Who Needs Consensus Anyway? Addressing Manufactured Doubt and Increasing Public Trust in Climate Science

Public Affairs Quarterly Volume 31, Number 3, July 2017

WHO NEEDS CONSENSUS ANYWAY? ADDRESSING MANUFACTURED DOUBT AND INCREASING PUBLIC TRUST IN CLIMATE SCIENCE

Kristen Intemann

Several empirical studies purportedly demonstrate the existence of a scientific consensus on climate change. Such studies have been pursued as a response to concerns that private industries and think tanks have “manufactured” public doubt and derailed regulatory policies. While there is overwhelming evidence for anthropogenic global warming, studies aiming to empirically establish the existence of consensus rely on several problematic assumptions about the nature of consensus and the role of consensus in policy making. Even more worrisome, reinforcing such assumptions in public may actually undermine, rather than increase, trust in climate science.

1. Introduction

here are increasing concerns about the problem of “manufactured doubt,” Tor cases where private industry and think tanks have funded research aimed at generating public confusion about widely accepted scientific claims about climate change in order to stall or derail regulatory policies.1 A 2012 study by Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins tracks the activities of what he calls the “Climate Change Counter Movement,” supported by ninety-one conservative/free-market organizations with a combined annual budget of over USD $900 million.2 Such organizations engage in activities directed toward creating distrust or uncertainty about the scientific consensus on climate change. Such strategies appear to have been successful. There is a significant gap between scientists and laypersons in the United States as to whether human-induced climate change is occurring and is likely to have serious consequences.3 Only about 50 percent of people in the United States currently believe there is currently a consensus among scientific experts on climate change.4 __s __n 189 lc

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In response, scientists and science studies scholars have attempted to empirically demonstrate and publicize the existence of a scientific consensus on climate change.5 Scientific consensus is often taken to be a benchmark for scientific knowledge6 and thus important for legitimately grounding policy decisions.7 If so, then demonstrating the existence of a consensus provides reason for the public to accept the consensus view and support related policies. Indeed, some research suggests that this approach is promising and successful.8 However, such empirical studies make substantive epistemological assumptions about what constitutes a reliable scientific consensus and about the weight or role that consensus should have in guiding belief and policy making. The aim of this paper is to identify and critically evaluate these assumptions. Several of these are problematic, and reinforcing them by appealing to consensus as a reason to adopt particular beliefs or actions may ultimately undermine, rather than enhance, public trust in climate science (and in science more generally). Alternative strategies for addressing the problem of manufactured doubt and increasing public trust are presented.

2. Assumptions Made in Empirical Studies Measuring Consensus on Climate Change

Scholars attempting to demonstrate a scientific consensus about anthropogenic global warming (AGW) have understood scientific consensus as agreement among relevant experts.9 In order to measure this, empirical studies operationalize who counts as a climate change expert and develop methodologies to accurately measure the beliefs of those experts. Several different methodological approaches have been employed to do this. For example, Naomi Oreskes and Cook et al. analyzed abstracts from articles published in peer reviewed science journals that take an explicit position on AGW.10 On this approach, “experts” were scientists who had published a peer-reviewed article on climate change. The study by Cook et al., undertaken as a part of The Consensus Project,11 examined over twelve thousand peer-reviewed scientific papers on climate change and found that, among those who took a position, over 97 percent endorsed the consensus view that human- caused global warming is occurring. Anderegg et al. examined signed public statements on AGW and identified climate experts as those who had published at least twenty peer-reviewed articles on climate science.12 They found that between 97–98 percent endorsed the consensus view about AGW. Other empirical studies directly surveyed scientists who publish in climate change and belong to professional organizations for climate scientists. Doran and Zimmerman surveyed Earth scientists, concluding that 97.4 percent of those actively publishing in peer- reviewed climate science journals agreed with the consensus view.13 Stenhouse et s__ al. surveyed members of the American Meteorological Society14 and found that n__ lc

