in risks social socia of absence or presence outlines that measure static a is It disability. and age old unemployment, poverty, as such risks social for compensate that arrangements viable levels toreformsofprimecommitment ministers’ performance explains social area. inthe between contingency if clear not is it because examination, further deserves area economic and social in performance between relationship The policymaking. social in success moderate a only achieved economythe ( affairs social in poorly performed also economy the in poorly performing ministers prime data and entitlements welfare sustain to ability the limit constraints are policymaking Nečas
Correlation between two dimensions is strong and positive ( positive and strong is dimensions two between Correlation emsie o a epnin of expansion an for permissive , Table 4.8 compares expert data to BTI’s welfare regime (WR) indicator. WR measures WR indicator. (WR) regime welfare BTI’s to data expert compares 4.8 Table Bērziņš, Klaus, Sanader, Kalvītis, Mečiar). Sanader,Kalvītis, Klaus, Bērziņš, may be also also be may
dimensions or other factors matter, or if prime ministers’ general lack of of lack general ministers’ prime if or matter, factors other or dimensions conditioned
58 social
on a on good state of the economy where economythe of state good pnig I te cnm grows economy the If spending. 99
r However, prime ministers performing well in well performing ministers prime However,
= .64, .64, = p <.01), (see chapter 2, table 2.7) table chapter 2, (see <.01),
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, fiscal fiscal ,
CEU eTD Collection performance as anaggregate all ispresented three of fu by explored be should which measures,two the contingencybetween scoresmayoverall equalindicate almost areasocialwith and economic in performance moderate ministers’ Prime area. social in poorly perform count ministers all in ministers’ prime moderate match nets safety developed Moderately poverty. of risk at remains population the of part significant a and groups ministers’ prime successful moderately s only to matched is ministers prime Czech of achievements poor and Hungary and Slovenia in interventions that poverty of prevention 4.8, table in WR by indicated C As Slovenia, present. also is measures two between variation country cross Some governance. democratic of dimensions other any in than worse generally however ne safety developed Relatively citizens’. of security social general provide but risks, social all for cover not do countries most in that nets safety developed moderately have countries nine all 4.8, table in data by suggested As score ***WRcountry well a exists care and social indicate 10 and 9 while poverty, of risk at remains population the of part significant a and strata social all for risks all cover not in reflected and used are * scores better III, and II ES between scores country performance social in difference score of case In incountry each *Prime indicator Source by BTI 4.8 Table phere * Total Latvia Republic Czech Croatia Poland Slovakia Hungary Estonia Lithuania Slovenia Country WR
: E
. In other countries, social safety nets are developed, but do not cover all risksfor socialIn all social safety butdonotcover developed, are countries, . nets other ministers’ performance in social policymaking policymaking social in performance ministers’ is measured on a 1 1 a on measured is
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III safety nets that are comprehensive and compensate for social risks, especially nationwide health nationwide especially risks, social for compensate and comprehensive are that nets safety
- – focused prevention of poverty is in place is in poverty preventionof focused is an average of all bi annual scores available available scores annual bi ofall isan average
prime ministers’ prime Prime ministers’ performance in social policymaking in social ministers’performance Prime -
10 point scale where scale point 10 performance in social sphere social in performance ts match moderate prime ministers’ success in social area that is that area social in success ministers’ prime moderate match ts Expert Survey (mean all PM) (mean all Survey Expert ture research in more depth. In the next section, prime ministers’ prime section, next the In depth. more in research ture performance in social policymaking and and policymaking social in performance 7 and and 7 5.3 4.2 4.9 4.9 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.5 6.0 6.1
- 100
country scores are aggregates of all prime ministers’ scores scores ministers’ prime all of aggregates are scores country 8 indicate 8
(BTI codebook 2012) codebook (BTI dimensions of dimensions
social safety nets that are well developed, but do but developed, well are that nets safety social (country level) and welfare regime (WR) regime welfare and level) (country - by BT by
ie elh ae n a well a and care health wide is ecp i Lti wee prime where Latvia in except ries, I from 2003 until 2012 until 2012 from2003 * effective governance. BTI’s BTI’s
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ting Primeministers’
7.9) ES II and II ES neither
ver effective policies policies effective ver Categories of Prime ministers in
effectiveness, nor ineffectiveness and ineffectiveness nor effectiveness,
III
–
index of effectiveness (an aggregate of average scores in EU integration, economic and and economic integration, in EU scores ofaverage aggregate (an indexofeffectiveness 7.0 7.1 7.8 7.9 Mean ten
performancegovernance effective in
- point scale, wh scale, point
Ferenc Gyurcsány Ferenc Donald Medgyessy Péter JerzyBuzek Vagnorius Gediminas Fico Robert JuhanParts LeszekMiller Dombrovskis Valdis Laar Mart Horn Gyula Vähi Tiit Račan Ivica Špidla Vladimír Algirdas Brazauskas (5.0 Average Orbán Viktor Janša Janez Mirek Kosor Jadranka Zeman Miloš Pahor Borut that
. Prime ministers are are ministers Prime . –
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Tusk sters’ effectiveness is effectiveness sters’ 21
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ffective governance
llows discussion of prime ministers with different with ministers prime of discussion llows
101 7
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grouped in three categories; “effective”, categories; three in grouped
effectiveness
one of the of one
Mečiar Vladimír VáclavKlaus AigarsKalvītis Adolfas Šķēle Andris Bērziņš Andris Sanader Ivo Nečas* Petr (3.1 Ineffective
their effectiveness measured in in measured effectiveness their –
- 5.0)
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democratic governance’s democratic
ance in EUintegration,
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; 5 ;
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7 CEU eTD Collection in outlined was performance ministers’ prime 4.2, and 4.1 sections well citizens’ improve to outcomes policy effective deliver and institutions democratic conduct of democratic composed ministers’ index an prime is governance democratic in performance one, chapter in outlined As democratic performancein 4.3 Prime ministers’ governance effectiveness. an is which an governance, as presented democratic is performance ministers’ prime section, next the In effectiveness. their for matter to appear reforms structural to conducive generally mindsets ministers’ instit prime democratic respecting to compared restructuring social and economic conduct democratic ministers’ prime score overall lower Slightly CEE. in politicians effective average of presence nor general indicates ministers democratic prime neither of number Large effectiveness. in success same the achieve of dimension each in scores average institutions for dangerous more appears their while conduct policymaking, undemocratic in results better achieve appears ministers It prime dimensions. ineffective boththat however, in performance of levels equal relatively indicate effectiveness 4.0, whilean averag is ministers prime ineffective of score average an Interestingly, 5.8. moderately is ministers prime of effective score average an while 6.0, is ministers prime democratic moderately of score e of score average an while 7.6, is ministers prime of category each ministers’ prime in variation Score ineffective. were eight but undemocratic, were ministers (N=17) ineffective of nor effective neither were total (N=21) and undemocratic nor democratic A effective. were four only and democratic slight ministers’ prime to Compared
ly less successful in effectiveness as data in table 4.9 suggest. Ten prime ministers were ministers prime Ten suggest. 4.9 table in data as effectiveness in successful less ly f . i pie iitr’ fetvns cmae t a oeal vrg soe f . in 6.0 of score average overall an to compared effectiveness ministers’ prime in 5.7 of vrg soe i dfeet aeois f rm ministers’ prime of categories different in scores Average
democratic conduct democratic e score of undemocratic prime ministers is3.4. ministers ofundemocratice score prime democratic conduct democratic . Democratic prime ministers however do not appear capable to capable appear not do however ministers prime Democratic .
and effectiveness is small. An average score of democratic of score average An small. is effectiveness and (see table 4.11) may point to some complexity related to related complexity some to point may 4.11) table (see
grgt of aggregate n effectiveness. and 102 , outlined in table 4.1, prime ministers areonly ministers prime 4.1, table in outlined ,
ffective prime ministers is 7.5. An average An 7.5. is ministers prime ffective pr m mnses dmcai conduct democratic ministers’ ime
rm mnses ut oh respect both must ministers Prime
prime ministers ministers prime
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–
poor nor good and goodand nor poor 8)
ES II and III III and II ES
5 “average” and “poor”, as table 4.10 indicates, based on based indicates, 4.10 table as “poor”, and “average” 0
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eto 41 n e and 4.1 section
–
Mean index of democratic governance, see appendix eight appendix see governance, indexofdemocratic 7.5 7.1 7.1 7.7 7.8 8.0
of prime ministers in prime ministerial prime 7
-
9 indicating 9 te Petr Nečas Petr Mirek Zeman Miloš Kosor Jadranka Vagnorius Gediminas Fico Robert Gyurcsány Ferenc Tusk Donald Laar Mart Pahor Borut JuhanParts Vähi Tiit Algirdas Brazauskas Dzurinda Mikuláš Dombrovskis Valdis Medgyessy Péter Horn Gyula LeszekMiller Ansip Andrus (5.0 performance Average n - on sae ag to range scale point fciees n eto 42 I ti scin pie ministers’ prime section, this In 4.2. section in ffectiveness –
7.0) Topolánek i effectiveness good performance in democratic governance in democratic performance good dx of ndex
19
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democratic governance (aggregated)
eortc oenne s n grgt o prime of aggregate an as governance democratic
103 . Prime ministers are ministers Prime .
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6.7 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.3 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.7 5.9 5.9 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.7 a lw icsin f rm mnses with ministers prime of discussion llow efr well perform
Viktor Orbán Viktor VáclavKlaus Bērziņš Andris Šleževičius Adolfas (2.9 Poor Mečiar Vladimír AigarsKalvītis Šķēle Andris Janša Janez Sanader Ivo
their performance in democratic in performance their –
performance
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grouped in threecategories; in grouped 9 n eortc governance. democratic in
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5
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that CEU eTD Collection governance performance variable ministers prime of understanding relative in ministers’ prime success weighs section next The desirable. still are governance democratic countr CEE is This effectiveness. and democracy for support moderate register countries other All policymaking. is mindset whose elite ministerial prime to relates likely which governance, democratic in poorly performs Latvia governance. effective by welfare citizens’ improves and framework democratic supports relates likely which and Poland countries. across variation of levels moderate suggest 4. table in indicated countries, nine all by governance democratic in 5.9 of score average An scores ministers’ prime individual in country each in performance ministers’scores prime individual for eight appendix see policymaking, social and economic integration, *Indexof 4.11 Index democratic of governance (c ofdiscussion cross 4.1 table In framework. democratic existing an to structures informal parallel develop who 2013 1990 June mid until from office in countries nine in ministers prime 33 of out few in corroborated only not is *Idx of ***Index of **Index Source: ES II II ES Source: Total Slovakia Slovenia Poland Lithuania Latvia Hungary Estonia R Czech Croatia Country
omte t efcie governance. effective to committed
neither great news, nor very bad news bad very nor news, great neither
prime ministers’ democratic conduct ministers’democratic prime
rm ministers’ prime . rm mnses promne in performance ministers’ prime and III III and e ae n rgt ah f post of path right a on are ies
1, performance in democratic governance is presented on a country level for for level country a on presented is governance democratic in performance 1, rm mnses dmcai conduct democratic ministers’ prime Democratic conduct Democratic – -
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prime ministers’ performance in performance ministers’ prime
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soi ae most are Estonia Effectiveness
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gvrac. rm mnses r gopd n three in grouped are ministers Prime governance. c prime ministers’ democratic conduct conduct democratic ministers’ prime
105 impact democratic conduct democratic
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Categorization of prime ministers’ effectiveness, see ministers’effectiveness, ofprime Categorization - trans ES II and III, see appendix appendix see III, and II ES 2 n efcie governance effective and
to pro o pltcl n eooi tasomto ad uiis uig financial during Kubilius and transformation economic and political of period ition
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ineffective cabinets with high number of ideologically ideologically of number high with cabinets ineffective Ručinskỳ
oee, h ipoe eooi stain i not did situation economic improved the However, sufficient for lower grades in reference to prime prime to reference in grades lower for sufficient
Example of his effectiveness challenges cabinet cabinet challenges effectiveness his of Example 107 - s that made Slovakia a magnet for foreign foreign for magnet a Slovakia made that s ee cruto aog lvks oiia and political Slovak’s among corruption level
BBC under t l 2009) al. et osdr vn n niet eainhp to relationship indirect an even consider N
Dzurinda was among the fastest in the the in fastest the among was Dzurinda etrs upre tasrps rm bug from transcripts purported features ews
2014). Dzurinda’s perception of perception Dzurinda’s 2014). . -
wide “Gorilla protests” and largely largely and protests” “Gorilla wide democratic conduct democratic Dzurinda
Mečiar from power in 1998 powerin Mečiarfrom mlig high implying – 2006 skills and challenging challenging and skills
is also credited for for credited also is (during
n 2011 in - level corruption corruption level r” h right the
59 may relate may
n 2011 in which , - wing ged ged
CEU eTD Collection and influence conduct law of passage for exchange in democratic Miller Minister Prime then including of regardless 60 ministers prime prime of level These moderate explaining performance. for variable ministers’ intervening an as taken be should factors in performance moderate of cases In coalitions. within constellation unfavorableor crisis restructuring,financial complexity contextual economic including transition in 2014( of one to bankruptcy of brink a on was and crisis economic amidst GDP its of 25% about lost that economy Latvia’s divert to able benefits social limited significantly measures but recovery, economic mild in resulted that transition early 2012 in resign crisis. economic amidst to forced was Pahor solutions, economic offer to Unable 2004. in resignation of unsuccessful proved introduced tax and measures friendly Business debt. g economic improved public of level and rate unemployment accession. EU Poland’s increases cosmetic only as however perceived were which budget, reduce to reforms and talks accession EU the of start for required Croatia in rule authoritarian ended 2000 in that coalition policy floating forint’s was elections), the in promised and (Blejer industries generally implemented and Poland of decentralization
Ry his involvement in the “Rywingate” the in involvement his wingate was Polish scandal scandal Polish was wingate ht resulted that Perceptions of prime ministers as democratic but moderately effective may relate to post to relate may effective moderately but democratic as ministers prime of Perceptions was Miller and takeover ofseve takeover and Åslund
rather than omte o otrn cnmc growth economic fostering to committed nlw f fo of inflow
exchange rate exchange and Dombrovskis 2011). and Dombrovskis
generally
expense cuts and growth cutsexpense inducing and n ae f oit ad neet ae ie. Račan hikes. rate interest and forints of sale in rowth, but the unemployment did not decline and decline not did unemployment the but rowth, Škreb reign Late Horn is credited is Horn Late His leadership unfolded in a difficult economic context including context economic difficult a in unfolded leadership His ral ral revealed in 2002 including bribe offer by bribe including 2002 in revealed TV TV
20
capital to respond to respond to commit broadcasters . . perceived 02 Interestingly, Buzek was not perceived less democratic less perceived not was Buzek Interestingly, ). Medgyessy’s social reform, extending welfare benefits (as (as benefits welfare extending reform, social Medgyessy’s ). the fastest growing economy in the EU that joined euro zone zone euro joined that EU the in economy growing fastest the . Špidla achieved mild economic growth by introducing introducing by growth economic mild achieved Špidla . ted to institutional and legal adjustments required for for required adjustments legal and institutional to ted 60
. as an ir an as for which 2002, in revealed scandal corruption
interests of exporters of interests reform in pension in reform for avoiding an imminent Hungarian bankruptcy in in bankruptcy Hungarian imminent an avoiding for ( 108 Cook and Orenstein 1999: 95). 1999: Orenstein and Cook responsible drain on the budget and decrease of of decrease and budget the on drain responsible
and supported and .
s
allowing allowing
an influential “group in power”, allegedly allegedly power”, in “group influential an
, health and education area education and health , a series of unpopular austerity austerity unpopular of series a as a flawed piece of economic of piece flawed a as print media houses bigger houses media print
privatizat
the the effectiveness, contextual contextual effectiveness, led six party electoral electoral party six led health care reform care health ion of state of ion
Dombrovskis was was Dombrovskis consisting of of consisting
reforms - in spite spite in financial ced his ced owned owned , was was , high tax he he -
CEU eTD Collection ( appointment ministerial prime his to prior agencycorruption corruptio to accustomed are culture who experts Estonian by expectations higher to relate may ministers prime these of performance Moderate effective. moderately and democratic Exc ** * effectiveness Source: Table 4.1 likely ismost mindset toaccount moderate performanceministers. for by average prime likel and ministers challenging in unfold to partially likely that is contexts ministers prime average of leadership However, welfare. democ respect somewhat They effective. moderately and moderatelydemocratic are ministers “average”prime 4.13, table in suggested As 4.4.2 ofdemocraticdimensions governance. indirectly or directly discus section are next The they in. scandalsinvolved of revelation to related usually factors contextual to Moderate overcome. ch contextual encountered have may reforms to commitment Categorization of Categorization Total 11 Total Zeman Miloš Mirek Vagnorius Gediminas Fico Robert Kosor Jadranka Laar Mart Algirdas Brazauskas Vähi Tiit Tusk Donald Gyurcsány Ferenc JuhanParts democratic Moderately conduct Democratic
Categorization of Categorization ept Ansip, all Estonian Prime Prime Estonian all Ansip, ept
Topolánek “Average”PrimeMinisters characteristic ES II and III, see appendix appendix see III, and II ES 3
“Average” Prime Ministers
prime ministers’ democratic conduct ministers’democratic prime
prime ministers’ prime
*
pplss te neato bten otxs pltcl kls n political and skills political contexts, between interaction the populists, y
democratic conduct by conduct democratic for
accounts
Nordic cou Nordic effectiveness, see effectiveness, Mean o ter oeae efrac. nie o ottnig prime outstanding for Unlike performance. moderate their for 6.2 5.5 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.7 eight
iitr (at, ar n Vähi and Laar (Parts, ministers ntries. Parts is perceived as “clean politician” active in anti in active politician” “clean as perceived is Parts ntries.
ses prime ministers that are moderately successful in both in successful moderately are that ministers prime ses
o idvda pie iitr’ scores ministers’ prime individual for ratic institutions and moderately improve citizens’ citizens’ improve moderately and institutions ratic
otherwise effective prime ministers may also relate relate also may ministers prime effective otherwise Miloš Zeman Miloš Mirek Vagnorius Gediminas Fico Robert Kosor Jadranka Mart Algirdas Brazauskas Vähi Tiit Tusk Donald Gyurcsány Ferenc JuhanParts effective Moderately Effectiveness**
, see , 109 table 4.9 4.9 table
Laar
table 4.1 4.1 table Topolánek
11
Helsinki TimesHelsinki
legs ht ee o es to easy not were that allenges ae ecie moderately perceived are )
in in eortc conduct democratic
2003), yetscore his 2003), Mean
5.4 5 6 6 5.3 6.4 6.8 6.7 5.8 5.5 6.2 5.9 n
.0 .0 .0
-
free political political free
and and - CEU eTD Collection Topolánek and ( groups certain benefited that reforms social and economic several to related is which democratic, than effective t party nationalist conduct process accession cris economic amidst production decreasing and large handling for sufficient not were taxes reforms Increased structural by unclear. unsupported remains deputy Sanader’s was she when corruption to relationship high of ( socia some leaving measures internet monitoring over moderate his as to relate could which transfers, money well and connections as gambling internet banning laws and censorship internet infr Polish in improvements significant prompting favor Tusk’s in worked 2012 in championship football European growth. to downturn economic pro strong a implemented crash economic Hungary’s handling about criticism over mounting resigned and 2009 May until office in to remained lead He not resignation. did immediate but Gyurcsány’s riots, and protests of series a sparked revelation This earlier. months few win to just economy the of state the about public the to lying admitted he which in assoc close and family his for promptedresignation his in1997( capital Estonian the in flats luxury obtaining of moderate ’s par the in during promptedconfidence This vote term. prime ministerial first his started he as militaryjust practice target shooting a as opponent his of picture a used he when 2001 in scandal shooting” Laar’s democratic. moderately only is The WarsawThe voice - Kosor’s harsh stand on corruption that resulted in a series of arrests and corruption trials corruption and arrests of series a in resulted that corruption on stand harsh Kosor’s speech a broadcasted radio when 2006 in damaged severely was reputation Gyurcsány’s
ranking politicians did not contribute to experts’ perception experts’ to contribute not did politicians ranking relates to his controversial relationship with the media and coalition partnership with the with partnershipcoalition and media the with relationship controversial his to relates liament he survived and remained prime minister ( minister prime remained and survived he liament democratic conduct democratic
Slovak Spectator Slovak r cnrvril zc fgrs ih uiu rltosi t ognzd crime organized to relationship dubious with figures Czech controversial are hat openly challenges rights of the Hungarian minority. He is lightly more more lightly is He minority. Hungarian the of rights challenges openly hat that was was that
2014). 2014).
- uies n pro and business blocked by Slovenia before her tenure. her before Slovenia by blocked l groups at risk of poverty may explain his moderate effectiveness effectiveness moderate his explain may poverty of risk at groups l
may relate to “Tallinn apartment” scandal apartment” “Tallinn to relate may
2008) and Slovakia’s euro zone membership in 2009. in membership zone euro Slovakia’s and 2008) Associated Press newsarchiveAssociated Press moderate - EU strategy that diverted Polish economy from from economy Polish diverted that strategy EU 110 is. However, she made a break a made she However, is.
eortc odc m conduct democratic astructure. He faced some criticisms over over criticisms some faced He astructure. Central Europe review Europe Central
1997).
