The Difference Between Societal Response to the Harm

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THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOCIETAL RESPONSE TO THE HARM

OF TOBACCO VERSUS THE HARM OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF

PARTY DISCOURSE ON THE POLARIZATION OF PUBLIC OPINION

______

A Thesis Presented to

The faculty of

College of Arts and Sciences

Ohio University

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In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for Graduation

with Honors in Political Science

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Maya Schneiderman

May 2018

Table of Contents

Abstract………….…………………..……………………………………………....2

Literature Review and Argument ………....………………………………………...4

Section 1: Tobacco….…………..…………………………………………..……...12

Section 2: Climate Change……...….……………………………………….……...22

2.1: Environmental Protection: An American Value………………...23

2.1(a): Climate Science: A Changing Discourse…………………….24

2.2: Inherent Political Party Ideological Differences…………….….28

2.2 (a): Competing Economic Views………………………..29

2.2 (b): Problems Arise Between Parties……………………31

2.3: Manipulation of Public Opinion Through Denial Campaign…..33

2.3 (a): Denial Campaign……………………………....…....39

2.3 (b): Amplification of Denial by Role of Media………....43

Section 3: Discussion and Conclusion…….…….……………………………….. 46

References....………………………………………………………………………52

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOCIETAL RESPONSE TO THE HARM OF

TOBACCO VERSUS THE HARM OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF

PARTY DISCOURSE ON THE POLARIZATION OF PUBLIC OPINION

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the actors involved in effectively altering public perception of scientific evidence through a comparison of the climate change denial campaign versus the tobacco denial campaign. It finds that the denial campaign conducted by the Tobacco Industry was not successful in creating uncertainty about tobacco science among the public, however, the climate change denial campaign has been successful in influencing public perception on the accuracy of climate science. By understanding the role of public perception of the risk of personal harm, this paper identifies how particular denial campaigns are successful in polarizing of public opinion on scientific evidence.

Keywords: climate change, public opinion, climate science, tobacco industry,

polarization, denial campaign

This paper will explore the differences in societal understanding of public health issues by comparing the scientific evidence released about the correlation of lung cancer to smoking tobacco with the scientific evidence released about the correlation of burning fossil fuels to climate change. In each era, scientists formed a consensus on the evidence they found. With respect to tobacco science, public opinion consistently increased to reflect the evidence released by scientists. Looking at the dramatic impact on societal perception of the scientific evidence released about tobacco smoke, we can assume that this pattern would repeat itself in the future.

However, it does not. These cases show how partisanship carried through mistrust for scientific knowledge is able to sway public opinion. This paper will show how the infiltration of the denial campaign into the discourse of politicians impacts public opinion on climate science.

One way that partisanship carried through mistrust for scientific knowledge was through the strategic implementation of the climate change denial campaign by the Republican Party. This paper finds that in order for the Republican party to sustain their support in their position on climate policies, they had to enact skepticism about the accuracy of climate science and its scientific consensus. Recycling tactics of the

Tobacco Industry in denying tobacco science, members of the Republican Party

(starting with the conservative branch) enacted a similar denial campaign, in which the science of a warming planet was regarded as inaccurate or uncertain. Polarization of

public opinion is more durable when it correlates with beliefs in the absence or presence of personal harm to individuals.

Literature Review And Argument

Existing literature attempts to understand how partisanship can lead to societal polarization. Much of the literature acknowledges that there are inherent differences in party values that would suggest competing discourses on climate policy, which would explain partisanship. For example, it makes sense that Republicans tend to vote against environmental regulations due to their value of a small presence of government involvement. Additionally, Democrats have historically been known to work more with government to protect our environment for the good of the community. Yet, data shows that both Republicans and Democrats care about the quality of our environment when it concerns public health (Pew Research, 2017). However, when it comes to climate change, surveys find a large gap between answers one gives based on their affiliated political party. Pew Research (2017) finds that the majority of Republicans stated that they were in favor of stricter environmental laws, even if there were economic costs to those regulations, until 2010. By 2009 the majority of respondents that disagreed with the scientific evidence of anthropogenic climate change, identified themselves as members of the Republican Party, whereas the majority of respondents that attribute climate change to human activity and express

trust in scientific evidence identified more with the Democratic Party. This noticeable division of party affiliation in public opinion on climate change has lead many academics to examine the role of partisanship in forming opinion.

Journalists, such as Lauren Griffin (2016), point to the theory of cultural cognition of being a practical explanation of the polarization in public opinion about climate change. The theory of cultural cognition suggests that individuals form beliefs about controversial facts, such as climate change, in ways that reflect the values held by their cultural identities (Cultural Cognition Theory). Maeseele and Pepermans

(2017) also agree with the research on the cultural cognition theory. They find that research has consistently shown that individuals will form opinions of climate change for the purpose of connecting them to others who share their ideological standpoints.

This correlates with the Bullock et al’s (2015) findings that survey participants will actively provide an answer that aligns with their political affiliation solely because they believe it is part of their party’s ideology to answer a specific way. In other words, just as the cultural cognition theory suggests, participants do not want to give opinions that might separate them from their community; and this conditioned by outside sources.

The belief of climate science skepticism is a strong component to the movements of the Republican Party, and people do not like to question commonly shared beliefs within their group. Further, the actions of political elites can stimulate an even larger stigma for disagreement with your community’s values. For example,

as Griffin (2016) acknowledges in her article, a former Conservative congressman,

Bob Inglis, lost his seat in the primary almost immediately after speaking out on climate change. Other climate communication academics point to situations in which troubles of inner party disagreement has erupted. Guber (2017) refers to Mitt

Romney’s contention of announcing his belief in “the basic scientific principles of climate change,” receiving negative responses from his party, regarding that belief as

“tantamount to political suicide” (Guber, 2017, 10). Events like this create a narrative of the potential consequences if you take a stance on a political issue that differs from what your “community” believes.

In fact, there is literature that acknowledges partisanship as a strategy that is used by parties in order to strengthen political affiliation. Captstick et al (2014) and

Collomb (2014) argue that the stark polarization of opinion regarding climate change is a result from the attempt of the Republican Party to differentiate themselves from the Democratic Party. Specifically, once Republicans lost power to the Democrats in

Congress in 2006, and then again with the Presidency in 2008, there was a sense of urgency by Republicans to harden their ideological differences. Following the election of President Obama in 2007, “climate change came to constitute a ‘litmus test’ with

Conservative Republicans aligning with climate skeptic positions as a means of differentiating themselves from Democrats” (Capstick et al, 2014, 46). The Tea Party movement (beginning in 2009) is the most prominent example of the Conservative

Republicans using skepticism of climate science to differentiate themselves from

Democrats. Collomb (2014) writes about the ideology of climate change denial in the

United States, pointing to possible suggestions as to what motivated the Tea Party to engage in this type of discourse. He writes “from the small-government perspective, therefore, discrediting calls for strong national and international climate action has become a matter of ideological survival” (Collomb, 2014, 2).

With regard to how this impacted the views of constituents, we start to see stark divisions of opinion on climate change based on partisanship shortly after the birth of the Tea Party movement in 2009. For example, Pew Research (2017) found a significant drop in the percentage of Republican respondents who agree that there is evidence that the average temperature on Earth is increasing from 59% in 2006 down to 34% in 2009.