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93 percent of members whose area of expertise was climate science and who were actively publishing on climate agreed that global warming was significantly caused by human activities. Carlton et al. administered the same survey ques- tions to biophysical scientists and found 96.7 percent who had a majority of their publications in climate science also agreed.15 Despite the differences in these methodological approaches, all of these studies have produced similar findings.16 Analysis of a broad array of empirical studies shows that there is greater agreement among those who have the greatest expertise, or the highest number of peer-reviewed publications on climate change.17 However, it is important to note that the aim of these studies is not just to show that there is agreement among experts. Consensus is being emphasized because it is thought to be a reliable indicator of scientific knowledge that should be used as a basis to guide belief and action. The concern is that if lay persons doubt that a scientific consensus exists, it will influence their support for particular policies.18 Those who oppose regulatory policies to mitigate climate change also make the same assumption, and for that reason they have published Op-Ed pieces trying to convince the public that no scientific consensus exists on AGW.19 Thus, these studies are taken to establish not just that agreement among experts exists, but that there is a reliable scientific consensus, or that AGW is trustworthy knowledge that should guide our beliefs and policy decisions. Taking empirical studies on consensus as evidence for this, however, relies on a variety of epistemological assumptions that are untenable and, if reinforced, can have the unintended effect of decreasing public trust in science. These assumptions will now be identified and evaluated.

2.1 Agreement among Experts as Sufficient for Reliable Consensus Empirical studies on consensus about AGW focus on the percent of scientists that agree on particular claims in order to assert that a reliable consensus exists for those claims. While there is debate about what constitutes a reliable scientific consensus, the mere existence of agreement among experts is insufficient to determine that the knowledge produced is trustworthy.20 Agreement may occur, for example, as the result of accident, widespread misunderstandings, reliance on limited and homogenous methodologies, coercion, or the presence of widely shared values and interests that are likely to lead to systematic biases.21 At one time, there was widespread agreement among scientists that smoking did not cause lung cancer. But, in part, this was presumably because they were a relatively monolithic group of scientists funded by the tobacco industry who had vested interests in particular outcomes. In order for agreement among experts to be a reliable indicator of knowledge, it must possess certain features or be the result of certain practices or procedures that tend to produce reliable knowledge. Again, there are disagreements about what these features or procedures are. Some have argued that a reliable consensus __s __n

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requires that agreement be achieved or caused by the employment of shared standards or epistemological norms, and must undergo critical scrutiny.22 Some maintain that the agreement must be based on a convergence of evidence that occurs by employing diverse methodologies.23 Boaz Miller argues that even convergence of evidence is not sufficient to address concerns about potential biases.24 For a consensus to be reliable, participants must also be socially diverse, with different values and interests so as to minimize the possibility that the agreement is being reached solely because of the influence of those values and interests.25 While determining what constitutes a reliable consensus is beyond the scope of this paper, what is important to note is that the empirical studies under consider- ation only measure agreement among experts, without considering whether the agreement is the result of reliable processes or if it has additional features that might make it a trustworthy indicator of knowledge. Climate skeptics have rejected the empirical evidence for a scientific consensus precisely because they are dubious of the processes and practices that have produced agreement in climate science.26 Specifically, they claim that climate scientists, as a group, tend to share a particular political ideology and/or have powerful economic interests that make them more likely to arrive at particular conclusions. Some climate skeptics have argued that funding for climate change research generates financial conflicts that lead scientists to cherry-pick data, -ig nore alternative hypotheses, and suppress dissenting views.27 They claim climate scientists have a vested interest in continuing to receive funding for their research, which will be more likely if climate change is viewed as an urgent and critical area of research for avoiding catastrophic social consequences. Moreover, some point to economic interests among some climate scientists who also own stock, or receive honoraria or consulting fees. In 2010, skeptics highly publicized that the Chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Rajendra Pachauri, was the director of a for-profit alternative energy company that stood to benefit from particular climate policies.28 Although the IPCC has now adopted conflict-of-interest policies that require disclosure or management of such conflicts, it remains to be seen whether these are effective in practice. Given the economic interests behind many climate skeptics,29 this may seem like a rather ironic concern to have about scientists, but it is a concern that potentially undermines public trust in existing agreement among climate scientists. Recent polls in the United States found that 69 percent of adults polled believed it was at least “somewhat likely” that climate scientists had falsified evidence for global warming,30 and 37 percent believed that global warming is a hoax.31 Thus, it is not clear that merely pointing to agreement among climate scientists will increase the public trust in the consensus view. Hence, the worry is not merely that empirical studies on consensus rely on an s__ overly simplistic conception of reliable scientific consensus as mere agreement n__ lc

