Who's Afraid of Dissent? Addressing Concerns About Undermining

Who’s Afraid of Dissent? Addressing Concerns about Undermining Scientiªc Consensus in Public Policy

Developments Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021

Inmaculada de Melo-Martín Weill Cornell Medical College

Kristen Intemann Montana State University

Many argue that encouraging critical dissent is necessary for promoting scientiªc objectivity and progress. Yet despite its importance, some dissent can have negative consequences, including undermining conªdence in existing scientiªc consensus, confusing the public, and preventing sound policy. For example, private industries and think tanks have funded dissenting research to create doubt and stall regulations. To protect scientiªcally sound policies, some have responded by attempting to minimize or discourage dissent perceived to be problematic. We argue that targeting dissent as an obstacle to public policy is both misguided and dangerous.

1. Introduction Many have argued that allowing and encouraging public avenues for dissent and critical evaluation of scientiªc research is a necessary condition for promoting the objectivity of scientiªc communities and advancing sci- entiªc knowledge (Rescher 1993; Longino 1990, 2002; Solomon 2001). The history of science reveals many cases where an existing scientiªc consensus was later shown to be wrong (Kuhn 1962; Solomon 2001). Dissent plays a crucial role in uncovering potential problems and limitations of consensus views. Thus, many have argued that scientiªc communities We are grateful for the thoughtful comments and criticisms we received from two anonymous reviewers, as well as from Sharon Crasnow and Matthew Brown. This paper was substantially improved because of their efforts, though the responsibility for any re- maining problems is ours.

593 594 Who’s Afraid of Dissent? ought to increase opportunities for dissenting views to be heard and taken seriously. Such opportunities are necessary for both limiting the inºuence of problematic biases and ensuring that a full range of research projects, hypotheses, models, and explanations receive adequate attention. Yet despite the epistemic importance of dissent within science, there is growing concern about the negative role of dissenting voices on public policy. For instance, private industry and think tanks have funded research

whose primary aim has been to manufacture dissent by generating studies Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 that call into question widely received views, about climate change, environmental toxins, or the hazards of smoking (Michaels 2008; Oreskes and Conway 2010a; Oreskes and Conway 2010b). In other cases, respectable scientists defend claims that are entirely inconsistent with widely accepted scientiªc views (Duesberg and Rasnick 1998; Wakeªeld et al. 1998; Duesberg et al. 2003). Because such studies present what appears to be conºicting evidence, they have been used to call into question govern- ment regulations on grounds that there is a lack of scientiªc consensus (Vastag 2001; Enstrom and Kabat 2003; Duesberg et al. 2003; Michaels 2005; Michaels 2008; Oreskes and Conway 2010b). Thus, there are two sorts of negative consequences dissent can have. It can have negative epistemic consequences when it results in confusion or false beliefs about the true state of the science, the existence of a scientiªc consensus, or the degree to which a claim is supported by evidence. This can happen because those without the necessary expertise may be unable to assess the quality or extent of dissenting views. But in cases where the scientiªc evidence is relevant for public policy, these negative epistemic consequences can also have policy consequences. Scientiªc consensus is often taken to be a benchmark for scientiªc knowledge (Longino 2002) and thus thought to be important for legitimately grounding policy decisions (Jasanoff 2010). Dissent, insofar as it appears to call into question the scientiªc consensus, may make it appear to the public or policymakers that there is not sufªcient evidence to support the adoption of particular public policies (Bateman 2007; Specter 2007; McGarity and Wagner 2008; Diethelm and McKee 2009; Omer et al. 2009; McKee and Diethelm 2010; Oreskes and Conway 2010b). Motivated by a desire to protect what they take to be scientiªcally sound policies, then, many scientists and science studies scholars have adopted strategies that target dissent thought to be problematic. Some have, for example, attempted to discredit dissenters by showing their ªnancial ties to industry or political think tanks (Michaels 2008; Oreskes 2004; Oreskes and Conway 2010a; Oreskes and Conway 2010b). Some scientists have engaged in practices aimed at masking existing dissent from the public so as to prevent confusion or doubt about the scientiªc Perspectives on Science 595 consensus (Beatty 2006; Waltz 2009). What these strategies have in common, however, is that they all concede that such dissent—or dissent likely to have negative epistemic consequences—is an obstacle to justiªably en- acting public policy. While we share concerns about the extent to which dissent can have negative consequences, we argue here that targeting dissent as an obstacle to public policy is both misguided and dangerous. It is misguided because

it relies on problematic assumptions about the nature of scientiªc dissent Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 and consensus and the role of each in public policy development. It is dangerous because viewing dissent as an obstacle to policy is likely to increase illegitimate instances of dissent, deprive us of resources to criticize special interest science, and stiºe legitimate scientiªc dissent that is crucial to scientiªc progress and sound public policy. If we are correct, rather than targeting dissent, the focus of discussions should be ªnding successful strategies to help the public and policymakers better understand the nature of consensus and dissent, as well as their role in sound public policy making.