As the data shows strong polarization in climate change opinion, there is evidence to suggest that the cultural cognition theory applies to the opinions of the public regarding global warming. While I agree with these findings and understand cultural cognition as having a prominent role in constituents forming opinions, I believe that it is more than just party affiliation that creates a division in accepting climate change. I suggest that in order for cultural cognition to lead to polarization of public opinion, partisanship needs mistrust of scientific evidence.

Utilizing the strategy of mistrust for scientific evidence, the Tea Party began to dominate conversation with a core part of their platform being the denial of global warming. This strategy utilizes questioning the validity of climate science as well as

scientific consensus of the science as a way to confuse public opinion and harden ideological support. Van der Linden et al (2015) use the Gateway Belief Model to explore the correlation between the existence of scientific consensus and public understanding of an important issue, in the case of climate change. They find that formation of public opinion on the issue of climate change is determined by an individual's perception of scientific consensus. They state in their article that, “mis-perconceptions about the scientific consensus can be highly consequential, as even a small amount of perceived scientific dissent can undermine public support”

(van der Linden et al, 2015, p.8).

I agree with van der Linden et al’s findings on the correlation of perceived scientific consensus with public support and my research goes a step further by elaborating on how this tactic of questioning scientific knowledge can lead to polarization. I find that questioning scientific knowledge leads to confusion of whether the issue at hand (tobacco smoke or climate change) can be harmful to people on a personal level. This, in return, allows the issue at hand to be used by parties strategically, which can ultimately lead to polarization.

Using a discourse that discredits the evidence presented and agreed upon by a majority of scientists, undermines the scientific community. This in turn causes followers of this discourse to lack trust in all of the climate science, making them less likely to believe that climate change is truly occurring. Undermining a valuable institution of a democratic society, in this case trust in scientific knowledge, has the

effect of confusing public opinion on the actual harms associated with the risk at hand.

Generally, when the potential risks of an issue are not viewed as personally harmful, it can cause people to act in an indifferent way of responding to that issue. We find this behavior with regards to climate change, where trust in scientific knowledge adds to the perception of harm. When people are confused or unsure about the personal harms associated with a specific issue, they are less likely to be politically active on the issue, or try to get more informed.

When there is expressed trust in scientific knowledge, it is easier for society to personalize the harm associated with evidence. I define personalization of harm as being a component to validating scientific knowledge. This correlates with van der Linden et al’s (2015) experiment which finds that increasing knowledge of scientific consensus increases people’s personal worry for the problem of climate change. In other words, informing constituents that they can trust that the science is accurate allows them to personalize the risks associated with the issue. What does the personalization of harm do? Personalizing harm influences how society might get interested or galvanized in the issue that is being debated. For example: I have found that when harm from tobacco was personalized, more people were eager to support regulations for combatting tobacco. Contrary to that, I have found that the lack of personalizing harm from climate change has caused less concern among Americans.

Moreover, I find an important link between support of scientific knowledge by politicians and the narrative of personal harm, or lack of it.

What I have found is that when there is a consensus among political elites regarding scientific knowledge, society is more likely to see the harm as being personal rather than diffused. When there is an expressed trust in the scientific knowledge by leading political elites, members of society carry that trust too. This trust translates into accepting that the potential harms communicated by the scientific institutions are real and thus a personal concern. In other words, when there is lack of consensus regarding scientific knowledge, the society is less likely to make an association of the issue at hand and the risks, in this case tobacco and climate change, and thus less likely to be interested in confronting the issue. Moreover, I argue that when belief or disbelief on the scientific consensus of anthropogenic climate change is led by one political party, but not the other, polarization is even more stark.

I would like to add to the literature on polarization and partisanship by arguing that partisanship is far more successful in polarizing and confusing public opinion when it creates a narrative that undermines trust in the scientific community, a major pillar of American democracy.

I find that there is success in confusing public opinion when the competing political discourses, emanating from the two parties, argue over the validity of scientific knowledge about climate science. When one of the two leading political discourses of either party questions the validity of scientific knowledge, it influences how all of society perceives the science of climate change. I argue this is because it creates the possibility that anthropogenic climate change is not real, therefore creating

a possible reality in which the dangers are not going to occur. As a result of the two major political parties arguing over their trust in scientific knowledge, society is unable to form an accurate perception of the risks involved.

Ultimately, these competing views of scientific validity have become embedded into the ideology of each party–Democrats believing climate scientists warnings, and Republicans disagreeing with the evidence. My research finds that the

Republican Party used the strategic method of undermining scientific consensus of climate change to confuse overall public opinion. This resulted in polarizing public opinion on the concept. I argue that Republicans strategically used an argument of lack of scientific consensus as a way to confuse public opinion. The lack of trust in climate science promoted by the Republican party has produced a higher number of

Republican followers to align themselves with the belief that there is no solid evidence of climate change.

My research finds that Republicans used the strategy of undermining scientific consensus on climate change as a way to confuse public opinion and to create such competing views that constituents would feel as if this is apart of their ideology. As a result, individuals who identify with the Democratic Party answer questions about climate change in a way that reflects the leading political discourse, and those who identify with the Republican Party answer in a way that reflects their platform.

On the contrary, Democratic and Republican views did not lead to societal polarization during the Tobacco Era, because neither of the two party discourses

invalidated scientific knowledge. When there is no denial by political elites regarding scientific knowledge, then we do not have polarization of public opinion. I find that the opposite happened with climate change. Here we have a case where the two parties disagreed regarding the validity of scientific knowledge. So, when there is denial of the validity of scientific knowledge by only one of the two parties then we see societal polarization. This paper emphasizes that it is not partisanship that leads to societal polarization. Rather, it is partisanship regarding the validity of scientific knowledge that leads to the polarization of public opinion.

An important example of the absence of partisanship due to trust in scientific evidence is how the United States treated the risks of tobacco use. Even if there was difference of opinion in parties with regards to the regulation of the Tobacco Industry, we find that because neither party questioned scientific evidence, we had no societal polarization regarding the harm caused by tobacco. Next, I illustrate America’s relation with the Tobacco Industry with a summary of what has transpired.

Section 1: Tobacco

In today's day and age it is commonly accepted knowledge that smoking tobacco causes lung cancer and creates secondhand smoke that is harmful to others.

Due to the extensive amount of scientific research, the United States public overwhelmingly understands the risks associated with tobacco. We are fully aware

that nicotine is extremely addictive and there are carcinogens found in cigarettes.

However, these facts were not always understood by members of society. I will now present the history of how the science of tobacco evolved and how the responses by government influenced this public perception that smoking tobacco is harmful for health.

In the late 19th century and the early 20th century, smoking cigarettes was advertised as luxurious. During this time, smoking was extremely common and there was no public thought that it could be causing any medical problems. The number of lung tumor cases was significantly low, and if someone was experiencing medical issues regarding their lungs, it was typically misdiagnosed as tuberculosis. The idea of lung tumors was not brought into attention until the dramatic increase of finding large masses on the lungs through autopsies in the beginning of the 20th century. It was not until 1912 that a scientist proposed that abusing tobacco or alcohol products might be related to the formation of lung tumors, but there was not enough evidence to come to this conclusion. By the 1920s, doctors had more and more patients with lung tumors, but they were unsure of what might be to blame for this disease.

