Benefits of Marine Protected Area Networks

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REPORT JUNE 2009

Benefits of Marine Protected Area Networks: An Overview in Support of the Coral Triangle Initiative Lida Pet-Soede, Herman Cesar, Pieter van Beukering, Edward Willsteed, and Peter J. Mous Executive summary

This report contains an overview of benefits of Marine Protected Area networks, focusing on the Coral Triangle. It aims to provide technical back- ground for the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security (CTI). Launched by the President of Indonesia in December 2007, six countries participate in development of CTI: Indonesia, Philippines, Malay- sia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Timor Leste. These governments plan to present a Plan of Action at the World Ocean Conference in Manado, Indonesia in May 2009. The donor community has resoundingly supported these efforts with substantial early commitments by the US Gov- ernment, Global Environment Facility (GEF) and Asian Development Bank (ADB). One of the five CTI goals is to establish and effectively manage Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). The MPA target of the CTI is to have a Coral Triangle MPA system in place and fully functional by 2020. The target is for a significant percentage of total area of each major near-shore habitat type within the Coral triangle region (e.g., coral reefs, seagrass beds, mangroves, beach forests, wetland areas and marine / offshore habitat) to be in some form of designated protected status, with 20% of each major marine and coastal habitat type in strictly protected no-take replenishment zones to ensure sustainable fisheries. The CTI documentation states that the above ultimate goal of 20% of each major marine / coastal habitat type in strictly protected no-take replenishment zones recognizes an emerging scientific con- sensus that at least 20%-30% of all such habitat types need to be strictly protected in order to ensure sustainable fisheries. This has been recognized by governments at the 2003 World Parks Congress and the 2004 COP-7 meeting under the Convention on Biological Diversity. Contents

1 Introduction: Marine Protected Areas and the Coral Trian- gle 4 1.1 The Coral Triangle: Deﬁnition and delineation ...... 4 1.2 Why protect coral reefs in the Coral Triangle? Values and beneﬁts ...... 6 1.3 Marine Protected Areas ...... 11 1.4 Summary of the Coral Triangle Initiative ...... 13

2 Threats to near-shore ecosystems in the Coral Triangle 16 2.1 Degradation of reefs and mangroves in the Coral Triangle . . . 16 2.2 Over-fishing ...... 20 2.3 Destructive fishing ...... 24 2.4 Coastal development ...... 26 2.5 Sedimentation from changes in land use ...... 27 2.6 Marine-based pollution ...... 27 2.7 Global warming, ocean acidification, and coral bleaching . . . 28 2.8 Other threats ...... 29 2.8.1 Crown-Of-Thorns Starfish outbreaks and other pests . 29 2.8.2 Disease ...... 29 2.8.3 Phase shifts from coral-dominated to algae-dominated communities ...... 30 2.8.4 Damage from tourism development, SCUBA diving, and snorkeling ...... 31 2.8.5 Invasive species ...... 32

3 Tools and approaches for managing use of marine living resources 35 3.1 Tool selection ...... 35 3.2 Fishing gear regulations ...... 36 3.3 Fishing eﬀort regulations ...... 37 3.4 Catch regulations ...... 38 vi CONTENTS

3.5 Marine reserves, zoned Marine Protected Areas, and temporal closures ...... 39 3.6 Ecosystem-Based (Fishery) Management ...... 41 3.7 Integrated Coastal Zone Management ...... 43 3.8 United Nations Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries . . 44 3.9 Consumer awareness and certification ...... 47 3.10 Assessment of management tool effectiveness ...... 48 3.10.1 Addressing over-fishing and destructive fishing . . . . . 48 3.10.2 Addressing global warming at sites ...... 50

4 The science of marine reserves 53 4.1 How no-take areas provide benefits for capture fisheries . . . . 53 4.1.1 Egg and larvae export ...... 54 4.1.2 Spill-over and “leaking” of juveniles and adult fish . . . 57 4.1.3 An overview on recent literature on marine reserves . . 62 4.2 Design criteria for no-take areas as fishery management tools . 62 4.3 Are tiny and small no-take areas effective? ...... 65 4.4 Making a case for reserves ...... 66 4.5 Essential (and free) reading on marine reserves ...... 70

5 Strengthening MPA networks 72 5.1 Current status of the Coral Triangle MPA System ...... 72 5.2 Types of networks ...... 73 5.3 Ecological network design ...... 78 5.3.1 Process ...... 78 5.3.2 Deﬁning the area-of-interest ...... 80 5.3.3 Representativeness, resilience, and redundancy . . . . . 81 5.4 Do science gaps impede use of no-take reserves (and other Marine Protected Areas)? ...... 81

6 Financing of MPA network establishment and management 83 6.1 Are MPAs expensive? ...... 83 6.2 Are MPAs cost eﬀective? ...... 84 6.3 How are MPA management costs assessed? ...... 85 6.4 Meeting MPA management costs ...... 89 6.5 How can MPAs generate revenue to support management costs? 89 6.6 Financial beneﬁts of MPA networks ...... 91 6.7 Trust funds ...... 93 6.8 Payment for Environmental Services (PES) ...... 95 CONTENTS vii

7 Recommendations for development of the Coral Triangle Ma- rine Protected Area System 98 7.1 Design of CTMPAS ...... 98 7.2 Technical support ...... 99

Bibliography 101

A An overview of recent literature on reserves 123

B Internet resources 139

C Acronyms 141 List of Tables

1.1 Estimation of annual Justifiable Management Expenditure based on published resource use Net Present Values that take into account forgone benefits and costs to society. NPV = (Range of) Net Present Value (2008 US$). Period = Period over which NPV was calculated (years), JME = (Range of) Justifiable Management Expenditure (in 2008 US$ per km2 per year). Published amounts were converted to 2008 equivalent using the USA Consumers Price Index published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics at www.bls.gov ...... 10

1.2 Valuation of ecosystem services provided by near-shore ecosystems that occur in the Coral Triangle. Dollar values are converted to 2008 US$ using the Consumer Price Index published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics at www.bls.gov...... 12

2.1 Coverage of live coral (LC) at sampling sites thought representative for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines. There are no comprehensive data on the other three CT6 countries. Data from p. 134 in Wilkinson (2008) ...... 19

2.2 Surface area of mangrove forests in Coral Triangle countries, in km2. Loss is expressed as percentual loss over the period 1980-2000. Data from Solomon Islands are from Gilman et al. (2006), all other data from Giesen et al. (2006) ...... 19

3.1 Overview of Marine Aquariumﬁsh Council-certiﬁed Sites and Communities (Sites), Collectors (Coll.), Exporters (Exp.), Im- porters (Imp.), Retailers (Ret.), and Culturists (Cult.) . . . . 48 LIST OF TABLES ix

3.2 Assessment of efficiency of management tools (rows) to address over-fishing and destructive fishing in near-shore small- scale fisheries of the Coral Triangle. “-”=tool is inefficient, “+”=tool is only efficient in support of other tools, “++”= tool is efficient, requiring only a limited investment in other tools, “+++”= tool is efficient, and if applied at scale it can address the threat without major support from other tools. Compare with Table 1 in Roberts et al. (2005) ...... 51

5.1 Total MPA surface area (km2), mean MPA surface area (km2), and number of MPAs per country in the Coral Triangle. Source: www.MPAglobal.org (Wood, 2007)...... 73 5.2 Total MPA surface area (km2), mean MPA surface area (km2), and number of MPAs per ecoregion (Spalding et al., 2007) in the Coral Triangle. Source: www.MPAGlobal.org (Wood, 2007). 76 5.3 MPAs in the Coral Triangle: Number (N) and total surface area (Area, km2) per area category (AreaCat, km2). Data from www.MPAglobal.org (Wood, 2007) ...... 76

6.1 Estimate of 10 year endowment required to cover management costs of 14 MPA sites in Indonesia and the Philippines over a period of ten years (Merkl et al., 2003) ...... 86 6.2 Estimated costs associated with the management and operation of the WNP in Indonesia over a twenty-ﬁve year period (CCIF, 2006) ...... 88 List of Figures

1.1 The Coral Triangle and its ecoregions, as delineated by Green and Mous (2008). Whereas the boundaries of the Coral Trian- gle itself are based on hard coral diversity, the boundaries of its ecoregions are mostly based on bio-geography of reef ﬁshes (Allen’s ﬁsh provinces)...... 5

1.2 Australasia and the West Paciﬁc during the lowest sea-level stand of the last glacial maximum (18-17 ka), which was 120 m lower than now. Modern coral reefs on continental shelves (e.g., Sunda shelf and Sahul shelf) emerged and died oﬀ, with nearest coral reef life remaining along the continental margins. Cropped from Fig. 9 in Hoeksema (2007)...... 6

1.3 Growth in cumulative global marine area protected for: total (solid circles), log(total) (open circles), and no-take (squares) area. Copied from Wood et al. (2008)...... 13

2.1 Threats to coral reefs in Southeast Asia, which comprises a large part of the Coral Triangle. The eastern part of the Coral Triangle (Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands) are likely to have lower threat levels, especially in respect to pollution and coastal development. Only the threat of destructive ﬁshing may be similar because of availability of World War II explosives (see also (Huber, 1994). Copied from Burke et al. (2002)...... 18 LIST OF FIGURES xi

2.2 Relationship between total annual yield (Y-axis) and total effort to realise that yield (X-axis) of a hypothetical fishery over a 10- year period (black dots). The Schaeffer model (a) is a parabola yield = a · effort + b · effort2, where a and b are constants, a = 0.53 and b = 1.15 · 10−5. The fishing effort needed to achieve MSY is Maximum Sustainable Effort (MSE). It follows that MSE = −a/(2b) = 23, 007, whereas MSY = 6100t. Underexploitation is where effort is lower than MSE, whereas overexploitation is the area where effort is higher MSE; in both under- and overexploitation, the yield is lower than MSY. The cost of fishing (b) is assumed to increase linearly with effort. The economic return of the fishery, i.e. the difference between the yield (a) and the cost of fishing (b), is maximum at an effort level lower than MSE (compare c with d). Copied from Mous et al. (2005), see also Fig. 20 in World Bank and FAO (2008)...... 21 2.3 Expansion of the LRFF fishery in successive decades into both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The western extent of the fishery in the Indian Ocean is the Seychelles (not shown). Viet Nam is an exception in the trends shown: The trade did not begin there until the 1990s. (Sadovy et al., 2003)...... 23 2.4 Model depicting transitions between ecosystem states. Coral- dominated reefs become more vulnerable owing to fishing pressure and eutrophication. The dotted lines illustrate the loss of resilience that becomes evident when reefs fail to recover from disturbance and slide into less desirable states. Modified from Bellwood et al. (2004) ...... 31 2.5 Effects of diving on coral damage levels in Sharm-El-Sheikh (Egypt), Bonaire and Saba (copied from Hawkins and Roberts (1997)) (top graph) and in Eilat (Gulf of Aqaba, copied from Zakai and Chadwick-Furman (2002) (bottom graph). Both studies suggest that damage rapidly increases once diving pressure exceeds 5,000 dives per year. Note the difference in horizontal axis units (dives per year and dives per quarter). Num- bers on the vertical axis cannot be compared directly because the studies used different metrics for coral damage...... 33

3.1 Application of an insurance factor, a resultant of recovery time after a disturbance and the incidence and spatial scope of the disturbance. This example pertains to oil spills aﬀecting US shores. Copied from Allison et al. (2003)...... 52 xii LIST OF FIGURES

4.1 Simpliﬁed representation of the processes that result in a good catch in waters surrounding a reserve...... 55

4.2 Awareness poster of WWF’s “Big Mamma” campaign on protection of spawning aggregations of reef ﬁsh of the Meso- American reef...... 58

4.3 Fish population density in a small reserve (a) and a large reserve (b), in a population regulated by density-dependent growth (DDG, solid line) and a population regulated by density- dependent growth in combination with spill-over proper (here labelled as density-dependent movement or DDM, dashed line). Lc is the minimum reserve diameter a fish population needs to survive, its value in this example is 4.81 times a constant that is here set at unity. In a small reserve (a), there is not much difference between both populations. In a large reserves (b), however, fish populations that are regulated by spill-over proper build up to a higher biomass in the center of the reserve. Note that in a small reserve, population density never reaches the same level as in larger reserves. Modified from a modeling study by Kellner et al. (2008) ...... 60

4.4 Total population size per unit reserve area (a, b) and spill- over rate per unit reserve area (c, d) of populations regulated by density-dependent growth (a, c) and by spill-over proper in combination with density-dependent growth (b, d). For populations where spill-over proper takes place, bigger reserves are always better, whereas for populations regulated through density-dependent growth there is an optimum where reserves yield most benefits to fisheries working surrounding fishing grounds. Note that fished reef populations comprise many species, which each have their requirements in terms of Lc (the minimum reserve diameter a species needs to survive). Modified from a modeling study by Kellner et al. (2008) . . . 61

4.5 The relationship between the percentage of ﬁshing grounds set aside as no-take areas (X-axis) and the beneﬁts these no-take areas provide in terms of sustainable catch (Y-axis)...... 71 LIST OF FIGURES xiii

5.1 Boxplots of surface areas of individual MPAs in the Coral Tri- angle, grouped by country. Data are from www.MPAglobal.org Wood (2007), which does not yet include MPAs recently established in Timor Leste and Indonesia (e.g. Berau MPA, MPAs in Raja Ampat, West Papua, COREMAP community- managed marine reserves). Strictly speaking, Brunei is not part of the Coral Triangle, since surveys so far found less than 500 species of reef-building corals. However, this is likely a result of the relatively low survey eﬀort rather than of low biodiversity (Dr Mark Erdmann, pers. comm.). In the delineation of the Marine Ecoregions of the World (MEOW) (Spalding et al., 2007), Brunei was included in the Palawan-North Bor- neo ecoregion, in accordance with an earlier delineation of the Coral Triangle...... 75 5.2 Example of a network of priority areas for marine conservation in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea Marine Ecoregion (SSME). Adapted from Miclat et al. (2006)...... 79

6.1 The logic of payment for environmental services (PES). (Ad- justed from (Quintela et al., 2004) ...... 95 Preface

It is reckless to suppose that biodiversity can be diminished in- deﬁnitely without threatening humanity itself.

—E. O. Wilson (1994). The Diversity of Life.

Tropical marine ecosystems of the Coral Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity, support the livelihoods of 120 million coastal people, and they have important social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreation and aesthetic values. In addition to its intrinsic value, marine bio-diversity determines humanity’s resilience to a changing climate. Marine productivity is essential for maintaining the long-term viability of fisheries. Numerous cultures are inherently linked to the sea by virtue of their beliefs, lifestyles, traditions and recreational pursuits. Economic growth is one of the prevailing values that directs policy and personal lives. The United Nations Millenium Ecosystem Assessment (Mille- nium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005b) shows how strongly sustained economic growth depends on sustained ecosystem services, and it shows in a compelling way that the values of pristine ecosystems to humanity are often much higher than the values individuals obtain from use through conversion and degradation of these same ecosystems. Though politicians are aware of this, they find themselves in a situation where interests of individuals and groups often prevail over the public good—A problem that Aristotle first decribed 24 centuries ago in his Politics. Over-use of renewable natural resources and climate change (Intergovern- mental Panel on Climate Change, 2007) affect ecosystem diversity, structure, and function, putting at risk the goods and services the ecosystems currently provide. The extent of marine habitat degradation is significant: As far back as 1994, less than 5% of coral reefs in the Philippines were in excellent condition (Gomez et al., 1994), and even in more pristine reefs in the Eastern part of the Coral Triangle, blast fishing was found to cause damage to reefs (Huber, 1994). Fishers can only maintain catch volume by working deeper waters or taking fish that were snubbed only a few decades ago (Jackson LIST OF FIGURES 3 et al., 2001; Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005a), and only 25% of the world’s fisheries remain under-exploited (FAO, 2007). Among the tools to abate these threats are Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), and today they are an accepted, but still under-utilized, means to curb over-fishing and other forms of unsustainable development. Improved management of use of near-shore ecosystems (“conservation”) through MPAs requires a more thorough understanding among coastal societies that MPAs can improve quality of our life and that of our children. Of course, conservation and sustained use often necessitate restraint in exploitation, even at times that needs are pressing, for the same reason that one must protect the principal if one plans to live from the interest. . . The challenge is to show politicians and their constituencies that Marine Protected Areas are a cost-efficient way to protect the natural “principal” of the Coral Triangle. Often, human population growth and increasing demands on resources are thought to be the root cause for environmental problems such as the ones the Coral Triangle Initiative seeks to resolve. This is, of course, not entirely accurate. Rather, the problem relates to behaviour, and the absence of mechanisms to curb wasteful behaviour. Studies referenced in this report show that over-fishing, blast fishing, coral mining, just to name a few, all come at a cost, not a benefit, to society. They continue not because individuals are either needy or greedy, but because societies do not act. One great opportunity in this information age is that now, at least, we are better aware of the environmental problems we cause. It was not always like this. Extinction of the dodo progressed unnoticed by the global community, who realized what was lost only after Lewis Carroll wrote Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland three centuries later. Had we known about it earlier we might have saved the dodo. Fortunately it was not too late for the blue whale, where society intervened just in time. Awareness, combined with the evidence that degradation can be avoided, means that we have a choice. The challenge is to take wise choices and follow up on them. This report on benefits of Marine Protected Areas for sustainable use of near-shore ecosystems in the Coral Triangle is a contribution to this end. Chapter 1

Introduction: Marine Protected Areas and the Coral Triangle

This report gives an overview of the benefits, or value, of MPAs and MPA networks as a tool for addressing anthropogenic stressors on the marine environment in the Coral Triangle, and an introduction to why the governments of Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste, Fiji and Vanuatu are ratifying a regional plan of action that prioritises the establishment of networks of MPAs in the Coral Triangle. This report also examines the financial requirements of MPA networks and an introduction to how these requirements can be met using diverse and sustainable revenue sources. While MPAs are recognised by governments as valuable tools in addressing pressing issues coastal States face, and while the body of research that supports their establishment is now substantial, the blunt truth is that MPAs often fail because they do not achieve enough financial support to cover costs for their management.

1.1 The Coral Triangle: Deﬁnition and delineation

The Coral Triangle is deﬁned as the marine area where ecoregions have 500 or more reef-building coral species (Scleractinians or hard corals) (Green and Mous, 2008)—As such, it represents the global center of marine biodiversity (Hoeksema, 2007; Briggs, 2005; Carpenter and Springer, 2005; Allen, 2007), and it is a priority area for marine conservation (Roberts et al., 2002). The Coral Triangle proper has a surface area 5.4 million km2, and it includes eastern Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia (Sabah), Timor Leste, Papua New 1.1. THE CORAL TRIANGLE: DEFINITION AND DELINEATION 5

Figure 1.1: The Coral Triangle and its ecoregions, as delineated by Green and Mous (2008). Whereas the boundaries of the Coral Triangle itself are based on hard coral diversity, the boundaries of its ecoregions are mostly based on bio-geography of reef ﬁshes (Allen’s ﬁsh provinces).

Guinea and the Solomon Islands (Fig. 1.1). The Coral Triangle roughly coin- cides with the area that stayed submerged during the 120 m drop in sea level in the Last Glacial Maximum (18-17 ka) (Hoeksema, 2007), when corals in the shallower Sunda and Sahul shelves died oﬀ (Fig. 1.2). Hoeksema (2007) presents a comprehensive overview of patterns in biodiversity of various tax- onomic groups in the Coral Triangle area—Other delineations of areas with high biodiversity in the region include areas to the west of the Coral Triangle proper, such as Java, part of Sumatera, peninsular Malaysia, and the west coast of Borneo, similar to the delineation in Allen (2002) (see also Fig. 1 in Hoeksema (2007)). The WWF Coral Triangle Programme also includes these western parts in its area-of-interest, whereas The Nature Conservancy and Conservation International focus on the Coral Triangle proper. 6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: MARINE PROTECTED AREAS AND THE CORAL TRIANGLE

Figure 1.2: Australasia and the West Paciﬁc during the lowest sea-level stand of the last glacial maximum (18-17 ka), which was 120 m lower than now. Modern coral reefs on continental shelves (e.g., Sunda shelf and Sahul shelf) emerged and died oﬀ, with nearest coral reef life remaining along the continental margins. Cropped from Fig. 9 in Hoeksema (2007).

1.2 Why protect coral reefs in the Coral Tri- angle? Values and beneﬁts

Because “value” and “beneﬁts” are central concepts in this report, we explain them here a bit further. Values are human constructs and as such vary according to our upbringing, experience, and with time. Value itself varies in meaning depending on context and can be understood in three ways (Najder, 1975):

• Value as the worth of something (such as the market price of yellowﬁn tuna);

• Value as a property of a thing (such as high recreation value); and

• Value as an idea or feeling (such as spiritual value).

Benefit indicates that a situation involves a recipient who gains in some way from the presence or ascription of value. Thus, value is the more direct term, having physical, cognitive, affective or spiritual aspects (Lockwood, 2006). Hence, in this report we use the term value rather than benefit. It is commonly accepted that coral reefs and associated near-shore ecosystems must be conserved because these ecosystems represent various values 1.2. WHY PROTECT CORAL REEFS IN THE CORAL TRIANGLE? VALUES AND BENEFITS 7 to humanity. Examples of such values (Salm and Clark, 2000) or ecosystem services (Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005b) are:

Direct values or provisioning services Production of goods, e.g. fish and fish products (for consumption, fish feed, fish oil, etc.), tourism and leisure, and building materials.

Indirect values or regulating and supporting services , e.g. shoreline protection, storm and ﬂood control, carbon sequestration, and wildlife habitat such as ﬁsh nursery sites.

Existence values or cultural services Intrinsic signiﬁcance, e.g. cultural, aesthetic, heritage, bequest.

Option values Contributing to future food security requirements, e.g. extractive, leisure, pharmaceutical, industrial

In contrast to the anthropocentric values listed above, the biocentric approach stems from the belief that bio-diversity has a value in its own right, which implies that where people exploit nature, they have a moral responsibility to take care of it. In recognition of this, the United Nations World Charter for Nature states:

Every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man and, to accord other organisms such recognition, man must be guided by a moral code of action.

The biocentric approach may not always resonate with politicians, but together with existence values it provides a convincing and, according to Mc- Cauley (2006b), a more important argument that often wins over the general public. For example, in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (Australia) it was emotionally motivated public support and a feeling of pride1, in combination with economic considerations, that resulted in formalization of the zoning plan, which includes 30% no-take areas (John Tanzer, Alison Green, pers. comment). Experts agree that sound governance of ecosystems requires an appeal to “hearts, minds and wallets” (Reid, 2006; Costanza, 2006; Marvier et al., 2006), with the note that existence values must feature prominently in considerations even though they cannot always be valued in Kina, Pesos, Ringgit, Rupiah, SI Dollar, or US Dollar (McCauley, 2006a). In purely anthropocentric terms, it makes sense to invest in good governance of coral reef ecosystems if:

1The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority’s tag line, “Keeping It Great”, reﬂects this. 8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: MARINE PROTECTED AREAS AND THE CORAL TRIANGLE

• they provide value (goods and services) that either cannot be substi- tuted or that would be more expensive to substitute in comparison with the cost of maintaining what is already there; and • the long-term cost of social and environmental externalities generated during unmanaged, often destructive and unsustainable value extraction outweighs welfare gains. Today, it is generally accepted that for societies (but not necessarily for individuals), management towards sustainability pays off over the long term. One way to illustrate this is by comparing the Net Present Value (NPV) of a resource use (i.e. the discounted summation of annual costs and revenue, including societal costs and forgone benefits from with sustainable use, over a long time period, usually 20-30 years) to costs for management. If NPV of a resource use amounts to minus US$100,000, and assuming that such resource use takes place in the absence of any management, then it would be justifiable to put in place a management program with a total cost of US$100,000 over the same time period to keep that resource use from taking place. For example, Pet-Soede et al. (1999) calculated that blast fishing on coral reefs in Indonesia results in a net loss of US$ 44,000 - 396,000 (in 2008 US$) per km2 of coral reef over a period of 20 years. This means that it is justifiable to spend between US$ 2,000 and US$ 20,000 per km2 of coral reef per year on management towards prevention of blast fishing. See 1.1 for justifiable management expenditure to abate poison fishing, coral mining, sedimentation from logging, over-fishing, and conversion of mangroves into shrimp ponds. The figures for coral reefs and mangrove forests are well within the range of required expenditure for MPA management (including shortfalls reported by MPA managers) presented by Balmford et al. (2004) (median US$3,373, minimum US$ 5, maximum US$ 38 million per km2 per year, values converted to 2008 US$). The examples presented above show that unsustainable use of near-shore ecosystems comes at a huge cost to society. The same is true at a global scale: The global economy puts at risk ecosystem services valued at nearly twice the global gross national product (Costanza et al., 1997), and if global capture fisheries would be conducted in a sustainble way then it would contribute US$ 50 billion per year more to the global economy than it currently does (World Bank and FAO, 2008). Valuation studies of ecosystem goods and services provide only part of the picture, because these goods and services do not necessarily cease to exist without management towards sustainability. Furthermore, valuation studies do not answer the question whether management expense is justifiable, nor who is going to foot the bill. Finally, values 1.2. WHY PROTECT CORAL REEFS IN THE CORAL TRIANGLE? VALUES AND BENEFITS 9 of services provided by an ecosystem depend strongly on their location, and therefore they can only be extrapolated to areas where conditions are similar (see the large range of reported values in Table 1.2). Nevertheless, such studies, summarized in Table 1.2, do provide some idea of the values that are at stake. 10CHAPTER1. INTRODUCTION: MARINE PROTECTED AREAS AND THE CORAL TRIANGLE per 2 km ¨ Ohman and Cesar, 1999) 2000) tem2005a) Assessment, -88,192 25 3,528 Thailand (Millenium Ecosys- -341,250 25 13,650 Indonesia (Cesar, 2000) -53,750 -595,000 25 2,150 23,800 Indonesia (Cesar, 2000) Estimation of annual Justifiable Management Expenditure based on published resource use Net Present Values that overfishing on coral reefsshrimp farmingverted mangroves in con- -136,250 25 5,450 Indonesia (Cesar, 2000) Useblast fishing on reefscoral mining -43,809poison fishing -396,478reefs onlogging coral causingtation sedimen- of coral 20 reefs -41,260 2,190 -952,729 19,824 NPV Eastern Indonesia (Pet-Soede 30 et 1,375 Period al., 31,758 Lombok JME Location ( Source year). Published amounts wereof converted Labor to 2008 Statistics equivalent at using www.bls.gov the USA Consumers Price Index published by the US Bureau Table 1.1: take into account forgoneover benefits which and NPV costs was to calculated society. (years), NPV JME = = (Range (Range of) of) Net Justifiable Present Management Value (2008 Expenditure US$). (in 2008 Period US$ = Period per 1.3. MARINE PROTECTED AREAS 11

1.3 Marine Protected Areas

The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) deﬁnes a Pro- tected Area as (Dudley, 2008):

A clearly deﬁned geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed, through legal or other eﬀective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values.