2. Worries about Scientiªc Dissent Clearly we want public policies, health advice, or regulatory decisions to be informed by scientiªc knowledge (Jasanoff 2004; Selinger and Crease 2006; Collins and Evans 2007; Bijker et al. 2009; Kitcher 2011). The existence of a scientiªc consensus is often taken to be a proxy for such knowledge. When—through rational mechanisms—experts agree on a particular scientiªc claim, e.g., that smoking causes cancer, that anthropogenic effects are responsible for global warming, or that condoms prevent transmission of HIV, this consensus is thought to be evidence for the strength of the scientiªc evidence. Worries about dissent, then, seem to have to do with its potential to call into question existing scientiªc consensus, when this is not warranted by the evidence, and with it, the legiti- macy of using existing scientiªc evidence as grounds for public policy. Recent controversies in science-based public policy provide support these worries. In some well-publicized cases, for instance, oil, tobacco, and chemical companies have been shown to fund dissenting scientiªc studies in an apparent attempt to generate doubt about current scientiªc theories (Mooney 2005; McGarity and Wagner 2008; Michaels 2008; Oreskes and Conway 2010b). In some cases, scientists with ties to the tobacco industry produced several studies that rejected the consensus about a greater risk of lung cancer for smokers (Oreskes and Conway 2010; Michaels 2008). Sim- ilarly, scientists funded by the chemical industry have published studies that challenged the consensus and purported to support “hormesis,” the 596 Who’s Afraid of Dissent? hypothesis that low doses of toxins and carcinogens have some beneªcial health effects for humans (Shrader-Frechette 2010; Elliott 2011). In another now infamous case, publication of a link between the measles, childhood vaccines and autism (Wakeªeld et al. 1998; Geier and Geier 2006, 2007) questioned the scientiªc consensus and presented the safety of vaccines as contested knowledge, even when no real disagreement existed in the scientiªc community (Kirby 2005; Olmsted and Blaxill

2010; Poland and Spier 2010; Shwed and Bearman 2010). As a result, at Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 least in part because of such dissent, many parents have rejected vaccinations for their children, risking the loss of herd immunity for diseases that had been largely eradicated from the industrialized world (Jansen et al. 2003; Glanz et al. 2009; Omer et al. 2009; Brown et al. 2010). Thus, dissenting voices can sometimes have considerable negative consequences on public health and may delay or prevent needed regulations or other sound public policies. Such dissent can also waste time and resources, both on the side of scientists and policymakers, when they are required to continue offering thorough critiques of dissenting voices or justifying why such voices ought to be dismissed.

3. Targeting Dissent as an Obstacle to Public Policy In an effort to prevent these consequences, some scientists and science studies scholars have responded by adopting a variety of interrelated strategies, all of which target dissent perceived to be problematic so that it does not present an obstacle to particular science-based policies. Three of them are particularly common: masking disagreement, silencing or preventing what is taken to be problematic dissent, and discrediting dissenters. One way to prevent the public and policymakers from being negatively inºuenced by dissent is to present a so-called united front to the public, or what has been referred to as “masking disagreement by joint acceptance” (Beatty 2006). In these cases, scientists may mask existing disagreements by presenting to the public and policy makers only those scientiªc claims about which they can all agree while omitting or downplaying those aspects about which disagreements exist. For instance, although it is correct that there is widespread agreement that average global temperature is increasing, there are also general legitimate disagreements about how much warming will occur, how quickly it will occur, and how best to prevent or mitigate it. Because presenting these disagreements to the public is likely to create doubt and uncertainty not just about the particular aspects about which there is disagreement but also about those for which agreement exists, scientists might conceal discrepancies by presenting only very general claims for which there are a consensus (Oppenheimer et al. 2007). At least Perspectives on Science 597 some of these agreements are, strictly speaking, genuine, but the consensus presented is somewhat superªcial because it relies on over simpliªca- tions that ignore or mask existing disagreements. In such cases, the consensus view is achieved for largely strategic or non-cognitive reasons, such as concerns about how the public will react to uncertainty (Beatty 2006; Miller 2013). A similar strategy of emphasizing consensus has also been utilized by science studies scholars attempting to defend certain scientiªc