( h Telegraph The Fico’s
democratic conduct democratic of her as democratic. Her Her democratic. as her of
y eae o “target a to relate ay
- when he was he when moderate cl unemployment scale - through in EU in through
2009). iates, which which iates, 2001). Vähi Vähi 2001). democratic democratic elections a elections
accused . Social . Zeman Tusk
CEU eTD Collection may others while culture, political negative of aspects all manifest populists likely Some corruption. or personalization executive of aspects usuallymanifest populists ministers prime these populists Likely governance. democratic of dimension political suggests, 4.14 table As impact prosperity. citizens’ least erodes is generally governance it democratic because in desirable, performance whose ministers prime are populists Likely 4.4.3. but moderately dimension ofdemocratic inanother governance. one in or both in poorly perform who ministers prime discusses section next The skills. personal politica between interaction entails likely it most because is explain to performance difficult moderate ministers’ prime Consequently, changes. political significant min prime these because leadership, of areas problematic or improvements of level exact pin the to point ministers prime of categories two other the for than difficult more be may it ministers o majorities parliamentary inter as such leadership surroundingtheir context complexity to of also but committeddemocracytoreforms, and not mindsets their to maymoderateperformancerelate effect or framework democratic erode severely nor improve, 1998 recove economic some of spite in reforms, social economicand poor and tenure his during scandals several in involvement Brazauskas’s 2004). Jeffries 2009, Raadt (de reforms economic of implementation impeded and work intergovernment’s overshadowed constant to relate may performance sex to and (Zeman) isters are likely to maintain the leadership situation they inherit rather than introduce introduce than rather inherit they situation leadership the maintain to likely are isters -
1999 crisis may relatetoperception of hisperformanceas moderate. Likely Populists Likely of likely populists populists likely of Average prime ministers characterized by moderate levels of performance neither greatly neither performance of levels moderate by characterized ministers prime Average
deliver policy outcomes that do not contribute to citizens’ welfare. citizens’ to contribute not do that outcomes policy deliver -
oe scandals power is negative either in both, or in one, but mo but one, in or both, in either negative is mn ielgcly ies cbnt ate. o aeae prime average For parties. cabinet diverse ideologically many r for example for
negative political culture political negative
Tplnk. n ihai, anru’ moderate Vagnorius’s Lithuania, In (Topolánek). - xctv cnlc wt president with conflict executive 111 engage in populist rhetoric, but not in corrupt in not but rhetoric, populist in engage
’ conduct is generally un generally is conduct ’ ive governance. Perceptions of their their of Perceptions governance. ive that may include may that ry in the aftermath of the Russian Russian the of aftermath the in ry
derately positive in another another in positive derately - executive conflicts, weakconflicts, executive mnst cnet and context mindset, l
populist rhetoric, populist democratic dmu that Adamkus Likely and and ion - CEU eTD Collection research. 61 a by characterized policymaking, social His rates. inflation increased and drop sales in resulted expenditures on record a to led economy Czech wo thought mistakenly he 2010, in term his started he When companies. owned state in posts for exchange in seats parliamentary their up give to MPs bribed and intelligence and collaboratorsclosest his sex A ** * effectiveness Source: Table 4.1 negative that characterizes politicalpopulists. culture likely de personalization executive and populism ministers’ prime of discussion five chapter In Nečas). (e.g. setting agenda in role dominant or populism to resort e or Categorization of prime ministers’ democratic conduct ministers’democratic prime of Categorization Total 10 Total 4 Total Mečiar Vladimír AigarsKalvītis Šķēle Andris Sanader Ivo Undemocratic T Janša Janez Orbán Viktor Undemocratic 4 Total VáclavKlaus Bērziņš Andris Šleževičius Adolfas Nečas Petr democratic Moderately conduct Democratic
This study does not evaluate levels of prime ministers’ corruption, which ministers’corruption, ofprime levels not evaluate study This does otal otal Categorization Categorization uld not be affected by an economic crash in the US. However, this bad economic assessment assessment economic bad this However, US. the in crash economic an by affected be not uld xecutive personalization. Other likely populists populists likely Other personalization. xecutive - power scandal revealed in summer 2013 forced Nečas to resign on accusations that one of of one that accusations on resign to Nečas forced 2013 summer in revealed scandal power ES II and III, see appendix appendix see III, and II ES
4 2 *
“Likely populists”
-
of prime ministers’ ofprime breaking deficit of 5.5 % o % 5.5 of deficit breaking ht would that
*
alleged mistress ordered illegal spying on several people by military military by people several on spying illegal ordered allegedmistress 4.2
Mean
vi a re seai icuig a increase tax including scenario Greek a avoid 2.6 3.2 3.4 3.9 3.4 3.9 5.2 5.2 5.6 5.6
effectiveness
eight
o individual for Viktor Orbán Viktor effective Moderately VáclavKlaus Bērziņš Andris Šleževičius Adolfas Nečas Petr Ineffective Effectiveness** Mečiar Vladimír AigarsKalvītis Šķēle Andris Sanader Ivo Ineffective Janša Janez
is based on table 4.9 4.9 table on based is f GDP and GDP f 4 10 2
4
112 is based on table 4.1 4.1 table on based is *
crs on scores
may be related to corruption to related be may
prompted
prime ministers’ ministers’ prime osrts ees n apcs of aspects and levels monstrates should be an be should
Nečas
to introduce to important task important eortc conduct democratic Mean 3.8 4.4 4.2 4.8 4.3 4.8 s, price rises that that rises price s, 5 3.1 3.9 4.4 5
.0 .0
61
, but may not may but ,
chaotic cuts chaotic of
further
and and CEU eTD Collection anti of anti amidst down stepped Kalvītis while 58), anti new a under officials corrupt prosecuting in slow was Šķēle 2007. in Kalvītis and 1997 in Šķēle scandals; corruption over resigned both Latvia in Kalvītis ten a to charges corruption on convicted and and crisis economic amidst process negotiation EU blocked and growth economic state in companies foreign to corruption news ratio over to relates ineffectiveness His organizations. freedom media from criticism its large drew in which intervenestory, the to published that government media Finnish the pressured and channels diplomatic used He trial. two a him earned which company, bribe defense Finish a with a scandal in involvement Janša’s revealed television Finnish Slovenia, in elections 2008 before socia of and decrease economic included some that to improvements relate may effectiveness moderate His parliament. the of role the undermining thus office, minister’s prime in power concentrating at attempts and opponents blamed for (Richter economicdifficulties 2008). statefrom transition speedy of for policy privatization cornerstone voucher for s term, financing his party during irregular criticized after 1997 in resigned Klaus minister, prime As 2006). (Holmes collapse bank’s a before shortly assets his of withdrawal and deposits personal c no of vote a amidst 1996 in resigned He 1994). (Knobl inflows capital large to contributed which rate, inflation the decreased moderately and rate exchange the stabilized but workers, state to hikes Šležev 1993, in office taking Upon 2013). ( protection social adequate for provide not could risks social for expenditure low very
of banks banks of 2013). - aae ws mn te ot oua pltcas eoe i ivleet n large in involvement his before politicians popular most the among was Sanader Orbán orpin gny ( agency corruption niec ad rmnl hre acsn hm f eevn lre neet ae o his on rates interest large receiving of him accusing charges criminal and onfidence
revealed in 2009 shortly after his unexpected resignation that included favorabincluded that resignation unexpected his shortlyafter 2009 in revealed
’ un s sliding out of control and inability to reach sustainable growth in Slovenia ( Slovenia in growth sustainable reach to inability and control of out sliding eortc eair eae t hs miuu rltosi wt political with relationship ambiguous his to relates behavior democratic B news BBC - we frs Gnrly h ws o al t hnl stalled handle to able not was he Generally, firms. owned - borrowing borrowing
2007). ičius did not deliver on initial promises of large wage large of promises initial on deliver not did ičius nlto rates inflation - corr
from foreign banks, which resulted in loan deposit loan in resulted which banks, foreign from
113 eir dpe a atcai sye f governing of style autocratic an adopted Mečiar - omn o free to command er rsn em ( term prison year
uption protests prompted by his sack of a head head a of sack his by prompted protests uption
n pbi db (el 2003) (Bell debt public and - - - - we cmais ht a a was that companies owned akt cnm u was but economy market year p year corruption law (Holmes 2006: (Holmes law corruption B news BBC rison term in subsequent subsequent in term rison
2012). Šķēle and and Šķēle 2012). candal and was was and candal was later tried later was V4/Revue .
le deals deals le Shortly -
scale BBC BBC later later l
CEU eTD Collection period from 1990until mid support partially chapter culture” this political of Findings welfare. citizens’ improve that policies govern performance of levels moderate most suggests This governance. democratic perfor five great, neither policymaking social and ministers’ ministers’ prime as on labeled data survey expert presented chapter This 4.5 for personal gain. is funds public of amount significant after way occur they that in apparent is sanctions, anti sanction to mechanisms democratic their of revelation amidst resignation is populists likely to using common feature One to benefit. personal prone for office public and reforms to committed not mindsets undemocratic their than performance dur or transformation early in either contexts historical and political different in unfolded that terms Their parliament. the in exp backed solidly in relevant parties few less of composed coalitions stable relatively appear led all because performance, bad attributes populists’ personal and factors Contextual gain. personal for office public use frequently and activities corruptive in engage but welfare, citizens’ sup not do his partyof2002 elections votesinthea 1998and (Fridner majority 1996). won We companies. of owned state privatization shady and corruption propaganda, for media state of misuse by characterized
Conclusion ance. CEE prime ministers generally support democratic institutions and deliver effective deliver and institutions democratic support generally ministers prime CEE ance. Some aspect of negative political culture characterizes all likely populists. They generallyThey all likely characterizesculture populists. negativepolitical aspectof Some respectfor
m well, 19 perform neither well nor poorly and only nine perform poorly in in poorly perform nine only and poorly nor well neither perform 19 well, m port democratic framework and deliver ineffective policies that do not improve improve not do that policies ineffective deliver and framework democratic port performance performance nor very bad news bad very nor
thesis
involvement in scandals and corruption, which indicates general ability of of ability general indicates which corruption, and scandals in involvement democratic institutio democratic
but in only nine only in but ht improve that n eortc governance democratic in June June stern criticisms did not however erode his domestic popularity and popularity domestic his erode however not did criticisms stern 2013 . In most part, part, most In . n ol few only and .
iies poprt. idns f hs chapter this of Findings prosperity. citizens’ prime ministers out of 33 ass 33 of out ministers prime - ns and democratic practices, but a delayed effect of these these of effect delayed a but practices, democratic 114
ing financial crisis appear less relevant for bad bad for relevant less appear crisis financial ing news is satisfactory is news prime ministers ministers prime effective efr ete wl o pol i democratic in poorly or well either perform
Dmcai gvrac entails governance Democratic . outcomes in EU integration,outcomes economic inEU are average politicians with with politicians average are . programmatic programmatic Out of 33 prime ministers, ministers, prime 33 of Out essed in nine countries in countries nine in essed
ann likely laining performance “negative stripped stripped indicate indicate prime CEU eTD Collection T attributes. personal their and service of complexity contextual also but reforms moderate may performance relate to their of Perceptions governance. effective or framework democratic erode severely nor improve, less relevan appear factors contextual while reforms, to commitment and conduct democratic their to largely relates governance democratic in performance Good prosperity. citizens’ to contributes most bo in performance successful because ministers. prime 33 among (N=10) populists likely and (N=11) average (N=12), outstanding of number equal an almost is There governance. a ( populists” “likely and “average” “outstanding”, categories; governance,i democratic consolidat “simultaneity overcome to ability reforms, to commitment general their indicates ministers prime most by effectiveness moderate However, restructuring. conduct engag policymaking. pro social generally and economic in worse comparatively but and integration EU in best perform ministers Prime apparent. but small is Latviacorruption in rates rel may which governance, democratic in worst perform ministers prime to relate may which governance, performance. ministers’ prime cross some is There performance. average than higher indicating ten of range scale a of out 5.9 is ministers prime all by governance democratic in score Overall eortc conduct democratic cut o pie iitr’ likely ministers’ prime for ccount ing ing Average prime ministers, characterized by moderate levels of performance neither greatlyneither performance levels characterized by of moderate Average ministers, prime of dimensions separate in performance variable ministers’ prime of discussion allow To
hn fetvns my eae to relate may effectiveness than in activities that bring their countries closer to EU project. EU to closer countries their bring that activities in ing t.
economic and social structures.economic and - European politicians politicians European /
fetvns) and effectiveness) n the second part of this chapter, prime ministers’ weregroup this ministers’ of chapter, partprimesecond the n . Variationgovernance dimensionsofdemocratic across of performance Polish and Estonian prime ministers ministers prime Estonian and Polish generally occasional undemocratic outburs variable omte t dmcay valuing democracy to committed th or in at least one dimension of democratic governance democratic of dimension one least at in or th
impact low opeiy of complexity
“Outstanding” prime ministers ministers prime “Outstanding” 115 performance er
corruption corruption
“od, aeae, n “bad”) and “average”, (“good”, post . ifrn dmnin of dimensions different rates in Poland and Estonia and Poland in rates
aao” n rltv sces in success relative and paradox” aeoiain s ae o scope on based is Categorization - transition economic and social social and economic transition - country variation in levels o levels in variation country ts or lack to commitment of ts or E pie iitr are ministers prime CEE Slightly bett Slightly r bs i best are
ate to generally higher higher generally to ate U ebrhp and membership EU democratic conduct democratic are most desirable most are he exact level exact he er n democratic democratic n ieso to dimension democratic democratic democratic ed in three in ed . Latvian f , CEU eTD Collection and demographic variables to compared performance programmatic worse or better ministers’ prime for account analy the As culture. political political and on literature leadership the in identified variables using tested next is hypothesis the of In range performance. a chapter, ministers’ prime in variation for accounting factor important most demo new in especially culture, elites’ However, performance. leadership irreparable the anti their for populists likely solid sanction Democratic eventually failure. mechanisms with ministerial prime their parties explains what is few benefit personal for of office public composed coalitions lead undem Rather, backing. all parliamentary They performance. poor their for relevant less appear attributes personal and factors Contextual corruption. and scandals in resign frequently also who populists likely characteristicof ineffective deliver and framework democratic usual a is culture political negative aspectof welfare.Some improve citizens’ not do that policies support not do generally They governance. because ministers, prime L transformations. significant introduce ratherthan the than likeliest are they because a by areas problematic or improvements of
se sanct se s ugse i catr n, utrl aibe ae agl inrd n understanding in ignored largely are variables cultural one, chapter in suggested As . ions are often overdue and overdue often are ions
of their negative impact in both or at least one dimension of democ of dimension one least at or both in negativeimpact their of .
other two groups to maintain leadership situation they inherit inherit they situation leadership maintain to groups two other political and economic damage they they damage economic and political ocratic mindset not committed to reforms but to using using to but reforms to committed not mindset ocratic verage prime ministers is more difficult to pinpoint to difficult more is ministers prime verage 116 i wl dmntae clua variables cultural demonstrate, will sis
ikely populists are the least desirable group of of group desirable least the are populists ikely after revelations of their involvement involvement their of revelations after - eortc ciiis h activities, democratic leave behind is often is behind leave cracies may be the the be may cracies contextual contextual owever, largely largely ratic CEU eTD Collection dependent variable. as eight appendix in indicated governance, democratic in performance of index and independent correlation, (ANOVA, analysis statistical us regression) multivariate by and bivariate hypothesis testing each parts, three in divided is chapter The settings. democratic new in continue and transmit likely that relationships client stro by characterized was that communism during socialized largely were ministers prime CEE transformations. institutional immediate beyond continue to likely path on Based experience. mindset ministers’ prime chapter, this in suggested As settings. transitional in success ministers prime thesis, this in argued as However, performance. leadership explaining in ignored largely are variables ministers’prime understanding demonstra to demographical and contextual cultural, of 33assessed prime minister thes culture political and integration EU in institutions successful democratic most were ministers more Prime generally rates. werecorruption rates corruption governanc lower democratic in with successful countries in ministers Prime apparent. crossSome e moderately and democracy of respectful moderately social and economic policy integration, EU the in governance effective and institutions democratic prime as defined was governance democratic in Performance dimensions. separate its and governance democratic in performance of map empirical an provide to presented were performance programmatic ministers’ prime of rankings expert chapter, preceding the In PROGRAMMATIC MINISTERS’ PRIME EXPLAINING PERFORMANCE 5: CHAPTER - aig Epr dt sget E pie iitr ae eeal aeae politicians average generally are ministers prime CEE suggest data Expert making. h mi ts o ti catr s o et yohss sn tre rus f variables; of groups three using hypothesis test to is chapter this of task main The s iey o manifest to likely is - country and cross andcountry
is suggested by previous literature was partially confirmed in only nine out nine only in confirmed partially was literature previous by suggested is ’ mindset committed to democracy and effective governance is crucial for crucial is governance effective and democracy to committed ’ mindset
but less successful in economic and social policymaking. Negative Negative policymaking. social and economic in successful less but - dependency old norms and values are difficult to change and are are and change to difficult are values and norms old dependency ial terms - dimension variation in performance in democratic governance inperformance variation dimension was indemocratic programmatic s ouim eeuie esnlzto o peiu po previous or personalization executive populism, as cmae t pie iitr i cutis ih higher with countries in ministers prime to compared e .
ing cultural, demographical and contextual variables as as variables contextual and demographical cultural, ing performance. As suggested in chapter one, cultural cultural one, chapter performance. in suggested As 117
e h iprac o clua vrals in variables cultural of importance the te fcie n mrvn ctzn’ welfare. citizens’ improving in ffective g irrh ad patron and hierarchy ng
ministers’ respect for for respectministers’
negative respect for for respect
political political litical litical - CEU eTD Collection populism, supports level behavioral a on and structure democratic erodes that instrument political a as used is Informality institutions. democratic firm by controlled not is that patterns control formal institutionsofdemocracy. and weaken structures informal how understand to culture political negative of manifestations jud the (e.g. informality MPs, ministers, prime judges, officials), by over toortaken state whichpoliticalexposed areassystemand of been have (e.g. informality generate actors political which uncover to important good with story success a been have transitions CEE that conclude erroneously might one knowledge, transitional from omitted is this if and structures, democratic to adapted not have actors that indicates framework democratic of requirements from to relate must systems political CEE in realized governance However,of culture.different forms political elite of importance the network power informal by over taken are (self) structures democratic populism, formal Consequently, corruption. nationalism, (systemic) and elites’ isolation politics, of distrust citizens’ widespread as such issues soc civil and parties political of weakness include aspects the part (Gallina makers of decision 2008). 52). 2008: (Bunce come” to years plural Consequently,feckless many for competition political of consequences the and boundaries democracy,the to define necessarily fatal bewill unlikelyto while deficiencies, these way following the in them expressed has Bunce Valerie and contexts transitional in especially widespread, be can democrats” without “democracies of the consequences in The confrontation. and corruption visiblepopulism, polarization, pol intolerance, by elite’smarked is political the deficit and democratic institutions structured apparent democratically of An coexistence 2009). (Pehe mentalities informal elite explanations 5.1 Cultural ofprime ministers’ programmatic performance Previous lit Previous CEE democracies are characterized by non by characterized are democracies CEE Institutional similar. are this for reasons and common is CEE in democrats of lack A erature pointed to a gap between formal democratic structures and the CEE political CEE the and structures democratic formal between gap a to pointed erature cay te ei, orpin. t s lo motn t understand to important also is It corruption). media, the iciary, s (Gallina 2011). Democratization studies do not fully acknowledge fully not do studies Democratization 2011). (Gallina s ism erodes the mechanism of responsiveness and accountability on on accountability and responsiveness of mechanism the erodes ism mentalities of the very political actors political very the of mentalities
118
- democrati : “democracy therefore is flawed, and and flawed, is therefore “democracy : iety, while actor iety,while future prospects. Consequently, it is it Consequently, prospects. future c elite conduct guided by informal informal by guided conduct elite c . Elite behavior d behavior Elite . -
based factors itical culture culture itical include include ifferent - CEU eTD Collection ntttos codn t ter ed. n neortc etlt dmnts ot f the of most dominates mentality undemocratic An needs. their to according institutions cultur political a communism during developed persistedrejection of andnotautomatically theoldsystem did the immediate of installment mean ideas and institutions some to attachment because rhetorical, experience making little and governing authoritarian society, over state the needs, policy level, general a At developments. present influence path to According 354 2005: Linde and (Ekman changes institutional or elite of independently continue may behavior. and elite based political sociallyValues arecontemporary on norms mark and their left build to take path with line In institutions. democratic of undermine consequent the for concern much without strategies power instrumentali Elites politics. personalized and nationalism populism, power, economic and political for struggle and thinking, contradicts hierarchical behavior, confrontational that power political for struggle princ egoistic an and behavior unethical including (Gallina 2011). instituti democratic with power coexist informal where networks structures independent other and media free with democracies formal as up set regimes are extremes two these between In institutions. formal control to instruments top a follow that law of formal respect elites rule the political by constrained is power and provisions democratic override not democracies,do and rules democratic liberal in principle, In instruments. democratic elites’cater and formal undermining situation concrete the thus interests of demands adaptableto exec and clientelism corruption, iples of liberal democracy (Gallina 2007). Negative political culture can be manifested as manifested be can culture political Negative 2007). (Gallina democracy liberal of iples -
- not on the needs of the public. the of needs the on not making based institutions. In authoritarian regimes, elites set up their own informal arrangements informal own their up set elites regimes, authoritarian In institutions. based
Previous literature suggested CEE elites have internalized a “negative political culture” political “negative a internalized have elites CEE suggested literature Previous Ln 2002). (Lane . Historical legacies Historical .
and the omnipotence of the communist partyprimari communist the of omnipotence the and
- - dependent theories, political culture takes more time to develop than institution than develop to time more takes culture political theories, dependent spotv o dmcay I CE eie ue ute ehius o shape to techniques subtle use elites CEE, In democracy. of supportive e down scheme in which knowledge and personal and knowledge which in scheme down - dependency, values, beliefs and institutions from the old regime continue to continue regime old the from institutions and beliefs values, dependency,
eeto of Rejection
utive personalization. Informal structures change and are more more are and change structures Informal personalization. utive such as socialist past and even pre even and past socialist as such The “carry The everything the communist regime stood for was only only was for stood regime communist the everything n ad ao non favor and ons 119 - over” from the past is the general acceptance of of acceptancegeneral the is past the from over”
tog irrhe caatrzd socialist characterized hierarchies strong - democratic behavioral patterns patterns behavioral democratic - ly concentrated on the party's party's the concentratedon ly
War political traditions have traditions War political relations are used as power power as used are relations e ouit n polarizing and populist ze with
eortc policy democratic - 74) - . CEU eTD Collection Hypo w apparent, Carinthian become policies financial per his highest larger the of having Carinthia consequences the death, his Nevertheless, level. after national shortly at structure democratic to relationship his of observation allow never state level ina pol however was Haider immigration. to opposed was and crimes financial and banking to pointing FreedomAustrian Party e For structure. democratic violate necessarily them of all not but regimes), authoritarian in even (and democracies new and old both in exist politicians anti mean automatically not may populism four, chapter in suggested I As 5.1.1 political for culture responsible prime ministers’ variableprogrammatic performance. negative of indicators as considered are experience political previous their and personalization ho and surveys to expert contribute that reforms to commitment th In and governance. effective for institutions democratic important for largely respect of are level experience political beca governance, previous democratic in performance and politics of personalization and 2007 polarization (Gallina corruption and populism by characterized actors, political divided with formed frequently however,elite CEE In 1998). al. et (Higley change political of outcomes the and developments political determines confrontational or united are elites which to extent suggested authors Some literature. democratization in acknowledged widely not are aspects ministers’primevariance the in someof explain governance.performanceCultural democratic in provokechange. a behavioral to outsiders” “intellectual for opportunity little with culture, and elite political thinking similar a policy of patron and structure institutional Populism Based on the argum the on Based - making at the governmental level (Korkut 200 (Korkut level governmental the at making
- le di bn’ fnnil ifclis n sbeun nationalization subsequent and difficulties financial bank’s Adria Alpe itical position (except governorship his position province)that Carinthia itical of would (FPO) used openly radical rhetoric against mainstream against rhetoric (FPO)radical openly used politics, Austrian itc rdn tcnqe f rm mnses sece, executive speeches, ministers’ prime of technique grading listic e following e ents of previous literature, political culture and elites’ mindset may mindset elites’ and culture political literature, previous of ents
- client relations client
section, levels of prime ministers’ populism measured by by measured ministers’ populism prime of levels section, : -
capita debt in Austria in 2009 related to the Bavarian the to related 2009 in Austria in debt capita 81). Prime ministers’ mindsets manifested as populism, as manifested ministers’mindsets Prime 81). s pie iitr’ ides il eemn the determine will mindsets ministers’ prime use 120 –
rather than institutions institutions than rather xample, the late late the xample, 5 : 149). The result is the reproduction of of reproduction the is result The 149). : non - cooperation, confrontation, confrontation, cooperation, Jörg –
- draw the bounda the draw democracy. Populist democracy.
Haider, a leader of of leader a Haider,
ries ries the the ith ith - CEU eTD Collection Re Czech or Poland (e.g. country the of outside or Slovakia) or Hungary (e.g. inside whether for failures, policy blame to object an for looks that culture political of aspect an is It reforms. economic and rhe mobilizing empty as defined mentality elite mechanism ofchecksbalancesas and witnessedempirical by many examples. offi but assume leaders poor), populist (e.g. once groups democracy threaten underrepresented mobilizing in powers corrective has populism that competitive into slide Latinand in populism Kaltwasser (2013)compareforms distinct of and America and find and Europe invariable almost are authoritarianism democracies weak successful, Where anti an r with voters mobilize leaders Latin Personalistic America. in authoritarianism competitive of emergence the for catalyst major Loxton and Levitsky or press the Walker of and 20 Navia 2012, (Hawkins accountability freedom horizontal liberties, civil competition, democratic for bad is populism leaders’ Ea citizens. and voters frustrated of mobilization in successful prove often that codes problem value simple real of instrument the an camouflage is populism to Consequently, ability their and charisma leaders’ on rely usually system value alternative an or solutions fundamental without but adversaries, democracy after are possible only tested. empirically itis institutions formal democratic national to relation in power unfold of position a in came would he if institutions, populism his how unknown is it and MP, Pen Le however,Haider, Like conservatives. Front National ( peettv isiuin, ne n fie hy tak ntttos f oiotl accountability. horizontal of institutions attack they office in once institutions, epresentative Tagesanzeiger In this section, populism is taken as a proxy of informal (negative) political culture and and culture political (negative) informal of proxy a as taken is populism section, this In political and weaknesses institutional to pointing for suitable instrument an is Populism public), but without assuming responsibility for policy failures (Gallina 2008). A 2008). (Gallina failures policy for responsibility assuming without but public), , known for his populist rhetoric and radicalism towards immigrants and political and immigrants towards radicalism and rhetoric populist his for known , , 20 , almost assured almost 09 f democracy of ). The same holds for Jean for holds same The ). 2013). For example, Levitsky and Loxton (2013) find that populism is a is populism that find (2013) Loxton and Levitsky example, For 2013). (e.g. Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuelaand Peru Ecuador, Bolivia, (e.g. Cnlsos bu te relatio the about Conclusions . - salsmn apa, u lcig xeine with experience lacking but appeal, establishment was was 121 where he would have an opportunity opportunity an have would he where - toric, without clear visions and plans for social social for plans and visions clear without toric, rlier literature has found that a higher degree of of degree higher a that found has literature rlier Marie Le Pen, a long a Pen, Le Marie
never ce, which usually results in a distorting distorting a in results usually which ce,
in a in high political pos political high 10 , Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 2013, Kaltwasser and Mudde , si bten ouim and populism between nship - term leader of the French French the of leader term
1990 . Populist measures Populist .
t, except t, - 2010). Mudde 2010). to influence influence to -
solution. being an CEU eTD Collection presence and treatment ofpersonal political charisma parties oftheir ( pop their to according ministers populist and experts (H). governance a with ministers Prime pop that is It expected populism. of manifestation to related likely is governance democratic in ministers prime et al. (Conniff fiefdoms personal as parties their treat to likely are Finally,leaders expression. populist in bent, (Weyland support public sustain to order in indebtedness, and borrowing excessive as such policies, fiscal irresponsible to linked often t related is leadership Frequently, populist followers. their of eyes the in interests mass defend to suited them makes that charisma personal utilize and possess often leaders Populist 2000). (Skolkay govern to unfit or incapable are that foreign against dignity national of defender unlik understands people, “commonexploitation, aswho the pressures man” a and a as himself presents typically leader populist
1999: 4 f hrcmns f lt pltcl culture political elite of shortcomings If volving abuses of power and disrespect for the rule of law, the opposition and freedom of of freedomlaw, and of opposition rule the the for disrespect and power of abuses volving - 21).