This definition, which pertains to both land and sea, supercedes an earlier definition, which is specific to the marine environment (Kelleher, 1999):

Marine Protected Areas are areas of tidal or subtidal terrain, together with its overlying waters and associated ﬂora, fauna and historical and cultural features, which has been reserved by law or other eﬀective means to protect part or all of the enclosed environment.

Marine reserves are a special kind of Marine Protected Area (PISCO - Part- nership for Interdisciplinary Studies of Coastal Oceans, 2007):

Marine reserves are deﬁned as ocean areas that are fully protected from activities that remove animals and plants or alter habitats, x except as needed for scientiﬁc monitoring.

Marine Protected Areas are an important tool to manage use for sustainability and to protect biodiversity. Nevertheless, marine habitats are still under-represented in protected area networks compared to land habitats: 12% of land habitats are protected (Chape et al., 2005; Brooks et al., 2004), whereas only 0.65% of the world’s oceans and 1.6% of the total marine area within Exclusive Economic Zones, are currently protected (Wood et al., 2008)2. Spurred by major international agreements and rising public awareness on the need for Marine Protected Areas, growth in global coverage of Marine Protected Areas has been substantial, increasing from 0.7 million km2 in 1980 (Wood, 2006) to approximately 2.35 million km2 in 2008 (Wood et al., 2008). Nevertheless, this rate is insuﬃcient to achieve even modest targets. Hence, the general feeling is that establishment and management of Marine Protected Areas must remain a priority in the coming decade (Wood et al., 2008).

2These ﬁgures exaggerate the problem of under-representation somewhat, because they include the high seas, for which Marine Protected Areas may not be the best management tool 12CHAPTER1. INTRODUCTION: MARINE PROTECTED AREAS AND THE CORAL TRIANGLE

Table 1.2: Valuation of ecosystem services provided by near-shore ecosystems that occur in the Coral Triangle. Dollar values are converted to 2008 US$ using the Con- sumer Price Index published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics at www.bls.gov.

Ecosystem Value (US$ Remarks Source 106km−2yr−1) Sea grass and algae 2.8 Global, 99% of the value is (Costanza et al., beds in nutrient cycling 1997) Coral reefs 0.88 Global, 98% of the value is (Costanza et al., in recreation, disturbance 1997) regulation, and food production Coral reefs 0.019 - 6.4 Sri Lanka (Berg et al., 1998) Coral reefs 0.17 Southeast Asia, potential (Cesar et al., 2003) value if well managed Coral reefs 0.036 Paciﬁc, potential value if (Cesar et al., 2003) well managed Coral reefs 0.12 Global, potential value if (Cesar et al., 2003) well managed Coral reef 0.050 American Samoa (Spurgeon and Roxburgh, 2006) Tidal marsh and 1.5 Global, 97% of the value (Costanza et al., mangroves is in waste treatment, 1997) disturbance regulation, recreation, and food production Mangroves 3.4 American Samoa (Spurgeon and Roxburgh, 2006) Estuaries 3.3 Global, 92% of the value is (Costanza et al., in nutrient cycling 1997) 1.4. SUMMARY OF THE CORAL TRIANGLE INITIATIVE 13

Figure 1.3: Growth in cumulative global marine area protected for: total (solid circles), log(total) (open circles), and no-take (squares) area. Copied from Wood et al. (2008).

Only 0.08% of the world’s oceans, and 0.2% of the total marine area under national jurisdiction is no-take (Wood et al., 2008). Furthermore, there has been hardly any growth in no-take surface area, except for Great Barrier Reef, which upped the global coverage in NTA with 50% in 2004, and the North-western Hawaian Islands designated as no-take in 2006, which will only be implemented by 2011. (Fig. 1.3).

1.4 Summary of the Coral Triangle Initiative

The Coral Triangle Initiative3 is a platform for collaboration of government agencies, environmental NGOs, and academia in the six countries who are (partly) situated in the Coral Triangle: Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Timor Leste, Papua New Guinea, and Solomon Islands, together known as the CT6 countries. The “Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security” was proposed by President Yudhoyono of Indonesia in

3This section is based on the “Port Moresby Draft” CTI Regional Plan of Action of March 6, 2009. 14CHAPTER1. INTRODUCTION: MARINE PROTECTED AREAS AND THE CORAL TRIANGLE

August 2007, and in December 2007 CT6 countries held the first Senior Official Meeting (SOM1) in Bali, Indonesia. At SOM1, officials from CT6 countries agreed to pursue the CTI as a new multilateral partnership, and to develop a joint Regional Plan of Action (RPoA) with five overall goals: 1. “Priority” Seascapes designated, with investment plans completed and sequenced

2. Ecosystem approach to management of ﬁsheries (EAFM) and other marine resources fully applied

3. Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) established and eﬀectively managed

4. Climate change adaptation measures achieved

5. Threatened speces status improving. The RPoA lists nine guiding principles, of which the first is CTI should support people-centered biodiversity conservation, sustainable development, poverty reduction, and equitable benefit sharing. CTI goals and actions should address both poverty reduction (e.g. food security, income, and sustainable livelihoods for coastal communities) and biodiversity conservation (e.g. conservation and sustainable use of species, habitats, and ecosystems). At SOM2 (Manila, Philippes, November 2008) and SOM3 (Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, March 2009), the partnership discussed and updated the RpOA. Building on the RpOA, CT6 countries each develop a National Plan of Action (NpOA). Coordination at the regional level is the responsibility of the CTI Rgional Secretariat, whereas coordination at the national level is the responsibility of National Coordination Committees. To date, the CTI’s most important funding sources are Global Environmental Facility’s CTI support program (implemented by the Asian Development Bank), and the US government. Whereas MPA networks serve each of the five aforementioned RPoA goals to some extent, goal 3 deserves a bit more attention here. Goal 3 lists one target, which is to be achieved by six actions. The regional target calls for a comprehsive, ecologically representative, and well-managed region-wide Coral Triangle MPA System (CTMPAS) that (1) generates income, livelihood and food security benefits for coastal communities, and (2) conserves the region’s rich biological diversity. The ultimate target is to include 20% of each major marine and coastal habitat in strictly protected “no-take replenishment zones”, i.e. marine reserves. This ultimate target does not have 1.4. SUMMARY OF THE CORAL TRIANGLE INITIATIVE 15 a time line, and the Port Moresby draft of the RpOA (dated March 6 2009) leaves open the interim target 2020. This is hardly surprising, because none of the CT6 countries, with the possible exception of Malaysia, have the means to assess their current status in respect to this target. It is clear, however, that the current percentage of coral reefs and associated habitat in no-take areas is less than 1%. Note that the RpOA does not specify a quantitative target for Marine Protected Areas in general (i.e. including MPAs that allow extractive use). This makes sense, because levels of protection vary widely between MPAs, hence a quantitative goal for MPAs without further specification or the level of protection would have been meaningless. Chapter 2

Threats to near-shore ecosystems in the Coral Triangle

2.1 Degradation of reefs and mangroves in the Coral Triangle

Near-shore coastal ecosystems in the Coral Triangle face a variety of threats that put at risk the ecosystem services they provide—They are discussed in some detail below. In broad strokes, coral reefs in the Coral Triangle are threatened by over-fishing, destructive fishing, coastal development, sedimentation from changed land use patterns, and pollution. Besides these localized effects, the global effect of climate change through warming, sea level rise, acidification, and more severe storms (Wilkinson, 2008), may pose the most important threat to coral reef systems: The mass coral bleaching event of 1997-1998, which had climate change as one of its root causes, destroyed 16% of the world’s coral reefs (Wilkinson, 2008). The most important threats to mangroves are conversion to fish and shrimp farms and building land, over- expoitation for construction and fire wood (Giesen et al., 2006), and sea level rise caused by climate change (McLeod and Salm, 2006). Of course, kind and severity of threats depend on location: Close to cities, coastal development and associated threats such as eutrophication and pollution are likely to become overriding threats, whereas at remote locations destructive fishing may pose the most severe threat. Often, there is a progres- sion in threats: Over-fishing and destructive fishing become manifest first, followed by sedimentation, coastal development, and pollution as human development proceeds in the coastal zone (Jackson et al., 2001). The Reefs at 2.1. DEGRADATION OF REEFS AND MANGROVES IN THE CORAL TRIANGLE 17

Risk assessments by the World Resources Institute give an overview about the spatial distribution of threat levels to coral reefs. The assessment for Southeast Asia (Burke et al., 2002), covering the western and central parts of the Coral Triangle, show that over-fishing and destructive fishing put at risk 60% of the reefs in the region. Coastal development and sedimentation jeopardize ecosystem services of more that 20% of reefs, whereas the risk from pollution by oil spills and the like is relatively low at 8%. Summation of threat levels at each site shows that almost 90% of the region’s reefs are exposed to medium, high, or very high threat levels (Fig. 2.1). Severity and pervasiveness also depends on management, though one might argue that management only prevents a threat from becoming reality while the threat itself may remain present. Nevertheless, the perception of managers is that threats disappear after management has been put in place. For example, in Komodo National Park (Indonesia), blast fishing incidence fell to almost zero after successful enforcement was put in place (Mous et al., 2003), and Park rangers even stopped maintaining their recording system for blast fishing. Another example is Tubbataha Reef National Park (the Philippines), among the most effectively managed reserves in the Coral Tri- angle, where NGOs and government agencies rate the threat of fishing low. This makes it unique among six other (clusters of) no-take areas in the Coral Triangle where fishing or destructive fishing all rate “high” or “moderate” (Green and Mous, 2008). Likely, the low threat level for fishing is a result of good management, not just an attribute of that area. Both in Komodo and Tubbataha, destructive fishing on over-fishing is likely to increase if management is not kept up. Unlike land ecosystems, where degradation can be expressed in terms of area lost to some other use, degradation of reefs is usually measured in percentage live coral cover. In its “Status of Coral Reefs of the World” reports (Wilkinson, 2008), the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network uses live coral cover to classify reefs as very good, good, fair, or poor. Allthough there is a general perception that reefs have deteriorated over the last decades, statistics on live coral cover thought representative for reefs in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are ambiguous (Table ??). Wilkinson (2008) reports that there are no comprehensive data on live coral for the other three CT6 countries (Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea, and Solomon Islands). It is generally accepted, however, that reefs in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands are in much better condition than those of the other CT6 countries. Coral Triangle countries are lost up to 35% of their mangrove forests over the period 1980 - 2000 (Table 2.2). This means that Indonesia is now loosing ecosystem services at a rate of 700 - 1.500 million US$ per year (cf. Tabel 1.2). 18 CHAPTER 2. THREATS TO NEAR-SHORE ECOSYSTEMS IN THE CORAL TRIANGLE

Figure 2.1: Threats to coral reefs in Southeast Asia, which comprises a large part of the Coral Triangle. The eastern part of the Coral Triangle (Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands) are likely to have lower threat levels, especially in respect to pollution and coastal development. Only the threat of destructive ﬁshing may be similar because of availability of World War II explosives (see also (Huber, 1994). Copied from Burke et al. (2002). 2.1. DEGRADATION OF REEFS AND MANGROVES IN THE CORAL TRIANGLE 19

Table 2.1: Coverage of live coral (LC) at sampling sites thought representative for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines. There are no comprehensive data on the other three CT6 countries. Data from p. 134 in Wilkinson (2008)

1993-1994 2003-2004 2004-2008 Indonesia > 75% LC cover 5 6 2 25-75% LC cover 53 65 64 < 25% LC cover 42 29 34 Malaysia > 75% LC cover 0 15 10 25-75% LC cover 91 70 70 < 25% LC cover 9 15 20 Philippines > 75% LC cover 2 1 1 25-75% LC cover 74 45 59 < 25% LC cover 24 54 40

Table 2.2: Surface area of mangrove forests in Coral Triangle countries, in km2. Loss is expressed as percentual loss over the period 1980-2000. Data from Solomon Islands are from Gilman et al. (2006), all other data from Giesen et al. (2006)

1980 1990 2000 Loss Indonesia 42,540 35,307 29,300 31% Malaysia 6,690 6,205 5,721 14% . Philippines 2,065 1,234 1,097 47% Timor-Leste 41 36 30 26% Papua New Guinea 5,310 4,800 4,323 20% Solomon Islands 642 35%

Little is known about the extent of the degradation of sea grass beds in the Coral Triangle, but ? estimates that Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and Singapor lost 30-60% of their seagrass beds in the recent past. Climate change, or rather increased dissolved CO2 and bicarbonate concentration, may benefit sea grasses, but the effect of sea level rise may be negative. Localized threats to seagrass beds are physical destruction by bottom trawl- ing or other bottom-scraping fishing methods such as dredging (Long et al., 1996), coastal development (especially land reclamation), sedimentaton, and declining water quality (Wilkinson, 2008), and farmers “cleaning” and trampling seagrass areas in use for bottom-set seaweed culture. 20 CHAPTER 2. THREATS TO NEAR-SHORE ECOSYSTEMS IN THE CORAL TRIANGLE

2.2 Over-ﬁshing

Over-fishing is the most pervasive threat to near-shore ecosystems in the Coral Triangle (Burke et al., 2002), and today it is among the most serious environmental problems (Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005a; Jackson et al., 2001; Pauly et al., 2005; Hilborn et al., 2003; Myers and Worm, 2003). At global scale, over-fishing threatens food security, livelihoods, and the very ecosystems that are the basis of these and other ecosystem services. Over-fishing is often understood the process where fishing effort (boat- days, number of gear units deployed, etc.) increases to a level where it degrades ecosystems. Its classical definition, however, is purely production- oriented: Over-fishing is the process where total fishing effort increases beyond the level where total catch volume is maximal. The theory behind this classical understanding of over-fishing is that each level of fishing will result in a state where fish stocks are in equilibrium with the fishery, which means that continued fishing at that level will result in a sustained, stable, catch. Fisheries that are well-managed have a high sustained catch, whereas fisheries that over-fish have a low, but nevertheless sustained catch. Under-exploited fisheries also have a low sustained catch, but profitability to individual fishing operations is much better than for over-fished fisheries, because in under-exploited fisheries fishers realize catch applying a low effort. Fishery research institutes have applied various versions of this theory, known as surplus production or Maximum Sustainable Yield models (Fig. 2.2), for decades to inform fishery development policies, and the World Bank and FAO recently used this concept to show that global fisheries are making US$ 50 billion less than they could make if they would address over-fishing (World Bank and FAO, 2008). One of the appeals of this model is its user- friendliness: It generates management advice using only catch and effort statistics. Whereas the MSY model is useful to explain the concept of over-fishing, is should not be used to inform management for reasons explained in more detail in sections 3.3 and 3.4, and Mous et al. (2005)). Perhaps the most important but seldom highlighted concern is that careless application of the model results in severely inflated estimates of MSY and MSE. One of the assumptions of the model is that fish stocks are in equilibrium with the fishery, which means that continued fishing at the same level of effort should result in a stable catch. If, however, the model is parametrized with catch- effort statistics from declining fisheries, then the estimated parabola of Fig. 2.2 ends up much higher than it would have been if data from an equilibrium fishery would have been used. The result is an over- estimation of MSY, and especially if the results are used to inform quota regulations, the fishery is 2.2. OVER-FISHING 21

Figure 2.2: Relationship between total annual yield (Y-axis) and total effort to realise that yield (X-axis) of a hypothetical fishery over a 10- year period (black dots). The Schaeffer model (a) is a parabola yield = a · effort + b · effort2, where a and b are constants, a = 0.53 and b = 1.15 · 10−5. The fishing effort needed to achieve MSY is Maximum Sustainable Effort (MSE). It follows that MSE = −a/(2b) = 23, 007, whereas MSY = 6100t. Underexploitation is where effort is lower than MSE, whereas overexploitation is the area where effort is higher MSE; in both under- and overexploitation, the yield is lower than MSY. The cost of fishing (b) is assumed to increase linearly with effort. The economic return of the fishery, i.e. the difference between the yield (a) and the cost of fishing (b), is maximum at an effort level lower than MSE (compare c with d). Copied from Mous et al. (2005), see also Fig. 20 in World Bank and FAO (2008). 22 CHAPTER 2. THREATS TO NEAR-SHORE ECOSYSTEMS IN THE CORAL TRIANGLE heading for disaster. After the collapse of some of the world’s most important fisheries (Myers et al., 1997; Pauly et al., 2002), it became clear that stocks never were at equilibrium with fisheries. Even before that, assessment methods evolved from single-species surplus production models and multi-species assessments to ecosystem-based fishery management (Pikitch et al., 2004), and fisheries scientists as well as managers are increasingly taking a more holistic approach to fishery management (Zabel et al., 2003; Mangel and Levin, 2005; Hall and Mainprize, 2004). More and more, fishery scientists and managers measure over-fishing in terms of the extent to which fisheries degrade ecosystems. Furthermore, fishery experts increasingly base their assessments on observations on spatial and temporal patterns, observations on species and size composition, observed changes in the ecosystem, and on output of ecosystem simulation models. The Millenium Ecosystem Assessment (2005b) shows that global fisheries can only maintain catch volume by fishing ever deeper waters, increasing average fishing depth from 175 m in the fifties to below 205 m in the 1990s, suggesting that easier to reach shallow waters are being depleted. Myers and Worm (2003) shows that open ocean fisheries, in an effort to compensate for falling catch rates, expanded to previously unfished waters. The fishery for live reef food fish in the Coral Triangle area shows a similar process (Fig. 2.3). Studies on fisheries in CT6 countries (see Box 1, Wilkinson (2008), and Mamauag and Gonzales (2008)) of CT6 countries corroborate the finding of Burke et al. (2002) that many of the region’s fisheries are at risk of over- exploitation. Contrary to general belief, small scale fishing can contribute to over- fishing in the same way as large scale fishing does (Cooke and Cowx, 2006; Lynch, 2006; Westera et al., 2003; Coleman et al., 2004). This means that managers must approach artisanal fishing, subsistence fishing, and recreational fishing (spearing as well as angling) in the same way as commercial fishing, though management interventions must be adapted to the characteristics of each kind of fishery. 2.2. OVER-FISHING 23 Expansion of the LRFF fishery in successive decades into both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The western extent Figure 2.3: of the fishery innot the begin Indian there Ocean until is the the 1990s. Seychelles (Sadovy (not et shown). al., Viet 2003). Nam is an exception in the trends shown: The trade did 24 CHAPTER 2. THREATS TO NEAR-SHORE ECOSYSTEMS IN THE CORAL TRIANGLE

2.3 Destructive ﬁshing

Destructive fishing is any type of fishing that damages habitat. Exampls of destructive fishing methods common in the Coral Triangle are:

• Fishing with explosives, often home-made fertilizer-based bombs, but left-over World War II explosives are also still in use. See, for example, Pet-Soede et al. (1999) for an economic analysis of blast fishing. In many areas in the Coral Triangle, blast fishing is the most important threat to reef habitat. For example, McManus et al. (1997) finds that blast fishing caused a decline in hard coral cover of 1.4% yr−1, compared to 0.4 % yr−1 to cyanide fishing and , and 0.03% yr−1 to coral-grabbing anchors on a heavily exploited fringing reef in Bolinao, Philippines. Blast fishing is illegal, and is readily detected by patrolers and nearby fishers; therefore, this threat usually decreases after better enforcement is put in place (see, for example, (Mous et al., 2003)). Though still common in some areas, there are indications that blast fishing is decreasing in Indonesia, partly because of better control of explosives through anti-terrorism laws (P.J. Mous, pers. obs.).

• Fishing with poison, for example pesticides and rotenone-based poisons. In fisheries supplying the live food fish and aquarium trades, sub-lethal doses are used to stun fish for easy capture. Because of the low dosages, live fish fisheries do not do as much damage to coral reefs as blast fishing Mous et al. (2000) or as poison fisheries that aim to catch food fish, for example rabbit fish (Siganidae) on reef flats.

• Fishing with bottom-scraping gear, such as bottom trawls and dredges.

• Fishing with traps that are set on reefs—Usually, ﬁshers break oﬀ living coral to cover the trap with.

• Fishing with damaging devices that scare ﬁsh into a net, for example muro-ami. In muro-ami, swimmers scare coral ﬁsh into a net with lines that are weighted down with a stone.

• Fisheries resulting in excessive by-catch. By-catch comprises the part of the catch that is returned to sea (usually dead or nearly dead), or that is wasted before it is sold, or that is from an un-managed fishery (Davies et al., 2009). This definition differs from earlier ones that addressed bycatch in terms of target and non-target fish—This differentiation became less meaningful because in many fisheries non- target fish became more and more important, and because in many 2.3. DESTRUCTIVE FISHING 25

Box 1 Status of Indonesian ﬁsheries

Indonesia’s Ministry of Marine Affairs and However, a summary of 129 studies on the Fisheries is aware of the problem of over- status of Indonesian marine capture fisheries exploitation in the Western part of Indone- suggests that 65% of fisheries are already sia’s seas, notably the seas around Java fully fished or over-exploited (see table be- (Mous et al., 2005). Driven by a pub- low, and Wiadnya et al. (2005)). Given lic expectation that the fishery sector must experiences with collapsing fisheries across contribute to increasing Indonesia’s GNP the globe, a prudent strategy is to focus on through increased total catches, the Min- improved fisheries management and habitat istry is now looking for “untapped poten- conservation rather than on further devel- tial” elsewhere. opment.

Status of Indonesian ﬁsheries, as summarized by Wiadnya et al. (2005). Under = Under-exploited, Fully = Fully exploited, Over = Over-exploited, and UnC = Uncertain Fishing Areas Under Fully Over UnC Mallaca Strait 1 3 9 2 South China Sea 6 4 5 0 Java Sea 2 4 8 3 Makassar S. and Flores Sea 2 3 9 1 Banda Sea 6 1 4 0 Seram Seas and Tomini Bay 6 2 1 0 Sulawesi Seas & Paciﬁc Ocean 4 2 7 0 Arafura Sea 4 2 11 1 Indian Ocean 6 5 4 1 Total 37 26 58 8 26 CHAPTER 2. THREATS TO NEAR-SHORE ECOSYSTEMS IN THE CORAL TRIANGLE

tropical ﬁsheries almost any living thing that ends up in a net has some value. According to this new deﬁnition, the percentage of the total catch that is by-catch amounts to is 63%, 56%, and 31% for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines repectively (Davies et al., 2009). The global by-catch rate is 40%.

2.4 Coastal development

Coastal development can result in a wide range of threats to near-shore ecosystems, including:

• Conversion of mangroves and seagrass beds into land for housing, industry, agriculture, etc. (land reclamation)

• Construction of sea walls and harbour facilities, which change coastline and near-shore hydro-dynamics.

• Eutrophication of reefs from waste water effluents, either from cities, intensive agriculture, or fish culture (Silverman et al., 2006). Eutroph- ication cause macro-algae to over-grow and smother coral reefs, it may increase incidence of coral disease, and it may increase incidence of out- break of the coral predator crown-of-thorns starfish Acanthaster planci (Nyströmet al., 2000). At extremely high levels it can cause “dead zones” in near-shore waters. At a low level, euthrophication has the beneficial effect of increasing productivity of seagrass areas.

• Pollution from solid waste and eﬄuents from industries and households

• Increased disturbance from shipping, increased damage from anchoring, and increased likelihood of marine mammals and sea turtles getting wounded by ship’s propellors

• Obviously, coastal development is driven by a growing human population, which puts additional demands on management towards curbing over-ﬁshing, destructive ﬁshing, over-use for tourism, etc.

Once coasts get developed, the shore protection value or reefs and mangroves becomes very important—More so to protect the shore from “normal” erosion forces than from dramatic events such as tsunamis UNEP-WCMC (2006). Other values that increase are tourism values (if reefs and mangroves remain intact) and existence values (i.e. cultural services). This means that from an economic perspective it makes sense and cents to invest in better 2.5. SEDIMENTATION FROM CHANGES IN LAND USE 27 management of near-shore habitats near population centers, even though their value for conservation may be lower than that of remote and more pristine reefs.

2.5 Sedimentation from changes in land use

Change in land use, e.g. logging or conversion for agriculture, often results in higher loading of rivers and run-off with sand and clay particles. If water with a high content of sediments reaches coral reefs, sedimentation (or siltation) of reefs may result. Sedimentation can have a severe effect, smothering entire reefs. Eutrophication can exacerbate the problem in sedimentation, because it increases phytoplankton production. Phytoplankton binds with a variety of other planktonic organisms to form “marine snow”, flocs up to 30 cm long and typically with a diamteter of 0.5 - 5 mm, that stay in suspension in the water column. In areas whith high sediment loading, clay particles bind with these flocs, weighing them down. Consequently, this “muddy marine snow” sinks, covering the substrate. Reefs get smothered, and eventually the snow kills coral colonies. Especially young, settling corals are vulnerable, and the mat of flocs prevents settlement of coral larvae on the reef substrate (Wolanski et al., 2003, 2004). Besides the smothering reefs, algae also release diffusible compounds that mediate coral mortality via microbial activity (Smith et al., 2006).

2.6 Marine-based pollution

The Reefs at Risk assessment Burke et al. (2002) understands marine-based pollution as pollution that originates from ports, shipping lanes, and oil exploitation and exploration. Although major oil spills make the headlines, most oil pollution comes from minor oil spills, routine maintenance of drilling rigs and pipelines, shipping, and the intentional dumping of used oil and bilge. The Reefs at Risk assessment concludes that marine-based pollution is the least pervasive of assessed threats, with only 1% of reefs in Southeast Asia under high threat. 28 CHAPTER 2. THREATS TO NEAR-SHORE ECOSYSTEMS IN THE CORAL TRIANGLE

2.7 Global warming, ocean acidiﬁcation, and coral bleaching

Incidence of coral bleaching, an aspecific reaction to stress where corals ex- pel symbiontic algae, has been increasing over the last decade (Ward and Lafferty, 2004; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007). Bleaching events have been known to occur since decades, but the unprecedented scale of the bleaching event of 1998 (Hoegh-Guldberg, 1999) first alerted the world that bleaching caused by higher than usual temperatures cause serious reef degradation. The bleaching event of 1998 was a “Perfect Storm” of the effects of global warming and the El NiñoSouthern Oscillation (ENSO). Though reef communities will change and adapt to warming (Hughes et al., 2003), these events are likely to happen more frequently in the future: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that with current climate change mitigation policies, emission of greenhouse gases wll continue over the coming decades, and that the global climate will warm with 0.2◦C per decade over the coming two decades (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007). Global loading with greenhouse gases not only increase sea surface temperature, it also acidifies the world’s oceans. Acidification reduces the con- −2 centration of carbonate CO3 ions, which in turn reduces the ability of reef-building corals to form their skeletons (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007). Consequently, ocean acidification reduces growth of corals, decreasing the resilience of coral reefs. Ocean acidification, global warming, and sea level rise make coral reefs, mangroves, salt marshes, among those ecosystems that are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007). Ninety-four representatives of NGOs and government agencies working at six MPAs in Indonesia, the Philippines and Papua New Guinea perceive this threat as much less severe: They rate the threat of coral bleaching as “low”, whereas other threats that feature less prominently on international agendas receive much higher threat rankings. For example, they rate the threat of “solid waste” as either “moderate” or “high” (Green et al., 2008)—This perception will likely change as soon as a bleaching event hits one of the sites, as perceived threat levels often depend on the visibility of the threat rather than on its actual severity. In contrast to local perceptions, a recent WWF report on the effects of climate change on ecosystems and societies (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2009) suggests that the problem is more severe than was previously thought . . . 2.8. OTHER THREATS 29

2.8 Other threats

Threats listed in this section emanate from, or are contained in, the major threats listed above.

