Superpowers, Hyperpowers and Uberpowers

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International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies Volume 7, Issue 10, 2020, PP 18-36 ISSN 2394-6288 (Print) & ISSN 2394-6296 (Online) Superpowers, Hyperpowers and Uberpowers “States are cold monsters who mate for convenience and self-protection, not love” —Michael Howard1 Dr. John Maszka* Professor of International Relations, Jilin International Studies University in Changchun, China *Corresponding Author: Dr. John Maszka, Professor of international relations, Jilin International Studies University in Changchun, China. INTRODUCTION arises. Third, the two powers compete for geopolitical and economic superiority. Finally, a We are living in the great exception. new power emerges as the uncontested Throughout history (barring our own modern 3 hegemon, and the cycle repeats itself. global order), there has never been a single global international system—hence, there has Contrary to Amy Chua’s claim that there have never before been a truly global hegemon.2 The been several hyperpowers throughout history,4 I title of this article reflects the popular use of the argue that the United States is the first terms superpower and hyperpower. However, hyperpower because as a superpower it there is no wide spread agreement on the possesses global military, political and meaning of these terms. For the purposes of economic leverage never before seen in the conceptual clarity, I offer the following history of the world. explanation. My position also differs from World System The world has seen a number of regional theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein, who hegemons rise and fall—several of which have argue that Rome and Han China were examples exercised extensive control—but it was not until the Cold War that any one hegemon possessed of world empires. They distinguish world the power of life and death over the entire empires from ordinary empires such as the planet. During the Cold War, there were two British empire in that they monopolized the such powers. The need to avoid a nuclear center of power. But I argue that this was not so. confrontation between the two superpowers How could it have been when Rome and Han turned the Cold War into an ideological war. China were contemporaries that, in all Consequently, the US and the Soviet Union also likelihood, didn’t even know about the other’s dominated the world politically and existence? 5 economically to an extent never before seen. What follows is a brief outline of the history of When the Soviet Union collapsed, all that power continental Asia, Europe and the United States. passed to the United States—and the world’s This is not an exhaustive account, nor could it first hyperpower was born. The new term be in the space allowed. The main reasons for captured America’s role as the only superpower choosing to focus on these areas to the exclusion in the world. No longer would the US be limited of all others are two fold. First, the majority of by an opposing force—the hyperpower would do as it wished—and unfortunately, it has. the world’s population has always resided in Fortunately, hegemony never lasts forever. Asia. Second, I focus on Europe and the United States because no other regions of the world There is a popular international relations have had so great an impact on the modern concept known as long cycles. Although there world as these two. The purpose of this chapter have been both various interpretations and is to establish an historical pattern which we can applications of the construct, the basic idea is then theoretically apply to the future. While no that there are four waves or cycles through which hegemony passes. First, the uncontested one has a crystal ball, I believe that this hegemon begins to decline. Second, a contender approach is the next best thing. International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies V7 ● I10 ● 2020 18 Superpowers, Hyperpowers and Uberpowers THE ANCIENT WORLD: FROM THE CRADLE with a large class of society suffering downward OF CIVILIZATION AND BEYOND social mobility while a small elite class of hereditary rulers grew rich.11 The story of the ancient world order is a cyclical one—from the city-states of Sumer to the fall of Yale University’s Frank Hole argues that the Roman Empire, the overall pattern has settlement in southern Mesopotamia was a consistently been the progression from a balance response to ―extraordinary environmental of power to a hegemonic system. From the conditions‖ that triggered a ―shift from village- earliest civilizations, local multipolar systems based agrarian societies to complex, urban gave way to hegemony. Once established, the civilization.