Prime ministers’ populism is measured as populist populist as measured is ministers’ populism Prime ls i ngtvl rltd o efrac i dmcai gvrac and governance democratic in performance to related negatively is ulism rhetoric higher degree of populism are likely to have worse recordsdemocratic worse havein to arelikely populism degree higherof
assessed by grading of speeches. Table 5.1 presents a rank speeches. Tableaof presents grading 5.1 by assessed ls caatrsis including characteristics ulist 2001 o economic shortcomings, because populist rhetoric is rhetoric populist because shortcomings, economic o 122 ). Populist leaders are likely to have an autocratic autocratic an have to likely are leaders Populist ).
xli elite explain
- institutional gap, performance of of performance gap, institutional
h reoi o nationalism, of rhetoric the ibid characteristics ).
e corrupt elites e corrupt elites
assessed by assessed
of prime prime of
CEU eTD Collection ueia sae n ae utbe o saitcl nlss I t In analysis. statistical for suitable are and a scale on minister prime numerical every in populism of degree a gauge to able are speech below and presented data coding expert populism, on research qualitative Le in unlike 2008, However, Gallina 2012). Ilonszki 2007, Rupnik, 2006, Rizman 2000, (Skolkay studies qualitative in populist as to referred frequently are these because data, expert of quality demonstrates Klaus) The presence high ** (strong 1 to populism) (no 0 from ranges that populism) minister prime each of score numerical calculate to characteristics * minister. prime each gaugepopulism in to deemedappropriate pa their of treatment (e) and law of rule the for disrespect(d)failures, economic (c) charisma, personal identity,(b) national of defender (a) Source Table 5.1 Prime ministers’ populist characteristics Each populist characteristic was reported in percentages. I assigned equal weight of 20% to each of fiv of each to 20% of weight equal assigned I percentages. in reported was characteristic populist Each Petr Nečas** Petr Tiit Vähi Medgyessy Péter ValdisDombrovskis Bērziņš Andris Špidla Vladimír Račan Ivica Kubilius Andrius JerzyBuzek JuhanParts Drnovšek Janez Horn Gyula Algirdas Brazauskas Gediminas Vagnorius Šleževičius Adolfas Kosor Jadranka Laar Mart Dzurinda Mikuláš LeszekMiller Mirek Topolánek Donald Tusk Pahor Borut Gyurcsány Ferenc Šķēle Andris Zeman Miloš AigarsKalvītis Andrus Ansip VáclavKlaus Fico Robert Janša Janez ViktorOrbán Sanader Ivo Mečiar Vladimír mi Prime
ES III that added Nečas to the analysis did not include the question about populist characteristics populist questionabout the not include did the analysis to Nečas that added III ES : ES II: “Please assess which of the following characteristics best describe populism in each prime minister; prime each in populism describe best characteristics following the of which assess “Please II: ES :
nister
of populism in some prime (Mečiar, in ministers of populism Sanader, FicoOrbán, and Janša,
rties as personal fiefdoms personal as rties ”. Experts could choose as many populist characteristics as they they as characteristics populist many as choose could Experts ”. 123
Populist Score* Populist 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.44 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.84 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 N/A
be ., aa n populist on data 5.2, able
ngyel and and ngyel e populist populist e CEU eTD Collection rm mnses ih or eod i dmcai gvrac ide manifest indeed governance democratic in records poor with ministers prime Šķēle) Klaus, Sanader, O Bērziņš, Kalvītis, (Meciar,Janša, 4.14 table in presented populists likely ten of out demonstrate, be governance. democratic in performance of records poor their on based presented were populists” “likely four, chapter of 4.14 table In captured better be would that discourse populist some rank. coding speech on ministers manyprime populismnoin which 0.3), explains and 0.2, 0.1, (e.g. scale interval traces that speech a to zero assigns method coding only even surveys, characterist populist measure to differentused scales of result a is rankplacements in variation Some ranks. both on ministers prime ten first the among placed are populists top and resembling closely positively and strongly correlate data coding speech and survey Expert project. coding speech and survey expert both in included were ministers prime 18 these because ministers, **** *** ribboncutting **Individ populism. strong indicating 2 and rhetoric) withpluralist mixed speech (populist overall * their on based grade a assign then and entirety is present. idea muchofan how its determine to impression in text the read to coders asks 1985) (White technique Source: Table 5.2 Prime ministers’ populist characteristics and populist rhetoric both of quality the demonstrate to methods measuring populism. rhetoric populist on data to compared are characteristics ere f ouim s esrd on measured is populism of Degree Borut Pahor Borut Gyurcsány Ferenc Kubilius Andrius ValdisDombrovskis Račan Ivica Zeman Miloš Donald Tusk Andrus Ansip Algirdas Brazauskas Dzurinda Mikuláš ViktorOrbán Sanader Ivo Aigars Fico Robert Janša Janez VáclavKlaus Mirek Topolánek Mečiar Vladimír Prime minister bn Sndr Nčs Šeeiis Kas Šēe, ee (eir Jna Kalvītis Janša, (Meciar, seven Šķēle), Klaus, Šleževičius, Nečas, Sanader, rbán,
measured prior to prior measured Score reflects Klaus’s reflects Score term(2003 presidential oprsn ewe popul between Comparison
Kalvītis ES II and holistic text analysis of prime minister’s speeches (Hawkins and Kocijan 2013) Kocijan and (Hawkins speeches minister’s prime of analysis text holistic and II ES ual p ual
speech, an speech,
opulist score reflects an average of all scores across four types of speeches; a speeches; of types four across scores all of average an reflects score opulist
lgt rsne f n ppls caatrsi i rfetd n cr aoe eo wie speech while zero, above score in reflected is characteristic populist one of presence light a
international conclusions
Speech coding r rne aog h tp ouit o bt rns hs ugss that suggests This ranks. both on populists top the among ranked are
ist scores in expert surveys and speech coding are presented for (N=18) prime prime (N=18) for presented are coding speech and surveys expert in scores ist 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.20 0.31 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.75 0.80 1.00 1.70(**) 0.80***
speech and a and speech a
about real manifestation of their populism. As table 5.1 and 5.2 and populism. 5.1 their table ofAs manifestation real about three point scale; 0 indicating no populism, 1 indicating some populism populism some indicating 1 populism, no indicating 0 scale; point three
*
However, it was noted that levels of their populism populism their of levels that noted wasHowever, it - 2013) Mikuláš Dzurinda Mikuláš Mirek Topolánek Donald Pahor Borut Gyurcsány Ferenc Zeman Miloš AigarsKalvītis Andrus Ansip VáclavKlaus Fico Robert Janša Janez ViktorOrbán Sanader Ivo Mečiar Vladimír Prime minister Valdis Račan Ivica Kubilius Andrius Algirdas Brazauskas famous
124
Dombrovskis
Tusk speech.
(
r
= .9, .9, =
p
< .01). Expert and speech coding ranks are are ranks coding speech and Expert .01). <
ics and populist rhetoric. In expert Inexpert rhetoric. populist ics and
Expert survey 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.40 0.44 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.84 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.30 campaign .
Holistic grading grading Holistic
* * populism. populism. , Orbán, Orbán, , **
speech, a speech,
by an an by must
- CEU eTD Collection (see rhetoric populist for and eight) appendix de and in performance 5.2) table (see variable dependent as governance democratic in performance * governance OLS Bivariate 5.4 Table 5.4, table in indicated appearspopulism goodpredictor a prime for ministers’ as governance. performance indemocratic performed, is regression OLS bivariate Once dimensions. separate democratic in worse perform of characteristics degree populist and higher rhetoric with populist ministers’ Prime dimensions. separate its and governance democratic *** * ministe prime matrix: governance Correlation 5.3 Table ofdemocraticdimensions governanceand executive personalization. separate and characteristics populist ministers’ prime between matrix correlation a presents 5.3 political negative of aspects other to relate factors These populism. of manifestations without Bērziņš) Šleževičius, ( ministers Prime three remaining the of performance poor explain factors However,other As indicated in table 5.3 prime ministers’ populism is negatively and strongly related to to related strongly and negatively is populism ministers’ prime 5.3 table in indicated As
p OLS regression was performed separately for populist characteristics (see table 5.1) as independent and and independent as 5.1) table (see characteristics populist for separately performed was regression OLS Exc. Dem.Gov. performance Social Performance Ec. performance EU conduct Democratic governance Democratic
< Nečas
.01, .01, Personalization Personalization .53 .53 .53 .483 .465 R ²
significant at the at significant
was not included in the in notwas included ^
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^ ^
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Std. .921 Err. .92 Populism ^
culture ^ ^
Populism
Populism
Populism
0.01 level (2 0.01 20.26 27.9 F
*
including political scan political including
ersin pie minister prime regression: mocratic governance as dependent variable (see appendix eight). appendix (see variable as dependent governance mocratic
analysis, because question on populist characteristics was not included in III ES notwas included characteristics populist on question because analysis, .00 .00 . Sig
coefficient Pearson’s
- tailed) ** tailed) - - - -
. 54* . - .74* .70* .46* .46* B coefficients Unstandardized
.72 (constant) (constant)
ex.surv
- sp.cod - 8.018 2.141 6.46 5.683
p
<.03, significant at the 0.05 level (2 the0.05 at significant <.03, (ExpertSurvey)*** N 1.074 Err. Std. .476 .285 .433 125
s ppls ad efrac i democratic in performance and populism rs’
dals ( dals
32 32 32 32 32 32 Coefficients Standardized ’ ouim n promne n democratic in performance and populism s’
- - Nečas Beta .747 .695
) or corruption ( corruption or )
18.503 - - t 22.69
4.501 5.290
coefficient Pearson’s
- - - .
-
.75* .83
- .51* .52* n.s. 75* *
-
.000 .000 .000 .000 * * Sig. tailed)
oenne n its and governance Šleževičius
intervalfor B 95% Confidencelevel N (speech coding) (speech N bound Lower - - 5.861 7.133 3.149 7.877
18 18 18 18 18 18
bound Upper ). Table). - - 7.068 8.903 1.132 3.489 Nečas
, CEU eTD Collection personalization of levels low personalization powers political strong of dispose formally not do they if even assess to asked S and Pakulski 2005, 2005, Poguntke and (Webb parties political to compared politics of areas h their of because setting agenda dominate to leaders of abilityan definedas personalization is Executive culture.negative political proxy afor as section P 5.1.2 Executive personalization ministers’ prime discusses section next the executive personalization. only and the culture not political is Populism negative democracies. of new manifestation and old co in to structure able democratic are for that dangerous mechanisms about learn would we Second, populists. of incidence the with do to anything has democracy of length if learn would we First, reasons. two populi rank’stop placements rhetoric pluralist in engage and populism by characterized placed (Orbán, ministers Prime populist All elite. is populism for dangerous only not is a at populism democracy suggested that literature previous of findings supports generally CEE, in democracy and populism between tested time first the for is that hypothesis citizens’pro improve would that reforms of and democracy of supportive not is that governance democratic in performance worse for responsible seems culture political finding negative important an appears This governance. supportin democratic in performance in variance of 50% about almost ministers’explains populism prime suggests analysis regression the of Output amuels and Shugart2010). and amuels informality of manifest another is personalization ministers’executive rime sm and democratic structures in both old and new democracies. This would be useful for for useful be would This democracies. new and old both in structures democratic and sm n h bto of bottom the on te mnst atr” hss bcue ouim s n o te aiettos of manifestations the of one as populism because thesis, matters” “mindset the g also not supportive of democratic structure at a behavioral level of prime ministerial prime of level behavioral a at structure democratic of supportive not also
indicate that decision that indicate situations where prime ministers dominate agenda setting in a political system system political a in setting agenda dominate ministers prime where situations tutrl ee (akn 21) I ad to adds It 2012). (Hawkins level structural Körösényi . Further research would benefit from looking into the relationship between relationship the into looking from benefit would research Further .
Toministers’ measureprime were experts personalization, executive p
indicate that decision making is not only a prerogative of a leader leader a of prerogative a only not is making decision that indicate erformance rank in contrast to prime ministers who are not not are who ministers prime to contrast in rank erformance
2011,
- making power concentrates around prime ministers, while ministers, prime around concentrates power making Helms 2005, 2005, Helms
Mečiar, Janša, Kalvītis, Šķēle, Sanader, Orbán) are Orbán) Sanader, Šķēle, Kalvītis, Janša, Mečiar, 126
as 19, G 1994, Kaase igh assertiveness assertiveness igh
who more often occupy mid occupy often more who
that literature by suggesting that that suggesting by literature that Glia 2008). (Gallina lia 2008, allina Curtice and Holmber Holmber and Curtice influence to that is that unter populism populism unter ih levels High ukr 1995, Tucker sperity. The used in this this in used
- different point or point of CEU eTD Collection sett agenda prime suggest, data expert as use to likely are countries these in ministers countries, prime and high is personalization ministers’of level other all In benefit. parties’ or personal achieving of propensity lower indicate may which rate, corruption low a record Slovenia and Estonia Poland, addition, In 2008). (Gallina consensualism suggesting findings previous with settin agenda dominate strongly still however personalized, less comparatively across vary indi ten of the over agenda dominance setting. average overall personalization4.2 outofa executive is The scalerange score of of levels high feature ministers prime CEE data, expert by suggested As pe indicatinglower score * power. political ofstrong le whichpolitical in situation 1 a on Source: of Table levels 5.5 Executive personalization individual ministers’ prime while personalization, personalizat executive level country (H). governance democratic in performance to relatenegatively to likely favor. parties’) policy the switch and politics consensual outweigh to likely ministers prime culture, political negative of manifestation policy influence who actors other also but Country score is an average of all prime ministers’ scores and in case of difference between ES II and III better better III and II ES between difference of case in and scores ministers’ prime all of average an is score Country Total Slovakia Hungary R Czech Latvia Croatia Lithuania Slovenia Estonia Poland Country
-
10 scale where 1 is “low personalization” and 10 is “high personalization”. Personalization is defined as a as defined is Personalization personalization”. “high is 10 and personalization” “low is 1 where scale 10
ES II and III: “Assess the “Assess III: and II ES
aig tog oes f edr t dtrie h aed. ees f personalization of Levels agenda. the determine to leaders of powers strong cating ing for personal or parties’ interest. Once I performed bivariate OLS regression, as as regression, OLS bivariate performed I Once interest. parties’ or personal for ing - ion are presented in appendix ten. ion are inappendix presented countries. Only in Poland and less so in Estonia and Slovenia, prime ministers are ministers prime Slovenia, and Estonia in so less and Poland in Only countries.
Consequently rsonalization is used for calculating country score country calculating for used is rsonalization
aders dominate agenda setting in a political system even if they do not formally dispose formallydispose not do they if even system political a in setting dominateagenda aders the , level of "personalization" "personalization" of level
ihr ee o pie iitr’ xctv proaiain is personalization executive ministers’ prime of level higher Polish elites are generally characterized by higher degree of of degree higher by characterized generally are elites Polish -
aig I execu If making. 127 Executive personalization Executive their politicians to dominate agenda setting for for setting agenda dominate to politicians their
of politics during the mandate of each Prime minister Prime each of mandate the during politics of
5.4* 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.2 2.7 3.8 3.8 3.9
-
h dmnt agenda dominate who making in their personal (or their (or personal their in making tive personalization is a proper proper a is personalization tive
Table 5.5 demonstrates Table5.5 g. This is in line in is This - etn are setting CEU eTD Collection independent variable and performance in democratic governance as dependent variable, see appendix eight appendix see variable, as dependent governance democratic in performance and variable independent * in newcomers, were majority great the ministers, prime becoming Upon 91). exte 2007: that (Baylis to and communism of fall the c to prior satellites its of one or party communist lacked the of members generally were ministers prime Many ministers politics. democratic in experience prime CEE office, taking upon that suggested literature Previous 5.1.3 Previous experience political governance. democratic in performance their of levels to related likely is which power, of position a in are values anddifferent accustomednessnorms to post ministe prime to relate to likely also is communism during especially experience, political previous section, next top and thinking hierarchical to accustomed elites made that is personalization Executive prosperity.citizens’ thatwouldimprove reforms of democracyand notsupportivegovernance of in democratic thatis performance worse for responsible seems culture political negative of manifestations the of one an appears This governance. perso executive because democratic thesis, matters” “mindset in the supporting finding important performance in variance of 30% about almost Output governance e regression: OLS Bivariate 5.6 Table prime of predictor significant statistically a minister'sperformance. programmatic appears personalization 5.6, table in indicated L rgeso ws efre uig rm mnses soe i eeuie esnlzto, e apni tn as ten appendix see personalization, executive in scores ministers’ prime using performed was regression OLS ommunist version of bureaucratic politics while only few were party officials or dissidents dissidents or officials party were few only while politics bureaucratic of version ommunist .296 .296 .273 R
s ²
epcal drn cmuim a ma dfeet ye f oilzto and socialization of type different mean may communism during especially , f h rgeso aayi sget pie iitr’ xctv proaiain explains personalization executive ministers’ prime suggests analysis regression the of
R ² Adj.
1.062 Err. Std. s pltcl ide. ifrn pltcl xeine ro t pie ministerial prime to prior experience political Different mindset. political rs’
13.01 F
.001 Sig.
(personalization B coefficients Unstandardized
(constant)
euie esnlzto ad efrac i democratic in performance and personalization xecutive
8.466 - .475
that
128 likely a carryover from the communist regime regime communist the from carryover a likely
.132 .742
Err. Std. may manifest differently once prime ministers differentlymayprimemanifest once
Coeff. Std - Beta .544
-
down mentality. down the in suggested As
t 11.407
- 3.608
Sig. .001 .000
nt engaged in the the in engaged nt intervalfor B 95% Confidencelevel bound Lower 6.952 - .744
nalization as nalization
bound Upper 9.980 - .207
CEU eTD Collection using only and previouspar ministerial by hypothesis above the tested I types, different across experience political in variation (Kosor, ministers Prime deputy Laar, , Vähi (Klaus, ministers Prime were five Dzurinda), ( presidents were three mayors, were Ansip) and (Bērziņš ministers Prime two the post, ministerial prime assuming to Prior ministerial. prime deputy and ministerial presidential mayoral, ministerial, parliamentary, experience; political previous of types available publicly their from collected were governanc democratic in better governanceperform to likely are democratic ministers or MPs in as experience performancepolitical previous with ministers in difference a make to likely is experience in performance governance. their of levels democratic to related likely is which power, of position a in are ministers values and norms different to accustomedness and dif mean may communism during especially post, ministerial prime communism. during experience of type the and experience conflict mor andfailure appear 91 2007: (Baylis with those afflict to likely more are but deficiencies, Westernlea tendencies. corruption and (elitism) discontent popular to insensitivity conflicts, personality excess, authoritarian compromise, to willingness politics, experie Political them. with capital political much bring not do they thus and office, assume they when ministers prime many know not does public the that frequent so been has turnover ministerial to accustomed experie and this but politics, democratic politicians career become have ministers prime CEE many communism, of fall the since years twenty the In ministers. prime becoming before experience party of years typical have who ministers, Westernwith prime comparison c s niprat se htdtrie teaiiyt nvgt h haso coalition of shoals the navigate to ability the determines that asset important an is nce n hs eto, lo a peiu mnseil n primnay rm ministers’ prime parliamentary and ministerial previous at look I section, this In - 92). If there is no established political culture of bargaining and compromise, compromise, and bargaining of culture political established no is there If 92). e
(H) rm mnses p ministers’ Prime Te aa sd n rm mnses peiu pltcl experience political previous ministers’ prime on used data The . e likely.
liamentary experience as independent variable. pda Nčs Mdysy nŠil) Bcue f insufficient of Because andŠpidla). Medgyessy Nečas, Špidla, nce has been relatively short. In some CEE countries, prime countries, CEE some In short. relatively been has nce
eiu pltcl mnseil n parliamentary) and (ministerial political revious biographies 129
that the
I olce dt o svrl different several on data collected I . practice of negotiation and persuasion and negotiation of practice may manifest differently once prime prime once differently manifest may
Different political experience prior to to prior experience Differentpolitical M ly been career politicians with many with politicians career been ly ečiar and Kubilius) and five were five and Kubilius) and ečiar ders are not immune to these to immune not are ders ferent type of socialization socialization of type ferent Drnovšek , Brazauskas and Brazauskas ,
. prime ,
Prime CEU eTD Collection and eight. appendix see variable, dependent experience” is continuous governance democratic in performance parliamentary “no or experience” “parliamentary and experience”, ministerial “no or experience” 62 reformed transfor political of time the at ( communism; during experience political of type the on based categories three in grouped be can democratic of unsupportive or to conducive is that mindset political different a of production consequently and socialization of type different mean may communism post to characteristic experience poli of type specific a is party,which communist in active were ministers prime CEE Many 5.1.4 Type of experiencepolitical communism during democratic governance. of unsupportive or to conducive is that mindset political different a of consequ production and socialization of type different mean may communism during experience of type different because important, prove may communism during experienceministers’ prime of improve for prospects not does parliamentary) or (ministerial experience political practical suggest section 200 Gill and Theakston 20, 2013: Hillmer and (Azzi performance experienc ministers ministerial prime prior British that found and Canadian for hypothesis same the testing Literature experience. to of score average mean a with better slightly performed ten of range scale a of out 5.7 mean a with performed experience parliamentary or ministerial prior without irrelevant previous ministers’ prime suggesting hypothesis the ministerial one used I ministers. prime as office assuming to prior experience (N=16) ministerial or (N=21) parliamentary either had ministers prime Most a) reformists, (b) dissidents, and (c) non (c) and dissidents, (b) reformists, a)
Parliamentary and ministerial experience are categorical independent variables coded as dichotomy; “mini dichotomy; as coded variables independent categorical are experience ministerial and Parliamentary efrac with performance - communist newly established socialist parties (e.g. Račan, Fico, Drnovšek, Drnovšek, Fico, Račan, (e.g. parties socialist established newly communist o promne n eortc governance. democratic in performance for experience
prime ministers’ prime
62 . ma aeae cr b pie iitr wt pir ministerial prior with ministers prime by score average mean 5.7
mattered for prime ministers’ performance. The analysis did not confirm not ministers’did primeanalysis for Theperformance. mattered
better better . mation joined its liberal wing and assumed a leadership role in role leadership a assumed and wing liberal its joined mation Moreover, prime ministers without prior ministerial experience ministerial prior without ministers prime Moreover, - communist elite. Different type of experience during during experience of type Different elite. communist performance in democratic governance. However, the type type the However, governance. democratic in performance i a isgiiat atr eemnn pie ministers’ prime determining factor insignificant an is e -
active. Reformists were active in communist party, communist in activebut were Reformists active. 130 - way ANOVA to test if previous parliamentary or or parliamentary previous way ANOVA if test to
parliamentary or ministerial experience is is experience ministerial or parliamentary
6.1 out of a scale range of ten compared compared ten of range scale a of out 6.1 oh rm mnses wit ministers prime Both governance. 6 : 17). The results of this this of results The 17). :
average score of score average
Prime ministers ministers Prime h and those those and h sterial sterial ently ently tical tical CEU eTD Collection the and use) to able is (or uses elite of type particular a cultural) or economic (political, capital of type the on based elites various of 64 fromjob. his was dismissed and in party 1970 from the 63 1995 Szelenyi post hierarchy suggests that elite ministerial prime to relation non of number Large reformists. were non were (N=14) ministers prime Most Source Table 5.7 Type of based grouped communism are ministers prime 5.7, table In regime. communist the against vocal explicitly party, nor communist in active neither were and Finally, Orbán). (e.g. communism non Zeman) were and regime the d against explicitlyfrequently were party communist in active initially sometimes pronounced occasional of times attempt at of especially outbursts communism, during active were Dissidents Brazauskas).