Theories for the cause of these lung tumors were extensive and did not solely relate the disease to smoking. Although smoking was thought to be aiding to the problem, air pollution from the growing industries was also proposed as a reason. The idea proposed in 1912 was first investigated in the late 1930s by scientists examining cases of lung tumors to compare potential causes of the disease. As more scientists and

doctors heard of this proposed idea, studies were conducted in order to understand the cause. By 1950, at least 5 studies were published that contributed to the suspicion of the correlation between smoking cigarettes and the growth of lung tumors. In 1954 two separate studies both concluded that there was in fact an undeniable link between smoking tobacco and getting a tumor on your lung.

By 1957, the US Public Health Service issued a statement that showed evidence of smoking cigarettes leading to lung cancer. During his term, President

Kennedy requested that the Surgeon General conduct a report on the health impacts of smoking tobacco. In 1964, the Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking was released to inform the public of this correlation. It concluded that smoking was a danger to the health of those that participated and is correlated to the formation of lung tumors.

It only took 10 years for the United States government to address this public health issue and relay the information to its citizens. This is important because it provided little time for competing discourses within government to form. During the time in between, the Tobacco Industry took extensive measures to deny these findings and to reassure their customers that smoking did not cause harm.

Before the 1950s, the public's’ perception on smoking tobacco included little thought to health concerns. However, this social view was challenged starting with the influence of the reports that linked smoking and cancer published in the early 1950s.

Gallup polls found that the awareness of the health concerns associated with smoking tobacco was relatively high in 1957, with 77% of the American population indicating

that they had heard of the American Cancer Society Report that found a link between smoking tobacco and lung cancer (Duch et al, 2018, 4). George Gallup commented at the time, that this rate of attention to a medical issue was almost non-existent in the past (Duch et al, 2018, 4). This comment implies that scientific findings do not typically enter public conversation at a high rate. I find this information important because it shows the importance of government involvement in communicating the scientific evidence to the public. This was the beginning of the government taking measures to act as a liaison between the scientific institution and the public sphere.

Subsequent to this report, tobacco science was impeding public discussion around the world. Not only was this evidence a prominent topic in the public arena, it was scientific evidence that was being understood by members of society. In 1954, when asked if smoking tobacco was a cause of lung cancer, about 40% of Americans answered yes and this percentage rises to about 50% during the years if 1957 to 1960.

Following the release of The Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking in 1964, the social view on smoking had been forever altered. 67% of the American public believed that smoking was a cause of lung cancer at the end of the 1960s and in 1977, the polls found that 81% of the population agreed with the statement. By 1985 over

90% of Americans responded that smoking tobacco definitely or probably increased the chances of getting lung cancer (Duch, 2018).

Following that first release of the Surgeon General’s Report, scientific evidence continued to grow and become more concrete in their findings. As more

evidence was released about the harms associated with tobacco smoke, the more the public agreed with scientists and supported policy to regulate smoking in public.

However, as we can see by comparing the two public health issues of tobacco smoke and climate change, scientific evidence alone did not shape public opinion.

In order to understand why society responded the way they did to the scientific evidence about that harms of smoking tobacco, it is important to examine the actors involved in conveying these messages to the public. The actors who played a prominent role in framing the issue of tobacco include the Tobacco Industry, the media, public health officials, and, ultimately, the government. With only minimal research circulating during the 1950s and 60s, no one was completely certain as to what the source of this disease was, and the Tobacco Industry utilized this lack of scientific consensus to their advantage. Using intense and increased public relation methods, the Tobacco Industry fought to keep their customers by stressing the notion that the science of tobacco was uncertain. The Tobacco Industry created a discourse that denied a correlation of cigarette smoking to the development of lung cancer.

However, as we see in the survey data provided above, this did not seem to strongly sway the opinion of the public. An important actor in preventing the claims from the

Tobacco Industry from disrupting public perception was the media.

According the Dorfman et al’s (2014) research on the media coverage on the problems of tobacco, we can see that following each pivotal development in tobacco science, the media coverage increases dramatically. Not only did the news focus on

the topic of tobacco science, they conducted it in a way that resonated with viewers.

Dorfman et al find that following the reports released in 1954 and 1964, “typical stories covered the dangers of smoking and findings from the Surgeon General’s

Report, policies to address the harms of smoking, smoking trends in a particular region.” (Dorfman et al, 2014: 39). By clearly stating the evidence that was found by scientists, the media acted accordingly in its role in society to help society understand problems. The Surgeon General’s report of 1964 gained extreme publicity and was later ranked one of the top news stories of the year. A majority of these reports focused on framing cigarettes as the cause of health risks associated with smoking tobacco. The prominent actor of society, the media, successfully conveyed the scientific evidence of the harms of tobacco to the public.

However, they were not the only actor to make a comment on this shocking scientific evidence. “Government representatives and scientists, from the Surgeon

General’s office to local officials, doctors, researchers, and some elected officials, were the most frequent speakers in news stories voicing the position that cigarettes were harmful products” (Dorfman et al, 2014: 40). The following year of the Surgeon General’s Report, the “Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965” was put into law and mandated that the information from the Surgeon General’s report be put on cigarette packages. However, these labels were considered to contain weak language compared to the warning labels required by the “Public Health Cigarette

Smoking Act” that was placed into law by President Nixon in 1970. Instead of a

simple cautionary label, the updated law required that the labels portray the message that the Surgeon General had determined that smoking is dangerous to your health.

Additionally, this law sought to fight the strong public relations of the Tobacco

Industry by prohibiting the advertisement of tobacco products on TV and the radio. By

1977–seven years after the strongly worded warning labels were required to be placed on tobacco products, a strong majority of Americans (around 80%) agreed with the statement that smoking is harmful to one's health (Newport et al, 1999).

It is important to note that the weak warning labels required by the “Federal

Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965” were considered a victory for the

Tobacco Industry lobbyists. Had it not been for the lobbyist, this act could have imposed the much stricter regulations immediately instead of waiting four years for the improvements to be mandated through the “Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act” of 1970. However, Gallup Poll finds that this did not impact public perception of the harms of smoking (Newport et al, 1999). In fact, by 1969, 70% of Americans understood that cigarette smoking is one of the causes of lung cancer. When there is dominant discourse among the political elite that puts trust into scientific knowledge, the public is able to comprehend the facts of the science better.

While there may have been disagreement between the political parties about the regulations to be put in place, neither political party outright denied that the scientific evidence of the correlation between tobacco use and health consequences.

Even though the pro-tobacco movement had successfully lobbied Democratic

members of Congress to reduce the severity of regulations on the Tobacco Industry, the act did not fail to stimulate a discourse that put trust into the scientific institution of American Democracy (Drew, 1965). Passing the “Federal Cigarette Labeling and

Advertising Act,” emphasized the importance among the political elite to address this public health issue by regulating tobacco products.

The overall consensus in government that the scientific evidence of smoking tobacco was correct, allowed these regulations to be passed. By implementing these laws, the political elites created the discourse that they agreed with the scientific consensus on the health consequences to using tobacco products. Specifically, the inclusion of the exact warning provided by the Surgeon General on each label creates the assumption that the federal government trusts that their report was correct; as a result the public understood that the consequences communicated were personally harmful.

The “Comprehensive Smoking Education Act” of 1984 required a total of 4 warnings that explicitly stated that smoking causes cancer. As stated in Section 1 of the Act, this act was mandated in order to "provide a new strategy for making Americans more aware of any adverse health effects of smoking, to assure the timely and widespread dissemination of research findings and to enable individuals to make informed decisions about smoking". By 1988, smoking tobacco was prohibited on all flights under 2 hours. This created more public awareness of the secondhand effects of

tobacco smoke, and support for tobacco regulation in public spaces continued to grow each year.

