CEPPS FINAL REPORT Project period: August 17, 2012 - January 31, 2017

USAID Associate Cooperative Agreement No. AID-520-LA-12-00001, under the Leader Cooperative Agreement No. A-00-08-00350-00

Project Names: August 17, 2012 - September 30, 2014 GUATEMALA: Support Electoral and Political Parties Reform and Strengthen the Guatemalan Congress

October 1, 2014 - January 31, 2017 GUATEMALA: Elections: More Inclusion, Less Violence Table of Contents

Glossary of Project Acronyms ...... 3 Executive Summary ...... 9 Program Overview ...... 12 Political Context ...... 15 Program Analysis ...... 26 Objective 1 ...... 26 Objective 2 ...... 32 Objective 3 ...... 33 Objective 4 ...... 36 Constraints and Challenges ...... 38 Lessons Learned ...... 42 Gender Integration ...... 46 Recommendations for Future Action ...... 49 Results ...... 50 Activities...... 66 Financial/Leverage ...... 68 Annexes ...... 70

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Glossary of Project Acronyms AC Acción Ciudadana (Citizen Action)

ACAG Alianza para un Congreso Abierto en Guatemala (Alliance for an Open Congress in Guatemala) ACECON Academia de Estudios Constitucionales (Academy for Constitutional Studies) APEVIHS Asociación Para la Prevención y Estudio del VIH/SIDA (Association for the Prevention and Study of HIV/AIDS) ALAC Centro de Asistencia Legal Anticorrupción (Anti-Corruption Legal Assistance Center) APROFAM Asociación Pro Bienestar de la Familia (Association in Support of Family Wellbeing) APTRANSSO Asociación de Personas Trans del Sur-Occidente (Association for Transgender Persons from the South-West) ARD Associates in Rural Development ARENA Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance) ASIES Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (Association of Social Research and Studies) ASMUGOM Asociación de la Mujer en el Gobierno Municipal (Municipal Government Women’s Association) BRIDGE Building Resources in Democracy Governance and Elections CALDH Centro para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (Center for the Defense of Human Rights) CAS Comisión de Auditoria Social (Civic Observation Committee) CAT Comisión de Apoyo Técnico (Technical Assistance Committee) CC Corte de Constitucionalidad (Constitutional Court) CEAE Comisión Específica de Asuntos Electorales del Congreso (Congressional Committee on Electoral Affairs ) CGCN Contraloría General de Cuentas de la Nación (General Controller’s Office) CICIG Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala) CLPC Comisión de Legislación y Puntos Constitucionales (Committee on Legislation and Constitutional Issues) CMC Crisis Management Center CNN Corazón Nueva Nación (New National Heart Party) COCODE Consejos Comunitarios de Desarrollo (Community Development Councils)

3 CODEFEM Asociación Colectiva para la Defensa de los Derechos de las Mujeres en Guatemala (Collective Association for the Defense of Women’s Rights in Guatemala) COMUDE Consejos Municipales de Desarrollo (Municipal Development Councils) CONADI Consejo Nacional para la Atención de las Personas con Discapacidad (National Council for People with Disabilities) CONAREP Convergencia Nacional por la Reforma Política (National Convergence for Political Reform) CONGCOOP Coordinación de ONG y Cooperativas (NGO Coordination and Cooperatives) CONRED Coordinadora Nacional para la Reducción de Desastres (National Coordinating Office for Disaster Reduction) COPAREM Consejo Parlamentario Regional Sobre Migraciones (Regional Parliamentary Council on Migration) COPREDEH Comisión Presidencial Coordinadora de la Política del Ejecutivo en Materia de Derechos Humanos (Presidential Commission for Coordinating Executive Policy on Human Rights) CRD Convergencia por la Revolución Democrática (Convergence for the Democratic Revolution) CREO Compromiso, Renovación y Orden (Commitment, Renewal and Order) CSJ Corte Suprema de Justicia (Supreme Court of Justice) CSO Civil Society Organization DAI Development Alternatives, Inc. DDS Defensoría de Diversidad Sexual (Defender for Sexual Diversity) DEIL Dirección de Estudios e Investigación Legislativa (Legislative Directorate for Research and Studies) DEMI La Defensoría de la Mujer Indígena (Protection of Indigenous Women) DEMOS Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios para la Democracia Social (Central American Institute of the Study of Social Democracy) DGM Dirección General de Migración (General Directorate for Migration) Digici Dirección General de Inteligencia Civil (Department of Civilian Intelligence) DOSES Asociación Desarrollo, Organización, Servicios y Estudios Socioculturales (Association for Development, Organization and Sociocultural Studies) DPI Documento Personal de Identificación (Personal Identification Document) DPO Disabled Persons Organization EG Encuentro por Guatemala (Together for Guatemala) ESWG Electoral Security Working Group

4 EU European Union FCN Frente de Convergencia Nacional (National Convergence Front) FGER Federación Guatemalteca de Escuelas Radiofónicas (Guatemalan Federation of Radio Schools) FMLN Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) FUNDESA Fundacion para el Desarrollo (Foundation for Development) GLOW Global Legislative Openness Week HIVOS Instituto Humanista de Cooperación para el Desarrollo (Humanist Institute for Cooperation) ICCPG Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala (Institute for Comparative Studies in Criminal Science) ICT Information Communications Technology IDB Inter-American Development Bank IDEA Instituto Internacional para la Democracia y la Asistencia Electoral (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) IDEI Asociación para Investigaciones, Desarrollo y Educación Integral (Association for Investigation, Development and Integral Education) IDSDH Iniciativa para la Diversidad Sexual por los Derechos Humanos (Initiative for Sexual Diversity for Human Rights) IDSO Iniciativa Diversidad Sexual de Occidente (Initiative for Sexual Diversity in the Western Highlands) IFCCPE Instituto de Formación y Capacitación Cívico-Política y Electoral (Institute for Civic, Political and Electoral Training) INCEP Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Políticos (Central American Institute for Political Studies) INFOM Instituto de Fomento Municipal (Municipal Development Institute) INTRAPAZ Instituto de Transformación de Conflictos para la Construcción de la Paz en Guatemala (Institute for Conflict Transformation for the Construction of Peace in Guatemala) IVE Intendencia de Verificación Especial (Special Inspectorate) JEM Junta Electoral Municipal (Municipal Electoral Board) JRV Junta Receptora de Votos (polling station) KAS Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Foundation LCP Ley de Comisiones de Postulación (Committee Nominations Act) LEPP Ley Electoral y de Partidos Políticos (Law on Elections and Political Parties) LGBTI Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex

5 LIDER Libertad Democrática Renovada (Renewed Democratic Freedom) LOOL Ley Orgánica del Organismo Legislativo (Organic Law on Congress) LTO Long-term observation MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MIDES Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (Ministry of Social Development) MINDEF Ministerio de la Defensa (Ministry of Defense) MINFIN Ministerio de Finanzas Públicas (Ministry of Public Finance) MNR Movimiento Nueva República (New Republic Movement) MOLOJ Asociación Política de Mujeres Mayas (Political Association for Mayan Women) MONITEC Monitoreo Tecnológico (Technological Monitoring) MOU Memorandum of Understanding MP Ministerio Publico (Attorney General's Office) MR Movimiento Reformador (Reform Movement) NALEB Organismo Indígena para la Planificación del Desarrollo (Indigenous Organization for Development Planning) NIMD Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy OAV Oficina de Atención a la Víctima (Office of Victim Assistance) OCV Out of Country Voting ODASA Organización de Diversidad Amigos Always Amigos (Diversity Organization Friends Always Friends) ODISCEA Organización de Diversidad Sexual para la Cultura, Educación y las Artes (Organization for Sexual Diversity in Culture, Education and the Arts) OGP Open Government Partnership OHCHR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights OTRANS Organización Trans Reinas de la Noche (Queens of the Night Organization) PAN Partido de Avanzada Nacional (National Advancement Party) PARLAD Consorcio para Parlamento Abierto y Democrático (Consortium for Open and Democratic Parliament) PASMO Pan American Social Marketing Organization PDH Procuraduría de los Derechos Humanos (Human Rights Ombudsman) PGN Procuraduría General de la Nación (Solicitor General’s Office) PNC Policía Nacional Civil (National Civilian Police) POA Plan Operativo Anual (Annual Operations Plan) POE Plan Operativo Estratégico (Strategic Operational Plans)

6 PP Partido Patriota (Patriotic Party) PRI Partido Republicano Institucional (Institutional Republican Party) PRONACOM Programa Nacional de la Competitividad de Guatemala (National Program for Competitiveness in Guatemala) PU Partido Unionista (Unionist Party) RENAP Registro Nacional de las Personas (National Civil Registry) REDNADS Red Nacional de la Diversidad Sexual y VIH de Guatemala (National Network for Sexual Diversity and HIV in Guatemala) REDMMUTRANS Red Multicultural de Mujeres Trans (Multicultural Trans omen’s W Network) REDTRANS Red Nacional de Personas Trans (National Network for Transgender Persons) RENOJ Red Nacional de Organizaciones de Jóvenes Mayas (National Network for Mayan Youth) RRF Rapid Response Funds SAT Superintendencia de Administración Tributaria (Superintendence of Tax Administration) SEGEPLAN Secretaría de Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia (Secretariat of Planning and Programming of the Presidency) SIAV Campaña Somos Iguales a Vos (Campaign We’re the Same as You) SIB Superintendencia de Bancos (Superintendence of Banks) SICOINGL Sistema de Contabilidad Integrada de Gobiernos Locales (Integrated System of Local Government Accounting) SICOIN Sistema Integrado de Administración Financiera (Integrated System for Financial Administration) Sida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SIT Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones (Superintendence of Telecommunications) SITREP Sistema de Transmisión de Resultados Electorales Preliminares (Preliminary Elections Results Transmission System) SNIP Sistema Nacional de Inversión Pública (National Public Investment System) SOMOS CICO Fundación Somos Ciudadanos Comprometidos (We Are Committed Citizens Foundation) TODOS Partido Todos (Party of All) TSE Tribunal Supremo Electoral (Supreme Electoral Tribunal) UCN Unión de Cambio Nacional (National Unity for Change) UDEFEGUA La Unidad de Protección a Defensoras y Defensores de Derechos

7 Humanos (Protection of Human Rights Defenders of Guatemala) UMG Universidad Mariano Gálvez (Mariano Gálvez University) UNAIDS United Nations Joint Program on HIV/AIDS UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNE Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (National Unity of Hope) UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services UN Women United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women UPAT Unidad Permanente de Asistencia Técnica (Permanent Technical Assistance Unit) UPCV Unidad Para La Prevención Comunitaria De La Violencia (Community Violence Prevention Unit ) URNG Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) USAC Universidad de San Carlos (University of San Carlos) USAID United States Agency for International Development USG United States Government VAWIE Violence Against Women in Elections VENAS Vecinos de Nebaj en Acción Social (Nebaj Neighbors in Social Action) VIVA Visión con Valores (Vision with Values) WDN Women’s Democracy Network

8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Nearly three decades after the transition to democracy and 20 years since the signing of the peace accords, Guatemala’s political system continued to face numerous challenges to consolidating its democratic institutions and responding to growing citizen security threats generated by corruption, impunity and organized crime. Addressing institutional weaknesses required reforms to the electoral and political system, including reforms to the Law on Elections and Political Parties (Ley Electoral y de Partidos Políticos, LEPP) and the Organic Law on Congress (Ley Orgánica del Organismo Legislativo, LOOL), as well as technical assistance to strengthen the capacity of Congress and electoral authorities to implement laws and administer elections. These institutional weaknesses were exacerbated by the 2015 political crisis and civic protests, further highlighting the need and citizen demand for reforms. To address these challenges, CEPPS successfully implemented the program “Elections: More Inclusion, Less Violence” between August 17, 2012 and January 31, 2017. The project institutionalized processes to mitigate the risks for political violence and illicit/illegal financing of electoral campaigns as well as to involve diverse groups of citizens in the process in meaningful ways.

The More Inclusion, Less Violence project successfully strengthened civil society organizations and media to prevent electoral violence and monitor campaign spending in targeted areas prior to, during and after 2015 elections. These activities deterred electoral violence and illicit campaign financing by increasing public scrutiny through inclusive civil society observation, contributing to one of the most peaceful elections in Guatemalan history.

CEPPS partnered with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo Electoral, TSE) to increase its capacity to counter political violence and better regulate campaign finance during elections. CEPPS’ assistance helped the TSE monitor and sanction political parties, including support CEPPS provided to Citizen Action (Acción Ciudadana, AC) and the Mirador Electoral coalition to present the TSE with of party spending that was used to fine and temporarily and permanently suspend parties for violations of electoral law.

CEPPS helped increase the capacity of the Guatemalan government, Congress, TSE, political parties and civil society to promote and implement key reforms. CEPPS provided technical assistance to the TSE, civic groups, various congressional committees and leaders, and party officials to develop and pass reform legislation. This included hallmark passage of reforms to the political-electoral system and internal legislative procedures in 2016, which made significant improvements to Congress’ capacity to deliberate and pass legislation and improved the TSE’s sanctioning authority, among other notable provisions.

Finally, CEPPS partnered with cisgender and transgender women to strengthen their political participation. The project was instrumental in providing lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) communities with opportunities to participate actively in the 2015 electoral process as well in institutionalizing anti-discrimination measures within the TSE and the National Civil Registry (Registro Nacional de las Personas, RENAP). This component of the project was the first of its kind in Guatemala and these actions will have an impact in the 2019 elections and beyond.

9 Key CEPPS Accomplishments

Over the course of a nearly five year program, the CEPPS partners contributed to the following results: • Passage of Elections and Political Party Reforms: CEPPS/NDI supported the Congress on the development and passage of legislation to improve the political and electoral system and strengthen the transparency and effectiveness of the legislature. CEPPS/NDI supported the congress to reform the LEPP to promote a more credible electoral process and a more representative, democratic political party system. In 2015, CEPPS/NDI supported a joint congressional-civil society working group that debated reforms to the LEPP in response to the political crisis. CEPPS/IFES also provided technical assistance to the TSE in developing their recommendations. The ambitious reforms, which ultimately included civil society and TSE input, were passed by Congress in April 2016 and signed into law the following month. The reforms included tighter restrictions on political campaigns, improvements to the system of control and monitoring of political financing and a more equitable system of candidate access to media. CEPPS/NDI supported civil society organizations were critical in advocating for the president to ratify the final reform package. • Adoption of Internal Congressional Reforms: CEPPS/NDI supported Congress to reform the LOOL to make the institution’s internal procedures and operation more transparent and effective. With CEPPS/NDI technical assistance, Congress passed LOOL reforms in February 2016, which reduce the potential for misuse of questioning proceedings, introduce restrictions on party switching, and establish a permanent technical research and assistance body. The LOOL provides Congress with more efficient procedures that will improve the content of legislation and the process for their passage. • Increased LGBTI Participation and Inclusion in Political Life: CEPPS conducted a baseline assessment of the barriers to LGBTI political participation, the first of its kind in Guatemala. The assessment found that a major barrier to political participation for transgender women is the lack of a Personal Identification Documents (Documento Personal de Identificación, DPI) that matches their gender identity. CEPPS conducted trainings with 337 RENAP personnel responsible for issuing DPIs throughout the country on the legal rights of and non-discrimination against LGBTI communities (73 percent demonstrated an increased understanding of issues facing LGBTI communities). CEPPS supported RENAP to institutionalize the inclusion of LGBTI rights in organizational protocols, and as a result, instructive posters outlining the protocols are being placed in all RENAP offices and additional staff is being trained on the new protocols and non- discrimination, a crucial step in institutionalizing efforts to guarantee LGBTI rights. • Improved Procedures on Freedom of Information: CEPPS/IRI supported the Guatemalan Congress’ Access to Public Information Unit to assess the internal processes and effectiveness of the unit. As a result of CEPPS/IRI recommendations, the unit has an increased understanding of processes and procedures, which have increased request response rates from 43 percent in January 2016 to 98 percent in July of the same year-- helping to strengthen Guatemala’s commitment to transparency. • Reduced Violence and Increased Inclusion through National Election Observation: CEPPS/NDI supported Guatemalan partners AC and the nine-member Mirador Electoral coalition in organizing a comprehensive election observation. Observers collected data to

10 provide evidence-based recommendations to improve the transparency and effectiveness of the elections at the national and local levels. An external evaluation found that the presence of observers had a deterrent effect on potential perpetrators of violence by ensuring that acts of violence would be reported to authorities and the public. During the first round of voting, AC’s quick count was crucial to reaffirming the TSE’s results when they were too close to call on election night. Mirador Electoral and AC’s observations and quick count contributed to helping prevent additional conflicts, a surge in violence or questions regarding the credibility of the elections. To increase inclusion in the electoral process, the Mirador Electoral networks included representatives of historically excluded populations. Approximately 30 percent of the observers were indigenous (100 percent were indigenous in predominantly indigenous communities), more than 50 percent were women (well above global observer group averages), and the majority were under 30 years old. AC also supported six transgender women in conducting the first ever transgender focused observation in Guatemala. • Prevented Community Violence: The CEPPS/IRI and the Institute of Conflict Transformation for Peace’s (Instituto de Transformación de Conflictos para la Construcción de la Paz, INTRAPAZ) "Culture of Peace" supported civil society organizations in mitigating outbreaks of political and electoral violence. The training program worked with more than 200 community leaders (including 80 women). As a result, civil society organizations effectively organized activities across the country that helped prevent outbreaks of violence before, during and after the elections. • Increased Public Awareness on Elections from Investigative Journalism: The CEPPS/IRI and Media Laboratory (Laboratorio de Medios) investigative journalism program supported 30 journalists to publish over 200 investigations that helped increase awareness of political and electoral issues occurring in their respective municipalities, such as cases of local nepotism and partisan gridlock, instances of voter discrimination, and the impact of the presidential transition on local communities, among others. • Improved Elections Administration: CEPPS/IFES assisted the TSE in the administration of the 2015 elections by supporting election officials to develop and implement an elections operation plan and produce 66,000 pieces of electoral materials, radio and television spots. These efforts contributed to the successful administration of the elections, particularly in the planning and logistical operation of the process down to the polling station level. • Increased Election Security: CEPPS/IFES supported the TSE to coordinate electoral security efforts with the Attorney General’s Office (Ministerio Público, MP) and other state institutions by facilitating the work of the Electoral Security Inter-Institutional Coordination Committee. CEPPS/IFES conducted an electoral violence assessment and updated the electoral conflict risk maps, which were crucial in allowing authorities to plan and maximize resources to mitigate electoral related violence. CEPPS/IFES helped produce 16,000 electoral security materials such as protocols, electoral security directories, and informational posters on electoral felonies and crimes for nationwide distribution. As a result of the collaboration, the MP created a permanent electoral felonies and crimes unit, which previously only operated ad hoc during elections, helping to make the practices permanent. • Improved Campaign Finance and Campaign Ethics Oversight: CEPPS/IFES provided technical assistance to the TSE on engaging with other government institutions to gain

11 better access to information to conduct more effective and transparent political party campaign finance oversight. CEPPS/IFES helped the TSE develop and publicize a code of ethics for political parties that promoted peaceful elections and campaign ethics and transparency, which were adopted by 23 of the 26 national-level parties. A similar code of ethics was adopted in 10 municipalities that were identified as high risk for electoral violence. As part of campaign finance oversight, CEPPS/IFES and CEPPS/NDI assisted the TSE in monitoring the media, which provided the TSE with reliable data to scrutinize political parties’ spending that resulted in stronger penalties for violations of electoral law. • Advancing Women’s Participation in Congress and City Councils: CEPPS supported the creation of a women’s legislative group, an idea that grew out of the trainings conducted by CEPPS and partners with newly elected women representatives. In August 2016, the group officially signed its charter, a historic first in Guatemala.

Please see Annex 1 for the CEPPS success stories.