Total 9 Total Ansip Andrus Algirdas Brazauskas LeszekMiller Fico Robert Pahor Borut Drnovšek Janez Medgyessy Péter Horn Gyula Račan Ivica Reformists Szelenyi’s conducted a large survey research at the beginning of 1990, which included examination of a large pool pool large a of examination included which 1990, of beginning the at research survey large a conducted Szelenyi’s
During the Czech spring in 1968, Zeman opp in spring 1968, Czech Duringthe : Prime ministers’ biographical data publicly available on governmental websites ministers’ governmental on : Prime publiclyavailable data biographical 63
Dsiet ms otn sue pry edrhp f osraie ate i post in parties conservative of leadership party assumed often most Dissidents . unfolded so that that so unfolded
as reformists, and dissidents non although ministers prime These 1989. in collapsed communism before shortly pie epomn o ohr ihs o ter anti their for rights other or employment eprived (political, cultural and economic) in Visegrad countries, Bulgaria and Russia. Their conclusions are are conclusions Their Russia. and Bulgaria countries, Visegrad in economic) and cultural (political,
64
, Hankiss 1990, Staniszkis Staniszkis 1990, Hankiss , political experience during communism
d ieaiain hwvr ter poiin o omns ws most was communism to opposition their however, liberalization; ed e pol w people new
Andrius Kubilius Andrius Tusk Donald JerzyBuzek Dzurinda Mikuláš Mečiar Vladimír Janša Janez Orbán Viktor Mirek Zeman Miloš VáclavKlaus Dissidents 10 - - active prime ministers confirms elite circulation theory in in theory circulation elite confirms ministers prime active activists pursued non pursued activists osed the Warsaw pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and was expelled was expelled and Czechoslovakia of invasion the pact Warsaw osed -
active during communism, communism, during active Topolánek ere recruited for command positions (Szelenyi and and (Szelenyi positions command for recruited ere - t al. et
active.
131
*
91 Sen 97 Cote ad Matonyte and Crowther 1997, Steen 1991,
on the type of political activism during during activism political of type the on
- rniin tutrl hne n h top the in change structural transition - political careers during communism during careers political Gediminas Vagnorius Gediminas AigarsKalvītis Vähi Tiit Adolfas Dombrovskis Valdis Šķēle Andris Bērziņš Andris Ference JuhanParts Laar Mart Peter Špidla Vladimír Sanader Ivo Kosor Jadranka Non ten – 14 communist activism (e.g. (e.g. activism communist -
active were dissidents and dissidents were Nečas
Šleževičius Gyurcsány
nine -
CEU eTD Collection in post communist elite (ma reproduction their of extent already practiced type consensual a of and longer is experience their because non ministers, prime and dissidents than better perform to likely are reformists for However, responsible performance. be could this dissidents and reformists to compared communism democratic in performance for (H). matters governance communism during performance ministers’ prime LengyelIlonzskiand and 2008, 2010). di frequently post CEE to pointing thesis consensus elite original the challenge to grounds elite found already scholars some however certain, less of is place in is democracy once consensus uniformityelite relative the (Hig given transitions of time Republic, the at consensus Czech and Hungary Poland, in emerged post In regime. unstable an or stable determines conse elite an of absence or existence the that argued is It typethe and constellation prime each fits best communism during activism accordingminister biographica totheir of type which is know present at we that actors’pre and Munck 2002, (McFaul 1997, Leff Skalnik likely more is democracy transition, of drivers main are radicals ty the determines andnot opposition democracyemerges. ormoderate reform communist that if It suggested that is transitions drive who radicals) moderates, (reformists, actors of type the that consider authors democracy.Some for prospects endanger or beneficial are that factors leadership political transitional 2007 . urn kolde bu te eainhp ewe cmuit ciim n post and activism communist between relationship the about knowledge Current ). ae o peiu actor previous on Based pre between relationship the beyond hypothesize not do theories Elite - transition activism anyhow relates to their post their to relates anyhow activism transition vided on many aspects that were important for initial elite consensus (Gallina 2007 (Gallina consensus elite initial for important were that aspects many on vided
Because - Wolchik and Curry 2010 Curry Wolchikand transition).
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neac o cmuit lt i post in elite communist of intenance non
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l data.
ley and Pakulski 1998). What happens to the original the to happens What 1998). Pakulski and ley democratization
). It remains unknown, remains It ). 132
– communist Europe, a stable democracy has has democracy stable a Europe, communist nsus about democratic rules and norms and rules democratic about nsus - transition leadership performance. leadership All transition
ieaue I expect I literature, - - based transitional literature looks at looks literature transitional based transition) or circulation (replacement of of (replacement circulation or transition)
1992, no political experience during during experience political no however if different type of of type different if however Higely and Pakulski 1998 HigelyPakulski and - that communist elite communist - rniin elite transition
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CEU eTD Collection performance. leaders’ connect these how explain to personality the of components the identifies p rarely research of type This 2012). Geronik 2004, (Post leaders’performance for account in to childhood occurred that events or personality of elements deeper of influence the emphasized studies (Ba biographies political of interest the and leaders of attributes personal The 5.2 Leader ministers’ prime of effect personal variables the test I section, next the In welfare. citizens’ erodes or improves personalization largely todemocracycommitment effective and theiraccount for governance that political Their communism. post from in posts transition political high occupy they once relevant appear communism in to accustomed ministers’prime ministers’values wereprimeand explainingNorms performance. programmatic performance. ministers’prime for irrelevant appeared communism during experience of type the or experience parliamentaryministerialorpolitical Previousdemocratic governance. in worselikelyperform to mo are and setting agenda dominate ministers’who prime “personalized” for holds same The citizens’welfare. improve not does that governance ineffective deliver and structure democratic by characterized ministers populism of effect of ten while 5.5. thatofis dissidents average Mean ten. of range scale do however, Reformists, communism. during perform comparatively better experience their on based ministers prime of analysis find didnot astatistically p wingparty’s liberal communist to dissented they when In this section, three proxies of prime ministe prime of proxies three section, this In rovides means of assessing precisely the origin of leaders’ personal influence, or seldom seldom or influence, leaders’ personal of origin the precisely assessing of means rovides
prime ministers’ mindset mindset ministers’ prime appeared - centered explanations of prime ministers’centered explanations performance programmatic
h rsls f hs eto epaie h impor the emphasize section this of results The on prime ministers’on prime programmatic performance. statistically statistically oevr pyhaayia suis fe concentr often studies psychoanalytical Moreover,
populism and engaged in populist rhetoric are more likely to violate violate to likely more are rhetoric populist in engaged and populism than the other two groups with a mean average mean groups a with two theother than significant
score significant differencesignificant groups inperformance between thethree rber 1977, Greenstein 196 Greenstein 1977, rber on
performance in democratic governance. Prime ministers’ Prime governance. democratic in performance of non of
ir predictor of prime ministers’ performance. Prime Prime performance. ministers’ prime of predictor
effect on what they achieve has mostly been an an been mostly has achieve they what on effect 133 - active prime ministers is 5.6 out of a scale range scale a of out 5.6 is ministers prime active ide mnfse a ppls o executive or populism as manifested mindset
s oiia cluewr sdt test to used were culture political rs’ rior to transition. transition. to rior 8 , Bass , ac o clua vrals in variables cultural of tance
2009 However,the ANOVA ). Some psychological Some ). to score
each other and other each t o (only) on ate of 6.7 out of a of 6.7 out of
the the to to re re - CEU eTD Collection sense, this In older. or years 70 were bottom the on were that three the however office, took t when old years 66 to 47 were survey Canadian a in ministers prime five top The rankings. ministers’ prime in difference no made also age 2011, in conducted ministers prime Canadian beco first they when forties their in were fifteenth) (ranked Major and sixth) (ranked Blair ministers, prime youngest two The Chamberlain. and Law Bonar bottom, the at ranked two the were as ministers, prime ranki expert Leeds of MORI/University the performanceof top in placement their and office ministers; prime British rankedon threeMacmillan,and example, ForChurchill rankings.Attlee, assuming upon ages ministers’ prime did between leaders Western on literature Previous job. the for his/her required on skills bearing a have inter can and political office more have to assuming likely are ofministers prime older time because performance, the at minister prime a of age The 5.2.1 Prime ministers’ age office at assuming Rejai 1983). and Philips to not socio findings, previous on Based governance. democratic in performance their on ideologypolitical and education, post, ministerial prime the assuming upon m prime variables; demographical several of effect the more test I section, turn this In in certain. is performance leaders’ on influence its and easily more observable is variables edu origin, social as research leaders’the stream, cross analyzedwere backgrounds this In elites. political of recruitment the in interested primarily been have sociology are two the ( tested rarely and uncertain between correlations the since variables, demographic (only) to attributable part d likely is that health leaders’mental of element an as abnormality emphasize and leaders “unbalanced” istinguish the part of leaders’ effectiveness attributable to (only) psychological factors and the the and factors psychological (only) to attributable effectivenessleaders’ of part the istinguish to influence(Blondel their performance 1987). ae get ifrne n rm mnses p ministers’ prime in difference great a make One methodological complexity in leader in complexity methodologicalOne me prime ministers (Theakston (Theakston ministers prime me cation, occupation and ideology in the selection of leaders. This group of of group This leaders. of selection the in ideology and occupation cation,
Ibid : 134). In addition to psychol to addition In 134). :
134 - centered research is the present impossibility to impossibility presentthe researchis centered ng were in their sixties when they first become become first they when sixties their in were ng
and Gill Gill and - nationally to assess the role of factors such factors of role the assess nationallyto rogrammatic performance (Blondel 1987, 1987, (Blondel performance rogrammatic ogical studies, political science and and science political studies, ogical 200 - demographic variables demographic 6 : 15). In an expert ranking of ranking expert an In 15). :
o fn a relationship a find not inisters’age are likely likely are - personal personal hey CEU eTD Collection performance governance. indemocratic older.ministers’prime between correlation chart a presents 5.1 Figure assumingoffice age and at or 60 were four and 60 and 50 between were eight only posts, ministerial prime took they when of time the at ministers prime 50 below were (N=22) ministers prime of 33 the of majority The posts. ministerial age prime assuming average the as 48 with ministers, prime become they politic level high before their long politicians career been have many because job, the to capital political more bring they means office,which political assume theyWestern when comparativelyolder are politicians and East the in politicians of structure generational performance ministers’ prime influencing factor important slightly a had ministers, better chancerankings andHillmer 2013, higher tooccupy Mu (Azzi prime becoming first at 70, than younger ministers prime Canadian n ie ih rvos idns eae t Wsen leaders, Western to related findings previous with line In al appointments. By contrast, CEE politicians are relatively young when when young relatively are politicians CEE contrast, By appointments. al
135
West (Europe) is different however, and and however, different is (Europe) West
in democratic governance. The The governance. democratic in rray Blessing and 1994). age is not likely to be an an be to likely not is age
CEU eTD Collection by explained be can ministers prime CEE of education wide generally This degree. university generally are ministers prime CEE 5.2.2 younger than 50at p assuming ministers’prime by ten of range scale a of out 5.6 of average mean and 50 than ministers’older s a had 50 prime by ten above of rangescale a of out 6.2 of average bymean indicated also is which performance, ministers prime sense, this In 50. above and (Sanader two but Šķēle), Janša, (Kalvitis, officeassuming at 50 below bottom five the of Three minister. prime become he when 42 was top Račan, Buzek, (Kubilius, five the of Four performance. ministers’ prime performan and office assuming at age ministers’ prime between relationship hypothesized the with line In eight appendix see governance, democratic in performance ministers’ Source Figure
Prime Ministers’Prime education : correlation analysis, independent variable; prime ministers’ age at assuming office, assuming ministers’at ageprime variable; independent analysis, correlation :
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: Data on prime ministers’ are prime on age Data : Šleževičius Brazauskas
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Kosor Jadranka Robert Fico Robert Orbán Viktor JuhanParts Račan Ivica Lawyers - fee paying) education for all practiced during practiced all for education paying) fee , lawyers 6
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of governments or prime ministers is evaluated. These different policy strategies by by strategies policydifferent These evaluated. is ministers prime or governments of ed at more public spending on social welfare, while right wing prime ministers are ministers prime wing right while welfare, social on spending public more at ed - ih dsicin mn laes n gvrmns n oieooi ise (in issues socioeconomic on governments and leaders among distinction right ). In Lithuania, In ). he right he - left political orientation may be deceptive because political notions of notions political because deceptive be may orientation political left
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- wing prime ministers are likely to pursue pursue to likely are ministers prime wing equally well equally s even further to suggest that the most the that suggest to further even s - making process. - oriented cabinets are more stable stable more are cabinets oriented - right spectrum of the governing the of spectrum right with a mean average score of of score average mean a with - leaning parties.
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- retd rm mnses wo r lkl t pru policies pursue to likely are who ministers, prime oriented - twelve left - 2010 oriented prime ministers may relate to a slight disdain for disdain slight a to relate may ministers prime oriented
- - make a difference in prime ministers’ performance in in performance ministers’ prime in difference a make oriented and right and oriented retd rm mnses a hv lgt datg in advantage light have may ministers prime oriented - - right distinction in contemporary democracies, democracies, contemporary in distinction right ” (Bakker et al. 2012). This database positions parties parties positions database This 2012). al. et (Bakker ” point ideological scale where 0 indicates extreme left, extreme indicates 0 where scale ideological point are Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel The Europe: in Positions Party Measuring 139
left
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are - s that prime ministers’ demographical characteristics do not matter for better or or better for matter not do characteristics ministers’demographical prime that s oriented prime ministers. If more cases are added to the analysis, the effect mayeffect the analysis, the to added are cases more If ministers. prime oriented
tested on their performance indemocraticgovernance.tested o e task be to I tested the effect of of effect the tested I - retd n re t b efcie Te ulte sc a energy, as such qualities The effective. be to order in oriented - oriented prime ministers performing with a mean average of of average meana with performing ministers prime oriented ess” and the type of exact policies pursued by differently by pursued policies exact of type the and ess”
As ic performance
140 ed prime ministers influence performance. In the the In performance. influence ministers prime ed suggested by previous literature neither prime prime neither literature previous by suggested ormance than are others. Some scholars even even scholars Some others. are than ormance
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minority minority factors in prime ministers’ immediate (the type of type (the immediate ministers’ prime in factors 141 aie tp i iprat o pie ministers’ prime for important is type cabinet
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CEU eTD Collection as one term. coded and werecollapsed 68 parli enjoyed cabinets several (N=15), (N=29), coalition winning minimum is type cabinet 62 of Out Ansip as indicated minority party (3). multi was type cabinet term third his during while coalition, in winning minimum Number minister. of mandate prime the during individual type minister. cabinet an prime different same a of (chronologically) mandate indicates ministers the prime some during to next changed brackets, sometimes has type Coalition Note: singlewas *Cabinet (2007). al. Source Table 5.9 The type of government cabinets; of types winning or different of leadership their on based categories majority.parliamentary the by supported also is Total 29 Total 2) (1, Kubilius Andrius Šleževičius Adolfas (1) Algirdas Brazauskas (2) LeszekMiller Tusk Donald (1) JerzyBuzek (1) Pahor Borut Janša Janez Fico Robert Mečiar Vladimír Drnovšek Janez MikulsDzurinda (3) Dombrovskis Valdis Medgyessy Péter Gyurcsány Ferenc 2) (1, Ansip Andrus JuhanParts Laar Mart Vähi Tiit Nečas Petr Špidla Vladimír VáclavKlaus Sanader Ivo Kosor Jadranka coalition winning minimum of Leader
See chapter two, table 2.1 for the total number of prime ministerial terms. Prime ministerial consecutive terms terms consecutive ministerial Prime ministerialterms. ofprime number thefor total 2.1 two, table chapter See
: Comparative Political Data Set III 1990 1990 III Set Data Political Comparative : eleven are m are eleven ParlGov
(1, 2) (1,
prime ministerial terms ministerial prime
surplus coalition
(1)
(3, 5) (3,
(2)
(1, 2) (1, ( party majority party Döring
For example, Ansip (1, 2) means that cabinet type during Ansip’s first and second term was term second and first Ansip’s during type cabinet that means 2) (1, Ansip example, For
ulti party ulti mnay upr, hl 1 wr mnrt cbnt. rvos literature Previous cabinets. minority were 14 while support, amentary
and Manow (201 Manow and (1) LeszekMiller Bērziņš Andris Šķēle Andris Orbán Viktor Mirek 2) (1, Algirdas Brazauskas Vagnorius Gediminas Dzurinda Mikuláš Drnovšek Janez (1) Dombrovskis Valdis AigarsKalvītis Horn Gyula Račan Ivica cabinet surplus of Leader
and
Topolánek 15 cabinets. party single are three and
as
68 leader
(1, 2) (1,
, during the during , (2)
(2) 2
) (1)
– s
2010, Armingeon et al. (2012). (2012). al. et Armingeon 2010, of single of single
142 In t In
Gyurcsány Ferenc (2) JerzyBuzek Zeman Miloš (minority) party single of Leader
tenure of 33 prime ministers, the predominant the ministers, prime 33 of tenure
able 5.9 able or multi
3
-
prime ministers are grouped in fo in grouped are ministers prime partycabinets
cabinets (3)
Out of these 62 cabinets, 44 cabinets, 62 these of Out Governing Together Governing as Algirdas Brazauskas (3) Algirdas Brazauskas (2) LeszekMiller Dzurinda Mikuláš (2) Pahor Borut Drnovšek Janez VáclavKlaus 4) (2, Dombrovskis Valdis AigarsKalvītis (3) Ansip Andrus (minority) multi party of Leader
are surplus surplus are . leader
s of minimum minimum of s
11
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(1)
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(3)
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CEU eTD Collection These majority. a or minority a is cabinet the if or positions different or similar ideologically ministers’ prime for relevance no majority in ministers prime while ten, of range scale cabinets per a of out 6.3 of score average mean a minority slightly with In better performed cabinets fact, in ministers andcabinets. minority prime significant statistically find not also did One ten. of range scale a of out 5.7 of score average mean a with worse performed cabinets surplus in ministers prime and ten of range scale a of out 5.9 of score average mean a perf cabinets party single and wining minimum leading ministers Prime ten. of range scale of out 6.7 of score average mean a with best performed cabinets party multi sign better chance prime ministers’ of heading forward to their preferred them policies. minis aremajority heading cabinets by supported theparliamentary better prime than likely toperform decision make may coalitions winning minimum (H1), governments party multi or surplus heading ministers prime than better perform areto coalitions likely winning minimum ministers’governance democratic in performance winning minimum and coalitions satisfaction in withcabinet decision surplus between as well as majority and minority between difference Blondel However, policies. their for support legislative securefor easier is it because efficient, more be to likely are cabinets minority to compared inter of decision effective likelihood more the minimizes outlook ideological and unified a because cabinets, stable surplus and multiparty more are cabinets party single suggested ificant for prime ministers’ performance in democratic governance. Prime ministers leading leading ministers Prime governance. democratic in ministers’performance prime for ificant es edn mnrt cabinets minority heading ters Once findings, previous on Based - These findings suggest that type of cabinet or its support by parliamentary majority has has majority parliamentary by support its or cabinet of type that suggest findings These cabinet conflicts over policies. Cabinets supported by the majority in the parliament parliament the in majority the by supported Cabinets policies. over conflicts cabinet formed with aformed mean5.7 outofa with average scorescalerange of ten. of one - a ANOVA way because fewer number of ideologically distinct parties in single or or single in parties distinct ideologically of number fewer because
a performed was performance. (H3), aie type cabinet ifrne ewe pie iitr’ edn majority heading ministers’ prime between difference eas cbnts alaetr spot il mean will support parliamentary cabinet’s because - 143 making and effectivenessmaking and
. (H). Prime ministers heading ministers Prime (H). . t s reeat f aie cmoiin reflect composition cabinet if irrelevant is It
, cabinet type did not appear statistically statistically appear not did type cabinet , s xetd t expected is - making less conflictual. conflictual. less making et al (2007) did not find a large a find not did (2007) al et mk a ifrne in difference a make o . ormed equally well with well equally ormed
rm ministers Prime single party and and party single
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way ANOVA these prime to s CEU eTD Collection parties. one with cabinets of leaders as categories; three few with cabinets lead who ministers prime to contrast in governance, democratic in worse perform to likely are parties of number making ineff to related is parties cabinet of number higher the suggested literature Western Previous 2007). al. et (Blondel distant ideologically are parties if especially agree likely,areless conflicts broadlyideologyand political common share a usually ministers because governments, party single In support. parliamentary sustaining for required than coalition that i participating are parties many how know not do still we coalition, surplus of example for speak we If parties. more with cabinets between distinguishing allow not does types cabinet of discussion However, types. cabinet of discussion parties cabinet of number The 2004). al. et Muller 2000, Cotta, and (Blondel effectiveness cabinet eventually and activity cabinet of aspect important an are parties Political 5.3.2 numberThe parties cabinet of democrat procedural in effective less be decision to likely are Dombrovskis) Račan, Dzurinda, equally (e.g. coalitions not but performance, cit of improving type in procedural successful in effective be may Gyurcsány) Zeman, prosperity. citizens’ improve that simple decision beyond go that outcomes policy the in reflected may parties diverse ideologically aspect. procedural its in only but decision cabinet of effectiveness to relate may items
on the goals prime ministers pursue. In coalition governments, conflicts are more likely, more are conflicts governments, coalition In pursue. ministers prime goals the on
- - (Muller et al. 2004). In line with this, this, with line In 2004). al. et (Muller making, but may be more successful in improving citizens’ welfare by respecting respecting by welfare citizens’ improving in successful more be may but making, ministe prime to extend and making, ic institutions and effectiveic institutions governance. izens’ life. Similarly, prime ministers in multi party or surplus surplus or party multi in ministers prime Similarly, life. izens’
Accordingly, prime ministers in single party cabinets (e.g. (e.g. cabinets party single in ministers prime Accordingly, owr ter gna oe aiy Ti hwvr i not is however, This easily. more agenda their forward er parties (H) parties er
rm mnses n cabi in ministers Prime n that coalition, except that there are more parties in parties more are there that except coalition, that n 144 rs’ - rm mnses edn cbnt wt a larger a with cabinets leading ministers prime two, two two,
eortc odc adefcie governance effective and conduct democratic . In t In - making as suggested by previous literature, previous by suggested as making able 5.10 prime ministers ministers prime 5.10 able - three and three procedural effectiveness of cabinet cabinet of effectiveness procedural es ih ee pris r less or parties fewer with nets ective and conflictual decision conflictual and ective as leaders as
relates to previous to relates over four cabinet four over are grouped in grouped - CEU eTD Collection performance. correlation in a chart presents 5.2 Figure governance. democratic in performance ministers’ prime of predictor poor a is parties cabinet of number the showed regression Linear 5.7. of score average m prime and 5.9 of score average mean a with performed parties three over with cabinets in ministers Prime ten. of range scale a of out 6.3 averagescoreof mean a performslightlywith betterdid parties two or one with cabinetslead parties three over with cabinets or two one, with cabinets leading ministers One parties. lead ministers prime eleven two with cabinets lead ministers prime most suggest, 5.10 table in data As Source: Table 5.10 The number of cabinet parties Total 8 Total Šleževičius Adolfas Tusk Donald Gyurcsány Ferenc Vähi Tiit Zeman Miloš JerzyBuzek Medgyessy Péter Horn Gyula Leader of cabinet with cabinet of Leader One
Müller
iaig o eainhp ewe te ubr f aie pris n pie ministers’ prime and parties cabinet of number the between relationship no dicating
-
two parties two
– -
a AOA i nt id ttsial sgiiat ifrne ewe prime between difference significant statistically find not did ANOVA way Rommel et al. (2004), (2004), al. et Rommel
aies vr he parties three over cabinets
Leader of cabinet wit cabinet of Leader Armingeon and Two
Andrus AnsipAndrus Sanader Ivo Orbán Viktor Topolánek Mirek Nečas Petr JuhanParts VladimirMečiar Algirdas Brazauskas Laar Mart Borut Pahor VladimirŠpidla LeszekMiller Fico Robert VáclavKlaus – three parties three inisters in cabinets with two or three parties with a mean a with parties three or two with cabinets in inisters
14
Careja (2012), Careja
145
h
an Döring, d eight and and
Leader of cabinet with cabinet with of Leader ed aies ih one with cabinets lead Man Jane Janez Janša Andris Bērziņš JadrankaKosor AndriusKubilius Dombrovskis Valdis Mikuláš Dzurinda Račan Ivica AndrisŠķēle AigarsKalvītis Gediminas Vagnorius over three parties three over ow ow
Drnovšek . Prime ministers who ministers Prime . - Parl Gov Parl three parties (N=14), parties three 11
(2012).