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among experts. It is that by doing so, they open up possibilities for climate skeptics to convince members of the public that there is no “real” scientific consensus because the agreement that exists is manufactured.32 Insofar as policy makers or members of the public believe that scientific consensus is “mere agreement,” the less weight they are likely to give to the existence of a consensus. That is, they are likely to conclude that the fact that a scientific consensus exists isnot a reliable indicator of knowledge, to dismiss scientific consensus as “group think,” or worse. Of course, there are many reasons to think that there is strong evidence in support of AGW. For example, there is a convergence of evidence from a variety of scientific disciplines related to climate change utilizing a diversity of methodologies from a variety of scientific disciplines. Physicists, atmospheric chemists, geologists, snow and ice scientists, ecologists, conservation biolo- gists, oceanographers, and a variety of social scientists have generated evidence from use of very different methodologies and approaches, and we have seen a convergence of evidence supporting AGW. Even those working within a dis- cipline have employed pluralistic methodologies that have arrived at similar conclusions. For example, climate modelers rely on ensembles of climate models that make different assumptions regarding initial conditions about which there are still uncertainties. While there is significant uncertainty about conditions related to aerosols, cloud formation, and water vapor feedback, researchers use ensembles of models that capture the range of scenarios that are likely.33 Thus, instances where we see a convergence of evidence in research that utilizes diverse assumptions, methodologies, and models give us some reason to think that theories regarding AGW are justified and reliable.34 Climate models have successfully predicted phenomena that we are now observing, such as rapidly retreating glaciers and extreme weather events. Similarly, climate science research has undergone significant scrutiny and critical feedback, both from other scientists as well as stakeholders.35 Models have been revised and improved in response to some of that criticism. In synthesizing its assessment reports on the physical science, the IPCC has a feedback process that involves multiple levels of review by diverse experts from a variety of countries and stakeholder groups.36 Despite significant scrutiny, AGW remains the best explanation that we have for the data. However, while convergence of evidence, ability to make novel predictions, undergoing intense critical scrutiny, and providing the best explanation of the available data may all be important criteria in assessing whether a theory is well justified or constitutes reliable knowledge, they are properties of theories that exist regardless of whether there is widespread agreement about the theory.37 What is important for the public to know, then, is that AGW meets these criteria and not that there is agreement among experts. __s __n

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2.2 Peer-Reviewed Articles as a Mark of Reliability and Expertise One might argue that empirical studies on climate change consensus do not only demonstrate that there is mere agreement on anthropogenic climate change, but also establish that agreement has occurred, through a reliable process of rigorous scrutiny among experts. As mentioned earlier, empirical studies measure expertise in relation to the number of peer-reviewed published articles on climate change. Thus, the fact that there is consensus among peer-reviewed publications and/ or authors with peer-reviewed research is assumed to be an indicator of not just agreement, but also reliable agreement because the expert views in question have survived critical evaluation by those with the appropriate training. There are, however, several problems with taking peer review to be an indicator of either expertise or of reliability of the view being expressed. There are worries that the peer-review process is flawed such that it does not provide adequate opportunities for dissenting views to compete fairly.38 One concern is that that reviewers, editors, and granting agencies have a bias toward conservativ- ism—or a tendency to negatively evaluate views that challenge widely accepted theories, methodologies, or theoretical frameworks.39 Some studies have found that researchers proposing unorthodox claims or theories need to meet a higher burden of proof than those supporting an accepted view.40 While some argue that a preference for conservative theories and frameworks is not epistemically problematic,41 this raises the question of whether dissenting views can be fairly evaluated and may exaggerate the existence of consensus. A second concern is that confirmation bias can lead reviewers and editors to favor findings that agree with their own views and discount those that challenge such views.42 Insofar as reviewers are more likely to hold a consensus position, they may be more resistant to acknowledging merits of dissenting views. Third, such reviews are often not blinded, so both reviewers and editors know the identities of authors. This potentially allows decisions to be influenced by prestige bias or networking bias where authors who are less well known or less well connected to those who hold the consensus view will be unfairly disadvantaged.43 Finally, there are ethical concerns that reviewers may have conflicts of interests—either ideological or economic—that might lead them to try to prevent certain research from being published.44 Thus, because consensus studies measure expertise by number of peer-reviewed publications and dissenting views are unlikely to receive fair treatment in peer review, the worry here is that empirical studies are “rigged” to include only those who are very likely to endorse AGW. Climate change skeptics often charge that they have been excluded inappropriately from conference programs and advisory panels and that their work has been treated unfairly in the peer-review process.45 Some have argued that the process is highly politicized and has been used to s__ block dissenting views from being published or from being included in IPCC n__ lc