2.8.1 Crown-Of-Thorns Starfish outbreaks and other pests Crown-of-thorns starfish (COTS) Acanthaster planci is a predator of corals that occurs in the Coral Triangle area. At low densities this invertebrate does no damage, but occasionally populations of COTS rapidly grow to dominate the reef. During such outbreaks, COTS can literally strip large sections of the reef of all coral growth (Jones et al., 2004; Lourey et al., 2000). Dulvy et al. (2004) relates increased incidence of COTS outbreaks to over-fishing, which selectively removes COTS predators from the reef community. Eutrophica- tion may also increase likelihood of COTS outbreaks, because eutrophication increases food availability for algae-feeding COTS larvae. The Great Barrier Marine Park Authority addresses the COTS problem by addressing over- fishing and by addressing issues related to land use—It considers removal by SCUBA divers too expensive, ineffecient, and not entirely appropriate because COTS outbreaks are a partly natural phenomenon (CRC Reef Re- search Center, 2001). Sweatman (2008) finds that no-take zones in the Great Barrier Reef Marine National Park are proportionally less affected by COTS outbreaks, and he hypothesizes that higher abundance of piscivorous coral trout in no-take zones (Russ et al., 2008) resulted in a trophic cascade that increased mortality of COTS juveniles. In an area of about 100,000 ha comprising the northern part of Komodo National Park and bordering waters, a COTS removal program based on a bounty system for local fishers resulted in the removal of app. 133,000 COTS over in six months, but this removal did not stop the expansion of the COTS population (Mous et al., 2007).

2.8.2 Disease Disease in corals (e.g. blackband disease and whiteband disease) are known to cause degradation of coral reefs, especially in the Caribbean. Based on published reports, Ward and Lafferty (2004) conclude that incidence of coral disease excluding non-infectuous bleaching) fluctuated without a trend over the period 1970-2001. During rapid assessements conducted in Indonesia over the period 1995 - 2006, researchers did detect disease in corals here and there, but nowhere at a significant scale. 30 CHAPTER 2. THREATS TO NEAR-SHORE ECOSYSTEMS IN THE CORAL TRIANGLE

2.8.3 Phase shifts from coral-dominated to algae-dominated communities Over-fishing, in combination with climate change, may result in a phase shift where reefs change from coral-dominated to algae-dominated communities (Hughes et al., 2007) (Fig. 2.4). A phase shift is initiated by events such as large-scale bleaching or a hurricane that destroys corals, leaving bare substrate. In the presence of large herbivorous fish, coral recruits will re-colonize the bare substrate, and, assuming that nearby healthy reefs supply coral larvae, the reef can revert to its previous state. If, however, large herbivorous fish have been depleted through over-fishing, algae will out-grow corals, in- hibiting re-colonization of coral recruits (Smith et al., 2006). Consequently, the reef may remain in this alternate, algae-domininated state for a long period, even though there are no apparent changes to other components of the reef ecosystem (Ledlie et al., 2007)—Some years after the event that initiated the phase shift, the reef may loose its structural complexity, resulting in loss of species diversity and leaving a more fragile ecosystem (Graham et al., 2006). It appears that for reefs to over-grow with algae, some major disturbance is essential to unsettle the balance; algae appear not the be the primary cause of mortality of corals (Diaz-Pulido and McCook, 2002; Mc- Cook et al., 2001). Lack of grazing pressure is probably a more important factor for development of algae over-growth than is nutrient supply (Fur- man and Heck, 2008; Diaz-Pulido and McCook, 2003). This underlines the importance of maintaining a healthy population of herbivorous fish, while addressing climate change as a root cause of major disturbances (Aronson and Precht, 2006). The most important herbivorous groups on the reef are parrotfishes and some of the surgeon fishes. Especially large-bodied parrotfishes are effective grazers. Sometimes, a fish species that is not normally a grazer “steps up to the plate” and becomes critical in reducing algae cover; see Bellwood et al. (2006) for an example where batfish Platax pinnatus became the main actor in reducing algae cover on a reef in the Great Barrier Reef system. On the other hand, typical grazers do not always live up to expectations as they tend to be specific for certain algae species (Mantyka and Bellwood, 2007). Over- fishing, which usually affects large fish first, has a minor positive effect on grazing because it reduces predation on herbivorous fish by piscivores. This positive effect, however, is overwhelmed by the negative effect of overfishing on grazing due to depletion of large herbivores (Mumby et al., 2006). These interactions show that one cannot exactly predict how an ecosystem will react to a catastrophic event, but it is clear that over-fishing decreases capacity of reefs to bounce back (resilience), and that any major effect on one or more 2.8. OTHER THREATS 31

Figure 2.4: Model depicting transitions between ecosystem states. Coral-dominated reefs become more vulnerable owing to fishing pressure and eutrophication. The dotted lines illustrate the loss of resilience that becomes evident when reefs fail to recover from disturbance and slide into less desirable states. Modified from Bellwood et al. (2004) . of the components of the reef ecosystem may turn out to prohibit recovery later on, even though immediate effects on the ecosystem as a whole were not directly visible. This, in turn, demonstrates the need for comprehensive protection of reef ecosystems.

2.8.4 Damage from tourism development, SCUBA diving, and snorkeling Probably the main threat from tourism is contained in general coastal development issues, such as habitat conversion for marinas and other infrastructure, waste water disposal from hotels, run-off, etc. (see section 2.4). There are also more direct interactions, such as disturbance of nesting of sea turtles at tourist beaches and anchoring damage from boats carrying tourists. These threats are manageable through visitation rules and installation of mooring buoys. Though threats from tourism are real and significant, tourism has one essential benefit: It enables people to enjoy nature for what it is, thereby increasing the value of the ecosystem services reefs provide in their pristine state. Without doubt, SCUBA dive tourism has been a major factor in developing global awareness on the plight of reefs. Another benefit is that presence of SCUBA divers often prevents other illegal activities such as blast fishing. 32 CHAPTER 2. THREATS TO NEAR-SHORE ECOSYSTEMS IN THE CORAL TRIANGLE

Furthermore, dive operators are often the first to report on environmental problems such as mass coral bleaching, Crown-Of-Thorns Starfish outbreaks, illegal fishing, and illegal waste disposal. Notwithstanding these benefits, SCUBA divers inevitably touch corals, causing some damage (Zakai and Chadwick-Furman, 2002; DeVantier and Turak, 2004; Hawkins and Roberts, 1997). The question is how may dives each site can withstand without excessive degradation. Research in the Caribbean islands Saba and Bonaire, Eilat (Israel, Gulf of Aqaba) and Sharm-el-Sheikh (Egypt, Red Sea) suggests that the percentage of corals that are damaged hardly increases up to a diving pressure of 5,000 dives per year per site. Damage increases rapidly beyond this diving intensity (Fig. 2.5) (Zakai and Chadwick-Furman, 2002; Hawkins and Roberts, 1997). Whereas this threshold of 5000 dives per year is not necessarily the same as the reef’s carrying capacity for diving, it seems prudent to manage dive tourism with this number in mind. Another aspect of direct damage to corals from visitation is trampling: Divers and snorkelers often stand on reef flats before starting their visit to the reef slope. Though localized to the point of entry, this damage is generally more serious than the damage done during the dive itself, and a study in the Red Sea shows that trampling at some sites in Ras Mohammed National Park is six times higher than the level at which damage to the reef is acceptable (Leujak and Ormond, 2008). Because dive sites usually take up only a small percentage of the total area of reefs within a dive destination, direct effects of SCUBA diving at the scale of a seascape are small. The aforemention threshold of 5,000 dives per site per year means that if each site receives a dive pressure equivalent to one medium-sized live-aboard dive vessel a day, there is unlikely to be any noticeable damage at all. In fact, the “social” carrying capacity for diving, i.e. the dive intensity where divers perceive a reef as crowded and therefore less attractive, is probably lower than the level where damage starts to become noticeable (Dr. Alex Brylske, PADI Project AWARE, perc. comment). In principle, dive tourism does not differ from other threats emanating from use by humans: Use represents the values of ecosystem services, but if left uncontrolled it may degrade these same values. Because of its non- extractive nature, however, and because of its benefits in terms of generating awareness, a carefully managed dive tourism is an opportunity for better governance of reefs rather than a threat.

2.8.5 Invasive species There are no known major problems with invasive species in the seas of the Coral Triangle. 2.8. OTHER THREATS 33

Figure 2.5: Effects of diving on coral damage levels in Sharm-El-Sheikh (Egypt), Bonaire and Saba (copied from Hawkins and Roberts (1997)) (top graph) and in Eilat (Gulf of Aqaba, copied from Zakai and Chadwick-Furman (2002) (bottom graph). Both studies suggest that damage rapidly increases once diving pressure exceeds 5,000 dives per year. Note the difference in horizontal axis units (dives per year and dives per quarter). Numbers on the vertical axis cannot be compared directly because the studies used different metrics for coral damage. 34 CHAPTER 2. THREATS TO NEAR-SHORE ECOSYSTEMS IN THE CORAL TRIANGLE

Box 2 Bunaken National Park (NP): A carrying capacity study

(DeVantier and Turak, 2004) investigated can be closed temporarily to enable recov- the effects of SCUBA divers on the reefs of ery. Furthermore, the authors recommend Indonesia’s Bunaken National Park (North to conduct education programmes towards Sulawesi, Indonesia) and the surrounding increased care and awareness among those reefs of North Sulawesi. About 9,000 divers benefiting from the health of the coral reefs. visit North Sulawesi each year and its reefs The authors recommend managers to des- receive between 110,000 and 225,000 indi- ignate “sacrificial” sites, where dive visita- vidual dives per year. These dives are not tion is allowed to reach a level where dam- spread uniformly across the area’s 120 dive age becomes noticeable. These sacrificial sites, with the most popular sites receiving sites could absorb visitation from beginning over 6,000 divers per year. Devantier and divers, thereby taking some of the pressure Turak found that each diver touches or holds off more pristine sites. the reef 60 times per hour, and that acci- The authors note great variation in prac- dental breakages of corals occurs on average tices of dive groups and dive operators, but twice per diver per hour. The cumulative impact of diving is substantial at some sites. in general dive operators have low awareness De Vantier and Turak recommend a dive on safety and good environmental dive prac- management model that incorporates both tices. They suggest to license dive opera- concepts of Carrying Capacity and Lim- tors after to compulsory training on respon- its of Acceptable Change. The objective sible diving behaviour. They recommend a of this management model is to maintain the ecological and aesthetic quality of reef “Swim, don’t Stand” awareness campaign to sites while maintaining the revenue and address the problem of snorkelers trampling goodwill values that dive tourism brings to reef flats. A licensing system will also enable Bunaken and Indonesia. They recommend monitoring and control of the dive industry, making an initial evaluation of reef health at and the licensing system can be set up in a all dive sites, followed by regular monitoring. Sites that exhibit signs of degradation way that it strengthens the dive fee collection system of Bunaken National Park. Chapter 3

Tools and approaches for managing use of marine living resources

3.1 Tool selection

To understand the role of Marine Protected Areas, it is necessary to understand roles of other tools and approaches for managing marine living resources, such as fishing quota and coastal zone management. Each of the tools discussed in this chapter has its strengths and weaknesses. The art of management is to choose the most efficient management tool for each situation. An a priori focus on MPAs is dangerous, because this may lead to the tool becoming the objective, which may result in inefficient management. One indicator to rate performance of management tools in different situations is the amount of behavior (present or future) changed per unit management effort. Whereas this indicator is difficult to operationalize (especially in respect to future behavior), it does provide focus to a comparison of the merits of different mananagement tools. Furthermore, this indicator does not get confused by management measures that merely confirm status quo and that do not change behavior. A published example of such nonsensical measures is Jervis Bay Marine Park (Australia), where a zoning plan avoided placement of protection zones in areas where fishing effort is high (Lynch, 2006). Though seldomly expressed in clear terms, many guidelines for MPA design implicitly recommend to avoid location of no-take areas where fishing effort is high so to avoid conflict with fishers—For no-take areas that are expected to sustain fisheries, such an approach completely defeats the CHAPTER 3. TOOLS AND APPROACHES FOR MANAGING USE OF MARINE LIVING 36 RESOURCES purpose1. Below, we briefly introduce each of the management tools or concepts, and we conclude this section with an assessement of the effectiveness for each tool to address anthropogenic threats discussed in Chapter 2, focusing on near-shore ecosystems (reefs, mangroves, etc.) in the Coral Triangle. We demonstrate that no-take areas achieve high change of behaviour per unit management effort in regard to overfishing. Conventional (i.e., not specific to area) fishing gear regulations are effective to address destructive fishing methods, whereas quota, size and species regulations are effective for mid- and large-scale pelagic fisheries. Zoned MPAs are effective in areas where uses such as shipping and oil exploitation need to be managed to avoid damage to reefs and associated ecosystems.

3.2 Fishing gear regulations

Fishing gear regulations come in two kinds: Outright prohibition of certain gears, and regulations that prohibit certain specifications. The bans on blast fishing and cyanide fishing in the fishery laws of each of the CT6 countries are examples of outright prohibition of “gears”. Mesh size regulations, either of trawl nets or gill nets, are the most common examples of gears that are legal or illegal depending on its specifications. Turtle Excluder Devices and Bycatch Reduction Devices, often mandatory on trawl gear, are also examples of gear specification regulations. Generally speaking, outright prohibition of certain fishing gears are effective means to ban gears that are destructive to the environment. These regulations can be enforced in a cost-efficient manner, because fishery officers can check vessels upon return to the harbour. Because fishing gear is expensive, fishers at sea will usually not discard them if a patrol boat is approaching. An exception, of course, is fish bombs and fish poisons, which fishers often keep in net bags that are weighed down for easy discarding over- board. The government of Manggarai District in Eastern Indonesia found a work-around for this problem by outlawing hookah compressors, a device that is often used in blast and poison fishing operations, and that has caused injury and death to fishers through decompression sickness (Pet and Djohani, 1999). Regulation of gear specifications often aims to optimize catch of a fishery, for example by setting mesh size at a level that avoids capture of under-sized fish. To achieve optimal catch, regulation of gear specifications is usually

1An exception is establishment of no-take areas on fishing grounds that are no longer productive because of over-fishing. 3.3. FISHING EFFORT REGULATIONS 37 accompanied by effort regulation. Regulation of gear specifications is also used to avoid by catch of threatened species, for example use of circle hooks instead of J-hooks to avoid by-catch of turtles in hook-and-line fisheries. Especially in reef fisheries, regulation of gear specifications is unlikely to be effective by itself because of the multitude of species that end up in the catch. Regulations that control gear specifications are much harder too enforce than outright bans, requiring special training for fishery officers. Mandatory add-ons, such as Turtle Excluder Devices and Bycatch Reduction Devices, may be present on board, but they are often not used during fishing (see, for example, the case of the Arafura shrimp fishery (FAO, 2001))— Hence, enforcement must take place at sea. Finally, in small-scale fisheries of CT6 countries, gears are often home-made, and therefore one would need to put a focused awareness program in place to tell fishers what is allowed and what not.

3.3 Fishing eﬀort regulations

With very few exceptions, over-use of any kind of gear will result in some form of over-exploitation for some of the species in the exploited fish stocks. Therefore, effort regulation is an essential tool in any fishery management plan, and even fishery management based on quota (see below) indirectly aims to regulate effort. The outdated Maximum Sustainable Yield model (see Fig. 2.2), still among the most common fishery management tools currently in use, provides a scientific underpinning for effort regulation. Though effort regulation is straightforward in concept, actual implementation is challenging. First of all, a management agency must have the knowledge (data, techniques) to set a maximum allowable effort—An extremely complex endeavour in multi-species and multi-gear fisheries, where a maximum level of effort is bound to over-fish part of the exploited stocks while under-fishing others. According to Johannes (1998), collecting data needed for “classic” fishery management is outright unfeasible, and he advocates “data-less” management based on devolution of management auhority to local communities. Second, a manager must keep track of development in total effort, and she must have the legal and operational means to put on the breaks once total effort reaches an agreed-upon maximum. Third, a manager must have a standard unit of effort and fishing units must be expressed in these standard units of effort—This is particularly difficult in a multi-gear fishery. An additional challenge in this respect is that technological development may increase fishing power, increasing actual effort while nominal effort stays the same. Even just a change in fishing practice can make an enormous CHAPTER 3. TOOLS AND APPROACHES FOR MANAGING USE OF MARINE LIVING 38 RESOURCES difference: For example, a shift from daytime to nighttime spearfishing dramatically increased catch per boat in the Pacific (Gillett and Moy, 2006). Fourth, unless effort regulation pertains to some highly selective gear, effort regulation by itself cannot prevent fishers shifting to other species or areas. Hence, a total effort deemed sustainable may wreak havoc if fishers shift to other species that have less resilience to fishing pressure than the previous target species. The challenges listed above illustrate that centralized management agencies cannot implement effort regulation in near-shore fisheries of the Coral Triangle, because these fisheries are small-scale, dispersed, multi-species, and multi-gear. Devolution of management authority to lower administrative levels may be part of a solution, but here the problem is that low administrative levels, because of their small jurisdictional areas, cover only part of the home range of fish stocks. It follows that various administrative units would share a stock, and this requires coordination between administrative units.

3.4 Catch regulations

Catch regulation comprises controls on catching certain species, controls on the catch quantity (quota regulation), and controls on the size range of species that may be caught. Catch regulation is the most direct way to control what is extracted from ecosystems, with one important caveat: The unmanaged by-catch that is associated with the managed part of the catch (see section 2.3). The concerns raised under effort regulation (section 3.3) also apply to catch regulations. With the exception of an outright ban on certain species, quota and size regulations are extremely costly management measures in a small-scale, dispersed, multi-species, and multi-gear fishery. To our knowledge, there are no examples of effective management systems for tropical near-shore fisheries in CT6 countries based on quota regulations. An elaboration of the quota system, Individual Transferable Quotas (Branch, 2009) and catch shares (Costello et al., 2008) offer promises for large-scale mono-specific fisheries, but this system would be difficult to implement in the dispersed small-scale fisheries working near-shore habitats of CT6 countries. Indone- sia and the Philippines do have size regulations, for example for Napoleon wrasse Cheilinus undulatus but their ecological benefits and enforceability have been questioned (Sadovy et al., 2003). On top of this, these regulations have been diluted by exceptions to accommodate aquaculture based on wild-caught juveniles. Outright bans on certain species, especially if these species require a spe- 3.5. MARINE RESERVES, ZONED MARINE PROTECTED AREAS, AND TEMPORAL CLOSURES39 cific fishing technique, are a more cost-efficient management measure than other catch regulations. Such bans can be enforced at some point in the marketing chain where the catch of prohibited species concentrates, for example at fish markets or wholesale centers. Furthermore, an awareness campaing towards explaining an outright ban can be much simpler, and therefore more effective, than an awareness campaign aims to explain which size range is prohibited.

3.5 Marine reserves, zoned Marine Protected Areas, and temporal closures

Marine reserves, zoned Marine Protected Areas, and temporal area restrictions (see section 1.3 for definitions), are different from aforementioned management tools because they are area-specific. They are very flexible, allowing different sets of regulations in different parts of the jurisdictional area for which a management agency is responsible. Of course, this flexibility comes at a cost: Instead of one set of regulations, society now must support a regulatory framework that supports various sets of regulations. Resource managers as well as resource users must have full understanding what is allowed where, and the demands to administrative and operational support systems are higher than they are in a “one size fits all” approach. Once established, marine reserves are the more effective in terms of amount of behaviour changed per unit management effort than zoned Marine Pro- tected Areas. After all, zoned MPAs merely modify fishery regulations in certain areas, whereas marine reserves achieve a change in behaviour that cannot be effected by any other means: A complete prohibition of all extractive uses. Especially if responsibilities for protected area management and fishery management reside with different agencies, as in Malaysia and to some extent in Indonesia, marine reserve systems are more efficient than zoned MPA systems, because marine reserves do not require the protected area management agency to also deal with fisheries and (partly) replicate the services that the fishery management agency already provides in other areas. The problem, of course, is that establishment of marine reserves is much more challenging than is establishment of zoned MPAs. It may not always be clear to fishers why reserves are necessary to sustain their fisheries, but it is clear to them that reserves are about an outright ban on fishing. In zoned MPAs, on the other hand, the sensitive part of the management intervention can be postponed to some time after formalization of outer boundaries and establishment of a management agency for the MPA. A perception survey CHAPTER 3. TOOLS AND APPROACHES FOR MANAGING USE OF MARINE LIVING 40 RESOURCES among stakeholders of Marine Protected Areas in Southern Europe indicates that support for zoned areas is higher than for single-designation reserves (Mangi and Austen, 2008).

The question remains whether partially protected areas are perhaps as effective or nearly as effective as as reserves. The hypothesis is that the effect of fishery on biomass, size composition, and species composition of fish populations are high in surrounding fishing grounds, moderate in use zones, and low in no-take zones. Of course, it depends on the type of restrictions in the use zone to which extent fish populations there more closely resemble those of no-take zones or those of surrounding fishing grounds. Nevertheless, Lester and Halpern (2008) concludes after reviewing “all empirical studies comparing biological measures . . . in no-take reserves and adjacent partially protected and unprotected areas . . . , that while partially protected areas may confer some benefits over open access areas, no-take reserves generally show greater benefits and yield significantly higher densities of organisms within their boundaries relative to partially protected sites nearby.” A study in Karimunjawa National Park (Indonesia), a zoned protected area, corroborates this statement: fish biomass increased or stabilized over the period 2004-2007 in no-take zones (Core Zone and Tourism Zone), and decreased in zones where only some of the fishing methods are restricted (Protected Zone) or where all legal fishing methods are allowed (Utilization Zone) (Ardiwijaya et al., 2008).

Temporal area restrictions are a kind of Marine Protected Area management (below), with the note that closures are temporary only and that they usually focus on species of economic interest. The sasi systems of Eastern Indonesia, for example, usually close a certain part of the reef for one or more years, after which the community opens the reef to fishing again. There is a wide variety in sasi systems, but usually the prohibition only pertains to valuable, sedentary species, such as lobster, top shell, or sea cucumber, while the community continues the fish the sasi-area for finfish species (Novaczek et al., 2001; Satria et al., 2006). In Papua (Indonesia), local churches play a pivotal role in declaration of traditional period and area restrictions (P. J. Mous, pers. obs.). In Maluku (Eastern Indonesia), sasi is more common among Christian than among Muslim communities (Novaczek et al., 2001). Whereas formal fishery laws do make provisions for period and area restrictions, fishery agencies of CT6 countries do not apply them routinely to near- shore fisheries, probably because their application requires a more detailed knowledge on local conditions than is available at local fisheries agencies. 3.6. ECOSYSTEM-BASED (FISHERY) MANAGEMENT 41

3.6 Ecosystem-Based (Fishery) Management

Pikitch et al. (2004) described Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management (EBFM) as a new direction for fishery management, essentially reversing the order of management priorities, putting first the health of the ecosystem to support fisheries instead of focusing on the fisheries themselves (see also (Appeldoorn, 2008). The overall objective of EBFM is to sustain healthy marine ecosystems and the fisheries they support. Since ecosystems are a spatial concept (or at least a concept with an important spatial aspect), Marine Protected Areas are almost by definition an essential ingredient in EBFM (see, for example, (Ward et al., 2002): “WWF’s approach to Ecosystem-Based Management is to foster area-based management across the oceans”). As a holistic concept that goes beyond management of commercial species to include effects on non-exploited part of the ecosystem (Zabel et al., 2003), eco-system based management is the most recent stage in the evolution in fishery management, following single-species and multi-species management approaches. As such, it is not a tool of the same kind as the ones listed above: EBFM may result in a management plan the comprises any combination of the tools listed above (see, for example, Appeldoorn (2008), who includes area and gear restriction in his EBFM portfolio for the reef fisheries of the US Caribbean).

Not surprising for a recent concept, the present governance framework in CT6 countries is not conducive for EBFM. This is clearly illustrated by the ubiquitous presence of administrative units within national ﬁsheries services that formulate their management objectives in terms of maximal sustainable yield, whereas other units are responsible for “conservation”. One might argue that a balance of powers between these units may result in an ecosystem-based approach, but it would probably be more eﬃcient to combine these units into a single planning group who takes development decisions on the basis of an overall goal to sustain ecosystem health. The challenge is to operationalize such a goal—Obviously, it cannot be measured with a single metric such as the value of annual yield. Hall and Mainprize (2004) proposes a balanced scorecard approach to this end.

Because EBFM is an approach or perhaps even a dogma (Box 3) rather than a tool, one cannot assess its eﬀectiveness in the same way as the other tools listed above, and it is therefore not included in the overview below (cf. Table 3.2). CHAPTER 3. TOOLS AND APPROACHES FOR MANAGING USE OF MARINE LIVING 42 RESOURCES

Box 3 Ten commandments for ecosystem-based ﬁsheries scientists

In an effort to accelerate the development 9. Account for evolutionary change of EBFM, Francis et al. (2007) offer the ten caused by fishing. commandments listed below. Though the 10. Implement an approach that is inte- authors specify that these commandments grated, interdisciplinary, and inclu- pertain to fishery scientists, it appears that sive. they seek to control behaviour of fishers and therefore the commandments must pertain Appeldoorn (2008) formulated the follow- to managers as well. ing tactical and strategic principles for ecosystem-based management of reef-based 1. Keep a perspective that is holistic, fisheries in the US Caribbean: risk-averse, and adaptive. 1. Rigorously protect structural habitat 2. Question key assumptions, no matter (see Commandment 5). how basic. 2. Protect water quality (see Com- 3. Maintain old-growth age structure in mandment 5). fish populations. 3. Maintain ecosystem integrity (see 4. Characterize and maintain the natu- Commandments 4, 6 and 7). ral spatial structure of fish stocks. 4. Maintain ecosystem function (see 5. Characterize and maintain viable fish Commandments 6 and 7). habitats. 5. Maintain a series of control areas for 6. Characterize and maintain ecosystem monitoring. resilience. 6. Employ a precautionary approach at 7. Identify and maintain critical food all times. web connections. 7. Recognize there are limits to produc- 8. Account for ecosystem change tion; therefore control rates of extrac- through time. tion. 3.7. INTEGRATED COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 43

3.7 Integrated Coastal Zone Management

Like EBFM and the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Integrated Coastal Zone Management is an approach rather than a tool. Its elaboration may result an application of any of the tools that are listed above (protected areas, gear regulations, etc.). In contrast to other tools listed here, it more explicitly addresses resource uses that are not direcly related to ﬁsheries. Christie et al. (2005)2 provides following deﬁnition for Integrated Coastal Zone Management:

ICM is a process by which rational decisions are made concern- ing the conservation and sustainable use of coastal and ocean resources and space. The process is designed to overcome the fragmentation inherent in single-sector management approaches (ﬁshing operations, oil and gas development, etc.), in the splits in jurisdiction among diﬀerent levels of government, and in the land-water interface.