- two two CEU eTD Collection ministers. other than moreimportant that found (2007) al et pe Blondel prominent CEE, more In as ministers. ministers other of actions the over control exercise and government the 69 1994) g effective in performance ministers’ prime finance head who ministers ( constrained more are cabinets cabinet, in decision parties diverse ideologically many are there if example, For role. significant more performance. (Lijphartdecisions wise mean necessarily not may parties fewer with cabinets by decisions fast However, making. de promote may majority the of hands the in concentrated power suggests that literature previous support section this of Results eight ministers’primeappendix see governance, indemocratic performance Source Figure 5.2 The number of cabinet parties and performance democratic in governance
Ministers of finance are “more” important because they are in charge of an overall income and the expenditure of expenditure the and income overall an of charge in are they because important “more” are finance of Ministers . It is likely that likely is It . creain nlss idpnet aibe nme of number variable; independent analysis, correlation : - aig a b tne n cneunl iefcet becaus inefficient, consequently and tense be may making More importantly, the ideology of parties participating in the cabinet may play a a play may cabinet the in participating parties of ideology the importantly, More 2012
prime ministers performed better in policy areas where a departmental departmental a where areas policy in better performed ministers prime : 259). : rceive ministers of finance, while only in Estonia; foreign minister was perceived perceived was minister foreign Estonia; in only while finance, of ministers rceive 69 , foreign, economy and social minist social and economy foreign, ,
A sheer number of parties does not play a role in prime ministers’prime in role a play not Adoes parties of number sheer cisive leadership and hence coherent policies and fast decision fast and policies coherent hence and leadership cisive tø 1994 Strøm ). Following this, the party ideology of individual individual of ideology party the this, Following ). overnance 146
cabinet parties, see table 5.10, dependent variable; variable; dependent 5.10, table see parties, cabinet (Norton 1998, Anderweg and Bakema Bakema and Anderweg 1998, (Norton
ries e prime ministers in these these in ministers prime e
may make a difference in difference a make may
-
CEU eTD Collection and “kinder deliver to likely are democracies consensus that finds ( etc protection, environmental provisions, welfare of interms policies” gentler he shor addition, where In prevalent. democracies more consensus are cabinets indicators) quality democratic and macroeconomic was data which for 16 of 71 out cases 12 available. in affairs economic ministers’ as same of was party ministers’ ministers’ Prime available. as same was party ministers’ Prime w party ministers’ Prime 70 decision cabinet in effectiveness ministers’ decision cohesion internal develop to opportunities stability regime to extends also likely which policies, coherent and sound develop to time insufficient vis a for office in minister prime A 84). 2007: (Baylis attention media unfavorable or popularity low indicate may and agendas out carry and formulate to time minist prime 2007, (Baylis goals substantive achieve of ability the and support political reflecting accurately effectiveness and success of indicator an as literature the in cited often is office in duration minister's prime The 5.3.3 Term duration forbut not prime ministers’ poli andministers departmental may ministers important for be proceduralaspectofdecision party same the generally ministers prime that apparent was it governance, democratic prime of dimensions to separate data in these performance ministers’ matched I When th same. the of were head ministries social the and and economic minister foreign, prime the of party the archives, public governments’ available was data Where cabinets. past for especially collect to difficult were hypothesis in worse perform areto likely who ministers prime to party,contrast fromsame in the was minister
Party of prime minister and minister of finance was same in 15 cases out of 19 for which data was available. available. was data which for 19 of out cases 15 in same was finance of minister and minister prime of Party Lijphart finds that majoritarian democracies with stable cabinets do not outperform (on a number of of number a (on outperform not do cabinets stable with democracies majoritarian that finds Lijphart policy areas policy - à - vis 71 -
aig rcs ( process making h primn, hl a short a while parliament, the
(Lijphart ogr em ices ter oiia eprec, hc my n un otiue to contribute turn in may which experience, political their increase terms longer . Data of this section support the argument that shared party ideology by prime by ideology party shared that argument the support section this of Data . where 2012 as same as ministers’ of foreign affairs in 15 out of 22 cases for which data was available. available. was data which for cases 22 of out 15 in affairs foreign of ministers’ as same as
departmental departmental 129 : do not perform better in areas whereareas in better perform not do Müller
awc 94. ncnrs, longer contrast, In 1994). Warwick , cy improve citizens’ outcomes that welfare. - making ( making - Rommel Rommel ministers were from different parties (H). parties different from were ministers - Müller lived prime minister is likely to be weak, because of of because weak, be to likely is minister prime lived Müller ,
r mr efcie n ls conflict less and effective more are t al. et 147
–
of social affairs in 13 out of 21 cases for which data was was data which for cases 21 of out 13 in affairs social of Rommel. 2005). insufficient meansRommel. A term brief
et al. et
200
1993). Previous literature found positive positive found literature Previous 1993). 4 , Frognier 1993). Moreover, prime prime Moreover, 1993). Frognier ,
long time is likely to be dominant be to likely is time long
departmental ministers are fromare ministers departmental 2012 - lasting cabinets have better have cabinets lasting : 275 - 300).
ter - lived and ineffective ineffective and lived
Data to test this this test to Data - ridden in the the in ridden e finance, finance, e - making, making, r to ers 70
in ’s
CEU eTD Collection prime all of duration years.Averageterm three than less for office in were (N=14) while more, yearsor three officefor in were (N=19) ministers prime5.11, table most in data by suggested As Source Table 5.11 Term duration years,(in months) and two for office in ministers prime durations; term their on based categories three shorter outperform (H) governance democratic in performance arguments, these on Based impact. an have to minister prime a for required is office in years five suggest decision effective an become to minister prime i office in years three that suggest authors Some effective. become to office of the In 200 Gill and (Theakton ministers prime serving short experts’than ranks on higher placed were ministers prime Zealander New and Canadian British, offic in performance and duration term ministers’ prime between correlations Total 14 Total Šķēle Andris Vähi Tiit JuhanParts Špidla Vladimír Laar Mart Vagnorius Gediminas LeszekMiller Bērziņš Andris Kosor Jadranka Dombrovskis Valdis Topolánek Mirek Adolfas Račan Ivica Two In office
this respect, the prime ministers’ duration can p can ministers’duration prime the respect, this in office – : head of nationalhead policy of
Three years Three See chapter 2, table 2.1, 2.1, table 2, chapter See The literature does not agree on the exact number of years a prime minister should stay should in yearsminister prime aof number exact the on agree not literaturedoesThe
Šleževičius
rm mnses drto i lkl to likely is duration ministers’ prime for more than four years. four for than more
- atn Piemnses (H1). ministers Prime lasting
Duration Duration (yrs/mo) 1.11 2.11 2.11 2.1 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.2 1.8 2 2 .0 .0 Müller
- making
- Petr Nečas Petr AigarsKalvītis Kubilius Andrius JerzyBuzek Mečiar Vladimír Orbán Viktor Pahor Borut Tusk Donald Fico Robert Janša Janez Horn Gyula Ansip Andrus Zeman Miloš Algirdas Brazauskas Three In office Rommel (2005: 10) (2005: Rommel .
–
Four years Four 14
148 .
- maker ( maker Longer
rovide some indication of the political impact impact political the of indication some rovide In t In
6 Duration , Azzi and Hillmer 2013, Sheppard 1998). 1998). Sheppard 2013, Hillmer and , Azzi able (yrs/mo) ae dfeec i pie ministers’ prime in difference a make - Müller 3.11 3.11 3.11 3.11 4.11 lasting prime ministers are likely to to likely are ministers prime lasting 3.6 3 3.1 3.3 4 4 4 4 4 4 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
5.11 prime ministers ministers prime 5.11
– Rommel 2005: 8), while others while 8), 2005: Rommel Gyurcsány Ferenc VáclavKlaus Sanader Ivo Dzurinda Mikuláš Drnovšek Janez years four over In office
5
s a minimum for a for minimum a s
-
three, three three, . Long e.
are
grouped in grouped Duration (yrs/mo) 10.6 - 6.7 4.7 4.7 5.6 7.8 serving serving
-
four four
CEU eTD Collection between prime ministers’ term duration andgovernance. performance indemocratic 5.3 poor Figure a governance. is democratic duration term ministers’ prime showed regression officein ministers prime while ten, of range scale a of out 5.9 of score average mean a with performed years four than more for office in ministers Prime ten. of range scale a of out 6.0 of score average mean a with performed less or years three for office in ministers prime fact, In years. four than more or four three, for office are One that coalitions favoring laws that cabinets party electoral single than shorter generally proportional of context the in accomplishment yea 3.5 is 2013 June until 1990s mid since office in ministers - a AOA i nt id statis find not ANOVA did way for ial sgiiat ifrne ewe pie iitr in ministers prime between difference significant tically rsns creain hr idctn n relationship no indicating chart correlation a presents four years or less performed with a score of 5.7. Linear 5.7. scoreof a with performedyears less or four 149 usually
form under majoritarian electoral laws. electoral majoritarian under form rs, which is relatively successful relatively is which rs, rdco o promne in performance of predictor
CEU eTD Collection decision of aspect procedural in effective relatively longsome aspectspolitical tenuresallmanifest insection culture 5.1. discussed ofnegative with ministers prime ranked bottom Incidentally, governments. coalition in tenures (Me years five and three between office in were years 1.8 of term short his with Šķēle except ministers prime ranked five bottom Ansip, and However, Horn). officefor in wereyears ten over of tenure his with Drnovšek except ministers prime ranked five top The governance. democratic in performance ministers’ prime T ministers’eight prime appendix variable; see governance, democratic in performance Source Figure 5.3 Term duration he analysis of this section suggests that prime ministers’ longer tenures are poor predictors of of predictors poor are tenures longerministers’ prime that suggests section this of analysis he : correlation analysis, independent variable; prime ministers’ term duration, see table 5.11, dependent dependent 5.11, table see duration, term ministers’ prime variable; independent analysis, correlation : idns f hs eto sget ht long that suggest section this of Findings
and performance democraticin governance Račan was inoffice threeandRačan lessthan for ciar, Kalvītis, Janša, Orbán, Sanader), which are relatively long relatively are which Sanader), Orbán, Janša, ciar,Kalvītis, - aig Hwvr long However, making. 150
- term prime ministers are likely to be more more be to likely are ministers prime term -
terms do not mean much if if much mean not do terms four years four
Špidla for two years. two for Špidla The
(Kubilius, Buzek, Buzek, (Kubilius,
CEU eTD Collection as indicated intable 5.12. re ministers prime and l resigned, who ministers prime categories; three in grouped be can ministers prime terminated, is office in period minister's prime a which in manner the to Related appointees. as Ansip,Špidla, Kosor, Kalvītis, (Bērziņš, ministers Gyurcsány,Topolán Prime ten only while (N=23), elections w ministers prime than performers, worse as experts by assessed be to likely are resigned or elections lost who ministers prime example, For governance. democratic in performance ministers’ prime of min prime a which in circumstances the addition, In 2013). Hillmer and (Azzi ministers Prime Canadian for finding same the for support h occupy to 20 Gill likely and (Theakston more were mandates larger won who leaders and mattered victory election of size the US, the and Britain in example, For victories. electoral from not and appointments political from mandates their derive who ministers perfor prime to perceived be may majorities electoral large winning parties of leaders are who ministers Prime governance. democratic in performance of assessments expert influence nature The 5.3.4 natureThe terms of circumstances and office leaving of for mattermindsets little good policy outcomes. democratic ministers’ effe prime by unsupported if and ministers prime by tenures framework longer democracies, democratic a is of and elites by supportive embraced widely is that culture political consensual the of result a primarily In welfare. Western ministers’prime democracies, are performancebetter relatedto longer terms im that governance democratic of supportive not are mindsets ministers’ prime nCE h aoiy fpiemnsessatd hi em atrterprishd won had parties their after terms their started ministers prime of majority the CEE, In ho were re of prime ministers' mandates and the circumstances in which they leave office may may office leave they which in circumstances the and mandates ministers' prime of ek, Dombrovskis, Šleževičius and Brazauskas) started their period in office in period their started Brazauskas) and Šleževičius Dombrovskis, ek, - elected and confirmed for another mandate (H).another mandateelected andconfirmed for - elected during incumbency (Von Beyme 1985, Woldendorp et al et Woldendorp1985, (VonBeyme incumbency during elected 06
en adRc 98.TeCnda epr akns i nt find not did rankings expert Canadian The 1998). Rice and Kenny , ister leaves office may play a role in expert assessments expert in role a play may office leaves ister 151
ctive governance. In newly established established newly In governance. ctive ge pae o epr rankings expert on places igher
proves citizens’ proves bte than better m ost elections elections ost .
2000), CEU eTD Collection E. D. C. B. A.
prime of perceptions experts’ influence not do office leaving of circumstances ministers’ performing with ten, of range scale a of out 6.1 of score average mean a with better slightly performed elections lost who ministers mi prime of assessments experts’ influence not did elections losing or resignations that indicating office, leaving of circumstances the on based ministers prime of groups three among performance in difference significant statistically a find mandate new a for confirmed 5.12. table in indicated sc political (e.g. p CEE A(N=19) of total and Fico whywhich six),is chapter (see in elections most votes receiving re study, this In partner. coalition a find to able not were they elections, because in votes of majority won parties their although term next the for confirmed not were ministers ***Prime dis Coalition 2, = 2 = confidence president the with Dispute 3, = crisis Financial 7, = Scandals ** mandatetermination of an indicator as waswhich taken (Dzurinda), *Prime Source: Table 5.12 Circumstances leaving of office Total 19 Total AigarsKalvītis* Zeman Miloš A.Brazauskas Vagnorius G. A. LeszekMiller Pahor Borut Drnovšek Janez Šķēle Andris Gyurcsány Ferenc Medgyessy Péter JuhanParts Laar Mart Vähi Tiit Nečas Petr Mirek Špidla Vladimír Sanader Ivo VáclavKlaus Resigned
Šleževičius
ma averag mean a Topolánek
iitr wr re were ministers See list of press articles used for coding circumstances of leaving office in appendix eleven appendix in office ofleaving circumstances coding for used articles list See press of
ih ma aeae cr o 58 Fnig o ti scin niae ht prime that indicate section this of Findings 5.8. of score average mean a with
nas caiin ipts dsgemns ih rsdns r te raos as reasons) other or presidents with disagreements disputes, coalition andals,
compared to compared Scandal Newleader party president with the Dispute withthe Dispute scandal Corruption scandal Rywingate ofconf./crisis no Vote run presidency for To Coalitioncollapse crisis Financial Coalitiondispute ofconfidence no Vote Coalitiondispute Party scandal Sex/Power crisis Financial elec. results EU in Poor scandal Corruption scandal Partycorruption Resignation** For Reason soe f . and 5.9 of score e – lce drn icmec, u eetal ete rsge ( resigned either eventually but incumbency, during elected
Eight rime ministers resigned from prime ministerial posts for various reasons various for posts ministerial prime from resigned ministers rime pressure/scandal
prime ministers ministers prime after electoral victories of their parties. parties. their of victories electoral after
prime ministers ministers prime
president
rm mnses h resigned who ministers prime
152 lost elections lost nisters’ likely worse performance. In fact, prime prime fact, In performance. worse likelynisters’
Viktor JadrankaKosor Račan Ivica Andris Bērziņš Andris A JerzyBuzek Janša Janez M.Dzurinda* Elections Lost
r
. e
Kubilius - elected during incumbency during elected Orbán 8
-
election is defined defined is election
Mečiar and only six prime ministers were ministers prime six only and
are categorized as “re categorized are
pute = 3, other = 4, vote of no of vote 4, = other 3, = pute ANOVAana
Re Kalvītis as prime ministers’ party ministers’party prime as – Valdis Dombrovskis Valdis during incumbency incumbency during Robert Fico*** Robert GyulaHorn VladimírMečiar Donald Tusk AnsipAndrus elected during terms terms during elected who performed performed who ) or lost elections elections lost or )
6 lysis did not not did lysis
- elected”
***
CEU eTD Collection Linz test” over turn “two withstood have 74 2000. and 1993 inbetween office ministers 73 time this include time because category, this fit not do study this 72 Because accomplished. successfully be to skills period leadership a is consolidation and elites of type different a transition CEE; in change political Wasilewski by hypothesis types” ongoing (2000 consolidation (1995 transformation during office in transition; ministers to prime subsequent phases distinct three on based 5.13) table in indicated (as categories performanc influenc also can crises global or disasters example natural providing events, for international major as such alternatively, operate ministers prime the or, which in framework freedom institutional immediate her 20 or (Helms action for his opportunities constraining on impact an potentially have also can performance, office in time minister's prime a of circumstances political The 5.3.5 T they for resign non prime if same not of because obviously resign to is prompted are ministers It performance. ministers’ prime and termination mandate re ex between relationship for the at looking from benefit might stand research Future election. than rather posts their from resign primarily ministers prime CEE terminations. ministers’ Consolidation is a period of stability and smooth operati smooth and stability of period a is Consolidation prime of service of period time fits and economy market and democracy crafting of period a is Transformation in ministers prime most Since established. are rules new which during regimes two between period a is Transition
1996, Huntington 1991). 1996, he Because of the intricacies of CEE transitions, prime ministers may be grouped in three in grouped be may ministers prime transitions, CEE of intricacies the of Because s of as
political circumstancespolitical office periodin of performance. This could relate to a small variation in the reasons for mandate mandate for reasons the in variation small a to relate could This performance. e . -
period period spring - political reasons. – as a category of prime ministers’ service. service. ministers’ ofprimecategory as a
07 ad rm mnses n fie uig 08 iaca cii (2008 crisis financial 2008 during office in ministers prime and 2007) 04. hs aeoiain s nprd y h “he phases “three the by inspired is categorization This 2014).
of stability and the smooth operation of the democratic process, it is it process, democratic the of operation smooth the and stability of
that indicates a consolidated consolidated a indicates that (2001) 72
, transformation , 5 Huho 20) Etra crusacs usd the outside circumstances External 2002). Haughton 05,
- who disti who eid f hi srie cus fe tastoa pro, dd not did I period, transitional after occurs service their of period their involvement in corruption and scandals or scandals and corruption in involvement their 153 on of democratic processes when all CEE countries should should countries CEE all when processes democratic of on
nguished between three phases of social and social of phases three between nguished 73
and consolidation and –
00, rm minis prime 2000), eorc (aiesi 01 134, 2001: (Wasilewski democracy 74 , each of which requirewhich of each , ters in office during during office in ters e prime ministers’ prime e act reason for for reason act –
three elite elite three Stepan and and if – - CEU eTD Collection difficulty” “situational emphasized literature previous because especially finding important an is governance.This democratic in performance or crisis financial as such circumstances political consolidation. Kubilius transformation, the Among transformation. during served Šķēle) and (Meciar two and consolidation during office in were 5.7 of score perform who consolidation and transformation during office in ministers prime than ten, of range scale a of out 6.2 of score average mean a with better slightlyperformed prime of categories circumstances three political the on based between ministers performance in difference significant statistically a in of theperiod inservice; circumstances political the on based categories three in split equally almost are ministers Prime Source Table 5.13 The p democratic prime (H). inofficeconsolidation ministers during governance than that likely Total 11 Total Mečiar Vladimír Šķēle Andris Šleževičius Adolfas VáclavKlaus Zeman Miloš Vagnorius Gediminas Laar Mart Vähi Tiit JerzyBuzek Horn Gyula Drnovšek Janez transformation during Office ministersin Prime office during consolidation and consolidation during office :
Own categorization based on timeon based Owncategorization The analysis in this section indicates that prime ministers’ terms surrounded by difficult by surrounded terms ministers’ prime that indicates section this in analysis The
mn te ie bottom five the Among . prime ministers in office during transformation, and crisis perform worse in in worse perform crisis and transformation, during office in ministers prime o fv ranked five top
olitical circumstances of period in office
eleven served
prime ministers rm mnses to ( two ministers, prime during crisis and two (Racan and (Racan two and crisis during ten during ten - period of service (see table 2.1, chapter 2) chapter 2.1, table (see ofservice period - ranking prime ministers, three (Sanader, Janša, Kalvītis) Kalvītis) Janša, (Sanader, three ministers, prime ranking Janez Janša Janez AigarsKalvītis Sanader Ivo Orbán Viktor Andris JuhanParts Dzurinda Mikuláš LeszekMiller Algirdas Brazauskas Špidla Vladimír Medgyessy Péter Račan Ivica consolidation during ministersin office Prime
12
of
Bērziņš 2008 financial crisis. financial 2008 154 were hi service their
s an as
post
in office during transfo
-
transitional transformation is irrelevant for for irrelevant is transformation transitional
important Drnovšek
I fc, crisis fact, In .
ANOVAfind not did analysis Špidla) Špidla) atr in factor n Bzk sre during served Buzek) and Andrus Ansip Andrus Mirek Peter Kosor Jadranka Fico Robert Tusk Donald Gyurcsány Ferenc Pahor Borut Dombrovskis Valdis Kubilius Andrius crisis during ministersin office Prime
10
ed equally ed
Nečas
Topolánek were in office in were rmation, - era prime ministers ministers prime era
xliig prime explaining
with a mean mean a with twelve were
during
CEU eTD Collection variable type cabinet The populism. ministers’ prime by predicted be can personalization ministers’ prime because model, is it because model the in entered not was personalization Executive constant. variables contextual ministers’ prime by predicted is regression multiple the As Matters” 5.4 “Mindset variables in demonstrates, analysis regression gov democratic in performance their of perceptions indicate section citizens’this Generally,improves of welfare. findingsthat performance good for much mean not ministers’prime by supported mindsets not if overcome, ministers’ to prime easyare forperformance. Rather, that bad excuse circumstances an be cannot not structures institutional specific to but tosome, conducive discrimination ofskills allow to contexts andchanging historical political matched be would skills ministers’ prime particular 2009. in protests government (2007 term to transformed economy successful was Godmanis Pawlak, Kubilius, Vagnorius, Godmanis, Orbán, non serve ministers prime CEE that uncommon not is it because espec others, in not but circumstances some in success achieve to able some were ministers prime why out find to interesting be would it specifically, More 2003). Owens and (Hargrove success situations. incomplex even achieve and environment their with interactto able but service, their of difficult of circumstances captives not ministers’are prime suggest, section this in data as Rather,ministers’ performance. correlated with populism ( populism correlatedwith to other contexts other Further research Further - their effect performance governance on indemocratic 09 ta ufle i te otx o eooi cii and crisis economic of context the in unfolded that 2009) that . Howe . atr surrounding factors
would benefit from exploring in more detail the “skill in context” thesis context” in “skill the detail more in exploring from benefit would market output output ver, data in this section suggest that suggest section this in data ver, a as nt nldd n h model, the in included not also was rm mnse drn hs is tr (1990 term first his during minister prime r Future case studies would studies case Future =. 73, =. - retd but oriented, in table 5.14 indicates, indicates, 5.14 table in utrl aibe otefr dmgahcl n contextual and demographical outperform variables cultural
populism populism p
<
.01, see table 5.3) and is thus a redundant variable in the the in variable redundant a thus is and 5.3) table see .01, rm mnses pro o srie are service of period ministers’ prime 155 and term duration holding other personal and and personal other holding duration term and ol nt eet hs ucs drn hs second his during success this repeat not could
eir Fc, aš) Fr xml, n Latvia, in example, For Janša). Fico, Mečiar,
ernance. In the next section, next the In ernance.
conducive to conducive best handle this type of research of type this handle best performance in democratic governance democratic in performance difficult political circumstances political difficult .