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reports.46 The so-called “Climategate” e-mails fueled this perception. One such e-mail claimed that certain papers would be kept out of the IPCC report “even if we have to redefine peer-review.” While scientists whose e-mails were hacked were later investigated and cleared of any research misconduct or wrongdoing, there is still some concern that the e-mails reveal a sort of “bunker mentality” among climate scientists who are resistant to dissenting views or criticism.47 Therefore, agreement among those with peer-reviewed articles is not sufficient to establish a reliable scientific consensus. Insofar as biases may influence evalu- ations in favor of a consensus view, agreement would be the result of factors that are epistemically irrelevant. This is not to say that peer review is altogether useless. Many argue that while improvements can be made, peer review is a necessary and important part of scientific evaluation and advancement.48 However, in terms of demonstrating that a reliable consensus exists, more would need to be said to show that success in peer review is a trustworthy indicator of expertise and reliability given the potential for bias. Encouraging the public to rely on peer review as an indicator of expertise and reliability also opens up the possibility that this will be manipulated. Climate skeptics have begun establishing their own journals in which articles are reviewed by sympathetic peers. The journal Energy & Environment has now been dubbed the “journal of choice for climate skeptics,” as it includes more articles, compared to any other journal, that have been interpreted as supporting skepticism about anthropogenic climate change.49 The editor of Energy & Environment freely admits that it is a venue for publishing work that is more sympathetic to the interests of industry, but argues that this is necessary because there is a lack of journals willing to give this work a chance.50 Critics fear that articles that coincide with particular ideolo- gies or policy preferences will not undergo rigorous epistemic scrutiny.51 Whether this journal is “really” peer-reviewed is debatable, but it illustrates the danger of emphasizing the importance of “peer reviewed” articles without appealing to a particular conception of the processes or features that make peer review reliable. Impact factor of journals may be one way to take into account the prestige of a journal, but impact factors can be problematic insofar as they tend to favor journals that have existed longer, or that may share the values and interests of a majority group. The result, however, is that climate skeptics may be appropriating the label of “peer review” as a tool to manufacture doubt and cause greater confusion among the public and policy makers. Using “peer review” as the gold standard for expert knowledge without clarifying the features of peer review that may make it reliable runs the risk that this strategy will be increasingly adopted.

2.3 Scientific Consensus as (Near) Unanimity Studies aiming to demonstrate consensus about AGW not only claim that agreement exists, but also tout the high percentage of experts who hold the consensus __s __n

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view. The Consensus Project declares on its website that “the debate is over,” as 97 percent of published climate papers that take a position on anthropogenic climate change agree.52 While most studies do not take a position on what percentage of agreement is needed to achieve consensus, the authors have suggested that there is at least 90–100 percent agreement, and have discounted studies purporting to show less than 90 percent agreement as methodologically flawed.53 The implicit assumption here is that the closer that an epistemic community is to unanimity, the more reliable the consensus. Some philosophers of science have also supported this view. Tucker, for example, has argued that near unanimity is not only desirable, but a necessary condition for establishing a reliable consensus.54 However, there are several problems with thinking that unanimity is either necessary or desirable for scientific consensus. First, unanimity is a very high bar that is rarely, if ever, reached. Most interesting scientific claims lack unanimous agreement, and it is overly restrictive to deny that such claims can constitute “scientific knowledge.”55 Some scientific claims must be at least adopted pro- visionally for research to proceed despite some uncertainty or disagreement. Particularly for purposes of developing time-sensitive public policy, there is a need to endorse some scientific claims as justified or as providing good evidence for action, even if there is not unanimous agreement. Second, it is not clear that near unanimity is even desirable.56 The existence of minority or dissenting views can actually strengthen the reliability of a consensus. Such dissent has the potential for the weaknesses and limitations of a consensus view to be made clear and for proponents of the consensus view to respond to those objections. The presence of disagreement is an indicator that careful critical evaluation of the consensus view has occurred and provides better understanding of the justification for it.57 Again, the problem is not merely that consensus studies make a false assumption that reliable consensus requires (near) unanimity. This mistaken epistemological assumption can also exacerbate problems in relation to manufactured doubt. It is precisely because there is a naïve perception that unanimity is required for consensus that instances of manufactured doubt are so effective. They attempt to call into question trust in a consensus view by showing that some doubt exists and therefore, there is no reason to believe climate scientists.58 Indeed, climate skeptics have aimed to undermine empirical studies on climate change by showing that nothing near unanimity exists. They point out, for example, that many of the empirical studies on climate consensus do not establish that 97 percent of all scientists agree that anthropogenic climate change is occurring and will bring about dangerous impacts. In response, authors of consensus studies argue that their number is more reliable precisely because s__ it only samples those who have expertise in climate science.59 Nonetheless, n__ this has allowed skeptics to claim that near unanimity is being achieved by lc