Looking at the dramatic impact on societal perception of the scientific evidence released about tobacco smoke, we can assume that this pattern would repeat itself in the future. However, the case of tobacco shows a different societal response to scientific evidence than the responses found during the climate science era. Public consensus on the harms associated with tobacco correlated with the consensus found in scientific institutions due to the concurrence in government that the science was legitimate.

Republican and Democratic consensus on the validity of the science behind tobacco enabled them to act as a liaison between the scientific institutions and the public sphere. Through the extensive effort to educate the public on tobacco science, produce anti-smoking advertisements, and pass laws to regulate smoking in public areas (such as on domestic flights), the government took measures that allowed individuals to personalize the risks associated with the act. As a result, we see consistent growth in public agreement that cigarette smoking is one of the causes of lung cancer (Newport et al, 1999).

During the Tobacco Era, we can see the leading discourses put trust into tobacco science: the government took extensive measures to communicate to the public the health risks associated with smoking tobacco–issuing pamphlets, making public statements, creating warning advertisements. Even if there were not any laws

being put into place, the public grew to understand the scientific evidence of tobacco use. In this case, each party was framing the scientific evidence as trustworthy and factual. There was not any varying understanding of the association of lung cancer to tobacco smoke by the two parties. By the parties creating a discourse of framing tobacco as harmful, they were validating the scientific pillar of American Democracy, without outright saying they believed or denied the evidence. The mere acceptance that the scientific institutions created accurate portrayal of the risks by not making public statements to criticize scientific evidence, the public conceptualized the issue as accurate and important–placing their trust into that institution. As a result, were able to understand the consequences associated with the act as being personally harmful.

The traditional media reporting styles of the scientific evidence infiltrated

American’s comprehension of the public health risks associated with tobacco in a positive way. Upon comparing the history of climate science, however, it is probable that this has to do with the overall consensus found in government. The high involvement of governmental actors in passing laws and relaying information to the public sector also positively impacted public opinion on smoking tobacco. The government’s extreme involvement in tobacco research, regulation, and public awareness announcements, contributed personalizing the issue of tobacco. In doing so, they verified that the scientific evidence was factual, therefore the risks were real as well. Additionally, specific laws such as the smoking on planes, followed the science that it is harmful even if you were not smoking.

On the contrary, the exact opposite phenomena developed regarding climate change science. What I find is that once the Republicans voiced strong mistrust in the scientific evidence that supported climate change, then we see stark polarization of public opinion over whether global warming is harmful to individuals. As a result, what should have been debates about policies to be enacted in order to deal with climate change, became politicized debates that separated the two political parties.

Section 2: Climate Change

In this section, I am going to show the history of climate science, how it became polarized in government, and the impact it has had on societal opinion.

Public opinion polls show major shifts in overall societal perception of climate change in the matter of three decades. Reflecting on numerous survey-based studies throughout these decades, Capstick et al (2014) identify the drastic shifts in public opinion as occurring in specific time periods. During the 1980s and the early 1990s, they find that there was an increase in knowledge and awareness of the rise of global temperature. The mid-1990s to the mid-2000s show growing public concern about climate change, however there was also variability in opinion. By the mid-to late-2000s, there was a significant decrease in public concern and an increase of skepticism with the polarization of viewpoints. Whereas we see public support for tobacco regulation growing as more evidence was released regarding the harm of

tobacco, the overall acceptance of the concept of climate change and climate change action fluctuated greatly.

2.1: Environmental Protection: An American Value

Before the 1990s, the concept of environmental protection was not considered an ideological issue (Dunlap & McCright 2008). Both Republican and Democratic presidents embraced the importance of our environment through the protection of air, land, and water quality. The concept of environmental protection became an accepted value among Americans starting with the Republican President Theodore Roosevelt in the early 1900s. Due to his creation of the United States Forest System, which granted national titles to forests, parks, and bird reserves to areas, lands across America received protection and were open to the public to view.

The first major Clean Air Act was passed in 1963 by Democrat President

Lyndon Johnson. Republican President Nixon implemented the National

Environmental Policy Act in 1970, mandating federal agencies to conduct environmental impact statements and sparked the founding of the Environmental

Protection Agency. Additionally, the Clean Air Act of 1970, signed by President

Nixon, granted the authority of government to regulate the emissions of industries and transportation vehicles–signifying the basis of the United States air pollution policy standards and requiring states to implement these standards. During Democrat Jimmy

Carter’s Presidency, the scientific evidence on the problems associated with CO2 emissions and the atmosphere was embraced when he faced Congress to address the violation of expanding industries to the clean air of the country. In his term he added many amendments to previous environmental acts that contained stricter standards for the protection of our air, land, and animals. It is clear that both Republican and

Democratic Presidents cared about our environment and acted in ways that produced significant standards to protect it. What changes when the protection of our environment involves climate change? This history brings us to the following section.

2.1 (a): Climate science: a changing discourse.

In 1965 President Lyndon Johnson’s scientific advisory committee released a report that warned of the possibility of CO2 emissions trapping heat in the atmosphere. At this point, the idea of global warming was introduced to the public, however it was considered a potentially distant fear. Acknowledging that there was a lack of understanding of climate science by the United States government, President

Jimmy Carter, with support of Congress, signed the National Climate Program Act in

1978–the first U.S. statute that directly addressed scientific research on climate change. This legislation created the National Climate Program Office in the

Department of Commerce with the intention to improve climate change research in government through assessing global temperatures.

By the 1980s, evidence was being more solidified that global temperatures were indeed warming, causing media outlets to bring scientists’ concerns about climate change into mainstream conversation. The concerns held by the climate scientists revolved around the idea that even a small change in average global temperature could cause serious health effects, and these changes were occurring much more rapidly than previously suggested in 1965 (American Institute of Physics,

2018). Capstick et al (2015) find that there was a rapid increase in public awareness about climate change during the second half of the 1980s.

In 1983 the EPA released a report that addressed the greenhouse effect with more urgency than previous reports. This report called on the federal government to explore new forms of energy in order to decrease the reliance on fossil fuels. At this time, however, President Reagan was introducing more conservative outlook on how to run the economy and this included a decrease in regulations. Because this report suggested an increase in environmental regulations and strong presence of government in the free-market, the EPA report came in conflict with the Administration’s conservative economic views (American Institute of Physics, 2018). However, President Reagan did not fail to place environmental issues on his governmental agenda. Following the strong recommendations by his advisors to put the United States in a leading position for climate action, President Reagan urged members of Congress to sign the international environmental treaty, The 1987

Montreal Protocol. In doing so, this administration created the discourse that fighting

global ozone depletion was necessary, and we can see somewhat of an impact on the public's understanding of climate change during this time. In 1984, when the administration was decreasing environmental regulations, only 34% of survey participants viewed climate change as posing a problem for their kids and grandkids; whereas one year after President Reagan's approval of the Montreal Protocol this percentage rises to 65% (Capstick et al, 2014). While the Reagan Administration favored decreased regulations on businesses, signing the Montreal Protocol created the narrative that climate change was worth any economic costs.