In developed countries, ICZM is concerned with the effect of sectoral policies (agriculture, fishery, industry, tourism, transport, and energy) on coastal zones (Belfiore, 2000). Christie et al. (2005) notes that ICZM in the Philip- pines and Indonesia emphasizes collaboration (cross-sectoral, between administrative levels, between stakeholders). Like ecosystem-based management, ICZM takes a holistic view at governance. In principle, ICZM plans cover the entire coastal area of an administrative unit. It is not necessarily restricted to natural or near-natural areas, and for example urban and industrial development may all be part of ICZM plan. ICZM plans usually include Marine Protected Areas. Its focus on providing a regulatory framework for bridging sectors and government services that are usually disjunct is its reason for being, but it can also become its weakness because it may confuse through duplication of regulations (see Box 4). According a review by Siry (2006), Malaysia has had a coastal zone management law since 1992, but up to an including 2004 ICZM was still not mainstreamed. Decentralization in Indonesia may de facto have fur- thered coastal zone management because it devolved regulatory power from sectoral national ministries to district-level administrations, where relations between sectoral services are stronger. Nevertheless, Indonesia developed a coastal zone management law, which was promulgated in 2007. In the Philip- pines, Integrated Coastal Zone Management seems to be out of fashion, or

2In: Cicin-Sain B, Knecht R. Integrated coastal and ocean management: concepts and practices. Washington D.C.: Island Press; 1998. CHAPTER 3. TOOLS AND APPROACHES FOR MANAGING USE OF MARINE LIVING 44 RESOURCES perhaps it lives on in another incarnation—At least, for their assessment on feasibility of the new kid on the block, Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Manage- ment, Christie et al. (2007) do not build on ICZM concepts they developed earlier.

3.8 United Nations Code of Conduct for Re- sponsible Fisheries

The United Nations Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries3 was developed by the UN Food and Agricultural Organization in 1995. It is global in scope, and it is directed to all groups and individuals concerned with the conservation of fishery resources and management and development of fisheries. The Code acknowledges that fisheries have profound effects on aquatic ecosystems, and it sets out a voluntary code for mitigation of negative effects. It also addresses social issues such as safety on board and food safety. The code is voluntary. Its first principle is “States and users of living aquatic resources should conserve aquatic ecosystems. The right to fish carries with it the obligation to do so in a responsible manner so as to ensure effective conservation and management of the living aquatic resources.” See Box 5 for the ten objectives of the Code. Though the Code predates EBFM, scientists consider EBFM critical to comply with the Code. Unfortunately, adherence to EBFM principles is one of the elements of the Code that countries find most difficult to implement. Pitcher et al. (2009) measured to which extent 53 countries that are responsible for 96% of the world’s catch comply with Article 7 of the code, which pertains to fisheries management in the context of conservation and sustainable use. Overall, compliance rating was far from satisfactory, with a highest score of only 60% (Norway). Of the CT6 countries, Malaysia, Philip- pines, and Indonesia scored 44%, 32%, and 26% respectively, the others were not assessed. Pitcher et al. (2009) concludes that the Code so far failed to achieve its objectives, and the authors call for a binding, international legal instrument for fishery management. Another voluntary code of particular interest to the Coral Triangle is the International Standard for the Trade in Live Reef Food Fish (Muldoon and Scott, 2004), which seeks to address problems with sustainability in the live fish fisheries in Southeast Asia (Sadovy et al., 2003). The Standard was never adopted as part of a certification scheme (see section 3.9), which has limited its effectiveness.

3http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.HTM, accessed on May 8 2009 3.8. UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT FOR RESPONSIBLE FISHERIES 45

Box 4 A coastal zone management law for Indonesia: Overlaps and opportunities

Indonesia’s Ministry of Marine Affairs and servasi Perairan under Law 31 of 2004) and Fisheries developed a national law (Law 27 Coastal and Small Island Conservation Ar- of 2007) that underpins coastal zone man- eas (CSICA Kawasan Konservasi Pesisir agement. The geographic scope of this law is land and inland water systems within dan Pulau-Pulau Kecil under Law 27 of coastal municipalities (kecamatan) and seas 2007). They are, however, not entirely over- up to 12 nautical miles from the coastline. lapping (see figure below): ACA can be One interesting aspect of this law is that it established in any water body, either ma- paves the way for exclusive use and manage- rine or freshwater, but they cannot comprise ment rights in the coastal zone (Hak Pen- gusuhaan Pantai Pesisir). This offers op- land. CSICA, on the other hand, can com- portunities for true devolution of manage- prise land in coastal municipalities, but it ment authority to local groups. can comprise neither land nor water in land- Unfortunately, this law also resulted in du- locked municipalities. Furthermore, CSICA plication of regulatory efforts, especially in cannot comprise offshore waters. These two respect to the Fisheries Law (Law 31 of protected area systems come in addition to 2004), necessitating the definitition of two the system operated by Indonesia’s Ministry types of marine protected areas: Aquatic of Forestry, which applies to both lands and Conservation Areas (ACA or Kawasan Kon- waters . . .

12 nm

Aquatic Conservation Area

Coastal and Small Island Conservation Area CHAPTER 3. TOOLS AND APPROACHES FOR MANAGING USE OF MARINE LIVING 46 RESOURCES

Box 5 Objective of the United Nations Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries

The objectives of the code are to: • facilitate and promote technical, fi- • establish principles, in accordance nancial and other cooperation in con- with the relevant rules of interna- servation of fisheries resources and tional law, for responsible fishing and fisheries management and develop- fisheries activities, taking into ac- ment; count all their relevant biological, • promote the contribution of fisheries technological, economic, social, envi- to food security and food quality, giv- ronmental and commercial aspects; ing priority to the nutritional needs • establish principles and criteria for of local communities; the elaboration and implementation of national policies for responsible • promote protection of living aquatic conservation of fisheries resources resources and their environments and and fisheries management and devel- coastal areas; opment; • serve as an instrument of reference to • promote the trade of fish and fish- help States to establish or to improve ery products in conformity with rele- the legal and institutional framework vant international rules and avoid the required for the exercise of responsi- use of measures that constitute hid- ble fisheries and in the formulation den barriers to such trade; and implementation of appropriate • promote research on fisheries as well measures; as on associated ecosystems and rel- • provide guidance which may be used evant environmental factors; and where appropriate in the formulation and implementation of international • provide standards of conduct for all agreements and other legal instru- persons involved in the fisheries sec- ments, both binding and voluntary; tor. 3.9. CONSUMER AWARENESS AND CERTIFICATION 47

3.9 Consumer awareness and certiﬁcation

Consumer awareness and certification programs work on the demand side in the fisheries sector. They seek to influence fishing behaviour by creating demand for fish that are caught in well-managed, sustainable fisheries. Some initiatives, such as WWF’s sustainable seafood guides4, focus on end- consumers, whereas others, such as the certification scheme of the Marine Stewardship Council5 work with wholesalers and retailers. The certification program of the Marine Steward Council pertain not to companies, but to fisheries: Examples of certified fisheries are the Kyoto Danish seine fishery for snow crab and flathead flounder, Gulf of Alaska pollock, and New Zealand hoki. Sometimes the fishery is defined not only on species, fishing grounds, and type of gear, but also by the group who participates in it (for example the fishery operated by the American Albacore Fishing Association or the Kyoto Danish Seine Fishery Federation). The Marine Aquarium Council6 offers different types of certifications for sites and communities, collectors, exporters, importers, retailers, and breeders and culturists (Table 3.1). Certification depends on traceability of catch from source to end-consumer. In large-scale, single-species fisheries, tracing fish from net to consumer is feasible, but in the near-shore, small-scale, and dispersed reef fisheries of the Coral Triangle, traceability is a major challenge. It is no surprise that certification and formulation of standards has only be attempted for high-value fisheries such as those for aquarium fish and live reef food fish—For “normal” food fish, the logistics of keeping track of fish from “reef to retail” would be prohibitively expensive. Jacquet and Pauly (2008) report that only one of the 26 MSC-certified fisheries is a small-scale fishery (Mexican red rock lobster, a high-value species). Even MAC, who does make an effort to certify (groups of) small-scale fishers, certified more three times more collectors, exporters, and importers, than groups positioned at the beginning of the marketing chain (Table 3.1). Jacquet and Pauly (2008) note how unfortunate it is that small-scale fisheries appear to miss out on certification schemes, as they would be more certifiable for various reasons: Compared to large-scale fisheries, they consume only 20% of all fishery subsidies, they produce four times more fish per unit of fuel consumed, and they hardly discard any fish at sea. Furthermore, small-scale fisheries employ about 25 times more people than do large-scale fisheres, catching about the same volume of fish. WWF’s sustainable seafood guides bypass problems with traceability of fish, because they inform consumers which (groups of) species are generally

4See www.panda.org 5See www.msc.org 6www.aquariumcouncil.org CHAPTER 3. TOOLS AND APPROACHES FOR MANAGING USE OF MARINE LIVING 48 RESOURCES

Table 3.1: Overview of Marine Aquariumﬁsh Council-certiﬁed Sites and Communi- ties (Sites), Collectors (Coll.), Exporters (Exp.), Importers (Imp.), Retailers (Ret.), and Culturists (Cult.)

Country Sites Coll. Exp. Imp. Ret. Cult. Fiji 5 5 1 Indonesia 3 3 6 Philippines 9 8 10 1 Singapore 1 1 1 Canada 1 France 4 2 Germany 1 Netherlands 2 UK 3 1 USA 4 4 2 Total 17 16 18 16 8 3 caught or cultured in a sustainable way. Anchovies, for example, are “safe”, because they are resilient to over-exploitation, and because they are caught in a selective ﬁshery. Grouper, on the other hand, are on the “Avoid”-list, because often sourced from already depleted stocks, and because they are sometimes caught with poison. Of course, a disadvantage of this system is that it lacks the ﬂexibility to except grouper that are from sustainable sources.

3.10 Assessment of management tool eﬀec- tiveness

Focusing on near-shore ecosystems, and considering threats and their relative importance (see section 2.1), the three threats that are important to consider at the scale of the Coral Triangle are over-ﬁshing, destructive ﬁshing, and global warming.

3.10.1 Addressing over-fishing and destructive fishing Tools for abating over-fishing and destructive fishing are gear restrictions, catch regulations, effort regulations, zoned MPAs, reserves, and temporary area restrictions. These tools may all become part of a management plan in- spired by Ecosystem-Based (Fishery) Management, the UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries or certification schemes. Whereas almost any of these tools and approaches can be applied to some effect, management efficiency (i.e. the amount of behaviour changed 3.10. ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT TOOL EFFECTIVENESS 49 per unit management effort, see section 3.1) varies. In near-shore fisheries of the Coral Triangle, management efficiency is dictated by the dispersed, multi-species, and multi-gear nature of the predominantly small-scale fisheries working reefs, mangrove areas, estuaries, etc. Tools that work for large- scale, single species fisheries usually fail in small-scale fisheries. Catch shares, for example, require (1) determination of an overall annual quota per species, (2) a mechanism to divide shares in an equitable way to fishing units, (3) a system to track how much each fisher catches, and a mechanism to fine fishers who surpassed their limits, (4) a mechanism for administration of chatch shares and trade in catch shares. In large-scale, single-species fisheries, economy of scale justifies implementation of these complex measures. In small-scale, multi-species fisheries, a catch share system would collapse in itself even if one could ever set quota for the hundreds of commercial species. Devolution of regulatory and implementing responsibilities would address part of the problem of scale, but one would incur extra costs for coordination because various local units would share fish stocks. Furthermore, there is a limit to which one can downscale tools: Villages that lack such basic infrastructure as a bank or a postal office are unlikely to administer a catch share system. In small-scale, dispersed fisheries only the simplest of gear, effort, catch, and area regulations are likely to have a satisfactory management efficiency. Compared to gear, effort, and catch regulations, area-specific management has one important advantage: It acts on the one aspect in small-scale near-shore fisheries that is somewhat fixed and predictable, namely place. Of course, ecosystems and fisheries at any one place are subject to change, but basic characteristics of coastal places stay the same over years and between seasons. In contrast to pelagic ecosystems, many of the values that coastal ecosystems provide ultimately depend on what happens at the places they occupy. Through area-specific management one can directly influence what happens at a place, provided that management organizations can find efficient means to ensure site presence. Site presence is costly, and costs increase with surface area. Therefore this tool must be used prudently—Area-specific management only makes sense if one intends to substantially modify behav- iors. In this light, reserves are more efficient than zoned marine protected areas, because zoned protected areas only modify fishing behavior (except in those zones that prohibit extractive use). Furthermore, zoned protected areas are conceptually more complex, and higher management flexibility does not necessarily justify higher management costs associated with higher complexity. These costs can be substantial, especially if responsibility for protected area management and fisheries management resides with different agencies. Incidentally, where other threats are important, protected areas contribute CHAPTER 3. TOOLS AND APPROACHES FOR MANAGING USE OF MARINE LIVING 50 RESOURCES most if they control the use that is the source of the prevailing threat—For example, in areas where coastal development is a major problem, a protected area would contribute most by prohibiting any construction. Table 3.2 provides a qualitative assessment of efficiency of management tools to abate over-fishing and destructive fishing, based on considerations presented in this chapter. EB(F)M, ICZM, and the UN Code for Sustainable Fisheries are approaches rather than tools, and therefore their effectiveness cannot be rated in the same way as the tools listed in the table.

3.10.2 Addressing global warming at sites

Addressing CO2 emissions as a root cause of global warming is beyond the scope of this report, but some have tried to address the effects of global warming by focusing conservation efforts on reefs that are likely to be more resilient to bleaching (e.g. McLeod et al. (2009); Salm and McLeod (2006); West and Salm (2003)). The problem with this approach is that the science to reliably identify resilient reefs does not exist. Even if one could identify resilient reefs, then one would still need to decide whether to protect reefs at highest or at lowest risk (where risk is a resultant of resilience and chance of getting exposed to warm water)—The solution to this problem is complex, depending whether one aims for the survival of reefs within reserves or for maximization of the expected number of healthy reefs, and also depending on the effects of protection on recovery rates (Game et al., 2008). Assuming that one wants survival of reefs within reserves, and if one knows the spatial distribution in likelihood that sea surface water temperature will exceed a threshold value at which bleaching occurs, one can let this factor in MPA network design (see Game et al. (2008) for an example from the Great Bar- rier Reef in Australia). Though advanced mathematics in combination with computing power today enables solution of complex problems in network design, it remains to be seen whether these advances are useful in the face of uncertainties in risk factor input and of practical problems in establishment and management of networks—An elegant design means nothing if little of it survives political processes that follow. Amidst these uncertainties and the complexities how to deal with global warming at the site level, the agreement among scientists and managers is that global warming poses an additional threat to reefs (see section 2.7), and that other threats, especially over-fishing, prevent a reef from recovering (see 2.8.3). Hoegh-Guldberg et al. (2009) go one step further, and they warn that better on-site management can only prevent coral reefs from collapse if the global community succeeds in stabilizing CO2 emissions. The reverse is true as well: Efforts to stabilize CO2 emissions will only help survival of reef 3.10. ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT TOOL EFFECTIVENESS 51

Table 3.2: Assessment of efficiency of management tools (rows) to address over-fishing and destructive fishing in near-shore small-scale fisheries of the Coral Triangle. “-”=tool is inefficient, “+”=tool is only efficient in support of other tools, “++”= tool is efficient, requiring only a limited investment in other tools, “+++”= tool is efficient, and if applied at scale it can address the threat without major support from other tools. Compare with Table 1 in Roberts et al. (2005)

Tool Over- Dest. Remarks fishing Fishing Gear - outright ban + +++ Gear - ban on specs + + Effort + + To the knowledge of the authors, there are no examples where management towards sustainability in near-shore small-scale fisheries resulted in a decrease or stabilization of effort Catch - ban on species +++ + A total ban on species is efficient if enforcement can focus on some point in the marketing chain where illegal catch concentrates Catch - quota - - Though it may be possible to manage fisheries of certain high-value species with quota, most of the hundreds of species caught in near-shore small-scale fisheries cannot be managed in this way. Catch - shares - - Inefficient for near-shore small-scale fisheries, because of high requirements for coordination and administration Catch - size - - Inefficient because of high complexity. For example, the size restrictions on Napoleon wrasse Cheilinus undulatus in Indonesia have been largely ineffective. Zoned MPAs + ++ See also the comparison of effectiveness in section 3.5. Reserves +++ + Reserves are efficient means to abate destructive fishing within their boundaries, but if the primary goal is to abate destructive fishing anywhere, it is more efficient to have a strategy that is not area-specific Temp. area restrictions + + Temporary area restrictions are less beneficial in terms of sustainable fisheries than reserves, and they require much more coordination and explanation. Hence, their efficiency is lower than efficiency of reserves. Consumer awareness + + Consumer awareness and certification programs have high leverage, but unless there is almost unanimous agreement among consumers to stay away from certain seafoods, their effect is indirect. Certification of seafood caught in near-shore small-scale fisheries is a challenge because of the dispersed nature of these fisheries. CHAPTER 3. TOOLS AND APPROACHES FOR MANAGING USE OF MARINE LIVING 52 RESOURCES

Figure 3.1: Application of an insurance factor, a resultant of recovery time after a disturbance and the incidence and spatial scope of the disturbance. This example pertains to oil spills affecting US shores. Copied from Allison et al. (2003). ecosystems if there is better on-site management over a greater area. A straightforward (but costly) way to account for global warming is to increase effort towards protection beyond levels deemed sufficient to address other threats. In other words, one would apply an “insurance factor” (Allison et al., 2003) (Fig. 3.1). For example, a rule of thumb to prevent over- fishing is to include 20% to 40% of fishing grounds in reserves (see chapter 4)—Accounting for global warming means that one would aim to include a higher proportion (e.g. 40%-60%) in reserves. With the global community barely coming to grips with much more modest targets, it is unlikely that this consideration will evolve into a formal policy any time soon. It does, however, provide justification for allocating funds intended to fight global warming to site-based management. Chapter 4

The science of marine reserves

There is overwhelming evidence that establishment of reserves in over-fished areas result in recovery of fish populations (Roberts and Hawkins, 2000b; Gell and Roberts, 2003, 2002; Roberts et al., 2005), and evidence that this translates into benefits in terms of sustainable fisheries is substantial and growing. In this chapter, we first provide and overview of the mechanisms behind reserves as fishery management tools, followed by an overview of recent literature, notes on design criteria, and how to create support for establishing reserves through social marketing.

4.1 How no-take areas provide beneﬁts for capture ﬁsheries

Reserves sustain coastal fisheries in four ways: 1. By export of eggs and larvae. Most reef fish are planktonic as eggs or larvae, which get carried away from their place of birth by currents. Hence, an area that has a high abundance of large, reproducing fish (i.e., a large spawning stock) will export eggs and larvae, which grow up on reefs outside the reserve. There, these exported eggs and larvae will eventually support fisheries. 2. By spill-over of juvenile and adult fish from the reserve into surrounding fishing grounds, where they can be caught by the local fishery. It has been demonstrated that unfished populations can reach a density where intra-specific aggression increases, forcing some of the fish out of the protected area into surrounding fishing grounds (Abesamis and Russ, 2005). Fishers throughout the world tend to fish near no-take areas to benefit from this spill-over effect. 54 CHAPTER 4. THE SCIENCE OF MARINE RESERVES

3. By safeguarding fish stocks from total collapse due to failing fishery management in surrounding fishing grounds. Unforunately, there are many examples of failures and very few examples of successful fishery management. Even well-studied fisheries ended up over-exploiting and depleting fish stocks because of weaknesses in management as well as science, resulting in collapse of major fisheries that sustained coastal people for centuries (e.g., the cod Gadus morhua fishery in the North- west Atlantic (Myers et al., 1997; Spurgeon, 1997)). Fishery scientists and managers are constantly trying out new approaches and techniques to improve fishery management but it is likely that it will take some time before a robust, successful fishery management approach is widely applied. Until that time, no-take areas help to prevent to worst, and they may help to speed up recovery of depleted fish stocks when fishery management will have improved.

4. By decreasing variability in fish catches. Marine reserves can keep fish stock sizes above levels where recruitment limitation occurs, which means that, within limits, variation in stock size does not affect recruitment. This, in turn, results in a more stable catch (Roberts et al., 2005). Whereas this mechanism has a basis in theory, it has not been empirically proven yet, probably because stock-recruitment relationships are notoriously difficult to assess.

In sections below we present evidence from ﬁeld studies on egg and larvae export and spill-over.

4.1.1 Egg and larvae export Reserves can have a dramatic positive effect on the egg production (Evans et al., 2008), an effect that is stronger than one would expect based on increase in biomass alone1. This is because recruitment success of reef fish depends not only on biomass of the spawning stock, but also on the average age (and therefore individual body size) of the spawning stock: Older and larger fish produce eggs that have a higher hatching rate, developing into faster growing larvae that survive starvation longer as do eggs and larvae produced by younger fish (Berkeley et al., 2004; Brooks et al., 1997). Re- serves tend to have not only a higher biomass of fish, but also older and

1Fecundity, or number of eggs produced per unit time, is linearly related to individual body weight of the mother ﬁsh (Pankhurst and Conroy, 1987; Kraus et al., 2000; Koops et al., 2004), and therefore biomass of spawning stock is a good indicator of the number of eggs produced. 4.1. HOW NO-TAKE AREAS PROVIDE BENEFITS FOR CAPTURE FISHERIES 55

catch

immigration spill-over

reserve

life cycle (reproduction, growth)

corals

sea grass

mangroves

reserve information board

Figure 4.1: Simplified representation of the processes that result in a good catch in waters surrounding a reserve. 56 CHAPTER 4. THE SCIENCE OF MARINE RESERVES larger-sized individuals than fished areas. This means that reserves produce more successful offspring per kg parent biomass than do fished areas—An effect that is often overlooked in traditional fishery management (Birkeland and Dayton, 2005). Furthermore, because fish stocks inside reserves have a more natural size compositition, some species will also have a more natural sex ratio (number of mature females vs. number of mature males), which may increase reproductive output. The relationship between size (or age) composition and sex ratio is strong for many commercial fish species, including groupers (Serranidae) and snappers (Lutjanidae), because these fish change sex at a certain size or age. Finally, the high biomass of spawners in reserves may help those species which spawning success depends on social interactions (which, in turn, depend on abundance)—This may especially be an important factor for species who form spawning aggregations. In summary, the prositive effect of reserves on eggs and larvae export results from four processes: • Build-up of fish biomass inside the reserve because of protection from fishing. • Higher age and larger individual size of fish inside the reserve because of protection from fishing. • Reserves offer better conditions for reproduction of sex-changing fish species, because protection from fishing results in a more natural sex ratio. • Reserves offer better conditions for species which reproductive success depends on intra-specific social interactions, because reserves generally have a higher abundance of fish than fished areas. WWF highlighted the importance of large fish for egg production (and hence for the sustainability of fisheries) in its “Big Mamma” campaign (Fig. 4.2) on protection of spawning aggregations on the Meso-American reef. Classical fisheries science (Ricker, 1975) postulates a dome-shaped curve (Ricker-type) or a curve that levels off beyond a certain spawning potentional (Beverton & Holt-type) to describe the relationship between stock biomass and recruitment, where “recruitment” is often defined as the number of fish added to the fishable stock. This is of importance to marine reserves, because the right-hand part of such recruitment curves suggest that build-up of parental biomass may result in stabilization (Beverton & Holt-type) or even decrease (Ricker-type) in recruitment. However, empirical evidence for the right-hand part of either Ricker-type or Beverton & Holt-type stock- recruitment relations has been weak at best, and many stocks have now 4.1. HOW NO-TAKE AREAS PROVIDE BENEFITS FOR CAPTURE FISHERIES 57 dwindled to levels where most stock-recruitment models predict that availability of spawners limits recruitment. Furthermore, marine reserve theory predicts that any excess of eggs or larvae will find its way to surrounding fishing grounds, where density of larvae is lower due to lower biomass of spawners. This means that it is extremely unlikely that egg and larvae export from marine reserves levels out as spawning stock builds up. It also means that any proposals to cull fish stocks in reserves for maintaining egg and larvae export must be treated with utmost caution. Egg and larvae export is an important concept in Marine Protected Area network design. Network design must address both import and export of eggs and larvae from fished and unfished areas (connectivity). Connectivity has been a major focus of research, because it determines whether reserves can be effective to sustain fisheries. Section ?? briefly reviews the current status of knowledge on connectivity in fish populations of reef ecosystems, and it discusses implications for Marine Protected Area network design. We will show that addressing connectivity in network design is a matter of spread- ing out reserves within an area-of-interest. Teasing out migration pathways and identification of “source” and “sink” reefs is usually impracticable and, perhaps, even unnecessary.