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significantly narrowing the sample size of potential experts.60 Josh Gelernter in the National Review was quick to point out that of the over twelve thousand scientific abstracts examined in the Cook et al. study, only 32.6 percent even took a position on whether climate change is significantly the result of human activity, and so the agreement he argues about is among a relatively small population of scientists.61 While Gelernter would clearly be wrong to infer that there is no reliable consensus on anthropogenic climate change on this basis, his argument has the potential to undermine public trust in those claiming that such a consensus exists. Indeed, this unfortunately fuels the misconception that climate scientists are aiming to “manufacture a consensus.”62 Insofar as members of the public understand consensus as agreement that approximates unanimity, they are less like to believe that there is a consensus when there is some disagreement. This may lead the public to think that there is no reliable consensus (and thus no reliable knowledge) on a host of other scientific claims for which there is less than unanimity. Exacerbating this problem is the fact that consensus studies tend to focus on whether there is agreement on a very general claim, such as whether anthropogenic climate change is occurring.63 But this raises a question about how deep agreement must be for it to be reliable. As John Beatty has argued, joint agreement is reached through oversimplification or acceptance on a general uncontroversial claim, masking disagreement about more specific substantive claims.64 While there may be near unanimous agreement that average global temperature is increasing, and principally due to anthropogenic greenhouse gases, there are significant disagreements among climate scientists on the extent of warming that will occur, how quickly it will occur, and what particular or regional impacts there will be.65 If a reliable consensus requires near unanimity, then the consensus on climate change will not go very deep. This risks that the public will infer that on those areas for which there is not near unanimity, there is no reliable scientific knowledge. Yet although there is disagreement, it would be problematic to assume that we have no reliable knowledge regarding, for example, likely climate impacts. Thus, the conception of reliable scientific consensus that appears to be oper- ating in many empirical studies rests on several problematic assumptions. One potential solution would be to revise the sort of methodologies used in consensus studies to explicitly focus on the features or processes that make a consensus reliable. Focusing on these features might help increase public understanding of science in a way that would counteract at least some of the sources of public mistrust. However, in order for this strategy to make sense, it must also be the case that establishing the existence of a reliable scientific consensus on AGW would be helpful or useful for advancing particular policy aims or changing public behavior. __s Hence, the next section will consider whether this is the case. __n

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3. Problematic Assumptions about the Role of Consensus in Policy

Studies that aim to establish the existence of a scientific consensus about climate change not only make problematic assumptions about what constitutes a reliable consensus, but they also make problematic implicit assumptions about what the existence of a scientific consensus can show in relation to policy.

3.1 Assumption that Reliable Consensus “Settles” Policy-Relevant Debates Studies demonstrating consensus about AGW have been intensely publicized presumably because the existence of a consensus is thought to “end debate” about contentious policy issues. Yet even if there is an overwhelming scientific consensus around anthropogenic climate change, this would not entail that particular public policies ought to be adopted. A variety of factors can legitimately be taken into account when making policy choices. Empirical information generated by science clearly ought to be one of those factors, but value judgments are also relevant. At times, legitimate economic, scientific, social, and political factors might enter into conflict when determining what policy option is best, and reasonable disagreements can exist about which factors are weightier.66 Focusing debate on whether or not a consensus exists can obscure real (and perhaps reasonable) value disagreements that exist that are also relevant to policy choices. Indeed, there can be agreement that the average global temperature will increase over the next one hundred years and that this is significantly caused by humans and will have catastrophic consequences—and still there can be disagreement about whether particular policies will be sufficiently cost-effective, will involve a just distribution of burdens, or will advance correct priorities about what needs to be protected. But by focusing so much attention on whether there is a scientific consensus, debates about the values at stake or how conflicting values ought to be prioritized are neglected. As mentioned, consensus studies have focused on very general claims about AGW and neglect where there are areas of disagreement about the rate and extent of warming, as well as regional or local impacts. Yet many of these disagreements are particularly relevant to adopting particular policies or developing mitigation and adaptation priorities. Thus, it is not clear that a consensus about the more general claim could be very informative in terms of helping us develop particular policies. To the extent to which a general consensus may neglect these other relevant disagreements, this may fail to provide the public with the sorts of reasons that they are likely to find compelling for supporting particular policies.