I. PROGRAM OVERVIEW

Program Goals, Objectives and Intermediate Results (IRs)

CEPPS’ overall goal from August 17, 2012 - September 30, 2014 was: to strengthen the Guatemalan political system so that it is more transparent, responsive and accountable. The project name during this period was “Support Electoral and Political Parties Reform and Strengthen the Guatemalan Congress.”

Objective 1: Government, Congress, Electoral Body, Political Party and Civil Society Capacity to Promote and Implement Electoral Reforms Increased. LLR 1.1: Consensus on key electoral reforms reached through discussion and analysis. (IFES-NDI) LLR 1.2: Congress, electoral body, political parties and civil society debate reforms to the political system. (NDI) LLR 1.3 Process and plans are developed to implement electoral reforms. (IFES- NDI) LLR 1.4 Best practices and lessons learned from Guatemala are shared with international organizations, national stakeholders and other countries. (IFES-NDI) Objective 2: Congressional oversight and lawmaking capacity increased. LLR 2.1: Consensus on key measures to strengthen Congressional regulation of procedures and functions is reached through discussion and analysis. (NDI) LLR 2.2: Oversight skills of congressional representatives strengthened. (IRI) LLR 2.3: Congressional leaders develop skills and knowledge to analyze, draft, discuss, approve and implement priority democracy related legislation. (IRI-NDI) LLR 2.4: Best practices and lessons learned are shared with key stakeholders, political parties and Congress. (IRI-NDI)

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CEPPS’ overall goal from October 1, 2014 - January 31, 2017 was modified to institutionalize processes to mitigate the risks for political violence and illicit/illegal financing of electoral campaigns. At this point, the project was renamed “Elections: More Inclusion, Less Violence” (Elecciones: Mas Inclusión, Menos Violencia) and the total estimated award was increased from $4,400,000 to $7,900,000. This modification was made at USAID’s request to reorient the project focus on the 2015 elections given their importance and high potential for violence. The modification also responded to the political context, as Congress was largely deadlocked due to partisan divisions that prevented the passage of legislations in the first two years of the program.

Objective 1: Civil society organizations and media are effectively strengthened to prevent electoral violence and monitor campaign spending in targeted areas (IRI- NDI). IR 1.1: A coalition of civil society organizations (CSO) engages in electoral violence and campaign spending monitoring and mitigation. (NDI) IR 1.2: Grassroots citizen groups engage in electoral violence prevention. (IRI) IR 1.3: Journalists raise awareness of electoral issues. (IRI) Objective 2: Capacity of the TSE to counter political violence and better regulate campaign finance is increased (IFES). IR 2.1: TSE develops and implements an efficient general elections plan and voter and candidate registration process to mitigate electoral related violence. IR 2.2: TSE better coordinates electoral security efforts at the national and local level to counter electoral related violence. IR 2.3: TSE political campaign finance oversight capacities developed and set in place to guarantee free, fair and transparent elections Objective 3: Capacity of the Guatemalan government, Congress, TSE, political parties and civil society to promote and implement key reforms is increased (IFES- IRI-NDI) IR 3.1: Congress, civil society, political parties and TSE debate and reach consensus on electoral reform and implementation plans (IFES-NDI) IR 3.2: Congressional leaders develop capacity to approve priority legislation and facilitate civil society involvement on key processes and reforms (IRI- NDI) Objective 4: Cisgender and Transgender Women Political Participation is strengthened for the 2015 and future elections (IFES-IRI-NDI) IR 4.1: Women (and transgender women, if feasible) run for office (IRI-NDI) IR 4.2: Cisgender and transgender women actively participate in the electoral process (IFES-IRI-NDI)

The objectives under the original project were largely incorporated under Objective 3 of the reprogrammed project. As such, this final report is structured around the logic model of the approved “Elections: More Inclusion, Less Violence” project. Activities and analysis from the period of August 17, 2012 - September 30, 2014 are reported under Objective 3 of this report.

13 Problem Statement and Theory of Change

Nearly three decades after the transition to democracy, and 20 years since the signing of the peace accords, Guatemala’s political system continues to face numerous challenges, among them low public confidence in the country’s fragile democratic institutions, a highly fragmented political party system and state institutions that have been unable to effectively respond to growing citizen security threats generated by corruption, impunity and increased influence of organized crime. Institutional weaknesses revealed by the 2007 and 2011 elections highlighted the need for reforms to the electoral and political system, including reforms to the LEPP and LOOL, as well as increased national-level debate on ways to make the system more transparent, responsive and accountable. These institutional weaknesses were exacerbated by the political crisis and La Plaza citizen protests that took place in 2015, further highlighting the need for reforms and space for citizen participation. For reforms to the electoral and political system to be effective, they must be accompanied by efforts to strengthen democratic institutions, in particular the Guatemalan Congress and the TSE.

The first phase of CEPPS program (2012-2014) sought to address these challenges by helping make the Guatemalan political system more transparent, responsive and accountable by supporting government and civil society efforts to improve the electoral and political system by reforming the LEPP. According to many Guatemalan analysts and public opinion polls, this law established a broad legal framework which, as it was structured, contributed to weaknesses in the political system. Similarly, there were calls to improve the ability of Congress to fulfill its key functions of citizen representation, executive oversight and lawmaking. Congress has received consistently low approval ratings in public opinion polls particularly since 2013 as its ability to approve legislation became paralyzed by internal dysfunction, especially minority parties’ use of procedures (interpelaciones) to hold questioning proceedings against public officials. These procedures prevented the consideration of legislation on the floor of Congress, making it virtually impossible to pass legislation. The legislative stalemate led to a Constitutional Court (Corte de Constitucionalidad, CC) resolution allowing legislators to postpone questioning proceedings and consider legislation deemed imperative or urgent. However, reforms to the LOOL and other laws determining the body’s internal rules were necessary to reach a long-term solution acceptable to all parties. Areas to be addressed included: budget approval procedures; use of questioning procedures; ability to conduct oversight of the executive branch; party switching by legislators (transfuguismo); and a lack of permanent, nonpartisan legislative technical assistance staff.

Through the reprogrammed second phase of the project (2015-2017), CEPPS sought to continue to address these challenges by helping institutionalize processes to mitigate risks of political violence and illicit financing of electoral campaigns. This included supporting civil society and government efforts to monitor and respond to these issues, including strengthening government and civic capacity to pass and implement reforms to the political and electoral system and fostering greater inclusion of marginalized segments of society in political processes. Increased transparency of the electoral process and greater participation by marginalized and vulnerable

14 groups, including women, indigenous peoples, LGBTI1 individuals, and people with disabilities, contribute to deterring violence and illicit campaign financing in the short-term and help galvanize institutional reforms in the longer term. Under Objective 1, CEPPS’ premise was that an inclusive civil society observation of the electoral process, as well as a violence education program, would help deter electoral violence and illicit campaign financing by increasing public scrutiny. In turn, findings from observation efforts and investigative reporting by journalists on incidents of violence and levels of campaign spending would help mobilize public opinion and political support for additional reforms by the Congress and other government entities to address these issues. For Objective 2, CEPPS posited that building the TSE’s institutional capacity to plan strategically and coordinate with key stakeholders would increase its ability to prevent political conflict and better regulate and oversee campaign spending. For Objective 3, the CEPPS partners’ approach was based on the premise that for Congress to further institutionalize efforts to mitigate the risks for political violence and illicit financing of electoral campaigns, it needed to pass reforms to the LEPP, as well as other legislation, while actively promoting transparency through regular committee work. This legislation would help advance institutional reforms that would make election processes more peaceful and transparent overall. Advocacy efforts by civil society would, in turn, provide expertise and generate additional pressure on Congress to act on these reforms. Under Objective 4, CEPPS maintained that increasing the number of cisgender and transgender women who participated in the electoral or political process as voters, election officials, observers, civic advocates, political candidates or elected officials would contribute to building a more diverse, tolerant and inclusive society that better understands and represents their needs.

II. POLITICAL CONTEXT

2012–2014: Partisan Division and Legislative Deadlock

The project launched following the 2011 elections and the inauguration of a new Congress. The 2008-2011 legislature functioned, passing an average of 52 measures per year. However, the new 2012-2015 Congress became largely deadlocked and on average, passed only 25 measures per year (refer to Table 1 below for details). The stalemate was largely a result of internal divisions in the majority bloc, the Patriotic Party (Partido Patriota, PP), as well as strong resistance to PP initiatives from the main opposition party, Renewed Democratic Freedom (Libertad Democrática Renovadora, LIDER). The congressional agenda was blocked by hearings led by LIDER deputies regarding the conduct of executive branch officials, as well as a broader inability to achieve quorum, as increasingly disengaged legislators failed to attend congressional sessions. Frequent party switching (transfuguismo) also posed challenges to building party allegiance or long-term alliances among parties, further complicating the advancement of reforms. The resulting lack of progress on a number of legislative initiatives, including electoral reforms, provoked condemnation from many civil society organizations and political analysts. The political context changed little between project startup and early 2015, with small windows of opportunity for advancing some legislation, which are explained in further detail below.

1 CEPPS uses the term “LGBTI” to describe individuals with same-sex sexual orientation or non-conforming gender identity and expression, while recognizing that individuals in Guatemala may prefer alternative terms for self-identification or there may be additional local identity constructs.

15 Table 1: Measures Passed by Congress between 2008 and 2016 Annual Average 2008- 2011 Congress Type of Measure Passed 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

5 Agreements (Convenios) 2 0 0 1 4

22 Laws (Leyes) 19 8 15 7 28

2 Treaties (Tratados) 0 2 0 0 3

2 Protocols (Protocolos) 0 0 1 0 2

3 Accords (Acuerdos) 11 4 1 5 11

2 Exonerations (Exoneraciones) 2 5 1 1 1

16 Government Decrees (Decretos Gubernativos) 0 9 4 0 1

52 TOTAL 34 28 22 14 50

2015–2017: Political Crisis, Elections and Anti-Corruption Efforts

Starting in April 2015, Guatemala began experiencing increased public demonstrations and an accelerating political crisis. On April 15, the Office of the Attorney General (Ministerio Público, MP) and International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala, CICIG) released findings of an investigation into a high- level bribery scheme. The CICIG and MP found evidence that officials in the executive branch, tax administration authority and other public institutions lowered customs duties for certain importers in exchange for kickbacks. In response to this scandal and other cases of alleged corruption, citizens organized large public demonstrations starting in April and continuing until just prior to September 2015 general elections, the largest of which was attended by an estimated 100,000 people. Thousands of Guatemalans gathered peacefully every Saturday in Guatemala City’s central plaza and in other cities throughout the country demanding the resignation of the president and vice president, an end to corruption and impunity in government, and reforms to the electoral and political system.

Bowing to public pressure, Vice President Roxana Baldetti stepped down in early May and was subsequently arrested and indicted for her involvement in the kickback scheme. A wave of

16 resignations followed the vice president’s, including nearly all cabinet ministers and the chiefs of the central bank, tax authority and social security institute. In contrast, President Otto Pérez Molina initially denied any wrongdoing and stated that he would serve the remainder of his term. However, in mid-June, the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia, CSJ) and CC ruled that the president was not immune from prosecution, paving the way for Congress to establish a special five-member commission to determine whether or not to investigate him. In late August, the MP and CICIG brought charges against President Pérez Molina for his involvement in the scheme. The congressional commission subsequently recommended that President Pérez Molina be stripped of his presidential immunity. The CSJ ruled in favor of allowing impeachment proceedings, and those present for the vote in Congress voted unanimously, 132 to 0, to remove his immunity, prompting the MP to issue an order for his arrest. On September 3, just days before the election, President Pérez Molina announced his resignation, which Congress accepted, and was escorted to prison pending preliminary hearings. Adhering to constitutional procedure regarding presidential succession, Congress appointed an interim president to complete Pérez Molina’s term. The MP-CICIG investigation, the CSJ’s and CC’s rulings and the president’s resignation were met with widespread approval by Guatemalan citizens, who applauded the historic efforts to hold public officials accountable for their actions and punish corruption in government.

During the La Plaza civic protests and in the wake of political uncertainty and the spate of corruption scandals, many civil society organizations and prominent political figures called for postponement of the elections until substantive reforms to the electoral system could be implemented, stating that electoral law was unable to combat the apparently pervasive corruption in the political system. However, the TSE rebuffed calls for postponement and confirmed that elections would take place as scheduled under existing electoral law. The TSE also took significant steps to enforce the law and levy sanctions on political parties’ infractions. In April 2015, the TSE sanctioned political parties, including the PP and LIDER, for early campaigning, improper campaign financing and misuse of public areas for partisan events. The TSE also questioned many high-profile candidates’ eligibility to run for office. In July, the TSE announced that the presidential candidate for Vision with Values (Visión con Valores, VIVA), the daughter of former president Efraín Ríos Montt, was not eligible, arguing that the Guatemalan constitution prohibited relatives of anyone who staged a coup from seeking office, although the decision was later overturned by the CC. The TSE also rejected the candidacy of former president Alfonso Portillo, who was running for Congress with the Party of All (Partido Todos, TODOS), for not meeting minimum ethics standards outlined in Article 113 of the Constitution and supporting legislation. The CC ruled in favor of the TSE’s decision, preventing him from appearing on the ballot or taking office.

Candidates from all parties continued campaigning until the officially sanctioned campaign period ended on September 4. The period was marked by high levels of campaign spending, particularly by the party leading in the presidential polls, LIDER. At the time, a consortium of Guatemalan election monitoring organizations, Electoral Watch (Mirador Electoral), estimated that the party spent 200 percent of the allowable limit per campaign on advertising alone. Other estimates, including the TSE’s, indicated LIDER had spent more than the legally allowed amount, resulting in the TSE levying a series of fines on the party, totaling several hundred thousand dollars. The TSE also held a vote to determine whether to suspend the party, but

17 ultimately decided not to do so, arguing that it would have had to suspend LIDER prior to the launch of the electoral process to adhere to electoral law. On August 11, Anonymous Guatemala, an Internet-based collective of anonymous “hacktivists,” or self-defined “Internet activists,” threatened the TSE with repercussions if it refused to suspend LIDER. The following day, hackers associated with Anonymous hacked the TSE’s website, shutting it down and acquiring more than 30 gigabytes of data from its servers. Anonymous also started publishing some of the data on its website. Despite this setback, the TSE was able to restore its systems in advance of the elections and faced no further issues of this nature during the electoral process.

On September 6, despite a climate of political uncertainty and concerns over potential eruptions of violence just three days after the president’s arrest, a record number of Guatemalans, approximately 70 percent, cast ballots in an overall smooth and peaceful electoral process. Fourteen presidential candidates participated in the first round. With more than 99 percent of the votes counted, former comedian Jimmy Morales, from the National Convergence Front (Frente de Convergencia Nacional, FCN), emerged as the clear frontrunner with 23.8 percent of the vote, followed by former first lady Sandra Torres, from the National Unity of Hope (Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza, UNE) with 19.7 percent and Manuel Baldizón (LIDER) with 19.6 percent. Because the vote was so close between the second and third place contenders, the TSE did not immediately announce who would proceed to face Morales in a runoff election. Baldizón was widely expected to win first place in the months preceding elections. However, as the TSE tallied votes it remained clear that Torres earned more votes. On September 14, Baldizón announced his exit from the electoral race and his party, effectively determining that Morales and Torres would proceed to the second round, which the TSE subsequently confirmed would take place since no candidate won an outright majority.

The runoff election was held on October 25. Morales defeated Torres by a large margin, garnering 67.4 percent of the vote to Torres’ 32.6 percent, winning the majority of the popular vote in all but two departments. Morales earned more than twice the number of votes in the second round than he did in the first, receiving 2.75 million votes in the runoff compared to 1.17 million in the first round. In spite of this decisive victory, Morales’ party only obtained 7 percent of the seats in Congress, although it eventually gained a plurality – 24 percent of seats – due to party switching. Voter turnout for the second round of elections was approximately 56 percent, which was lower than the 2011 runoff turnout. On the same day, repeat elections were successfully held in 11 municipalities that had experienced serious irregularities during the September elections.

After the conclusion of the runoff election, several organizations presented their findings regarding the 2015 electoral process. The “More Inclusion, Less Violence” observation network, led by AC and funded by USAID under this project, reported that its network observed political parties physically transporting approximately 13,000 voters across the 20 municipalities it observed on October 25, which may have included illegally transporting voters from neighboring municipalities. The Mirador Electoral coalition, with technical assistance from CEPPS/NDI, presented a report that identified the key strengths of the 2015 electoral process, such as the low levels of violence and the application of sanctions by the TSE against political parties who violated electoral law, as well as areas that require improvement. Some of these areas for improvement included the TSE’s limited financial resources, which made it difficult to carry out

18 its duties, and a lack of effort by the TSE to encourage greater inclusion and participation of women, youth and indigenous peoples. Mirador also identified more than 700 cases of vote- buying in the 20 municipalities observed by AC.

Following his victory in the September and October elections, president-elect Morales began publicly unveiling policy plans and taking stances on a broader range of issues than he did prior to September 6. On October 27, Morales promised to extend the mandate of the CICIG, which had been set to expire in 2019, until 2021. On the same day, the Guatemalan authorities announced another corruption investigation involving the Guatemalan Institute of Social Security (Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social, IGSS), marking the third such investigation implicating the IGSS since April 2015. Ongoing advancements in uncovering corruption cases and the president-elect’s announcement to extend the CICIG’s mandate were met with broad domestic and international support.

Between his October 25 electoral victory and January 14 inauguration, Morales faced public scrutiny over his appointment of certain members to his transition team and candidates for positions in his administration that were facing a number of allegations, including: the president’s liaison to Congress for plagiarizing articles he published while in his previous position at the University of San Carlos (Universidad de San Carlos, USAC); deputy director of the Department of Civilian Intelligence (Dirección General de Inteligencia Civil, Digici) for human rights abuses during Guatemala’s internal armed conflict; minister of communications for her business dealings and nonpayment of taxes; and FCN’s secretary general, who also was elected to Congress, for crimes related to massacres and forced disappearances during the conflict. These cases drew significant public and media attention, brought renewed attention to President Morales’ inner circle and raised concerns about his commitment to fulfilling his main campaign pledge of combatting corruption in government.

Throughout 2016, the MP and CICIG continued to announce new corruption scandals and implicate or arrest current and former public officials at all levels of government, including former defense and interior ministers, the executive director of the National Civil Registry (Registro Nacional de las Personas, RENAP), a CSJ magistrate, and the superintendent of the Superintendence of Tax Administration (Superintendencia de Administración Tributaria, SAT). In June 2016, the MP and CICIG also announced a major corruption scheme within former President Otto Pérez Molina’s administration and the PP and issued arrest warrants for former officials of the ex-president. Investigations revealed that state officials siphoned and laundered approximately 40 million quetzales ($5.2 million dollars) to provide lavish gifts to party members, primarily the then-president and vice president. Additional officials named included current and former members of Congress, such as the former president of Congress, cabinet ministers, party executives and a former presidential candidate. The announcement led to new protests, keeping popular pressure on President Morales to address corruption issues. In addition to these developments, the courts also made two significant convictions. In October 2016, former President of Congress Gudy Rivera was convicted and sentenced for attempted influence peddling. A court found him guilty of trying to bribe a judge to annul the CSJ’s decision to remove then-Vice President Roxana Baldetti from office in 2015. The court sentenced him to 13 years in prison. That same month, a national criminal court judge also was convicted and sentenced to 11 years in prison for illicit enrichment and money laundering. Both cases were

19 results of MP and CICIG investigations and, despite the large number of arrests and indictments during 2015 and 2016, marked the first successful prosecutions and sentences for corruption offenses. The latter case also marked the first time in Guatemalan history that a judge was convicted and sentenced for any offense.