- consecutive terms (e.g. Laar, (e.g. terms consecutive eas i contains it because
democratic - eind mdt anti amidst resigned 1993) when Latvian Latvian when 1993) as the multiple multiple the as
governance do do governance irrelevant for for irrelevant similar similar where where ,
ially ially and and - CEU eTD Collection orpin ftr rsac i ti ae i a necessity. a is area this in research future corruption, personalization as manifest the where settings new the into system old the in cherished values old the of some transmits as wh democracies recent are in relevant mandates their surround their that as important situations complex nor characteristics, demographic demo under welfare citizens’ to contributions ministers’ D welfare. citizens’ improve not do that not change, always because populism appears statistically significant. do study the of results overall the model, the in entered predictors of number the of regardless statis collinearity because model the leave of number the should variables which justify to difficult is it presently but reduced, Alternatively, be to have would predictors variable. dependent the on data more collect to time additional to impossible present at is However, increased. is cases of number Itthe unless shortcoming this overcome terms). ministerial prime (33 cases of number small relatively and those populism on zero score who ministers prime between governance democratic in performance of governance one of increase significant ministers’ populism). as prime (alt duration term and populism ministers’ byprime explained is performance ministers’ prime in variance the of 80% almost demonstrates, cabinet of number the as information In sum, populists do not respect democratic institutions and deliver ineffective outcomes ineffective deliver and institutions democratic respect not do populists sum, In a for predictors many too is 5.14 table in presented model the of limitation main The
who score one, issevenwho score one, .
Because populism populism Because aiu apcs f eaie oiia clue uh as such culture political negative of aspects various
n cruto. lhuh hs td hs o pi atnin o rm ministers’ prime to attention paid not has study this Although corruption. and in
prime ministers’ populism leads to a decrease of seven units units seven of decrease a to leads populism ministers’ prime omtet t dmcay n efcie oiis Ti apas e appears This policies. effective and democracy to commitments is measured on a scale from zero to one, to zero from scale a on measured is o ere the the ere ut ofa range scale ten. of parties’ mcai mnst ae agl rsosbe o prime for responsible largely are mindsets emocratic
prime ministerial prime Based on anBased og em uainde ntapa s statistically as appear not does duration term hough is o o pit o ute polm. Nevertheless, problems. further to point not do tics 156
variable. As the multiple regression output output regression multiple the As variable.
unstandardized cratic structure. Neither prime ministers’ prime Neither structure. cratic
elite socialized during communism communism during socialized
regression coefficient, the difference in mean mean in difference the ouim executive populism, this would require would this in democratic democratic in specially specially an an se
57 1 Table 5.14 Multiple regression output
phase consolidation during ministerin office is prime category *****reference re is category ****reference ***refere is reformist category **reference analysis wasregression usedin score scor III and II ofES case in eight, appendix see governance, democratic in ministers’performance prime variable: *dependent
Crisis***** T Lostelections Resigned O Lawyer Nonactive Dissident Partyideology Exp. ministeras Exp. as MP Term duration Num. parties Populism (Constant)
ransf therfield nce category is economist ncecategory ormation***** *** **** **
*** **
****
CEU eTD Collection
- elected Coefficients Unstandardized - 8.588 ------7.119 - .092 .126 .211 .776 .156 .219 .295 .525 .217 .009 .183 .133 265 B
St. Err St. 1.282 1.091 .156 .415 .364 .447 .140 .522 .175 .282 .487 .384 .370 .098 .132
Coefficients Standardized Residual
Model Total ------Beta .100 .048 .250 .244 .019 .063 .317
.197 .208 .258 .003 .072 .143 .870
49.259 SS 10.26 38
. 99
df 31 17 14 - - - -
1.507 1.486 2.225 7.874 - - - -
1.175 1.243 1.008 5.553 .588 .303 .406 .812 .622 .018 .495 t
2.78
.604 MS
AdjustedR²=0.62 N=32 R²=0.79 Prob>F=0.002 F(19,12)=4.61 St. Err.=0.
.564 .765 .428 .256 .150 .156 .545 .231 .986 .690 .627 .040 .328 .000 .000 Sig.
77
LowerBound 95.0% ConfidenceInterval forB - - - - 6.287 ------1.063 1.467 1.036 9.824 .011 .237 .749 .084 .326 .586 .861 .654 .965 .413
e difference better differencee better UpperBound 10.889 - 1.000 1.879 1.019 4.414 .420 .472 .418 .506 .152 .331 .598 .427 .146 966
CEU eTD Collection of because primarily regression, multiple in power predictive its loses mandates “personalized” likely more and setting agenda ineffective deliver and structure democratic violate to likely more are rhetoric populist in engaged and populism surve expert from populism ministers’ prime on sets data different and original two by supported is finding This regressions. multiple and bivariate in ministers’performance prime of predictor significant governance. democratic in performance first outperform variablescontextual inreferenc and personal continue influencing innewly politics settings. established pathwithline in is This establishments patron top valued culture political Communist democracy. a in required are that norms from different values and norms by characterized was that communism prime explaining perfo in important ministers’ prime most democracies new the in be Especially performance. may ministers’ variables cultural that argue I and However, institutional individual, on varia focused largely contextual leadership political on literature performance. ministers’Previous prime on culture political and leadership political on literature the in Inchapter, this 2008).effect the Icultura of tested communist/anti politics, as observed culture effective political negative and as manifested structure is democratic which of expense the at goals party or personal elite undermines which values, democratic share not do Previous 5.5 Conclusion section mne n eortc oenne CE rm mnses ee oilzd during socialized were ministers prime CEE governance. democratic in rmance - client relationships. This undemocratic political culture carried over into post into over carried culture political undemocratic This relationships. client The analysis in this chapter clearly demonstrates “mindset matters” and cultural variables cultural and matters” “mindset demonstrates clearlychapter this in analysis The literature suggested CEE elites are fragmented and composed of different groups that that groups different of composed and fragmented are elites CEE suggested literature
of this chapter this of s n gaig f rm mnses sece. speeches. ministers’ prime of grading and ys
and manifested and bles, but ignored cultural aspects in explaining leadership performance. performance. leadership explaining in aspects cultural ignored but bles, policies. - dependent theories dependenttheories - communist cleavage, political polarization and corruption (Gallina (Gallina corruption and polarization political cleavage, communist ,
the effect ofeffect the The same holds for “personalized” prime ministers’ wh ministers’ prime “personalized” for holds same The
as populism, polarization, corruption, and personalized politics. personalized and corruption, polarization, populism, as rd ctzn’ efr b iefcie oiis Te fet of effect The policies. ineffective by welfare citizens’ erode three proxies of prime ministers’prime of proxies three Prime ministers’ populism appeared a statistically statistically a appeared populism ministers’ Prime that state that 158 l, individual and contextual andvariables identified individual l,
norms and codes are difficult changeand areto codes and norms e toprime ministers’ performance. - down hierarchy, non hierarchy, down
- ntttoa rltos Eie pursue Elites relations. institutional rm mnses hrceie by characterized ministers Prime
ouim te esnlzto of personalization the populism, mindsets ides matter mindsets - transparency policy
was tested on tested was - o dominate o transitional - making In th
and and for for e , CEU eTD Collection are that values and Norms governance. democratic of supportive not apparently is democracy performa leadership on effect find might research of type This democracies. new in leaders of experiences cultural past different delivering that outcomes ministers’by supported prime mindsets R performance. poor for ministers’ prime excuse cannot circumstances political Difficult performance. programmatic their for of perceptions irrelevant appear environments distant more and immediate ministers’ prime surrounding leadership for matter office in the period of circumstances political duration, as well as office, term leaving circumstances and parties, terms of nature cabinet of number type, cabinet as such environments immediate mini prime in variables suggested ministers’literature Previous performance. programmatic differe prime influence ministers perceptions performance. byoftheir pursued policies specific how at looking from benefit would further research this, with line in and significant appear may effect the analysis, the to added are cases left ministers, prime oriented m prime right oriented and left between performance in difference significant statistically no was there Although performance. programmatic ministers’ prime for relevance office assuming at age ministers’ prime on variables and appeared communism during experience of ministers’performance. prime for irrelevant type the or experience political person parliamentary executive and populism between multicollinearity mindsets that Because it appears that mindset matters, further re further matters, mindset that appears it Because prime on variables contextual of effect the tested I chapter, this of section last the In th In mindsets socialized in different types of regimes preceding democracy have different have democracy preceding regimes of types different in socialized mindsets e second e
efrac i dmcai governance. democratic in performance theirexplain performa nses efre lgty etr hn right than better lightly performed inisters
section improve
of this chapter this of c i dmcaie stig. omns a a eie before regime a as Communism settings. democratized in nce effectiveness
citizens’ welfare. nce indemocraticnce governance. conduciveto euainl ere r oiia oinain ae any have orientation political or degree educational , ather, circumstances that are easy to overcome, if not not if overcome, to easy are that circumstances ather, ,
Hwvr dt in data However, . This suggests that prime ministers’prime that suggests This I tested the effect of effect the tested I 159
democraticto contributegovernancecannot
Findings in this section suggest neither neither suggest section this in Findings search would benefit from looking at looking from benefit would search
- alization. alization. oriented prime ministers. If more more If ministers. prime oriented
prime ministers’prime
this section suggest factors factors suggest section this
rvos iitra or ministerial Previous political culture political ntly oriented oriented ntly demographic sters’ - CEU eTD Collection understand prime ministers’ performance. l at arguedI ministers’ and performance prime of types different three are there one, chapter in suggested As performance. electoral and ministers’programmatic prime between relationship the examine I thesis, this of chapter last the performa their of perceptions and corruption leaders’ between relationship the test should research further culture, political negative of manifests the of one as corruption negative a as manifest cultu and political mindsets politicians’ in over carry communism of characteristic
re in democratized settings. Because this study did not look into prime ministers’prime into look not did study this Because settings. democratized in re east two must be weighed against each other to properly to other each against weighed be must two east
160
nce. In the next and and next the In nce. CEU eTD Collection ofdemocraticoutcomesviolations sever without structure. effec deliver ministers prime successful programmatically Simply, welfare. improves citizens’ dimensions these in performance good because policymaking, social and economic programmatic ministers’ Prime performance assessments. experts’ on based performance programmatic decision of regulations and min prime view, procedural thesis, this of In powers. ministers’ prime interest of presentation in immediate three chapter in addressed an partially was however not is performance Procedural 2010). McConnell and by performance of types different three These electoral.and programmaticprocedural, that donotimprove c outcomes policy bad deliver and institutions democratic attack They governance. democratic for dangerous appear setting agenda over dominance and populism by characterized ministers Prime political observ negative be of may manifests culture However, measured. easily not is culture political Prime developments. ministers’ present influence (negatively) and past t the from accustomed over were carry democracy, leaders values and norms that indicates This a chapter the previous As governance. con democratic and in performance personal ministers’ cultural, prime of on effect variables the determine to tested was hypotheses of range democracyeffectivegovernance prosperity.In and citizens’ previousa thatimproves chapter, the performance. leadership for responsible factors new important in Especially most the of one be may culture political However, variables. cultural ignored largely but variables, contextual and institutional leadership on literature Previous FORBETTER PROGRAMMATIC PERFORMANCE? CHAPTERDOEASTERN6: EUROPEANS REWARD PRIME MINISTERS public policy literature policy public s rud n hpe oe tee r tre ye o pie iitr’ performance; ministers’ prime of types three are there one, chapter in argued As
eae t itgiy f hi cnut n plc otoe i te U integration, EU the in outcomes policy and conduct their of integrity to related
demonstrated cultural variables outperform personal and contextual variables. contextual and personal outperform variables cultural demonstrated y eortzd etns edr’ ides atr o ter omtet to commitment their for matter mindsets leaders’ settings democratized ly itizens’ prospects. d as ed that is interested in interested is that isters are successful if decision if successful are isters
- aig rcs. n hpe fu, asse pie ministers’ prime assessed I four, chapter In process. making ouim executiv populism, performance emphasized the importance of personal, personal, of importance the emphasized performance
161 succ e personalization, corruption or polarization. polarization. or corruption personalization, e
esses of public policies (Bovens 2001, Marsh Marsh 2001, (Bovens policies public of esses
- making respected all required rules rules required all respected making
o during regimes prior to to prior regimes during o ayi i the in nalysis are identified areidentified tive policy policy tive textual CEU eTD Collection haveNetherlandsandthe introduction contemplated only ofinstitution. theUK) this 2001 in institution the abandoned but 1996, are minister unusual prime for elections Direct coalition. a form to entitled therefore is and elections, the in votes of number highest the wins which party, the from ministers prime their elect must parli directly, elected are presidents where systems, presidential Unlike held). (if results electionthe no minister primenew a and of vote a resign as to obliged is minister expressed prime the minority), a as usually continues government (unless confidence lost, is support parliamentary If support. parliamentary parliamentary In Ministers’ electoral6.1 Prime performance frequently observed asymmetry and between electoral programmatic performance. established. was elections and terms ministers’ prime between link a how and measured is performance electoral ministers’ prime how discusses first chapter The performance. programmatic good of regardless that A re asymmetrical. are governance democratic or symmetrical is performance symmetri electoral and programmatic ministers’ in of otherwise for theopposition. they theballot cast performance with satisfied are citizens If results. election in mirrored performance programmatic ministers’ prime of (electoral) benchmark final the Political is performance moment. electoral at rewarded is governance democratic in performance of types different between relationship symmetrical expect would one one, chapter in suggested As prime ministers’ prime
rm mnses promn wl i dmcai gvrac, r rmvd rm o from removed are governance, democratic in well performing ministers, prime The main task of this chapter is to uncover whether the relationship between prime prime between relationship the whether uncover to is chapter this of task main The - relationship cal Israel is the only country that expe that country only the is Israel Further, I present results of the logit regre logit the of results present I Further, democracies performance. However, it is not clear empirically if prime ministers’ prime if empirically clear not is it However, performance. elections elections
is appointed. Appointment of the new prime minister is based either on on eitherbased is minister primenew the of Appointment appointed. is ol dmntae that demonstrate would , - elected by voters. An asymmetrical relationship relationship asymmetrical An voters. by elected are held), or existing parliamentary arithmetic (if no elections are elections no (if arithmetic existingparliamentary or areheld), p the rime minister minister rime
rimented with direct prime ministerial elections in in elections ministerial prime direct with rimented 162
-
while few other countries (Japan, Italy, the the Italy, (Japan, countries other few while
remains in office as long as he/she sustains sustains he/she as long as office in remains ht rm mnses efrig etr in better performing ministers prime that ssion analysis and discuss reasons for reasons discuss and analysis ssion cumbents they reelect them, them, reelect they cumbents amentary regimes regimes amentary ol indicate would
good ffice ffice CEU eTD Collection suitable are 2011 in success. formation electoral of his indicators coalition successful and 2010 in percentages vote on based victory one incidences, he because minister, prime as continued Dombrovskis elections. 2010 in than less 12% about votes, of 19% with third finished Dombrovskis’s when 2011 September in again held were elections Latvia, In twelve. appendix see elections, perfor electoral Dombrovskis’s and elections 2000 on based elections, performance electoral Drnovšek’s 2007 on based evaluated was performance 75 collapsed terms consecutive served ministers prime Dombrovskis of performance electoral However, th of end the following elections parliamentary on based primarily is elections) votesinthe most receive does party not minister’s failure (prime elections) electoral or availabilityelection for ofa results year. particularcountrya particularelectoral or the on based sources different used and validity data for account to resources data crosschecked ( Database Election percentages vote party minister’s prime for sources data appointed pa ministers’ prime the (b) and term another for party ministers’ prime the (a) instances: two these below, detail more in discussed As mandate. next for confirmed is minister prime the that the in votes of number highest the receive not does party minister’s prime the that possibleItalso governing is acoalition. form cannot consequently,partnerand, coalition suitable be can this for Reasons party appointedanotherterm. fornot is prime minister that but minister’selections, the invotes most the receives prime the that possible is it below, explain I As first. the to subsequent place majority the win not did party minister’s prime the if zero and - vote use I ministers, o prime of performance elections parliamentary electoral in party ministers’ prime the denote by received percentages to proxy a as elections, the minister’ prime the Because
f the prime ministers’ tenure. The dependent variable dependent The tenure. ministers’ prime the f
is binary and coded one if the prime minister’s party received the highest percentage of votes of percentage highest the received party minister’s prime the if one coded and binary is The primary reason for this was to increase, already sma already increase, to was this for reason primary The P ie iitr’ lcoa sces pie iitrs at rcie ms vts n the in votes most receives party minister’s (prime success electoral ministers’ rime
was able to form a coalition from parties that supported him as prime minister. These two electoral electoral two These minister. prime as him supported that parties from coalition a form to able was for next term are coded zero and defined as electoral failure. I consulted following consulted I failure. electoral as defined and zero coded are term next for ) 75
was evaluated based on parliamentary elections held during their terms. These These terms. their during held elections parliamentary on based evaluated was
E) IFES EED),
many; however, the most common is prime minister’s inability to find a find to inability minister’s prime is common most the however, many; s authority emanates from leadership of the party most successful in in successful most party the of leadership from emanates authority s
lcin Guide Election four
rm mnses (Sanader ministers Prime wins most wins
163 Kalvītis rty
ll number of cases in this chapter. Sanader’s electoral electoral Sanader’s chapter. this in cases of number ll
does not win most votes most win not does to denote one term (see chapter 2, table 2.1) 2.1) table 2, chapter (see term one denote to , s lcoa promne ae o 20 elections, 2006 on based performance electoral ’s
-
n te Inter the and
votes electoral performance of prime minister prime of performance electoral
n alaetr elections parliamentary in → prime minister is minister prime →
of votes, but ended in any other other any in ended but votes, of Klīi, rošk and Drnovšek Kalvītis, , - e prime ministers’ terms. ministers’ prime e alaetr Uin I Union. Parliamentary
→ prime minister is minister prime → mance based on 2010 2010 on based mance held
not appointed not
elections, but elections,
after the end end the after European ; Unity Unity
CEU eTD Collection ended usually terms ministerial Lithuaniaprime Estoniaand Republic, Czech while in less and 77 Drnovšek 76 electoral Topolánek’s assess to suitable were performance. elections 2010 policymaking in engage not do usually governments caretaker Because resignation. Topolánek’s after year one about 2010 2 May in administration caretaker Fisher’s by criteria and closestresignations parliamentary between elections below. are discussed or chapte this including of for analysis Reasons the from performance. ministers electoral prime excluding his evaluating for link missing a indicate years two over elections, w there if However term. his during elections the on based assessed was performance electoralchapter, because his thethis analysis ofin included Sanader was electoral performance. defea electoral and resignation) Sanader’s since years two than (more 2011 December in held were elections Parliamentary Kosor. by replaced was and 2009 July in Croatia in resigned Sanader example, for time of amount this about takes It half. a and year one took I appointed, ones new prime and ofresigned who performance ministers electoral reflect that elections between distinguish to point of cut a As newly resignations of performance ministers electoral reflected prime resignations appointed these following held elections and term elections post the on based performance electoral their evaluated I terms, ministers’ prime the after and individual new and end terms ministers’ prime after well occur elections parliamentary times Many terms. their of elections on based was evaluation if analysis the from excluded be would and
Out of 33 prime ministers 18 resigned and 15 acco 15 and resigned 18 ministers prime 33 of Out of performance electoral evaluated I In ministers prime CEE Many so so
based on 2000 elections and of Dzurinda based on 2006 elections 2006 on based elections ofDzurinda and 2000 on based the in Poland, Latvia and Hungary prime ministers usually accomplished their parliamentary mandates, mandates, parliamentary their accomplished usually ministers prime Hungary and Latvia Poland, in and were suitable suitable were and
Czech Republic, Czech In Latvia In 76 o icmet D i 21 eetos elce Ksrs n nt Sanader’s not and Kosor’s reflected elections 2011 in HDZ incumbent of t .
s serve as prime ministers. If parliamentary elections were held both during both held were elections parliamentary If ministers. prime as serve s
h decisio the ,
Šķēle that elapsed that Ti i u is This .
served as an independent prime minister until minister prime independent an as served following his resignation in March 2009, Topolánek 2009, March in resignation his following to reflect electoral performan electoral reflect to n Gyurcsány - making of of making resigned since his resignation and parliamentary elections would would elections parliamentary and resignation his since nless early elections were held immediately after after immediately held were elections early nless
based on 2010 elections, of Klaus based on 1998 elections, of elections, 1998 on based Klaus of elections, 2010 on based 77 mplished their full parliamentary terms. In Croatia, Slovakia, Slovakia, Croatia, In terms. parliamentary full their mplished
164 prior to accomplishing their accomplishing to prior new prime minister minister prime new 009. Parliamentary elections were held in May May in held were elections Parliamentary 009.
ce of prime ministers who resigned. who ministers prime of ce , ae o te one the on based r, , see appendix twelve appendix see , to
as resignations. tr tkn effect. taking start parliamentary terms terms parliamentary
July 1997 July held after held
- er n half and year
was replaced replaced was
ere no such such no ere
when he he when the end the For For -
CEU eTD Collection this of analysis the in included not also was Parts which of evaluate result a to as performance, suitable electoral more are 2007 in held Elections elections. years two Nearly chapter. this since elapsed of analysis the in included not was Vähi elections, 1999 and elections. parliamentary 1999 March of indicator in the analysis ofthischapter. an is elections 2006 in socialists Hungarian than rather Gyurcsány’s of victory a half, a and year one 2004 Hungary, Špidla were 2000 months, more elections anindicator thansix wereas performance. of taken hiselectoral minister. prime as returned Bajuk to post ( performance. electoral Vagnorius’s of indicator Becau months. five for office in were administrations caretaker two elections, 2000 and resignation his Inbetween half. ayear and one than less little a only was October2000 in electionparliamentary performance elections parliamentary and politics coalition electoral success. of his intricacies of victory the electoral of the however because bargaining, minister, prime new as appointed not new a founded Šķēle next resignedand the May 1992 May
. in office until 2006 parli 2006 until office in se caretaker prime ministers do not engage in policymaking, 2000 elections were suitable were elections 2000 policymaking, in engage not do ministers prime caretaker se Because b Because ’s resignation and In Estonia, In In Lithuania,In
the eges resigned Medgyessy - Nov .