4.1.2 Spill-over and “leaking” of juveniles and adult ﬁsh

Fish who spend part of their lifetime in a reserve may cross the boundary to enter fishing grounds, where they can be caught. This process is known as spill-over. In this section, we define two kinds of spill-over: “Proper” spill-over, where fish migrate out of the reserve because of over-population (density-dependent movement), similar to a bucket that overflows because the tap is still running, and “leaking”, where fish occasionally stray outside the reserve because their neighborhoods are only partly inside the reserve, like a bucket that may be half empty and that leaks because it has a hole in the bottom. In our bucket analogy the result appears the same in both situations (the floor gets wet, or fish enter fishing grounds). Suppose, however, that the water flow from the tap depends on the amount of water in the bucket—In this situation, the amount of water on the floor below the leaking bucket will be lower than for the overflowing bucket. Likewise, a reserve that spills over is likely to result in a higher yield than a reserve that leaks. In our analogy, the amount of water in the bucket regulating the flow from the tap is a bit artificial, but in fish populations there is a strong relationship between stock 58 CHAPTER 4. THE SCIENCE OF MARINE RESERVES

Figure 4.2: Awareness poster of WWF’s “Big Mamma” campaign on protection of spawning aggregations of reef fish of the Meso-American reef. 4.1. HOW NO-TAKE AREAS PROVIDE BENEFITS FOR CAPTURE FISHERIES 59 and recruitment. Except in well confined reserves (e.g., reefs that comprise entire atolls), there is always some leakage at the boundaries, but in principle one would design a reserve in such a way that it spills over rather than leaks. In very small reserves, leakage may become the dominant process, and if fishing pressure is high around the reserve, the reserve may fail to build up biomass (see the difference in the height of the curves between (a) and (b) of Fig. 4.3) . In principle, with a small reserve one would only have achieved some fishing effort reduction. For coral reef reserves that aim to protect demersal commercial fish, scientists recommend a surface area of at least 1,000 ha (Friedlander et al., 2003; Shanks et al., 2003; Palumbi, 2004; Mora et al., 2006). A closely related issue in marine reserve design is “locking up” of fish inside the reserve. This may happen in very large reserves if spill-over proper does not take place and if growth is density-dependent (i.e., growth speeds up with increasing density at low biomass, then slows down again at high biomass). Under such conditions, biomass will build up until the carrying capacity of the system is reached, then slows down to only replace fish that are lost through natural mortality and leakage. Because leakage depends on boundary length per unit reserve area, which is low for large reserves, the amount of fish entering fishing grounds will be relatively low (Fig. 4.4 c). If, however, spill-over proper does take place, then large reserves will yield more fish per unit reserve area with increasing reserve size (Fig. 4.4 d). There are various studies that find a gradient in fish density in fishing grounds surrounding from reserves (see Table ??), and though the authors label their observations as spill-over, these gradients can be explained as both spill-over “proper” and leakage. Because most reserves are very small or, as in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, still young, there is no empirical evidence for “locking up”—Pristine, remonte reefs that do not have an exploitation history have fish populations that are dramatically different from areas subject to modest fishing pressure (DeMartini et al., 2008), and it is likely that many reserves, though in better shape than fished areas, still have a long way to go before they have a mature fish population that resembles that of a pristine reef. Abesamis and Russ (2005) find indications for spill-over “proper” for surgeon fish Naso vlamingii, which show aggressive intra-specific behaviour nearly four times more often inside a small reserve than outside the reserve. 60 CHAPTER 4. THE SCIENCE OF MARINE RESERVES

Figure 4.3: Fish population density in a small reserve (a) and a large reserve (b), in a population regulated by density-dependent growth (DDG, solid line) and a population regulated by density-dependent growth in combination with spill-over proper (here labelled as density-dependent movement or DDM, dashed line). Lc is the minimum reserve diameter a fish population needs to survive, its value in this example is 4.81 times a constant that is here set at unity. In a small reserve (a), there is not much difference between both populations. In a large reserves (b), however, fish populations that are regulated by spill-over proper build up to a higher biomass in the center of the reserve. Note that in a small reserve, population density never reaches the same level as in larger reserves. Modified from a modeling study by Kellner et al. (2008) . 4.1. HOW NO-TAKE AREAS PROVIDE BENEFITS FOR CAPTURE FISHERIES 61

Figure 4.4: Total population size per unit reserve area (a, b) and spill-over rate per unit reserve area (c, d) of populations regulated by density-dependent growth (a, c) and by spill-over proper in combination with density-dependent growth (b, d). For populations where spill-over proper takes place, bigger reserves are always better, whereas for populations regulated through density-dependent growth there is an optimum where reserves yield most benefits to fisheries working surrounding fishing grounds. Note that fished reef populations comprise many species, which each have their requirements in terms of Lc (the minimum reserve diameter a species needs to survive). Modified from a modeling study by Kellner et al. (2008) . 62 CHAPTER 4. THE SCIENCE OF MARINE RESERVES

4.1.3 An overview on recent literature on marine reserves Gell and Roberts (2002) and Gell and Roberts (2003) provide excellent and accessible overviews on documented effects of marine reserves for fisheries. Many studies were published over the years 2004-2009 (Appendix A), providing overwhelming evidence for the sometimes dramatic positive effects that reserves have on body size and abundance of exploited fish species. Demon- strating spill-over and export of eggs and larvae, however, has been much more challenging, and there are far fewer studies that provide compelling evidence for these mechanisms. This is mostly due to the scarcity of well- enforced, large marine reserves and challenges with doing field research at large spatial scales. Consequently, much of the scientific underpinning for spill-over and export of eggs and larvae, and how these two mechanisms result in benefits for fisheries, comes from modeling studies. Our haphazard review of recent studies that specifically address reserves showed that the scientific community strongly supports international agreements to establish reserves (see the studies labeled with “Rec” in Appendix A).

4.2 Design criteria for no-take areas as ﬁsh- ery management tools

Reserves can only support aformentioned processes if the following conditions are met: 1. Reserves must be entirely no-take, meaning that all types of fishing, including subsistence, artisanal, and recreational fishing must be prohibited. 2. Reserves must be large enough for fish to complete the part of their life cycle that they are vulnerable to fishing inside the no-take area. Because large fish tend to have a larger home range than small-bodied fish (Palumbi, 2004), no-take areas for large-bodied species must be much larger than for small-bodied species. The home range of adults of most benthic fish is 10s-100s of km, so no-take areas must be of that order of magnitude. Shanks et al. (2003) and Mora et al. (2006) advise 1,000 ha as a optimum size for sustainable fisheries. This is small compared to aforementioned homerange of benthic fish, which means that this surface area is a compromise between sub-optimal protection for large benthic fish on the one hand (spill-over higer than natural replenishment), and locking up small benthic fish on the other hand 4.2. DESIGN CRITERIA FOR NO-TAKE AREAS AS FISHERY MANAGEMENT TOOLS 63

(spill-over lower than natural replenishment). Some benthic fish migrate for spawning, and consequently these species require much larger no-take areas than would seem necessary at first sight. Fisheries targeting migration routes of reef fish have been known to degrade spawning aggregations (Graham et al., 2007), and especially fish forming transient spawning aggregations (Domeier and Colin, 1997) require large no-take areas. Species that form transient spawning aggregations include the commercially important tiger grouper Epinephelus fuscoguttatus and polkadot grouper Plectropomus areolatus). Since these migration routes are often unknown, the only way to increase the likelihood that they are actually included in the no-take area is by making the no-take areas large enough and by establishing many of them. Be- cause of the between-species differences in home range, it is difficult to formulate a one-size-fits-all recommendation, and therefore some scientists recommend to design a network of no-take areas that vary in size, whith sizes of no-take areas ranging from “a few kilometers to a few tens of kilometers across” (Roberts et al., 2001). No-take areas within the Great Barrier Reef Marine National Park (Australia) are at least 20 km across over the smallest dimension (except for coastal no-take areas)(Fernandes et al., 2005). Dispersal distances of mid-sized and large pelagic fish (e.g. tunas, scads, and mackerels) tend to migrate over 100s-1000s of km in open seas, and therefore coastal no-take areas cannot be used to manage these fisheries. Botsford et al. (2004) suggest that fisheries targeting fish that disperse over long distances benefit less from no-take areas, unless a high percentage of the home range (> 20%) is set aside as no-take area. A study by Tupper and Rudd (2002) corroborates this theory by demonstrating species-specific differences in the effect of a 400 ha no-take area in the Caribbean: a positive effect was found for two small-sized species (hogfish Lachno- laimus maximus and white margate Haemulon album), whereas no such effect was found for the large Nassau grouper Epinephelus striatus. An empirical assessment in New Caledonia (Western Pacific), however, did not detect a difference in effect of a no-take area between sedentary and highly mobile fish (Ferraris et al., 2005).

3. The surface area of all no-take areas combined must be large enough. For the purpose of sustaining fisheries, most studies recommend to set 20-40% of fishing grounds aside as no-take areas (Roberts and Hawkins, 2000b; Botsford et al., 2003; Gell and Roberts, 2003) for fish stocks subject to moderate or high fishing mortality (Botsford et al., 2004)— a lower value would result in insufficient spill-over, and a higher value 64 CHAPTER 4. THE SCIENCE OF MARINE RESERVES

would leave too little area for fishers (Fig. 4.5). In this respect, no-take area design for catch optimization differs from no-take area design for conservation—conservation benefits continue to increase as the fraction of habitat in no-take areas increases. In general, conservation objectives are most efficiently served by few, large reserves, whereas optimization of fisheries yield would require many smaller reserves (where “small”, in the international context, is still in the order of magnitude of 1000 ha). The optimal percentage of habitats or fishing grounds that need to be set aside as a no-take area continues to be a subject of much discussion among scientists and managers. This percentage depends on biological, operational, and social factors, including the risk that society is willing to take that stocks cannot be sustained (Mangel, 2000). Dis- tance between no-take areas is strongly correlated with both percentage coverage and the average size of no-take areas—a high percentage of fishing grounds set aside as no-take areas, and a low average size of individual no-take areas must necessarily mean that distance between no-take areas within a network is low. For medium-sized and large no- take areas (> 1000 ha), which may still be too small for self-seeding, Sala et al. (2002) and Fernandes et al. (2005) advise a network with a maximum distance between no-take areas of 100 km. For no-take areas of 50 ha each, a separation distance of ca. 1 km (Galal et al., 2002) has been used (Nabq Managed Resource Protected Area, Egypt). Note that even networked no-take areas that together cover a high percentage of fishing grounds can only contribute to sustainable fisheries if they are each of sufficient size (Roberts et al., 2001).

4. Reserves only increase long-term catch if fishing pressure was high enough; resesves do not increase catch of lightly exploited fish populations (Botsford et al., 2003, 2004). In other words, managers and fishers should not expect reserves to increase catch-per-unit-effort if the fish population is only lightly exploited. Furthermore, reserves only generate fishery benefits if they displace fishing effort (Gerber et al., 2003), or if they prevent fishing effort from increasing. Obviously, a no-take area that is planned in such a way that it avoids fishing areas is nonsensical (Lynch, 2006), it merely formalizes a status quo and it does not contribute to a behavioral change toward sustainability.

5. Reserves must include habitat of those commercial ﬁsh that are the objective of improved management. This seems obvious, but there clearly is misunderstanding about this, as some communities participating in marine reserve programs expect their coral reef reserves to increase 4.3. ARE TINY AND SMALL NO-TAKE AREAS EFFECTIVE? 65

catch of pelagic species such as small tuna species and squid (P. J. Mous, pers. obs.).

4.3 Are tiny and small no-take areas eﬀec- tive?

There are tiny (ca. 10 ha) and small (ca. 100 ha) reserves that demonstrate positive effects on fish biomass within their boundaries, such as the 2.6 ha Anse Chastenet hotel reserve in St.Lucia (Roberts and Hawkins, 2000b), the classic, nearly 20 ha Apo Island reserve, the 15 ha Sumillon reserve in the Philippines (The World Bank, 2005), and a 24 ha Fijian reserve that was closed to clam fishing (Gell and Roberts, 2003). As explained in Section 4.2, some sedentary species species may benefit even from tiny reserves, whereas mobile species need larger no-take areas for their management. It follows that tiny and small no-take areas can contribute to sustainable fisheries, but only for part of the commercial fish species. Demonstrating an increase in fish biomass within boundaries and increased catches around the no-take area does not necessarily contribute to sustainable fisheries at scale. On the scale of a seascape, a single successful, but small, reserve will have no measureable effect on the overall catch-per- unit effort in seascape waters. Even for small and sedentary species, tiny and small no-take areas will only contribute to sustainable fisheries if there are enough of them, achieving a coverage of 20-40% of fishing grounds. Accepting that tiny and small no-take areas can only fulfill fishery management needs for small, sedentary species, the question remains whether it is possible to establish a sufficiently high number of tiny and no-take areas. Community- managed reserves have a high failure rate, so one would need to start up even more small community reserves to ensure a durable network. Experi- ence from the Phlippines suggests a success rate of 13% White et al. (2005), and preliminary results of a survey of community-managed reserves established in the framework of the Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Program (COREMAP) in Indonesia indicate that the success rate of CORE- MAP’s community-managed reserves (Daerah Perlindungan Laut or DPL) program is in this ballpark (P. J. Mous, pers. obs.). Accounting for this means that one would need to start up community managed reserves at all reefs to achieve protection of 10% of the reefs . . . Even if we find a way to lower failure rate, it is unlikely that sufficient coverage can be achieved through government projects or NGO initiatives towards community-managed reserves. It can probably only be achieved if 66 CHAPTER 4. THE SCIENCE OF MARINE RESERVES coastal communities establish and manage no-take areas by themselves with minimal facilitation. Obviously, this will happen only if coastal communities widely accept the usefulness of no-take areas, and if design criteria are widely understood. Unfortunately, we are far from achieving this level of awareness, and a study on a network of community-managed no-take areas in North Su- lawesi, found that success in establishment of no-take areas strongly depends on project inputs and facilitation by community organizers (Crawford et al., 2006). In COREMAP districts too, most villages expect project support for establishing “community-managed” no-take areas (P. J. Mous, pers. obs.). Because costs for consultation, training, facilitation, and other community activities remain relatively high, community-managed reserves must be as large as possible, which will also broaden the range of fish species that benefit from protected area management.

4.4 Making a case for reserves

Though most scientists and many decision-makers agree on the benefits of reserves, selling this concept to coastal societies in the Coral Triangle remains a formidable challenge. Societies have become so used to regard the seas as an open-access resource that few are prepared to prevent over-exploitation, even if this jeopardizes livelihoods in the future. As long as this remains the prevailing mindset among coastal societies, it is unlikely that local decision- makers will take decisive steps towards establishing and implementing reserves irrespective of long-term benefits. To increase local acceptance of reserves as a management tool, the NGO Rare2 plans to conduct social marketing campaigns at various sites in In- donesia in support of conservation programs implemented by environmental NGOs such as WWF-Indonesia and Conservation International. These social marketing campaigns are based on a Theory of Change and a set of axioms related to causes of over-fishing, the role of governments and coastal communities, and the conditions under which coastal communities will self-regulate to avoid over-fishing3. Though tailored to the style of Rare, the Theory of Change and axioms provide a widely applicable basis for argumentation in favor of reserves.

2www.rareconservation.org 3The strategy document in which the axioms and Theory of Change are documented in more detail is available on request from Rare, Arlington VA, [email protected] 4.4. MAKING A CASE FOR RESERVES 67

Box 6 Sizing community-managed marine reserves: Experiences from the Coral Reef Management and Rehabiliation Program in Indonesia. The World Bank-funded Coral Reef Re- reef fish. habilitation and Management Program COREMAP facilitators encourage local (COREMAP) aims to include 10% of reefs communities to make their DPLs as large as in seven Indonesian districts (kabupaten) in they are comfortable with—10 ha is the ab- marine reserves to sustain fisheries. CORE- solute lower limita, and they target an aver- MAP supports various types of reserves, age size of all DPLs in the district of at least including community-managed reserves or 100 ha. The 100 ha target is a compromise Daerah Perlindungan Laut (DPL). As the in consideration of the amount of reef con- main purpose of DPLs is sustainable fish- trolled by villages, and in consideration of eries, the optimum surface area for a DPL the fact that community-managed protected should be around 1,000 ha. There is, how- areas tend to be very small elsewhere in the ever, a problem: The amount of reefs that world as well. Despite these guidelines, of- are controlled by village administrations ten DPLs turn out much smaller than hoped (desa) is usually much smaller than 1,000 (see table below, from Mous (2008)). Fortu- ha. In districts that participate in CORE- nately, there are some examples of villages MAP, the median amount of reef controlled in Raja Ampat who have established large by desa administrations varies between 46 DPLs, for example the 792 ha DPL Mursika and 377 ha, excluding those coastal desa of Kampung Mutus. that do not have any reef at all. This In the long term, the positive effect of DPLs means that the majority of desa are simon fish and fisheries in the direct vicinity of ply too small to control areas sufficiently DPLs will hopefully enthuse groups of lo- large for optimal fishery benefits over a wide cal fishers, encouraging them to start a re- range of commercial species. It follows that serve by themselves. For now, however, the DPLs can only benefit fisheries on small and total amount of effectively managed DPLs sedentary species, and only if the total cov- and other types of reserves remains too low erage of DPLs is sufficiently high. Hence, to expect a district-wide increase in catch higher-level administrative units (district, per unit effort. Therefore, COREMAP fa- province, nation) must take responsibility cilitators must manage expectations of both for establishing medium-sized (1000 ha) and local communities and local government of- large (> 10,000 ha) no-take areas to opti- ficials. mize fisheries for medium- and large-sized

District No of DPLs Average Min. Size Max. Size Size (ha) (ha) (ha) Wakatobi 37 2.8 1 10 Buton 39 6.5 1 54 Selayar 11 18 10 69 Pangkep 47 3.6 1.5 12 Raja Ampat 19 104 15 972 Biak 26 13 0.6 61 Sikka 0

aIncidentally, the Philippine-based CCE Foundation Inc. applies the same minimum size to its network of community-managed reserves in the Bohol Marine Triangle (CCE Foundation Newsletter 17, August 2007) 68 CHAPTER 4. THE SCIENCE OF MARINE RESERVES

Box 7 Axioms listed below pertain to the problem of over-ﬁshing, reserves as a solution, self-regulation, governance by local government agencies, and the roles of local communities including, but not restricted to, ﬁshing communities.

1. Over-fishing is a major threat to bio- exploit to the detriment of fishing grounds diversity and livelihoods in coastal waters in the wider surroundings. throughout the Coral Triangle, and over- 9. Even if conditions are such that self- fishing is caused by local fishers as well as regulation towards sustainability can oc- outsiders, by fishing units of a wide range cur, fishers may opt to over-exploit towards of size and level of technology, fishing for short-term return of investment in means for subsistence as well as for trade. extraction (knowledge, access, boats, and 2. Open access, tragedy of the commons, gear). and human population growth are root 10. Concerned about peer pressure and pub- causes of over-fishing. lic outcry, self-regulated fishing communi- 3. Reserves are an effective means through ties are less likely to over-exploit if the rest which local communities can ensure that the of the local community (including other fish- threat of over-fishing is contained. ing communities!) are aware of and con- 4. Local communities in the Coral Trian- cerned about risks of over-exploitation. gle, through their local formal or informal 11. Concerned and informed local commu- governments have the opportunity to estab- nities will look towards their elected govern- lish reserves. In addition, local communi- ments to put minimum safeguards against ties can devolve fishery management to self- over-exploitation in place, if only to protect regulating fishing communities. interests that compete with fishing at par- 5. Self-regulation can only occur if fishers ticular fishing grounds. Such competing in- are organized as groups, be it as fishing co- terests include fisheries in surrounding fish- operatives or as other institutions. ing grounds, biodiversity conservation, and eco-tourism. 6. Fishing communities will only self- regulate towards sustainability if they are 12. Reserves are eminently suited as safe- (a) assured that benefits of self-regulation guards, because they are robust manage- accrue to themselves, and (b) if these bene- ment tools and because their establishment fits compare favorably to investments in self- does not require detailed stock assessments. regulation. Furthermore, the concept of reserves is easily understood by a lay audience. 7. Only if these cooperatives or institutions are based on a unit stock or ecosystem there 13. Increased concern among local commu- will be a strong incentive towards manage- nities will result in local politicians taking ment for sustainability. Any group that is action, and it will result in local acceptance primarily interested in the process of extrac- of reserves. tion, perceiving the status of the stock as 14. If local communities feel a need for an externality, is unlikely to self-regulate for the specific objective of sustainability. no-take areas, and if non-compliance is no longer socially acceptable behavior, then 8. Even if conditions are such that self- regulation towards sustainability can occur, voluntary compliance will increase, and fishing communities in control of particu- cost-efficient enforcement mechanisms will larly valuable resources may opt to over- emerge. 4.4. MAKING A CASE FOR RESERVES 69

Box 8 Rare’s Theory of Change towards establishment and acceptance of marine reserves. Theory variables are in bold font, and their “values” are in normal font. This Theory of Change is based on axioms listed in Box 7

Conservation Result resources), align reserves with traditional Healthy coral reefs and other coastal shelf tenure systems. ecosystems that sustain ecosystem services. Interpersonal Communication Threat Reduction Awareness campaigns must aim to create Over-fishing is the most pervasive threat to support for no-take areas among a large part coastal shelf ecosystems, causing inefficient of rural and urban society. This support will and unsustainable use of living resources as engender political will to create effectively- well as habitat degradation through cascad- managed no-take areas. Awareness cam- ing effects. paigns targeting fishing communities must explain the necessity of no-take areas for Behavior Change sustaining fisheries. Society (general public, politicians, and fisheries sector) chooses to set aside productive Knowledge areas where fishing will no longer be allowed, Society realizes that living marine resources forsaking short-term revenue in the interest are finite and that open access resulted in of long-term benefits. over-exploitation. Barrier removal Society understands that effort and gear Enhance political will by creating soci- regulations towards sustainable fisheries by etal understanding that reserves represent themselves proved ineffective at sustaining a choice between, on the one hand, healthy fisheries, and that no-take areas are a neces- marine ecosystems in the future at the cost sary addition to the fishery manager’s tool- of a decrease in income now, and on the box. other hand a postponed but inevitable de- Entities tasked with design and manage- crease in income with degraded ecosystems ment of no-take areas understand spatial de- in the future. sign principles (location, size) and they have Enhance political will and support from the know-how to design an efficient manage- coastal fishing communities by (1) offering ment plan. jobs in management of reserves to members of the local fishing community, (2) ensuring Attitude that fishing areas near villages remain open to fishing, (3) exploring ways to give coastal Society discards the idea of the seas as a re- fishing communities exclusive use and man- source that is free for everybody to abuse, agement rights to nearby fishing areas. and society takes responsibility for abating over-fishing. Make poaching (fishing in reserves) unac- ceptable behavior by creating societal un- Society accepts reserves as a necessary man- derstanding that this is a form of stealing agement tool, and society is willing to en- from the community. force no-take regulations. Enhance local capacity to manage and en- Supported by strong enforcement, voluntary force no-take areas (know-how, mechanisms, compliance with reserves is high. 70 CHAPTER 4. THE SCIENCE OF MARINE RESERVES

4.5 Essential (and free) reading on marine reserves

There is a wealth of free publications available from the Internet. Essential reading for facilitators is PISCO - Partnership for Interdisciplinary Studies of Coastal Oceans (2007). This brochure is in English, but it is richly illustrated so this publication should be easy to understand even for those who only have a basic understanding of English. Another important publication is the WWF report on the science of marine reserves (Roberts and Hawkins, 2000b), which is also available in Bahasa Indonesia (Roberts and Hawkins, 2000a). The IUCN makes most of its publications available as free downloadables. Noteworthy are Dudley (2008) on application of protected area categories (which at the same time gives an overview of the spectrum of Marine Pro- tected Areas), Kelleher (1999) and Salm and Clark (2000), which provide an excellent introduction to MPA management. 4.5. ESSENTIAL (AND FREE) READING ON MARINE RESERVES 71

fishery benefits

20-40%

0% percentage no-take 100%

Figure 4.5: The relationship between the percentage of ﬁshing grounds set aside as no-take areas (X-axis) and the beneﬁts these no-take areas provide in terms of sustainable catch (Y-axis). Chapter 5

Strengthening MPA networks

5.1 Current status of the Coral Triangle MPA System

Although a Coral Triangle MPA System (CTMPAS) is yet to be established, it is likely that this system will include a large part, if not all, of the MPAs that are already established in the Coral Triangle: Regional Action 1 in the CTI Regional Plan of Action1 speciﬁes that CTMPAS shall be based on previously established networks (national MPA systems, SSME, BSSE, World Heritage Sites, ASEAN Heritage Sites, Ramsar sites, UNESCO Man and Biosphere Reserves). MPAglobal.org gives a comprehensive overview of marine protected areas world wide. Furthermore, it allows easy selection of marine protected areas situated in the Coral Triangle, following the delineation of Marine Ecoregions of the World (MEOW) (Spalding et al., 2007). According to MPAglobal, there are 361 Marine Protected Areas in the Coral Triangle with a total surface area of 84 ∗ 103km2 (Tables 5.1 and 5.2)—As explained in Box 9, this is likely an under-estimation of the current area of MPAs in the Coral Triangle, the actual area is probably around 12∗104km2. Though MPAglobal under-estimates the total surface area of MPAs in the Coral Triangle, it is possible to discern some patterns:

• Indonesia has large MPAs, with a median surface area of app. 100 km2, followed by Malaysia and Brunei. Each of these three states have a long history of centralized adminsitration, with the note that Indonesia started to decentralize in the year 1998. The decentralized

1Coral Triangle Initiative, Port Moresby Draft Regional Plan of Action, March 6 2009 5.2. TYPES OF NETWORKS 73

Table 5.1: Total MPA surface area (km2), mean MPA surface area (km2), and number of MPAs per country in the Coral Triangle. Source: www.MPAglobal.org (Wood, 2007).

Country N Missing Total Mean Brunei Darussalam 6 0 181 30 Indonesia 69 1 59992 869 Malaysia (Sabah) 44 0 6976 159 Malaysia (Sarawak) 3 0 61 20 Papua New Guinea 18 2 1918 107 Philippines 199 0 14387 72 Solomon Islands 22 0 112 5 Total 361 3 83627 232

Philippines has the smallest MPAs in the region with a median surface area of app. 0.12km2 (Fig. 5.1)

• Measured in surface area, Indonesia has 71% of the MPAs of the Coral Triangle.

• The Coral Triangle has only 16 very large MPAs (> 1, 000km2) (4% of MPAs in numbers), but these MPAs comprise 71% of the total MPA surface area (Fig. 5.3).