As final campaign finances were tallied after elections, the TSE continued to exercise its authority and mete out punishments for violations of the law. In November 2015, the TSE announced that it would disqualify and prevent from taking office 16 newly elected deputies from various political parties for perjury, claiming that they had signed an affidavit stating they met all of the requirements to be a candidate for public office even though they did not. Twelve were found to have criminal cases pending against them, three were business contractors for the state and one was directly related to a public official. Most of these deputies appealed the decision to the CSJ, which unanimously rejected their appeals in December 2015. In February 2016, the TSE ordered the suspension of three parties for non-compliance with electoral law. This included two small, relatively new parties, the New Republic Movement (Movimiento Nueva República, MNR) and the Institutional Republican Party (Partido Republicano Institucional, PRI), for not obtaining a minimum threshold of 5 percent of valid votes in the elections or obtaining any congressional representation. In addition to these suspensions based on procedural requirements, the TSE also suspended LIDER for willful violation of campaign spending limits. Many Guatemalan analysts noted the importance of this suspension given LIDER’s political power. According to studies conducted by Mirador Electoral, LIDER was one of the largest parties and had the most extensive municipal and departmental presence of any party in the country prior to the elections. Public opinion polling also suggested that LIDER’s candidate was the favorite to win the presidency prior to elections. Despite coming in third in the presidential race, LIDER still won more seats in Congress than any other party. Party leaders appealed the TSE’s decision, but on February 6, 2017, the TSE upheld its decision and LIDER was permanently suspended. In January 2017, the TSE also permanently suspended PP for non- compliance with electoral regulations on campaign finance.

Reforms to the Political and Electoral System

Following the 2011 elections, CEPPS worked with partner Guatemalan civil society organizations on coordinating their efforts to build on election observation activities and advocate for specific reforms. The Congressional Committee on Electoral Affairs (Comisión Específica de Asuntos Electorales del Congreso, CEAE) approved a draft of a comprehensive electoral reform bill in August 2012 that included input from civic coalitions, which was presented to the full Congress. However, it stalled due to partisan deadlock in Congress for more than a year. Deputies unveiled a set of laws in late September 2013 and submitted several proposals to reform the LEPP to the CEAE. After several failed attempts to suspend proceedings led by the LIDER party, as well as a ruling issued by the CC stating that proceedings could be interrupted with a qualified majority vote by Congress, the PP negotiated agreements with other parties to vote with them and successfully postponed proceedings starting in mid-September. LIDER deputies continued attempts to prevent legislative deliberations, but the PP gained sufficient cooperation from other parties to proceed with drafting and passing legislation in three readings. Legislators preliminarily passed a LEPP reform bill on October 31, 2013 and sent it for CC review.

20

On July 9, 2014, the CC completed its review and issued its findings to the Congress. Out of 60 amendments to the LEPP, the CC found 32 of them favorable, eight unfavorable and 20 partially favorable or favorable under certain conditions. One of the most notable elements of the decision was the approval of the establishment of a 30 percent gender quota for women legislators, an important step in requiring political parties to include women on candidate lists and to facilitate their ability to run for office. The LEPP reform bill was returned to the CEAE, where CEPPS/NDI continued to provide technical assistance to members during deliberations on additional amendments. However, Congress failed to make progress on the bill prior to the end of the year, and LEPP reforms did not advance again until the 2015 political crisis and civic pressure pushed it to the forefront of the legislative agenda. Congress advanced on LEPP reforms during the electoral process and submitted a new reform bill to the CC for its review in October 2015. However, the CC did not issue its ruling on the reforms prior to December 31, meaning the incoming Congress assumed responsibility for passing a final reform bill.

Politicians emerged from elections with a clear understanding of public demand for change in the political system, making LEPP reforms a priority in Congress and for the newly elected president. Congress passed reforms to the LEPP on April 19, 2016, which the president signed into law on May 24. The final reform package enacted many significant provisions to improve the electoral and political system, including: granting voting rights for the presidential and vice presidential ticket to Guatemalans residing abroad; more strictly regulating the use of media to provide more fair coverage of candidates; increasing the funding and sanctioning authority of the TSE to improve its election administration capacity; providing public funding for election campaigns to reduce the use of private funds; modifying the electoral calendar to combat illegal advertising during the “pre-campaign” period and provide more time for candidate registration; restricting the release of public polling data immediately before elections; and introducing the null vote (voto nulo). Although the reform package significantly improves the electoral process, there are still many provisions supported by civil society that were ultimately not included. One of the most contentious debates that took place pertained to the adoption of a quota or parity measure for women and indigenous candidates, which gained support among many civic organizations and members of Congress. However, despite the Congress’ initial inclusion and the CC’s approval of a gender quota in the LEPP, members of Congress removed any mention of a quota from the law. Legislators similarly declined to adopt a quota provision for indigenous candidates, despite advocacy by some civic organizations and members of Congress.

Recognizing these and other shortcomings, Congress, civil society and the TSE began deliberating a second generation of political and electoral reforms to address the pending issues. Civil society organizations met to discuss their priorities and presented proposals to the president in August 2016, which sought to: require political parties to select candidates with gender parity, alternate between male and female candidates on party lists, and include indigenous candidates proportional to their population size; change TSE magistrates’ terms to a single period of eight years without the possibility of reelection; reform the selection process of TSE magistrates by establishing a nominating commission comprised of an ex-president from the Congress, TSE and CSJ as well as two professors of political science or constitutional law; automatically register citizens to vote when they are issued a personal identity document; and increase the size of the Congress from 158 to 160 members, 25 of whom would be selected from a national list and the

21 others selected at the departmental and municipal level. Congressional leaders agreed to consider these proposals and others provided by the TSE, though it had not advanced on passing them as of the writing of this report.

Reforms to Improve Congressional Procedures

Given the above-mentioned legislative deadlock, the Congress prioritized reforms to the LOOL starting in 2012. Supporters of the reform measure sought to: regulate the number of procedural hearings allowed, thereby limiting institutional hurdles to the deliberation and passage of legislation; reduce or end party switching to help strengthen political party cohesion and ideology and increase the likelihood of parties and members of Congress building strategic alliances; and modify quorum thresholds to streamline legislative deliberation and passage rules. Congress prepared several draft LOOL reform bills between 2013 and 2015. However, there was strong opposition to many of their provisions, including the regulation of party switching, which many legislators used as a means of improving their political leverage depending on the political climate: more than two-thirds of legislators switched parties at least once between 2012 and 2015. Due to strong opposition to many of the core provisions within the bill, it was not passed during the 2012-2015 Congress.

During the political crisis, political reform, including improving the performance of public institutions, became a primary citizen demand. Following elections and the inauguration of the 2016-2019 Congress, newly elected legislators quickly decided to take action on this issue within their first month in office. On February 4, 2016, Congress approved a reform bill to the LOOL in a third and final reading. The reforms aim to improve the internal functioning and image of Congress by strengthening parliamentary processes and increasing integrity standards. Key reform areas include: strengthening party cohesion by applying restrictions on elected deputies who switch parties, such as removing or barring these members from leadership positions; removing barriers to the functioning of the legislative process, including reducing the potential misuse of hearings to prevent deliberation of legislation; improving integrity requirements for public servants, including placing greater restrictions on the employment of elected officials’ family members or contracting the services of businesses tied to legislators; making congressional operations more transparent by requiring video recordings of committee hearings; strengthening the Congress’ capacity by providing additional technical advisers to parties, commissions and members of Congress; and establishing a Legislative Directorate for Research and Studies (Dirección de Estudios e Investigación Legislativa) to provide research services and technical assistance to legislators.

After passage of the LOOL reforms, deputies agreed to add reforms to the Law on Civil Service (Ley de Servicio Civil) to the legislative agenda as a complementary measure, which they passed in July 2016. These reforms will help improve congressional administration, complement recent reforms to the LOOL and address potential abuse of government authority. Main provisions outlined in the reforms include adopting a manual to evaluate employee hiring qualifications, raises and performance; prohibiting members of Congress from hiring relatives; and limiting annual raises to 10 percent of an employee’s base salary.

22 On April 12, a provision in the reforms to the LOOL went into effect prohibiting additional party switching among members of Congress. Between January and April, when there were no restrictions, a total of 70 legislators changed parties, representing 44 percent of Congress. The ruling FCN achieved a plurality with 37 representatives, followed by UNE with 32, the Reform Movement (Movimiento Reformador, MR) with 20, and TODOS with 17. The remaining 52 legislators are independent or divided among 13 other political parties. Under the new rules, members of Congress may still resign from their parties; however, if they do so, they are not permitted to join new parties, and they also would be forced to resign from any leadership posts they have, which would subsequently be filled by the same party. The change in legislators’ rules appears to have had a significant impact on Congress’ ability to pass measures, though this is also likely a result of renewed political will and increased citizen demand. As Table 1 demonstrates, Congress’ productivity returned to the 2008-2011 levels with passage of 50 measures in 2016.

Reforms to the Nominating Commissions Act

In 2014, nominating commissions (comisiones de postulación) were established and tasked with reviewing and selecting a list of candidates for magistrates for the CSJ, and judges for the courts of appeals (cortes de apelación). The process faced public criticism from the beginning for several reasons: 26 of the Commission members also accepted nominations to become magistrates themselves and had the power to place themselves on the final list to assume office; the evaluation criteria heavily weighted professional experience over moral conduct; and many organizations outlined minimum transparency standards that the Commissions did not meet. Once the process for selecting CSJ magistrates concluded, media outlets and civic organizations monitoring the process alleged that LIDER and PP members struck a political pact to vote for certain candidates in exchange for votes to raise the debt limit and approve additional state spending. The final selection also was made behind closed doors instead of in a public setting, leading many civil society groups to call for the process to be completed again in a more transparent fashion. A total of 63 lawsuits were filed to stop the processes; however, the CSJ selection process ended in late September, and 126 appellate judges had been selected as of September 30. Nominating commissions were also established to select officials to lead other high-level government institutions, including the Attorney General’s Office, CC and the General Comptroller’s Office (Contraloría General de Cuentas de la Nación, CGCN). With CEPPS/NDI and CICIG assistance, civil society actively engaged in discussions to reform the Nominating Commissions Act (Ley de Comisiones de Postulación, LCP), which governs the committee responsible for nominating candidates for a number of positions. However, given the contentious nature of the law and legislative deadlock, reforms were never submitted for a full vote in Congress. To provide guidance to commissions without reforming legislation, these organizations instead developed a manual to help guide nominating commissions’ selection process and members’ conduct to improve their transparency and ethical behavior.

Migration Reforms

Starting in mid-2014, the migration of unaccompanied minors from Central American countries to the United States started receiving significant media coverage, prompting public officials and civil society organizations to advocate for reforms to migration policy in each country and for

23 urgent humanitarian action. The presidents of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador held an executive-level meeting in Washington, D.C. in late July to discuss solutions to the issue and develop a coordinated response. To support migration reform, the Guatemalan congressional Commission on Migrants (Comisión del Migrante), with CEPPS/NDI’s support, organized a series of public consultations between representatives from government and civil society to assess policies and develop proposals for alternatives starting in late 2014 and continuing through 2016. Participants reached agreements regarding specific provisions to include in a new, comprehensive Migrant Code (Código del Migrante), a 246-article compendium of laws to address the many issues faced by migrants who are in Guatemala as a point of origin, transit, final destination, or return. Congress approved the Migrant Code on September 20, 2016. However, its implementation was stalled due to a legal complaint filed with the CC seeking congressional amendments to the Code. The complaint sought to ensure that the government would continue to provide certain services while the current General Directorate for Migration (Dirección General de Migración, DGM) reorganized into a new entity – this would include processing of visas, passports and labor permits for immigrants. If ultimately approved by the courts, the code would help improve regulations, including by establishing a comprehensive immigration system coordinated by various government institutions, creating a semi-autonomous National Institute of Migration to replace the current DGM, and establishing a network of consular services to help migrants seeking shelter or assistance to return to their country. The code has not advanced further as of the writing of this report.

Judicial Reforms

In April 2016, the MP, CICIG, the Human Rights Ombudsman (Procuraduría de los Derechos Humanos, PDH) and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) launched national dialogues to deliberate constitutional reforms to the judicial sector with broad input from all sectors of society. In September, they announced agreement on a set of reforms, which would make significant changes to the judicial system, including: granting a large degree of autonomy for indigenous groups to administer their own judicial systems; separating the administrative and jurisdictional functions of the CSJ; reforming the selection process of judicial authorities, including eliminating the use of nominating commissions (comisiones de postulación) for CC magistrates; amending pre-trial proceedings (antejuicios) to prevent their abuse as an obstacle to holding trials; and creating a professional career path for judges and justice officials. The reforms were presented to Congress as a preliminary package that legislators must debate and introduce as a draft constitutional reform, with or without modifications. In order to pass, the government will likely hold a popular consultation on the reforms to gain public approval. However, some legislators and the private sector expressed strong opposition to certain provisions, including granting greater autonomy for indigenous groups’ legal systems and weakening legislators’ immunity from prosecution, which have threatened to derail the entire reform package. In a November vote, Congress rejected two bills and reached an impasse on another bill related to this package, which included provisions proposing modifications to pretrial hearings and indigenous justice systems. At the time of writing this report, the approval process for the reform is ongoing and has an uncertain future.

24 Supreme Electoral Tribunal

Between 2013 and 2014, the TSE made preparations to oversee a referendum on border delineations between Belize and Guatemala. However, the territorial dispute among both nations was never fully resolved, and the referendum ultimately did not take place during the program period. In 2014, new TSE magistrates were appointed by nominating commissions to serve on the body and oversee elections. With CEPPS/IFES and CEPPS/NDI assistance, the TSE began developing protocols between 2013 and early 2015 to prepare for the administration of elections. In a departure from the past, the TSE also demonstrated significant political will to not just warn but also sanction political parties for apparent violations of political and electoral law. It publicly ordered LIDER and TODOS parties to stop their presidential candidates from “pre-campaigning” in early 2014. Given the low amount of maximum fines allowed for violations of the law, the TSE also decided to deduct the fines issued to political parties from any public debt owed to them for their votes earned in the 2011 elections to ensure the fines were paid.

In May 2014, the TSE issued Resolution 117-2014, which publicly called on political parties to end campaigning outside of the officially sanctioned campaign period and gave parties 30 days to comply. The TSE gave parties a one-month period to remove campaign advertisements from public places and stop organizing campaign events, a move that was welcomed by civil society, universities and the international community. After the deadline passed and parties failed to comply, the TSE announced Resolution 147-2014, a six-month suspension of 11 political parties for violating early campaign laws, prohibiting them from holding any meetings or party events. The suspended political parties denied allegations that they were in violation of electoral laws, but, according to AC, which independently monitored media advertising with CEPPS/NDI support, the parties spent 6.3 million quetzales ($845,000) on early advertisements between January and August 2014, with the government alone spending 3.4 million quetzales ($456,000). On September 4, with a three to two vote, the TSE determined that all political parties had complied with the law and lifted the suspension. However, weeks later, the PP held a political rally to announce its presidential nominee’s “pre-candidacy,” which led to a new six-month suspension from the TSE. Political parties contested the TSE’s actions, accusing the body of overstepping its constitutional boundaries and going beyond its authority. As a result, in late 2014, PP and LIDER legislators agreed to hold a vote on a non-binding resolution demanding the resignation of four TSE magistrates. PP legislators joined with LIDER to schedule the vote but did not cast ballots for the resolution, which ultimately failed to pass. By the start of 2015, the TSE had already levied 462 different sanctions on political parties or individual members for campaigning outside of the official electoral period. The ruling PP was responsible for the plurality of these violations, followed by LIDER. The TSE continued to levy sanctions for legal infractions between early 2015 and the elections.

As described above, the TSE oversaw one of the most peaceful and participatory election processes in Guatemalan history. This is notable as the TSE was able to take strong stances against and withstand constant criticism from political parties and powerful political elites; quickly recover from hacking by Anonymous less than one month prior to the first round of elections; and assuage concerns of fraud on election night and promote voter and political party confidence in electoral outcomes. However, the TSE also received the same level of funding in

25 2015 as in the 2011 elections, which presented an issue as the number voting centers, polling stations and municipalities increased since the last election.

Following the 2015 elections, the TSE issued a ruling to permanently suspend several political parties, including some of the country’s most powerful parties. This included LIDER for exceeding campaign spending limits, despite the party winning a plurality of seats in September. The TSE also took actions to ensure other parties’ compliance with political and electoral law, including the PP and FCN. In November, the TSE ruled to suspend the PP due to large discrepancies between political funds reported to the TSE as on hand, spent and raised by the party between 2011 and 2015. Both LIDER and PP lost their appeals and were permanently suspended in early 2017. The TSE also began weighing whether to levy sanctions on the ruling party, FCN, for non-compliance with electoral laws requiring disclosure by November 30, 2016, of financial contributors to the 2015 electoral campaign. In an official statement, FCN officials reported that they could not locate the party’s accountant to prepare the report, resulting in its delayed submission. As of the writing of this report, the FCN has not addressed the TSE’s concerns. Political analysts speculate that the TSE will likely fine the party for the infraction, though non-submission of the report also could provide grounds for the TSE to temporarily or permanently suspend the party.

To further support these and other cases of enforcement of electoral and political party laws, the TSE took steps to implement priority aspects of recently-passed LEPP reforms by improving coordination with other public institutions. On November 22, 2016, the TSE, CGCN, SAT, Superintendence of Telecommunications (Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones, SIT), and Superintendence of Banks (Superintendencia de Bancos, SIB) signed an agreement to streamline communications systems to improve oversight of political parties. The agreement would establish a specialized unit to cross-reference financial information reported by political parties to each of these entities to detect irregularities in parties’ financial reporting and potential violations of party finance laws. The move is part of the TSE’s efforts to implement reforms to Article 21 of the LEPP, which grants the TSE the authority to conduct oversight of political parties, and provides an important new tool to authorities to improve accountability.

III. ANALYSIS

Analysis of Achieving Objectives and their Impact

Objective 1: Civil society organizations and media are effectively strengthened to prevent electoral violence and monitor campaign spending in targeted areas (IRI and NDI).

Long-term election observation

Acción Ciudadana Evaluation activities and interviews with civil society organizations in the AC network confirmed that the group successfully created a network of local level organizations specialized in long-term election observation and that the network’s capacity to prevent electoral violence and monitor campaign spending was strengthened. Although the organizations will still need some technical support for future elections, they are well positioned to implement future

26 observation processes. While AC, a well-respected and national-level organization, was key in ensuring a unified vision and approach and provided political support to a sensitive project, the organizations also communicated with each other independently and developed new alliances that will enable them to collaborate going forward. The local organizations were vital in responding to the needs of the observers during the long-term observation. Each organization periodically met with its observers to reinforce trainings and respond to questions. The majority of the organizations interviewed stated that the administrative and financial support that they received from AC strengthened their ability to receive funding from international donors in the future. However, the sustainability of this internal capacity will depend largely on each organization's ability to retain administrative staff, which can be challenging because they often lack steady sources of funding.

The project left behind an important precedent. For the first time in these mostly rural communities, the actions of political parties and candidates were being observed and reported. Confronted with a new degree of electoral transparency, parties recognized that they could not act with complete impunity and that citizens were tracking any violations of the law. Many network organizations noted that there were lower levels of violence in their municipalities than in previous years. While there are a multitude of factors that may have contributed to a decrease in violence, the organizations interviewed stated that the presence of the observers helped mitigate violence. Since parties knew that they were being watched and citizens were more aware of their political rights, there were fewer confrontations.

Many of the organizations also stated that the observation process helped them expand their territorial presence, either by working in a neighboring municipality or by working in new communities in their own municipalities. The media attention, especially since the observation was covered nationally, helped them raise their profiles. This gave them greater credibility in their communities and could increase opportunities for future funding. The organizations explained that this type of observation is necessary both because of the impact that it had in the communities and because no other groups are carrying out these types of projects in their municipalities. The organizations also expressed ownership and commitment to the observation project. Many did not have previous expertise in electoral observation and voiced their interest in participating in future observation efforts as a result of this experience.