claims and policies. Oreskes and Conway, for example, have responded to Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 climate change skeptics by showing that the overwhelming number of peer-reviewed articles published support the claim that average global temperature is increasing and that human activities are a signiªcant cause (Oreskes 2004; Oreskes and Conway 2010b). They believe that, given the preponderance of evidence, rather than being excessively careful about the uncertainty of any scientiªc knowledge claim, climate scientists should now clearly label anthropogenic warming a fact (Oreskes and Conway 2010a). Demonstrating the strength and breadth of the existing scientiªc consensus is correctly thought to help put dissenting views in perspective, so that they are not given more weight than they deserve. But the empha- sis on the existing consensus also works to mask the disagreements that do exist. A second strategy for targeting dissent thought to pose an obstacle to sound public policy is to silence dissenting views that are perceived to be particularly problematic. For example, dissent can be hindered through the peer-review process. In order to do so, papers are sent to experts in the ªeld, who quite likely will hold the prevailing view and who will be less sympathetic to dissenting studies. That is, they will be more inclined to think that dissenting research must be bad science. Of course, sometimes this will indeed be the case, but not always. It is not easy to show that peer-review is used as a way to limit dissent (Martin 1999). However, the highly publicized case of hacked emails from a computer server at the University of East Anglia’s Climate Research Unit (CRU) calls attention to this strategy. Climate change scientists at the CRU came under ªre because in some of those stolen emails, researchers were apparently boast- ing about how they could prevent articles with even the appearance of questioning anthropogenic climate change from surviving peer review (Schiermeier 2009). The Inspector General later found that there was no evidence that the CRU scientists were guilty of scientiªc misconduct (NOAA 2011), although others have argued that the emails still demon- strate a lack of openness and “bunker mentality” within scientiªc communities (Grundmann 2012). This episode, as well as the subsequent calls to take peer-review off its pedestal (Horton 2010), call attention to the ways in which peer-review might be used to suppress the publication of 598 Who’s Afraid of Dissent? research that dissent from widely accepted scientiªc claims because it can interfere with the development of public policies. When dissenting articles or books are published, a third strategy that has been employed by scientists and science scholars is to discredit the dissenter. A common response to cases of dissent thought to have problematic implications for public policy is not just to criticize the science, but to publicize the ªnancial or political ties that the dissenters have to think

tanks or private industry (Oreskes and Conway 2010; Shrader-Frechette Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 2010, Elliott 2011), or to otherwise call into question the reputation of the scientist. A recent example of this strategy can be found in debates about genetically modiªed organisms (GMOs). In 2007, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) published a study that challenged the general scientiªc consensus on the safety of GMOs (Rosi-Marshall et al. 2007). According to the study, cadis ºies consuming Bt maize pollen died at twice the rate of ºies fed non-Bt maize pollen. Immediately after publication, not only the evidence presented in the article, but also its authors were subjected to a relentless and scathing attack by a group of scientists who favor biotech crops (Waltz 2009). Arguing that one of their main motivations is the fear that anti-GMO interest groups can seize on the study to advance their agenda, pro-GMO scientists helped organize widespread and sustained criticism of the study. The attack was broad ranging. Not only were the authors denounced for presumed glaring er- rors in their scientiªc methodology and conclusions, criticisms were di- rected to the PNAS for publishing the article as well as the National Science Foundation for funding the study in the ªrst place. Some of the participants even accused the authors of misconduct. Given the variety of targets, it is not unreasonable to argue that scientiªc issues were not the only concern. Even if the study were scientiªcally ºawed, and many other scientists thought that it was not, the backlash seemed aimed more at dis- couraging research contrary to the received scientiªc view of GMO safety than at presenting legitimate scientiªc concerns about the paper (Waltz 2009). A potential consequence of this coordinated and sustained strategy is the discouragement to conduct studies or publish ªndings that may be counter to dominant views (Frank 2004). This strategy of discrediting the dissenter can hinder dissent not just by making a particular scientist less credible; it can also deter funding agencies from ªnancing such research as well as editors from publishing it. It may also have a general effect of de- terring other scientists from research that is inconsistent with widely accepted theories, insofar as doing so will be risky to their careers. As we can see by these examples, attempts to protect policymaking from dissenting views that attempt to challenge the scientiªc consensus Perspectives on Science 599 can take a variety of shapes and originate from players of different political persuasions. But as mentioned earlier, what these strategies have in common is that those who use them are concerned with preventing the negative effects that dissenting views can present to sound policy development. Without dismissing the relevance of such concerns, we argue here that targeting dissent as a way to protect public policy is both misguided and dangerous. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 4. Why Targeting Dissent Is Misguided Given the negative effects that a challenge to the scientiªc consensus by dissenting voices can have, it might seem reasonable to attempt to use the strategies mentioned, or similar ones, to protect sound public policy development. Indeed, those who employ such strategies may do so precisely because they believe certain policies are justiªed by the best available science and they want to limit public confusion by what they take to be junk science or the work of biased scientists. But even if the motives are reasonable, taking dissent in these cases to be the appropriate target of concern is grounded on a variety of assumptions that may not be justiªed. In what follows we reconstruct and assess what we take to be the most plausible arguments that can be presented to make sense of the belief that targeting dissent as an obstacle to public policy is appropriate. We conclude that such arguments fail. We do not claim that those who are worried about the negative policy effects of dissent explicitly make these arguments. Our claim is simply that such concerns are plausible only under these assumptions.