Additionally during this time there was a strong spotlight on climate change science. In 1988, NASA scientist and climate expert, James Hansen, testified to the

U.S. Senate of the evidence he had found doing years of research on climate change.

In this 20-minute testimony, Hansen emphasized that this was an urgent issue to address and presented a strong argument of the cause of the rapid warming: human activity. He stated there was no doubt a relation of burning fossil fuels and the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere to the increasing temperature around the globe. As the New York Times article comments following this testimony,

“Until now, scientists have been cautious about attributing rising global temperatures of recent years to the predicted global warming caused by pollutants in the atmosphere, known as the ‘greenhouse effect’” (New York Times, 1988). This article did a successful job on relaying his televised testimony to the public by describing the risks associated with continuing to burn fossil fuels.

In 1982, only 43% of U.S. respondents saw the issue of climate change as very or somewhat concerning; yet by 1989 this rose to 75% (Capstick et al, 2014). By signing the Montreal Protocol in 1987, President Reagan identified global warming as real, translating to the public that there are apparent risks. Additionally, the high media attention to the James Hansen's testimony generated awareness among the American public of the science behind the issue. President George H.W. Bush followed in Reagan’s footsteps of placing climate change action on his agenda by signing international treaty, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC) in 1992. This treaty required parties to meet on a regular basis to negotiate international plans to address climate change.

It is clear that at this point in time, environmental protection was a value held close by both political parties. This begins to change when the debates start to include questions of the relationship of economic growth and environmental protection.

Starting with President Reagan, his views on environmental protection differed from past presidents, calling for decreased regulations. Yet, we do not see an impact on the overall importance of environmental protection to Americans, because there was still the assumption that these Republican Presidents trusted scientific evidence upon their signing of the Montreal Protocol in 1987 and the UNFCCC in 1992.

Following the signing of the UNFCCC, a strong reliance was put on developed nations to lead the global fight in climate action. By 1996, the scientific evidence of human-induced climate change was becoming more concrete as evidence with the

publication of the IPCC’s Second Assessment Report. It was clear that the negotiations were going to rely on heavy reductions of greenhouse gas emission from the world’s largest contributing nations, such as the United States. This would require drastic changes to infrastructure, finance, and regulation laws in industrialized nations.

I have found that partisan divides within the American government begin to form when the costs of environmental protection became more economically stringent.

Starting with the international negotiation, the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, we see a distinct divide in Congressional support based on party affiliation. The competing political views regarding the Kyoto Protocol were based on economic uncertainties.

However, we do not necessarily see a reflection of this polarization onto the American public. These partisan differences are slow to influence the opinions of American society, because at first, the competing views only regarded the economic consequences of policies.

2.2: Inherent Political Party Ideological Differences

If we examine the core values of each party we can form views as to why a party may be for or against environmental policy. For example, Republicans are known to hold the values of private goods and decreased government involvement which could lead to the negative reaction of regulating private industry’s air pollution.

Democrats, for example, typically share the view of promoting social goods and

welfare, leading to a positive reaction of taking measures to ensure our planet is healthy. While this may be true, it does not distract from the fact that a majority of

Americans value public health–something that is connected by the health of our environment. Pew Research shows that in 1994 the majority of each party (58% of

Republicans and 66% of Democrats) shared the belief that stricter environmental laws and regulations were worth the cost (Pew Research, 2017). These responses show an overall acceptance of environmental regulations in order to promote public health, regardless of the values one’s party holds.

However, when it comes to global warming the statistics change and become increasingly polarized, with the decreasing percentage of Republicans supporting climate change action. If the concept of a changing global climate falls into the category of environmental and public health, then why is the issue of climate change become a value that is divided by party?

Partisanship does not always have an effect on polarizing society on concepts such as science, it is usually successful in areas of social policy. Yet the competing debates regarding climate change have not been centered around the potential policy needed to combat climate change, they have been centered around questioning the accuracy or legitimacy of the science. I argue that partisanship was successful in polarizing public opinion on climate change once it adopted the discourse of invalidating scientific knowledge.

2.2 (a): Competing economic views.

When Democrat President Bill Clinton came into office in 1993, fighting climate change was on his agenda. However, Clinton recognized that the increasing gridlock in Congress would prevent any measure he took to address global warming from passing under economic uncertainties. Therefore, President Clinton put this effort aside until his second term when he could mobilize public support for the international negotiations set to come during the UNFCCC in Kyoto, Japan in 1997.

The purpose of this meeting was to create an international treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, that that aimed to drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions as a way to slow down earth’s increasing temperature.

The President expressed strong approval for the Kyoto Protocol and wanted to stimulate public agreement to signing an international agreement to fight anthropogenic climate change; so he attempted to mobilize public support for the

Kyoto Protocol by educating the public of its severity. Beginning with a speech in

October of 1997 at the National Geographic Society, President Clinton informed

Americans about the seriousness of global warming (Royden, 2002). In the speeches that follow, such as his State of the Union Addresses in 1999 and 2000, President

Clinton acknowledged the overwhelming scientific consensus of human-induced global warming, and frequently described climate change as an enormous threat

(Royden, 2002). It is clear that throughout the discussion of the Kyoto Protocol under

Democratic President, Bill Clinton (1997-2000), the percentage of Americans who were personally concerned about global warming increases significantly: from 50% in

1998 to 59% in 1999 and up to 72% in 2001 (Saad, 2013). During this period, climate change was talked about in a particular way–something that is real and needs to be addressed through international policy.

By validating that the scientific institution was conducting exceptional data,

President Clinton created a discourse that showed the reality of the threats posed by climate change. The public showed increasing concern about global warming during the years of this leading discourse. In three years, the amount of Americans who worried a great deal about global warming increased from 50% in 1998 to 59% in

1999 and finally reached the high level of 72% in 2000, the year before Republican

President George W. Bush took office. I argue that validating the institution of science causes society to perceive risks as a personal threat to themselves, therefore support action. Support for the United States participation in the Kyoto Protocol was relatively high among society but it varied deeply among political elites (Capstick et al, 2014;

Royden, 2002).

2.2 (b): Problems arise between parties.

While the Kyoto Protocol generated support among the public, there was a lack of support by major industries and Republican members in government. There was

backlash from the Republicans in Congress to the Kyoto Protocol due to the lack of economic commitment for developing nations–developed nations were required to commit to much higher standards than developing nations. Royden’s (2002) paper shows that there was intense lobbying by the energy industry to influence Congress to oppose the Kyoto Protocol; prompting the Byrd-Hagel Resolution of 1997 (lead by

Republicans), which declared the President was not able to sign any emission reduction agreement that did not include developing countries. President Clinton worked hard to create a treaty that met the demands of the Republican Party while successfully promoting action that made environmental sense.

Yet the Republicans pushed to repeal the Kyoto Protocol by offering a new act with voluntary measures that met their economic standards–the Energy and Climate

Policy Act of 1999. While this act would not achieve the standards necessary to drastically reduce the United State’s greenhouse gas emissions in a fast manner,

Royden recognizes the aspect of success with this act by saying that, “Rather than reject the concept of global warming outright, by introducing the Act the Senators acknowledged the need to deal with the issue.”

Because this was a matter of climate policy and not the legitimacy of the science, we do not see a negative impact on the public’s perception of personal harm.