Mirador Electoral The external evaluation conducted by the Just Governance Group found that the Mirador Electoral project had a notable impact on preventing violence and monitoring campaign spending at the national level and in targeted municipalities and that the member organizations increased their capacity to conduct this type of observation. The evaluation report noted that the Mirador Electoral observation is widely recognized in Guatemala as a fundamental element of the electoral process and that future elections require a similar observation. Key findings include: ● Mirador Electoral is recognized in Guatemala as a widely consulted reference on election related issues, as confirmed by local media, government authorities, and other actors in the electoral process; ● The project was particularly relevant in the context of the exclusion of marginalized populations, institutional weaknesses, distrust, and the risk of violence and conflict that characterized the 2015 electoral process;

27 ● The publication of the observation results helped deter or limit the behavior of actors who could damage the integrity of the electoral process and its results at the national and municipal levels; ● Mirador Electoral provided specific information to state institutions such as the MP and the TSE to support their decision-making processes, including holding coordination meetings with the TSE before and after elections and sharing a report of the “quick count”2 results to increase confidence in the election results and provide key information to improve the decision making by the magistrates; ● The presence and actions of the observers, as well as the support of the population, hindered the influence and ability of those who engage in political corruption to commit illegal actions; ● The decline of serious electoral offenses reported by the PDH and the increased willingness of the public to report such violations are examples of the election observation’s impact; ● Mirador Electoral provided evidence on the actions of political parties that were not in compliance with provisions of the LEPP related to campaign financing, including electoral advertising in the form of televised “infomercials;” ● Information gathered in the focus groups highlighted that, as a result of Mirador Electoral activities, citizens’ fear of a flawed electoral process was reduced and credibility and trust increased, helping to improve participation; and ● Focus group participants reported that program activities conducted in Mayan languages motivated women and youth -- especially first-time voters -- to participate in the electoral process.

In addition to the impact on the electoral process, the evaluation also noted that the project strengthened consortium members as individual organizations and Mirador Electoral as a coalition. For example, the Mirador Electoral members, especially the organizations participating in the consortium for the first time, increased their ability to use concrete quantitative data to substantiate qualitative analysis. The evaluation found that Mirador Electoral has the technical capability and credibility to continue observing electoral processes but that, for the consortium to sustain its work over time, a new political agreement between the different organizations will be required. The evaluation team recommended that such an agreement should focus on a redesign so that the consortium begins to act as a platform of organizations rather than a short-term alliance. The members of Mirador Electoral agree that a permanent electoral “observatory,” or monitoring entity, is a viable proposal to build on the electoral observation efforts to date.

Post-election civic observation (auditoria social)

Many AC network organizations emphasized the importance of conducting “social audits” and civic education campaigns between electoral cycles so that citizens have an opportunity to participate in political life, to better understand their rights, and to hold elected officials accountable. There is a strong desire on the part of the participating organizations to do this type of work between elections -- many stated that for citizens to be truly engaged during electoral

2 A quick count is a method for verification of election results by projecting them from a sample of the polling stations.

28 years, they need to have the space to participate and learn between election periods. Moreover, they noted that citizens holding politicians accountable between electoral periods is key to rooting out corruption. Citizen engagement between electoral cycles increases the impact of efforts to mitigate electoral violence and campaign spending during the elections.

In response, six local-level civil society organizations, as well as the AC, implemented a pilot civic observation project. AC, with technical support from CEPPS/NDI, presented local level reports in six municipalities and the consolidated final report to the Ministry of Social Development (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, MIDES) (the institution that was audited) and the PDH (the institution responsible for ensuring the right of access to public information) in Guatemala City. The reports contained findings and recommendations that will strengthen government authorities’ ability to respond to requests for information and improve transparency of social programs (identified by AC as a trigger of electoral violence). By sharing the consolidated final report with all six organizations, AC and CEPPS/NDI created an opportunity for the organizations to reflect on the importance of citizen oversight and discuss actions that can be taken in the future. The final activity with the local organizations demonstrated that the organizations have strengthened their technical and administrative capacities to implement a civic observation project and that they are well positioned in their communities to provide oversight to increase transparency and combat corruption.

Electoral Peace and Nonviolence Training

Guatemala continues to be one of the most violent countries in the world, and is the fifth most violent country in Latin America.3 Despite some short-term successes, security conditions have not improved significantly. By some measures, they continue to decline in some locations in the absence of evidence-based prevention approaches. Key to reducing these shortcomings is open dialogue and collaboration between communities, governments, businesses, and organized civil society. CEPPS/IRI’s “Culture of Peace” series sought to address the institutional and systemic failures leading to inadequate policy creation and implementation of prevention efforts by folding community actors, namely civil society organizations and community leaders, into formal discussions with national and local authorities. Strengthening communities’ capacity to design and implement prevention initiatives based on the expressed needs of citizens, and changing local norms about the citizen’s role in communities, was a critical assumption about the changes needed to be made to bolster prevention.

The CEPPS/IRI series helped civil society organizations understand historical and intercultural dynamics that lead to violence, and key approaches to prevention—laying the groundwork for forward-looking violence prevention policies developed in consultation with communities. CEPPS/IRI helped consolidate civil society’s capacity to prevent political and electoral violence by helping organizations grow in understanding major drivers and underlying causes, as well as tools, techniques and approaches to enhance cooperation, collaboration and coordination with key stakeholders. Overall, civil society is better equipped to help reduce violence and insecurity, including political and electoral violence, and better prepared to do so in concert with authorities. An official from the Municipality of Coatepeque said, “The trainings not only help me learn about different violence prevention approaches, but helped me understand the importance of

3 http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/insight-crime-homicide-round-up-2015-latin-america-caribbean

29 working at the community level. From these [trainings], I took lessons learned and helped sensitize the Community Development Councils [Consejos Comunitarios de Desarrollo, COCODE] in my municipality to bolster existing community prevention efforts.”

Collectively, these tools and lessons helped organized civil society develop integrated mechanisms to bolster prevention efforts before and after the general election, while ensuring that they were appropriate for the community, sustainable, and replicable. These included developing more interactive ways of training polling station staff to better handle complaints before they escalate to violence; developing mechanisms to make complaint resolution processes more efficient and credible; enhancing cooperation and coordination between political parties, electoral management bodies, government officials and civil society organizations to ensure that resources are allocated to polling stations that need it most; mapping conflict-prone areas to more effectively respond to incidents; and devising public safety initiatives in at-risk communities to prevent spillover effects from conflict-prone areas.

Violence is a complex issue that crosses the boundaries between criminal justice, health and human services, and education. Within government, the responsibility for reducing and preventing violence spans numerous agencies, departments, and programs. Given the broad scope of major drivers and underlying factors, effective violence prevention requires collaboration among a broad array of actors to design and implement comprehensive, multi- faceted initiatives. Poor coordination, for example, can unnecessarily duplicate efforts, which can reduce resources for new initiatives. Poor collaboration can also prevent community leaders from becoming powerful bridges between communities and government authorities to more effectively carry efforts beyond external interventions. To better meet the challenges of violence, CEPPS/IRI sought to overcome barriers to effective coordination by expanding partnerships and providing tools and resources to think and act collaboratively on prevention.

To do this, CEPPS/IRI trained national and local government actors on core elements and approaches to prevention; how to establish alliances and build consensus with other agencies and institutions; and how to incorporate civil society in the process. CEPPS/IRI also incorporated interactive features into trainings, including online tools, task simulations and role-playing exercises, to better help beneficiaries design the multifaceted initiatives necessary to reduce and prevent violence. The importance of this is unequivocal. To effectively reduce and prevent violence, it is important to change the attitudes and behaviors that perpetuate conflict and develop mutually acceptable strategies that address major drivers. CEPPS/IRI emphasized the need to work in concert with other government and civil society actors to affect changes in citizens and communities. To advance the broad dialogue and engagement needed to support effective and sustainable prevention, CEPPS/IRI provided lessons on multi-stakeholder engagement practices, and alliance and consensus-building solutions.

According to feedback, the Presidential Commission for Coordinating Executive Policy on Human Rights (Comisión Presidencial Coordinadora de la Política del Ejecutivo en Materia de Derechos Humanos, COPREDEH) departmental delegate in Quetzaltenango said that “[CEPPS/IRI’s] trainings were helpful in enhancing our levels of knowledge and understanding of violence prevention approaches. Learning to map community actors, for example, was particularly useful because it allows us to more effectively identify specific institutions to work

30 with at the local level. The trainings also helped us understand the importance of coordinating with municipal governments, councils and mayors on prevention efforts, who have influence and credibility in their respective communities to carry efforts locally.”

Journalist Training

Independent journalism is the backbone of a free marketplace of ideas and plays a valuable role in promoting public discourse and raising awareness. Investigative journalism can expose criminal and corrupt behavior, spark reform, and ultimately, improve governance, while preventive journalism can identify root causes and principal actors in political and electoral violence before, rather than after, eruptions occur so that authorities and communities can effectively engage in prevention. Such journalistic activities are essential in a healthy democracy because they strengthen transparency and allow citizens to act as social auditors to ensure that government institutions serve in their best interest. In Guatemala, where corruption, organized crime and violence are often co-mingled and regularly dominate the news cycle, investigative and preventive journalism are paramount to achieving an effective and peaceful democracy. Because journalists are so central to this process, journalism is one of the most dangerous professions in Guatemala.4 Intimidation and violence toward journalists are still rampant and can discourage would-be reporters from undertaking this work.

Accordingly, CEPPS/IRI sought to improve independent journalists’ capacity to be effective social auditors. Both of CEPPS/IRI’s series, which graduated over 50 journalists, reporters and journalism students, focused on improving their investigative and reporting skills, their understanding of local political and electoral landscapes and their impact on citizens and communities. CEPPS/IRI saw a dramatic improvement in capacity to investigate and report on important and timely topics. In addition to the quality and frequency of reporting increasing, beneficiaries published over 300 articles regarding political and electoral issues affecting their respective communities. For the second iteration, CEPPS/IRI expanded its pool of beneficiaries to include members of community media associations, including radio stations, which make up 80 percent of community media across Guatemala and are an essential media source for distant rural areas that do not have access to internet, broadcast television or newspapers.

As part of its approach to integrate gender considerations throughout its programming, CEPPS/IRI also incorporated a gender mainstreaming approach to help boost advocacy for social inclusion. With the aim of narrowing gender gaps and enhancing greater equality, CEPPS/IRI’s modules focused on the importance of women’s rights, gender perspectives and sexual diversity, heterosexual biases, and the visibility and contributions of women and LGBTI persons in the community. According to post-training feedback, a local journalist from the Municipality of Izabal said, “the [CEPPS/IRI] trainings helped improve the quality of my investigative work, and, above all, improved the way I discuss the challenges and risks faced by the LGBTI community. Further, I’ve been able to more effectively discuss issues of human rights, civic oversight, and transparency on radio, which has helped awaken citizen interests on these issues.”

Through its work, CEPPS/IRI increased the number of social auditors and the quality of their investigative work around the country, equipping them with knowledge, skills and tools to

4 http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/guatemala-most-dangerous-country-for-journalists-in-central-america-report

31 investigate public institutions, monitor their actions and behaviors, research and disseminate irregularities more quickly to a wider audience and ensure the free exchange of accurate and fair information.

Objective 2: Capacity of the TSE to counter political violence and better regulate campaign finance is increased (IFES)

Throughout the project, CEPPS/IFES worked in partnership with the TSE’s leadership and staff of its Chief Elections Office, the Inspectors Office, the International Cooperation Unit, and Capacity Building and Training Institute to achieve results under Objective 2. The premise behind this effort was that building the TSE’s institutional capacity to plan strategically and coordinate effectively with key stakeholders increases its ability to prevent political conflict and oversee and regulate political party campaign financing in Guatemala.

Significant progress on strategic planning was made through direct technical support to the TSE, including national and subnational trainings on election administration and security and violence prevention; completing the electoral risk mapping and assessment; and setting up the high level national technical inter-institutional coordination committee. Similar structures were created in Huehuetenango, Izabal, Quetzaltenango, Quiché, Petén and San Marcos. The creation of this inter-institutional structure was the foundation that allowed for the successful implementation of the Crisis Management Center on election day during the first round of elections.

CEPPS/IFES also enhanced the TSE's capacity to conduct campaign finance oversight through media monitoring and collecting of credible information, and oversight and regulation of political party campaign financing and spending. By late August 2015, the TSE magistrates issued a 1.84 million quetzals ($250,000) fine in a three to two vote against the political party LIDER for continuing to violate the LEPP. Prior to setting the sanction, the TSE called on the party to suspend its campaign activities to no avail. The magistrates who voted against issuing the fine argued in favor of suspending or terminating the party, stating that LIDER had repeatedly violated the law and that monetary sanctions would not prevent them from continuing to do so. The magistrates who voted in favor of the fine argued that a party’s registration status cannot be canceled once elections have been called, a decision with which various civic groups expressed dissatisfaction. In addition, the TSE imposed a fine of 734,000 quetzales ($100,000) against the political party New National Heart Party (Corazón Nueva Nación, CNN) for promoting a third party. CNN was given 48 hours to remove propaganda supporting LIDER. This continued media monitoring and campaign finance technical assistance, and support to the TSE provided citizens with updated information which was published on the 2015 elections website.

Given the success of the inter-institutional electoral security committee coordination, with monitoring and response coordinated by the TSE with CEPPS/IFES’ technical assistance during the first rounds of elections, the effort was replicated and improved during the run-off election on October 25, 2015. The importance of the continuous work of this committee was shared with the TSE by members of the institutions that participated, the leadership organizations and the MP. The representatives highlighted the impact of the committee’s work and what these efforts produced during the first round of elections. This further convinced the TSE to support and

32 strengthen the Committee and to continue the work leading up to the run-off, especially in the 11 municipalities in which the local elections had to be repeated due to electoral violence outbreaks during the first-round elections. Significant progress has been made in strengthening the capacity of the TSE to counter political violence. The TSE has exceeded its efforts and actions to counter political violence, and took a significant leadership role coordinating the security efforts, which helped position it as a proactive decision-maker and not just as a recipient of instructions from the national security agencies during the elections period.

CEPPS/IFES interventions to conduct campaign finance oversight were timely, targeted and responsive to the needs of the TSE. The support provided for media monitoring of campaign expenditure throughout the official campaign period proved to be an essential tool for collecting credible information to conduct oversight of political parties’ campaigns. The TSE was very receptive to citizens’ complaints and demands during the political and institutional crisis, which occurred in September 2015, only a few months short of the elections, The TSE was also able to increase oversight of political parties, especially during the official campaign period. In response, the TSE increased and dramatically improved its efforts in monitoring and auditing campaign expenses. The monthly audit reports and party expenditures allowed by the campaign ceiling were made public on time, and were well-received by Guatemalan citizens and media.5

Objective 3: Capacity of the Guatemalan government, Congress, TSE, political parties and civil society to promote and implement key reforms is increased (IFES-IRI-NDI)

Passage of Critical Legislation to Improve the Political System

Congress passed landmark legislation with CEPPS assistance, the most notable of which is the 2016 LEPP reform. CEPPS/NDI supported congressional and civil society deliberation of these reforms since 2012. During the political crisis, public demand for reforms to root out corruption and improve the political and electoral system made LEPP reforms one of the top policy priorities. CEPPS/NDI supported Congress to establish a joint legislative-civil society working groups to draft political and electoral reforms. To complement these efforts and pressure Congress to adopt the 85 jointly developed proposals, an advocacy group formed that included representatives from civil society organizations. CEPPS/NDI provided technical assistance on specific provisions under consideration, helped develop a methodology to discuss and track policy proposals and played a critical convening role for both Congress and civil society in each of these groups. These mechanisms for citizen participation, and the resulting legislation adopted by Congress, ultimately improved the transparency, efficiency and participation of marginalized populations in the political system.

After a short grace period following its passage in mid-February, the LOOL barred legislators from switching parties without facing repercussions. The law will likely help strengthen party blocs in Congress by facilitating building alliances and reducing uncertainty about how

5 CEPPS/NDI conducted media monitoring during the pre-campaign period. The TSE used the information to temporarily suspend all major political parties. CEPPS/IFES assumed the costs of the media monitoring during the campaign period, during which time the TSE use the information to permanently suspend all parties. CEPPS/NDI supplemented this information with reports collected through its long-term observation in 20 municipalities as well as with Mirador Electoral reports projecting political party spending.

33 legislators will vote on legislation. The number of laws passed in 2016, following its enactment, was the highest since 2010. CEPPS/NDI’s technical assistance helped incorporate key provisions into the final law, including the creation of a new congressional research body, reducing the potential for abuse of questioning proceedings as a means of blocking the legislative process, and introducing restrictions on party switching. LOOL reforms also included provisions that will facilitate publishing information online, including creating a new area on the official congressional website to receive public input and encourage engagement between citizens and elected officials. CEPPS/NDI will continue to support these efforts under a separate project supported by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). This initiative could help provide citizens with greater access to their members of Congress, as well as provide a space for citizens to provide recommendations during the policymaking process.

Strengthening Institutional Bodies

CEPPS/NDI’s approach prioritized the establishment and consolidation of new and existing committees such as Legislation and Constitutional Issues (Comisión de Legislación y Puntos Constitucionales), Governance (Comisión de Gobernación), Technical Support (Comisión de Apoyo Técnico) and Electoral Affairs (Comisión de Asuntos Electorales); deliberative forums such as the Security and Justice Working Group and the Multiparty Forum of Women Parliamentarians; and internal bodies such as the Legislative Directorate for Research and Studies (Dirección de Estudios e Investigación Legislativa, DEIL). The Multiparty Forum, comparable to a women’s caucus, provides a mechanism for women legislators to achieve further gender equity by ensuring that legislation is gender sensitive and that internal congressional operations are responsive and equitable for both male and female staff. This will be particularly important for the deliberation of new reforms to the LEPP as a key feature of the new bill will center on a gender quota. It could also help improve women’s leadership roles within Congress as advisers or researchers through additional LOOL reforms.

CEPPS/NDI’s assistance to the Security and Justice Working Group has helped institutionalize the body. Although not a formal committee, the congressional governing board charged the working group with developing draft legislation to then be considered by Congress. This was particularly helpful to gather proposals from a wide range of actors, as the working group includes representatives from Congress, civil society, international organizations, MP, CICIG, the UN and relevant judicial and executive branch agencies. This method provided a means for meaningful citizen participation in the policy development process. It also helped to advance legislation despite a deadlock within Congress. As the security group was responsible for implementing interparliamentary forums on security and justice legislation, it also lead Guatemalan efforts to coordinate the country’s efforts with others in the region to address shared challenges, such as immigration, security, and organized crime, though unified strategies and policies.

The DEIL represents a significant step toward improving the legislature’s technical capacity to develop and deliberate legislation. Given the high rotation of legislators and their staff, as well as legislators’ lack of permanent technical experts, the DEIL will help the Congress improve staff understanding of policy provisions during development and consideration of legislation. CEPPS/NDI supported initial efforts to establish the DEIL, including developing an

34 organizational framework and developing technical profiles for the recruitment of initial staff. Although the project concluded prior to the DEIL’s formal launch, CEPPS/NDI and the DEIL made progress in its initial establishment and will seek opportunities for future collaboration to contribute to the body’s consolidation and effective operation.

Increasing Legislative Transparency

The right to access public information is an essential pillar of democratization, allowing citizens to hold their government accountable in all aspects of public life. Despite the passage of a 2008 access to public information law in Guatemala, obtaining information remained difficult in practice, especially information regarding corruption issues. Legislation has little value if it is not implemented and if there is no penalty for noncompliance. Effective and complete implementation is largely dependent on a genuine legislative commitment to transparency— entailing both the adequate infrastructure in place to respond to requests and providing the right education to both the public and bureaucrats on their rights and obligations under the law. To achieve this commitment, CEPPS/IRI worked with the Guatemalan Congress and its Board of Directors, the Transparency Commission, the Access to Public Information Unit, and the Human Rights Ombudsman, to secure broad commitments for enhanced compliance with the access to public information law.

As part of this, CEPPS/IRI first conducted a diagnostic of internal processes, including compliance in publishing information and responding to public requests for access to information, procedures and internal regulations, and cooperation with other congressional offices. With results in hand, CEPPS/IRI then organized a series of trainings with over 100 technical and support staff targeting institutional deficiencies around the law’s major provisions, procedures and regulations, and presented recommendations to the Access to Public Information Unit on how to improve the handling of requests and the timeliness of responses, how to provide disclosures online, and how to reduce red tape from a request to fulfillment—which it subsequently adopted.