Bjk a i ofc fr ee mnh utl the until months seven for office in was Bajuk . Czech Republic, Czech at resign Parts h tm elap time The ember y
the time of the 2006 elections, Gyurcsány was Gyurcsány elections, 2006 the of time the Vähi resigned in March 1997 and was was and 1997 March in resigned Vähi only nine months elapsedbetween nine months only
parliamentary elections People’s party People’s
2002 Medgyessy the n oebr 1996 November in ed
Because Drnovšek’s twelve Drnovšek’s Because
) 2006
was shortly broken in May 2000 when 2000 May in broken shortly was n pi 2005 April in amentary elections amentary
e bten anru’ rsgain n a 19 ad a and 1999 May in resignation Vagnorius’s between sed after in
elections, he was not included in the analysis of this chapter. this of analysis included not elections, inthe was he
uut 2004 August ’s electoral p electoral ’s
Špidla (TP) which received most votes in the elections. Šķēle was Šķēle elections. the in votes most received which (TP) Because
resigned in July 2004 July in resigned wih r tkn s n niao o hs electoral his of indicator an as taken are which , n ws elcd by replaced was and w
nearly two nearly 165 ere held in October 1998. Prior tothese 1998. inOctober ere held erformance, who was consequently not included included consequentlynot was who erformance, In Slovenia, In . Because more than two years two than more Because . n ws elcd y G by replaced was and
el founded newly - Šleževičius year mandate was broken for only a little little a only forbroken yearwas mandate years elapsed years replaced by Siimann who Siimann by replaced
Drnovšek 2000
already in office for more than than more for office in already
the two other prime ministers ministers prime other two the ’s r Ansip party is an indicator of his his of indicator an is party Ansip’s rather than Parts’s Parts’s than rather Ansip’s he he
esignation lcin we Drnovšek when elections ’s since Vähi ’s resi ’s Vähi since resigned yurcsány in September September in yurcsány in prime ministerial term term ministerial prime 07 parliamentary 2007 elapsed
in February
and passed the the passed and served until served
elections, elections, between gnation an
In d
CEU eTD Collection Fide Socialists Horn’s elections, parliamentary 1998 Hungary’s post than partners. coalition finding because minister, prime as continued Dzurinda however, elections, parliamentary 2002 in contrast, In victory electoral minister. prime overwhelming became Dzurinda coalition Slovakia prime skilful how relevant less is it areministers coalitions than howthey informing performed voting, inoffice. retrospective for because failure, electoral of indicator an is elections the in votes most win not did party whose leader party a of appointment leaders’ becaus success, electoral ministers’ performance. than rather bargaining, party and formation coalition minister. prime new becomes minister Prime l a but Prime minister possible. resultsthan electoralare could be not assessed office in were ministers prime different years two over Because 2008. chapter. s z eader of the winning party does not necessarily become the new prime minister. minister. prime new the become necessarily not does party winning the of eader , n Slovakia In rather politics coalition from resulting scenarios unusual two mentioned, previously As however
In Lithuania, In
performance HD) o mjrt o vts n coe i with tie close a in votes of majority won (HZDS) - Union Christian and lcoa pltc, zrnas ponmn i a idctr f lcoa failure. electoral of indicator an is appointment Dzurinda’s politics, electoral
Prime minister’s party receiving most votes in the elections is an indicator of prime ofindicator an is elections in the votes most receivingparty minister’s Prime ly won, he was unsuccessful in finding coalition partners and did not become a become not did and partners coalition finding in unsuccessful was he won, ly ’s
Orbán become the new prime minister after forming a coalition with coalition a forming after minister prime new the become Orbán because success, party minister’s prime of ministers’ prime of indicators are scenarios electoral Both party may not receive most votes in the elections, but the leader of that party party that of leader the but elections, the in votes most receive not may party
the s 98 alaetr elections, parliamentary 1998 ’s
and hethe analysis wasand ofthischapter. included not in Brazauskas ahr hn hi ngtain kls o om oltos Pie ministerial Prime coalitions. form to skills negotiation their than rather new
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rm minister. Prime
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fe hs einto ad 08 elections 2008 and resignation his after in the meanwhile the in ral victory of prime ministers’ party is more important more is party ministers’ prime of victory ral is more important than important more is
in June 2006 and 2006 June in iial, n 00 lcin, lhuh Fico’s although elections, 2010 in Similarly, Dzurinda 166 ’s ’s
party may receive most votes in the elections, votesinthe most party receive may
Mečiar voters’ evaluations of prime ministers’ past past ministers’ prime of evaluations voters’
’s Mečiar’s Mečiar’s SKDU finished after finished SKDU , Brazauskas’s electoral performance performance electoral Brazauskas’s ,
was unable to form a coalition and coalition a form to unable was eir a aan nucsfl in unsuccessful again was Mečiar
the elections were held in held were elections the f nse first inished Dzurinda’s post oeet o a Democratic a for Movement -
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td o post to ated , ahead of of ahead , lvk Democratic Slovak
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CEU eTD Collection wasnot. other the and wassuccessful electorally one werethat included two other outthe of and chapter 78 performance successful economi in scores better with ministers prime Lithuania, succes electorally once only countries. other in higherthan is Slovakia Latviaandin ministers prime successful electorally of suggest,frequency e the in votes most win not did parties their because successfully, electorally were electorally not eleven were 17 while chapter, elections, the in this votes most of won parties their analysis because successful, the in included ministers prime 28 of Out Source Table 6.1 Prime m presentedparties’ basedontheir electoral performance in ministers prime unsuccessful electorally and successful electorally of number for chapter this of analysis the in included were (N=28) only thesis, this in analyzed ministers prime (N=33) of total a of Out 6.2. The victory an is Socialists indicator ofelectoral of Horn’s success. Forum Democratic Total Slovenia Slovakia Poland Lithuania Latvia Hungary Estonia Republic Czech Croatia Country
In Estonia, no conclusions are possible because two prime ministers were not included in the analysis of this this of analysis the in included not were ministers prime two because possible are conclusions no Estonia, In
:
Electoral data see appendixsee twelve data Electoral
ae o te supin o rtopcie oig literature voting retrospective of assumptions the on Based
Relationship betweenRelationship andelectoral primeministers’ performance programmatic
prime areministers prime alwayselectorally unsuccessful. (H is clear to clear is
1 ) .
inisters’ electoral performance h c The In
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all countries except Lithuania and Estonia and Lithuania except countries all
voters aiy f respons of larity 11 1 2 1 0 3 1 1 1 1
and
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are more likely to award leaders for good performance and and performance good for leaders award to likely more are Electoral discussed discussed blt tei sae ta we responsibility when that states thesis ibility 167 17 c performance are more likely to be be to likely more are performance c
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n h peiu section previous the in (FKgP) s .
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., total a 6.1, Total electorally electorally
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E ruling coalition explain coalition ruling ooi performan conomic lcoa cacs o success for chances electoral o et 1 n H3, and H1 test To them with better scores in scores better with chances for for for followed by performance in followedperformance by not always always s eedn vral a idx of index an variable dependent as e a etrd is it lgsi rgeso, s h lklet rdco o eetrl success, electoral of predictor likeliest the as regression, logistic into first entered was ce t
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oe a oe f rm mnse’ party minister’s prime if one as coded s a s uih hm o bd performance bad for them punish
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hc party which significant. This indicates that that indicates This significant. ae on Based
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. s ugse b rtopcie oig economic voting, retrospective by suggested As Lewis rvos findings previous 168
s epnil fr oiy ucms hn several when outcomes policy for responsible is 79
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as independent variables. I also performed performed also I variables. independent as
app - punishment thesis. What is possibly more more possibly is What thesis. punishment ead rm mnses o good for ministers prime reward – Beck , ae saitcly significant statistically eared
leading ca leading nomic voting. In other words, other In voting. nomic eortc oenne Hwvr n However, governance. democratic
vious findings are mixed in reference in mixed are findings vious (1988) (1988) I adto, oes o o reward not do voters addition, In . oe ol epc that expect would one , prime ministers’ programmatic programmatic ministers’ prime o bnr otoe variable outcome binary for , namely the number of parties of number the namely , binets with fewer parties have parties fewer with binets using individual level data in in data level individual using received most votes in the the in votes most received
n model and
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alone was alone
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statistically significant. This significant. statistically ministers
’ in democratic governance to examine if there are any major major any are there if examine to governance democratic in lcoa chances electoral B oth the number of parties and parties of number the oth
169 indicates that fewer numbers of cabinet parties do parties cabinet of numbers fewer that indicates nr ht rm ministers prime that nor , rac. ernance.
According to the economic voting voting economic the to According . rfrne o programmatic to reference n the interaction effect, interaction the It is possible that it is clearer is it that possible is It an independent variable and variable independent an ih od economic good with I also performed performed also I al 62 s a is 6.2 Table nor .
the the CEU eTD Collection Table 6.2
Electoral Failure Electoral Success
** *S Source ec Dzurinda Mikuláš Račan Ivica (LIT) Kubilius Andrius (PL) JerzyBuzek (LT) Kubilius Andrius Račan Ivica Ansip Andrus Drnovšek Janez (LAT) Dombrovskis Valdis Drnovšek Janez (LAT) Dombrovskis Valdis
ee See
t The relationship between programmatic and electoral p categorization of categorization categorization of of categorization
: ora ES II and III and electoral data, see appendices five, six, seven, eight and twelve twelve eight and seven, six, five, appendices see data, IIIand and electoral II ES
l Successful Successful Successful Successful
(CR) (CR)
(ET)
Fa (SL) (SL)
(SK)
i Total: 3 Total: 3 Total: 2 Total: Total: 3 Total: prime ministers’ prime l
prime ministers’ prime
ure
Jerzy Buzek (PL) JerzyBuzek (LIT) Vagnorius Gediminas Gyurcsány Ferenc Nečas Petr Dzurinda Mikuláš (PL) LeszekMiller (LT) Vagnorius Gediminas (ET) Laar Mart Mirek (CR) Kosor Jadranka (SL) Pahor Borut Šķēle Andris Zeman Miloš (PL) Tusk Donald (SK) Fico Robert (HU) Horn Gyula (HU) Horn Gyula Robert (PL) Tusk Donald (ET) Ansip Andrus Zeman Miloš Mirek Mirek Orbán Viktor (PL) LeszekMiller (ET) Laar Mart Democratic Governance Democratic Democratic Governance (aggregate) Governance Democratic Topolánek Topolánek
Fico (SK) Fico democratic governance in chapter four, table 4.10 four, table in chapter governance democratic Economic Performance Economic e conomic performance in chapter four, table 4.5 four, table chapter in performance conomic
Economic Performance Economic (CZ)
Average Average Average Average
(LAT) (CZ) (CZ) (HU)
170
(CZ) (CZ)
(SK) (HU)
Total: 5 Total: Total: 5 Total: Total: 6 Total: 9 Total:
*(aggregate) **
Vladimír Mečiar Vladimír AigarsKalvītis (CR) Sanader Ivo Mečiar Vladimír AigarsKalvītis Šķēle Andris (CR) Sanader Ivo Petr Nečas Petr Gyurcsány Ferenc (CR) Kosor Jadranka VáclavKlaus (LT) Šleževičius Adolfas Bērziņš Andris (SL) Pahor Borut Janša Janez Bērziņš Andris Victor Janša Janez Šleževičius Adolfas VáclavKlaus erformance
Orbán
(CZ)
(SL) (SL) Unsuccessful Unsuccessful Unsuccessful Unsuccessful
(LAT) (HU) (CZ) (CZ)
(LAT) (LAT) (LAT) (LAT)
(SK) (SK)
(HU)
(LIT)
Total: 3 Total: 4 Total: Total: 8 Total: 5 Total:
CEU eTD Collection system party relevant While less become they transition, in earlier 2011). (Marinova information may instability electoral and fragmentation of clarity and availability bringing names, party changing as such leade unpopular tools various use can They success. economic and forcredit policy governance claim or record poor a from themselves distance strong incentives to straightforward “interrupt” may ministers prime This be. would government where logic voting retrospective future alternative an what retrospective (Lewis voting of logic the contradicts which considerations, ideological and religious class, pure a on parties perfo economic for responsible areactors political eliteobscurewhich clarify political andor whereconstellations party contexts cross specific from range can factors election and/or countries other many in effects such of lack a and periods some in and countries some in voting economic strong explain can thinking of line This di economic failed performance who at elections. in and governance democratic in successful ministers prime three explain not does it Similarly, were who performance economic in unsuccessful ministers prime and three governance democratic in unsuccessful ministers prime four explain not does theory The performance. electoral and programmatic ministers’ prime between relationship asymmetrical in unsuccessful cases many cover ministers to able not is theory the However, prime performance. economic eight and governance democratic in unsuccessful ministers economicperformance.Simil successfulin ministers prime three and governance democratic in successful ministers prime two of success electoral explains theory voting Retrospective cases. of handful a only explain can theory voting reward the 6.2 table in indicated As fferences across elections that moderate the strength of retrospective voting (Anderson 2007). 2007). (Anderson voting retrospective of strength the moderate that elections across fferences Party systems with large number of effective electoral p electoral effective of number large with systems Party contextual by literature the in explained primarily is voting economic in Asymmetry
rs down, or restructuring party organizations (e.g. party splits) to manipulate the the manipulate to splits) party (e.g. organizations party restructuring or down, rs based on on based past record of record past - Beck 1988). rmance. One must also not forget that voters sometimes select select sometimes voters that forget not also must One rmance. voters would form form would voters ae been have - - uihet hss s o symmetr not is thesis punishment national institutional differences to immediate electoral electoral immediate to differences institutional national
governance and competence. Political elites also have have also elites Political competence. and governance arly, the theory explains electoral failure of five prime prime fivefailure ofelectoral arly,theory the explains 171
because of gradual stabilization in most in stabilization gradual of because motn fcos lrig ersetv v retrospective blurring factors important
expectations about the future performance of performance future the about expectations arties make it less clear to voters voters to clear less it make arties s (Paldam 1991). Contextual 1991). (Paldam s
successful at elections. elections. at successful cl n retrospective and ical , which points which , Eastern
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largely explain Tusk’ victory in 2007 elections and his satisfactory performance by by performance satisfactory his and elections 2007 in victory Tusk’ explain largely explain s
and evaluations. voters’ voters may properly evaluate prime ministers’ past performance, but because of a a of because but performance, past ministers’ prime evaluate properly may voters ing (Sitter 2002, (Sitter , in Estonia, rank high on programmatic performance, which is matched to matched is which performance, programmatic on high rank Estonia, in ,
i re him smercl eainhp ewe pie ministers’ prime between relationship asymmetrical sell his harsh short harsh his sell - lcin ht ae er Ltuna Kblu i te eod top second the is Kubilius Lithuanian year. same that election
Enyedi 2006). In Eastern Europe, there are other explicit and explicit other are there Europe, Eastern In 2006). Enyedi
proper perceptions about prime ministers’ past record in record past ministers’ prime about perceptions proper
(proper) cin. h stain a cag i upcoming in change may situation The ections. 172 - term structural adjustment policies required for for required policies adjustment structural term Eas n Adeo 2006 Andreson and (Evans
voters’ perceptions may explain an ease with ease an explain may perceptions voters’ eosrt te motne f contex of importance the demonstrate uania. His government was successful was government His uania. f h efc o rtopcie voting. retrospective of effect the of , Anderson 2000, 2000, Anderson , programmatic Law Law tual n CEU eTD Collection i Nečas’s results. electoral for importance goals. their achieve to powerful them makes which assets, electoral parties’ are they when to contrast p remove parties that conformation a for way the clear open are examples empirical two These to 2015. in due elections resignation the in party the lead his to successor prompted which 2013, of as scandal financing party stagna become rates growth initial However, economy. the d elections zone euro it His earned performance governance. his that for experts Estonia by positively in assessed is navigation and 2011 crisis in membership successful for credited is He term. upcoming late 2014( due elections in good supermarket Riga tragic the and crisis financial parliamentary during unstable service his His amidst people. support 54 killed and collapsed roofs supermarket Riga’s of one centre is 2013 October a when in resignation recent elections His socialists. of victory 2011 the despite leadership afterhis under formed coalition appointment ministerial prime him earned skills ear and bankruptcy imminent from Latvia not did party, Russian pro and opposition socialist the supported elections 2011 in who electorate, the that suggests year heldone elections only vote won in2010 ofthe compared to31% However, Dombrovskis’s former Estonia, and Latvia In incumbency. their c challenge to alternative viable a of lack a and performance that of recognition voters’ performance, good of combination a is performance success electoral their ommunist parties did not reform into into reform not did parties ommunist political
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related to a non a to related Reform party Reform es fully . What may explain symmetry between their electoral and programmatic and electoral their between symmetry explain may What . Unity welcome nvolvement in sex in nvolvement dropped to the third placevote in with 19%ofdropped the to the third was re was - political event for which he took political responsibility when when responsibility political took he which for event political rime ministers as soon as they become electoral liability, in in liability, electoral become they as soon as ministers rime BBC News Dombrovskis’s - elected twice during his incumbency, in 2007 and 2011 and 2007 in incumbency, his during twice elected oefl oils opposition socialist powerful to allow allow to ned it euro zone membership in 2014. His negotiation His 2014. in membership zone euro it ned
he implemented causing an immediate contraction of of contraction immediate an causing implemented he 173
2013 -
power scandal power his successor his
). structural adjustment structural
nt and his party was embroiled in a a in embroiled was party his and nt a party leadership in the wake of of wake the in leadership party a
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with policy alternatives. The cumulative result of result cumulative The alternatives. policy he fifth place with only 6% of the vote vote the of 6% only with place fifth he the vision of vision the etrs upre tasrps rm b from transcripts purported features . Although the media was clearly was media the Although .
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for the privatization of thefor privatization vote n dfa o Hnain oilss s iaiiy f the of “inability as Socialists Hungarian of defeat ing . won in 2010 elections and 18% and elections 2010 in won T he wiretap transcripts wiretap he
state state 175 ein eortc at’ (D) 08 electoral 2008 (SDS) Party’s Democratic venian enterprises, especially in energy and transport. and energy in especially enterprises,
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at other times contextual factors account for asymmetry between prime ministers who ministers prime between asymmetry for account factors contextual times other at
ive political culture that once in the government systematically attacks attacks systematicallygovernmentthe in once thatculture political ive rime ministers performing poorly in democratic governance, while while governance, democratic in poorly performing ministers rime ed
the effect of economic performance on electoral chances of of chances electoral on performance economic of effect the rm mnses pormai sces s eadd y re by rewarded is success programmatic ministers’ prime y performance. and between electoral programmatic 176 nt typesnt issymmetrical. ofperformance
ect of other voting issues such as the as such issues voting other of ect - sters who are kept in office office in kept are who sters uihet hss is thesis punishment welfare in the EU the in welfare
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- rgamtc n eetrl efrac sget the suggests performance electoral and programmatic uihet hss a b mr aprn cmae to compared apparent more be may thesis punishment Visegrád Visegrád 177 atr European Eastern
countries, prime ministers’ were invariably invariably were ministers’ prime countries,
n either were even blamed for following the the following for blamed even were have
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norms supportive of democracy. In recently democratized settings, however, elite elite however, settings, democratized recently In democracy. of supportive norms cision e as led - making. Because ministers’making. performance prime type, was be can in it different
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only possible when a large number of “good” and “bad” leaders are assessed assessed are leaders “bad” and “good” of number large a when possible only f edr sol as ke i mn ta te ms hv significant have must they that mind in keep also should leaders of - making, especially if policy outcomes are set as criteria for for criteria as set are outcomes policy if especially making, method ro kolde bu ter onre’ oiis n the and politics countries’ their about knowledge erior 181 because of their advantages over case studies and and studies case over advantages their of because ch are Latin America, Eastern Europe and post and Europe Eastern America, Latin are ch - oriented to perf to oriented
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haracteristic to collective cabinets in parliamentary democracies. As demonstrated in this this in demonstrated As democracies. parliamentary in cabinets collective to haracteristic In t demonstrates data expert presidents, to reference In - making. Contrary to expectations, institutional structure and term duration cannot fully cannot duration term and structure institutional expectations, to Contrary making. chapter . As expert data suggests, CEE prime ministers are generally average politicians politicians average generally are ministers prime CEE suggests, data expert As . - making. This cross This making. four I , presented presented ta CE rm mnses ae mdrt t srn aiiy to ability strong to moderate a have ministers prime CEE that s ng the balance of power closer to the center, thereby allowing thereby center, the to closer power of balance the ng - making. This is an important research step that clarifies the the clarifies that step research important an is This making. n miia mpig of mapping empirical an - country estimate of prime ministers’ powers is supported is powers ministers’ prime of estimate country ile strong prime ministers do not not do ministers prime strong ile - aig cos n em o ifunig decision influencing of terms in actors making 182
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h leadership performance under democracy. This would confirm if communism communism if confirm would This democracy. under performance leadership h , especially in recently democratized settings. settings. democratized recently in especially , The literature on political leadership has hitherto onlyspe hitherto has leadership political on literature The hat determines prime ministers’ performance once in office. Future research Future office. in once performanceministers’ prime determines hat the peculiarity of of peculiarity ,
and even old democracies, or whether the findings the whether or democracies, old even and erroneous conclusions about the determinants of leadership leadership of determinants the about conclusions erroneous ical culture thesis does not hold across a large number of number large a across hold not does thesis culture ical the Eastern European European Eastern the 186 have rarely qualitative; mostly presently is lism
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A more ambitious solution lies within political partie political within lies solution ambitious more A level, practical a On thesis This work with. In this respect, this In with. work points to the importance of contextual factors contextual of importance the to points Democracy promoters and international donors for long argued funds and expertise and funds argued long for donors international and promoters Democracy However, rsonal changes at the top the at changes rsonal the literature voting economic to contributes also u i i still is it but development of civil society and grass roots, or overseeing or roots, grass and society civil of development
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Democracies: 20 in Government “Party 1998. Budge. Ian and Keman, Hans Jaap, Woldendorp, L., SharonL. Wolchik, Jane and Curry. 2010. K.,2003.PRs Williams, First Decade Europe. inEastern Wiener, Antje, Diez. and Thomas Latin of E.M.1985. White, Study the in Populism Concept: Contested a “Clarifying 2001. Kurt. Weyland, Polit Ministers, “Prime 1991. Patrick. Weller, Pau Webb, Paul Webb, 1994. Paul. Warwick, The James, Walter, Crisis: in Performance “Leadership 1988. Suedfeld. Peter and D., Michael Wallace, at, sly . Sot . iined Srh rni Sih Jsu D Mle, . Keith W. Miller, D. Joshua Smith, Francis Sarah Lilienfeld, O. Scott L., Ashley Watts, Jacek.Wasilewski, 2001. d Upda An Communism Democracy to University Press. American Politics.” Journal ofPublicAustralian Administration Democratic the in Government Party and World.” Leadership Party Evaluating Leadership? (eds.), Holliday Ian and Advanced DemocraciesIndustrial Farrell, David Webb, Paul in Societies’, 89. Presidents.” US Among Leadership Unsuccessful Double “The and Rubenzer, J. Steven Waldman, D. Irwin Campbell, Transformative Pathsin andEasternEurope Central Univ Limited.University Press Wales New of South Longevity oi:10.1111/1475
, hms oute ad oi Kldy 21. Te rsdnilzto o Party of Presidentialization “The 2012. Kolodny. Robin and Poguntke, Thomas l, . ersity 2002. ‘Conclusion: Political Parties and Democratic Control in Advanced Industrial Advanced in Control Democratic and Parties Political ‘Conclusion: 2002. and Paul Strangio. 2007. Strangio. Paul and Comparative Leadership Political e (1990 te - Complexity Link.” Complexity Press. Press. Teaching and Assessing WritingTeaching andAssessing - de Sod f rnis Nriss Ipiain fr ucsfl and Successful for Implications Narcissism Grandiose of Sword Edged
- oenet uvvl n alaetr Democracies Parliamentary in Survival Government 6765.00378. – “Three of Elites theCentral 1995).” 1995).” Comparative Politics Comparative 2 2009: European Integration Theory . Rowman & Littlefield& Publishers. . Rowman uoen ora o Pltcl Research Political of Journal European International Studies Quarterly
No, Prime Minister: Reclaiming Politics from Leaders from Politics Reclaiming Minister: Prime No, . Oxford: Oxford University Oxford Press,Oxford: 438 Central an Central 213 , 1 , 77
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Executive.” Core Polish the of Transformation The Check: in Core “A 2001. Radoslaw. Zubek, Zimmermann,Hubert, Andreas and 2012. Dür. 2001. Pravda. Alex and Jan, Zielonka, 2009. Dansereau. Fred and J., Francis Yammarino, Hans J., Woldendorp, Jaap Keman,Budge.Ian 2000. and Journal ofEuropeanPublic Policy Palgrave Macmillan. International Behavior Leadership and Democracies (1945Democracies
and Transnational Factors
- . Emerald Group Publishing. 1998) . Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: Volume 2: 2: Volume Europe: Eastern in Consolidation Democratic Springer.
8 (6): 911 214 Key ControversiesKey inEuropean Integration . Vol. 2. Oxford University. Vol.2.Oxford Press.