3.2 Assumption that Reliable Consensus Is Necessary for Public Policy s__ Some might argue, however, that even if reliable consensus is not sufficient for n__ policy or does not “settle” policy debates, it is necessary for making rational policy lc

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decisions. Indeed, one might think that debates about values cannot move forward unless there is first agreement on the empirical facts. Thus, perhaps demonstrating the existence of a scientific consensus is crucial in this regard. However, it is also dangerous to think that scientific consensus is necessary for making rational policy decisions. Often, there are contexts in which we must adopt public policies despite significant uncertainties and thus despite a lack of consensus about the scientific evidence.67 For example, significant, and legitimate, disagreement might exist about the extent to which a particular substance is toxic. Nonetheless, one might still argue that in the face of uncertainty, certain risks are more acceptable than others. Hence, it might be rational to adopt regulations even if there is no scientific consensus about toxicity. As noted, even if we take for granted that there is a consensus on the general claim that average global temperature is increasing, there are still reasonable disagreements about the extent and speed with which this is occurring, as well as what the impacts will be on regions and local communities. Yet some action clearly must be taken (as even inaction constitutes a particular policy course). Plac- ing much emphasis on the importance of scientific consensus risks undermining policy development in areas where there is genuine and reasonable disagreement.

3.3 Assumption that Reliable Consensus Is Desirable for Developing Public Policy One might, however, argue that while a reliable consensus is neither necessary nor sufficient for developing public policy, it is desirable or useful because it re- solves certain empirical debates that can then be used for informing policy (along with stakeholder interests and values). That is, perhaps scientific consensus can be used to advance policy discussions even if it does not settle policy debates. This, however, falsely assumes that science and policy occur at two distinct stages.68 That is, first we seek to secure agreement about the scientific “facts” among experts in the relevant fields, and then this information is used by policy makers and the public to determine what policies or practices will best advance the interests or values at stake. On this account, science and policy making are taken to be two distinct spheres, where science is “value-free” agreement about the empirical facts among experts and values only enter the realm of policy making. It assumes that scientific claims, such as the claim that “average global temperature will increase due to human activity and is likely to have serious impacts,” are supported by evidence that has nothing to do with the values of scientists, such that they should be accepted on the basis of agreement among experts. However, there is an increasingly strong case that ethical, political, and social values play relevant and legitimate roles in climate science.69 Values may play a role in selecting methodology and deciding what types of errors are more acceptable in collecting data.70 Values can play a role in determining what kinds of __s models to use or what counts as a “serious impact” of climate change.71 They can __n

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also be relevant to the selection of ontologies, for example, in how we measure species endangered by climate change.72 To the extent that agreement on empirical claims may be reached by implicitly relying on value judgments as background assumptions, then those assumptions must also be clearly articulated and open to evaluation by members of the public and policy makers.73 But insofar as values may be relevant to generating evidence in climate science, it is not clear that a scientific consensus is even desirable. In this context, agreement would likely signal that some values and interests are not being fairly represented in shaping the available science. Where values are relevant to scientific decision making and help determine the evidence that is available to policy makers, then pluralism may actually be more desirable than consensus. Scientists, after all, are not experts in values, and stakeholders may have different values and interests than those held by scientists.74 At best, the existence of a scientific consensus would show that if one accepts values widely held by the scientific community, then one ought to accept the scientific conclusions that they agree upon in relation to those values. Unfortunately, many climate skeptics are dubious of the values of climate scientists. Instead, being transparent about values at stake and engaging with the public so as to assure them that diverse and representative values have shaped the available science—rather than a few values that all climate scientists happen to share—may do more to help increase public trust in climate science.75 This may also force climate skeptics to make explicit their own values and defend them, rather than distracting the public about whether there is a consensus for AGW.

4. Conclusions

I have argued that empirical studies purporting to demonstrate a reliable scientific consensus around anthropogenic climate change make several problematic assumptions about both the nature of reliable consensus and the role of such consensus in developing public policy. It is not only that such studies rely on assumptions that are overly simplistic, but that they tend to reinforce these problematic assumptions for the public and for policy makers in ways that can exacerbate problems of manufactured doubt and that can risk undermining trust in climate science. My intention has not been to call into question whether there is in fact a reliable scientific consensus on climate change, or to somehow suggest that the doubts that have been generated are warranted. Indeed, there is overwhelming scientific evidence that average global temperature is increasing, that it is significantly caused by human activities, and that it will have serious impacts. I have argued, however, that empirical studies attempting to demonstrate this consensus are methodologi- s__ cally flawed insofar as they rely on overly simplistic assumptions about what makes n__ a consensus a reliable indicator of knowledge. In addition, it is not clear that so lc