‖12 These environmental forces hegemon typically expanded to the extent included rising sea levels (the flooding of the possible until a new balance of power emerged. Tigris and Euphrates rivers and the Arabian 13 This cycle repeated itself again and again with Gulf) and climate change. each hegemonic system growing larger and Urbanization increased during the Uruk Period more powerful until there was simply no more (c. 4100—2900 BCE) as populations continued room for expansion—and thus our current to migrate from the countryside and concentrate international system evolved. within a handful of urban centers (Uruk, Eridu, 14 SUMER (C. 5800—1750 BCE) Ur, Nippor, Kish). The city of Uruk became prominent, and kings also began to emerge The patriarch Abraham is recorded as originally during this period.15 Just as the names of the coming from Ur of the Chaldees—one of the rivers and cities are not Sumerian, the names of famed city-states of Sumer located near the Sumer’s earliest kings are not Sumerian either, present-day Persian Gulf. Most people don’t but Semitic.16 realize it, but when Abraham headed out for the land of Canaan, he most likely left behind a Whoever originally founded it, the Sumerian comfortable home in a highly urban center. civilization bequeathed a number of legacies to Located within the lush Fertile Crescent, Sumer the rest of mankind: writing, the wheel, cities, is believed to have been one of the earliest and sailing, trading, agriculture, irrigation, religion most advanced civilizations of the ancient and perhaps its most enduring legacy of all—its world. Based upon the discovery of Chinese hegemonic system of governance. pottery carbon dated at over 20,000 years old, Unlike other ancient civilizations such as Egypt China almost certainly predates it, but the or Assyria, Sumer never became an empire per written records we currently possess point to se. Rather, it was a loose confederation of city- 6 Sumer. I would not be surprised if that changes states—each with its own hereditary monarchy in the foreseeable future. and its own patron deity. What tied these city- According to the ancient Sumerians, civilization states together was their common culture, itself began when the gods descended from extensive trade networks and a complex system heaven to Sumer and created Eridu (present day of government and religion. Abu Shahrein in Iraq)—both the first human The Sumerians were polytheistic, and they city and home to the great god Enki (the god of believed that the earth simply mirrored the 7 wisdom and magic). It’s believed that the heavens. Thus, each city-state belonged to a original settlers of Sumer did not speak the single deity (god or goddess). The king of each Sumerian language. This assumption is based city-state was the recognized representative of upon the fact that the names of the Tigris and its deity. In return for their devotion, the Euphrates rivers (in cuneiform: Idiglat and Sumerians believed that their deity provided Buranun) and the names of most of its urban them with an abundance of food and water and 8 centers are not Sumerian with protection from the elements and from their So, who were these early settlers of Sumer? No enemies. one knows for certain, however, archeologists For me, the most interesting aspect of the have dubbed them the Ubaid people— a name Sumerian religion is the way in which it affected 9 taken from the mound of al-Ubaid. Based upon Sumerian politics. Just as the Sumerians artifacts excavated at the mound of al-Ubaid, believed that the gods struggled among archeologists date the Ubaid Period c. 5800— themselves for domination of the heavens, so 10 4000 BCE. Various grave goods found in they also struggled for hegemony over one burial sites suggest that the Ubaid period another on earth. Therefore, there was endless experienced progressive social stratification, conflict between the kings of the city-states as 19 International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies V7 ● I10 ● 2020 Superpowers, Hyperpowers and Uberpowers they battled over access to resources and representative on earth, possessed the legitimate hegemony of the land. right to exercise hegemony over the remaining states in the entire region.19 Hegemony didn’t give the king of the ruling city-state the freedom to control the other city- It’s quite possible that influence traveled in both states or to meddle in their internal dealings, directions, as the concept of kingship in Sumer however. Instead, the hegemon served as a began to change c. 2900 BCE. During what is mediator—equipped with the authority to now known as the Early Dynastic Period (c. resolve disputes and wielding the power to 2900—2334 BCE) the Sumerian ensi (priest- enforce a settlement. The hegemon possessed king) was replaced by the lugal (big man). It legitimacy because it was sanctioned as such by was during this period that Sumer witnessed the the priests of Enlil—the chief deity of the rise of the First Dynasty of Lagash (c.
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