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CEU eTD Collection I (ES POWERS MINISTERS’ PRIME GOVERNANCE INDEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE MINISTERS’ PRIME 1:SurveyAppendix Questionnaire Appendice
9. 8. 7. 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1.
o wud o rt ec Pie iitr ae o ter oe and role their on based making process minister Prime each rate you would How confidence call and bills veto deliberation, for atthe finalmotions stages ofpolicy deliberation. policies propose to ability ministers’ have does “LOTS”) “SOME”, LITTLE”, (“VERY control much how country, your In favorablemost decision for forum governm to have much how country, your In electo good have parties their when use prospectsand control coalition parties. to the of behavior parliamentary can ministers prime motions confidence Prime does “LOTS”) “SOME”, LITTLE”, to have country your (“VERY in minister freedom political much how general, In to have country your in minister remove individual ministers Prime does “LOTS”) “SOME”, LITTLE”, (“VERY Prime does On “LOTS”) “SOME”, LITTLE”, (“VERY your in minister countryhave to freedom much CONFLICTUAL”, how general, In MOSTLY BUT COOPERATIVE, TIMES “MOSTLY CONSENSUAL” “AT COOPERATIVE”, (“ country theevaluate wouldyou how Overall, (institutionally andin practice); “PRIME MINISTER” OR “PRESIDENT”? is who country, your In cabinet); “YES”, “NO”? political Is e h idvda mmes f aie ae eie, o mc patcl freedom practical much how decided, are cabinet of members individual the ce vr h aed of agenda the over s ent)?
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January 2012 2012 January
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ral rfr t pie iitr’ blt to ability ministers’ prime to refers broadly ? 215
P – rimnay gna setting agenda arliamentary
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ral ral r CEU eTD Collection CHARACTERISTICS POPULIST MINISTERS’ PRIME POLITICS OF PERSONALIZATION II (ES GOVERNANCE DEMOCRATIC EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE EFFECTIVE 15. 14. 13. 12. 11. 10.
best best describe each Prime fiefdoms”) personal as parties their “Treat law”, of rule the for “Disrespect failures”, “Economic Choose which even system if they donot formally of strong dispose politicalpolitical power. a in setting agenda dominate leaders political which in situation a as defined is - the Assess relationship between th about of area the in performance” “GOOD is 10 1 on minister Prime each of performance Assess th between relationship citizens’ economic prosperity. the and inflation) unemployment, budgeting, banking, t of assessment, area the your in making performance” “GOOD is 10 and performance” 1 on “BAD mandates their during minister Prime each of performance Assess brough move “any about think assessment, your making “ is 1 a Please (un)favorableelectoral laws influenced they how and assessment your making When democracy. of institution to relation in ministers prime by conduct of integrity democratic” to “fully refers 10 and undemocratic” “fully is 1 where scale assess Please
10 scale where 10 where scale 10 very bad” very any t y t ssess performance of each Prime minister minister Prime each of performance ssess our country our closer social measure by measure social level of "personalization" of politicsof"personalization" of level characteristics populism of eortc conduct democratic
and 10 is “ is 10 and
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minister. Select as many youthink as applicable. measure and citizens’ so democratic institutions such as the rule of law, media freedoms, freedoms, media law, of rule the as such institutions democratic ik about hink
each each (ES II II (ES very good” very .
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–
December 2012 2012 December
December 2012 2012 December (or away further prime minister (especially pension and health reforms) and the and reforms) health and pension (especiallyminister prime think about think –
December 2012 2012 December of each prime minister minister prime each of any ; (“Defender; national of identity”, “Personal charisma”,
216 performance in the area of EU integration. When When integration. EU of area the in performance social policy social cnmc esr by measure economic
– during the mandate of each Primemi each of mandate the during (ES I any p any –
June 2013) June cial welfare.
– June 2013) June
from 10 scale where 1 is “B is 1 where scale 10 – I
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CEU eTD Collection April 2014) 2:PrimeAppendix primeministers and and ministerial CEE termsBaltic States in (1990 Estonia Czech Republic Croatia Ivica Račan Ivica Mateša Zlatko NikicaValentić Šarinić Hrvoje minister Prime JuhanParts Siim Laar Mart Siimann Mart Vähi Tiit Vähi Tiit Tarand Andres Laar Mart Vähi ( Tiit Savisaar ( Edgar minister Prime Sobotka Bohuslav Jiří Nečas Petr Fischer Jan Topolánek Mirek Paroubek Jiří Gross Stanislav Špidla Vladimír Zeman Miloš Tošovský Josef VáclavKlaus minister Prime ZoranMilanović Kosor Jadranka Sanader Ivo Rusnok Kallas 7
10 (not including(not caretakers) 10
caretaker)
(caretaker) caretaker)
217
29 January 2014 January 29 2014 17 Apr 17 16 Aug 2006 Aug 2006 16 12 Aug 1992 Aug 1992 12 08 Nov 1994 1994 Nov 08 06 Nov 1995 1995 Nov 06 17 Mar 1997 Mar 17 Oct 21 03 Apr 1993 Apr1993 03 10 Apr2003 10 Apr2005 25 20 Aug 1991 20 01 Jan 1993 1993 Jan 01 25 07 Nov 1995 1995 Nov 07 28 Jan 2002 Jan 28 08 May 2009 May 08 2009 27 Jan 2000 2000 Jan 27 28 Jun 2010 Jun 2010 28 06 Jul 2009 2009 Jul 06 2003 Dec 23 29 Jan 1992 Jan 29 1997 Dec 17 19 Jul 2004 2004 Jul 19 10 Jul 2013 2013 Jul 10 23 Dec 2011 2011 Dec 23 12 Jul 2002 2002 Jul 12 07 Jul 1998 1998 Jul 07 Mar 1999 Mar
Term duration Term duration Term Term duration Term 1 199 995 995 2
- 11
- - – – - – -
7 - – – ------
–
– -
- 06 - -
1997 Dec 17
- 23 Dec Dec 2011 23
25 Apr2005 25
23 Dec 2003 Dec 23 - 12 2002 Jul 12 07 Nov 1995 Nov 07 16 Aug 16 2006
08 Nov 1994 08 1992 Oct 21 0 03 Apr 1993 Apr 03 17 Apr 17
10 Apr102003 25 Mar Mar 1999 25 2014 Jan 29 2004 Jul 19 17 Mar 1997 17
12 Apr2005 12 Jun17 2013 28 Jun 2010 28 2000 Jan 27 06 Jul 2009 Jul 06 17 Jul 1998 Jul 17 28 29 1992 Jan 29 incumbent 8 May 8 2009 - -
Incumbent
Nov 1995 Nov Jan 2002 Jan
1 995
–
CEU eTD Collection
Latvia Hungary Prime minister Prime Rõivas Taavi Ansip Andrus Ansip Andrus Ansip Andrus Straujuma Laimdota Dombrovskis Valdis Dombrovskis Valdis Dombrovskis Valdis Godmanis Ivars AigarsKalvītis Aigars Emsis Indulis EinarsRepše Bērziņš Andris VilisKrištopans Krasts Guntars Andris Šķēle Andris Gailis Māris Birkavs Valdis Godmanis Ivars Prime minsiter Viktor Viktor Bajnai Gordon Gyurcsány Ferenc Medgyessy Péter Orbán Viktor Horn Gyula ( Boross Péter ( Boross Péter Antall József 8 8 including(not caretakers) 6 (not including(not caretakers) 6
Kalvītis Šķēle Orbán Orbán 12
caretaker) caretaker)
218
06 Apr 2011 Apr2011 06 23 May 23 1990 0 14 Apr2009 14 0 May 05 2000 May 07 1990 27 May 27 2002 07 Nov 2006 2006 Nov 07 0 20 Dec 2007 Dec 20 0 12 Mar 12 May 29 2010 15 29 Sep 2004 Sep 29 1993 Dec 12 13 Feb 1997 1997 Feb 13 Aug 1993 03 05 Ap 05 Apr2005 12 21 Dec 1995 1995 Dec 21 26 08 Jul 1998 1998 Jul 08 03 Nov 2010 Nov 03 06 April 2014 April 2014 06 21 Dec 21 25 Oct 2011 2011 Oct 25 7 Aug 7 1997 7 Nov 2002 Nov 7 2 Dec 2004 Dec 2 9 Mar 2004 Mar 9 26 Mar 2014 Mar 26 22 Jan 2014 2014 Jan 22 15 Jul 1994 Jul 15 Sep 1994 1994 Sep Nov 1998 1998 Nov Term duration r Term duration Term
2009 2007 2007 1993 1993 –
18
1 10 -
–
– – – – -
– – – - – - - - - – - - - - – - 04 March 2014 March 04 - – 4 – -
27 May 27 2002
-
-
Aug07 1997 29 May 29 2010
03 Nov 2010 Nov 03 04 Apr2011 04 Apr2007 05 1993 Dec 21 25 Oct 2011 Oct 25 07 Nov 07 21 2014 Jan 22 2009 Mar 12 2002 Nov 07 1997 Feb 13 Aug 1993 03 14 Apr142009
26 Nov 1998 Nov 26 0 0 Sep 1994 15 -
20 Dec Dec 2007 20 Apr2014 06 12 Dec 1993 Dec 12
15 Jul 1994 Jul 15 29 Sep Sep 2004 29 incumbent 8 8 Jul 15
incumbent 2 Dec 2004 Dec 2 9 Mar 2004 9 incumbent Dec 1995 Dec Jul 1999 Jul
1998
200
6
CEU eTD Collection
Poland Lithuania Adolfas Šleževičius Adolfas Lubys Bronislovas Abišala Aleksandras Vagnorius Gediminas Šimėnas Albertas Prunskienė KazimiraDanutė Prime minister Donald Tusk Donald Kaczyński Jarosław Marcinkiewicz Kazimierz Belka Marek LeszekMiller JerzyBuzek Cimoszewicz Włodzimierz Oleksy Józef Pawlak Waldemar Suchocka Hanna Pawlak Waldemar Olszewski Jan Bielecki Jan Mazowiecki Tadeusz Prime minister Algirdas Kubilius Andrius Kirkilas Gediminas ( Balčytis Zigmantas Brazauskas Algirdas Mykolas ( EugenijusGentvilas Paksas Rolandas Kubilius Andrius Degutienė( Irena Paksas Rolandas Irena Vagnorius Gediminas Stankevičius Mindaugas Laurynas Degutienė( 12 (not including caretakers)
Butkevičius
caretaker) caretaker)
caretaker)
caretaker)
219
27 Nov 1996 1996 Nov 27 02 Dec Dec 02 16 Nov 2007 2007 Nov 16 0 2001 Oct 19 15 Feb 1996 1996 Feb 15 0 27 Oct 1999 Oct 27 26 Oct 1993 Oct 26 24 Aug 1989 24 10 Mar 1993 Mar 10 Ma 11 23 0 14 Jul 14 26 Oct 2000 Oct 26 21 04 Jul 2006 Jul 04 3 Nov 1999 Nov 3 1999 Oct 27 10 0 31 1992 Jul 11 26 Feb 2003 Feb 26 0 0 14 Jul 2009 Jul 14 2001 Jul 3 12 Jan 1991 Jan 12 20 Jun 2001 Jun 2001 20 13 Jan 1991 1991 Jan 13 2 May 2 2004 9 Dec 2008 Dec 9 13 Dec 2012 2012 Dec 13 7 Feb 1996 Feb 7 7 Mar 1995 Mar 7 5 Jun 2006 1
Dec 1991 Dec Jul 1992 1992 Jul Jan 1991 1991 Jan Oct 2005 Oct Jun1992 Term duration Term duration
r 2006
1990 1992 1992
–
19 –
– –
– – –
– – –
–
– – – – - - – – – – – – - – 31 May 31 2006 - - - – – –
–
16 Nov 2007 Nov 16
02 09 - 0 0 May 04 1999 25 Oct 1993 Oct 25 0 26 Oct 2000 Oct 26 1996 Nov 27 18 Nov 2011 Nov 18
17 Jan 2012 Jan 17
15 21 Jul 1992 Jul 21 13 13 Dec 2012 Dec 13 03 2001 Jul 03 1993 Mar 10 20 Jun20 2001 31 Oct 1997 Oct 31
10 1992 Jul 10 0 3 Nov 1999 Nov 3 05 Dec 1991 5 14 10 1991 Jan 31 Oct 2005 Oct 31 12 1991 Jan 12 6 Apr2004 6 2 May 2 2004 7 Feb 1996 7Feb 3 Nov 3 1999 incumbent 6 Mar 1995 6 4 4 2006 Jul
Dec 1992 Dec Dec 2008 Dec F 1991 Jan Jun1992 Jul 2006 Jul eb 1996 eb
CEU eTD Collection
Slovenia Slovakia Vladimír Mečiar Vladimír Moravčík Jozef Mečiar Vladimír minister Prime Do Total Bratušek Alenka Janez Pahor Borut Janša Janez Rop Anton Drnovšek Janez Bajuk Andrej Bajuk Andrej Drnovšek Janez Peterle Alojz minister Prime Fico Robert Radičová Iveta Fico Robert Dzurinda Mikuláš Dzurinda Mikuláš Total nald
Janša 13
7 Tusk
6
220
03 May 2000 May 03 2000 10 Febr Febr 2012 10 May 14 1992 May 16 1990 0 11 Dec 2002 Dec 11 04 Aug 2000 Aug 2000 04 21 Nov 2008 Nov 21 17 No 17 15 Mar 1994 Mar 15 30 Octr 1998 1998 Octr 30 1994 Dec 13 Jun 1992 24 0 16 Oct 2002 2002 Oct 16 9 Nov 2004 Nov 9 18 Nov 2011 2011 Nov 18 20 Mar 2013 Mar 20 04 Jul 2006 2006 Jul 04 04 Apr 2012 Apr2012 04 8 Jul 2010 Jul 8 v Term duration Term Term duration Term
2000 2000
1 10
–
–
– 8 – - – – - - - - - – - - 5 -
-
0 - 04 Augt 04 2000 -
16 Mar Mar 1994 16
17 Nov 2000 Nov 17 May 03 2000 May 14 1992 08 2010 Jul 08 13 Dec 1994 Dec 13 0 11 Dec Dec 2002 11 21 Nov 2008 Nov 21
04 Jul 04
20 Mar Mar 2013 20 15 Oct 2002 Oct 15 1998 Oct 30 10 Feb Feb 2012 10
4Apr2012 incumbent incumbent incumbent 92004 Nov
2006
CEU eTD Collection 3:Experts’ affiliation Appendix institutional Hungary Republic Czech Slovakia Slovenia Croatia Estonia Lithuania Latvia Poland
Vytautas Magnus University Vytautas Magnus University Romeris Mykolas Sciences ofFacultySocial College, University Vidzeme ofInt Institute Latvian Sciences ofSocial FacultyLatvia, of University Relations International Sciencesand Political University Jagiellonian Science, ofPolitical Institute ofWroclow, University Science Political of Institute sciences, academyof Polish University Journalism and Science ofFacultyPolitical Poznan, University, Mickiewicz Adam of University Science Political of ofLublin, Institute University Catholic Paul John Curie Maria Science ofPolitical Institute ofWarsaw, University HAS, Institute for worldeconomics for Institute HAS, science ofpolitical Institute HAS, University Corvinus Prague University Charles university Masaryk Bohemia ofWest University Palack Brno of University Mendel St. Uni Economic in Bratislava University Comenius Bistrica University, Bel Banska Matej Gorica Nova Studies, Social Advanced of School Ljubljana Science, ofFacultySocial E Zagreb of University Science, ofFacultyPolitical Studies Policy Centre For Praxis, ofTechnology University Talinn University University Tallin VilniusUniversity Institute of Political Science and Journalism and Science InstituteofPolitical Sciences ofFacultySocial Katowice, in ofSilesia University conomic institute conomic
Cyril and Methodius Cyril and ý
University
ofTartu Science ofPolitical Institute ZielonaGora, of – Łódź
versity Sklodowska University, Faculty of Facultyof University, Sklodowska
, , Zagreb , , Faculty of International and Political Studies Political and International of Faculty ,
Institute of int of Institute
, Bratislava , ernational
in Krakow, Facultyof Krakow, in
University
affairs
ernational
, Trnava ,
221
rel
International and Political Studies, Institute of Studies,Institute Political and International ations
Political Science Political
and pol and
itical science itical
CEU eTD Collection ** scores II ES on based calculated *StDev Appendix 4:PrimeAppendix ministers’ Borut Pahor Borut JerzyBuzek Ivica Špidla Vladimír Medgyessy Péter Kubilius Andrius Drnovšek Janez minister Prime Mečiar Vladimír AigarsKalvītis Janša Janez Šķēle Andris Sanader Ivo Viktor Ansip Andrus Dzurinda Mikuláš Šleževičius Adolfas Mirek VáclavKlaus Bērziņš Andris Zeman Miloš JuhanParts Nečas Petr Vähi Tiit Vagnorius Gediminas Fico Robert Laar Mart Kosor Jadranka Algirdas Brazauskas LeszekMiller Tusk Donald Gyurcsány Ferenc Dombrovskis Valdis Horn Gyula Included in ES III after in III ES Included Račan Topolánek Orbán
*
*
mandate termination in summer 2013 summer in termination mandate 2.6 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.9 3.9 4.2 6.4 4.7 4.8 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.5 N/A 5. 5.8 5.8 6 6 6.1 6. 6.4 6.6 7 7. 7.2 7. 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.7 8.2 (mean) ES II .0 .0 .0 7 3 1 3
democraticconduct
(mean) ES III N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.6 5.5 6.2 6.1 6.4 7.3 6.5 8.7 6.6 7.1 6.4 2.5 3.9 6.6 6.2 5.6 5.8 4.5 5 6.7 5.6 6.5 .0
222
( Score Difference Score ES II and ES III ES ES IIand
+ + + +1.0 +0.1 +1.4 + + + + + N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ------0 1.2 0.3 0.9 0.4 1.3 0 0.2 0. 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 2.4 0.9 1 1.2 0. .0
.1 .0 6 8
)
StDev 1.39 1.60 1.78 1.56 1.59 1.89 2.40 2.20 1.65 1.26 1.64 1.84 1.26 1.98 1.50 1.25 1.64 0.94 2.33 0.54 1.66 1.37 2.40 1.67 1.95 1.41 1.62 1.46 2.10 1.66 2.66 2.8 1.21
0
*
CEU eTD Collection ** scores II ES on based calculated *StDev Appendix 5:PrimeAppendix ministers’ integration EU performance in Valdis Dombrovskis Valdis Algirdas Brazauskas Horn Gyula Laar Mart Kosor Jadranka Kubilius Andrius Drnovšek Janez minister Prime Mečiar Vladimír Šķēle Andris Šleževičius Adolfas AigarsKalvītis VáclavKlaus Orbán Viktor Bērziņš Andris Janša Janez Nečas Petr Mirek Vagnorius Gediminas Zeman Miloš Fico Robert Pahor Borut JerzyBuzek Juhan Vähi Tiit Račan Ivica Gyurcsány Ferenc Medgyessy Péter Tusk Donald Dzurinda Mikuláš Sanader Ivo Ansip Andrus LeszekMiller Špidla Vladimír Included in ES III after mandate termination in summer 2013 summer in termination mandate after in III ES Included Parts Topolánek
*
*
2.6 4.3 4.4 4. 4.9 5. 5.1 5.4 N/A 5.5 5.9 6 6 6.2 6. 6. 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.0 7 7.1 7. 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.6 7. 8 8.1 8.2 9 (mean) ES II .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 6 1 6 7 2 8
(mean) ES III N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.3 7.8 7 6.4 7.7 8.3 7.8 6.4 7.9 7.6 7.9 1.2 3.9 3.1 5.3 5.9 4.3 6.4 6.2 6.5 7.1 5.7 .0
223
( Score Difference Score ES II and ES III ES ES IIand
+0.8 + +1.0 + + + + N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ------0 0. 0.7 1.2 0.1 0.5 0.3 1. 0.5 1.8 0.4 1.6 0.1 1.1 0. 0.5 0.4 0.2 0. .0
6 4 5 4
)
StDev 2.37 2.08 1.94 1.71 2.17 2.84 0.98 1.42 1.65 1.74 1.57 1.57 1.78 1.72 1.98 1 0.88 2.34 1.34 2.78 2.43 2.99 2.84 2.19 2.4 1.19 1.79 2.12 1.80 2.58 1.93 0.81 1.47 .00
0
*
CEU eTD Collection ** scores II ES on based calculated *StDev 6:Performance Appendix economic in policymaking Tiit Vähi Tiit Račan Ivica Dombrovskis Valdis Drnovšek Janez Dzurinda Mikuláš Kubilius Andrius minister Prime Mečiar Vladimír AigarsKalvītis Sanader Ivo Kosor Jadranka VáclavKlaus Šleževičius Adolfas Bērziņš Andris Mirek Pahor Borut Gyurcsány Ferenc Medgyessy Péter Janša Janez Špidla Vladimír Ansip Andrus Nečas Petr JuhanParts Orbán Viktor Šķēle Andris Zeman Miloš Tusk Donald LeszekMiller Laar Mart JerzyBuzek Fico Robert Vagnorius Gediminas Horn Gyula Algirdas Included in ES III after mandate termination in summer 2013 summer in termination mandate after in III ES Included Topolánek Brazauskas
***
2.9 3 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.8 4 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.7 N/A 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.5 6.7 7.0 7.2 7.6 7.9 8.2 (mean) ES II .0 .0
(mean) ES III N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.6 4.2 5.8 6.3 5.7 4.0 4.0 6.5 7.0 4.2 5.3 7.3 2 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.9 5.3 5.3 7.9 4.9 6.5 .0
224
( Score Score ES II and ES III ES ES IIand
-
+0.5 +0.8 +0.1 +0.3 + +1.1 +0.7 +3.2 +1.5 Difference N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ------Individual primeministers’ scores 0.0 0.4 1.1 1.8 2.0 2.8 2.6 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1
)
StDev 2.39 1.93 2.02 1.99 1.76 2.20 1.71 1.94 2.09 2.06 0.81 1.49 2.22 1.51 1.38 0.63 1.63 1.87 2.11 1.83 1.80 1.61 1.80 1.62 0.83 1.96 1.82 0.89 1.66 1.63 2.4 0.89 2.35
0
*
CEU eTD Collection ** II ES on based calculated *StDev Appendix 7:PerformanceAppendix socialpolicymaking in Borut Pahor Borut Račan Ivica Vähi Tiit Algirdas Brazauskas Drnovšek Janez Kubilius Andrius minister Prime VáclavKlaus Mečiar Vladimír Mirek Šķēle Andris Sanader Ivo AigarsKalvītis Bērziņš Andris Tusk Donald Ansip Andrus JuhanParts Nečas Petr Adolfas Kosor Jadranka Dombrovskis Valdis Zeman Miloš Orbán Viktor Laar Mart LeszekMiller Janša Janez Gyurcsány Ferenc Špidla Vladimír JerzyBuzek Horn Gyula Fico Robert Medgyessy Péter Vagnorius Gediminas Dzurinda Mikuláš Included in ES III after mandate termination in summer 2013 summer in termination mandate after in III ES Included Topolánek Šleževičius
***
2.9 3.8 3.8 3.9 4 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2 N/A 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.8 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.8 7.2 (mean) ES II .0
scores
(mean) ES III N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 7.1 4.8 5.0 4.5 4.3 4.3 6.1 6.4 6.3 3 3 5 3.7 3.2 5.6 5.1 4.3 4.4 4.2 5.0 4.7 6.0 .0 .0 .0
225
( Score Difference Score ES II and ES III ES ES IIand
-
Individual Individual primeministers’ score +1.7 + +1.4 +0.9 +0.2 +0.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ------
0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.9 1.5 1.8 1.9 0.2 0.9 0. 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.1 1.2 .0
8
)
StDev 1.48 2.13 2.59 2.42 1.77 1.91 2.29 1.76 2.13 2.17 2.25 1.03 0.84 1.64 1.55 1.44 1.81 2.07 1.90 1.88 1.83 2.14 1.81 2.13 1.60 2.1 1.83 1.64 2.00 2.31 2.39 2.78 1.98
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- - - : Erosion of public confidence in politics”, V4/Revue, September 12 2013, 2013, 12 September V4/Revue, politics”, in confidence public of Erosion : - eta Europe Central 20407006 22781752 26430899 Mečiar conomic Review No. 6, August 6, 1994. No. Review conomic 19940043 - end ) - 06
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