When the leading narrative is around validating that the scientific evidence is factual, it suggests that the risks associated with the issue are serious. In other words, because the Republicans introduced a bill that acknowledges climate change, they created a

discourse that accepted the science behind the issue, allowing the public to keep their trust in the scientific evidence. This is evident with the outstanding percentage of 72% of Americans sharing a personal worry about climate change during this time. As I mentioned earlier, I define personalization of harm as being a component to validating scientific knowledge.

However, right after President George W. Bush took office in 2001, personal worry about global warming plummeted down to 63%, and consistently decreased throughout his terms reaching a low of 51% in 2004 (Saad, 2013). I argue that this is due to the invalidation of the scientific evidence for climate change caused members of society to disassociate the risks projected as being reality.

2.3: Manipulation Of Public Opinion Through Denial Campaign

It is important to note the inherent differences in understanding environmental issues compared to the issues presented regarding tobacco. Remarking on the belief formation process of individuals, Millner and Ollivier (2016) argue that because only few of us have first-hand sensory experience to the consequences of global warming, this becomes an issue that “requires us to think abstractly and to project the consequences of current behaviors into the distant future in order to appreciate their magnitude” (Millner and Ollivier, 2016).

However, data suggests that it is not the complexity of the science behind climate change that influences public opinion. In 1994, Bostrom et al conducted a survey to understand how people conceptualized global warming. Their results find that respondents’ explanations about the physical mechanisms of global climate change contained inconsistencies and fundamental misconceptions on aspects of the problem as well as subtle misconceptions about the importance of the causes of global warming (Bostrom et al, 1994). Yet the data shows that 53% of respondents agreed that global climate change exists, and when asked about the severity of the issue, 75% said that the greenhouse gas effect is bad in general and 51% answered that it was bad for them personally. While people experienced difficulty explaining the underlying causes of global warming in a correct matter, the surveys results show that respondents overall held beliefs about climate change that were consistent with the leading scientific evidence; in fact, 78% of respondents felt that scientists agreed that there will be an overall global climate change. 57% answered that it is very likely that human activity was a cause and 24% were certain it is the cause of increasing global temperature.

The data aboves shows that while there may have been some errors in respondents’ explanations of climate change, they did not fail to give answers that support scientific evidence. It is evident that people find it hard to develop an in depth understanding of climate change, however the data above suggest that this is not the reason for competing opinions on climate change. Additionally, we see that a large

majority, 78%, believed that there was strong agreement of climate change in the scientific community. This suggests that one way people come to understand the harms of climate change is through perceived scientific consensus.

There is academic work to support this assumption. As van der Linden et al prove, creating awareness of scientific consensus dramatically influences one's’ belief of climate change as well as personal concern. (van der Linden et al, 2015).

Additionally, if one believes that there is no scientific consensus on the accuracy of climate change, then they are less likely to view climate change as a threat. So, the decrease in scientific consensus can prove successful in swaying public opinion.

During the time that this survey was gathered in the mid 1990s, there were not leading discourses that suggested the science was not correct, and this is reflected in public opinion. However, by the 2000s we start to see drastic changes in societal perception of climate change and climate science.

A Gallup Poll surveyed Americans asking what they believed to be the cause of climate change from 2003-2008 (Saad, 2013). They divided the answers based on the respondents’ political affiliation, showing the percentages of both Democrats and

Republicans that believe changes in the Earth’s climate is due more to human activity than to natural changes in the environment. This survey shows that from 2003-2008 the percentage of Democrats that agreed with this statement increased from 68% to

73%, while the percentage of Republicans that agree with this statement gradually decreased from 52% to 42% (Saad, 2013).

Van der Linden et al (2015) acknowledge the strong impact of perceived expert consensus on public support of climate policy, with which I agree. At this point in time, however, institutions from the United Nations (for example the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or the IPCC) had released a number of findings that confirmed the source of climate change as being the result of human-produced greenhouse gas emissions. Additionally, institutions in the United

States (for example the National Academy of Science) reviewed the findings from the

IPCC and confirmed that their conclusions were accurate. (Union of Concerned

Scientists). Even though there was confirmed scientific consensus on the causes and occurrence of global warming, public opinion started to become polarized over the issue.

Brewer and Pease’s (2008) argue that the anti-environmental movement (climate change denial campaign) has been successful in stimulating public opinion that fails to reflect the scientific consensus, by promoting skepticism about the evidence of global warming (2008: 96). As I mentioned earlier, I define personalization of harm as being a component to validating scientific knowledge–yet the discourse of tobacco denial relied heavily on invalidation of scientific knowledge.

Public opinion polls show us that the denial campaign lead by the Tobacco Industry, did not cause societal perception of the evidence to fluctuate. Therefore, I believe that there was an outside force infiltrating the arena with the goal to manipulate public opinion by means of undermining scientific consensus.

I argue that polarization is far more stark when the partisanship discourses rely on invalidating of scientific evidence. By comparing the case study of tobacco to that of climate change, I find that the invalidation of scientific knowledge is most impactful on public opinion when presented in political party discourse. It not only decreases personal concern for the topic by confusing public opinion on potential risks associated with the findings, it also causes individuals to rely more on partisan cues to understand where they stand.

One of the differences in these case studies is the impact of the denial campaign on party members. Brewer and Pease show us that Conservative organizations and Republican politicians have frequently held strong connections and have had substantial support from Fossil Fuel Industries (2008:90). Financial data shows us that the Tobacco Industry made large donations to Democrats and

Republicans throughout history (CNN, 1997). It is true that tobacco lobbyists were successful in impacting legislation to include reduced regulation on their industry, such as the “Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965”. Yet the involvement of the Tobacco Industry in the funding of politicians did not influence public opinion. The tobacco lobbyists did not gain the support of party members to convey their denial campaign as part of their own platform.

In regards to climate change, however, it seems as though it is possible that the climate denial lobbyists were successful in transforming the discourse of party members in induce their denial tactics. For example, Rinkema (2003) has

acknowledged the high involvement of Fossil Fuel industries on funding many of the climate skeptics. “Despite their underlying credibility problems, climate skeptics have managed to maintain a high profile due to Republican Congressional support in the

United States” (Rinkema 2003:738).

Climate change denial lobbyists have successfully reduced a number of proposed legislations to be passed and they conducted this tactic in a different way–by changing the narrative that governmental members spoke of when speaking of climate change. This has created countering discourses among the parties that not only include climate policy, but also include the questioning of the legitimacy of climate science.

Unlike the tobacco denial campaign, the climate change denial campaign has been successful in confusing public understanding of climate science. I posit that partisanship alone is not the reason for polarization of public opinion on climate change. Rather it is when a political party adopts a competing discourse that not only includes climate policy, but also includes the questioning of the legitimacy of climate science.

When two political parties have competing discourses on the validity of scientific knowledge, we see a bigger impact on society–one that confuses public opinion on the scientific evidence. The presence of uncertainty as to which political party is correct makes climate change a more complex issue; and ultimately decreases concern about the consequences associated with the issue. The cultural cognition theory examines the impact of when the two major parties dispute over facts, in this

case belief of scientific consensus of anthropogenic climate change. The dispute over facts causes this issue to be more complex. When an issue becomes extremely complex it pushes individuals to seek advice from “opinion leaders,” such as politicians, community elites, and journalists. (Guber, 2017). As a result, individuals form opinions based the leading narrative of their political leaders in order to maintain their position in that community (cultural cognition theory).