CEPPS/IRI also helped revamp the congressional web portal, which, according the diagnostic, published only 40 percent of public requests. As part of its new design, CEPPS/IRI incorporated features to better apprise citizens of status updates while simultaneously allowing them to provide inputs and feedback on public requests. CEPPS/IRI also incorporated an interactive forum allowing citizens to reach out to lawmakers on legislative issues and priorities.

To reinforce Congressional commitments on transparency and accountability, CEPPS/IRI helped the First Secretary of the Congress launch the “Here there is Open Access” public awareness campaign. It exposed more than 100,000 citizens to the law and how to submit requests. CEPPS/IRI showcased these accomplishments during the Alliance for an Open Congress in Guatemala’s (Alianza para un Congreso Abierto en Guatemala, ACAG) “Open Government National Action Plan” presentation to Congress, which secured broader commitments from Congressional leaders to enhance transparency and civic oversight. CEPPS/IRI’s involvement in the development of ACAG’s Open Government Partnership (OGP) action plan was also important, as it helped moderate working group discussions around legislative transparency

35 reforms. This is critical as USAID seeks to continue its support to OGP’s multilateral discussion model and Guatemala’s involvement in reform processes.

Collectively, CEPPS/IRI helped advance Congressional commitments to openness and transparency in decision-making. As a result, Congress and elected officials should be more accountable to voters. Citizens will not only have better information about how government manages its funds, but also clearer insights into the functions of government.

Objective 4: Cisgender and Transgender Women Political Participation is strengthened for the 2015 and future elections (IFES-IRI-NDI)

To strengthen cisgender and transgender women’s political participation, CEPPS supported processes to build their capacity and collaborated with government agencies and CSOs to reduce barriers to their political participation. In partnership with LGBTI organizations, CEPPS provided opportunities for groups to increase their capacity to advocate on behalf of their communities, build sustainable organizations and alliances and to increase the capacity of individuals to engage in public life. CEPPS worked directly with women candidates and elected officials to increase their capacity and effectiveness in public office. Additionally, CEPPS worked to reduce the barriers to political participation by identifying strategic entry points within government institutions and political parties. CEPPS supported efforts to increase public awareness on the challenges faced by LGBTI communities in Guatemala. By working to both increase capacity and reduce barriers, CEPPS sought to influence political customs and social norms such that democratic institutions and practices are embedded within organizations and not only individuals. While changes in norms and political customs remain as long term goals, key steps were made in the process during the program.

Increased Capacity

A key element to reducing barriers to political participation faced by cisgender and transgender women is increasing the knowledge and capacity of these populations to participate. Women continue to be underrepresented in politics and face significant barriers to entry in the political arena, including discrimination and violence. To reduce obstacles and increase political participation, CEPPS launched a training program for women candidates and newly elected women officials. In advance of the 2015 elections, women candidates received training on tools to run campaigns, including the development of effective messaging. Following the election, 25 women representatives from more than 10 political parties participated in trainings to boost their effectiveness in Congress through knowledge of parliamentary procedures, practices and methods to develop and advance gender-sensitive legislation and budgets. The pre and post-tests demonstrate a 42 percent reported change in knowledge about the political rights of women (including transgender women) as well as their barriers to political participation. The courses served as a launching pad for the development of a Multiparty Forum of Women Parliamentarians, which provides an unprecedented opportunity in the Guatemalan Congress for women legislators to discuss and advocate for measures that further the rights of women, including by ensuring that legislation is gender-sensitive and that internal congressional operations are responsive and equitable for women representatives and congressional staff.

36 Increasing the capacity of women representatives had the multiplier effect of the representatives identifying a strategic entry point to elevate women’s voices in Congress.

Additionally, CEPPS focused on building the capacity of LGBTI organizations to continue to advocate for their needs beyond the life of the program. The low capacity level of organizations advocating for vulnerable populations is a barrier to actively creating spaces through which for individuals are able to participate. In 2016, CEPPS implemented a political training course with two organizations representing LGBTI communities, Parallel Lives (Vidas Paralelas) and the Organization for Sexual Diversity in Culture, Education and the Arts (Organización de Diversidad Sexual para la Cultura, Educación y las Artes, ODISCEA). In tandem, CEPPS provided the organizations with technical assistance to improve accounting and administration systems to prepare the organizations to receive outside funding and support for project implementation. Technical assistance focused on skills-building to enable organizations to carry out future programs. Both organizations demonstrated an 80 percent increase in knowledge; however, the organizations still face challenges in managing external funds (see challenges section). In addition to increasing the capacity of individual organizations, CEPPS also provided opportunities for alliance building across LGBTI communities in Guatemala as well as organizations outside the country. Organizations representing various facets of LGBTI communities came together to develop a public policy that defends LGBTI rights.

Creating an Enabling Environment

Creating an enabling environment by removing barriers is the second key element of increasing the political participation of cisgender and transgender women. The 2015 baseline assessment identified fundamental barriers to participation for members of LGBTI communities, including access to DPIs, which is required to vote and run for office. To reduce these barriers, CEPPS worked with RENAP to ensure that transgender women have access to DPIs by conducting sensitization trainings with public-facing staff on the human rights of LGBTI communities to reduce discrimination. These staff are better prepared to provide effective and respectful registration services to all citizens. Members of LGBTI communities that have not registered for their DPI due to fear of discrimination may now be more likely to request their identity document. As possession of a DPI is required for participating fully in political life, these are critical advances. To institutionalize the gains, CEPPS supported RENAP to develop anti- discrimination trainings for all new staff and to develop anti-discrimination client service protocols. Additionally, CEPPS partnered with the TSE and following trainings with TSE staff, supported the TSE’s Institute for Civic, Political and Electoral Training (Instituto de Formación y Capacitación Cívico-Política y Electoral, IFCCPE) to develop anti-discrimination modules for new TSE staff.

The baseline assessment also found barriers to the participation of cisgender and transgender women in political parties. To reduce this barrier, CEPPS and the TSE Institute implemented a series of trainings on the rights of vulnerable populations for members of political parties, TODOS and the Convergence for the Democratic Revolution (Convergencia por la Revolución Democrática, CRD). Participants reported an increased understanding and anecdotally shared plans to engage vulnerable populations in party activities. A CEPPS-supported theater group provided a moving portrayal of the challenges faced by LGBTI communities, which served as a

37 catalyst for reflection and dialogue. Additionally, CEPPS increased opportunities for members of LGBTI communities to directly engage with candidates for public office in the 2015 elections. CEPPS also organized a series of roundtables between candidates and LGBTI organizations, which provided an opportunity for LGBTI groups to advocate for their needs to be included in governing plans, legislative initiatives and public policies. Survey responses indicate that the forums were a unique opportunity for participants to engage in dialogue with political leaders on important issues to their community, and candidates anecdotally indicated that the experience helped them better understand the needs of the LGBTI community.

To raise public awareness on the challenges faced by LGBTI communities, CEPPS supported the efforts of partner organizations to carry out public events. The events created opportunities for the general public to interact with stories of members of LGBTI communities as well as the individuals themselves. Throughout the program, CEPPS supported public events that commemorated Transgender Remembrance Day, International Women’s Day and LGBTI Pride and Dignity Day. The events elevated the voices of LGBTI communities through increased visibility and alliances between groups.

Sustainability

CEPPS incorporated sustainability into program activities by building the capacity of individuals and organizations to design and implement future activities, formalizing gains in anti- discrimination awareness at the institutional level and formalizing the women’s parliamentary forum. Key to the process of implementing a program that seeks sustainable change is understanding and meeting the needs of beneficiaries. In 2015, CEPPS conducted an assessment that mapped organizations representing LGBTI communities and their needs. This process allowed CEPPS to design a program with the necessary buy-in to engage individuals and organizations by increasing their own political participation.

On an individual level, participants trained during the program demonstrated increased understanding of the challenges faced by LGBTI communities and the human rights of these communities. The increased awareness constitutes the first step in attitude and behavior change. Anecdotally, members of political parties and government institutions committed to more inclusive practices. On the organization level, increased awareness within RENAP and the TSE led to the inclusion of anti-discrimination training for all new employees, a change in behavior from past practices. Additionally, the increased capacity of LGBTI organizations and elected women officials are sustainable gains, in that they are better prepared to advocate on behalf of the populations they represent.

Constraints/Challenges

Objective 1 The greatest challenge across the three observation processes supported by CEPPS/NDI was time constraints. The participating civil society organizations shared that the projects could have had a greater impact had they been able to observe for longer periods of time.

38 The evaluation activities carried out by CEPPS/NDI and AC served as an opportunity to identify and better understand the challenges faced by the local organizations: ● Given the sensitivity of monitoring electoral violence and campaign spending, some of the organizations received threats from local authorities. CEPPS/NDI and AC provided support to those organizations to respond safely and appropriately. ● Political parties resisted discussing the sources of their financing, especially since it was alleged that much of it came from illicit and/or illegal sources. In cases where information was provided, campaign finance observers found it difficult to verify. ● The geographic distances between the municipalities and the home location of local organizations supporting them was a challenge for some of the groups; the groups wanted to be able to provide more in-person support to the observers but did not always have sufficient resources for travel. ● While the final long-term observation (LTO) report was presented nationally, delays in compiling and editing the report hindered CEPPS/NDI and AC from presenting it at the community level. Formal presentations at the community level would have provided citizens with additional information on the electoral process. ● Lack of public knowledge of civic and political rights was a challenge both in the implementation of the LTO and during the citizen oversight project, which highlights the importance of continuing to support civic education processes. Citizens were not aware of their civic and political rights and thus in addition to implementing oversight projects, CEPPS/NDI and AC educated citizens while engaging them in oversight processes. ● Accessing public information from MIDES during the civic observation was a challenge. While access to public information is guaranteed under the law, in practice, accessing information from public institutions can be time consuming and is dependent on the local authorities. ● The organizations in AC’s network had varying levels of administrative and financial capacity, which presented challenges during the close-out of their small grants. Throughout the observation, some organizations took longer to reconcile their costs, which in turn impacted AC’s ability to finalize its financial reporting to submit to CEPPS/NDI.

The external evaluation of the Mirador Electoral coalition noted the following challenges and constraints: ● CEPPS/NDI and Mirador Electoral members faced tension between the project duration and the expected results. The project was more ambitious than what could realistically be achieved in the 12 months during which the organizations implemented their projects. ● Observation was limited by the territorial scope of organizations (except for the quick count that employed a random sample with national coverage). ● Of the two mechanisms used by Mirador Electoral to coordinate (director meetings and technical team meetings), the least efficient was the mechanism to bring together the directors. This may explain the difficulties related to the consortium identity, lack of a unified spokesperson, and eventual dominance of the identity of the organizations over the identity of the consortium. ● To maintain a permanent electoral monitoring coalition, new methodologies are required to provide timely, reliable, and verifiable information. One of the biggest challenges that would face the consortium, if it decided to maintain its efforts, is to equip itself with its

39 own technical capacity so that it can independently produce reports. Each organization adapted and deployed its own methodological tools for the 2015 elections. Shared observation instruments would be an important aspect to address in a long-term alliance.

Prior to launching the “Culture of Peace” series, CEPPS/IRI conducted a series of group interviews with government officials and civil society organizations both prior to and after the general election regarding violence prevention efforts being broadly implemented. Feedback suggested that while government agencies and institutions were implementing prevention initiatives, there was little to no coordination among them. Further, if an overarching strategy on prevention did exist, government actors across levels of government were uninformed or poorly trained on the strategy. This fragmentation not only resulted in duplicative efforts, but also cut resources and bandwidth for new initiatives. There was also little to no collaboration with community leaders, which is critical to adding depth and sustainability to local efforts. CEPPS/IRI responded to these challenges by expanding partnerships between government actors and agencies across levels of government, providing them with tools and resources to think and act collaboratively on prevention and helping them both incorporate and coordinate with civil society actors on prevention efforts.

Moreover, general prevention efforts were more active during the first-round of the election than the runoff, especially at the local level, primarily because mayoral and municipal councils do not participate and thus less enthusiasm is generated around local campaigns. As a result, government and civil society actors significantly decreased working on prevention after the first- round of voting, leading to sudden, albeit minor, spikes in violent conflict. To ensure continuity during the runoff period, CEPPS/IRI continued to support government and civil society actors in replicating training initiatives in target communities.

Objective 2 The constraints and challenges of the TSE to counter political violence and regulate campaign finance resided in the human resource capacity of the TSE. Staff was not adequately recruited, training was not a priority investment, and specifically, staff lacked information communications technology (ICT) skills hindering communication and coordination with relevant actors. Further, the TSE was unable to provide competitive salaries to retain the more qualified staff members or maintain.

The TSE magistrates were sworn in in 2014, and every rotation of the TSE magistrates to date has also resulted in high turnover of support staff. One of the challenges of this frequently changing workforce is that the new staff hires usually come with little or no election management experience and have a steep learning curve, which is detrimental in an election year. During 2015, there were also several senior staff that left the ranks of the TSE during elections preparations, including the head of the Coordination Unit of Regional Delegates and Sub-delegates and the Communications Director. Further, the sudden passing of the Director of the TSE’s IFCCPE had an impact on elections preparations.

The government budget cuts for the 2015 elections and delay in the disbursement of funds by the Ministry of Finance also had serious implications for the administration of the elections. International donor support was crucial and was coordinated to fill the gaps left by the budget

40 shortfall in areas such as voter registration, civic and voter education, elections ICT needs, poll- worker training, and the development and production of election materials.

Objective 3 Between 2012 and 2015, partisan divisions resulted in legislative deadlock in the Guatemalan Congress, generally preventing the passage of any major legislation supported by this project during that period. CEPPS supported the development and consideration of legislation throughout this period, which helped strengthen legislative staff’s technical understanding of priority laws. Many laws also were passed in committees but were unable to advance to the floor due to questioning proceedings that prevented consideration of legislation. Building consensus on these bills among different party members in committees represented progress, but the challenge of transforming bills into laws remained. Despite the deadlock, Congress did preliminarily pass LEPP reforms twice, which were sent to the CC for review. However, the CC review process has no established time frame, making it hard for Congress to predict when magistrates will complete their reviews and prolonging the reform process.

An additional significant constraint relates to institutional policies requiring annual rotation of congressional leaders. Committee chairs and members of the congressional governing board are renewed or rotated every January, which largely resulted in shifting policy priorities and disrupted continuity of CEPPS technical assistance on many measures. As the LEPP was a priority for most party leaders, it remained at the forefront of the policy agenda despite not having sufficient support for its passage. A series of LOOL reforms were developed under different committee leaders, and the constant rotation made it difficult to secure support from enough parties within the one-year periods to pass the bill in a plenary session. Constant rotation of committee leaders, compounded with partisan deadlock, created significant challenges to building consensus on or passing legislation within committees and within the full Congress.

Genuine commitments to transparency and civic oversight can be intimidating to political actors accustomed to a culture of secrecy and impunity—especially when corruption and organized crime is woven into the political fabric. This notion presented challenges for CEPPS/IRI when it sought to work with Congressional leaders and other political actors on issues of openness and transparency. There was a sense that openness and transparency would impinge or make it more difficult for lawmakers to make deals on legislative priorities and reforms by reducing the privacy needed for negotiators to explore their full range of options, including policies and reforms that might have been unpopular with their fellow partisans. CEPPS/IRI responded to this challenge by helping Congressional leaders and political actors understand the benefits of making such commitments.

Objective 4 The primary challenges CEPPS faced under Objective 4 were related to partnering with nascent civil society organizations that are organizationally weak and have competing priorities. At times, partner organizations had limited ability to participate due to organizational weaknesses, including limited human and financial resources. As members of vulnerable populations, some members of these organizations have not had access to higher levels of formal education or experience managing civil society organizations. Taking the context into account, CEPPS adjusted program approaches and prioritized capacity building of organizations that would likely

41 exist beyond the end of the program to help guarantee their permanence and institutional capacity. However, CEPPS still faced hurdles in building the capacity of the selected organizations. In 2016, CEPPS provided a subgrant to the National Network for Sexual Diversity and HIV (Red Nacional de la Diversidad Sexual y VIH, REDNADS), one of the higher capacity groups in Guatemala. However, REDNADS required additional support from CEPPS to evaluate project activities to provide the necessary information for reporting. Additionally, CEPPS provided ongoing technical assistance on accounting and financial management to ODISCEA and Parallel Lives; however, neither organization was prepared to receive external funding at the end of the project. While the organizations took steps to implement new accounting software and internal regulations and train staff on accounting principles and norms, the implementation of the new procedures were not yet strong enough to administer a subgrant.

Additionally, at times, organizations representing different populations within the LGBTI communities had competing priorities that challenged alliances and cooperative processes. During the process of providing recommendations for an LGBTI public policy, CEPPS played a role in mediating to ensure that all groups were able to participate. It was critical for groups to continue to participate in the process as to not de-legitimize the final document. CEPPS made a concerted effort to include as many LGBTI organizations as possible in the process.

The process of reducing institutional barriers is long-term. CEPPS was able to find strategic entry points within RENAP and the TSE; however, for larger scale changes in norms, the process would need to be repeated in additional government institutions. Additionally, while various political parties expressed interest in increasing awareness on the rights of LGBTI communities, only two parties ultimately chose to participate in these CEPPS activities. For sustained changes in norms and culture within political parties, ongoing training and accountability mechanisms on the inclusion of vulnerable populations are necessary for increased awareness to translate into behavior change.

Lessons Learned

Objective 1 It was clear from consultations with the AC network organizations that having a national-level organization serve as the umbrella group organizing the local-level observation was critical to the success of LTO. While there were challenges, all of the groups recognized the support that AC gave them throughout the process. In addition, the local groups were undertaking a project that was politically sensitive and included security risks. Having a nationally recognized organization supporting them allowed them to feel more secure conducting the work. For example when observers were threatened, AC was able to respond by holding a national press conference and engaging with the PDH and local police.

The observation was also crucial in generating greater political understanding in rural communities of citizen rights and the role of political actors. Observers from nearly all of the 20 municipalities stated that they believe the greatest impact of the project was educating citizens and bringing attention to issues that have been not addressed in their communities, which, while not the stated goal, is still an important contribution to the political system.

42 Other lessons learned from the AC LTO include: ● While the local groups were committed to implementing a successful observation and ultimately did so with the amount of funding available to them, the budget limitations affected the scale and impact of the activity. Observers reported using their stipend to purchase materials and the local groups reported needing more funds to better support the observers in the field. ● Despite threats and safety concerns, the observers were committed to fulfilling what they saw as their civic responsibility. ● The majority of the participating organizations believe that their ability to manage projects related to electoral and political participation, both from a financial and programmatic perspective, had been strengthened. ● The LTO was valuable in helping the organizations extend their territorial presence and create new relationships with community members through the creation of the observation network and the presentation of the project to community members. ● The participating organizations stated that the LTO helped them increase their knowledge on issues related to increasing citizen participation, mitigating electoral violence and/or monitoring campaign spending.

The external evaluation of the Mirador Electoral consortium identified the following lessons learned and recommendations: ● In the target municipalities, the political crisis provided a window of opportunity for the participation of youth, women and indigenous people in the electoral process. The presence of the consortium through local observers and activities conducted before and during the elections contributed to greater understanding of the meaning and significance of electoral participation. ● The effect that Mirador Electoral had on increasing citizen confidence was much more intense and important at the municipal level. After the political crisis began in April 2015, citizens were inclined to abstain from voting as a form of protest against corruption. Particularly at the municipal level, Mirador Electoral filled a void of confidence and legitimacy. ● Mirador Electoral should explore the feasibility of establishing a permanent election observation and citizen oversight body to improve coordination of work and organize training events, such as exchanges of experiences, methodologies and strategies, with other organizations or consortia observing elections. ● Mirador Electoral should continue to build linkages between its citizen coordinators, liaisons and volunteers to promote social capital developed during project implementation. This structure can be strengthened with low-cost interventions such as systematic access to information and ongoing training sessions. ● Mirador Electoral should deepen its work at the municipal level. Support to observers at the municipal level requires precise knowledge of the particular dynamics of each municipality, more easily done when a member organization has a presence in these territories. It is recommended that organizations based in Guatemala City make a consistent effort to conform their activities to local contexts.

