Who's Afraid of Dissent? Addressing Concerns About Undermining
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Who’s Afraid of Dissent? Addressing Concerns about Undermining Scientiªc Consensus in Public Policy Developments Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 Inmaculada de Melo-Martín Weill Cornell Medical College Kristen Intemann Montana State University Many argue that encouraging critical dissent is necessary for promoting scientiªc objectivity and progress. Yet despite its importance, some dissent can have negative consequences, including undermining conªdence in existing scientiªc consensus, confusing the public, and preventing sound policy. For ex- ample, private industries and think tanks have funded dissenting research to create doubt and stall regulations. To protect scientiªcally sound policies, some have responded by attempting to minimize or discourage dissent perceived to be problematic. We argue that targeting dissent as an obstacle to public policy is both misguided and dangerous. 1. Introduction Many have argued that allowing and encouraging public avenues for dis- sent and critical evaluation of scientiªc research is a necessary condition for promoting the objectivity of scientiªc communities and advancing sci- entiªc knowledge (Rescher 1993; Longino 1990, 2002; Solomon 2001). The history of science reveals many cases where an existing scientiªc con- sensus was later shown to be wrong (Kuhn 1962; Solomon 2001). Dissent plays a crucial role in uncovering potential problems and limitations of consensus views. Thus, many have argued that scientiªc communities We are grateful for the thoughtful comments and criticisms we received from two anonymous reviewers, as well as from Sharon Crasnow and Matthew Brown. This paper was substantially improved because of their efforts, though the responsibility for any re- maining problems is ours. Perspectives on Science 2014, vol. 22, no. 4 ©2014 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology doi:10.1162/POSC_a_00151 593 594 Who’s Afraid of Dissent? ought to increase opportunities for dissenting views to be heard and taken seriously. Such opportunities are necessary for both limiting the inºuence of problematic biases and ensuring that a full range of research projects, hypotheses, models, and explanations receive adequate attention. Yet despite the epistemic importance of dissent within science, there is growing concern about the negative role of dissenting voices on public policy. For instance, private industry and think tanks have funded research whose primary aim has been to manufacture dissent by generating studies Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 that call into question widely received views, about climate change, envi- ronmental toxins, or the hazards of smoking (Michaels 2008; Oreskes and Conway 2010a; Oreskes and Conway 2010b). In other cases, respectable scientists defend claims that are entirely inconsistent with widely ac- cepted scientiªc views (Duesberg and Rasnick 1998; Wakeªeld et al. 1998; Duesberg et al. 2003). Because such studies present what appears to be conºicting evidence, they have been used to call into question govern- ment regulations on grounds that there is a lack of scientiªc consensus (Vastag 2001; Enstrom and Kabat 2003; Duesberg et al. 2003; Michaels 2005; Michaels 2008; Oreskes and Conway 2010b). Thus, there are two sorts of negative consequences dissent can have. It can have negative epistemic consequences when it results in confusion or false beliefs about the true state of the science, the existence of a scientiªc consensus, or the degree to which a claim is supported by evidence. This can happen because those without the necessary expertise may be unable to assess the quality or extent of dissenting views. But in cases where the scientiªc evidence is relevant for public policy, these negative epistemic consequences can also have policy consequences. Scientiªc consensus is of- ten taken to be a benchmark for scientiªc knowledge (Longino 2002) and thus thought to be important for legitimately grounding policy decisions (Jasanoff 2010). Dissent, insofar as it appears to call into question the scientiªc consensus, may make it appear to the public or policymakers that there is not sufªcient evidence to support the adoption of particular public policies (Bateman 2007; Specter 2007; McGarity and Wagner 2008; Diethelm and McKee 2009; Omer et al. 2009; McKee and Diethelm 2010; Oreskes and Conway 2010b). Motivated by a desire to protect what they take to be scientiªcally sound policies, then, many scientists and science studies scholars have adopted strategies that target dissent thought to be problematic. Some have, for