This shows that in order for a denial campaign to be successful, it must enter the discourse of the political elite. By promoting distrust of the scientific community through the platform of Conservatives and the Republican Party, the climate change denial campaign impacted all of society. I argue that the climate change denial campaign strategically infiltrated the discourse of the Republican Party in order to manipulate societal understanding and create polarization in public opinion.

2.3 (a): Denial campaign.

During the Bush Administration we start to see measures taken by members of the Republican Party to deny climate science as a way to delay legislation. In an effort to manipulate public opinion on scientific knowledge, Frank Luntz, a political specialist in the Bush Administration, provided consulting to President George W.

Bush on environmental communications. Sent in 2002, this memo identified the public’s ability to understand the harm of global warming (thus promote action to

combat it) if they were to believe that the science was settled. In order to combat this,

Luntz suggested that Republicans utilize the minute percentage of scientists who did not agree with the majority. This method was used by Fossil Fuel Industry lobbyists in the 1990s and has continued to be used with Conservative Think-Tanks (as we will mention later). Following this memo, Republican political elites were coached on how to approach the topic of climate change in a way that would manipulate public opinion. Soon, more members of the Republican Party were speaking out against the scientific evidence of anthropogenic climate change. For example, Conservative

Senator Inhofe spoke to his colleagues in 2003 and equated human-induced climate change to the largest hoax in mankind.

Dunlap and McCright (2011) argue that the events that transpired during the

George W. Bush Administration, constitute the Administration’s attempt to induce a war on science. Not only were these efforts achieved by word of mouth, there were also deliberate actions by the Bush Administration to manipulate the work of federal climate scientists. Articles from the Union of Concerned Scientists pull evidence from the Atmosphere of Pressure Report of 2007 by the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Government Accountability Project to prove that the approach of the Bush

Administration was to amplify any uncertainties in climate science. It finds that the

Administration exercised, “strict control over which scientists are allowed to talk to the media and which scientific results are communicated to the public“ (Union of

Concerned Scientists). This report finds that there was deliberate manipulation of

physical evidence of climate change from reaching the public sphere by the

Republican Party.

This can be associated with the strong movement of Conservative Think-Tanks

(CTTs), which attempted to influence the conversation of climate science. Their effort to undermine scientific consensus on climate change was successful for a couple of reasons; they were able to undermine climate change science from within the Bush

Administration as well as from outside. The Bush Administration allowed direct access for representatives from the Fossil Fuel Industry and Conservative Think-Tanks to undermine climate science from within the Executive Branch (Dunlap and McCright, 2011). By having this direct access, CTTs were able to institutionally influence discourse about climate change through mediating what information was released to the public.

Another way CTTs were successful in promoting climate change denial was through arenas outside of government. Many of the efforts to deny climate change were achieved by Conservative Think-Tanks who published books directly denying climate change. Conservative Think-Tanks (CTTs) and their promotion of climate change denial has been researched by many academics. They have been a huge component of the denial campaign, and this is evident through Dunlap and Jacques’

(2013) research. Through their study of climate change denial books and the link to conservative think tanks, Dunlap and Jacques found that CTTs published climate change denial books at high numbers from 2000 to 2010, joining the movement to

manipulate public opinion from outside of government. Before 2007, an average of three books were published each year. However 2007-2010 there was over 25 published, showing a significant increase in their publishing rates. Dunlap and Jacques (2013) identify this dramatic surplus in publishing as correlating with the increasing public concern on climate change that was stimulated from the strength of the environmental movement in 2006 and 2007. If we compare the books released prior to 2007 to the books released during the three years that follow, it is clear that there was a sense of urgency to disrupt the large awareness of climate science impeding public opinion; similar to the state of urgency pushed by Frank Luntz in 2002.

Eventually, CTTs and Republican political elites communicated to their followers that believing in climate science was a matter of political ideology, thus embedding the idea that they must also take this belief if they were to associate themselves with that party. -- first embedding the politicians, then the constituents. In fact, climate change skepticism became a part of the republican ideology (as evident through the response to Mitt Romney).

The Pew Research (2008) shows the dramatic impact on polarizing public opinion within one year of the dramatic publication of climate change denial books.

Where as in 2007 62% of Republicans agreed that there was solid evidence of increasing global temperatures, this number drops to 49% in 2008. Additionally the average percentage of Americans who agreed with this statement dropped from 77% in 2007 to 71% in 2008.

It is clear that these denial book publications succeeded in in confusing public opinion on the reality of climate change by undermining scientific consensus but also succeeded in adding climate change denial to the ideology of Republicans. Under the intention to confuse public opinion and delay legislative action, CTTs published these books, in effect, securing their ideology. In years before, only credible scientists were mentioned in journalist’s pieces when regarding climate science; however as these

CTTs gained momentum, media and papers started equally citing highly respected scientists as unknown skeptics that rarely had any degree in this area of study. It is important to note that this was the start of journalists framing the conflict as climate scientists versus the Republican Party. The dramatic rate of published denial books correlates with the increasing ‘litmus test’ about climate change skeptic positions.

With their goal of delaying legislation and confusing public opinion, they achieved it due to the implementation of denial discourse into the mouths of politicians.

The release of these denial books and the uprise of the Tea Party Conservative movement had an enormous impact on public opinion and the division of that opinion based on party affiliation. During these years we see a dramatic drop in public opinion about concern of climate change, and belief of its existence. Not only do we see decreasing percentage of all Americans who were concerned about climate change during this time, we see an even more dramatic drop among Republican respondents.

Mistrust in scientific evidence on climate change becomes even more amplified because of the norm of balanced reporting.

2.3 (b): Amplification of denial by role of media.

Public understanding of social problems comes in large part from news coverage. The media had a prominent role in communicating the differing beliefs of climate change to the public. The public learns most of what it knows about science from the mass-media; if there are varying explanations on climate change and global warming, the media will relay each of these to the public. Collomb (2014) and many other academics, remark on the success of the climate change denial movement on confusing public opinion as being related to their considerable media attention, regardless of the scientific support of these claims.

The American Press Institute states that journalists attempt to be fair through object measures and managing bias (American Press Institute). In order to have a lack of bias, the journalistic code of reporting necessitates that both sides of an argument are presented equally. This equality of journalistic reporting (what we call balanced journalism) increased the confusion of society with regards to climate change.

Balanced journalism requires that a reporter must attempt to cover all sides of a story.

The obligation to equally report both sides of an argument resulted in the denial sources receiving almost as much attention as real climate scientists.

As a result, the media ended up reinforcing the ideas and evidence presented by the denial campaign. This denial campaign was lead by Republican politicians, the

Fossil Fuel Industry, and Conservative Think-Tanks; and it impeded public understanding, in large part, because it was promulgated by the media. Although the members of the climate denial campaign have relied on a unqualified scientists to prove that there was a lack of scientific knowledge on climate change, the small percentage of climate skeptics were receiving as much media attention as large number of those who agreed about climate science.

Shapiro (2014) also finds that this balanced reporting norm in the United States has lead to uninformative articles on explaining climate change. Shapiro goes a step further and argues that framing through media is a tactic often used by special interests in order to directly influence public opinion in their favor. He states, “it is common for special interests to attempt to influence public opinion and public policy through the strategic placement of credentialed advocates in the news media. These actions exploit rules and norms of balanced reporting to create the impression of scientific controversy, leading the public to doubt even settled scientific conclusions.” (Shapiro:

2). By having that direct access to government through CTTs during the Bush

Administration as well as impeding the discourse of Republican Politicians, it is likely that the denial campaign spread their message by promoting media coverage.