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much emphasis should be placed on the existence of scientific consensus as a way to resolve skepticism about particular climate adaptation or mitigation policies. Consensus, particularly about very general scientific claims, has relatively little significance in resolving public policy debates. Indeed, the focus on consensus risks obscuring important debates about values that are relevant and reasonable both to the understanding the science as well as to developing policy. The problems we have seen with consensus studies, however, suggest alternative strategies for dealing with manufactured doubt and advancing climate change policies. First, increasing the public trust in climate science requires communicat- ing the features of theories and models that make them reliable or trustworthy in guiding belief and action. While there is debate about what features reliable knowledge has, there are several promising candidates such as convergence of evidence among diverse methodological approaches, ability to make novel predictions, explanatory power, and having undergone critical scrutiny of socially diverse researchers who share certain epistemic standards of evaluation. Second, climate scientists can be more open and transparent about the value judgments that guide their research, making these more explicit. Doing so may also force climate skeptics to be more explicit about the values and interests they are trying to promote. Climate skeptics are often let “off the hook” in terms of having to identify or defend their values and interests, as they have been able to keep attention focused on whether the scientific claims are true.

Montana State University

NOTES

I am very grateful to two anonymous reviewers who provided many helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. 1. Mooney, Republican War; Michaels, Doubt Is Their Product; Oreskes and Conway, Merchants of Doubt; Brulle, “Institutionalizing Delay.” 2. Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins, “Shifting Public Opinion.” 3. Ibid. 4. Cook et al., “Quantifying the Consensus.” 5. Oreskes, “Beyond the Ivory Tower”; Lichter, “Climate Scientists Agree”; Anderegg et al., “Expert Credibility”; Doran and Zimmerman, “Examining the Scientific Consensus”; Cook et al., “Quantifying the Consensus”; Cook et al., “Consensus on Consensus.” 6. Longino, Fate of Knowledge; Kitcher, Advancement of Science. 7. Jasanoff, “Science and Society.” 8. Lewandowsky, Gignac, and Vaughan, “Pivotal Role”; van der Linden et al., “Sci- __s entific Consensus.” __n

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9. Oreskes, “Beyond the Ivory Tower”; Bray and von Storch, Perspectives of Climate Scientists; Doran and Zimmerman, “Examining the Scientific Consensus”; Bray, “Scientific Consensus”; Rosenberg et al., “Climate Change”; Farnsworth and Lichter, “Structure of Scientific Opinion”; Verheggen et al., “Scientists’ Views”; Stenhouse et al., “Meteorolo- gists’ Views”; Carlton et al., “Climate Change Consensus”; Cook et al., “Consensus on Consensus.” 10. Oreskes, “Beyond the Ivory Tower”; Cook et al., “Quantifying the Consensus.” 11. Cook et al., “Quantifying the Consensus.” 12. Anderegg et al., “Expert Credibility.” 13. Doran and Zimmerman, “Examining the Scientific Consensus.” 14. Stenhouse et al., “Meteorologists’ Views.” 15. Carlton et al., “Climate Change Consensus.” 16. Cook et al., “Consensus on Consensus.” 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid.; Ding et al., “Support for Climate Policy”; McCright, Dunlap, and Xiao., “Perceived Scientific Agreement”; van der Linden et al., “Scientific Consensus.” 19. Elsasser and Dunlap, “Leading Voices”; Oreskes and Conway, Merchants of Doubt. 20. Goldman, “Experts”; Jasanoff, Designs on Nature; Jasanoff, States of Knowledge; Solomon and Richardson, “Critical Context”; Beatty, “Masking Disagreement”; Beatty and Moore, “Should We Aim?”; Miller, “When Is Consensus?”; de Melo-Martín and Intemann, “Scientific Dissent”; “Climate Consensus.” 21. Goldman, “Experts”; Solomon, Social Empiricism; Tucker, “Epistemic Significance”; Miller, “When Is Consensus?” 22. Longino, Fate of Knowledge. 23. Oreskes, “Scientific Consensus”; Miller, “When Is Consensus?”; Stegenga, “Three Criteria.” 24. Miller, “When Is Consensus?” 25. Ibid. 26. Michaels, “How to Manufacture.” 27. Ibid. 28. Mendick, “Taxpayers’ Millions”; Pielke, “Major Change.” 29. Oreskes and Conway, Merchants of Doubt; Brulle, “Institutionalizing Delay.” 30. Rasmussen Reports, “69% Say It’s Likely.” 31. Williams, “Conspiracy Theory Poll.” 32. Michaels, “How to Manufacture.” 33. Parker, “Understanding Pluralism.” s__ 34. Oreskes, “Scientific Consensus”; Miller, “When Is Consensus?”; Stegenga, “Three n__ Criteria.” lc