example, attempted to discredit dissenters by showing their ªnancial ties to industry or political think tanks (Michaels 2008; Oreskes 2004; Oreskes and Conway 2010a; Oreskes and Conway 2010b). Some scientists have engaged in practices aimed at masking existing dissent from the public so as to prevent confusion or doubt about the scientiªc Perspectives on Science 595 consensus (Beatty 2006; Waltz 2009). What these strategies have in com- mon, however, is that they all concede that such dissent—or dissent likely to have negative epistemic consequences—is an obstacle to justiªably en- acting public policy. While we share concerns about the extent to which dissent can have negative consequences, we argue here that targeting dissent as an obstacle to public policy is both misguided and dangerous. It is misguided because it relies on problematic assumptions about the nature of scientiªc dissent Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 and consensus and the role of each in public policy development. It is dan- gerous because viewing dissent as an obstacle to policy is likely to increase illegitimate instances of dissent, deprive us of resources to criticize special interest science, and stiºe legitimate scientiªc dissent that is crucial to scientiªc progress and sound public policy. If we are correct, rather than targeting dissent, the focus of discussions should be ªnding successful strategies to help the public and policymakers better understand the na- ture of consensus and dissent, as well as their role in sound public policy making. 2. Worries about Scientiªc Dissent Clearly we want public policies, health advice, or regulatory decisions to be informed by scientiªc knowledge (Jasanoff 2004; Selinger and Crease 2006; Collins and Evans 2007; Bijker et al. 2009; Kitcher 2011). The ex- istence of a scientiªc consensus is often taken to be a proxy for such knowledge. When—through rational mechanisms—experts agree on a particular scientiªc claim, e.g., that smoking causes cancer, that anthro- pogenic effects are responsible for global warming, or that condoms pre- vent transmission of HIV, this consensus is thought to be evidence for the strength of the scientiªc evidence. Worries about dissent, then, seem to have to do with its potential to call into question existing scientiªc con- sensus, when this is not warranted by the evidence, and with it, the legiti- macy of using existing scientiªc evidence as grounds for public policy. Recent controversies in science-based public policy provide support these worries. In some well-publicized cases, for instance, oil, tobacco, and chemical companies have been shown to fund dissenting scientiªc studies in an apparent attempt to generate doubt about current scientiªc theories (Mooney 2005; McGarity and Wagner 2008; Michaels 2008; Oreskes and Conway 2010b). In some cases, scientists with ties to the tobacco industry produced several studies that rejected the consensus about a greater risk of lung cancer for smokers (Oreskes and Conway 2010; Michaels 2008). Sim- ilarly, scientists funded by the chemical industry have published studies that challenged the consensus and purported to support “hormesis,” the 596 Who’s Afraid of Dissent? hypothesis that low doses of toxins and carcinogens have some beneªcial health effects for humans (Shrader-Frechette 2010; Elliott 2011). In another now infamous case, publication of a link between the mea- sles, childhood vaccines and autism (Wakeªeld et al. 1998; Geier and Geier 2006, 2007) questioned the scientiªc consensus and presented the safety of vaccines as contested knowledge, even when no real disagreement existed in the scientiªc community (Kirby 2005; Olmsted and Blaxill 2010; Poland and Spier 2010; Shwed and Bearman 2010). As a result, at Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 least in part because of such dissent, many parents have rejected vaccina- tions for their children, risking the loss of herd immunity for diseases that had been largely eradicated from the industrialized world (Jansen et al. 2003; Glanz et al. 2009; Omer et al. 2009; Brown et al. 2010). Thus, dissenting voices can sometimes have considerable negative con- sequences on public health and may delay or prevent needed regulations or other sound public policies. Such dissent can also waste time and re- sources, both on the side of scientists and policymakers, when they are required to continue offering thorough critiques of dissenting voices or justifying why such voices ought to be dismissed. 3. Targeting Dissent as an Obstacle to Public Policy In an effort to prevent these consequences, some scientists and science studies scholars have responded by adopting a variety of interrelated