A. The Consensus-as-Necessary Argument Concerns about dissent appear reasonable when scientiªc consensus is taken to be a necessary condition for the development or enactment of sound public policy. A plausible argument that could make sense of such concerns is the following: 1. If a public policy P is to be justiªably enacted, then there must be a consensus on some (pertinent) scientiªc theory T. 2. The existence of dissenting voices undermines the scientiªc consensus about T. 3. Dissenting voices exist. 4. Therefore, consensus about T is undermined, by Modus Ponens 2,3. 5. Therefore, public policy P cannot be justiªably enacted, by Modus Tollens 1,4. 600 Who’s Afraid of Dissent?

So, for example, one might argue that in order for regulations on anthropogenic CO2 emissions to be justiªed, it must be the case that there is a scientiªc consensus around the hypothesis that such emissions signiªcantly contribute to climate change. Climate deniers who challenge that view could then undermine conªdence in the scientiªc consensus and pose an obstacle to policy regulations on CO2. Strategies used to block the effects of this dissent then seem reasonable, as such strategies will elimi-

nate a signiªcant obstacle—dissenting voices—to the development of ap- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 propriate public policies. But the soundness of this argument, and thus its ability to explain the appropriateness of targeting dissenting voices, seems to be grounded on several controversial assumptions. First, as plausible as it may initially seem, the truth of premise 1 is questionable as it is not obvious that the existence of a consensus is necessary for making rational public policy. Often there are contexts in which we must adopt public policies despite signiªcant uncertainties and thus despite a lack of consensus about the scientiªc evidence (Grundmann and Stehr 2012). For example, signiªcant, and legitimate, disagreement might exist about the extent or immediacy of climate change impacts. Nonetheless, one might still argue that in the face of uncertainty, certain risks are more acceptable than others. Hence, it might be rational to heavily invest in alternative energies or reduce greenhouse gas emissions because the risk of unnecessary economic costs might be more acceptable than the risks of doing nothing and being wrong. So, why should we accept the premise that the existence of a consensus is necessary for making rational public policy?1 Presumably, the idea is that in order for a science-based policy to be justiªed, there must be good reason for thinking that the science is more likely to be true than to be false.2 If the existence of scientiªc consensus is thought to indicate that a theory is likely to be true, then the necessity of consensus for adopting a policy would seem to follow. Indeed, believing that consensus is a proxy for the likelihood of a theory being true seems particularly reasonable for lay persons and policymakers who do not have the necessary expertise required to interpret the existing evidence themselves (Jones 2002; Ander- son 2011). However, even if one accepts that justifying some public policy

1. We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer who encouraged us to consider more carefully why one might accept this premise and suggested the line of argument presented in this paragraph. 2. Some would argue that this is the wrong way to think about justiªcation or that truth should not be viewed as a central aim of science (Ravetz 2011). We argue, however, that even if truth is a goal of science, whether consensus per se can be taken as a proxy for truth and whether it is necessary for adopting public policy is still questionable. Perspectives on Science 601 requires that the scientiªc theory supporting it is true—or likely to be true—it is not clear that a consensus is the best indicator of truth. Pre- sumably, what is important is not the existence of a consensus per se, but rather the fact that consensus was formed in epistemically appropriate ways. If consensus is the result of veritic luck, epistemic misfortune, or non-cognitive reasons for example, the fact that a consensus exists provides little reason to think that the theory is true or likely to be true

(Gilbert 1987; Longino 1990, 2002; Miller 2013). Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 Yet another problem with the above argument is that even if one assumes that consensus is indeed necessary to justify a particular policy, the argument’s soundness seems to depend on when scientiªc consensus can be said to exist. If one assumes that the consensus needed for public policy involves unanimity (Tucker 2003), then the existence of any dissenting voices might indeed be a problem for the scientiªc consensus and an obstacle to public policy development. Under the consensus-as-unanimity view, concerns about dissenting voices would then be understandable. But the requirement of a unanimous consensus among scientists seems problematic for a variety of reasons (Ackermann 1986; Gilbert 1987; Sol- omon 2001; Longino 2002; Beatty and Moore 2010; Miller 2013). First, as many have acknowledged, unanimity can be difªcult to come by even when the epistemic agents are rational (Rosen 2001). There is signiªcant evidence that, even in the same discipline, scientists’ inferences are subject to contextual values, differences in background assumptions, the use of various inferential principles, and differences in theory assessment strategies, which may make unanimity practically impossible (Longino 1990, 2002; Solomon 2001; Moffett 2007; Dietrich and Skipper 2007; Miller 2013). Second, even if possible, requiring unanimity might not be epistemically desirable. Some have argued that the existence of a dissenting minority is likely to strengthen a consensus as there would be con- ªdence that the agreed upon position has been tested against other worthy alternatives (Mill 1978; Elster 1986; Solomon 2001; Longino 2002; Gutmann 2004; Beatty and Moore 2010). Third, the requirement of unanimity would actually give disproportionate power to dissenting views, whether or not the dissenting views are reasonable, because one or a few expressions of disagreement will be sufªcient to prevent a unanimous agreement (Beatty and Moore 2010). In other words, it would give a single dissenting voice a “veto power” with greater inºuence on the outcome than a single advocate of the consensus view. Hence, the requirement of unanimity itself creates the need for strategies that call for blocking the negative effects of dissent. It makes dissenting voices, whether those dissenting voices are justiªed or not, a more serious threat to the authority of science, and thus a signiªcantly more robust obstacle to public policy. 602 Who’s Afraid of Dissent?