Reducing and preventing political and electoral violence is critical ahead of any general election, but also challenging if approached too close to the official pre-electoral period. To be effective

43 and sustainable, CEPPS/IRI learned that prevention efforts must be implemented months before this period starts to encourage political parties, candidates and campaigns to champion a culture of peace. Party leaders and candidates, for example, could be encouraged to undertake efforts to avoid actions that could incite violence before, during and after the elections by signing pacts. Public and private institutions could develop and disseminate mapped areas of marked electoral violence prior to the pre-electoral period to help propose appropriate prevention strategies and allow citizens to prepare adequately. Even transparent voter registration mechanisms, accompanied by voter education campaigns, could be implemented well before the pre-electoral period to help prevent violence during the election.

Further, once the electoral period beings, there needs to be enhanced interagency coordination, cooperation and collaboration among national and local authorities for prevention to be effective. Establishing and/or bolstering networks can strengthen efforts by promoting communication and facilitating information flows, supporting the process of developing and disseminating new tactics and strategies and accelerating training initiatives. This can help reduce overlap, fragmentation and duplication of existing prevention efforts, and can free up resources for new initiatives.

Most importantly, citizens and communities need to be involved in planning and decision- making processes, as effective dialogue is an integral part of any process aimed at truly reducing and preventing violence. CEPPS/IRI learned that engaging large segments of society in the process helps add depth and sustainability so that citizens and communities can take ownership of building a culture of peace. One of the greatest strengths civil society organizations bring to the table is their capacity to support changes in how citizens and communities respond to violent conflict and to direct attention to the underlying causes that need to be addressed. Civil society actors also have the potential to play an important role in raising awareness of both the costs of continued violence and the opportunities and means to seek constructive engagement. If citizens, communities and organized civil society have been excluded from the process or believe that it has not addressed major drivers and underlying causes, they are less likely to work actively on prevention.

Objective 2 The lessons learned workshop conducted in December 2015, at the end of the electoral period, identified six operational strategic priority areas to improve future elections management and preparation: communication, infrastructure, organizational restructuring, permanent training, a management coordination unit, and budgeting. During this workshop, TSE authorities and officials identified solutions on these topics to implement before the next election. These recommendations helped the TSE strengthen the institution’s overall capacity in elections management, which advanced improvements during the 2015 post-elections period and will carry forward into the 2019 pre-election and elections cycle. The group agreed that one of the most important tasks would be to establish a management coordination unit. To that end, a CEPPS/IFES organizational development expert helped define the scope of the unit, its functions and potential unit members. A final report with these recommendations was submitted to the TSE.

44 Objective 3 The establishment of forums for consultation, debate and coordination proved to be a successful mechanism to advance on certain issues of the legislative agenda and engage a range of civil society actors in discussions with government officials. With CEPPS/NDI’s assistance, the consultation methodology for the Committee on Migration and the Security and Justice Working Group has allowed representatives from civil society and all branches of government to discuss policy issues. The methodology facilitated members’ reaching consensus and provided committee members with opinions on all aspects of different issues, enriching both the policymaking process by making it more participatory as well as the draft legislation by making it more comprehensive.

The January 2016 inauguration of new legislators, combined with continued civic pressure, helped Congress to quickly advance on many priority reform laws. In the first four months of the new Congress’ operation, CEPPS/NDI provided technical assistance to legislators on measures that stalled in the previous sessions, including the LEPP and LOOL. CEPPS/NDI trainings for newly elected legislators helped prepare them to deliberate and pass these reforms within these first few months. Previous CEPPS/NDI assistance provided between 2013 and 2016 to re-elected legislators also helped ensure that they were in a position to continue deliberations on these measures and position them for rapid advancement. Given high public expectations for change and immediate action following elections, these policy advances, as well as CEPPS/NDI’s assistance during reform deliberations, helped legislators deliver on promises to improve the political system.

Changes in public administration, both in the executive and legislative branches, and at the national and local levels, may generate institutional memory loss, resulting in waning political will and programming delays. Minimizing institutional memory loss by orienting incoming officials and support staff as quickly as possible, as well as helping them understand the benefits of following through on such commitments, is key to ensure that efforts are continuous and that institutions do not experience significant setbacks.

Helping congressional leaders and other political actors understand the benefits of making commitments to open government principles is critical to generating openness and transparency in decision-making affecting the general public. CEPPS/IRI learned that these challenges can be overcome if champions at the highest levels of office can help carry these efforts forward. In order to secure these broad commitments from congressional leaders and political actors, CEPPS/IRI involved the president, first secretary, and the congressional governing board, the Transparency and Integrity Commissions, and technical teams and support staff, to understand both the value and their obligations under the law on enacting reforms that enhance openness and transparency, and enable citizens to more fully participate in public life. CEPPS/IRI also helped launch a public campaign with the first secretary of the Congress to help citizens learn and develop expectations of lawmakers being committed to such principles. This was key in sending citizens the message that they have a unique role in demanding that their governments become more open, accountable, and responsive to their needs.

45 Objective 4 Working with nascent civil society organizations and individuals from vulnerable populations who have never had the opportunity to participate in public policy discussions, carry out studies or manage funds required CEPPS to adjust training methodologies to meet the needs of all participants. As an example, during discussions on a potential LGBTI public policy, the majority of participants had not previously taken part in the design and formulation of public policy, which meant that many of the initial meetings were tailored to focus on discussion of what a public policy consists of and why it is important. CEPPS adjusted the methodology to include more sessions for discussion and reflection and increased understanding of policy approaches.

Additionally, CEPPS noted that in the dialogue spaces with political parties, additional hurdles existed to shift attitudes towards vulnerable populations. CEPPS found that, in these instances, theater was an effective methodology; the visualization of the challenges LGBTI individuals face helps create an emotional response among participants. Political party members also had the opportunity to interact with the theater group, who identify as LGBTI. While members of political parties noted the future inclusion of vulnerable populations, additional mechanisms to engage parties on diversity and inclusion are necessary for the increased awareness from the training to shift into sustained attitude and behavior changes.

Gender Integration

Gender integration was a priority for the CEPPS partners in the design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of the project. CEPPS’ approach does not assume that policies and interventions affect all participants in the same way, and thus the project involved both men and women, including those who identify as LGBTI, and took into account their different experiences. CEPPS recognized the historical exclusion of women, in particular transgender women, in Guatemala and believed that program interventions needed to be designed to address inequalities that persist in the political sphere. Gender considerations were mainstreamed into Objectives 1, 2 and 3, while Objective 4 specifically focused on the needs of cisgender and transgender women in increasing their political participation.

Objective 1 CEPPS/NDI worked to ensure that the AC observation methodology had a strong gender and LGBTI inclusion component. Gender considerations were included in the LTO observation forms and the AC press releases and conferences regularly highlighted how violence particularly impacted women. Of the 12 organizations in the AC network, six specifically focused on gender and women’s issues. In addition, eight of the organizations were led by women.

The Guatemala observation program was one of the four pilot countries that informed the development of CEPPS/NDI's "Votes without Violence" program and toolkit. This toolkit, which was launched in September 2016, is designed to strengthen the capacity of domestic election observers to monitor and mitigate violence against women during elections, which is a major barrier for women's political participation and, as such, can undermine the very democratic integrity of an election. Attention to gender and the observation of violence against women during the election was integrated thoroughly into the project, exemplified by the fact that more than 50 percent of the observers in AC's observer network were women. This high level of

46 inclusion also strengthened other aspects of the observation, in particular relating to culturally sensitive information about gender-based violence that observers collected; observers and AC staff remarked that female observers were better placed to collect information on incidents such as sexual assaults, which women would be more reluctant to share with men. The methodology piloted by AC also was innovative in its attention to gender, not only because it included questions specifically about violence against women, but also in its dedication to disaggregating by gender throughout the process of data collection and analysis in order to capture the different issues and concerns for women and for men. In this aspect, the Guatemala program was able to collect rich and more complete data. The toolkit, as well as a video testimonial from the AC LTO coordinator, can be found at: https://www.ndi.org/votes-without-violence

As part of its “Culture of Peace” series, CEPPS/IRI incorporated modules on gender-based and domestic violence, helping to raise awareness of local realities and promoting avenues and approaches for effective prevention. CEPPS/IRI also leveraged its Women’s Democracy Network (WDN)—a member-driven mentorship initiative that aims to increase women’s political participation, leadership and representation in elected office—to help women’s groups learn how to assume leadership roles in political and civic life. WDN’s Guatemala Chapter, one of the most active in the region, maintains active programming in the country, and as such, is able to continue aiding women’s groups on a case-by-case basis.

Further, as part of its investigative journalism series, CEPPS/IRI sought to ensure that gender parity was an integral part of the beneficiary selection process, and that gender perspectives and sexual diversity issues were integrated into the content. This included helping journalists learn to reduce heterosexual biases in their reporting, dispel common myths around HIV/AIDS, and increase the visibility and contributions of women and LGBTI persons in the community. CEPPS/IRI prioritized including LGBTI journalists in the training series as well, which resulted in one transgender student participating. The inclusion of LGBTI individuals was a priority because these persons traditionally do not have the same access and opportunities as do other Guatemalans. Because of the stigma associated with these identities, most Guatemalans are not familiar with LGBTI individuals. This transgender student’s participation was meaningful to her professional development and also provided the other students with a unique opportunity to engage with someone who has experienced the challenges of this community firsthand. This exposed peers to the realities and hardships LGBTI persons face on a daily basis, while providing valuable insight from someone that lived through the experience.

Objective 2 CEPPS/IFES generated demand for gender parity and inclusion in all aspects of TSE capacity strengthening. For example, CEPPS/IFES intentionally and regularly reached out to both men and women working in the TSE. Given the low level of women working for the TSE, CEPPS/IFES purposely recruited women to participate in its activities and made its intentions of gender parity for participation in these trainings a key talking point with the TSE leadership and throughout the organization. Although the numbers do not reflect gender parity, they do reflect a better effort on the part of the TSE to have a more representative office, where women work alongside men and are responsible for the strategic direction of the office.

As part of the work CEPPS/IFES did on campaign finance, it included discussions on how

47 financial factors hinder (or help) increased gender equality in politics and how reforms in this area can help achieve a more equal competition between women and men. Predictably, the outcomes indicate a need for specific attention, analysis and programming on the issue of gender and political finance in Guatemala, with a focus on how and why the TSE is responsible and a potential key catalyst for addressing the gender inequality in campaign finance and the specific barriers women candidates face.

Although IFES’ global tool on Violence Against Women in Elections (VAWIE) was in development at the time of the implementation of this project, the data collected from this project was incorporated into the VAWIE framework, which recognizes that violence against women in elections is a threat to the integrity of the electoral process. In Guatemala, the vast majority of cases of violence against women in both public and private spaces is not reported. Individuals do not have access to methods for reporting violence beyond the existing formal structures. Further, in public spaces, authorities have little capacity to address violence against women, including character assassinations and threats. VAWIE was developed with reflections from the Guatemala project to better understand and address the ways in which electoral violence creates a barrier to women’s political participation, as well as the participation of individuals from other marginalized groups, and to specifically identify and address the unique issues related to gender- based election violence.

Objective 3 A major component of the project since its inception has been supporting reforms to the LEPP. Since 2012, CEPPS/NDI provided technical assistance to Congress and civil society organizations on ways to improve women’s political representation, particularly through the inclusion of a gender quota in the LEPP. As part of the working group on reforms to the LEPP that took place during the 2015 political crisis, CEPPS/NDI helped identify areas in which reforms proposed by legislators and civil society representatives could be more inclusive. One of the points discussed was whether or not to enact a quota for women on party lists to increase their representation as candidates and eventually as elected officials. In addition, CEPPS/NDI encouraged civil society partners (particularly groups representing the LGBTI community) to participate in the working groups. While women’s groups actively participated, LGBTI groups were less active despite CEPPS/NDI’s encouragement. As Congress continued to work on finalizing reforms to the LEPP, one of the more contentious debates was over adopting the gender quota. The version of the LEPP that was sent by Congress to the Constitutional Court in 2015 included the gender quota, which the court ruled as constitutional. However, despite pressure from civic organizations, the newly sworn-in members of the present Congress removed any mention of a quota from the law that was ultimately passed. In spite of this disappointing setback, CEPPS/NDI continued to support the CEAE in including the gender quota in the next generation of reforms that the Congress began to deliberate in late 2016. The quota currently under debate would require a minimum of 30 percent of candidates on congressional party lists to be women and require alternation between men and women. If passed, this would be the first time a gender quota is enacted in the Guatemalan political system and would represent a significant step forward for gender equality.

CEPPS/NDI ensured that gender considerations were taken into account in its study on the 2015 electoral process. CEPPS/NDI’s study includes an analysis of women’s political participation,

48 both as citizens exercising their right to vote, which they do at a high rate, and as political actors running for or elected to public office, which happens at a much lower rate than men.

While providing assistance to the Commission on Migrants, CEPPS/NDI ensured that migration policy provisions included discussion on the specific rights and needs of women and children. According to many testimonies and reports on human rights violations committed against migrants, women and children are more likely to be subject to particular rights abuses, including sexual violence and sex trafficking. CEPPS/NDI discussed these abuses and supported the commission to take them into consideration during discussions.

Objective 4 As noted, Objective 4 focused on increasing the political participation of cisgender and transgender women and as such, all activities included a gender component. Through the assessment conducted under this objective, CEPPS gained an increased understanding on the priorities of cisgender and transgender women, and was able to implement a more relevant and impactful project. The work with RENAP was critical for addressing discrimination against transgender women. The training process for newly elected women was particularly successful in addressing the importance of gender, building the skills of women legislators and encouraging female legislatures to work together to address the needs of all Guatemalan women. Please see the Objective 4 Activity and Success Stories annexes for more details.

Recommendations for future actions

Guatemala is at a critical crossroads. Sustaining and deepening the process of constructive change begun during the project implementation period is dependent on the consolidation of advances in effective civic mobilization and civil society engagement with government actors. Improved governance, through tackling corruption and strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law, lies at the center of the Alliance for Prosperity’s6 vision for Guatemala. Central for securing better governance mechanisms is marshalling the political will of key actors. The successful passage of reforms in 2016 demonstrated that political will to enact positive change can be generated as a result of the mobilization of citizens and implementation of dialogue mechanisms between civil society and decision-makers. A window of opportunity exists to achieve further progress. To take advantage of this opportunity, the landmark reforms passed by Congress must actually be put into practice and public expectations for a more transparent and inclusive political system be further addressed well before the next election cycle gets underway. To build on these gains and secure new advances, CEPPS recommends considering the following areas of action: ● Support civil society in continuing to implement observation initiatives in the period between elections that contribute to reduced corruption and violence by providing oversight (auditoria social) of public officials’ statements, policies and conduct; ● Work with Mirador Electoral prior to the electoral period to explore the feasibility of establishing a permanent election observation and citizen oversight body to improve coordination of work;

6 A U.S.-backed initiative aimed at boosting economic growth and improving security conditions in the Northern Triangle countries over five years (2016-2020).

49 ● Provide technical assistance to Mirador Electoral in the lead up to the 2019 elections, which are scheduled for earlier in the year than in past electoral cycles as a result of the LEPP reforms, to conduct long-term, issue-based observations at the municipal and national levels and to implement an election day quick count; ● Support local community leaders’ capacity to mediate and resolve violent conflict; ● Strengthen independent journalists’ ability to identify and analyze potential conflicts and social problems; ● Assist the TSE to implement key provisions of reforms to the LEPP, including increased campaign finance oversight and out of country voting (OCV) as well as take measures to prepare for the 2019 elections and potential referendums on border issues with Belize and constitutional reforms to the judiciary; ● Support political parties to adapt to LEPP reforms to facilitate compliance with electoral regulations, strengthen social inclusion practices and improve internal democracy mechanisms; ● Assist government and civil society actors to develop proposals for the next generation of electoral reforms, that could include measures such as quotas for proportional representation of women and indigenous communities, oversight mechanisms to deter the abuse of judicial processes by political parties and protocols for increased internal democracy within political parties; ● Strengthen the capacity of Congress to deliberate, develop and pass political and institutional reforms, particularly in relation to strengthening internal legislative procedures and on electoral, security, justice, transparency and anti-corruption issues; and ● Support LGBTI communities to strengthen their political participation by: continuing to build the administrative and advocacy capacity of civil society organizations; supporting legal and advocacy initiatives that seek to improve public policy and legislation on LGBTI issues; engaging the TSE during the pre-election period to promote inclusion of LGBTI communities in electoral processes; and involving political parties on inclusion- related issues outside of the electoral period and before their party candidate lists are determined.

IV. RESULTS

Please see Annex 2 for the Performance Indicator Tracking Tool (PITT) that includes all indicator data for the life of the project.

Indicators and cumulative results (August 17, 2012 - September 30, 2014):

Goal: The Guatemalan political system is more transparent, responsive and accountable

Impact Indicator 1: Number of draft laws subject to substantive amendment and final vote in legislatures receiving USG (United States Government) assistance

No results to report during the period of August 17, 2012 - September 30, 2014. However, Impact Indicator 3.0.1 captured the same data following the reprogramming. By the end of the project, three laws receiving CEPPS assistance were subject to final vote in the legislature and were ultimately approved. See Impact Indicator 3.0.1 below for a description of the laws.

50

Objective 1: Government, Congress, electoral body, political party and civil society capacity to promote and implement electoral reform increased

Indicator 1.0.1: Number of laws or amendments to ensure credible elections drafted with USG technical assistance

One law to ensure credible elections was drafted with CEPPS/NDI technical assistance between August 17, 2012 and September 30, 2014. During FY14Q1, the Guatemalan Congress drafted a LEPP reform bill, Reform Initiative 4783, which 105 legislators approved for CC review. While this draft law was not the final version that was ultimately passed, the draft was an important step in laying the groundwork for the development of the LEPP reform bill that was passed in FY16 (see Impact Indicator 3.0.1 below).

Indicator 1.0.2: Number of partner civil society organizations that participate in legislative proceedings and/or engage in advocacy with national legislature and its committees

Twenty civil society organizations participated in legislative proceedings and/or engaged in advocacy with the national legislature and its committees between August 17, 2012 and September 30, 2014. See Annex 3 for a list of organizations, which consortium they belong to, and their institutional areas of focus.

Civil society groups focused on women and indigenous rights and political participation were particularly instrumental in advocating for the inclusion of a gender quota for parties to improve women’s representation on party lists as well as a provision requiring indigenous candidates in majority-indigenous regions in the original LEPP reform bill that was approved by Congress and presented to the CC. Even though the CC approved the quotas as constitutional, the members of Congress that voted on the final bill in 2016 removed any mention of a quota to increase the number of women or indigenous candidates from the approved law. Despite this setback, the inclusion of the quotas and their approval by the CC sets an important precedent and makes it more like that will be included in the next generation of reforms.

Although this indicator was not included in the M&E plan from October 1, 2014 - January 31, 2017, civil society continued to play a critical role in advocating for reforms. Through ad hoc working groups and participatory dialogues facilitated by CEPPS/NDI, congressional representatives and civil society organizations came together regularly to debate reforms, including those encompassed by the LEPP. Following approval of the LEPP by Congress in April 2016, the final step was for President Jimmy Morales to sign or veto the legislation. He initially indicated that he did not believe that the reforms went far enough in improving the political and electoral system and that he was considering vetoing the legislation. However, civil society (including members of Mirador Electoral and National Convergence for Political Reform [Convergencia Nacional por la Reforma Política, CONAREP], both supported under this project) came out strongly in favor of approving the reforms, even if they did not meet all of their demands, as it still represented significant advances. After consulting with civil society, President Morales approved the reforms in May 2016. In addition to playing an important role in

51 influencing the reforms, civil society played a critical role in advocating for the final approval of the new law.