5.2 Types of networks

As in land protected areas, the ﬁrst marine protected areas were established to protect a places of exceptional natural value or beauty. With the main- streaming of protected areas as a tool for conservation and sustainable use, planners realized that single protected areas would be insuﬃcient or unprac- tical to achieve conservation or sustainable use objectives. Hence the idea of networked protected areas was born. Marine protected area networks come in three groups:

Ecological networks where each individual protected area contributes to a common conservation or sustainable use objective. Often, it is assumed that individual protected areas have ecological linkages to each other, but also networks where separate protected areas contribute to a common ecological goal (e.g., percentage of ecosystems covered) qualify as such. Management approaches of protected areas within a network may 74 CHAPTER 5. STRENGTHENING MPA NETWORKS

Box 9 Estimation of current surface area of MPAs in the Coral Triangle The version of the MPAglobal database (2008) lists 23 MPAs, so here the discrep- that is publicly accessible has been updated ancy is much smaller. Mamauag and Gon- in 2007, which means that the substan- zales (2008) does not present a total surface tial area of District-managed marine pro- area of MPAs in the Philippines, but recal- tected areas in Indonesia (Kawasan Kon- culation of data presented results in an es- servasi Laut Dearah or Kawasan Konser- timated total MPA area in the Philippines vasi Perairan) has not been included yet. of 20 · 103km2a, 40% higher than the to- On the other hand, few of these recently es- tal in MPAglobal. For the Papua MEOW tablished areas have seen management on- (Spalding et al., 2007), for which more com- the-ground, so they are not yet fully eﬀec- prehensive MPA data are available, the dis- tive. Also, small community-managed re- crepancy was a bit less: MPAglobal reports serves are severely under-represented: For 21 · 103km2, whereas a more accurate esti- example, MPAglobal.org reports only 66 mate amounts to 25 · 103km2 (P.J. Mous, Coral Triangle MPAs in the category 0.01-1 unpublished data). For Papua, the under- km2, whereas the review by Mamauag and estimation by MPAglobal seems moderate, Gonzales (2008) for the Philippines alone but a look at the details reveals that the lists 708 MPAs in that size category. Be- the MPAglobal estimate for Papua com- cause tiny and small MPAs get established prises protected areas that include land— (and perish) quickly, it is unlikely that a Excluding land area would further decrease centralized database will ever be up-to-date the MPGglobal estimate. Assuming that in this respect. This large discrepancy MPAglobal underestimates MPA surface ar- in number of MPAs does not mean much eas in each Coral Triangle country to the since that size category hardly contributes same extent as in the Philippines, results to the total surface area covered. In the in an estimated surface area of MPAs in size category > 100km2, MPAglobal reports the Coral Triangle 12 · 104km2, or 12 mil- 17 Philippine MPAs with an average size of lion ha. 812km2, whereas Mamauag and Gonzales aSee Figure 2 in Mamauag and Gonzales (2008), using geometric mid-points for each size category, assuming an average size of 812 km2 for the largest size category, and dis- regarding MPAs for which surface area data were missing 5.2. TYPES OF NETWORKS 75

Surface areas of MPAs in the Coral Triangle

● 10000.00 ● ● ● ● ● ● 1000.00 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 100.00 ● ● ● ● ● 10.00 ● ● ● ●

Area (km2) ● 1.00 ●

0.10

0.01 Indonesia Philippines Solomon Islands Malaysia (Sabah) Brunei Darussalam Papua New Guinea Malaysia (Sarawak)

Figure 5.1: Boxplots of surface areas of individual MPAs in the Coral Triangle, grouped by country. Data are from www.MPAglobal.org Wood (2007), which does not yet include MPAs recently established in Timor Leste and Indonesia (e.g. Berau MPA, MPAs in Raja Ampat, West Papua, COREMAP community-managed marine reserves). Strictly speaking, Brunei is not part of the Coral Triangle, since surveys so far found less than 500 species of reef-building corals. However, this is likely a result of the relatively low survey eﬀort rather than of low biodiversity (Dr Mark Erdmann, pers. comm.). In the delineation of the Marine Ecoregions of the World (MEOW) (Spalding et al., 2007), Brunei was included in the Palawan-North Borneo ecoregion, in accordance with an earlier delineation of the Coral Triangle. 76 CHAPTER 5. STRENGTHENING MPA NETWORKS

Table 5.2: Total MPA surface area (km2), mean MPA surface area (km2), and number of MPAs per ecoregion (Spalding et al., 2007) in the Coral Triangle. Source: www.MPAGlobal.org (Wood, 2007).

Ecoregion N Missing Total Mean Banda Sea 22 1 26576 1208 Bismarck Sea 12 0 1004 84 Eastern Philippines 182 0 5249 29 Lesser Sunda 15 0 4989 333 Northeast Sulawesi 4 0 2744 686 Palawan/North Borneo 70 0 16186 231 Papua 15 0 20865 1391 Solomon Archipelago 23 0 544 24 Solomon Sea 3 1 477 159 Southeast Papua New Guinea 2 1 4 2 Sulawesi Sea / Makassar Strait 13 0 4987 384 Total 361 3 83627 232

Table 5.3: MPAs in the Coral Triangle: Number (N) and total surface area (Area, km2) per area category (AreaCat, km2). Data from www.MPAglobal.org (Wood, 2007)

AreaCat N Area PercN PercArea 0.01-0.1 2 0.02 0.6 0 0.1-1 64 4.5 18 0 1-10 162 205 45 0.3 10-100 57 2240 16 2.7 100-1000 60 22085 17 26 1000-10,000 14 30658 3.9 37 >10,000 2 28435 0.6 34 Total 361 83627 100 100 5.2. TYPES OF NETWORKS 77

differ, and an ecological network may contain community-managed as well as government-managed protected areas. An example of an ecological network is the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas Marine Ecoregion network (DeVantier et al., 2004; Miclat et al., 2006) (Fig. 5.2), which is essentially a portfolio of priority areas that contain ecosystems, species, and ecological processed that are representative for this region. An- other example is the portfolio of priority sites for marine conservation in Indonesia developed by Rod Salm and Matheus Halim, which is still relevant though it dates back to early eighties (Salm, 1984). Management networks where each individual protected area shares a management approach. Protected areas in a management network are often managed by the same management authority (for example the Directorate-General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation of the Ministry of Forestry in Indonesia), or they are established through the same process (for example Locally-Managed Marine Areas, a network of community-managed marine protected areas in Southeast Asia, Melanesia, Micronesia, Polynesia, and the Americas). Protected areas that are part of management networks enjoy considerable benefits in terms of economy of scale, because management structures, operational procedures, policies, and “template” regulations (for example types of zones) can be repeated between sites. A pitfall, of course, is that protected areas in a management network end up with management plans that are not suitable for their special needs. An extreme example of this is that some marine protected areas in the Indonesia Ministry of Forestry’s network have yearly work plans and budgets that are almost the same as those for the Ministry’s land protected areas, despite considerable differences between operations on land and at sea 2. Special designation networks are networks where protected areas share a special designation, for example UNESCO World Heritage Site, UN- ESCO Man & Biosphere Reserve, ASEAN Heritage Park, or Ramsar Site. Such designations are awarded to emphasize the uniqueness and value of an area. Special designations do not necessarily imply a certain type of management. Note that a protected area may be a member of any of the aforementioned network groups. For example, Komodo National Park in Indonesia is a member of the Lesser Sundas Marine Ecoregion ecological network, it is part of

2Especially fuel, a major cost for institutions who operate ships and speedboats, is usually heavily under-budgeted, resulting in a very low presence of Park management staﬀ at sea. 78 CHAPTER 5. STRENGTHENING MPA NETWORKS the Indonesia Ministry of Forestry’s management network, it is a Natural Heritage Site, and it is a Man and Biosphere Reserve. In this report, we focus on ecological networks, because the main design criterion for the Coral Triangle Marine Protected Area System is ecological: By 2020, it aims to include a “signiﬁcant” percentage of each major near- shore habitat in Marine Protected Areas, with 20% of each marine and coastal habitat type in in no-take areas3 (see also Section 1.4).

5.3 Ecological network design

5.3.1 Process Ecological network design comprises the following elements:

• Deﬁnition of the area-of-interest, often an eco-region or a part thereof.

• Inventory of the area-of-interest, spatial description of ecological and socio-economic attribution.

• Setting targets and design criteria (e.g., 30% of the eco-region’s near- shore habitats contained within Marine Protected Areas, minimum surface area of MPA is 100 km2)

• Delineation of the network.

Typically, network design is a process driven by government agencies and environmental NGOs who involve experts from their staffs, universities, or consulting companies. Involvement from resource users is usually low, because the process is not specific which type of uses will be restricted to which extent. Instead, network design usually works with “sustainable use and conservation of bio-diversity” as a rather non-confrontational management objective. Whereas this greatly enhances political feasibility of the network’s formal establishment, it also defers the “difficult” part of the process, namely deciding where resource use will be restricted, to decision makers at local levels where capacity to deal with such issues is often much lower than at higher levels. Note that design of zoning plans has many similarities with network design. The main differences are that (1) zoning takes place at a smaller scale, as it is confined to a single Marine Protected Area, (2) it more specifically

3Version of CTI Regional Plan of Action distributed at the World Ocean Conference, Manado, Indonesia, May 2009 5.3. ECOLOGICAL NETWORK DESIGN 79

China Pacific Ocean

Philippines

Malaysia

Indonesia Legend Rank 1: Outstanding in the Indo-Pacific Rank 2: Outstanding Sulu Sea in SSME Rank 3: Outstanding in sub-regions

Sulawesi Sea

Figure 5.2: Example of a network of priority areas for marine conservation in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea Marine Ecoregion (SSME). Adapted from Miclat et al. (2006). 80 CHAPTER 5. STRENGTHENING MPA NETWORKS considers management and use restrictions, and it works with various designations (“traditional use zone”, “no-take zone”, etc.), and (3) its result covers the entire area-of-interest, whereas network design results in conﬁned areas within the area-of-interest. Often, the most critical part in the zoning process is designating the zones where use is most restricted (e.g., no-take zones).

5.3.2 Deﬁning the area-of-interest

The choice of geographic units for planning is of some importance, because it affects which areas are selected for MPA designation—After all, the boundaries of the planning unit define which ecosystems are typical or unique for that area. In a publication prepared for the Convention on Biological Diver- sity (also published as Spalding et al. (2007)), Spalding et al. (2006) presents a regionalization of marine areas on the continental shelf (waters <200 m depth), where the eastern and the western Coral Triangle are delineated as provinces within the Central Indo-Pacific sub-realm. Within these provinces are ecoregions, which Spalding et al. (2007) defines as:

“Areas of relatively homogeneous species composition, clearly distinct from adjacent systems. The species composition is likely to be determined by the predominance of a small number of ecosystems and/or a distinct suite of oceanographic or topographic features. The dominant biogeographic forcing agents deﬁning the ecoregions vary from location to location but may include isola- tion, upwelling, nutrient inputs, freshwater inﬂux, temperature regimes, ice regimes, exposure, sediments, currents, and bathy- metric or coastal complexity.”

Spalding et al. (2006) suggest that ecoregions are the smallest units for planning of ecological MPA networks. This is consistent with terminology in other conservation planning publications, e.g. Groves et al. (2002). Though Green and Mous (2008) recommend a unit below ecoregions, functional seascapes, as footprints for MPA network planning, it appears that WWF and The Na- ture Conservancy adopted ecoregions as delineated in Spalding et al. (2007). Conservation International now structures its programs around “seascapes”, geographic units than can be much larger than the ones described in Green and Mous (2008). 5.4. DO SCIENCE GAPS IMPEDE USE OF NO-TAKE RESERVES (AND OTHER MARINE PROTECTED AREAS)? 81

5.3.3 Representativeness, resilience, and redundancy

Ecological criteria for centralized planning of protected areas are representativeness, resilience, and redundancy (Shaﬀer and Stein, 2000). More complex planning approaches, such as Groves’s seven-step framework for ecoregional planning (Groves et al., 2002) or Salm’s Reef Resilience (Salm and McLeod, 2006) approach are essentially variations on this theme. “Representative- ness” means that the protected area network needs to include habitats and species that are representative for the wider area. This wider area is often called an eco-region or sometimes a functional land- or sea-scape. “Re- silience” refers to the ability of habitats or species to recover from a disturbance, and conservation planners tend to look for areas where resilience of habitats or populations of species is likely to be higher. “Redundancy” refers to the number of protected areas that have similar of habitats or species. The idea is that if for whatever reason a particular habitat or species perishes in one protected area, there will still be another protected area where the habitat or species survives. The required level of redundancy depends on the risk and on the ability of the habitat to recover should the risk become reality. If, for example, a stretch of coastline is prone to oilspills because of a nearby shipping route, than the prudent planner would increase the number of protected areas along that stretch of coastline, and she would increase the number of protected areas even more if the habitats along that coastline are particularly vulnerable to oil spills (Allison et al., 2003) (see also section 3.10.2).

5.4 Do science gaps impede use of no-take reserves (and other Marine Protected Ar- eas)?

Some scientists feel we still lack the knowledge to design Marine Protected Areas (Sale et al., 2005; Sale, 2008), arguing that we need to invest more in research. It is important to have a closer look at gaps in knowledge, because this aﬀects conﬁdence in MPAs as a management tool. After all, few implementing organizations would be willing to invest in a tool of unproven value, and rightly so. In this section, we argue that questions that are unan- swered today must not impede network design and implementation. Rather, it is the other way around: Delays in network design and implementation impedes resolution of these questions. Russ et al. (2008), demonstrating a regional increase in coral trout density after rezoning of the Great Barrier 82 CHAPTER 5. STRENGTHENING MPA NETWORKS

Reef Marine National Park in Australia, state that such empirical evidence is rare because of the scarcity of large-scale marine reserve networks. There are millions of field situations, each unique to some level, and it is easy to get overwhelmed by local complexities. Universities and research institutes will never have enough resources to provide clear-cut answers that apply to each situation, especially considering that the majority of studies only address a fraction of stakeholders and biota that are affected by the management intervention, and that most studies only cover a fraction of the period that the effect lasts. Compared to empirical studies, ecosystem models offer more opportunities to assess effects of management scenarios over longer periods of simulated time (see, for example, Ainsworth et al. (2008) for a model of near-shore ecosystems in Raja Ampat, Eastern Indonesia). These models, however, only help to assess implications of the system as it is currently understood—There are no reality checks. Furthermore, construction and parameterization of these models requires a highly skilled team of researchers, and it is unlikely that such a team can be made available for each situation. A similar problem in management of tropical nearshore finfisheries brought Johannes (1998) to advocate for data-less management, highlighting the use of Marine Protected Areas as a data-less tool to protect spawning aggregation sites of reef fishes4. Indeed, whereas MPAs still require data on location and timing of spawning aggregation, data requirements are far less than what would be needed for a conventional stock assessment. The point here is not to downplay to importance of research, but rather to emphasize that a perceived lack of knowledge must not keep us from implementing Marine Protected Areas. Only through implementation in different situations we will generate knowledge for improved, field-tested designs and approaches. Implementation in different situations will yield insights that would never have been anticipated in experimental designs, models, or in situ research in the few no-take areas that currently exist. The list of references to this report, however, proves that the body of knowledge on design of MPAs is already considerable, and this list is only a sample of the empirical and modeling studies that were conducted over the last few decades.

4Note the diﬀerent perspectives: Sale et al. (2005) focuses on gaps in knowledge for the application of a tool, whereas Johannes (1998) highlights the same tool for use in data-less management Chapter 6

Financing of MPA network establishment and management

The cost of not conserving the marine environment was covered in earlier sections of this publication. This section discusses the costs of managing the marine environment using MPAs and how these costs can be met using diverse revenue streams and the potential impact of MPA networks on management costs.

6.1 Are MPAs expensive?

Because development has become the overriding international cultural ideal, the burden of proof generally lies with those seeking to implement marine protected areas. There is recognition that government support for conservation is best justiﬁed by using economic development terms. Scientists have since appreciated that their ability to represent nature in units (e.g. species or habitats) that can be assigned a monetary value, enables ecological theory to be integrated with economics. This alignment of MPAs with economic costs and beneﬁts is attractive to politicians because it allows them to make decisions based on like-for-like comparisons. Although economic comparisons undervalue ecosystems by failing to appreciate social and intrinsic value, this is reality commonly encountered by conservationists. The rationale for MPAs and MPA networks also needs to stand up to scrutiny when expressed in the common language of economic value1. Environmental valuation studies are a useful tool to support discussions

1Although current indicators of economic growth paradoxically include cleanup costs incurred when rectifying externalities generated by destructive or unsustainable human activities. 84 CHAPTER 6. FINANCING OF MPA NETWORK ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT about the value and cost effectiveness of MPAs. Valuation studies have demonstrated that goods and services from marine ecosystems have considerable economic value. However, industries that benefit from this value generally do not have to contribute to the cost of maintaining the ecosystem that is generating those values. Fishers, people collecting coral and divers at coral reefs often have free access to natural resources. Where MPAs conserve or increase goods and services, the costs associated with the operation of the MPA should return economic benefits to resource users and society at large. In the majority of cases, the problem is not demonstrating the benefits, but how to appropriate any economic benefits to contribute to management costs of the system that produces those benefits. Mechanisms by which extractive activities and beneficiaries of marine productivity can contribute to marine management are discussed below in section.

6.2 Are MPAs cost eﬀective?

The costs and beneﬁts of marine resource management through spatial closures versus conventional management methods are not well known, partly due to limited management experience with MPAs in general, and because most studies have focused on the biological performance of reserves. Nonethe- less, there are a number of supportive studies that investigate the cost eﬀec- tiveness of MPAs, for example:

• White et al. (2000) analysed the contribution of a poor-quality coral reef at Olango Island, Cebu, to the Philippines’ economy. It was con- cluded that improved management could result in a 60% increase in annual net revenues derived from the reef.

• Emerton and Tessema (2000) estimated that management costs for protecting the Kisite Marine National Park and the Mpunguti Maine National Park in Kenya were US$190,000, far less than the US$1.75 million derived from the MPA.

• Cesar et al. (2000) assessed incremental beneﬁts related to the MPA at Portland Bight Protected Area in Jamaica to be worth between US$40.8 million and US$52.6 million, signiﬁcantly more than the annual management cost of $19.2 million.

• Balmford et al. (2004) suggest that investments in global networks of MPA can provide substantial returns. Using value estimates for marine ecosystems calculated by Constanza et al. (1997), the authors 6.3. HOW ARE MPA MANAGEMENT COSTS ASSESSED? 85

estimated the establishment of such a network could result in economic value from non-extractive marine services to return between US$4.5-6.7 trillion per year. The study suggests that the annual cost of establishing a global network would be about US$2600/km2. The CCIF ﬁnan- cial model predicts that management costs associated with 14 MPA sites in Indonesia and the Philippines are far lower than this, requiring US$48/hectare.

• A meta-analysis by Brander et al. (2004) evaluated 164 evaluations of coral reef value from across the world. The value of coral reefs ranged from $25 per km2 to $6 million per km2, with an average value of $251,943 per km2 per year. If this beneﬁt estimate is compared to the cost estimate of $2,698 per km2 proposed by Balmford et al. (2004), it becomes evident that the cost of MPA management represents only around 1/100th of MPAs’ total value.

• Brander et al. (2004) uncovered a trend that MPA beneﬁts per unit area are typically higher when MPAs are small and close to highly populated coastal zones. While coral reefs that are close to human set- tlements are often more diﬃcult to protect, resulting in comparatively high management costs, the proximity to higher numbers of people who can enjoy their services, increases their value.

6.3 How are MPA management costs assessed?

The Conservation and Community Investment Forum (CCIF) was commissioned by the WCPA Southeast Asian Marine Working Group to develop an MPA network-specific business plan that included, inter alia, financial projections, potential revenue sources and detailed cost estimates. In developing the model, CCIF analysed the financial characteristics of a broad range of MPAs, from small parks with limited revenue potential to large “flagship” sites and developed estimates of total management costs associated with each site evaluated (Merkl et al., 2003). Box 10 provides further information about how cost estimates for MPA sites are derived using the CCIF model. The model incorporates a degree of flexibility by enabling two levels of management intensity to be prescribed to a series of expenditure categories that include: park initiation/establishment, legal/policy framework, stakeholder engagement, community development and education, protection/enforcement, park management and planning, ecological monitoring and restoration, and marketing and tourism. The model also allows the phasing in of parks over time at different levels of service. The model was 86 CHAPTER 6. FINANCING OF MPA NETWORK ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT

Table 6.1: Estimate of 10 year endowment required to cover management costs of 14 MPA sites in Indonesia and the Philippines over a period of ten years (Merkl et al., 2003)

then developed to enable calculation of the size of the endowment that would cover management costs associated with a portfolio of 14 parks in Indonesia and the Philippines (Table 6.1). The estimated endowment of US$177.8 million that would fund the recurrent costs of a portfolio of protected areas spanning more than 3.8 million hectares works out at about US$48 per hectare. This ﬁgure seems low, but not that it depends on assumptions regarding the revenue-generating capacity of protected areas. On the other hand, the model does not consider the potential savings that could be achieved through networking sites of MPAs through mechanisms outlined previously. 6.3. HOW ARE MPA MANAGEMENT COSTS ASSESSED? 87

Box 10 Recurrent management costs for a single large MPA, Wakatobi Na- tional Park, in Indonesia

Wakatobi National Park (WNP) in Indone- tions, operations (utitilities, office supplies, sia was included in the MPA network cost etc.), fees (sponsored meetings, insurance, analysis completed for the Coral Triangle. bank charges,etc.), capital assets (vessels, CCIF estimated the annual expenditure, buildings, field equipment,etc.), and miscel- over 25 years, that would enable the MPA laneous (gifts, trainings, etc.). A cursory ex- to achieve its objectives based on historical amination of these cost categories suggests budget records (Table 6.2). The estimate that MPAs linked by ecological and man- of expected expenditure is calculated by ap- agement objectives would logically be able plying 12 cost categories (split into function to achieve savings within many of the cate- and supporting costs) to the MPA and de- gories described by CCIF. Although the de- riving estimates for each, based on previ- gree of saving possible will depend on the ous budgets or experience. The six func- specific circumstances of each site and net- tional cost categories are: Resource protec- work, the 12 cost categories were chosen due tion, science and training, community out- to their common occurrence within MPA reach, tourism and marketing, community budgets suggesting a coordination between development, and finance and administra- sites could avoid duplication of effort and tion. The six supporting cost categories sharing of tasks and the resources needed to are: Senior management staff, communica- accomplish activities such as MCS. 88 CHAPTER 6. FINANCING OF MPA NETWORK ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT Estimated costs associated with the management and operation of the WNP in Indonesia over a twenty-five year Table 6.2: period (CCIF, 2006) 6.4. MEETING MPA MANAGEMENT COSTS 89

6.4 Meeting MPA management costs

To date, long-term financing mechanisms for MPA setup and management costs have focused primarily on single MPAs, specifically charismatic sites (such as the Komodo National Park and Bunaken National Park in Indone- sia and the Bonaire National Marine Park in the Netherlands Antilles) where establishing a user-fee system was relatively straightforward. In light of increasing knowledge about the importance of ecological linkages in the marine environment, the focus is shifting away from individual MPAs to establishing and managing systems or networks of sites that fulfil ecological objectives taking into account the connectivity of the marine realm. This has important financial implications and requires policy makers to go beyond scaling up site-based mechanisms and to consider system-wide approaches to both funding and allocation mechanisms. Scaling up from sites to systems and networks should create economies of scale that could allow for significant re- ductions in operational costs of MPAs. Network approaches could also enable revenue collection at sites where this can be realised at lower costs. Trust funds, corporate sponsorship, and bio-prospecting can also be handled more easily at a system or network level. For some ecosystem goods and services, this is equally applicable for payments for environmental services. Stable funding sources are essential for long-term MPA management and MPAs need to build portfolios of complementary revenue sources to spread the risk of financial shortfall if one revenue source is lost. The most effective portfolio will be context specific and management bodies need to be pragmatic when considering potential financing mechanisms. For example, the incorporation of “sacrificial” sites, which typically have easy fund-raising opportunities and are less ecologically sensitive, could allow for more remote areas to remain pristine, well-funded and well-managed. More funding does not necessarily equate to better managed MPAs. However, if funding is severely limited, fewer well-managed and sufficiently funded MPAs are preferable to a larger number of MPAs that are so financially destitute they cease to be effective.

6.5 How can MPAs generate revenue to support management costs?

A lack of financial resources remains one of the greatest impediments to the effective management of MPAs: without sustainable financing MPAs and MPA networks quickly become ineffective and their benefits diminish. To ensure financial stability (networks of) MPAs need to generate sufficient 90 CHAPTER 6. FINANCING OF MPA NETWORK ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT

Box 11 MPA revenue generating mechanisms.

• Payment for Environmental Services (see box ?)

• Government appropriations

• Taxes, levies and surcharges

• User fees

• Leases and concessions for products and services

• Sale of goods and services

• Case related marketing

• Biodiversity prospecting

• Philanthropic donations

• Corporations

• Individual donations

• Trust funds

Source: based on Morris (2002) and TNC & UNEP (2001) funding. Box 3 presents a broad range of possible MPA revenue generating mechanisms. These revenues can broadly be categorized into: (i) those from direct and indirect beneﬁciaries and (ii) those from non-users. The eﬃcacy of these instruments is context dependent: not all are equally applicable in every situation. An example of innovative revenue generation is the concessions-based system that generates fund for the Komodo National Park Collaborative Management Initiative (KCMI) in Indonesia. It is worth recalling at this point that networked sites of MPAs with common management objectives provide potential cost savings over standalone MPA sites, through sharing resources and avoiding management duplication (refer sect. ?). A user fee for visitors is probably the most common mechanism for appro- priating revenue to contribute to MPA management costs. Examples include the Bonaire National Marine Park (US$ 10 per year), the John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park in Florida (US$ 5 per day), the Koror State Park in 6.6. FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF MPA NETWORKS 91

Box 12 Capturing the commercial value of coral reefs through biodiversity prospecting

In 1992, the Coral Reef Research Founda- countries are guaranteed economic compen- tion (CRRF) entered into a ﬁve-year con- sation and protection of biodiversity rights tract (worth US$2.9 million) to supply reef if a commercially valuable compound is dis- samples to the US National Cancer Insti- covered, providing countries with incentives tute for use in cancer and aids screening pro- and the means to preserve their reefs. grams. The CRRF provides the NCI with around 700 samples per year, taken from Source: Morris (2002) based on Spurgeon the reefs of 14 diﬀerent countries. These and Aylward (1992).

Palau (US$ 15 for two weeks). For a detailed global overview of user fees applied to MPAs, see Lindberg and Halpenny (2001). Biodiversity prospecting is a potential source of revenue to support management costs associated with conserving marine resources. Marine biodiversity, particularly that associated with the coastal shelves, is particularly rich and only a fraction has been tested to see what other useful medical and pharmaceutical applications of coral reef species there are. Financial rewards are obtained through rental fees, rural employment, proﬁt share, licensing fees, international technology transfer, disease research, royalties and joint venture agreements (Putterman, 2000). In Fiji and Palau, LMMAs beneﬁted from obtaining revenue from bio-prospecting (See Box ??

6.6 Financial beneﬁts of MPA networks

The benefits of establishing MPA networks rather than single marine reserves are not only ecological. On a practical level, networks can help to augment the financial and human resources available to tackle management and fund- raising issues across marine sites. Resources can be focused on solving shared problems rather than unnecessarily duplicating efforts. Collaboration can also lead to more innovative and effective management regimes (Barr 2000). In summary, from an economic perspective, the financing of networks of MPAs presents the following challenges and opportunities:

• Financial sustainability of MPAs is increasingly dependent on building diversiﬁed portfolios. Networks of MPAs can provide greater scope for such diversity. Examples are corporate sponsorship and international donor funding arranged at a network or country level;

• Environmental services/beneﬁts provided by networks are typically greater 92 CHAPTER 6. FINANCING OF MPA NETWORK ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT

than those that could be supplied by single MPAs, and therefore there is greater scope for a so-called system of payments for environmental services (PES). • Scaling up from sites to systems creates potential economies of scale, leading to lower transaction costs and more eﬃcient use of human and capital resources. The associated cost savings, for instance in terms of pooling international technical assistance, could be enormous. Ad- ditionally, at a network level, protected area management is able to support a greater division of labour, for example full-time fund-raising and trust fund management posts; and • Networks of MPAs allow for collection of revenues at sites where this can be realized at lowest costs.