But if the consensus required in premise 1 does not involve unanimity but allows for the existence of a dissenting minority, then how should we understand premise 2’s claim that dissenting voices undermine scientiªc consensus and thus present an obstacle to enactment of a particular policy? Premise 2 might plausibly be interpreted as making an epistemically nor- mative claim that there are some dissenting voices that appropriately undermine consensus and with it the justiªcation for adopting certain poli-

cies. Perhaps, for example, dissent might appropriately undermine the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 consensus view when it receives a signiªcant amount of uptake after careful consideration, or when it reºects persistent anomalies not explained by the consensus view, or when it is advocated by a diverse group of scientists who have no shared political or economic interest at stake. Indeed, it seems right to say that if such dissent existed, our conªdence in the consensus view ought to decrease. In this case, however, those who target dissent would need to have an account of how to distinguish between dissent that would appropriately undermine the scientiªc consensus and dissent that would not do so. However, even among those who have targeted dissent as an obstacle to public policy, it is difªcult to ªnd a systematic defense of what kind or under what conditions dissent is appropriately consensus-undermining or not. Indeed, a review of a variety of cases where dissenting voices have been suppressed, their motives criticized, or the dissent masked shows that these strategies can target dissenting voices that appear to have very different characteristics (Kidd and Modlin 1998; Martin 1999; Frank 2004; Kuehn 2004; Martin 2004; Beatty 2006; Waltz 2009; Oreskes and Conway 2010a). This failure might have to do with a variety of factors, such as the difªculty of determining the quality of scientiªc deliberations, the conditions under which consensus is achieved, the composition of sci- entiªc communities, or the epistemic authority given to the dissenters during deliberations, all of which are likely to inºuence determinations about whether a particular dissent is consensus-undermining or consensus-strengthening (Solomon 2001; Longino 2002; Beatty and Moore 2010; Miller 2013). More importantly, if premise 2 is interpreted as referring to dissent that appropriately undermines consensus, this has implications for how we can understand premise 3’s assertion that dissenting voices exist. In order for the argument to be valid, it will not be sufªcient to show that some dissenting voices exist. Rather, premise 3 must be understood as claiming that the dissent in question is appropriately consensus-undermining (such that it would pose a threat to policy). But if this is the case, then such dissent may well present a legitimate obstacle to the policy in question. That is, if the dissent is legitimate dissent that rationally undermines Perspectives on Science 603 consensus and the justiªcation for a particular policy, then it is not the sort of dissent that should be discouraged or dismissed. If this is correct, this argument fails to provide justiªcations to target dissent as an obstacle to public policy. Clearly, critics of dissent are concerned about dissent that would inappropriately undermine the consensus—and thus inappropriately challenge public policy. Perhaps then premise 2 is best understood as a descriptive claim about

laypersons’ perceptions, rather than referring to dissent that would appro- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 priately undermine scientiªc consensus. Policymakers or the public, insofar as they lack the expertise necessary to be able to accurately assess the quality or weight of dissenting studies in relation to existing scientiªc evidence, may not be able to distinguish appropriate and inappropriate instances of dissent. As a result, they may mistakenly believe all dissent to be consensus-undermining. If so, the public will erroneously take any dissenting voices to call into question the scientiªc consensus. Dissenting voices should be targeted then, it might be argued, because of their practi- cal implications for public policy developments: they will cause laypersons to think that there is no trustworthy scientiªc consensus, even when there is one. Believing that scientiªc consensus is missing, policy makers and the public might conclude that the rational grounds for a particular public policy are lacking and therefore that such policies should not be enacted. Strategies that target dissent, on this view, are pragmatic tactics aimed at trying to prevent such confusion and remove an illegitimate obstacle to public policy. Interpreting premise 2 in this way then, makes the targeting of dissent appear reasonable, at least when one believes that the dissent in question is likely to be perceived as consensus-undermining, even when it is not. In- deed, this interpretation seems quite plausible when one reºects on the instances of dissent that have received the most negative attention. Those who have targeted dissent as an obstacle to public policy do not take climate deniers, tobacco scientists, and creationists to provide the sort of dissent that is epistemically valuable and can appropriately undermine sci- entiªc consensus. Their fear is that the public and policy makers would incorrectly see the dissenters’ claims as legitimate challenges to the sci- entiªc consensus and thus would fail to enact or support scientiªcally- grounded public policies. This would then justify the targeting of dissenting voices that, although not really a source of concern for scientiªc knowledge, are perceived by the public and policy makers to be so. Yet, even if this interpretation of the argument justiªes the targeting of dissent as a way to eliminate an illegitimate obstacle to public policy making, it is not clear that such is the best way to address the problem. Clearly, the problem that inappropriate dissent presents to the enactment 604 Who’s Afraid of Dissent? of rational public policy is the result not only of the existence of such voices but also, and more fundamentally, of incorrect assumptions that laypersons apparently have about the nature of dissent and scientiªc consensus and their role in sound public policy making. If so, addressing the problems does not necessarily require masking or quelling dissent, even when such dissent is illegitimate from an epistemic point of view. That is, they could also be addressed by educating the public and policymakers