LLR 1.1: Consensus on key electoral reforms is reached through discussion and analysis

Indicator 1.1.1: Number of agreements reached through consensus-building processes on electoral reforms

With CEPPS/NDI assistance, the Guatemalan Congress drafted and submitted to the CC a LEPP reform bill, Reform Initiative 4783, which was the result of significant consensus-building efforts, including through public forums, workshops for legislators and their staff, and dialogues with civil society organizations.

LLR 1.2: Congress, political parties and civil society debate reforms to the political system

Indicator 1.2.1: Number of references to partner civil society organizations' efforts related to political and electoral reforms in major media sources

From August 17, 2012 to September 30, 2014, there were 205 references to in major media sources related to CEPPS/NDI partner civil society organizations’ efforts on advocating for political and electoral reforms. Media coverage of the civil society efforts related to political and electoral reforms helped raise public awareness of the LEPP reforms under deliberation and maintain LEPP reforms as a priority within Congress. While this indicator was not included in the M&E plan from October 1, 2014 - January 31, 2017, media attention to citizen demands for reforms to the political and electoral system during the 2015 political crisis was critical in catalyzing Congress to continue to debate and ultimately approve LEPP and other reforms. See Annex 4 for a breakdown of the news source and topic.

LLR 1.3: Processes and plans are developed to implement electoral reforms

Indicator 1.3.1: Number of processes and plans to implement electoral reforms developed

No results to report. These activities were designed to take place following final passage of reforms to the LEPP by the Guatemalan Congress, which did not occur during the August 17, 2012 to September 30, 2014 period.

Indicator 1.3.2: Number of individuals who receive technical assistance on implementing electoral reforms

CEPPS/IFES provided 16 individuals with technical assistance between August 17, 2012 and September 30, 2014 on implementing electoral reforms.

LLR 1.4: Best practices and lessons learned from Guatemala are shared with international organizations and other countries

52 Indicator 1.4.1: Number of different actors with which documents containing best practices and lessons learned are directly shared

No results to report. In the original program design, CEPPS partners had planned to compile lessons learned throughout the project to be included in a comprehensive document that was be drafted and shared upon the project’s completion. However, this indicator and activity were removed during the reprogramming and a document covering the period of August 17, 2012 to September 30, 2014 was not produced. See Activity 1.1.6 in the Activity Implementation section in Annex 9 for a list of documents containing best practices and lessons learned developed by CEPPS/NDI and local partners during the October 1, 2014 - January 31, 2017 period.

Objective 2: Congressional oversight and lawmaking capacity increased

Indicator 2.0.1: Percentage of amendments to Congressional procedures and/or functions drafted with CEPPS technical assistance that are passed

Between August 17, 2012 and September 30, 2014, with CEPPS/NDI technical assistance, the Technical Assistance Committee (Comisión de Apoyo Técnico, CAT) in Congress finalized a LOOL reform bill that was later introduced for full congressional consideration and eventually passed (see Impact Indicator 3.0.1 below).

Indicator 2.0.2: Number of national legislators and national legislative staff participating in skills-building exchanges or education events

Between August 17, 2012 and September 30, 2014, a total of 51 national legislators and national legislative staff participated in skills-building exchanges or education events supported by CEPPS partners.

CEPPS/NDI supported the participation of 31 legislators and legislative staff in a series of six skills-building exchanges, including 18 women and two indigenous people, from 11 legislative entities: CAT, Unit on Access to Public Information (Unidad de Acceso a la Información Pública), Extraordinary National Committee for Transparency (Comisión Extraordinaria Nacional por la Transparencia), Extraordinary Committee for the Study and Analysis of Delegislation (Comisión Extraordinaria Encargada del Estudio y Análisis para la Deslegislación), Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on Tourism, Congressional Governing Board, Committee on Security and Intelligence, Committee on the Interior, Committee on Defense and the Committee on Public Finances.

CEPPS/IRI supported the participation of 15 legislators and five legislative staff (20 people in total, including seven women) in two skills-building exchanges or educational events from two legislative entities: the Extraordinary National Committee for Transparency and the Integrity Commission.

LLR 2.1: Consensus on key measures to strengthen Congressional regulation of procedures and functions is reached through discussion and analysis

53 Indicator 2.1.1: Number of agreements reached through consensus-building processes on Congressional regulation of procedures and functions

A total of four agreements were reached through consensus-building processes on congressional regulation of procedures and functions between August 17, 2012 and September 30, 2014 with support from CEPPS/NDI: ● In FY14Q1, the CAT’s team of legislative advisers from the Permanent Technical Assistance Unit (Unidad Permanente de Asistencia Técnica, UPAT) drafted a preliminary LOOL reform bill utilizing proposals made by civil society, the result of consensus-building efforts including public forums and dialogues with civil society organizations. ● In FY14Q4, the Legislative Directorate and congressional governing board reached three agreements through consensus-building processes on congressional regulation of procedures and functions related to the acquisition of a new electronic voting system: 1) to conduct a technical assessment of the conditions of the congressional chamber; 2) to develop a guide to ensure the proper installation of the electronic voting system; and 3) to develop technical terms of reference for the Congress to successfully implement the new electronic voting system.

LLR 2.2: Oversight skills of congressional representatives strengthened

Indicator 2.2.1: Number of Congressional representatives that show increased oversight skills and knowledge as a result of USG assistance

Zero (0) Congressional representatives showed increased oversight skills and knowledge as a result of USG assistance, mainly due to changes in the scope of work. See analysis section for more information.

LLR 2.3: Congressional leaders develop skills and knowledge to analyze, draft, discuss, approve and implement priority democracy-related legislation

Indicator 2.3.1: Number of democracy-related actions, procedures or bills drafted with CEPPS technical assistance

One democracy-related action, procedure or bill was drafted with technical assistance from CEPPS/NDI. During FY13Q4, CEPPS/NDI provided technical assistance to the Committee on Legislation and Constitutional Issues (Comisión de Legislación y Puntos Constitucionales, CLPC) during LCP deliberations to improve deputies’ ability to draft LCP reforms. The CLPC convened three public roundtable discussions on LCP reforms with CEPPS/NDI assistance. Fifteen organizations attended and submitted proposals to reform the LCP. With support from CEPPS/NDI, the CLCP successfully concluded 10 roundtable discussions regarding the reforms to the LCP. During FY14Q1, utilizing a report on LCP reform prepared by CEPPS/NDI, the CLPC decided to produce a manual for nominations committees to improve their ethical and procedural practices and to increase their transparency.

54 LLR 2.4: Best practices and lessons learned are shared with key stakeholders, political parties and Congress

Indicator 2.4.1: Number of different actors with which a document containing lessons learned and best practices are directly shared

No results to report. In the original program design, CEPPS partners had planned to compile lessons learned throughout the project to be included in a comprehensive document that was drafted and shared upon the project’s completion. However, this indicator and activity were removed during the reprogramming and a document covering the period of August 17, 2012 to September 30, 2014 was not produced. See Activity 1.1.6 in the Activity Implementation section in Annex 9 for a list of documents containing best practices and lessons learned developed by CEPPS/NDI and partners during the October 1, 2014 - January 31, 2017 period.

Indicators and cumulative results (October 1, 2014 - January 31, 2017):

Cross-cutting: Output Indicator 1: Number of USG supported activities designed to promote or strengthen the civic participation of women.

Between October 1, 2014 and January 31, 2017, the CEPPS partners implemented 123 activities designed to promote or strengthen the civic participation of women. Types of activities (most of which included multiple activities as part of implementation) included: ● Trainings for female poll workers; ● Implementation of candidate roundtables that focused on LGBTI rights; ● Trainings with female candidates running for congressional and municipal office; ● An exchange with participants from Nicaraguan LGBTI communities on advocacy techniques; ● Outreach with the TSE in 2015 on gender inclusion in the elections; ● Implementation of a get-out-the-vote campaign with women and LGBTI voters; ● Trainings to increase women's capacity to participate effectively in the political process and to prevent violence; ● Development of a public policy on non-discrimination of LGBTI populations; ● Support to civil society on implementing an International Women’s Day activity; ● Implementation of training modules on LGBTI rights and non-discrimination with the TSE personnel; ● Implementation of training modules on LGBTI rights and non-discrimination with the RENAP personnel; ● Development and presentation of the theater piece “Transformation of Thought”; ● Implementation of training modules on LGBTI rights with political parties; ● Implementation of training modules with lesbian civil society groups; ● Training of newly elected female congressional representatives and city council representatives; ● Support in the development of the women’s parliamentary forum in congress; and ● Support in the development of the association of women representatives at the municipal level.

55 All activities with LGBTI communities included a specific focus on promoting or strengthening the civic participation of lesbians and/or transgender women, although some activities (such as the public policy and candidate roundtables) also included gay men and/or transgender men.

Objective 1 Impact Indicator 1.0.1: Number of concrete actions regarding campaign financing and electoral violence taken by authorities in response to findings and/or recommendations made by USG- assisted CSOs and/or media outlets

Thirteen concrete actions regarding campaign financing and electoral violence were taken by authorities in response to findings and/or recommendations made by CEPPS supported CSOs and/or media outlets.

CEPPS/NDI Ten (10) of the actions were taken in response to recommendations made by CEPPS/NDI- supported CSOs, either through the Mirador Electoral coalition or the AC network.

One (1) concrete action, specifically the passage of the LEPP, was taken by Congress and the president in part in response to advocacy by groups comprising Mirador Electoral. As noted, the legislation passed by Congress included input from CEPPS/NDI-supported civil society groups, and President Jimmy Morales had indicated that he was considering vetoing the legislation but ultimately approved it after pressure from civil society that included CEPPS/NDI-supported groups. An example of a concrete action taken by Congress related to campaign financing that can be directly attributed to this project is the inclusion of the regulation of media airtime in the LEPP. The new law states that parties can no longer buy their own airtime, rather airtime must be purchased by the TSE and distributed to the political parties. CEPPS/NDI-supported civil society advocated for this measure, and media monitoring by AC through the company Monitoreo Tecnológico (MONITEC) and media monitoring by the Association for Development, Organization and Sociocultural Studies (Asociación Desarrollo, Organización, Servicios y Estudios Socioculturales, DOSES) as part of the Mirador Electoral coalition provided concrete data for these advocacy efforts.

Four (4) concrete actions were taken by the TSE in response to findings from CEPPS/NDI- supported CSOs: ● On May 15, 2015 the TSE published a press release on dialogue with civil society, including Mirador Electoral member Collective Association for the Defense of Women’s Rights in Guatemala (Asociación Colectiva para la Defensa de los Derechos de las Mujeres en Guatemala, CODEFEM).7 In addition to recommendations on women’s political participation, the group discussed the LEPP and the need to reform campaign finance laws.

7 TSE, Civil Society Dialogue with TSE Magistrates, Official Press Communiqué No. 002, 15 May 2014 http://tse.org.gt/images/comunicados/002- Sectores%20de%20la%20sociedad%20civil%20en%20dilogo%20con%20el%20Pleno%20de%20Magistrados%20del%20TSE.p df

56 ● On May 28, 2015 the TSE published another press release that incorporates recommendations from Mirador Electoral on reforms to the LEPP, including reforms on campaign finance laws.8 ● The TSE included a section in their manual for training poll workers at the JRVs on the rights of voters from the LGBTI community. ● Following a September 28, 2015 AC press conference in which AC provided recommendations to the TSE on responding to and mitigating violence, the TSE agreed to pay for damage to 23 schools in 11 municipalities that were used as polling centers on September 6.9

Four (4) concrete actions regarding campaign financing and electoral violence were taken by authorities in response to findings and/or recommendations made by AC LTO observers supported by CEPPS/NDI. These actions are anecdotal and were shared by AC observers during evaluation sessions with CEPPS/NDI: ● San Lucas, Sacatepéquez: observers reported denouncing incidents of intimidation towards a member of the LGBTI community by a member of the political party LIDER to the PDH. LIDER representatives eventually apologized for the incident. ● Cotzal, Quiche: A female observer reported that during the first round observers noted that party pollwatchers were intimating female voters and that there were not sufficient conditions for voting in secret. The observers reported this to the electoral authorities and PDH. During the second round, she stated that conditions had improved. ● Colotenango, Huehuetenango: an observer shared an example of a female citizen being illegally detained over publicly disagreeing with the mayor. The observer approached a representative from the Office for the Protection of Indigenous Women (La Defensoría de la Mujer Indígena, DEMI), who helped the citizen find legal assistance. ● El Estor, Izabal: With AC technical assistance, the organization Junajil (which is part of the AC network) facilitated a “political-ethical non-aggression pact” at the departmental level. The pact was signed by seven political parties in the presence of COPREDEH and the departmental governor’s office. Members of the LGBTI community were present.

Numerous AC observers reported close coordination with the police and PDH in their communities and stated this coordination and communication helped mitigate violence. CEPPS/NDI also published the blog series “Voices from Guatemala”10 that captured illustrative examples of the impact of the AC LTO and Mirador Electoral observation for the observers and their communities.

One (1) concrete action was taken by MIDES following the presentation of the final report of the pilot civic observation (auditoria social) project. The MIDES executive director sent a formal request to AC asking for follow-on for support to implement the recommendations in the report. AC has indicated that they will continue to support MIDES after this project ends.

8 TSE, Official Press Communiqué No. 014, 29 May 2015 http://tse.org.gt/images/comunicados/014%20Comunicado%20de%20Prensa%20-%20A%20la%20Ciudadania%2029-05- 2015.pdf 9http://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/politica/hubo-violencia-en-elecciones-segun-observacion-ciudadana 10 https://www.demworks.org/series/voices-guatemala

57 CEPPS/IRI Three (3) concrete actions regarding campaign financing and electoral violence were taken by authorities in response to findings and/or recommendations made by CEPPS/IRI assisted CSOs and/ or media outlets: ● COPREDEH took two (2) concrete actions in response to findings made by INTRAPAZ during one of CEPPS/IRI’s “Culture of Peace” training. COPREDEH’s departmental delegate from Quetzaltenango conducted workshops in Coatepeque and Quetzaltenango that discussed core elements and approaches to violence prevention. Attendees included representatives from the Ministry of the Interior, the PNC, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Ministry of Health of Quetzaltenango, and the Citizen Registry of the TSE. ● The PDH, the Health Ministry of the Ixil Area, representatives from the youth-based organization Nebaj Neighbors in Social Action (Vecinos de Nebaj en Acción Social, VENAS) and local media Radio Voice of Nebaj and Cablevision Turansa took one (1) concrete action in response to findings made by INTRAPAZ during one of CEPPS/IRI’s “Culture of Peace” trainings. These entities conducted a workshop on core elements and approaches to violence prevention in the Municipality of Santa Maria Nebaj.

Outcome Indicator 1.1.1: Number of references to and acknowledgement of the AC coalition and Mirador Electoral monitoring reports and recommendations by the media, civil society organizations, political parties, candidates, and/or the TSE.

From October 1, 2014 to January 31, 2017, there were 114 media references to statements or reports made by AC and/or Mirador Electoral. Please see Annex 5 for type of media outlet and type of reference or acknowledgement. CEPPS/NDI notes that there were minor modifications to the PITT in FY2015 to reflect the accurate, final data.

Outcome Indicator 1.1.2: Number of election observers deployed through the Mirador Electoral and AC coalition networks.

There were 2,469 unique election observers deployed through the Mirador Electoral and AC coalition networks.

Table 2: Number of Election Observers by Organization Organization Number of observers deployed

AC Coalition

Acción Ciudadana LTO 140

Multicultural Trans Women’s Network (Red 6 Multicultural de Mujeres Trans, REDMMUTRANS)/AC Transgender Observation

Acción Ciudadana Civic Observation (auditoria social) 83

58 Mirador Electoral Coalition

CODEFEM 43

NGO Coordination and Cooperatives (Coordinación 100 ONG y Cooperativas, CONGCOOP)

National Network for Mayan Youth (Red Nacional de 63 Organizaciones de Jóvenes Mayas, RENOJ)

RENOJ 63

Acción Ciudadana Quick Count 1595

TOTAL 2469

Please see Annex 6 for information on the breakdown of gender (including cisgender and transgender), ethnicity, age, municipality and organization to which they belong as an observer.

Outcome Indicator 1.2.1: Number of activities implemented by representatives of marginalized groups that seek to prevent or mitigate election-related violence.

Thirty-one (31) activities were implemented by representatives of marginalized groups that sought to prevent or mitigate election-related violence. ● Two (2) violence prevention training activities were replicated by women’s organizations in priority municipalities; ● Nine (9) violence prevention training activities were replicated by indigenous youth organizations in priority municipalities; ● Nine (9) violence prevention training activities were replicated by indigenous organizations in priority municipalities; ● One (1) violence prevention training activity was replicated by a youth organization in a priority municipality; ● One (1) violence prevention training activity was replicated by a LGBTI organization in a priority municipality; and ● Nine (9) violence prevention training activities were replicated by civil society organizations in priority municipalities.

Output Indicator 1.3.1: Percentage of journalists who publish an article following training displaying knowledge of training content.

Sixty-two percent of journalists published an article following training displaying knowledge of training content. See Annex 4 for details on the articles.

Objective 2 Output Indicator 2.0.1 (F): Number of election officials trained with USG assistance to address political violence and campaign finance oversight.

59 CEPPS/IFES trained a total of 1,509 TSE officials during FY 2015 -- 454 women (30 percent) and 1,055 (70 percent) men -- through 32 training events that addressed a variety of training topics related to electoral violence prevention, mitigation, electoral disputes, planning, campaign finance oversight, media crisis and management, sexual diversity inclusion and inclusion of other traditionally marginalized groups.

Outcome Indicator 2.0.2: Demonstrated capacity of TSE to work within its mandate to address electoral security.

CEPPS/IFES developed a matrix to evaluate the capacity level of the TSE to address electoral security. A total of eleven interviews and questionnaires were conducted to evaluate this indicator, which was graded on a scale ranging from 1 (very low capacity) to 5 (very high capacity), based on the following criteria: ● The TSE is able to collaborate with the pertinent authorities to ensure the public order and the electoral process; ● The TSE develops effective mechanisms to deal with electoral violence; ● The TSE develops pertinent tools to mitigate and prevent incidents of electoral violence; ● The TSE is able to develop effective complaint mechanisms in the matter of electoral crimes; and ● The TSE efficiently coordinates the safe transport of electoral materials.

Originally, CEPPS/IFES was aiming for a high capacity grade (4). Nevertheless, according to the results of the survey, the average score is 3.6, indicating a capacity level between medium and high capacity. Please see Annex 8 for a complete analysis.

Outcome Indicator 2.0.3: Percentage of political parties and candidates who commit to a more transparent and peaceful campaign process.

During the 2015 electoral period, CEPPS/IFES promoted and provided technical assistance for the signing of ethical pacts for a more transparent and peaceful campaign process. Overall, 71 percent of the political parties and candidates participating in the elections signed the pledge.

Objective 3 Impact Indicator 3.0.1: Number of draft laws subject to substantive amendment and final vote in legislatures receiving USG assistance.

Throughout the life of the project, CEPPS/NDI supported three draft laws subject to substantive amendment and final vote in the legislature: ● Passage of reforms to the LOOL ● Passage of reforms to the LEPP (also supported by CEPPS/IFES) ● Passage of the Migrant Code

All three laws were passed in FY16. The content of all three laws, as well as CEPPS/NDI’s support in the process, is reported in detail in success stories in Annex 1 of this report.

Outcome Indicator 3.0.2: Percent of congressional committees receiving USG support that demonstrate an increased capacity in debating and elaborating congressional documents.

60 In total, out of the seven committees that the CEPPS partners work with, 57 percent (four committees) demonstrated an increased capacity in debating and elaborating congressional documents.