An interesting example of the final point is the Hanauma Bay Marine Life Conservation District (MLCD) on Oahu, Hawaii, established in 1976. The Hanauma Bay Nature Preserve is one of the most heavily used marine reserves in the world, attracting over one million visitors per year. Current admission charges for non-Hawaii residents are $5 plus $1 per car for parking. The MLCD (City of Honolulu) earns more than is needed to run the Park and part of its revenues are used to subsidise other coral reef projects off- site, thereby contributing to reef conservation in other areas in the State of Hawaii. Hanauma Bay can be considered a “sacrificial area” that attracts many tourists, has easy fund-raising opportunities and is not particularly ecologically sensitive. The incorporation of such sites into MPA networks allow for more remote areas without similar fund-raising options to remain pristine, well-funded and well-managed. These positive outcomes suggest that the selection of MPAs for networks should be partly based on pragmatic revenue-raising arguments rather than solely based on ecological criteria, if sustainable financing is a key priority for an MPA network. One of the more recently published case studies of how the sustainable financing of a network of MPAs might potentially work in practice comes from Southeast Asia. The Conservation and Community Investment Forum (CCIF) was commissioned by the WCPA Southeast Asian Marine Work- ing Group to develop an MPA network-specific business plan that included financial projections, potential revenue sources, detailed cost estimates, or- ganizational design(s) required and action plans (Merkl et al. 2003). The CCIF study is discussed above in the section on Costs. More concrete examples of operational MPA network funding systems can be found in Latin America, specifically Belize and Mexico. The Mexican case study centres on a network of 4 MPAs: the Islands of the Gulf of California, 6.7. TRUST FUNDS 93 the Ra Lagartos Biosphere Reserve in the Yucatn Peninsula along the Gulf of Mexico, the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve located along the Caribbean and the Contoy Island National Park in the Caribbean. The network is funded by a variety of mechanisms, both of a long-term and short-term nature. Key long-term support comes from a private endowment fund called the Natural Protected Areas Fund (FANP), initiated through a GEF grant. Long-term financial support is also provided by the government through CONANP, the government agency in charge of protected areas (Gonzlez-Montagut 2003). This public-private partnership has proven to be very successful. Indeed, State contributions to the management of the MPA network have gradually increased as the government is ever more reassured by the transparent, effective management and planning system established by the FANP. These factors have also encouraged other external funders to make donations to the MPA network. One of the most positive elements of this system is that the different funding mechanisms are complementary. Directors of individual parks are encouraged to search for funding independently and ideally, the MPAs will cease to be financially dependent on the FANP in the longer- term. As Gonzlez-Montagut (2003) explains “the FANP actively promotes the graduating of protected areas from the program by helping them acquire long-term support from other sources.”

6.7 Trust funds

Trust funds can be effective tools to financially sustain MPAs and MPA networks, providing a more reliable annual income. If managed well, trust funds can be independent, credible allocation mechanisms for funding MPAs or MPA networks, based on clear standards, stakeholder input, and concrete results. Trust funds can be replenished through user fees, payments for environmental services, penalties, donor contributions, individual and corporate donations and philanthropic foundations among others. These funds can act as an intermediary between those paying fees or allocating resources based on benefits provided by ecosystems protected by MPAs and the actual management uses on the ground. If a government has a sufficient stake and degree of confidence in the administration of the fund, this might also help to transcend what has become a typical State reluctance to allow MPAs to retain a large proportion of fees and other income they generate. Examples include the Galapagos Trust and the Bunaken Preservation Fund. Subade (2004) documents the potential for an MPA in the Philippines to be funded by a public trust fund (see Box 13. In Belize, a further system of MPA network financing is in place for its 94 CHAPTER 6. FINANCING OF MPA NETWORK ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT

Box 13 Citizens non-use values of Tubbataha Reefs National Marine Park, Philippines

Tubbataha Reefs National Park (TRNMP) ing to pay for a trust fund to protect and is a UNESCO World Heritage Site and one manage TRNMP, with the main motivation of the most important MPAs in the Philip- being the so-called bequest value/motive pines. Although a popular site for foreign (leaving use and non-use values to future tourists, it remains unvisited by most Fil- generations). The combined WTP ranged ipinos. The value of this site to Filipinos from US$ 2.5 to 5 million, although Sub- was assessed using a contingent valuation ade (2004) proposes a conservative estimate survey of willingness-to-pay to help con- of US$ 200,000 that could be appropriated serve the biodiversity of the park. An av- from the Filipino population to fund park erage of 41% of Filipinos would be will- conservation. Source: Subade (2004)

14 marine reserves, national parks, and other protected areas, including fish spawning aggregation sites (Morrison and Bovarnik 2004). The Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute (CZMAI) was established in 1998 with funding from the EU and the GEF and is characterised by an integrated approach. CZMAI recently developed a long-term financing strategy for Belize’s coastal zone management, including funding of MPA sites. The resulting strategy includes three principal components: (1) a range of revenue sources sufficient to cover annual operating and investment costs; (2) a trust fund mechanism to receive and invest the funds; and (3) transparent and accountable processes to allocate funding among MPAs and other coastal institutions (Smith, 2004). CZMAI envisages raising funds through tourism and non-tourism based fees and taxes, as well as cost recovery charges. It is thought that these cost recovery charges could potentially be directed at industries responsible for aquaculture effluent discharge, coastal development or marine dredging, for example, thereby using the “polluter pays” principle as a revenue generating mechanism. Other proposed revenue sources include merchandising, donations and grants (CZMAI 2003). Charges made to those benefiting from healthy marine ecosystems (for example marine tourists, biodiversity prospectors etc.) are known as “Pay- ments for Ecosystem Services” (PES, see Chapter 6.8). The logic of payments for environmental services is as follows: stakeholders downstream (or ’down current’) who benefit from the sustainable management of natural resources upstream (or ’up current’) pay for the use of services provided by these intact resources. This payment gives upstream resource users an incentive to continue with or shift to sustainable management practices. This is explained in Figure 1 where a situation of extractive resource use (with off-site costs) is compared with a conservation with payment for services scenario. Costs are 6.8. PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (PES) 95

Figure 6.1: The logic of payment for environmental services (PES). (Adjusted from (Quintela et al., 2004) represented by the darker gray box beneath the central line, and benefits as the lighter gray areas above this line. The extractive resource use, such as coral mining, sand removal and/or unregulated fishing, has on-site benefits for those engaged in the extractive activity (i.e. they earn their livelihoods from this activity). However, there is a negative external effect, referred to as the off-site costs (in dark gray). Example costs include coastal erosion, reduced fish catch (due to loss of spawning areas and habitats) and loss of dive income.

6.8 Payment for Environmental Services (PES)

The idea of a PES-system is that part of the avoided ’off-site’ costs of the extractive resource use scenario is used as ’payment’ or compensation for extractive users to shift to (or continue with) conservation practices. If successful, the ’conservation with payment for services’ scenario is achieved. In this scenario, off-site costs are removed, the extractive users have a financial incentive to adhere to resource conservation, and the overall on-site benefits of conservation are greater than the on-site benefits of extractive uses (when this payment/compensation is included) (see Figure ). PES was first developed in a terrestrial setting. More traditional PES 96 CHAPTER 6. FINANCING OF MPA NETWORK ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT include user fees for tourists and international donor funding for biodiversity preservation. Other innovative PES are royalties for bio-prospecting and payments for carbon sequestration. Together, these PES help ensure sustainable forestry and watershed management practices. User fees, international donor funding and royalties for bio-prospecting have also been applied in a coastal/marine setting. Yet, so far, the terrestrial success of PES has not been mirrored in terms of the marine equivalents of downstream water use (for example), such as fisheries spill-over effects and coastal protection. Coastal defence services provided by coral reefs are difficult to measure, particularly on a per unit level: dose-response functions of the link between coral destruction and coastal erosion are highly non- linear, uncertain and site specific. Besides, in most places in the world, the activities that eventually lead to coastal erosion, such as coral mining and blast fishing, are forbidden in the first place With regard to fisheries, notwithstanding increasing evidence of the benefits provided by MPAs (see Gell and Roberts, 2003 and references therein), the extent of spillover fisheries effects associated with protected areas have yet to be adequately established in a variety of contexts. This, coupled with the fact that fishers are usually not a wealthy group with the capability to be able to pay for improved future stocks, means payments from this sector is unlikely in the short term. When financial payments from small-scale fisheries are not feasible, in- kind transfers such as mooring buoy maintenance, and monitoring and assistance with enforcement may provide an alternative. Monetary transfers are possible in cases of recreational fishing where record-size catches along the boundaries of MPAs are reported (Bohnsack, reported in Roberts et al. 2001) and possibly in larger scale fisheries. Another option may be the allocation of exclusive rights to specific fishing grounds in return for financial compensation. An example is the recent work by the Marine Aquarium Council (MAC) addressing the collection of ornamental fish. MAC requires a Collec- tion Area Management Plan (CAMP) to be set up for all collection sites and obliges fishermen to take responsibility for managing each ’collection area’ sustainably. Payments in a marine setting could also include a payment by dive operators to local fishermen to discontinue shark fishing or the capture of other charismatic species. Where a well-functioning system of MPAs exists, lobster fishermen (and potentially larger scale fisheries) in adjacent areas may, for instance, also be asked to share part of their profit with the MPA management body for maintaining healthy lobster (and other species) broodstock. 6.8. PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (PES) 97

Box 14 Transforming Fisheries Subsidies

A study by WWF and the Royal Society for desperate need of reappraisal: nearly 75 per the Protection of Birds estimates that es- cent of fisheries are categorised by FAO as tablishing global networks of MPAs cover- overfished or fully exploited; populations of ing 30 per cent of the world’s oceans would large predatory fish have fallen to less than cost US$12-14 billion annually (Balmford et 10% of their numbers prior to the onset of al., 2004). Economic subsidies paid to sup- commercial fishing. Marine habitat loss now port the world’s commercial fisheries total equals or exceeds that of the rainforests, between US$15-30 billion each year. The re- with 60 per cent of coral reefs expected to port evaluates that global networks of MPAs be lost by 2030 if present rates of decline could help safeguard - and over time in- continue. crease - a global fish catch valued at about “Meeting the global commitment to marine US$80 billion per year, and could result in protection will require international effort the annual economic benefits from marine on an unprecedented scale, involving gov- ecosystem services valued at US$7,000 bil- ernments, donor agencies, the fishing indus- lion each year. Global MPA networks could, try and the conservation community. Redi- in theory, generate more than 1 million full- recting government spending from harmful time jobs. Despite international commit- fishing subsidies to marine reserves would ments to create national networks of marine provide enormous ecological, social and eco- protected areas by 2012 (WSSD, 2002), less nomic benefits worldwide.”—Simon Cripps, that 1% of the world’s oceans are currently Director of WWF’s Endangered Seas Pro- protected in comparison with the 12% of ter- gramme. restrial habitat that is protected. Subsidies are increasingly acknowledged as supporting an inefficient industry that is in Source: WWF Gland Press Office Chapter 7

Recommendations for development of the Coral Triangle Marine Protected Area System

The Coral Triangle Initiative presents an opportunity to contribute to national and regional programs that aim to promote marine bio-diversity conservation and sustainable use of marine natural resources. Recommendations below aim develop the Marine Protected Area part of the Coral Triangle Initiative, the CTMPAS, as a complement to local, national, and regional initiatives. Hence, these recommendations assume existence of a variety of MPA development programs, and they should not be understood as general guidance for MPA network establishment.

7.1 Design of CTMPAS

Following recommendations pertain to Goal 3, Regional Action 1 of the Coral Triangle Initiative Regional Plan of Action1.

• The Coral Triangle Initiative must consider to focus efforts on the establishment of marine reserves rather than zoned Marine Protected Areas, for reasons of management efficiency (see sections 3.5 and 3.10 in this report). This does not affect the ultimate goal of including 20% of each major marine and coastal habitat type in reserves, but it would

1Version distributed during the World Ocean Conference, Manado, Indonesia, May 2009 7.2. TECHNICAL SUPPORT 99

reduce overlap with Goal 2 on the Ecosystem Approach to Management of Fisheries. • The considerable effort towards establishment of tiny and small community- managed reserves, especially in the Philippines, hardly contributed to progress in terms of area covered. Because CTMPAS aims to achieve scale, it must invest in development of processes that (1) increase average size of community-managed reserves, (2) achieve cost-efficient and self-sustained replication of community-based initiatives, (3) facilitate establishment of large, co-managed Marine Protected Areas. • Usually, Marine Protected Areas are classified according to their management objective, without specification of the type of use restrictions that will be effected (see, for example, the IUCN classification system described in Dudley (2008)). Whereas this practice increases flexibility and political feasibility, it also tends to defer the most difficult part of MPA establishment, namely specification and implementation of use restrictions, to local groups. The Coral Triangle Initiative must consider developing a system that is specific in respect to management measures. The percentage of area that must be included in no-take zones is one of the most important aspects to this issue, which is why the CTI Regional Plan of Action sets out a Coral Triangle-wide target of 20% of near-shore habitats in no-take areas. The Coral Triangle Initiative must consider to set the percentage of no-take zones within MPAs at a minimum of 30%. In this way, CTI decision makers and network designers will share some of the load of creating political will for no-take zones with their counterparts at the local level. • Besides the percentage of no-take area, there are numerous other design criteria for network design and MPA zoning. Rather than compiling its own set of design criteria, CTI must consider providing access to publications that provide sound guidance. A simple way to achieve this would be an annotated list of links and references to resources available at ReefBase.org or elsewhere.

7.2 Technical support

Following recommendations pertain to Goal 3, Regional Actions 2 and 3 of the Coral Triangle Initiative Regional Plan of Action. • None of the CT6 countries have a comprehensive database on surface areas of Marine Protected Areas and no-take areas (though some agencies CHAPTER 7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORAL TRIANGLE 100 MARINE PROTECTED AREA SYSTEM

have data on the MPAs in their portfolio). Without such a database, CTI cannot measure progress in respect to CTMPAS. The Coral Trian- gle Initiative has an opportunity to work together with MPAglobal.org and ReefBase.org to establish such a database. The database must cover each CT6 country in its entirety (not only the part that is within the Coral Triangle proper), and it must facilitate selection of MPA records by ecological region (e.g. MEOW of Spalding et al. (2007)). The database must be available in two versions: An open, web-based version (wiki-style) where anybody can enter and retrieve data, and a supervised version, where data are reviewed by an expert. The open version is important to collect and update data on small, community- managed reserves2.

• Because no-take areas feature prominently in CTMPAS, CTI must invest in development of tools towards building political will and societal support for establishment of no-take areas. These tools must be based on the inherent benefits of reserves—They cannot be based on economic development of coastal communities (e.g. alternative livelihood projects), because there is no evidence that economic development, by itself, results in a reduction of fishing effort.

2Dr Louisa Wood, [email protected], is currently developing a wiki-style database for MPAs. Bibliography

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An overview of recent literature on reserves

Overview of recent literature on marine reserves. Abbreviations under Type are as follows: Stat = Empirical study that addresses differences within and outside reserves, or before and after establishment of reserves; Exp = Empirical study that finds evidence for export or eggs or larvae; SpOv = Empirical study that finds evidence for spill-over; Mod = Modeling study; Rec = Study that specifically recommends reserves as a management tool.

Type Source Reserve Synopsis Stat Ardiwijaya et al. Karimunjawa, Indone- Fish biomass increased or stabilized over the (2008) sia, coral reefs period 2004-2007 in no-take zones (Core Zone and Tourism Zone), and decreased in zones where only some of the fishing methods are restricted (Protected Zone) or where all legal fishing methods are allowed (Utilization Zone). Stat Bartholomew Florida Keys (USA), Reserves promote an increased density of ex- et al. (2008) 24 reserves, coral reefs ploitable species, but reserve design param- eters (reserve perimeter / total reserve area, and permeability of reserve boundaries) has an only weak significant or insignificant effect. continued on next page 124 APPENDIX A. AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE ON RESERVES

Type Source Reserve Synopsis Stat Christie (2005) Mabini (Philippines), Numbers of fish more than doubled over a 2 reserves of 15-24 ha, period of 10 years after the reserves were es- coral reef tablished, whereas numbers of fish remained stable in a nearby fished area. The authors conclude that the reserves might have pre- vented a decline in nearby fishing grounds, and that the reserves might have improved yield. Stat Cinner et al. East Africa, 11 re- Reserves have approximately three times the (2009) serves and 19 fished fish biomass of fished sites. There is no clear sites, coral reefs relationship between biomass in closures and the gradient of development, suggesting that effective reserves are not just a measure of community affluence. Stat Claudet et al. Europe, 19 marine re- Analysis of 58 datasets from 19 European (2008) serves marine reserves shows that reserve size and age do matter: Increasing the size of the no- take zone increases the density of commercial fishes within the reserve compared with outside: For every 10-fold increase in the size of a no-take zone, there was a 35% increase in the density of commercial fishes. Size of the buffer zone has a negative effect on density— There is no clear explanation for this, though it might be caused by fishers concentrating effort around reserves in buffer zones. Posi- tive effects of marine reserve on commercial fish species and species richness are linked to the time elapsed since the establishment of the protection scheme. For each year since protection, the mean relative density of commercial fishes increased by 8.3%. Stat DeMartini et al. Pacific atolls (Kiribati Comparison of fish assemblages between 4 (2008) and US), two fished atols show effects of fishing pressure. Even and two unfished of modest fishing pressure has a strong effect 15-50 km diameter. on density and body size of apex predators. coral reefs Fish biomass at the most remote and pristine atoll is 5 times higher than of the atol with the highest fishing pressure. Stat Evans et al. Great Barrier Reef Compared to fished areas, no-take areas have (2008) (Australia), network a 2.3 times higher biomass of stripey seaperch of no-take and fished Lutjanus carponotatus, which results in a 2.5- areas, coral reefs fold difference in batch fecundity per unit area. continued on next page 125

Type Source Reserve Synopsis Stat Ferraris et al. Abore Reef (New After opening a 10,000 reserve to fishing, den- (2005) Caledonia), 10,000 ha sity of most exploited fish species decreased reserve, coral reef. faster than in a control area that remained closed. Surgeons, however, decreased faster in the area that remained open, and the authors explain this with the high mobility of this exploited species group. Stat Graham et al. Western Indian Reserves support higher biomass of fish, but (2008) Ocean, 9 coral reef they did not enhance survival of reefs after reserves the 1998 mass bleaching event. Changes in fish composition followed degradation caused by bleaching, irrespective of management regime. Fisheries benefits of reserves are not impaired after the bleaching event. The authors recommend to identify and protect regional refugia, combine these into existing reserve networks, and implement management targeted at reducing stress to reefs outside reserves. Stat Guidetti et al. Mediterranean (Italy), Compared to fished areas, fish biomass is 2.4 (2008) 15 coastal reserves of times higher in well-enforced reserves. In re- 18-1067 ha serves with weak enforcement, fish biomass is equal to fished areas. Stat Hamilton and Manus (Papua New After one fishing community opened commer- Matawai (2006) Guinea), 3 grouper cial fishing on a previously closed spawning spawning aggregations aggregation site, peak density of aggregat- sites measuring 10s of ing grouper was a factor three lower than in ha each previous years, whereas peak densities at the other two sites were the same or higher as in previous years. In 2009, Hamilton (pers. comm.) reports that numbers at the fished site recovered after the site was closed again. Stat Harborne et al. Exuma Cays Land and Inside the reserve, biomass of large-bodied (2008) Sea Park (Bahamas), grouper species is 5-fold higher than outside 442km2 coral reef re- the reserve, species richness is 15% higher in- serve side the reserve, and grazing by parrotfish is twice higher inside the reserve. Macroal- gae cover inside the reserve is lower. Various other effect of reserves were misleading, because these also occurred in other areas at similar spatial scales. continued on next page 126 APPENDIX A. AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE ON RESERVES

Type Source Reserve Synopsis Stat Hughes et al. Great Barrier Reef, This study compares the fate of reefs after (2006) exclusion experiment, the 1998 bleaching event in fish exclosures coral reefs to reefs that have a healthy fish population. In control areas, where fishes were abun- dant, algal abundance remained low, whereas coral cover almost doubled (to 20%) over a 3 year period, primarily because of recruitment of species that had been locally extir- pated by bleaching. In contrast, exclusion of large herbivorous fishes caused an explosion of macroalgae, which suppressed the fecundity, recruitment, and survival of corals. Stat Jones et al. (2004) Kimbe Bay (Papua A decline in coral cover in the Kimbe Bay New Guinea), small area resulted in a decline in density by a fac- coral reef reserves tor two or more in 50% of reef fish species. The decline took place in reserves as well as fished areas, and the authors conclude that reserves cannot always prevent such losses. [Note that the reserves in Kimbe Bay are very small] Stat Kaiser et al. English Channel Adult scallops (Pecten maximus) within ar- (2007) (UK), coastal pro- eas protected from towed bottom-fishing gear tected area closed for have heavier adductor muscle tissue and go- scallop fishing nads that are 19%-24% heavier than those of scallops in fished areas, while other body and age characteristics are similar in both areas. The scallops within the protected area also occurr at a much higher abundance than adjacent, chronically fished (13-fold) and wider commercially exploited (2-fold) areas. Stat Ledlie et al. Cousin Island (Sey- Effective protection of reefs around Cousin (2007) chelles), 120 ha re- Island did not prevent a phase shift to a serve, coral reef macro-algae dominated state after the 1998 bleaching event. Herbivorous fish avoided macro-algae, and reefs lost structural complexity. The authors conclude that especially at small, isolated islands, reserves may not suffice as an adaptation measure to catastrophic events. continued on next page 127

Type Source Reserve Synopsis Stat McClanahan Indonesia, Papua New Differences in fish biomass inside and out- et al. (2006) Guinea, co-managed side protected areas are larger for tradition- reserves of 12-60 ha ally managed temporary closures than for co- and temporary clo- managed reserves. Large national parks did sures of 33-58 ha, coral not have any effect, [because their zoning sys- reefs tems are not enforced]. The authors argue that the de facto level of protection is highest in traditionally managed temporary closures because there is higher local buy-in, and consequently these areas perform better. Stat Molloy et al. Review, reserves Old reserves are most consistently beneficial (2008) throughout the world to female-first sex-changing species. Effects of protection are only detectable after several generations. Stat Mumby et al. Exuma Cays Land and This study tests the hypothesis that re- (2006) Sea Park (Bahamas), serves ultimately decrease grazing pressure 456km2 coral reef re- on macroalgae by parrotfishes because reserve serves usually increase biomass of piscivores. Because large-bodied parrotfishes escape the risk of predation from a large piscivore (the Nassau grouper), predation reduces grazing by only 4 to 8%. This effect is small compared to the increase in density of large parrotfishes due to cessation of fishing, resulting in a net doubling of grazing. Increased grazing within the reserve causes a fourfold reduction in the cover of macroalgae, which, because they are the principal competitors of corals, highlights the potential importance of reserves for coral reef resilience. Stat Mumby et al. Exuma Cays Land and See Mumby et al. (2006). Increased grazing (2007) Sea Park (Bahamas), by parrotfishes within reserves lead to a two- 456km2 coral reef re- fold increase in density of coral recruits. serve Stat Pande et al. Review, 10 New Reserves result in two times more and 10% (2008) Zealand reserves of bigger individuals soon after the establish- 0.9 − 24km2. ment of the reserve (mean of 6.5 yr for blue cod, 8.5 yr for rock lobster). continued on next page 128 APPENDIX A. AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE ON RESERVES

Type Source Reserve Synopsis Stat Robbins et al. Great Barrier Reef Density of whitetip reefshark Triaenodon (2006), Dulvy (Australia), network obesus and grey reefshark Carcharhinus am- (2006) of no-entry, no-take, blyrhynchos are 80 and 97% lower in no- and fished areas, coral entry zones (1% of the total area) than in reefs no-take zones (30% of the total area) and fished zones (64% of the total area). The authors explain the similarity between no- take and fished zones by poaching. Density of reefsharks in well-enforced no-entry zones is about the same as in a pristine atoll in the Cocos Islands. Stat Russ et al. (2005) Philippines, 15 coral Biomass of large predatory fishes (Ser- reef reserves of 3-38 ha ranidae, Lutjanidae, Lethrinidae) is up to 10 times higher inside than outside reserves. It takes up to 6 years of protection before differences become significant. Stat Russ et al. (2008) Great Barrier Reef After 1.5-2 years of protection, density of (Australia), re- the primary target of reef line fisheries, coral serve network of trout (Plectropomus spp.), increased signifi- 115, 395km2, coral cantly in inshore reefs and offshore reefs (31- reefs 68%). On inshore reefs in one region, both reserves and open areas showed a decrease, possibly due to a large scale bleaching event. The authors note that empirical demonstra- tions of such responses have been lacking until now due to the worldwide scarcity of marine reserve networks Stat Smith et al. Californian coast At sites subjected to higher levels of hu- (2008) (USA), rocky inter- man visitation, mussel populations are signif- tidal habitat. Various icantly lower than low-use sites. Mussel pop- marine reserves, sizes ulations inside regulatory marine reserves do not specified. not consistently differ from population outside reserves. The authors explain this absence of a reserve effect by (1) weak enforcement, resulting in high mortality through collection, (2) continuing visitation, resulting in high mortality through trampling. Stat Sweatman (2008) Great Barrier Reef Crown-Of-Thorns Starfish (COTS) out- (Australia), re- breaks are less common in no-take zones than serve network of in fished zones. The authors hypothesize that 115, 395km2, coral higher abundance of piscivorous coral trout reefs in no-take zones (Russ et al., 2008) resulted in a trophic cascade that increased mortality of COTS juveniles. . continued on next page 129