about what constitutes scientiªc consensus, how to distinguish between Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 dissent that is appropriately consensus-undermining and that which is not, as well as about the appropriate relationships between scientiªc knowledge and public policy. Of course, one might argue that such education is likely to be too difªcult and it would be more effective to get the public and policy makers to disregard dissent that the scientiªc community deems inappropriate. There is, however, something very paternalistic about this approach. It appears to require deliberately misleading the public about the nature of scientiªc consensus and the relationship between dissent and public policy “for their own good.” This paternalism seems unjustiªed as there is a non-paternalistic alternative for addressing the problem. More importantly, as the recent disputes on climate change, intelligent design, or GMOs reºect, it is doubtful that current efforts to get policymakers and the public to disregard dissent is any less challenging than efforts to ensure a more adequate understanding of scientiªc consensus, dissent, and their relationships to public policy. Moreover, strategies that mask or suppress dissent present problems that the education alternative does not face. Such strategies reinforce the false perception among laypersons that if there were any dissent, it would undermine scientiªc consensus and its authority to support public policy. This is what actually motivates special interests to manufacture dissent in the ªrst place. That is, they aim to exploit the false perception that (any) dissent undermines the existence of scientiªc consensus and presents an obstacle to policy. We will return to this concern in section 5, where we will argue that targeting dissent has additional dangerous consequences that make educating the public a better strategy for addressing the problem.

B. The Consensus-as-Sufªcient Argument Another option that makes sense of concerns about dissent and justiªes the targeting of dissenting voices takes scientiªc consensus to be not necessary for the development or enactment of sound public policy but sufªcient. A plausible reconstruction of the argument would be the following: Perspectives on Science 605

1. If there is a consensus on some (pertinent) scientiªc theory T, then public policy P can be justiªably enacted. 2. The existence of dissenting voices (appears to)3 undermine the scientiªc consensus around T. 3. Successfully targeting those dissenting voices will preserve the consensus around T. 4. Dissenting voices should be targeted.

5. Therefore, consensus about T will be preserved, by Modus Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 Ponens 3,4 6. Therefore, public policy P can be justiªably enacted, by Modus Ponens 1,5 This sort of reasoning might seem plausible. For example, one might argue that if there were a consensus that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are a signiªcant contributor to climate change, then a policy re- ducing greenhouse gas emissions would be justiªed. If this were true, then targeting problematic dissent would be reasonable insofar as it would help preserve the justiªcation for emission regulations and remove a signiªcant obstacle to public policy. The assumption that consensus is sufªcient for a particular policy might seem particularly reasonable when one is confronted with policy options that appear to be relatively straightforward. For example, the existence of a scientiªc consensus that tobacco causes cancer might appear sufªcient to ground the enactment of, say, smoking restrictions. Yet no matter how initially plausible, the assumption that consensus is sufªcient for the enactment of particular public policies is false. First, as in the case of the necessity argument, premise 1 here also relies on the assumption that a scientiªc theory is more likely to be true than false only when it enjoys a scientiªc consensus. But as mentioned earlier, what is important is not the existence of a consensus per se, but rather the fact that consensus is formed in epistemically appropriate ways. More importantly, premise 1 erroneously presupposes that the only relevant aspect in public policy making is simply the scientiªc evidence. But such is clearly not the case. Take, for example, the case of biotech crops. Many have argued that there is a scientiªc consensus on the safety of GMOs. They argue that the evidence clearly shows that biotech crops, such as Bt corn, pose no serious harms to the health of humans, other animals, and the environment.