Of the four committees that CEPPS/NDI works with, 100 percent (four out of four) demonstrated an increased capacity: ● Migrant Committee: during FY2016, the president of the Migrant Committee worked closely with CEPPS/NDI to draft versions of the Migrant Code that was ultimately approved by Congress. The documents elaborated by the committee demonstrate an increased skill and mastery of the subject matter. The final documents were of higher quality and more relevant in addressing the needs of the migrant community. ● CEAE: As noted, the LEPP reforms were passed in FY16Q2 after stalling in Congress for years, which demonstrates an increased capacity by the committee to debate and negotiate the reform package. In addition, in FY16Q3, the CEAE began debating and elaborating a new generation of reforms. The current president of the committee is in his first legislative term. The willingness to continue to draft legislation after a reform package was approved, especially by a new committee president, demonstrates a long- term commitment to improving legislation as well as sustainability within the committee. ● Committee on Technical Support: Reforms to the LOOL were also debated and approved this fiscal year after having been stalled in Congress, which demonstrates an increased capacity by the Committee on Technical Support. The debate and final legislation was based on technical input that had been provided by CEPPS/NDI over the course of the project. ● Committee on Legislation and Constitutional Issues: When the project was designed, support for this committee focused on legislation related to nominating commissions. The committee drafted multiple bills to reform the LCP, which ultimately did not pass due to partisan divisions and deadlock in Congress (in lieu of legislation, CEPPS/NDI worked with the committee chair, CICIG and other civil society and government entities to develop a manual for nominating commissions). However, the committee has begun focusing on drafting legislation related to the constitutional reforms with a focus on greater transparency and integrity in the judiciary, which is directly related to the focus of the support provided on the topic of the nominating commissions. The committee also continues to request CEPPS/NDI technical assistance to elaborate legislative documents.

Of the three committees that CEPPS/IRI worked with (Committee on Human Rights; Committee on Integrity; and Committee on Transparency), zero percent (zero out of three) demonstrated an increased capacity. CEPPS/IRI was unable to work directly with elected officials in select commissions due to unforeseen political challenges. To meet this challenge, CEPPS/IRI targeted technical and support staff on select commissions. By focusing on technical and support staff rather than elected officials, CEPPS/IRI worked with individuals who will be working in the Congress far longer that those elected to represent, speaking to both the sustainability of the approach and the strategic adaptation to challenges on the ground.

Objective 4

61 Outcome Indicator 4.0.1: Percentage of training participants who report change in knowledge about the political rights of women (including transgender women) as well as their barriers to political participation.

Of the 717 pre- and post-tests administered to the participants in the CEPPS training courses under Objective 4, 47 percent reported change in knowledge about the political rights of women (including transgender women) as well as their barriers to political participation. The below tables disaggregate the percent change by training process.

Intermediate Result 4.1

Table 3: Candidate Training Course Module Percentage change

Module 1: Campaign communication strategies 33%

Table 4: Training Courses for Women Legislators Module Percentage change

Module 1: Society, women and political participation 35%

Module 2: The functions and parliamentary practices of Congress 0%

Module 3: Lobbying, negotiation and political communication tools 23%

Module 4: The legislative agenda of Congress: priority topics 20%

Module 5: A legislative agenda for the advancement of the Global 54% Agenda for Women

Average percent change 26%

Table 5: Training Courses for Women in Municipal Government Location Module Percentage change Guatemala City Module 1: Public policies and municipal 50% governance Module 2: Technical instruments for municipal 38% governance Module 3: Municipal financial planning and 63% administration Module 1: Public policies and municipal 75% Quetzaltenango governance Module 2: Technical instruments for municipal 40% governance

62 Module 3: Municipal financial planning and --11 administration Average percent change 43%

Table 6: Training Modules on LGBTI Awareness with the Political Party TODOS Module Percentage change

Module 1: How to Approach Vulnerable Social Groups and 8% Recognizing Different Perspectives

Module 2: Human Rights and Inclusion 22%

Module 3: The Role of Political Parties in Democracy 100%

Average percent change 43%

Table 7: Training Modules on LGBTI Awareness with the political party CRD Module Percentage change

Module 1: How to Approach Vulnerable Social Groups and 19% Recognizing Different Perspectives

Module 2: Human Rights and Inclusion 58%

Module 3: The Role of Political Parties in Democracy 0%

Average percent change 26%

Intermediate Result 4.2

Table 8: Training Modules on LGBTI Awareness with RENAP staff Module Percentage change

Module 1: LGBTI rights related to identity and citizenship 5%

Module 2: LGBTI non-discrimination and what it means to identify as 82% LGBTI

Average percent change 44%

11 Due to a methodological error in applying the pre- and post- tests, CEPPS is not able to report a percentage change for this module. However, participants expressed to CEPPS staff that they had a better understanding of the covered topics, including government accounting systems, municipal budget planning and administration and the management of public services.

63 Table 9: Training Modules on LGBTI Awareness with TSE Staff Module Percentage change Module 1: Prejudice, stigma anddiscrimination towards LGBTI 64% communities Module 2: LGBTI rights are human rights 90% Module 3: The role of political parties 76% Average percent change 74%

Table 10: Political Training Modules with the CSO Parallel Lives Module Percentage change

Module 1: The Status of Institutions and Democratic Governance 33%

Module 2: Social Organization as an Instrument for Participation and 71% Political Advocacy

Module 3: The Role of Feminism 50%

Average percent change 51%

Table 11: Political Training Modules with the CSO ODISCEA Module Percentage change

Module 1: The Status of Institutions and Democratic Governance 63%

Module 2: Social Organization as an Instrument for Participation and 33% Political Advocacy

Module 3: The Role of Feminism 42%

Module 4: Construction of Strategic Alliances 33%

Module 5: Theory and Methods for Political Advocacy 31%

Average percent change 40%

Outcome Indicator 4.0.2: Percentage of participants responding increased agreement with the concept that males and females should have equal access to social, economic, and political opportunities.

Forty-three percent of participants surveyed during CEPPS trainings responded with an increased agreement with the concept that males and females should have equal access to social, economic and political opportunities. The questionnaire was applied with 332 participants in trainings under Objective 4.

64 Outcome Indicator 4.0.3: Percent change in score of partner LGBTI organizations on capacity scorecard.

CEPPS worked closely with two organizations, Parallel Lives and ODISCEA, to build their capacity to receive, manage and implement activities with USG funding. CEPPS supported the organizations by providing them with trainings on setting up internal accounting and administrative systems to manage donor funds. Before and after the course, CEPPS applied a scorecard with the organizations that measured their knowledge of specific accounting and administrative procedures necessary for receiving external funding. The scorecard included 29 topic areas and the organizations were scored between 0 and 5, which equals a maximum score of 145.

Organization Entry score Exit score Percent out of total possible score

ODISCEA 0 118 82%

Parallel Lives 0 117 81%

The percent change is 100 percent if you consider that the entry score was zero for both organizations. The fact that both organizations scored about 80 percent out of the total possible scores indicates a significant increase in knowledge. However, both organizations still face challenges in their capacity toreceive and manage donor funds. Please see the Objective 4 analysis section for further details on the capacity of the partner organizations.

Outcome Indicator 4.1.1: Percent of women (including transgender women) participants in USG supported training who report an increase in political participation following trainings

During interviews following CEPPS-supported trainings, 75 percent of the participants interviewed reported an increase in political participation following the trainings.

Candidate training course: CEPPS held interviews with 18 of the 25 women from the candidate training course one year after the completion of the course; 70 percent of the candidates indicated that they had increased their political participation following the trainings. This is noteworthy given that only one candidate was elected to office. The fact that such a significant percentage of the participants interviewed reported an increase in political participation highlights that women who participate in training courses are seeking other ways to remain politically and civically active.

Training Courses for Women Legislators: At the end of the training process with recently elected women legislators, CEPPS held an evaluation session with nine of the 23 participants; 80 percent of the participants indicated that the content of the training course had provided them with information that will permit them to increase their political participation. A concrete example of how the participants are putting the knowledge into practice is the creation of the Forum of Women Legislators (see success stories).

65 Outcome Indicator 4.2.1: Percentage of electoral workers and observers who are women

Fifty-three percent of electoral observers were women. Out of 2,469 observers, 1,288 were cisgender women and 14 were transgender women.

An average of 43 percent of election workers were women during the first and second rounds of the general elections.

Foreign assistance indicators

Table 12: Foreign Assistance Indicators Foreign Assistance Indicators FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 Total

Number of draft laws subject to 0 0 2 3 n/a 3* substantive amendment and final vote in legislatures receiving USG assistance Number of laws or amendments to 0 1 n/a n/a n/a 1 ensure credible elections drafted with USG technical assistance Number of USG-supported activities n/a n/a 50 63 10 123 designed to promote or strengthen the civic participation of women. Number of election officials trained n/a n/a 1,509 0 n/a 1,509 with USG assistance to address political violence and campaign finance oversight Percentage of participants reporting n/a n/a 46% 40% n/a 43% increased agreement with the concept that males and females should have equal access to social, economic, and political opportunities. *Unique number of laws ultimately passed

V. ACTIVITIES

Cross-cutting activities/ Coordination Meetings with CEPPS, USAID and Other Donors

Throughout project implementation, the CEPPS partners held regular coordination meetings with USAID to discuss the evolving political context and to update USAID on the status of project implementation. CEPPS partners also participated in regular USAID Democracy and Governance partner meetings, USAID communications meetings and a USAID security training.

Under the leadership of USAID, CEPPS participated in donor meetings with the international community to coordinate activities ahead of the elections, analyze possible election scenarios given the political crisis and give updates on TSE preparations and other program activities. CEPPS/NDI also coordinated regularly with donors supporting the Mirador Electoral

66 observation efforts, including the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and USAID.

Prior to the first round of elections, CEPPS/NDI and CEPPS/IFES participated in an election-day observer training at the U.S. Embassy. The CEPPS/IFES resident director presented on elections organization and the role of the TSE and the CEPPS/NDI resident director discussed the political context and the CEPPS/NDI resident program manager described the role of Mirador Electoral and the quick count.

Through project implementation, CEPPS met with other USAID implementing partners to discuss areas of coordination: ● Checchi: CEPPS/NDI, CEPPS/IFES and AC met with Checchi to discuss areas of collaboration related to security and justice sector reform. CEPPS/NDI and Checchi discussed options for coordinating on topics related to CEPPS/NDI’s work with the Security and Justice Roundtable in Congress. The CEPPS/NDI senior resident director met multiple times with representatives from Checchi to facilitate contacts in Congress. ● Pan American Social Marketing Organization (PASMO): CEPPS/NDI and CEPPS/IRI met with representatives from PASMO, a USAID implementing partner focused on strengthening local capacity in providing health services to vulnerable communities, including LGBTI communities. The CEPPS partners discussed activities being carried out under Objective 4 related to the LGBTI community’s political participation. ● Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI): CEPPS/NDI met with the DAI chief of party for the Nexos Locales project being implemented in the Western Highlands and noted two areas of possible collaboration: 1) linking municipal efforts to specific committees in Congress; and 2) working with youth, indigenous peoples and women around anti- corruption issues. CEPPS/NDI shared contact information for the AC partner groups in the Western Highlands as DAI is considering providing small grants to local groups. ● Mercy Corps: CEPPS/NDI and CEPPS/IRI met with the Mercy Corps country director to discuss its community strengthening program that focuses on citizen security. CEPPS/NDI and CEPPS/IRI discussed their violence prevention and mitigation activities in 20 municipalities with high levels of violence. ● Counterpart International: CEPPS/NDI met with Counterpart International and Transparent Congress (Congreso Transparente) representatives to discuss areas of collaboration on legislative transparency, particularly in developing an “Open Parliament Plan.” The CEPPS/NDI Resident Director participated in the Counterpart International selection committee that reviewed proposals from potential local partner organizations to implement anti-corruption activities.

CEPPS partners organized presentations for the USAID/Guatemala mission, providing political and programmatic updates: ● In January 2016, all three CEPPS partners discussed the project’s work with LGBTI communities in Guatemala. ● In March 2016, CEPPS/IFES and CEPPS/NDI gave a presentation to USAID/Guatemala mission staff on the status of reforms to the LEPP.

67 ● In August 2016, CEPPS/NDI gave a presentation on the historical context of political reforms, current changes in the political context following the 2015 political crisis, and challenges ahead for political reform.

In April 2016, a representative from USAID/Washington’s LGBTI office conducted a case study of CEPPS work with LGBTI communities in Guatemala. During her visit, CEPPS coordinated 21 meetings with 68 representatives from partner organizations, including a congressional representative, theater group members, representatives from LGBTI CSOs, a TSE magistrate, poll workers, journalists and AC observers.

Under Objective 4, CEPPS coordinated with the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Foundation (KAS), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) to plan and implement activities. See Objective 4 activities for details.

Objective 1: Civil society organizations and media are effectively strengthened to prevent electoral violence and monitor campaign spending in targeted areas (IRI and NDI)

Please see Annex 9 for the Objective 1 activities.

Objective 2: Capacity of the TSE to counter political violence and better regulate campaign finance is increased (IFES)

Please see Annex 10 for the Objective 2 activities.

Objective 3: Capacity of the Guatemalan government, Congress, TSE, political parties and civil society to promote and implement key reforms is increased (IFES-IRI-NDI)

Please see Annex 11 for the Objective 3 activities.

Objective 4: Cisgender and Transgender Women Political Participation is strengthened for the 2015 and future elections (IFES-IRI-NDI)

Please see Annex 12 for the Objective 4 activities.

VI. FINANCIAL/ LEVERAGE

During the program, the CEPPS partners built collaborative relationships with local actors. Buy- in from local actors increased the local ownership of activities as well as the reach of project activities. The CEPPS partners collaborated with local organizations as well as the government of Guatemala, including Congress and the TSE. Additionally, CEPPS partnered with international organizations, such as KAS or NIMD, to leverage additional support for project activities.

Under Objective 2, CEPPS/IFES leveraged support for technical assistance, in-kind use of meeting space, and workshop costs (lodging, materials, food), as well as project activities to

68 increase the participation of marginalized populations in the elections. Between 2013 and 2016, the TSE provided in-kind use of meeting space, which was used for various project activities. A few examples of workshops and meetings that took place in the in-kind space include technical assistance workshops between members of the National Council for People with Disabilities (Consejo Nacional para la Atención de las Personas con Discapacidad, CONADI) and CEPPS/IFES; meetings between presidential candidates and the TSE to sign non-aggression pacts in advance of the 2015 elections; a working session to evaluate and reflect on the first round of the presidential election in September 2015; and, a final evaluation meetings follow the second round of the presidential election in October 2015. Additionally, in 2013 CEPPS/IFES leveraged pro bono technical assistance on reforms to the LEPP from the Electoral Tribunal of Panama, including consulting fees and travel costs. In 2015, CEPPS/IFES again leveraged technical assistance from the Electoral Tribunal of Panama for trainings on conflict resolution mechanisms for trainings with local electoral authorities.

Prior to the 2015 presidential election, CEPPS/IFES leveraged resources from outside organizations and institutes to increase participation of marginalized populations in the election. In 2015, the National Network for Transgender Persons (Red Nacional de Personas Trans, REDTRANS) provided in-kind meeting space for activities to increase voter registration of LGBTI populations. Between July and September 2015, CEPPS/IFES leveraged two separate programs to increase women’s participation in the 2015 elections. First, CEPPS/IFES received support from the Embassy of Norway to conduct a campaign to increase women’s political participation in the 2015 elections. Second, CEPPS/IFES leveraged a program with similar goals implemented by the TSE. Both programs furthered the mission of the CEPPS project.

Additionally, during the program, CEPPS/IFES leveraged financial support for workshop costs. In 2015, the TSE provided financial support for eight days of training for members of the Municipal Electoral Boards (Junta Electoral Municipal, JEM) in advance of the elections. Following the elections, CEPPS/IFES coordinated with UNDP in its support to the TSE’s post elections evaluation process. Sharing expenses to implement these activities allowed CEPPS/IFES to maximize the impact both after the first round of elections and after the run-off election.

Throughout the life of the project, CEPPS/NDI collaborated with the Guatemalan Congress. To facilitate collaboration on reforms to the laws listed below, the Congress provided in-kind space for meetings and workshops, which demonstrates buy-in from political actors. To support deliberations on reforms to the LEPP, CEPPS/NDI leveraged support for technical assistance. In 2012, CEPPS/NDI leveraged in-kind support from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (Instituto Internacional para la Democracia y la Asistencia Electoral, IDEA) for a public forum on electoral reform in April. IDEA covered the costs of an expert to participate in the event. In 2013, CEPPS/NDI leveraged in-kind support from the Central American Institute of the Study of Social Democracy (Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios para la Democracia Social, DEMOS) for airfare and lodging costs for two panelists for the forum on freedom of expression and LEPP reform held by NDI, the OHCHR and National Convergence for Political Reform (Convergencia Nacional por la Reforma Política, CONAREP). Additionally in 2013, KAS and the TSE supported the participation of four technical experts in an international forum on strengthening the LEPP. In 2016, CEPPS/NDI

69 shared the costs for a forum on the implementation of the LEPP reforms with the Association of Social Research and Studies (Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales, ASIES).

Additionally, CEPPS/NDI leveraged support for events on reforms to the LOOL and the Migrant Code. In 2013 and 2014, CEPPS/NDI leveraged support from the NIMD to host workshops and a public forum on reforms to the LOOL. To support two public forums on the Migrant Code in 2015, CEPPS/NDI leveraged financial support for flights from the Regional Parliamentary Council on Migration (Consejo Parlamentario Regional Sobre Migraciones, COPAREM). In 2016, CEPPS/NDI shared costs with NIMD for technical assistance activities with the CEAE. Beginning in November 2014, CEPPS/NDI increased the breadth of activities related to reform and implementation of the LEPP and LOOL, through shared costs with a project being implemented with support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). The support allowed CEPPS/NDI to increase technical assistance to Congress and the TSE and host additional workshops and forums. In 2016, CEPPS/IRI collaborated with the Citizen Network (Red Ciudadania), KAS and Counterpart on the open government initiative. CEPPS/IRI leveraged the cost of flights for experts to provide technical assistance to Congress.

Under Objective 4, CEPPS leveraged support from partner organizations to broaden the reach of training for women candidates and newly elected public officials and increase support to LGBTI organizations conducting public awareness activities. CEPPS leveraged support from seven organizations in 2015 and 2016.

In 2016, CEPPS leveraged costs from both UN Women and a CEPPS/NDI project implemented with support from UNOPS to carry out trainings for newly elected women legislators. UN Women provided financial support for lodging and food for participants. CEPPS leveraged costs through the UNOPS program to bring technical experts to Guatemala for three of trainings. For the final module in the training series, UN Women, the Embassy of Canada, KAS and NIMD provided support for conference costs, including food. Following the trainings, women congressional representatives formed a women’s parliamentary forum. To support the creation of the forum, KAS and the Central American Institute for Political Studies (Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Políticos, INCEP) provided meeting space for strategic planning meetings. UN Women also provided meeting space for the forum to discuss the Guatemala national budget, and NIMD covered the cost of an external consultant to provide support to develop the internal regulations of the forum and to design a survey to receive feedback from women congressional representatives.

Additionally, CEPPS leveraged costs to support initiatives carried out by LGBTI organizations. In 2016, Humanist Institute for Cooperation (Instituto Humanista de Cooperación para el Desarrollo, HIVOS) provided consultations with LGBTI organizations in Quetzaltenango and provided financial support for actions carried out by organizations on LGBTI Pride and Dignity day. In November 2015, CEPPS leveraged support from the UNOPS project to provide support to film a public awareness raising event for the International Day against Violence Against Women. In 2016, the University of San Carlos provided meeting spaces for the LGBTI theater group to develop and practice the theater piece, “Transformation of Thought.”

70 In 2015 and 2016, RENAP provided meeting space to carry out meetings on the Client Service Protocol and conduct anti-discrimination trainings with RENAP staff. Leveraging institutional resources in this instance was important to establish buy-in from RENAP.

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