This type of reporting of climate change is even more consequential since, as my data shows, there is a connection between framing climate change as causing harm, or not. When there is equal reporting of the unsubstantiated evidence suggesting that global warming is a fear for the great and far future, or of the minority of climate

skeptics who disagree with anthropogenic climate change, then the harms of climate change are not accurately reported. How it is framed in terms of harm is consequential. This framing on the part of these Republican actors goes against the consensus of the scientific community that the harm from climate change is occurring now. Therefore, constituents come to have a lack of trust in scientific knowledge and, as a result, they do not conceptualize the public health risks communicated by this institution as factual, therefore not personal.

Section 3: Discussion and Conclusion

The Fossil Fuel Industry and the Tobacco Industry are similar in many aspects; both create consumer goods that have negative impacts on public health. The Fossil

Fuel Industry has been based on a practice that is scientifically known to damage our ozone layer and contribute to the changing of the world’s climate (A Blanket Around the Earth, NASA). Similarly, the Tobacco Industry produces a product that causes consumer addiction and has been scientifically proven to invoke various forms of cancer. We know now, due to released internal files from both the Tobacco Industry and the Fossil Fuel company, ExxonMobil, that both of these entities had secretly conducted research to determine the effects of their products on the health of the environment and on the consumers. The independent research from both of these industries concluded the harmful outcomes of their products on the environment and

public health. Although their evidence was consistent with the warnings produced by governmental organizations, such as the US Public Health Service and the EPA, these two industries continuously denied that the warnings were true. Both of these industries made the strategic choice of avoiding to validate information that would frame their practice as damaging to health.

In 1993 the Tobacco Industry attempted to foster the belief that there were not health consequences to smoking tobacco, under the claim that there was not conclusive evidence to prove the correlation. By next year, however, internal documents from the Tobacco Industry revealed that they had known the dangers associated with smoking, yet, they took measures to conceal them (Levy, 1998: 5). In the summer of 2016, classified documents revealed that ExxonMobil conducted research in the 1980s that analyzed the impacts of greenhouse gases on our climate system. Even though the results concluded that their practice of burning fossil fuels did not contribute to global warming, they kept that evidence classified. Eventually, as a tactic to keep their business unaffected, ExxonMobil became the leaders in the climate change denial campaign. It is factual to say that these two entities had introduced expreme public relations measure in order to create confusion on the risks associated with their products.

Examining the history of tobacco science shows that the denial campaign constructed by the Tobacco Industry did not significantly sway public opinion after the first Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking was released in 1964. If we assume

that public opinion is far more persuaded by scientific evidence rather than public relation techniques from industries, then we could determine that the societal response to climate science would follow the same fashion. However, it does not.

Each year, as scientific evidence was released regarding the consequences of tobacco use, public knowledge of the issue constantly grew. Additionally, societal preference for tobacco regulation grew. This is because there was an agreement within political parties of the validity of the scientific evidence of the health effects of tobacco use. Without competing discourses from political elites on their trust in scientific knowledge, public opinion was shaped in a way that reflected the scientific consensus. The actions taken by government on regulating tobacco (that were achieved due to the consensus of the science), corresponds with the developments found in the science of tobacco and cancer. In effect, societal personalization of the harms associated with tobacco smoke grew as science became more concrete.

In the case of climate change, however, we do not see a reflection of the science on public opinion. As the science became more concrete regarding the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions on our global climate, public concern and trust in scientific knowledge actually fluctuates. As a result, personalization of the harms associated with climate change does not consistently grow as climate science improves. In fact, in many situations it decreases.

A main differences in these two case studies is the discourse of the political elite. In the case of tobacco we find no disagreement by political parties regarding

tobacco science. In the case of climate change, however, there is a clear political divide in the trust of climate science by the two political parties. The competing discourses on climate change surround the validity of scientific knowledge. Because there has been such a strong disagreement on climate science by the two political parties, we see dramatic impacts on societal concern and acceptance of climate change.

I argue that the lack of persuasion of climate science is based on the frames each party uses to conceptualize the issue of global warming. Before the 1990s, it is clear that each party accepted the evidence presented to them on climate science and made a point to enact laws to combat the harms associated. The implementation of laws by these Presidents influences the public to believe it is an important matter. If we compare this to the evidence presented by the tobacco science, we can see that laws were not always implemented to regulate the tobacco industry; yet the opinion polls still reflected an overall public agreement that smoking tobacco was negative for public health. This can lead to the conclusion that it is not a matter of laws that sway public opinion, but it is a matter of the discourses used by each party to regarding an issue.

Did the discourses accept or deny the science that was presented to them?

During the Tobacco Era, we can see that the leading discourses put trust into tobacco science: the government took extensive measures to communicate to the public the health risks associated with smoking tobacco–issuing pamphlets, making public

statements, creating warning advertisements. Even if there were not any laws being put into place, the public grew to understand the scientific evidence of tobacco use. In this case, each party was framing the scientific evidence as trustworthy and factual.

There was not any varying understanding of the association of lung cancer to tobacco smoke by the two parties. By the parties creating a discourse of framing tobacco as harmful, they were validating the scientific pillar of American Democracy, without outright saying they believed or denied the evidence. Without critization of scientific evidence of tobacco led by a political party, the public conceptualized the issue as accurate and important–placing their trust into that institution.

With regards to climate change, this story has changed. It does not matter if both parties are in favor of increasing public health through environmental health, what matters is whether either party creates a discourse that validates scientific evidence. For example, when political elites acknowledge that the scientific institution of American Democracy is knowledgeable, the public is able to identify that the risks projected are factual and therefore a personal concern to them.

In addition, the journalistic norm of balanced reporting has reinforced the denial campaigns that is led by Republican political elites, the tobacco industry and conservative think tanks. By giving equal weight of coverage to climate skeptics as to the climate evidence, public opinion on climate change has been distorted. However, the media alone is not forming a conspiracy to disrupt with public perception of a

social issue. In fact, they only report on what is being communicated by political elites and special interest groups.

My research suggests that during the Tobacco Era, the media was successful in relaying the scientific warnings due to the strong bipartisanship and government presence in communicating these issues. In fact, I find that because there were not competing discourses by the two political parties on the validity of the science, media was less inclined to provide full coverage of the alternative views. Media only reports on what is being said in the political elite. While there may have been competing discourses on the accurate legislation to pass that was based on party ideology, it did not create a discourse that invalidated the science behind it. Just as Merchant (2015) states, the defenders of tobacco, “did not have political leaders who made it a point of pride to reject well-established science.”

The strategies used by the Tobacco Industry to deny the scientific evidence have been recycled by the Fossil Fuel Industry. By integrating the denial statements into the words of politicians, the climate denial campaign has successfully caused public opinion to fracture. Partisanship does not always lead to polarization but in this case it does. Partisanship has successfully polarized opinions on climate change action because of the politically motivated discourse to undermine scientific consensus. By implementing a discourse that invalidated the important institution of American

Democracy-Science, the Republican Party, Conservative Think-Tanks, and the Fossil

Fuel Industry successfully polarized public opinion. As a result, opinions regarding climate change have become an aspect of party affiliation.

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