3. Notice that in this argument premise 2 cannot be the sort of dissent that ought to undermine consensus, as this would make premises 3 and 4 implausible. Presumably no one can reasonably think that epistemically appropriate dissent ought to be targeted to preserve consensus per se. Thus it must be the case that the dissent in question only appears to undermine dissent, when in fact it does not. 606 Who’s Afraid of Dissent?

Policies that promote widespread use of this new agricultural biotechnology are then said to be science-based, while policies that restrict the use of these crops are thought to be unscientiªc, and therefore unjustiªable (Arntzen et al. 2003; Miller 2003; Saleh-Lakha and Glick 2005; Editorial 2007; Hodgson 2008). But narrow factual claims about the safety of GMOs are not sufªcient to justify the widespread use of such technolo- gies. Such a justiªcation would require many additional value judgments

and background assumptions, for which there may be reasonable disagree- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 ment (Lacey 2005). For example, reasonable people can disagree about what counts as a serious risk, what the relevant time frame for investigat- ing such risks is, what constitutes an acceptable level of risk, or what the standards are to judge that unmanageable risks are not present (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). Moreover, one might reject public policies that promote wide use of biotech crops, even if one agrees that they are safe for human health, because they present a threat to genetic diversity. Similarly, some have argued that transgenic seeds are not only biological entities, but also bearers of intellectual property rights and thus they can be used to exercise control over the agricultural systems in which they are used. Currently, a few companies own the vast majority of the patents for various GM plants, which means that farmers worldwide must purchase their seed stock from them. Concerns about the developing world’s increased dependence on the interests of the global-market and the effects that this might have on people’s well-being, and not just worries about health risks can thus ground rejection of public policies encouraging an extensive use of GMOs (de Melo-Martín and Meghani 2008). Thus, the justiªcation of policies depends not only on a consensus about certain facts, but also on certain values and background assumptions. The reason then that the truth of premise 1 might appear uncontrover- sial is that in many cases there exist widely shared background assumptions that are implicitly doing important work. For instance, it might seem unproblematic to argue that we should adopt smoking restrictions in light of the consensus that smoking causes cancer. But such is because most people value their health and tend to believe that an important goal of public policy is to protect public health. In this case, however, it is these additional value judgments operating as background assumptions, and not the scientiªc consensus alone, that help determine what policy ought to be adopted. If this is the case, then worries about scientiªc dissent appear again to be misguided. The problem is once more not with dissent but the incorrect assumption that scientiªc consensus is sufªcient to establish particular public policy options. The choice of public policies is a complex activity. A variety of factors can legitimately be taken into account when Perspectives on Science 607 defending particular policies. Scientiªc evidence ought to be one of those factors, but it is clearly not the only one. At times, legitimate economic, scientiªc, social, and political factors might enter into conºict when determining what policy option is best. Reasonable disagreements can exist about which factors are weightier (Jasanoff 2004; Douglas 2009; Inte- mann and de Melo-Martin 2010; Wynne 2010; Grundmann and Stehr 2012).

If we are correct, targeting dissent as an obstacle to public policy will Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 not address the real problem, that is, the need to ensure that particular public policies, thought to be grounded on the scientiªc evidence, are enacted. An effective solution will necessarily involve helping the public and policymakers better understand the nature of scientiªc consensus and dissent, and the role that scientiªc knowledge can play in directing public policy. While we recognize that this sort of education would be challenging to accomplish, it would address the real problem at stake: protecting rational policymaking.

5. Why Targeting Dissent Is Dangerous Targeting scientiªc dissent as an obstacle to public policy is not only misguided, as it focuses on the wrong aspect of the problem, but also dangerous. This is the case for several reasons. First, it can contribute to the very sorts of problems critics of dissent seek to address, that is, it can actually increase instances of dissenting voices that are merely aimed to create public doubt rather than to answer scientiªc questions. This is so because it can reinforce incorrect assumptions, discussed earlier, about the nature of consensus and dissent and their relationships to sound public policy making. As a result, it provides incentive to create doubt by those who would like to see those policies thwarted. If people believe that a good way to undermine an undesirable—economically or ideologically—policy outcome is to challenge the science that presumably grounds such policy, they will ªnd the manufacture of dissent an appealing and productive strategy. Moreover, in the minds of the public and policymakers, targeting dissent reinforces the idea that the dissent in question is appropriately consensus- undermining, when in fact it is not. Thus, as we mentioned earlier, a more promising strategy would be to educate the public and policy makers about the complex relationships between scientiªc knowledge and public policy. Second, targeting dissent can also be used to promote special interest science. Those who target dissent because they are concerned about the role of private interests in manufacturing doubt, need to keep in mind that these interests can just as easily work to suppress dissent that is appropriately consensus-undermining as they can work to create dissent that is 608 Who’s Afraid of Dissent? not so. For instance, some are concerned that in the GMO case, companies such as Monsanto are heavily funding the research that supports the now dominant view that GMOs do not pose a signiªcant threat to health. Such interests are equally capable of using their resources to manufacture consensus by suppressing or discrediting dissenting voices that could actually appropriately undermine the scientiªc consensus for instance, as they are to create doubt through epistemically inappropriate dissent. Targeting dis-