Type Source Reserve Synopsis Stat Westera et al. Ningaloo Marine Inside reserves protected from recreational (2003) Park (Australia), fishing, legal-sized lethrinids (the most tar- large reserves of geted family in the region) have greater 10 − 100km2each. biomass, size, and abundance, than surrounding areas that support a recreational fishery. There are no differences in other fam- ilies/genera. Stat, Alcala and Russ Bohol Sea, Philip- Reserve protection enhances fish biomass at SpOv (2006) pines, coral reef both islands. Fisheries catch outside the re- reserves Sumilon (38 serve increases with duration of reserve pro- ha) and Apo (25 ha) tection at Sumilon Island, but not at Apo Island. Removal of 25% (Sumilon) and 10% (Apo) of the available fishing area does not reduces total fish catch at either island in the long term. Large predatory fish, as well as surgeonfish and jack, increased by factors of 17 and 3 in Apo reserve over 18 years of protection. Total fish biomass in Sumilon reserve increases with 6.7 kg per year from a baseline of 87 kg over 10 years of protection. Stat, Nemeth (2005) Red Hind Bank (US After imposing a temporal closure, average SpOv Virgin Islands), 41km2 body length of red hind Epinephelus gutta- reserve with deep coral tus increased with 10 cm, and after full clo- reefs. sure average body length of male red hind increased with 7 cm. After full closure, biomass at the spawning aggregation site increased with over 60%. Red hind that were tagged at the reserve were recovered in surrounding fishing grounds (500km2), which is evidence for spill-over. Exp Bell (2008) Northern Europe, us- Genetic analysis suggest that island MPAs ing two intertidal in- are isolated, and that island MPAs may not vertebrate species as provide as much larval export or receive models as much buffering against local extinctions, compared with mainland populations (for a similar sized protected area). Exp Cudney-Bueno Gulf of California Two years after reserve establishment, den- et al. (2009) (Mexico), two re- sity of juveniles of two two commercial serves of 5 − 10km2 species of mollusks, rock scallop Spondy- with beach-rock and lus calcifer and black murex snail Hexaplex granite reefs nigritus, at the downstream edge of the reserve network increased three-fold. SpOv Abesamis and Apo Island (Philip- Aggressive interaction in a surgeon fish, Naso Russ (2005) pines), 20 ha reserve, vlamingii is higher inside the reserve than coral reef outside, suggesting that density-dependent mechanisms may drive fish from the reserve into surrounding fishing grounds continued on next page 130 APPENDIX A. AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE ON RESERVES

Type Source Reserve Synopsis SpOv Francini-Filho Abrolhos Bannk A Before-After Control-Impact assessment and Moura (Eastern Brazil), fish biomass inside and outside the reserve (2008) 10km2 reserve, coral finds increases in biomass of three commer- reefs cial fish species inside and outside the reserve after reserve establishment, indicating that spill-over does take place. The reserve, however, was established in poor habitat with low fish biomass. This would have obscured reserve effects if a Before-After assessment would not have been done. SpOv Goni et al. (2008) Mediterranean (Spain Effort and catch per unit area of artisanal and France), 6 coastal fisheries around six reserves is highest near reserves measuring 65- the boundary of the reserve, and declines 270 ha, rocky going outward. The authors attribute this to spill-over from the reserve. Spill-over ex- tended 700 to 2,500 m from reserve boundaries. SpOv Harmelin-Vivien Mediterranean (Spain Starting from a core reserve and going out- et al. (2008) and France), 7 coastal wards, fish biomass decreases rapidly at ei- reserves measuring 85- ther the boundary between the core zone and 8680 ha (incl. buffer the buffer zone or between the buffer zone zones) and surrounding fishing grounds. The gradient stretches out over 100s of metres, and the authors conclude that this is the area where spill-over is manifest. The rapid decrease is at either one of the boundaries, not at both, which suggests that instead of responding as zoned areas, the reserves respond as single- designation protected areas that vary in level of protection. SpOv McClanahan 75 km stretch of Catch Per Unit Effort (CPUE) is lower near et al. (2008) coastline in Southern MPAs than far from MPAs, probably be- Kenya, coral reefs and cause these areas are inherently less produc- seagrass beds. One tive. This conclusion is, however, modified reserve of 12km2. by gear regulations pertaining to one of the dominant gears, beach seines (see significant interaction term). Exclusion of beach seines has a positive effect on total yield and CPUE of remaining fishing gears. For closures to be effective at increasing catch, there must be simultaneous efforts at gear management around the periphery of the closures. Com- pared to catch realized in areas far from reserves, variability in catch near the reserve is lower, and trophic level is higher. continued on next page 131

Type Source Reserve Synopsis SpOv Tremain et al. Indian River Lagoon Whereas a tagging experiment finds that (2004) at the Merritt Island sport fish do emigrate from the reserve, the National Wildlife rate of immigration appears higher. There- Refuge, Florida fore, the reserve appears to extract fish from (USA), estuary and surrounding fishing grounds, and the authors river hypothesize that beneficial effects for fisheries are mainly through export of eggs and larvae. Mod Botsford et al. This modeling study draws parallels between (2003) conventional fishery management and fishery management through marine reserves Mod Botsford et al. This modeling study explains how the effect (2004) of reserves on fishery yield depend on overall fishing pressure, dispersal distance and spatial configuration of reserves. Mod Gerber et al. Model results indicate that reserves could (2003) play a beneficial role in the protection of marine systems against overfishing. Mod Grafton et al. An economic model shows that reserves can (2006) increase resource rents from fishing, even if reserves and fishing grounds face the same shocks and even if the population is persis- tent. Payoffs from reserves increase with increasing impact of fishery on fished populations. Mod Hilborn et al. Applies to fisheries Reserves prevent collapse in fisheries that are (2006) that can be managed in decline, but fisheries that are managed with quota regulations at Max Sustainable Yield through quota will yield less after reserves are implemented. Mod Kaplan and Bots- Networks designs based on variable spacing ford (2005) in reserves can yield greater benefits than designs based on uniform spacing if fisheries are close to collapse. If populations are far from collapse, then desings based on variable spacing perform about the same as designs based on uniform spacing. Mod Kellner et al. “Fishing the line” (fishing on or near the (2007) boundary of a reserve): (1) is part of the optimal effort distribution near no-take marine reserves with mobile species regardless of the cooperation level among harvesters; (2) has a significant impact on the spatial patterns of catch per unit effort (CPUE) and fish density both within and outside of the reserve; and (3) can enhance total population size and catch simultaneously under a limited set of conditions for over-exploited populations. continued on next page 132 APPENDIX A. AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE ON RESERVES

Type Source Reserve Synopsis Mod Kellner et al. Assumptions on population dynamics and (2008) migration affect calculation of spill-over per unit area: If population growth is density- dependent, and if there is no density- dependent movement out of the reserve, then large reserves “lock up” populations and the relation between reserve size and spill-over rate per unit area has an optimum (first increasing, then decreasing with increasing reserve size). If, on the other hand, populations are regulated by density-dependent growth in combination with density-dependent movement, then the relation increases continu- ously, and larger reserves have a higher spill- over rate per unit area. Mod Kritzer (2004) A high perimeter-to-area ratio in reserve network designs favor spill-over and export of eggs and larvae, but a high perimeter-to- area ratio also negates these beneficial effects in situations where non-compliance (fishing within reserves) is high. As non-compliance increases, single large reserves become a better management solution. Mod Little et al. (2005) Great Barrier Reef, Simulations suggested that marine reserves simulation based on might lead to better conservation of a fishery- population character- targeted species if infringement is negligible istics of Plectropomus or limited to reserve margins. Even where areolatus infringement occurred only at the edges of reserves, a network of small reserves may be less effective at conserving a targeted species than a smaller number of larger reserves. Mod Ralston and If fishing mortality is excessive (F > FMSY), OFarrell (2008) spatial variation in fishing intensity (for example by creating reserves) often improves yield and can produce yields in excess of MSY when compensation occurs after dispersal, and the density-dependent recruitment rate is a function of the local density of adults. If fishing mortality is not excessive then spatial variation in F does not influence catch. In- creasing spatial variability in F for the intra- cohort and predispersal density dependence models, especially for the case of reserves, can lead to decreased yield unless the stock is overfished. continued on next page 133

Type Source Reserve Synopsis Mod Smith and Wilen A model that includes fisher’s fishing ground (2003) selection in response to reserves shows that reserves can produce harvest gains in an age- structured model but only when the biomass is severely overexploited. Even when steady state harvests are increased with a spatial closure, the discounted returns are often negative, reflecting slow biological recovery relative to the discount rate. Mod Walters et al. Californian coast An equilibrium model shows that a network (2007) of no-take reserves comprising about 15-20% of the coast has a small negative effect on catch and a moderate effect on biomass of exploited species. The authors argue that it is meaningless to demonstrate higher biomass within reserves, if even this increased biomass is much lower than biomass in pristine situations. Mod White and [In contrast to Walters et al. (2007)] the au- Kendall (2007) thors find that reserves can have a beneficial effect compared to non-reserve management. Mod White et al. Nearshore fish Only a moderate proportion (ca. 20%) of (2008) and invertebrate the coast in reserves (with moderate har- species with a ses- vest pressures outside reserves) is required sile adult stage, to maximize fishery profit. Furthermore, re- density-independent serve area and harvest intensity can be traded mortality, and a off with little impact on profits, allowing for pelagic larval stage management flexibility while still providing that disperses higher profit than attainable under conventional management. Mod Wielgus et al. Carmen Island, Gulf Maximum economic benefits occur at mod- (2008) of California (Mex- eled closures of all of the shallow area and ico), theoretical re- 70%-90% of the deep area around Carmen serve to protect leop- Island. The high closure rate, and results ard grouper Mycterop- from recreational divers, who are willing to erca rosacea pay an average of US $0.60 per dive to ob- serve an additional large fish such as a leopard grouper. This compensates for losses in commercial fisheries for leopard grouper due to the closure. Rec Appeldoorn Puerto Rico and US This study recommends to establish reserves (2008) Virgin Islands reef as part of an ecosystem-based fisheries man- fisheries agement strategy. continued on next page 134 APPENDIX A. AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE ON RESERVES

Type Source Reserve Synopsis Rec Bell et al. (2008) Indo-Pacific, coral Population densities of some stocks of valu- reefs able tropical sea cucumbers have been reduced to the point where reproductive success trails behind natural mortality (known as depensation or the “Allee effect”). This means that reserves by themselves will not show any beneficial effect. The authors provide ideas to re-stock no-take zones to overcome the Allee effect. Rec Bellwood et al. Coral reefs This review emphasizes the importance of (2004) reserves to build up biomass of herbivores, thereby increasing resilience of reefs to climate change-induced bleaching. Rec Bellwood et al. Great Barrier Reef, This experimental study highlights the im- (2006) exclusion experiment, portance of herbivory on reefs, in this case coral reefs by a species that was not expected to be an important herbivore. This highlights the need for comprehensive protection, including a wide range of species Rec Campbell and Karimunjawa, Indone- This field study finds a strong effect of arti- Pardede (2006) sia, coral reefs sanal fishing on reef fish populations, and the authors recommend no-take zones to address over-fishing by local artisanal fishers. Rec Dulvy et al. Fiji Crown-Of-Thorns Starfish (COTS) out- (2004) breaks are more common at reefs where fishery removed predators, and the authors recommend reserves as a tool to prevent outbreaks of COTS. Rec Friedlander et al. Seaflower Biosphere To sustain fisheries in the Seaflower Bio- (2003) Reserve (Colombia), sphere Reserve and to insure against catas- design of 2-3 reserves trophic event, the authors recommend in- totaling 100km2 cluding a minimum of 38-41% of habitats in reserves, whereas an optimal target would be 60%. Rec Gell and Roberts Various Reviews of fishery effects of reserves, includ- (2002), Gell and ing case studies and recommendations for de- Roberts (2003) sign of reserves Rec Graham et al. Gladden Spit (Be- Catch-per-unit-effort and individual body (2007) lize), mutton snapper size of aggregating mutton snapper decreases spawning aggregation despite partial protection from fishing. The authors recommend a complete fishing ban for Gladden Spit. continued on next page 135

Type Source Reserve Synopsis Rec Halpern and Various Networked reserves provide fishery benefits in Warner (2003) terms of spill-over and export of eggs and larvae. Reserve networks can be designed to optimize fishery benefits, which makes unnecessary the debate between advocates of reserves and fishers. Networks of intermediate-sized reserves (10 − 100km2) are more effective in sustaining fisheries than are fewer large reserves, particularly if the networks include a variety of representative habitats. Rec Hoegh-Guldberg Coral reefs Reserves are among the few management et al. (2007), tools that have specific positive effects on her- Hughes et al. bivorous fish biomass, which increases reef re- (2003) silience against effects of climate change. Rec Hoegh-Guldberg Coral reefs in the Coral Triangle countries must consider ma- et al. (2009) Coral Triangle rine reserves as a climate change adaptation measure. A first priority, however, is stabilizing CO2 emissions. Rec Hooker and Ger- Marine megafauna Reserves benefit conservation of marine ber (2004) megafauna by protecting their forage base and prevention of fishery bycatch. Rec Hughes et al. Coral reefs Reserves serve far wider goals than just sus- (2005) tainable fisheries, they also maintain ecosystem integrity and they increase resilience to effects of over-fishing, eutrophication, and climate change. Rec Hughes et al. Coral reefs “No-take areas ... are vital tools for manag- (2006) ing food webs, ecosystem function and the resilience of reefs, in a seascape setting that ex- tends far beyond the boundaries of the reefs themselves.” Rec Kaiser et al. Temperate seas Reserves have clear benefits for management (2007) of sedentary species such as scallops, but their application may do more harm than good for wide-ranging long-lived species such as cod and place. Reserves are a management tool that complements, but not replaces, conventional management (esp. effort reduction). Rec Laurel and Brad- High latitudes At higher latitudes dispersal distances are bury (2006) greater, and therefore marine reserves must be of greater size than in the tropics to achieve sustainability in fisheries. continued on next page 136 APPENDIX A. AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE ON RESERVES

Type Source Reserve Synopsis Rec Lester and While partially protected areas may confer Halpern (2008) some benefits over open access areas, no-take reserves generally show greater benefits and yield significantly higher densities of organisms within their boundaries relative to partially protected sites nearby. Rec Mangi and Mediterranean fishers view MPAs as tools for Austen (2008) fisheries management, whereas other MPA stakeholders (MPA managers, conservationists, government officials, recreational users, researchers, and “others”) view MPAs as tools for conservation of marine biodiversity. “Research and education” and “Tourism” score low as MPA objectives. Fishers disagree to open all areas to fishing, but their disagreement is less strong than among other stakeholders. Fishers disagree more than other stakeholders to allow SCUBA diving or recreational fishing in all areas. Rec Mora et al. (2006) Global Reviewing global status of coral reef MPAs, the authors conclude that less than 0.1% of the world’s coral reefs are within effective reserves. Because reserves are critical for the survival of coral reefs, there is a need for an immediate reassessment of global-scale conservation strategies. Rec Mous et al. (2005) Indonesia Indonesia’s fishery policy must shift from development-oriented management towards management for sustainability and ecosystem-based management, where reserves play a role as fishery management tools. Rec Myers and Worm Global Exploitation depleted large predatory fish (2005) communities worldwide by at least 90% over the past 50-100 years. Reduction of fishing mortality usually leads to rapid recovery of community biomass and diversity. Besides regulation towards reduction of overall fishing effort, the authors recommend temporary and permanently closed reserves to rebuild stocks of large predatory fishes. Rec Palumbi (2004) Global In an effort to determine neighborhood sizes of marine species, Palumbi (2004) summa- rizes literature on spill-over effects. Palumbi concludes that neighborhoods of demersal fish measure up to 100 km. continued on next page 137

Type Source Reserve Synopsis Rec Pandolfi et al. Global coral reefs The authors find that reef degradation (2003) started centuries ago, far before the effects of climate change and bleaching became apparent. Large herbivores and large carnivores decreased first, and at the beginning of the 20th century none of the reef systems were pristine in this respect. Results demonstrate that coral reef ecosystems will not survive for more than a few decades unless they are promptly and massively protected from human exploitation Rec Pauly et al. Global fish popula- The current collapse of fish stocks resembles (2005) tions the mass extinctions caused by hunting of large land mammals in Australia and North America. Progress in fishing methods has made accessible to fishing all fish stocks, and refugia no longer exist. The authors recommend, amongst others, to re-recreate these refugia by establishing marine reserves. Rec Pet et al. (2005) Komodo (Indonesia), Numbers and body size of groupers grouper spawning ag- (Epinephelus fuscoguttatus and Plectropomus gregation site, coral areolatus) at spawning aggregations sites in reef Komodo National Park have been decreasing due to continued fishing. The authors recommend to enforce the Park’s no-take zones, where poaching has been common. Rec PISCO - Partner- Global A popular review of the science of marine re- ship for Interdis- serves. ciplinary Studies of Coastal Oceans (2007) Rec Roberts et al. Global To reverse fishery declines, safeguard marine (2005) life and sustain ecosystem processes, exten- sive marine reserves that are off limits to fishing must become part of the management strategy. Fishery management measures outside protected areas are necessary to complement the protection offered by marine reserves, but cannot substitute for it. Rec Sadovy De Mitch- Review, reef fish Reserves are among the most important man- eson et al. (2008) spawning aggrega- agement tools to protect reef fish spawning tions. aggregations from over-fishing. Where they fail this is usually a consequence of weak enforcement. Reef fish spawning aggregations must be valued as important life-history phe- nomena rather than as fishing opportunities. continued on next page 138 APPENDIX A. AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE ON RESERVES

Type Source Reserve Synopsis Rec Sale et al. (2005) Global This opinion paper argues that there are still gaps in the science underpinning no-take reserves, and that these gaps need to be addressed before reserves can be applied efficiently at scale. Important gaps concern connectivity and export of larvae and eggs from reserves. Rec Sale (2008); Sale “We still are unable to state with any preci- et al. (2005) sion how large an MPA needs to be, or what proportion of total habitat needs to be within MPA borders to adequately protect any marine species ... These questions are eminently answerable; we just have not bothered to do the needed science.” Rec Sumaila et al. Closure of 20% of the high seas may lead to (2007) the loss of only 1.8% of the current global reported marine fisheries catch, and a decrease in profits to the high seas fleet of about US$270 million per year. A closure would reduce likelihood of over-fishing, it would protect against fishery management errors, it would be enforceable with vessel tracking systems, it would protect vulnerable benthic organisms and habitats, and it would reduce demands places on society for subsidies and fuel. Appendix B

Internet resources

www.mpaglobal.org A global database on location and size of Marine Pro- tected Areas, maintained by the Sea Around Us Project, and supported by WWF, IUCN, UNEP, and WCMC. The database allows selection of records by Coral Triangle ecoregion (under the list for Geograpical Re- gion, choose MEOW Ecoregion, then select Coral Triangle ecoregions under the “select region” list. Coral Triangle ecoregions are listed in Spalding et al. (2007). www.iucn.org Home of the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, and a repository of over 1,000 downloadable reports. www.reefbase.org ReefBase is a project by the World Fish Center. It is a repository of all proceedings of the International Coral Reef Symposia (ICRS) and of papers presented at the International Tropical Marine Ecosystems Management Symposia (ITMEMS). ReefBase also hosts Status of Coral Reefs of the World, a publication by the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network (GCRMN). The site also offers an on-line mapping facility. www.fishbase.org An on-line database, including pictures of each fish species, maintained by the World Fish Center that aims to include all fishes known to science. Frequent users may prefer to order the database on DVDs. www.fao.org/fishery/ Home of the FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture De- partment, offering many FAO publications for download. The site also makes available Fishstat Plus, a database with catch and aquaculture statistics from each country. 140 APPENDIX B. INTERNET RESOURCES

Following URLs provide access to scientific and technical publications in peer-reviewed journals, focusing on open access resources. www.doaj.org Directory of open access journals, links to sites that provide free-of-charge access to publications, mostly peer-reviewed. biology.plosjournals.org Home of Public Library of Science. Provides free-of-charge access to peer-reviewed publications (full text PDF). Au- thors must pay a fee to publish in this journal. www.ecologyandsociety.org Home of Ecology & Society, a journal that provides free-of-charge access to peer-reviewed publications (full text PDF). www.conservationandsociety.org Home of Conservation & Society, a journal that provides free-of-charge access to peer-reviewed publications (full text PDF). www.bentham.org/open/tombj/ Home of the Open Marine Biology Jour- nal, published by Bentham Open. Downloading of full-text articles is free-of-charge. Authors must pay a fee to publish in this journal. fishbull.noaa.gov Home of Fishery Bulletin, a peer-reviewed journal published by NOAA. Full-text articles are downloadable free-of-charge, and publication in this journal is free-of-charge as well. www.nature.nps.gov/ParkScience/ Home of ParkScience, a journal that provides free-fo-charge access to peer-reviewed publications on protected areas (Parks) in the United States of America. www.seaturtle.org/mtn/ Home of the Marine Turtle Newsletter, includes peer-reviewed articles free-of-charge. scholar.google.com Searches scientific publications. Many of the sites that Google Scholar links to only provide full text at a fee (typically US$ 20- 30 per publication), but abstracts can usually be accessed free of charge. In February 2009, a search for the exact phrase “marine protected area” yielded 5,410 hits, and a search for the exact phrase “coral triangle” yielded 235 hits. google.desktop.com Download Google Desktop to index your hard disk so that you can locate information that you downloaded from the web- sites listed above. Clicking “Cntrl” twice will pop up a search window where you can enter keywords; adding the argument “filetype:pdf” will restrict your search to PDF documents. Appendix C

Acronyms

Acronym Description AOI Area Of Interest, technical term that is often used in spatial planning to indicate the entire area that the planner is interested in ADB Asian Development Bank ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BAPPEDA District Development Planning Board (Indonesia) BBKSDA Balai Besar Konservasi Sumber Daya Alam. Office for Conservation of Natural Resources (the provincial or district representation of PHKA) (Indonesia) BKKPN Balai Kawasan Konservasi Perairan Nasional or National Aquatic Protected Area Agency, a subisdiary of the Min- istry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries [Indonesia] BHS Bird’s Head Seascape [TNC, WWF, CI] BSSE Bismarck Solomon Seas Ecoregion [WWF] CBM Community-based management CI Conservation International, an international environmental NGO CCSBT Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna COREMAP Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Project [In- donesia] CPI Consumer Price Index, an index that is used to convert currency amounts published in one year to another year to correct for inflation and deflation, enabling comparison of costs between years continued on next page 142 APPENDIX C. ACRONYMS

Acronym Description CPUE Catch-Per-Unit-Effort CT6 Acronym for the six Coral Triangle countries: Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Timor Leste, Papua New Guinea, and Solomon Islands (Coral Triangle Initiative) CTI-CFF Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security CTMPAS Coral Triangle Marine Protected Area System [Coral Tri- angle Initiative] CTSP Coral Triangle Support Program [Coral Triangle Initia- tive], the name of the ADB- and USAID-funded project that supports the Coral Triangle Initiative DKP Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, also Dinas Kelautan dan Perikanan, district-level Fisheries Service (Indonesia) DPL Daerah Perlindungan Laut. Marine Protected Area established under COREMAP. DPLs are managed by local communities and formalized through a PERDES (Indone- sia). DPRD Local (District) Legislative Council (Indonesia) EAFM Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management (Coral Triangle Initiative) EBFM Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management EC European Community EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone ENSO El NiñoSouthern Oscillation EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency [USA] EU European Union FAD Fish Aggregation Device FAO Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations GEF Global Environmental Facility GIS Geographic Information System GOI Government of Indonesia GPS Global Positioning System, a satellite-based system for finding coordinates of a position anywhere on Earth. ICZM Integrated Coastal Zone Management, an approach towards multi-sectoral management of coasts IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature KepPres Keputusan Presiden (presidential decree, Indonesia) continued on next page 143

Acronym Description KKLD Kawasan Konservasi Laut Daerah, a Kawasan Konservasi Perairan that is managed by the District government (In- donesia) KKP Kawasan Konservasi Perairan, Marine Protected Area initiated under law UU31/2004 on fisheries [Indonesia] IOTC Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, a regional fisheries management organization LIPI Indonesia National Institute of Sciences [Indonesia] LIT Line-intersect transect (a monitoring technique for reef health) LMMA Locally-Managed Marine Area, an MPA that is managed by a local entity, often a village-based organization MAC Marine Aquarium Coucil, an international NGO that focuses on certification and eco-labeling in the aquarium fish sector MAMTI Marine Aquarium Market Transformation Initiative (a GEF-funded project) MCS Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance MEOW Marine Ecoregions of the World, a bio-geographic regionalization by Spalding et al. (2007) MMAF Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries MoU Memorandum of Understanding MPA Marine Protected Area MPA Mata Pencarian Alternatif, Alternative Livelihood (In- donesia) MSY Maximum Sustainable Yield, the maximum total catch that can be sustained indefinitively. Typically, MSY models assume that each level of fishing effort results in an equilibrium catch. Stocks are under-exploited if effort is lower than the effort at MSY, and stocks are over- exploited if effort is higher than the effort at MSY. NCC National Coordinating Committee (Coral Triangle Initia- tive) NGO Non-Governmental Organization NOAA National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration [USA] NPoA National Plan of Action (Coral Triangle Initiative) PEMDA Pemerintah Daerah, District government (Indonesia) continued on next page 144 APPENDIX C. ACRONYMS

Acronym Description PERDA Peraturan Daerah. Regulation at province or district level. (Indonesia) PERDES Peraturan Desa, regulation at desa (village) level (Indone- sia). PerMen Peraturan Menteri, Ministerial Regulation (Indonesia) PHKA Direktorat-Jenderal Perlindungan Hutan dan Konservasi Alam, Directorate-General of Forest Protection and Na- ture Conservation PNG Papua New Guinea PP Peraturan Pemerintah, Government Regulation [Indone- sia] PRA Participatory Resource Assessment RFMO Regional Fisheries Management Organization, such as IOTC and WCPFC RRA Rapid Rural Appraisal RRI Rapid Resource Inventory (a survey method) SI Solomon Islands SIPI Surat Izin Penangkap Ikan, fisheries license [Indonesia] SIUP Surat Izin Usaha Ikan, fisheries business license [Indone- sia] SK Surat Keputusan, decree [Indonesia] SML Suaka Margasatwa Laut (Marine Wildlife Reserve), a designation used by PHKA [Indonesia] SPC Secretariat of the Pacific Community SOM Senior Officials Meeting [Coral Triangle Initiative], often followed by a number (SOM1, SOM2, SOM3) SSME Sulu-Sulawesi Seas Marine Ecoregion TAC Total Allowable Catch RPoA Regional Plan of Action [Coral Triangle Initiative] TN Taman Nasional (National Park), a designation used both by PHKA (Ministry of Forestry) and the Ministry of Ma- rine Affairs and Fisheries [Indonesia] TNC The Nature Conservancy, an international environmental NGO TWAL Taman Wisata Alam Laut (Marine Tourism Park), a designation used by PHKA (Ministry of Forestry) [Indonesia] continued on next page 145

Acronym Description UPT Unit Pelaksanaan Teknis, or Technical Implementation Unit. This term is used by both the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries and by the Ministry of Forestry to refer to a field unit that reports to the Ministry [Indonesia] UPTD Unit Pelaksanaan Teknis Daerah, a Technical Implemen- tation Unit that reports to the district or provincial government [Indonesia] WCPFC Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, an RFMO WCS Wildlife Conservation Society, an international environmental NGO WFF Walton Family Foundation, a foundation that, amongst others, supports marine conservation in the Coral Trian- gle WWF Worldwide Fund for Nature, an international environmental network with local representations WPP Wilaya Pengelolaan Perikanan, Fishery Management Area, a large planning area encompassing various provinces. The Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries aims to have a fisheries management plan for each WPP [Indonesia]. CORAL TRIANGLE INITIATIVE REPORT WWW.PANDA.ORG/CORALTRIANGLE s natural environment and .panda.org/coraltriangle o stop the degradation of the planet’ to build a future in which humans live in harmony with nature. Why we are here T www