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35. Kloprogge and van der Sluijs, “Inclusion of Stakeholder Knowledge”; Tang and Dessai, “Usable Science?”; Kirchhoff, Lemos, and Dessai, “Actionable Knowledge.” 36. IPCC, “Procedures for the Preparation.” 37. Special thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this line of argument. 38. Blackburn and Hakel, “Examination of Sources”; Lee et al., “Bias in Peer Review.” 39. Luukonen, “Conservatism and Risk-Taking”; Lee et al., “Bias in Peer Review”; Shamoo and Resnik, Responsibe Conduct; Resnik and Elmore, “Ensuring the Quality.” 40. Resch, Ernst, and Garrow, “Randomized Controlled Study”; Luukonen, “Conser- vatism and Risk-Taking.” 41. Shatz, Peer Review. 42. Lee et al., “Bias in Peer Review”; Jelicic and Merckelbach, “Peer-Review”; Nick- erson, “Confirmation Bias.” 43. Lee, “Limited Effectiveness”; Lee et al., “Bias in Peer Review.” 44. Resnik and Elmore, “Ensuring the Quality.” 45. Pearce, Climate Files; Michaels “How to Manufacture.” 46. Michaels “How to Manufacture”; Carter, “Global Warming Research.” 47. Grundmann, “Legacy of Climategate”; Ryghaug and Skjølsvold, “Global Warming.” 48. Ware and Monkman, “Peer Review”; Lee et al., “Bias in Peer Review.” 49. Hunt, “Energy and Environment”; Thacker, “Skeptics Get a Journal”; Schmidt, “E&E Threatens.” 50. Schmidt, “E&E Threatens.” 51. Thacker, “Skeptics Get a Journal”; Schmidt, “E&E Threatens.” 52. Cook et al., “Quantifying the Consensus.” 53. Cook et al., “Consensus on Consensus.” 54. Tucker, “Epistemic Significance,” 509–10. 55. Miller, “Scientific Consensus.” 56. Miller, “When Is Consensus?”; Beatty and Moore, “Should We Aim for Consensus?” 57. Beatty and Moore, “Should We Aim for Consensus?” 58. de Melo-Martín and Intemann, “Scientific Dissent”; Miller, “Scientific Consensus.” 59. Cook et al., “Consensus on Consensus.” 60. Tol, “Quantifying the Consensus”; Tuttle, “The 97 Percent Solution.” 61. Gelernter, “Great Climate Lie”; Cook et al., “Quantifying the Consensus.” 62. Michaels, “How to Manufacture.” 63. Oreskes, “Beyond the Ivory Tower”; Rosenberg et al., “Climate Change”; Cook et al., “Quantifying the Consensus.” __s 64. Beatty, “Masking Disagreement.” __n

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65. Schiermeier, “Real Holes.” 66. Douglas, Science, Policy; de Melo-Martín and Intemann, “Who’s Afraid of Dissent?” 67. Grundmann and Stehr, Power of Scientific Knowledge; de Melo-Martín and Inte- mann, “Who’s Afraid of Dissent?” 68. Douglas, Science, Policy; de Melo-Martín and Intemann, “Interpreting Evidence.” 69. Risbey, “Subjective Elements”; Biddle and Winsberg, “Value Judgments”; Wins- berg, “Values and Uncertainties”; Intemann, “Distinguishing between Legitimate.” 70. Biddle and Winsberg, “Value Judgments”; Winsberg, “Values and Uncertainties.” 71. Intemann, “Distinguishing between Legitimate.” 72. Ludwig, “Ontological Choices”; de Melo-Martín and Intemann, “Risk of Using.” 73. Douglas, Science, Policy; Biddle and Winsberg, “Value Judgments.” 74. Intemann, “Distinguishing between Legitimate”; de Melo-Martín and Intemann, “Risk of Using.” 75. Kloprogge and van der Sluijs, “Inclusion of Stakeholder.”

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