sent may thus discourage the very sorts of arguments that are necessary to Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 counter the inºuence of commercial interests. After all, the claims for which scientiªc consensus exists change over time and can come from both sides of the aisle (Kuehn 2004). A few decades ago, the claims that nicotine was not addictive or that smoking did not cause lung cancer were widely accepted by the scientiªc community. When dissenters attempted to challenge such consensus, tobacco companies seemed perfectly eager both to fund research that reinforced the presumed consensus of the time and suppressed dissenting voices by mounting serious attacks on the careers of scientists (Martin 1999). Targeting dissent as an obstacle to public policy, then, has the potential to strip away precisely these resources needed to guard against the inºuences of special interests. Third, repudiation of dissent is likely to stiºe legitimate dissenting voices, which will serve neither science nor public policy. That is, focus on dissent and its negative effects on public policy and public behavior might result in a “chilling effect” where dissent that is appropriately consensus- undermining is silenced. Scientists may be reluctant to voice dissenting views insofar as doing so may harm their reputations, limit their careers, or undermine prevailing theories or policies, which they care about deeply. For instance, Beatty shows how a panel of scientists for the U.S. National Academy of Sciences omitted their wildly different predictions about the genetic harms of radiation when presenting a risk assessment of radiation in 1956 (Beatty 2006). They did not include the range of predictions in their ªnal report precisely because they thought the differences would undermine conªdence in their recommendations. Yet this range could have been very relevant to decisions policymakers had to make about what lev- els of exposure to radiation would be acceptable. Some evidence indicates that this potential “chilling effect” can now be seen in climate science research. There are genuine disagreements about how, for example, to best model cloud formation, water vapor feedback, and aerosols in General Cir- culation Models (GCMs), all of which have signiªcant impacts on the magnitude of warming likely to occur (Weare 2000a, 2000b; IPCC 2007; Rind et al. 2009). Yet, some scientists are reluctant to make these disagreements public, for fear that they will be accused of being denialists, faulted for confusing the public and policymakers, censured for abating Perspectives on Science 609 climate change deniers, or criticized for undermining needed public policy (Ottawa Citizen 2006; Schiermeier 2010; van der Sluijs et al. 2010; Pidgeon and Fischoff 2011). Of course, targeting dissent can reinforce not just self-censorship, but also the suppression of legitimate dissenting by peer-reviewers, editors, and funding sources, using the strategies mentioned earlier. Unfortu- nately, if criticisms of dissent result in the stiºing of dissent that is appro-

priately consensus-undermining, dissenting voices that could have been Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/posc/article-pdf/22/4/593/1789955/posc_a_00151.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 crucial to helping the scientiªc community discover new truths might also be blocked out. If this happens, scientiªc progress is hindered. This is particularly relevant in the case of the biomedical sciences, where consensus in clinical practice is often difªcult to challenge.

6. Conclusion We have argued that targeting dissent as an obstacle to public policy is both misguided and dangerous. It is misguided because it fails to focus on the real problem at stake: the prevalence of false assumptions about the nature and role of scientiªc consensus and dissent, as well as the relationship between scientiªc evidence and public policy. Those assumptions, as we have seen, include beliefs that consensus is always an indicator of truth; that it must be unanimous; and that consensus is necessary and/or suf- ªcient to justifying public policies. Targeting dissent does nothing to correct these assumptions; indeed it might reinforce them. Moreover, we have argued that targeting dissent is also dangerous because it is likely to increase illegitimate instances of dissent, deprive us of resources to criticize special interest science, and stiºe legitimate scientiªc dissent that is crucial to scientiªc progress and sound public policy. Our intention has not been to defend “special interest science,” deny the value of scientiªc consensus, or dismiss the problematic consequences that dissent can cause in certain cases. On the contrary, it is precisely these concerns that lead us to our thesis. If our arguments are correct, the problem is not with dissent as such, even dissent that is not epistemically valuable, but with an incorrect understanding of the nature of consensus and dissent and their role in sound public policy making. Addressing the real problem should be our aim. Moreover, this demonstrates that science studies scholars should direct their attention towards questions such as: What are the factors that make policy decisions rational? How much agreement must exist within a scientiªc community to help justify particular policies? When does dissent appropriately undermine a scientiªc consensus? When is it appropriate for policymakers to ignore dissenting voices? We have not attempted to answer these questions here. Our claim, however, is that in the context of science relevant to public policy, 610 Who’s Afraid of Dissent? concerns about manufactured dissent would be better addressed by an ex- amination of these questions, rather than by focusing on dissent as a problematic activity.

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